gains

“We’ve been so used to thinking about politics in terms of left and right, yet what Reform are able to do is to win in areas that have always been Conservative, but equally, we’re proving in a big way that we could win in areas that Labour has dominated since the end of World War I.”

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is in Beijing, seeking support on a deal with the US, while US President Trump will be in China next week, and Iran will be on the agenda.

Why is everyone turning to China? What role is Beijing playing in the US-Israel led war on Iran?

Los Angeles County Dist. Atty. Nathan Hochman and the union that represents rank-and-file police officers offered a stinging rebuke of embattled City Atty. Hydee Feldstein Soto on Tuesday morning while endorsing one of her challengers in the upcoming election, county prosecutor John McKinney.

Hochman said he analyzed the field and decided the city attorney’s office “desperately needed” an experienced litigator like McKinney, who has been a prosecutor for 28 years and handled some of the city’s highest-profile trials.

“What we need in the L.A. city attorney’s office is someone who actually has courtroom experience, someone who understands how to win a trial,” Hochman said. “Someone who has actually not only talked the talk, but walked the walk.”

Hochman and leaders from the Los Angeles Police Protective League, the union which represents the majority of LAPD officers, stood shoulder to shoulder in endorsing McKinney. The league recently rescinded its endorsement of Feldstein Soto.

Feldstein Soto has been under fire for weeks, with her office accused of failing to properly inform other city officials about a hack of confidential files that saw 337,000 documents, videos and photographs leaked online. The documents amount to millions of pages, and appear to mostly come from civil lawsuits against the city that have been resolved in court. The files were not secured by a password, according to sources who spoke previously with The Times and requested anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the ongoing investigation.

The city attorney’s office previously responded to questions from The Times by referring to a public report issued April 17, which said a preliminary investigation indicated that “the incident was contained to that third-party environment, and that no other City applications, systems, or department records were accessed or affected.”

While many of the documents dealt with relatively minor issues, others contained sensitive information about police officers. The Times used the leaked documents last month to reveal how the LAPD disciplined the officers who blew up a city block when they misjudged the weight of seized fireworks in South L.A. in 2021.

Sgt. Chris Wecker, vice president of the police union, said officers’ frustration with Feldstein Soto goes beyond the data breach. Wecker noted the city had paid out gargantuan sums in civil cases under Feldstein Soto’s administration, some of which the union believes she misplayed.

“Los Angeles has seen a dramatic rise in lawsuits, settlements and verdicts against the city costing taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars,” he said. “The city attorney should not simply react to lawsuits after they’ve been filed. He must work proactively with city departments to identify legal risks before they turn into costly litigation.”

Feldstein Soto has also been accused of mismanaging her office and using the city’s prosecutorial powers for personal vendettas in multiple lawsuits, allegations she has repeatedly denied.

McKinney said he believes the city attorney’s office can do more work to reduce homelessness and criticized Feldstein Soto for her handling of an array of misdemeanor crimes including animal cruelty and trespassing. He said he is a proponent of “Broken Windows” policing — the idea that enforcing lesser laws will reduce felonies and deter criminals from committing worse crimes — and took a shot at Feldstein Soto’s handling of the data breach.

If such an incident happened under his watch, he said his “first call would be to the [Los Angeles Police] Department, the second to the FBI and the third to the people impacted.”

Feldstein Soto’s office has said senior LAPD officials and the city’s IT department were alerted as soon as the leak was discovered, and the FBI is investigating the matter.

Although it’s rare for the county district attorney to weigh in on the race for their city level counterpart — ex-Dist. Atty. George Gascón did not offer an endorsement in the 2022 contest which Feldstein Soto won — Hochman and McKinney are political allies who have aided each other before.

When Hochman emerged from a crowded 2024 primary field to challenge Gascón, McKinney endorsed him and functioned as a campaign surrogate.

A longtime trial prosecutor who oversaw a number of high-profile cases, including winning a conviction against the man who killed beloved L.A. rapper Nipsey Hussle, McKinney was promoted to oversee all special prosecutions in the office after Hochman’s election night victory.

