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The California Legislature just passed two bills that advocates say will greatly improve access to small-scale solar for renters, people in condos and others who don’t have access to their roofs or can’t afford a full rooftop array.

On Sunday night, lawmakers approved Assembly Bill 1813, a third-time effort to force the California Public Utilities Commission to develop a more robust community solar program, in which residents sign up to participate in a small solar array near where they live and pay monthly at a discount on their electrical bills.

“California’s clean energy transition should benefit everyone, not just those who can afford rooftop solar,” said Assemblymember Chris Ward (D-San Diego), the bill’s author.

Last week, with Senate Bill 868, California’s Legislature also became the latest to legalize plug-in solar. Also known as “balcony solar,” these systems allow anyone — renter or owner — to set small panels on their patios or fences and plug them directly into wall outlets to lower bills without having to navigate utility permissions.

“It’s an idea whose time has come,” said bill author Sen. Scott Wiener (D-San Francisco), who noted the devices can bring down bills by hundreds of dollars a year. “It’ll be very beneficial for people who are looking to lower their cost of living.”

The votes come after some difficult years for rooftop solar in California thanks to strong pushback from utility companies. The state had been a leader nationally on solar energy in the 2000s. But installation rates plummeted in 2022 after Gov. Gavin Newsom’s Public Utilities Commission sharply cut back incentives for customers.

Utilities that lobbied for the change argued that compensating rooftop solar at a higher rate meant that people without solar panels were disproportionately paying the costs of maintaining the overhead lines that everyone uses.

This year, utilities made similar arguments against both the community solar and balcony solar bills.

Pacific Gas & Electric was successful in inserting an end date for Wiener’s SB 868 balcony solar bill, so, if it is signed into law, the Legislature will have to reauthorize it before 2030.

“While the bill establishes additional guardrails, it also creates a period through 2030 during which plug-in solar devices not meeting key safety and certification requirements could be purchased and used in California,” PG&E spokeswoman Lynsey Paulo said. “We believe customers and emergency personnel deserve the protections that come from clear safety standards and established interconnection processes from the outset.”

Both bills now go to the governor’s desk.

If signed, the balcony solar bill will go into effect once systems have been certified as safe for use in the U.S. by a nationally recognized testing laboratory like UL Solutions. Balcony panels are already certified in Germany, where plug-in solar is popular. Advocates say U.S. certifications will come through soon.

Community solar reform could have a harder time clearing Newsom’s desk, as the Public Utilities Commission, appointed by the governor, has previously opposed this type of program.

All the state’s big investor-owned utilities lobbied against the community solar bill, AB 1813, which would require them to compensate community solar developers and customers at higher rates than those established under the Public Utilities Commission’s current program.

That program, finalized this year, relies on canceled federal funding and incentives that developers say are too low for them to launch new projects.

“We remain opposed to AB 1813 because it would shift significant costs to customers who do not participate in the program,” PG&E’s Paulo said. “This legislation is about profits for solar companies, not customer affordability.”

The Public Advocates Office, the independent consumer advocate at the Public Utilities Commission, said recent amendments to the bill did not address its concerns about shifting costs from one group of ratepayers to another.

“We support expanding community solar so renters and other Californians who cannot install rooftop solar can benefit from clean energy. But the savings for participants should not be financed by raising bills for everyone else,” said Mary Flannelly, a spokesperson for the Public Advocates Office. “Our analysis of AB 1813 estimates that it could shift about $1.5 billion a year onto customers who cannot participate — roughly $12 more per month on average — a sizeable cost.”

Southern California Edison also has opposed the bill. SCE spokesperson David Eisenhauer said it would “expose customers to higher rates and unreasonable costs compared to more cost-effective clean energy sources.”

But Ward disputes that any costs will be shifted to people who don’t have solar. He cited two recent studies that indicate all consumers will benefit from reduced costs when community solar is more available. One found if the state added 5.4 gigawatts of community solar and energy storage, all ratepayers could save $6.5 billion by reducing costs for gas generation, electricity imports and transmission.

Ward and a coalition of environmental groups, solar developers and the Utility Reform Network, a ratepayer advocacy group, have tried for years to get the Public Utilities Commission to adopt their vision for a community solar program that would serve people who don’t own or don’t have access to their roofs. Several other states have them.

