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Niger’s military government has contained an attempted mutiny in the capital, but the uprising has exposed tensions inside an army struggling to contain persistent attacks by armed groups.

It has also highlighted the changing nature of Niger’s security partnerships, with Russian personnel helping government forces contain the unrest.

The mutiny began on Saturday at Base 101, a military installation at Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, before fighting spread to other sensitive sites, including areas near the presidential palace and the state broadcaster.

Niger’s army said it regained control of the base after hours of fighting. State media reported that dozens of soldiers were killed or arrested, although Reuters said it could not independently verify the figures.

Russia’s Africa Corps was involved in the government’s response.

Russia’s ambassador to Niger, Viktor Voropaev, said Nigerien authorities requested the force’s assistance to neutralise the mutineers. The Associated Press reported that Africa Corps provided ground and aerial support to forces loyal to the government.

The intervention is significant because Russian forces were helping Niger’s military government confront an armed challenge from within its own military.

What happened in Niamey?

The unrest began with a hostage situation at the military base, according to the Associated Press. Soldiers took fellow servicemen hostage before opening fire and attacking what Niger’s Defence Ministry described as “sensitive” sites in the capital.

Gunfire and explosions were heard around the airport, while the state broadcaster was temporarily taken off air. The presidential palace was also targeted, according to Reuters and Al Jazeera.

Government forces eventually regained control of Base 101, while the Presidential Guard remained loyal to General Abdourahamane Tiani, who seized power in a July 2023 coup.

The precise size and leadership of the mutiny remain unclear. Nigerien state media said hundreds of soldiers were involved, but Reuters said it could not independently verify that figure.

Some of those involved were reportedly from areas including Ouallam, Tera and Dosso in southwestern Niger, where the army has suffered heavy losses fighting armed groups.

The uprising appears to be the most serious internal challenge to Tiani’s rule since he came to power.

Why are Niger’s soldiers under pressure?

The precise motives of the mutineers have not been publicly established.

But analysts and security sources have linked the unrest to frustration over worsening insecurity and heavy military losses.

Niger’s army has been fighting groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS), particularly in the country’s west.

Reuters reported that an attack by an ISIL affiliate earlier this month killed 18 Nigerien soldiers. The airport complex where Base 101 is located was also attacked earlier this year, including in January by an ISIL affiliate and in June by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s Sahel affiliate.

The mutiny therefore came against the backdrop of the same security crisis that helped bring the military government to power.

Tiani and other officers who seized power in 2023 accused the elected government of failing to contain armed groups and promised to restore security. But the threat has persisted.

The unrest raises questions about the pressure facing front-line units as Nigerien forces continue to suffer casualties in their fight against armed groups.

Why did Africa Corps intervene?

Africa Corps is a Russian force operating under the Ministry of Defence that took over much of the Wagner Group’s role in Africa after Moscow reorganised its operations following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023.

The force includes former Wagner personnel and operates under Russian state control.

Africa Corps personnel are stationed at Base 101, according to AP, which reported that the force has between 200 and 300 personnel in Niger.

Voropaev said Niger had requested Russian assistance during the mutiny.

AP reported that Africa Corps provided ground and aerial support after forces loyal to the government struggled to regain control of the base.

The episode does not establish that Russia controls Niger’s armed forces.

But it demonstrates that when Niger’s military government faced an armed challenge from within its own military, it was able to call on Russian forces already operating inside the country.

That underscores how significantly Niger’s post-coup security arrangements have changed.

What does Russia gain from Niger?

Niger’s relationship with Russia has deepened since the 2023 coup.

The military government pushed French forces out of the country, while United States forces later withdrew. Niger also joined Mali and Burkina Faso in forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), as the three military-led governments moved away from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Moscow has cultivated closer military ties with all three governments.

Africa Corps is part of that wider security relationship, taking over much of Wagner’s former role while operating under Russian state control.

Its intervention in Niamey gives that partnership a new dimension.

Russia was not simply helping Niger fight armed groups. Its personnel were involved in helping the government respond to an armed challenge from within the military itself.

Whether that translates into greater Russian political influence over the military government remains unclear.

What role did Algeria play?

Russia was not the only foreign actor to support Niger during the crisis.

Niger’s presidential office said Algeria provided military assistance. Reuters reported that Algeria sent four fighter jets, a transport aircraft and a refuelling tanker.

The Alliance of Sahel States also backed Niger’s military government, while Turkiye expressed solidarity and called for restraint.

It was not immediately clear whether Mali or Burkina Faso provided direct military assistance. Their political support should therefore not be presented as evidence that their forces participated in suppressing the mutiny.

What does this mean for France and the UK?