Hochman said his endorsement was more about things McKinney had done right than anything the incumbent had done wrong.

Feldstein Soto still has the endorsements of U.S. Sen. Adam Schiff (D-Burbank) and Mayor Karen Bass, who is fighting her own difficult reelection battle.

Marissa Roy, a deputy attorney general with the California Department of Justice, is running to the left of the field and has the backing of the county’s Democratic party, the Democratic Socialists of America and her boss, California Atty. Gen. Rob Bonta. Roy has said she wants to turn the office into “the largest public interest law firm in the city,” targeting wage theft, tenant harassment and other issues impacting working-class Angelenos.

A call to Roy’s campaign was not immediately returned Tuesday.

Los Feliz attorney Aida Ashouri is also running.

The announcement from Hochman and the LAPD union could jump-start McKinney’s flagging campaign. He’s raised only $78,000 since entering the field, far less than either Roy or Feldstein Soto.

McKinney is relying on some of Hochman’s past campaign resources, hiring both the man who managed Hochman’s victory in the 2024 district attorney’s race and fundraiser Trey Kozacik, who operates the Pluvious Group.

The group was successful in helping Hochman build a massive war chest during his 2024 run for office, but its work helping organize fundraisers for President Trump in Los Angeles has drawn scrutiny before. The city has often found itself in litigation against the Trump administration in recent years, efforts McKinney would likely have to lead if elected.

McKinney, a registered Democrat, previously told The Times he would protect the city’s residents in court, “regardless of who’s in the White House.”

“I have been very, very disturbed by the activities of some federal law enforcement agencies that have come into Los Angeles and intentionally attempted to terrorize our people,” he said.

Times Staff Writers David Zahniser and Libor Jany contributed to this report.

In recent years, the evolution of women in Saudi Arabia has become one of the most scrutinized aspects of the kingdom’s reforms of recent times. These reforms have frequently served as proof of a broader transformation under Vision 2030, an ambitious pathway designed to modernize Saudi Arabia and decrease its reliance on oil revenues. However, behind these apparent advancements arises an intricate question: are these reforms a genuine move towards social emancipation or primarily a tactical element of state-led goals of economic diversification, modernization, and enhancing global reputation?

In 2016, Saudi Arabia introduced Vision 2030, launched and guided by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and Muhammad bin Salman as a comprehensive and holistic strategy aimed to reform the country’s future. This initiative leverages the Kingdom’s strengths, including its pivotal role in the Arab and Islamic world, robust investment capabilities, and advantageous strategic position. The goal is to establish Saudi Arabia as a global leader while improving quality of life and broadening growth opportunities for citizens. At its essence, Vision 2030 seeks to reposition Saudi Arabia in the global economy by diversifying the non-oil sectors, drawing in foreign investment, and cultivating a dynamic workforce.

The women’s research compendium has gained significant attention from the government in alignment with the kingdom’s Vision 2030 and its associated programs. Consequently, relevant authorities, including the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development, have allocated one of the visions’ goals to improve the public and private lives of Saudi women. From this perspective, the progress of Saudi women towards empowerment has condensed. This perspective of ministry is facilitated by numerous policies, legislations, and regulations that bolster the female’s status in society. In this context, women have become a pivotal component of reform. Enhancing female participation in the labor force is not just a social aspiration but also an economic imperative. By incorporating women into sectors like tourism, mass markets, and technology, the government intends to harness previously underutilized human capacity and accelerate economic growth. Hence, women’s empowerment is intricately aligned with the national development goals. It is important to acknowledge the considerable progress the country has made so far, such as the removal of the driving ban; increased employment; and enhanced public representation signify substantial changes in the everyday life of numerous women in Saudi Arabia.