The bill would compensate community solar developers and customers at a rate that advocates say more accurately accounts for the savings solar brings to the grid, especially on hot days when the system is stressed.

Wiener said both bills are important for helping individuals and communities “to not be trapped in the monopoly utility model that is so expensive.”

“We should empower people to generate their own electricity and to lower their electric bills,” he said.

The Legislature also passed Senate Bill 913, which would allow batteries, electric vehicles, smart thermostats and other consumer-owned devices to be bundled together and counted as a reliable source of electricity for the state’s grid.

Brandon Garcia, California director for Advanced Energy United, an association representing clean energy businesses, said it would help reduce strain on the grid and keep electricity costs in check while “giving customer-owned resources a fair opportunity to compete and deliver reliable energy at an affordable price.”

Niger’s military government has contained an attempted mutiny in the capital, but the uprising has exposed tensions inside an army struggling to contain persistent attacks by armed groups.

It has also highlighted the changing nature of Niger’s security partnerships, with Russian personnel helping government forces contain the unrest.

The mutiny began on Saturday at Base 101, a military installation at Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, before fighting spread to other sensitive sites, including areas near the presidential palace and the state broadcaster.

Niger’s army said it regained control of the base after hours of fighting. State media reported that dozens of soldiers were killed or arrested, although Reuters said it could not independently verify the figures.

Russia’s Africa Corps was involved in the government’s response.

Russia’s ambassador to Niger, Viktor Voropaev, said Nigerien authorities requested the force’s assistance to neutralise the mutineers. The Associated Press reported that Africa Corps provided ground and aerial support to forces loyal to the government.

The intervention is significant because Russian forces were helping Niger’s military government confront an armed challenge from within its own military.

What happened in Niamey?

The unrest began with a hostage situation at the military base, according to the Associated Press. Soldiers took fellow servicemen hostage before opening fire and attacking what Niger’s Defence Ministry described as “sensitive” sites in the capital.

Gunfire and explosions were heard around the airport, while the state broadcaster was temporarily taken off air. The presidential palace was also targeted, according to Reuters and Al Jazeera.

Government forces eventually regained control of Base 101, while the Presidential Guard remained loyal to General Abdourahamane Tiani, who seized power in a July 2023 coup.

The precise size and leadership of the mutiny remain unclear. Nigerien state media said hundreds of soldiers were involved, but Reuters said it could not independently verify that figure.

Some of those involved were reportedly from areas including Ouallam, Tera and Dosso in southwestern Niger, where the army has suffered heavy losses fighting armed groups.

The uprising appears to be the most serious internal challenge to Tiani’s rule since he came to power.

Why are Niger’s soldiers under pressure?

The precise motives of the mutineers have not been publicly established.

But analysts and security sources have linked the unrest to frustration over worsening insecurity and heavy military losses.

Niger’s army has been fighting groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS), particularly in the country’s west.

Reuters reported that an attack by an ISIL affiliate earlier this month killed 18 Nigerien soldiers. The airport complex where Base 101 is located was also attacked earlier this year, including in January by an ISIL affiliate and in June by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s Sahel affiliate.

The mutiny therefore came against the backdrop of the same security crisis that helped bring the military government to power.

Tiani and other officers who seized power in 2023 accused the elected government of failing to contain armed groups and promised to restore security. But the threat has persisted.

The unrest raises questions about the pressure facing front-line units as Nigerien forces continue to suffer casualties in their fight against armed groups.

Why did Africa Corps intervene?

Africa Corps is a Russian force operating under the Ministry of Defence that took over much of the Wagner Group’s role in Africa after Moscow reorganised its operations following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023.

The force includes former Wagner personnel and operates under Russian state control.

Africa Corps personnel are stationed at Base 101, according to AP, which reported that the force has between 200 and 300 personnel in Niger.

Voropaev said Niger had requested Russian assistance during the mutiny.

AP reported that Africa Corps provided ground and aerial support after forces loyal to the government struggled to regain control of the base.

The episode does not establish that Russia controls Niger’s armed forces.