The crisis highlights the reversal of Western military influence in Niger.

France had a major military presence in the country as part of its wider counterinsurgency campaign in the Sahel, but French forces withdrew after relations with the military government collapsed following the 2023 coup.

The US subsequently withdrew its forces from Base 101 and Niger’s other military installations.

Niger has since moved closer to Russia and strengthened its ties with Mali and Burkina Faso.

There has been no confirmed new French or British military response to this specific mutiny in the latest reporting.

France’s relevance is therefore primarily its withdrawal from Niger and the resulting shift in the country’s security partnerships. The United Kingdom had a much smaller military role in Niger than France.

Can Russia solve Niger’s security problem?

Africa Corps may have helped the military government contain the immediate threat, but its intervention does not resolve Niger’s wider security crisis.

Armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL remain active, while Nigerien soldiers continue to face heavy losses.

Tiani came to power promising greater security and sovereignty. Yet three years later, the armed-group threat persists, and soldiers have mounted an internal challenge to the government.

Russia can provide personnel and operational support. But there is no evidence from this episode that the Africa Corps can by itself resolve the insecurity driving Niger’s conflict or the pressures facing its military.

The immediate challenge to Tiani has been contained.

But the episode exposes a difficult contradiction for Niger’s military government: it seized power promising to make the country more secure, yet it continues to face a serious rebellion while confronting unrest within the armed forces.

For Russia, meanwhile, the crisis demonstrates the practical value of its growing security relationship with Niger.

When the government faced an internal military crisis, Africa Corps was already on the ground.

That does not mean Russia has replaced Niger’s own armed forces.

But it shows how far Niger’s security architecture has shifted since the 2023 coup, from one heavily reliant on Western partners to one in which Russian forces now have a visible supporting role.

The upcoming official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Egypt, scheduled for August 30 to September 3, 2026, coincides with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. The visit will address economic and technological cooperation, as well as regional and international issues, and marks the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Egypt and China. The visit aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries and expand Beijing’s economic and political influence in the Middle East amidst escalating regional and international tensions, while also bolstering China’s role in the Global South.

As an Egyptian academic specializing in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can analyze and summarize the significance of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo and his meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and its importance to China’s influence in the Middle East and the Global South through the following points:

– First: What does China hope to achieve with Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt at this particular time?

This visit of President Xi Jinping to Cairo (the first by a Chinese president to Cairo in nearly a decade) coincides with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It carries several key objectives, including political and international dimensions related to Chinese coordination with Egypt on Middle Eastern issues. The visit comes at a sensitive time, as the region is experiencing tensions linked to the conflict between Iran and the United States and its repercussions on maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets. Beijing also seeks to strengthen its strategic balance and reaffirm its diplomatic presence as an international power that supports diplomatic solutions and cooperates with pivotal countries like Egypt to achieve stability. This follows President Xi Jinping’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.  President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo also carries several economic and trade dimensions, such as expanding the economic partnership and capitalizing on the significant increase in trade between the two countries to deepen cooperation. Furthermore, China will support infrastructure and energy projects in Egypt by boosting Chinese investments in Cairo, including renewable energy sectors such as wind turbine manufacturing plants, transportation deals, and electric trains, in addition to extending currency swap agreements between the two central banks.

The visit also aims to discuss the technological and artificial intelligence file in China’s relations with Cairo, particularly major technological offers, most notably the offer from the Chinese company Huawei to build data and artificial intelligence centers in Egypt. This project is viewed with apprehension by intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Washington, which are attempting to offer Cairo alternatives from major American technology companies such as Microsoft, Nvidia, and AMD.

– Second: Does the visit carry political messages that extend beyond bilateral relations, especially regarding the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit carries major strategic political messages that transcend the framework of bilateral cooperation. It aims to reshape the international order and build a multipolar world, starting with the Global South. The visit also carries messages that go beyond bilateral relations, pushing for a Global South leadership role. Beijing seeks to garner African and Arab support to assert its position as a major power, offering an alternative to Western and American competition and influence. China also aims to promote multilateralism by urging countries in the region to adopt common positions that support international stability and security, moving away from the unilateral polarization of the United States. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping’s visit signals China’s desire to secure its economic interests. Chinese actions are focused on ensuring the security of maritime routes and the stability of energy and trade markets within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Here, President Xi’s visit to Cairo coincides with the launch of the second iteration of the massive joint air exercises, Eagles of Civilization, in August 2026 at Egyptian air bases. These exercises, which follow the first iteration in May 2025, will involve advanced fighter jets from both sides. This sends political and strategic messages to Washington and Tel Aviv about the new military partnership between Egypt and China, the diversification of arms sources, and the independence of Egyptian military and political decision-making in diversifying its partnerships.