Comparatively, these reforms demonstrate a prominent departure from more prudent norms of Saudi society and have formed new avenues for both personal and professional initiatives. Recognizing these developments is important for sustaining a fair and substantiated analysis. However, a deeper evaluation reveals that this empowerment is closely associated with the economic strategy and development. The consolidation of women in the workforce is consistently presented not just as a matter of rights but as a roadmap to enhance productivity and to boost the country’s GDP. This realistic perspective implies that empowerment is being pursued not just as a fundamental social objective but as a calculated countermove to fulfill economic demands. In this context, women are viewed not just as citizens, but also as economic assets that are essential to the success of Vision 2030.

In addition to the economic considerations, these reforms significantly contribute to the international image of Saudi Arabia. As the kingdom aims to enhance foreign investment and establish itself as a contemporary progressive nation, the advancement of women’s rights acts as a strong emblem of transformation. These developments are visible as a form of strategic liberalization, a deliberate opening intended to synchronize domestic policies with the international standards. Within this framework, women’s empowerment is integrated into a broader soft power strategy, boosting nations’ appealing image on the world stage. However, this transformation is still being meticulously overseen. Although new liberties have been introduced, they operate within a well-defined structure and are regulated by the state. The pace and scope of these structural initiatives are not propelled by grassroots institutions but are instead orchestrated by the governing bodies. This top-down approach limits the acceleration of the independent voices and limits the growth of a more autonomous civil society. Consequently, empowerment is allocated rather than asserted, therefore prompting the queries regarding its substantive nature and sustainability.

Therefore, this dynamic creates a striking paradox: “advancement without complete autonomy.” Currently, Saudi women experience enhanced mobility and visible participation in public life, but their capacity to independently shape the trajectory of reform is still constrained. The expansion of opportunities has not been accompanied by a similar increase in agency. This conflict highlights an important question: can empowerment truly exist in the absence of independent expression and participation in decision-making processes? However, the future prediction denotes that the sustainability of these reforms depends on their ability to progress beyond their strategic foundations. Women’s empowerment continues to be closely linked to economic and image-building objectives of the state; it risks being susceptible to shifts in governmental priorities and policies. On the other hand, lasting transformation necessitates more profound structural alterations that are way beyond mere participation to encompass genuine agency and proper representation.

In this context, the transformations unfolding under Vision 2030 are the embodiment of both advancement and limitation. They indicate a notable departure from the previous practices and traditional norms while also underscoring the constraints of government-driven modernization. Ultimately, the issue is not if change will lead to enduring empowerment, for true empowerment is not just about participation in the workforce or recognition in public spheres; it is about having the capacity to influence one’s own future. This aspect remains the most vital and a pending dimension of Saudi Arabia’s evolution.

In conclusion, the trajectory of advancing gender diversity as articulated in Vision 2030 demonstrates both meaningful advancements and fundamental structural limitations. Although reforms have undeniably broadened strategic growth indicators and transformed the social norms, they’re still closely intertwined with economic needs and strategic initiatives for international status. This top-down model of reform prompts essential inquiries regarding the depth, independence, and long-term durability of women’s empowerment. For Saudi Arabia, the operating complexities will be whether these transformations can progress beyond mere instrumental milestones to cultivate true agency and representation. Only then can women’s empowerment shift from being a facet of national strategy to a lasting anchoring principle of societal advancement.

In Nigeria’s North East, the Boko Haram insurgent group once carved out territory and declared a caliphate. In the North West, terrorist groups operate as fluid, profit-driven networks, embedding themselves in local economies. In the Middle Belt, communal violence reflects deeper contests over land, identity, and survival. In the South East, separatist agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has fused with armed enforcement and criminal opportunism. Along the southern waterways, oil theft and piracy threaten economic lifelines.

Across all these theatres, one institution has remained consistently engaged: the Nigerian military, often as the default responder in the absence of effective civilian governance. Public perception often frames this engagement as a failure as attacks continue and civilians remain vulnerable. A closer, evidence-based reading tells a more complex story, however, though available data remains incomplete and, at times, contested. 

The Nigerian military appears to have adapted under pressure and recalibrated aspects of its doctrine, and, in key moments, helped reverse trajectories that once pointed toward state collapse. It has delivered tangible gains, some strategic, others tactical, many costly. Still, those gains sit on unstable ground because governance gaps, political interference, corruption, and weak institutional follow-through have repeatedly blunted them. Communities liberated from one threat find themselves exposed to another. 