But it demonstrates that when Niger’s military government faced an armed challenge from within its own military, it was able to call on Russian forces already operating inside the country.

That underscores how significantly Niger’s post-coup security arrangements have changed.

What does Russia gain from Niger?

Niger’s relationship with Russia has deepened since the 2023 coup.

The military government pushed French forces out of the country, while United States forces later withdrew. Niger also joined Mali and Burkina Faso in forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), as the three military-led governments moved away from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Moscow has cultivated closer military ties with all three governments.

Africa Corps is part of that wider security relationship, taking over much of Wagner’s former role while operating under Russian state control.

Its intervention in Niamey gives that partnership a new dimension.

Russia was not simply helping Niger fight armed groups. Its personnel were involved in helping the government respond to an armed challenge from within the military itself.

Whether that translates into greater Russian political influence over the military government remains unclear.

What role did Algeria play?

Russia was not the only foreign actor to support Niger during the crisis.

Niger’s presidential office said Algeria provided military assistance. Reuters reported that Algeria sent four fighter jets, a transport aircraft and a refuelling tanker.

The Alliance of Sahel States also backed Niger’s military government, while Turkiye expressed solidarity and called for restraint.

It was not immediately clear whether Mali or Burkina Faso provided direct military assistance. Their political support should therefore not be presented as evidence that their forces participated in suppressing the mutiny.

What does this mean for France and the UK?

The crisis highlights the reversal of Western military influence in Niger.

France had a major military presence in the country as part of its wider counterinsurgency campaign in the Sahel, but French forces withdrew after relations with the military government collapsed following the 2023 coup.

The US subsequently withdrew its forces from Base 101 and Niger’s other military installations.

Niger has since moved closer to Russia and strengthened its ties with Mali and Burkina Faso.

There has been no confirmed new French or British military response to this specific mutiny in the latest reporting.

France’s relevance is therefore primarily its withdrawal from Niger and the resulting shift in the country’s security partnerships. The United Kingdom had a much smaller military role in Niger than France.

Can Russia solve Niger’s security problem?

Africa Corps may have helped the military government contain the immediate threat, but its intervention does not resolve Niger’s wider security crisis.

Armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL remain active, while Nigerien soldiers continue to face heavy losses.

Tiani came to power promising greater security and sovereignty. Yet three years later, the armed-group threat persists, and soldiers have mounted an internal challenge to the government.

Russia can provide personnel and operational support. But there is no evidence from this episode that the Africa Corps can by itself resolve the insecurity driving Niger’s conflict or the pressures facing its military.

The immediate challenge to Tiani has been contained.

But the episode exposes a difficult contradiction for Niger’s military government: it seized power promising to make the country more secure, yet it continues to face a serious rebellion while confronting unrest within the armed forces.

For Russia, meanwhile, the crisis demonstrates the practical value of its growing security relationship with Niger.

When the government faced an internal military crisis, Africa Corps was already on the ground.

That does not mean Russia has replaced Niger’s own armed forces.

But it shows how far Niger’s security architecture has shifted since the 2023 coup, from one heavily reliant on Western partners to one in which Russian forces now have a visible supporting role.

The upcoming official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Egypt, scheduled for August 30 to September 3, 2026, coincides with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. The visit will address economic and technological cooperation, as well as regional and international issues, and marks the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Egypt and China. The visit aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries and expand Beijing’s economic and political influence in the Middle East amidst escalating regional and international tensions, while also bolstering China’s role in the Global South.

As an Egyptian academic specializing in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can analyze and summarize the significance of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo and his meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and its importance to China’s influence in the Middle East and the Global South through the following points:

– First: What does China hope to achieve with Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt at this particular time?

This visit of President Xi Jinping to Cairo (the first by a Chinese president to Cairo in nearly a decade) coincides with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It carries several key objectives, including political and international dimensions related to Chinese coordination with Egypt on Middle Eastern issues. The visit comes at a sensitive time, as the region is experiencing tensions linked to the conflict between Iran and the United States and its repercussions on maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets. Beijing also seeks to strengthen its strategic balance and reaffirm its diplomatic presence as an international power that supports diplomatic solutions and cooperates with pivotal countries like Egypt to achieve stability. This follows President Xi Jinping’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.  President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo also carries several economic and trade dimensions, such as expanding the economic partnership and capitalizing on the significant increase in trade between the two countries to deepen cooperation. Furthermore, China will support infrastructure and energy projects in Egypt by boosting Chinese investments in Cairo, including renewable energy sectors such as wind turbine manufacturing plants, transportation deals, and electric trains, in addition to extending currency swap agreements between the two central banks.