Furthermore, the Chinese president’s visit to Cairo carries support for Egypt’s regional role in the Middle East and Africa, reaffirming the pivotal role of Egypt. Choosing Egypt as a starting point reflects Beijing’s understanding of its geopolitical importance as a key link between the Arab world and the African continent and its commitment to addressing regional repercussions. China is also demonstrating its readiness to cooperate with its African and Arab partners to contain the economic crises resulting from conflicts in the Middle East.  In addition to China’s anticipated plan to expand alliances by strengthening the integration of Chinese development projects with major economic blocs such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, this visit also aims to coordinate common positions on de-escalation and maintaining peace and security in the Middle East and to discuss regional conflicts, particularly in the wake of the Gaza and Iran wars.

– Third: What economic files could witness new agreements or steps between Cairo and Beijing?

Economic relations between Cairo and Beijing are increasingly moving towards signing new agreements and taking new steps focused on strengthening joint investments and supporting financial stability. The most prominent joint economic and investment files between Egypt and China are based on supporting financial partnership and currency diversification. This involves renewing and strengthening local currency swap agreements between the Central Bank of Egypt and its Chinese counterpart to facilitate trade and support monetary stability, independent of international currencies. Economic cooperation and currency swaps will be among the top economic priorities of the visit through monitoring the surge in trade and extending the local currency swap agreement to enhance economic partnership within the BRICS framework.

Furthermore, there is a shared Chinese-Egyptian desire to localize industry and technology in Cairo by attracting substantial Chinese investments in electric vehicle manufacturing, new and renewable energy sectors, and advanced technology industries. With the expansion of Chinese projects in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, through the expansion of Chinese industrial and logistical projects within the Suez Canal Corridor, a major value-added production base is being established. China is also supporting Egypt in achieving food security and agricultural development by preparing joint Egyptian-Chinese alliances targeting large-scale agricultural land reclamation projects to enhance food security. This is happening concurrently with Chinese support for infrastructure and smart cities in Egypt through cooperation in urban development projects and modern smart cities.

– Fourth: Can China strengthen Egypt’s role as a key hub for its projects in the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, China is already strengthening Egypt’s role as a key and central hub for its strategic projects in the Middle East and Africa. The pillars of Chinese strategic cooperation with Egypt are based on China’s projects and investments within the Belt and Road Initiative. China considers Egypt a strategic gateway and a vital corridor for the maritime and land Silk Road, given the Suez Canal’s role as a global trade artery.  With the diversification of Chinese partnerships and investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, given the concentration of major industrial projects by Chinese companies in the zone, such as the China-Egypt Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (TEDA). China aims to access African markets through Egypt. Chinese companies utilize Egyptian land and ports as a joint manufacturing base and a launchpad for exporting products and services to markets across Africa and the Middle East. China also seeks to achieve developmental and security integration with Egypt, aligning its five-year development plans with Egypt’s Vision 2030. This is further evidenced by the development of joint military cooperation and air exercises between Egypt and China, such as the Eagles of Civilization exercises between the Egyptian and Chinese air forces, the first iteration of which took place in May 2025 and the second in August 2026.

Beijing also seeks to disseminate artificial intelligence and innovation technologies through Egypt to the African continent, the Middle East, and the Global South.  Especially since Egypt hosts a number of Chinese companies across various sectors, particularly technology, such as Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, ZTE, Midea, and Haier. Furthermore, a $300 million investment fund has been established with Tsinghua University in China, focusing on artificial intelligence and semiconductor design.

– Fifth: To what extent can the Egyptian-Chinese partnership affect the balance of American influence in the region?

The Egyptian-Chinese partnership significantly impacts American influence in the Middle East by diversifying China’s economic and political alliances in the region. However, it does not eliminate the strategic alliances between the United States and several countries in the region, particularly the Gulf states. The partnership between Egypt and China is based on the economic and financial dimension, including major Chinese investments in Egypt. China is pouring billions of dollars into infrastructure projects and the Suez Canal region. China also supports Egypt’s bid to join the BRICS group, led by China and Russia, to reduce its dependence on the dollar and the Western and American financial system. Furthermore, China is keen to closely integrate its Belt and Road Initiative projects with the Egyptian economy. The partnership between Egypt and China also rests on the diplomatic and strategic dimension as well as the diversification of alliances. Egypt pursues a balanced foreign policy that is not limited to a single ally.  Here, the partnership with China grants Egypt greater freedom of movement and a wider margin to maneuver, free from American political conditions and pressures, particularly in the areas of armament and military deals. This creates a delicate balance for Egypt, as it refuses to fully align itself with one power against another, maintaining its security partnership with Washington alongside its relationship with Beijing.