The North East war: reversing a collapse

By early 2015, Nigeria was on the brink of losing control in the North East. Boko Haram had evolved from an insurgent group into a territorial force controlling large swathes of Borno State and parts of Yobe and Adamawa. It administered territory, collected taxes, and imposed its authority over local populations. Gwoza was declared the headquarters of a so-called caliphate. Entire communities were displaced, and military formations overrun.

The turning point came with a shift in military posture, in which command structures were reconfigured, and the operational headquarters was relocated to Maiduguri, the Borno State capital, bringing leadership closer to the frontline. Coordination with regional forces under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) also intensified as air and ground operations were synchronised.

The results were immediate and significant, though the durability of these gains has varied across locations. Key towns like Monguno, Bama, Dikwa, and even Gwoza, the symbolic heart of Boko Haram’s territorial claim, fell back under government control in rapid succession. Data from ACLED shows that between 2015 and 2025, the military recovered at least 259 territories. 

With this territorial success, supply routes were disrupted, and fighters were killed in large numbers. Civilians began to return to these areas, in some cases under fragile security conditions. 

It marked the collapse of Boko Haram’s experiment with territorial governance, and the battle for Sambisa Forest reinforced this shift.

For years, Sambisa had functioned as a strategic sanctuary where fighters trained, hostages were held, and leadership structures operated with relative security. It also carried psychological weight. As long as Sambisa remained intact, Boko Haram retained a sense of permanence.

The military’s assault on the forest required sustained effort involving navigating difficult terrain, dealing with improvised explosive devices, and confronting entrenched fighters. Airstrikes softened targets while ground troops advanced in phases, enabling special forces units to penetrate deeper into the forest.

The symbolic impact was significant, though not decisive in ending insurgent capacity. Boko Haram could no longer claim a fixed territorial base for as long as was once the case. Its command structure was disrupted, and its image of invincibility weakened.

And so Boko Haram fragmented into factions. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) emerged as a more structured and strategic actor while the Shekau-led faction became more erratic, marked by extreme violence and unpredictability.

The military adjusted again.

Operations shifted from territory holding to mobility and disruption. Intelligence-led raids targeted leadership and logistics. Airpower became central to deep strikes in difficult terrain. Operation Lafiya Dole, the codename for the counter-insurgency operation, transitioned into Operation Hadin Kai, reflecting a recalibrated effort.

Today, the insurgency remains active, particularly in remote areas and along the Lake Chad basin. But the scale and nature of the threat have changed.

The North West: fighting a war without frontlines

The North West posed a different challenge. Armed groups here are diffuse. It lacks a central command and is driven by economic incentives rather than ideology, so groups form, splinter, and realign quickly. Local grievances and criminal enterprise also intersect here.

Estimates suggest tens of thousands of terrorists operate across this region, covering multiple states including Zamfara, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Kaduna. This fragmentation complicates the military response, as frontlines, headquarters, and leadership structures (the usual strategic targets) are not clear. The military has responded by leaning heavily on airpower and targeted ground operations. This has not gone without major problems, such as the repeated “accidental bombing” of civilian populations, which have drawn criticism from rights groups and affected communities. 

Still, airstrikes have been used to hit camps deep within forested areas that are difficult for ground troops to access. Intelligence plays a critical role in identifying targets. Data shows that the sustained air campaign has yielded at least 909 strikes and 10,237 fatalities in 10 years. ACLED data shows that about 560 of these fatalities were civilians.

Ground forces usually conduct follow-up operations to recover weapons and temporarily secure areas.

Large numbers of kidnapped victims have been rescued during coordinated operations. Livestock, often a key economic asset for communities, has been retrieved. Such attacks have also killed some high-profile terrorist leaders, but they have also led to the loss of officers. 

In some areas, these operations appear to have had a temporary stabilising effect, though violence frequently resurges. Communities report periods of reduced attacks, farming activities have resumed in limited corridors, and confidence in security presence has improved, though often temporarily. 