The visit also aims to discuss the technological and artificial intelligence file in China’s relations with Cairo, particularly major technological offers, most notably the offer from the Chinese company Huawei to build data and artificial intelligence centers in Egypt. This project is viewed with apprehension by intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Washington, which are attempting to offer Cairo alternatives from major American technology companies such as Microsoft, Nvidia, and AMD.

– Second: Does the visit carry political messages that extend beyond bilateral relations, especially regarding the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit carries major strategic political messages that transcend the framework of bilateral cooperation. It aims to reshape the international order and build a multipolar world, starting with the Global South. The visit also carries messages that go beyond bilateral relations, pushing for a Global South leadership role. Beijing seeks to garner African and Arab support to assert its position as a major power, offering an alternative to Western and American competition and influence. China also aims to promote multilateralism by urging countries in the region to adopt common positions that support international stability and security, moving away from the unilateral polarization of the United States. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping’s visit signals China’s desire to secure its economic interests. Chinese actions are focused on ensuring the security of maritime routes and the stability of energy and trade markets within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Here, President Xi’s visit to Cairo coincides with the launch of the second iteration of the massive joint air exercises, Eagles of Civilization, in August 2026 at Egyptian air bases. These exercises, which follow the first iteration in May 2025, will involve advanced fighter jets from both sides. This sends political and strategic messages to Washington and Tel Aviv about the new military partnership between Egypt and China, the diversification of arms sources, and the independence of Egyptian military and political decision-making in diversifying its partnerships.

Furthermore, the Chinese president’s visit to Cairo carries support for Egypt’s regional role in the Middle East and Africa, reaffirming the pivotal role of Egypt. Choosing Egypt as a starting point reflects Beijing’s understanding of its geopolitical importance as a key link between the Arab world and the African continent and its commitment to addressing regional repercussions. China is also demonstrating its readiness to cooperate with its African and Arab partners to contain the economic crises resulting from conflicts in the Middle East.  In addition to China’s anticipated plan to expand alliances by strengthening the integration of Chinese development projects with major economic blocs such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, this visit also aims to coordinate common positions on de-escalation and maintaining peace and security in the Middle East and to discuss regional conflicts, particularly in the wake of the Gaza and Iran wars.

– Third: What economic files could witness new agreements or steps between Cairo and Beijing?

Economic relations between Cairo and Beijing are increasingly moving towards signing new agreements and taking new steps focused on strengthening joint investments and supporting financial stability. The most prominent joint economic and investment files between Egypt and China are based on supporting financial partnership and currency diversification. This involves renewing and strengthening local currency swap agreements between the Central Bank of Egypt and its Chinese counterpart to facilitate trade and support monetary stability, independent of international currencies. Economic cooperation and currency swaps will be among the top economic priorities of the visit through monitoring the surge in trade and extending the local currency swap agreement to enhance economic partnership within the BRICS framework.

Furthermore, there is a shared Chinese-Egyptian desire to localize industry and technology in Cairo by attracting substantial Chinese investments in electric vehicle manufacturing, new and renewable energy sectors, and advanced technology industries. With the expansion of Chinese projects in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, through the expansion of Chinese industrial and logistical projects within the Suez Canal Corridor, a major value-added production base is being established. China is also supporting Egypt in achieving food security and agricultural development by preparing joint Egyptian-Chinese alliances targeting large-scale agricultural land reclamation projects to enhance food security. This is happening concurrently with Chinese support for infrastructure and smart cities in Egypt through cooperation in urban development projects and modern smart cities.