In this context, Beijing does not view Egypt merely as an economic partner, but rather as a strategic gateway and a pivotal pillar of its geopolitical influence in the Middle East and Africa, countering American penetration. This approach stems from China’s desire to fill the political and military vacuums resulting from the decline or fluctuation of the Western and American presence in the region. To this end, China leverages Cairo’s historical and political weight as a platform to expand its diplomatic influence and build partnerships with other countries in Africa and the Arab world. China’s support for Egypt’s membership in the BRICS bloc has provided Beijing with a strong regional ally, bolstering its vision for reshaping the global financial system into a multipolar order in the face of the United States’ unilateral hegemony in the region. This is especially significant given that Egypt represents a crucial land and sea crossroads for China’s Belt and Road Initiative via the Maritime Silk Road, considering the strategic and vital importance of the Suez Canal.

– Sixth: Does Beijing want Egypt merely as an economic partner, or does it see it as a strategic gateway for its influence in the Middle East and Africa?

Beijing views Egypt as a major strategic gateway for its influence, not just an ordinary economic partner. The relationship combines commercial interests with broad geopolitical ties. The economic dimension is based on the importance of the Suez Canal. China considers the Suez Canal a key artery for its trade with Europe and the rest of the world, and it is investing heavily to connect Egyptian ports and roads to its major commercial projects related to its Belt and Road Initiative. In addition to China’s role as a major logistics hub in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, numerous Chinese companies have established factories there to export goods. This is further compounded by Egypt’s strategic and political importance, as well as its sensitive geographical location, which is crucial to China’s interests. Egypt’s position at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe serves China’s regional influence. This coincided with China’s support for Egypt’s formal accession to the BRICS group, a move fully backed by China to bolster both countries’ political and economic weight globally.

Beijing also focuses on the growing security and military dimension of its relationship with Cairo to secure investments and international maritime routes. Chinese ambitions extend beyond simply selling goods; it seeks a greater role in protecting its interests and citizens by strengthening military cooperation with Cairo and diversifying defense partnerships with countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South through Egypt. Beijing sees the growing military cooperation and arms sales to Egypt and the region as an opportunity to undermine Western and American military influence and to forge closer ties with the Egyptian army, one of the largest armies on the African continent. This is the true objective of China in transforming Egypt into a political and military hub that guarantees Beijing’s vital interests in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South.

Accordingly, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo comes at a time when Beijing seeks to strengthen its engagement in the Middle East and expand its relations with developing countries and the Global South, coinciding with escalating competition with the United States for economic and technological influence. Xi’s visit to Cairo also carries significance that transcends bilateral relations, given the ongoing repercussions of a potential US war with Iran and the instability in global energy markets. Therefore, China seeks to leverage Egypt’s pivotal role in achieving regional stability, mitigating crises, and protecting its interests in the Middle East and Africa.

The U.S. military is planning to revamp Moron Air Base in Spain, including creating new parking spaces for as many as nine additional B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers. This effort comes even after Spain denied permission to use the base, and its naval station in the country, for direct strike operations on Iran during Operation Epic Fury. Long-range strikes by bombers flying from Europe played a major role in that operation. It also comes as the Pentagon is reviewing its posture in Europe, which could include major basing changes that fit the Trump administration’s vision for NATO and who it prefers to work with the closest, as well as tactical and strategic concerns.

The makeover is part of a nearly half-billion dollar construction program for U.S. facilities primarily in the Rota, Spain, area, which provide a great deal of support for American forces in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. It was announced on Thursday in a pre-solicitation notice posted on the government’s contracting portal that a contract is expected to be awarded next month.

Moron, located in southern Spain, is a Spanish Air Force Base, used by the U.S. Air Force to provide expeditionary combat support and the bed-down of transient aircraft. It also plays a major role in the “staging of aircraft and personnel in support of U.S. and NATO plans, exercises and contingency operations; and to provide Base Operating Support to tenant units,” according to the Air Force Fiscal Year 2027 Military Construction plan.

The first order of business is “a Combat Aircraft Parking Apron in Moron, Spain,” the recent pre-solicitation notice states. The plan calls for the “expansion of the Aircraft Parking Apron to provide nine (9) new aircraft parking spots in an unloaded condition, or three (3) new B-52 aircraft parking spots in a live ordnance [sic] loaded condition.”

The issue of being able to store live ordnance is critical, since extra space is needed for safety purposes in case of an unintended explosion.

“The current apron is not capable of supporting any loaded strategic bombers due to limiting factors associated with unrelated facilities violating inhabited building safety arcs,” the Air Force budget document explains.