Still, armed violence regenerates as the effects of weak governance in the North East are the same in the North West: new leaders emerge, and fighters disperse and regroup. Economic incentives remain strong. 

The Middle Belt: stabilising a political conflict

Violence in the Middle Belt is often described as a farmer-herder conflict, but the region’s violence reflects a complex mix of land disputes, ethnic tensions, and environmental stress. Armed militias operate alongside opportunistic criminal actors, while cycles of reprisal deepen mistrust between communities. 

There are too many dynamics in play here to reduce the crisis to a “military versus any specific group” conflict. Most of the time, softer kinetic actions, such as arrest and deterrence, are used. 

In certain corridors, the presence of military forces has reduced the frequency of mass casualty events. But the limits are clear. Several parts of the region still depend on self-help vigilante groups, who are often outgunned during terror attacks. 

There is also a growing distrust between communities and security operatives, who are sometimes accused of slow response and complicity. In April, residents of Gashish, a rural community in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area of Plateau State, staged a protest over continued attacks in the community despite military presence. A checkpoint manned by troops of Operation Enduring Peace was destroyed during the demonstration. 

The military has denied such accusations, but independent verification remains limited. 

However, in other areas, the visibility of armed forces has also had a deterrent effect on opportunistic attacks. 

At its core, the conflict in the region is driven by political and environmental factors. It revolves around identity and access to land and water. While military deployments can suppress violence temporarily, they cannot resolve competing claims or rebuild trust between communities. Without political solutions, stability remains provisional.

The South East: managing a hybrid threat

The South East presents a hybrid security challenge. Separatist agitation, particularly linked to IPOB, has evolved into a mix of political mobilisation and armed enforcement. The group has enforced sit-at-home orders through violence and intimidation while the Eastern Security Network (ESN) operates in forested areas.

The military’s response has been presented as targeted and intelligence-driven. Operations focus on dismantling camps, intercepting arms, and arresting key figures. Urban centres are secured to prevent escalation into wider insurgency.

Yet the approach carries risks.

Heavy-handed operations have generated grievances. Allegations of abuses have eroded trust in some communities. This complicates intelligence gathering, which is critical in a conflict where fighters blend into civilian populations. 

The Niger Delta and maritime domain: securing economic lifelines

In the South South and along Nigeria’s maritime corridors, the military, particularly the navy, has delivered some of its most visible successes. A decade ago, the Gulf of Guinea was a global hotspot for piracy. Sustained operations, including improved surveillance, increased naval patrols, and collaboration with international partners, have changed that landscape. These have led to the destruction of illegal refining sites and to arrests that disrupt networks involved in oil theft.

These gains have helped to protect revenue streams, stabilise energy production, and reinforce Nigeria’s position in regional maritime security, although illegal activities have not been fully eradicated. 

“The Nigerian military is overstretched”

According to World Bank data collected from development indicators in 2020, Nigeria has roughly 223,000 active personnel across the army, navy, and air force. The army, which carries out most internal operations, has about 140,000 to 150,000 troops.

In the battlespace, there are simultaneous operations in at least six theatres. That constitutes multi-domain internal security warfare. Nigeria has about 0.1 per cent of its population under arms. When compared to countries facing sustained internal conflict, which often exceed 0.3 to 0.5 per cent, the country is operating below the threshold needed to dominate territory.

On the geography front, Nigeria is over 923,000 square kilometres, with vast forests, porous borders, and ungoverned rural space. It is impossible to hold ground everywhere with the limited available personnel. So troops are cycled, which then leads to fatigue because units stay deployed for long periods with limited rest.

Retired Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai, the country’s former Chief of Army Staff, recently said, “The military is overstretched, defence budgets are diverted to routine policing duties, and the Armed Forces’ preparedness for conventional threats is reduced.”

However, there are also welfare issues and equipment gaps, especially at the tactical level in remote theatres. The result is predictable: Tactical wins, like killing terror commanders or rescuing hostages are visible, but strategic stagnation remains because you cannot sustain presence everywhere.