– Fourth: Can China strengthen Egypt’s role as a key hub for its projects in the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, China is already strengthening Egypt’s role as a key and central hub for its strategic projects in the Middle East and Africa. The pillars of Chinese strategic cooperation with Egypt are based on China’s projects and investments within the Belt and Road Initiative. China considers Egypt a strategic gateway and a vital corridor for the maritime and land Silk Road, given the Suez Canal’s role as a global trade artery.  With the diversification of Chinese partnerships and investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, given the concentration of major industrial projects by Chinese companies in the zone, such as the China-Egypt Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (TEDA). China aims to access African markets through Egypt. Chinese companies utilize Egyptian land and ports as a joint manufacturing base and a launchpad for exporting products and services to markets across Africa and the Middle East. China also seeks to achieve developmental and security integration with Egypt, aligning its five-year development plans with Egypt’s Vision 2030. This is further evidenced by the development of joint military cooperation and air exercises between Egypt and China, such as the Eagles of Civilization exercises between the Egyptian and Chinese air forces, the first iteration of which took place in May 2025 and the second in August 2026.

Beijing also seeks to disseminate artificial intelligence and innovation technologies through Egypt to the African continent, the Middle East, and the Global South.  Especially since Egypt hosts a number of Chinese companies across various sectors, particularly technology, such as Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, ZTE, Midea, and Haier. Furthermore, a $300 million investment fund has been established with Tsinghua University in China, focusing on artificial intelligence and semiconductor design.

– Fifth: To what extent can the Egyptian-Chinese partnership affect the balance of American influence in the region?

The Egyptian-Chinese partnership significantly impacts American influence in the Middle East by diversifying China’s economic and political alliances in the region. However, it does not eliminate the strategic alliances between the United States and several countries in the region, particularly the Gulf states. The partnership between Egypt and China is based on the economic and financial dimension, including major Chinese investments in Egypt. China is pouring billions of dollars into infrastructure projects and the Suez Canal region. China also supports Egypt’s bid to join the BRICS group, led by China and Russia, to reduce its dependence on the dollar and the Western and American financial system. Furthermore, China is keen to closely integrate its Belt and Road Initiative projects with the Egyptian economy. The partnership between Egypt and China also rests on the diplomatic and strategic dimension as well as the diversification of alliances. Egypt pursues a balanced foreign policy that is not limited to a single ally.  Here, the partnership with China grants Egypt greater freedom of movement and a wider margin to maneuver, free from American political conditions and pressures, particularly in the areas of armament and military deals. This creates a delicate balance for Egypt, as it refuses to fully align itself with one power against another, maintaining its security partnership with Washington alongside its relationship with Beijing.

In this context, Beijing does not view Egypt merely as an economic partner, but rather as a strategic gateway and a pivotal pillar of its geopolitical influence in the Middle East and Africa, countering American penetration. This approach stems from China’s desire to fill the political and military vacuums resulting from the decline or fluctuation of the Western and American presence in the region. To this end, China leverages Cairo’s historical and political weight as a platform to expand its diplomatic influence and build partnerships with other countries in Africa and the Arab world. China’s support for Egypt’s membership in the BRICS bloc has provided Beijing with a strong regional ally, bolstering its vision for reshaping the global financial system into a multipolar order in the face of the United States’ unilateral hegemony in the region. This is especially significant given that Egypt represents a crucial land and sea crossroads for China’s Belt and Road Initiative via the Maritime Silk Road, considering the strategic and vital importance of the Suez Canal.

– Sixth: Does Beijing want Egypt merely as an economic partner, or does it see it as a strategic gateway for its influence in the Middle East and Africa?

Beijing views Egypt as a major strategic gateway for its influence, not just an ordinary economic partner. The relationship combines commercial interests with broad geopolitical ties. The economic dimension is based on the importance of the Suez Canal. China considers the Suez Canal a key artery for its trade with Europe and the rest of the world, and it is investing heavily to connect Egyptian ports and roads to its major commercial projects related to its Belt and Road Initiative. In addition to China’s role as a major logistics hub in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, numerous Chinese companies have established factories there to export goods. This is further compounded by Egypt’s strategic and political importance, as well as its sensitive geographical location, which is crucial to China’s interests. Egypt’s position at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe serves China’s regional influence. This coincided with China’s support for Egypt’s formal accession to the BRICS group, a move fully backed by China to bolster both countries’ political and economic weight globally.