Beyond the new parking spaces, the planned expansion at Moron also calls for 10 new fuel pits and associated piping, the relocation of a Civil Engineer Storage Complex – including a new covered storage building and an open storage yard – and the extension of apron shoulders and access roads, among other items.

The Air Force sees these improvements as an imperative.

“This project is required to enhance readiness capabilities at Moron Air Base, Spain,” the Air Force Fiscal Year 2027 military construction budget documents note. “A key enabler for training and combat operations is substantial infrastructure, promoting a quick response and positioning of forces within prescribed response times. The expanded Strategic Bomber Aircraft parking apron will increase Moron Air Base’s ability to meet future mission requirements.”

If these improvements are not made, “[a]dequate airfield infrastructure will not be available to the DoW [Department of War] or its allied partners, and personnel, aircraft, and resources will lack key facilities and infrastructure to support expanded airfield operations for training and contingency environments,” the budget document warns. “This limitation will impede sortie generation and flying schedules, directly limiting airfield presence and impairing airfield capability and readiness. Therefore, responsiveness for bilateral and multilateral exercises and training missions would be compromised, directly limiting theater presence and impairing mission capability, readiness, and contingency support.”

The project has a price tag of between $25,000,000 and $100,000,000 and is “expected to be completed 1,038 calendar days after notice to proceed,” according to the pre-solicitation notice.

In addition, the Multiple Award Construction Contract (MACC) calls for new construction, renovations, alterations, demolition, repair work, and any necessary design to a wide range of U.S. assets in the region. This includes “airfield, industrial, infrastructure, administrative, training, retail, food service, munition storage, community support facilities and both vertical and horizontal construction in the Rota, Spain region or other areas managed by NAVFAC EURAFCENT, [Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command/Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central],” the pre-solicitation notice explains. “This tool may also be used throughout the NAVFAC area of responsibility (AOR), worldwide.”

However, as the Air Force budget documents stress, the Moron project is a priority.

The installation has long played an important role for American airpower. It has served as a host for B-1B Lancer and B-52 Bomber Task Force missions and as a way station for a wide array of other aircraft from fighters to aerial refueling tankers.

“Morón Air Base is a vital link in any operation moving east from the United States due to its strategic location close to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, its massive flight line, long runway, aircraft refueling systems and excellent weather,” according to the 496th Air Base Squadron, the facility’s host unit.

The facility played a key role in the run-up to Epic Fury, providing a midway point for a wide array of U.S. military aircraft.

In March, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, one of Europe’s most vocal critics of Epic Fury, refused to allow the U.S. to use its bases in his country for direct attacks on Iran. In addition, Sánchez denied permission for the U.S. to use Spanish airspace for Epic Fury, creating a logistics headache for American aircraft movements to the Middle East.

Sanchez’s decision affected Naval Station Rota, another major U.S. installation in that country. Rota supports the movement of personnel, equipment, fuel, and supplies through its three operational piers. It also has a 670-acre airfield capable of supporting U.S. Navy and Air Force aviation operations, and some of the largest weapons and fuel storage facilities in Europe.

Rota is also the home of Destroyer Squadron 60 (DESRON 60), one of three U.S. Navy destroyer squadrons permanently based outside the continental United States and the only one of these to call Europe home.

Sanchez’s moves set off U.S. President Donald Trump, who was already angered by Spain’s refusal to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP, previously agreed to at last year’s NATO summit. In March, the American leader called Spain “a terrible partner” and threatened to cut off trade.

The situation reached a critical juncture at the NATO Summit in Turkey in July, with Trump again threatening Madrid. 

“We don’t want to do any trade business with Spain anymore… I’d like you to cut it off,” Trump fumed in Ankara to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent during a press conference with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. “Spain is a terrible partner in NATO. They don’t participate; they don’t pay. I don’t want anything to do with Spain. Cut off all trade with Spain, please, including visits. Watch them, watch them come running back; oh, they’ll come running back.”

However, the rift eased after Sánchez agreed to bump up his country’s defense budget, Trump claimed.

On his way back to the United States after the summit, he told reporters aboard Air Force One: “I did have issues, and ​I still do. But Spain, they came back all the way today. Spain was very generous today.”

Asked what Spain had ​done, he said: “They honored a request for lots of payments, and if they didn’t, we wouldn’t have even ⁠talked to them.”

The two leaders displayed new-found cordiality for the cameras while sharing a box at the World Cup Final between Spain and Argentina at MetLife Stadium in New Jersey. 