The structural constraint: why gains do not hold

Despite these efforts, Nigeria’s security situation remains volatile. 

In many areas, once the military has cleared armed actors, there is limited follow-through by civil authorities, as local administration is weak. So, communities do not experience the full return of the state, allowing armed groups to exploit this gap to re-enter or reorganise.

Economic conditions sustain conflict. Studies have shown that high levels of poverty and unemployment, particularly among young people, create a pool of potential recruits when armed groups offer income, however precarious.

Trust deficits also weaken intelligence because communities that distrust state actors are less likely to share information. This limits the effectiveness of intelligence-led operations and increases reliance on force.

Finally, strategy remains fragmented. Nigeria faces different types of violence that require tailored responses. Yet policy often treats them through a similar lens. Counterterrorism approaches are applied to terrorist attacks, while military solutions are prioritised in conflicts that require political negotiation.

The Nigerian military has played a significant role in preventing state collapse in multiple regions.

At the height of Boko Haram’s expansion, the possibility of sustained territorial loss was real. That threat has been largely reversed. In the North West, despite persistent violence, terrorist groups have not been allowed to consolidate into a territorial authority. In the South East, tensions have been contained below the threshold of full insurgency. In the maritime domain, economic lifelines have been secured.

However, good governance remains the only real pathway out of a cycle of violence. 

Yet the reality remains harsh. Lives are still lost daily. Families continue to sell everything they own to pay ransoms. The military has contributed to pushing back elements of the threat with measurable, though uneven, success, but it has not eliminated them.

Additional data provided by Mansir Muhammed. 

April 15 (UPI) — Leftist candidate Roberto Sánchez has moved into second place in Peru’s presidential vote count, positioning himself for the runoff election as officials continue to tally ballots from the general election.

With about 90% of ballots counted, official results from Peru’s National Office of Electoral Processes show Keiko Fujimori leading with 16.9% of the vote, securing her place in the runoff. The race for second place remains extremely close.

After three days of slow vote counting, Sánchez climbed to second place with 12,05% of the vote, edging far-right candidate Rafael López Aliaga, who has 11.94%.

Ballots in Peru are processed in the order they arrive, favoring candidates with stronger support in major cities during the early stages of the count. That has kept the country in suspense, as the remaining rural vote could solidify Sánchez’s lead, La República reported.

Sánchez, a congressman and head of the leftist Juntos por el Perú party, ran as the political heir to former President Pedro Castillo, under whom he served as trade minister. During the campaign, he adopted Castillo’s signature wide-brimmed hat in public appearances.

His platform calls for sweeping state reforms through a constituent assembly, Peru’s entry into the BRICS bloc and greater state control over strategic resources without expropriation, seeking support in the Andean south and rural regions.

If Sánchez advances to the June 7 runoff, the result would echo Peru’s 2021 presidential election, when Castillo, then a little-known union leader, unexpectedly reached the second round against Keiko Fujimori with 18.9% of the vote.

As Sánchez gained ground, López Aliaga called the election a “systematic fraud” and demanded the vote be annulled, alleging manipulation in the electoral authority’s data transmission system and logistical chaos, El Comercio reported.

Election observation missions Tuesday backed the integrity of the process, describing the vote as credible and transparent despite logistical problems that caused delays and forced some polling stations to remain open longer, according to France 24.

Peru’s comptroller general also warned of serious problems in the distribution of tally sheets and election materials during the 2026 vote, which reportedly delayed polling station openings in parts of the country, Latina TV reported.

Election authorities said the prolonged count is largely due to the technical complexity of processing ballots that combined five simultaneous elections: president, national senators, regional senators, lower house lawmakers and Andean Parliament representatives.

Voters were asked to choose among 35 presidential candidates and nearly 10,000 candidates for Congress and the Andean Parliament.

Facing criticism and legal complaints over the delay, the electoral office director, Piero Corvetto, defended the process and urged calm as officials continue counting ballots from Peru’s most remote rural areas.