Beijing also focuses on the growing security and military dimension of its relationship with Cairo to secure investments and international maritime routes. Chinese ambitions extend beyond simply selling goods; it seeks a greater role in protecting its interests and citizens by strengthening military cooperation with Cairo and diversifying defense partnerships with countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South through Egypt. Beijing sees the growing military cooperation and arms sales to Egypt and the region as an opportunity to undermine Western and American military influence and to forge closer ties with the Egyptian army, one of the largest armies on the African continent. This is the true objective of China in transforming Egypt into a political and military hub that guarantees Beijing’s vital interests in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South.

Accordingly, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo comes at a time when Beijing seeks to strengthen its engagement in the Middle East and expand its relations with developing countries and the Global South, coinciding with escalating competition with the United States for economic and technological influence. Xi’s visit to Cairo also carries significance that transcends bilateral relations, given the ongoing repercussions of a potential US war with Iran and the instability in global energy markets. Therefore, China seeks to leverage Egypt’s pivotal role in achieving regional stability, mitigating crises, and protecting its interests in the Middle East and Africa.

The U.S. military is planning to revamp Moron Air Base in Spain, including creating new parking spaces for as many as nine additional B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers. This effort comes even after Spain denied permission to use the base, and its naval station in the country, for direct strike operations on Iran during Operation Epic Fury. Long-range strikes by bombers flying from Europe played a major role in that operation. It also comes as the Pentagon is reviewing its posture in Europe, which could include major basing changes that fit the Trump administration’s vision for NATO and who it prefers to work with the closest, as well as tactical and strategic concerns.

The makeover is part of a nearly half-billion dollar construction program for U.S. facilities primarily in the Rota, Spain, area, which provide a great deal of support for American forces in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. It was announced on Thursday in a pre-solicitation notice posted on the government’s contracting portal that a contract is expected to be awarded next month.

Moron, located in southern Spain, is a Spanish Air Force Base, used by the U.S. Air Force to provide expeditionary combat support and the bed-down of transient aircraft. It also plays a major role in the “staging of aircraft and personnel in support of U.S. and NATO plans, exercises and contingency operations; and to provide Base Operating Support to tenant units,” according to the Air Force Fiscal Year 2027 Military Construction plan.

The first order of business is “a Combat Aircraft Parking Apron in Moron, Spain,” the recent pre-solicitation notice states. The plan calls for the “expansion of the Aircraft Parking Apron to provide nine (9) new aircraft parking spots in an unloaded condition, or three (3) new B-52 aircraft parking spots in a live ordnance [sic] loaded condition.”

The issue of being able to store live ordnance is critical, since extra space is needed for safety purposes in case of an unintended explosion.

“The current apron is not capable of supporting any loaded strategic bombers due to limiting factors associated with unrelated facilities violating inhabited building safety arcs,” the Air Force budget document explains.

Beyond the new parking spaces, the planned expansion at Moron also calls for 10 new fuel pits and associated piping, the relocation of a Civil Engineer Storage Complex – including a new covered storage building and an open storage yard – and the extension of apron shoulders and access roads, among other items.

The Air Force sees these improvements as an imperative.

“This project is required to enhance readiness capabilities at Moron Air Base, Spain,” the Air Force Fiscal Year 2027 military construction budget documents note. “A key enabler for training and combat operations is substantial infrastructure, promoting a quick response and positioning of forces within prescribed response times. The expanded Strategic Bomber Aircraft parking apron will increase Moron Air Base’s ability to meet future mission requirements.”

If these improvements are not made, “[a]dequate airfield infrastructure will not be available to the DoW [Department of War] or its allied partners, and personnel, aircraft, and resources will lack key facilities and infrastructure to support expanded airfield operations for training and contingency environments,” the budget document warns. “This limitation will impede sortie generation and flying schedules, directly limiting airfield presence and impairing airfield capability and readiness. Therefore, responsiveness for bilateral and multilateral exercises and training missions would be compromised, directly limiting theater presence and impairing mission capability, readiness, and contingency support.”

The project has a price tag of between $25,000,000 and $100,000,000 and is “expected to be completed 1,038 calendar days after notice to proceed,” according to the pre-solicitation notice.