Though the Moron construction planning predated any of the political drama, as we noted earlier, the Pentagon is reviewing how many troops it will maintain in Europe and where it will base them. Undersecretary of War Elbridge Colby made a rare visit to NATO headquarters on Thursday to meet with officials to discuss the way forward. There, he pointed out that the Pentagon’s review is “designed to ensure that NATO is moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe leading, stepping up to take primary responsibility for the defense of Europe, stepping up to ensure our forces are postured for America’s global needs, and making sure that our access, basing, and overflight are clearly delineated and assured.”

There are a number of other military construction projects on the books for European installations, including about $4 billion earmarked for improvements to bases in the U.K. The largest planned expenditure is more than $1.6 billion for RAF Lakenheath, according to the Guardian. That’s where it is believed that the U.S. is poised to bring nuclear bombs back to the United Kingdom after nearly two decades.

Despite the geopolitical tiffs between the two nations, the investment in Moron and the larger construction package for Spain is a clear signal of how much the military and Congress value having access to bases in that country.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Commercial satellite imagery shows Russia has been expanding the dedicated launch infrastructure for its long-range one-way attack drones, including newly constructed extended rails apparently intended to accommodate larger, newer Geran variants. The construction provides concrete evidence that Moscow is increasing its ability to stage and launch larger numbers of long-range strike drones from dispersed locations near Ukraine and Belarus. The launch sites also bring more NATO territory within the drones’ reach.

An investigation by The Telegraph, based on commercially available satellite imagery and analysis by drone-intelligence firm DroneSec, identified at least 10 Russian sites with newly constructed or expanded drone-launch infrastructure. The investigation counted at least 59 launch rails, roughly 20 of which were assessed to be long enough to support newer Geran-type drones. Open-source tracking data indicated that seven of the 10 sites had been used in Russian attacks on Ukraine.

Some of the facilities have been converted from existing military bases and civilian airfields, while others have been constructed in remote areas.

At Tsymbulova in Russia’s Oryol region, for example, commercial satellite imagery shows four launch rails, including two measuring roughly 280 feet. Construction of the extended rails was visible beginning in late 2025. Business Insider independently reported on the facility in April 2026, citing imagery from U.S. satellite-intelligence company Vantor.

More recent imagery reportedly shows the Tsymbulova facility with 16 launch positions, as well as dozens of drones and additional support infrastructure. Storage buildings and other structures have also been constructed at the site, consistent with an expanding ability to stage large numbers of drones before launch. Some of the facilities have storage capacity for more than 1,000 drones, The Telegraph reports.

The longer rails have been assessed as being associated with Russia’s newer Geran-4 and Geran-5 variants, which represent a further evolution of the long-range one-way attack munition concept. There is also the possibility that these rails will be used to launch other heavier types with less range, too. This would be of considerable utility for Russia, as they have worked to max out the effects of the warheads on the Shahed-136/Geran-2, and their destructive power is limited to certain target types. Harder-hitting drones with heavier warheads but less reach would reduce the need to expend far more expensive and less numerous ballistic missiles and cruise missiles to hit target types that lay outside of the capabilities of the Geran-2/Shahed-136.

Case in point, the Geran-4/5, these jet-powered drones are faster and more survivable. They are also able to carry substantially larger payloads than Shahed-136/Geran-2s. The exact performance of the newer systems remains difficult to independently establish from open-source evidence. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR), the Geran-5 has a length of around 20 feet and a wingspan of approximately 18 feet. Overall, the drone’s payload weighs around 200 pounds, which is multiplied times that of a Shahed-136, and it is thought to have a range of around 620 miles.

While the heavier jet-powered one-way attack munitions may lack the range of the earlier propeller-driven Geran-2, which can hit targets at around 1,200 miles, this reach is not needed to strike targets even deep inside Ukraine, where payload maximization and reduced chances of interception are increasingly higher priorities. The jet drones allow for easier penetration, including at altitude, meaning they can operate outside the reach of lower-tier air defenses, ranging from SHORADS to drone interceptors. The Geran-4/5 can also be used at lower levels, depending on the area they are trying to penetrate.

The infrastructure expansion is occurring alongside a dramatic increase in Russian drone production. Russia adapted the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 into the Geran-2 and subsequently established large-scale domestic production. TWZ has reported that Russian output has reached thousands of Shahed/Geran-family drones per month, with production at the Alabuga complex potentially exceeding 50,000 annually in 2026. Earlier estimates put Alabuga production at roughly 2,000 drones per month, with plans to increase output to 5,000.

The expanding production capacity has transformed the Geran from a relatively limited weapon into the central component of Russia’s long-range strike campaign against Ukraine. TWZ has documented the progression from relatively small numbers of Shahed attacks over the winter of 2022-23 to barrages involving hundreds of drones and, by 2026, more than 1,000 in a single 24-hour period. The ability to manufacture the weapons in large numbers allows Russia to sustain repeated attacks and force Ukraine to expend scarce air-defense interceptors against comparatively inexpensive targets.

Satellite analysis indicates that Russia launched about 16,000 long-range drones against Ukraine in the period between January and March 2026, roughly 6,000 more than in the same period of 2025.

The attraction for Moscow is not simply range. Geran-type drones are sufficiently inexpensive to be expended in large numbers, and this cost-exchange reality forces Ukraine to balance the cost of defending against them against the much lower cost of Russia producing the drones in the first place. At the same time, the drones are critical to Russia since it cannot produce legacy standoff weapons at anywhere near the same scale, especially after years of sanctions and war.

Meanwhile, the expanded launch network also changes the geography of the threat. Some of the newly developed sites are close enough to Russia’s western borders that, depending on the actual performance of the newer drones, parts of Poland could fall within their theoretical reach. The entirety of the territory of the Baltic States would also be covered, placing a highly exposed and strategic part of NATO’s eastern flank under the potential threat of mass drone attacks.

While that does not demonstrate an intention to attack NATO, it does give Moscow additional options should the conflict broaden.

The development comes as NATO faces a wider range of Russian activity below the threshold of open warfare, including cyber operations, sabotage, GPS/electronic interference, drone activity and other “gray zone” measures on NATO’s territory. Earlier this month, Lithuania warned that Russia was considering a staged attack against that Baltic region, and the Baltic States, as well as Poland, have all stepped up security measures around dams, power plants and other critical infrastructure, amid fears of a false-flag operation, likely using drones.

A NATO official told The Telegraph that drones, more generally, have “fundamentally altered the character of modern warfare” and that the alliance is expanding its ability to produce, operate and neutralize drones at scale.

It’s worth considering that these Russian drone launch facilities are far from being invulnerable “secret bases.” Ukraine knows where many of them are and has attacked launch sites in the past. However, disrupting drone launch operations, in general, has proved difficult. In addition, by using mobile launchers mounted on pickup trucks, Russia can conduct launches from any location, employing “shoot and scoot” tactics to avoid attack, as seen in the video below.

SEOUL, Aug. 5 (UPI) — Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, warned Wednesday that Pyongyang could adopt “additional military options” against Japan, accusing Tokyo of becoming a “war state” through its expanding military capabilities.

Kim made the remarks in a statement carried by the state-run Korean Central News Agency.

“Japan, a war criminal state, is accelerating its transformation into a war state,” she wrote, claiming that Tokyo was exploiting growing geopolitical tensions to boost its offensive military capacity.

She cited Japan’s recent test-firing of U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles from a destroyer in the Pacific Ocean and its March deployment of long-range surface-to-ship missiles and high-speed gliding projectiles at bases in Kumamoto and Shizuoka prefectures as examples of Tokyo’s changing military posture.

Kim also pointed to Japan’s participation in U.S.-led military exercises in the Philippines in May, where it launched offensive missiles outside its territory for the first time since World War II.

Kim claimed that Japan’s growing arsenal of long-range weapons was transforming its Self-Defense Forces into an offensive military.

“The mass possession of different kinds of long-range strike means with an unexpectedness of preemptive attack and a drastic increase in the radius of their operation … make Japan reorganize its overall armed forces as a formation of preemptive attack and overseas aggression,” she wrote.

Kim also accused the United States of driving Japan’s military expansion, saying Tokyo and Seoul were acting as Washington’s “shock brigade” in the region.

“Japan’s military expansion in the Asia-Pacific region, which is being turned into the world’s biggest hotspot due to the U.S. exclusive and aggressive foreign policy … seriously threatens international peace and stability,” she wrote.

North Korea has repeatedly criticized the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, a hawkish conservative who took office in February, over efforts to strengthen Japan’s military and broaden its regional security role.

Tokyo has bolstered its defense posture since adopting a new National Security Strategy in late 2022 that calls for acquiring “counterstrike capabilities,” including long-range missiles intended to strike enemy launch sites if Japan comes under attack.

In a commentary published in KCNA on Tuesday, North Korea condemned a recent U.S.-led multinational naval exercise in Hawaii and criticized military cooperation among Washington and its regional allies, including the Pentagon’s recent move to upgrade U.S. Forces Japan into a joint force headquarters with expanded operational responsibilities.

Kim said North Korea should make Japan “regret” its growing military ambitions.

“One effective way is to make Japan feel that its security has been exposed to greater danger due to its greediness,” she wrote. “We will never remain a passive onlooker to the military evolution of Japan which may pose a grave threat to the security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea.

“I make it clear upon authorization that the armed forces of the DPRK and the military leadership will set up additional military options which are obviously due to Japan’s transformation,” she added.