In addition, the Multiple Award Construction Contract (MACC) calls for new construction, renovations, alterations, demolition, repair work, and any necessary design to a wide range of U.S. assets in the region. This includes “airfield, industrial, infrastructure, administrative, training, retail, food service, munition storage, community support facilities and both vertical and horizontal construction in the Rota, Spain region or other areas managed by NAVFAC EURAFCENT, [Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command/Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central],” the pre-solicitation notice explains. “This tool may also be used throughout the NAVFAC area of responsibility (AOR), worldwide.”

However, as the Air Force budget documents stress, the Moron project is a priority.

The installation has long played an important role for American airpower. It has served as a host for B-1B Lancer and B-52 Bomber Task Force missions and as a way station for a wide array of other aircraft from fighters to aerial refueling tankers.

“Morón Air Base is a vital link in any operation moving east from the United States due to its strategic location close to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, its massive flight line, long runway, aircraft refueling systems and excellent weather,” according to the 496th Air Base Squadron, the facility’s host unit.

The facility played a key role in the run-up to Epic Fury, providing a midway point for a wide array of U.S. military aircraft.

In March, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, one of Europe’s most vocal critics of Epic Fury, refused to allow the U.S. to use its bases in his country for direct attacks on Iran. In addition, Sánchez denied permission for the U.S. to use Spanish airspace for Epic Fury, creating a logistics headache for American aircraft movements to the Middle East.

Sanchez’s decision affected Naval Station Rota, another major U.S. installation in that country. Rota supports the movement of personnel, equipment, fuel, and supplies through its three operational piers. It also has a 670-acre airfield capable of supporting U.S. Navy and Air Force aviation operations, and some of the largest weapons and fuel storage facilities in Europe.

Rota is also the home of Destroyer Squadron 60 (DESRON 60), one of three U.S. Navy destroyer squadrons permanently based outside the continental United States and the only one of these to call Europe home.

Sanchez’s moves set off U.S. President Donald Trump, who was already angered by Spain’s refusal to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP, previously agreed to at last year’s NATO summit. In March, the American leader called Spain “a terrible partner” and threatened to cut off trade.

The situation reached a critical juncture at the NATO Summit in Turkey in July, with Trump again threatening Madrid. 

“We don’t want to do any trade business with Spain anymore… I’d like you to cut it off,” Trump fumed in Ankara to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent during a press conference with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. “Spain is a terrible partner in NATO. They don’t participate; they don’t pay. I don’t want anything to do with Spain. Cut off all trade with Spain, please, including visits. Watch them, watch them come running back; oh, they’ll come running back.”

However, the rift eased after Sánchez agreed to bump up his country’s defense budget, Trump claimed.

On his way back to the United States after the summit, he told reporters aboard Air Force One: “I did have issues, and ​I still do. But Spain, they came back all the way today. Spain was very generous today.”

Asked what Spain had ​done, he said: “They honored a request for lots of payments, and if they didn’t, we wouldn’t have even ⁠talked to them.”

The two leaders displayed new-found cordiality for the cameras while sharing a box at the World Cup Final between Spain and Argentina at MetLife Stadium in New Jersey. 

Though the Moron construction planning predated any of the political drama, as we noted earlier, the Pentagon is reviewing how many troops it will maintain in Europe and where it will base them. Undersecretary of War Elbridge Colby made a rare visit to NATO headquarters on Thursday to meet with officials to discuss the way forward. There, he pointed out that the Pentagon’s review is “designed to ensure that NATO is moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe leading, stepping up to take primary responsibility for the defense of Europe, stepping up to ensure our forces are postured for America’s global needs, and making sure that our access, basing, and overflight are clearly delineated and assured.”

There are a number of other military construction projects on the books for European installations, including about $4 billion earmarked for improvements to bases in the U.K. The largest planned expenditure is more than $1.6 billion for RAF Lakenheath, according to the Guardian. That’s where it is believed that the U.S. is poised to bring nuclear bombs back to the United Kingdom after nearly two decades.

Despite the geopolitical tiffs between the two nations, the investment in Moron and the larger construction package for Spain is a clear signal of how much the military and Congress value having access to bases in that country.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com