FIFA’s World Cup 2026 expansion was their first since 1998, but the 2030 edition could rise to 64 teams.

FIFA is studying whether to expand the World Cup from 48 to 64 teams for the 2030 edition in a move that could reshape football’s showpiece tournament when it celebrates its centennial.

World football’s governing body wants to appoint an independent agency to assess the ambitious expansion plan, which would add another 16 nations to ⁠a tournament that had already grown from 32 to 48 teams in 2026.

“FIFA wishes to appoint an independent agency to determine whether and how expanding the FIFA World Cup from 48 to 64 participating national teams, starting with the 2030 edition, would impact on the tournament proposition,” it said in a research brief seen by the news agency Reuters.

South American confederation CONMEBOL had officially proposed hosting the 2030 World ‌Cup with 64 teams last year, allowing more countries the opportunity to join in the celebrations for the tournament’s centennial edition.

The 2026 edition in the US, Canada and Mexico was the first since 1998 to move away from the 32-team format, adding four more groups and an extra knockout round in the process, resulting in 104 matches over more than five weeks.

The accelerated study comes on the heels of FIFA’s plan to create a $20bn subsidiary to run the World Cup and its other events with external investors, a move that has attracted criticism and a ⁠UEFA decision to boycott FIFA events.

Al Jazeera has contacted FIFA for comment.

UEFA and FIFA could be on another World Cup collision course

UEFA President ⁠Aleksander Ceferin said last year that expanding the World Cup to 64 teams was not a good idea.

The European governing body’s position has not changed since then, while Asian Football Confederation President Sheikh Salman bin Ibrahim Al Khalifa had also voiced opposition, questioning last year where further expansion ⁠might end.

FIFA’s proposed analysis is meant to assess whether the proposed expansion can strengthen the tournament or whether concerns such as competition dilution, calendar congestion, operational complexity and market saturation ⁠outweigh the potential benefits.

The study will examine the potential impact of expanding ⁠the tournament to 64 teams, including the effects on the competition, competitive balance, qualification, player welfare and the international calendar.

It will also estimate the revenues that could be generated from ticket sales, sponsorship and media rights under the proposed format.

“The final recommendation should demonstrate not only whether a 64-team tournament ‌can generate incremental value, but whether that value is sustainable,” the document added.

FIFA said a decision on selecting the agency would be made on August 14 and they would have only four weeks to deliver their analysis by September 11.

The ‌2030 ‌World Cup is being jointly hosted by Morocco, Portugal and Spain, while Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay will host one match each to celebrate the tournament’s 100th anniversary.

FIFA is already facing a dispute with its confederations due to a plan to sell stakes in World Cups and other events to private investors.

Relations between North Korea and Japan remain deeply strained due to historical grievances, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, and growing regional security tensions. In recent years, Japan has significantly increased defence spending and accelerated military modernisation in response to North Korea’s missile launches and China’s expanding military presence.

Tokyo has adopted a new national security strategy that includes acquiring long range strike capabilities, expanding missile defence and strengthening cooperation with the United States and other regional partners. Japan says these measures are necessary to deter growing security threats, while North Korea and China have criticised them as evidence of Japan moving away from its post World War Two defensive posture.

The latest remarks come as North Korea also continues expanding its own naval capabilities and developing new missile systems.

North Korea accused Japan on Tuesday of transforming its military into an offensive force, claiming Tokyo’s overseas military ambitions are now a reality rather than a hypothetical threat.

A commentary published by the state run Korean Central News Agency criticised Japan’s defence modernisation programme, pointing to plans to develop unmanned submarines, expand long range missile capabilities and acquire advanced weapons from the United States.

The comments come amid growing military activity across East Asia as regional powers continue strengthening their armed forces.

The KCNA commentary argued that Japan is abandoning its long standing policy of maintaining forces solely for self defence.

It claimed Tokyo is developing unmanned submarines capable of carrying torpedoes and naval mines that could be deployed near neighbouring coastlines to conduct pre emptive attacks during a conflict.

The report portrayed these developments as evidence that Japan is shifting toward a more offensive military posture.

Japan’s Foreign Ministry did not immediately comment on the allegations.

North Korea also highlighted Japan’s efforts to strengthen its missile capabilities.

According to the commentary, Tokyo is pursuing domestically developed long range missiles, a new ballistic missile with a reported range of up to 3,000 kilometres, upgraded anti ship missiles and hypersonic glide weapons.

The report also criticised Japan’s acquisition of United States made Tomahawk cruise missiles as part of its broader military modernisation programme.

Japan has argued that these capabilities are intended to strengthen deterrence against growing regional threats.

The criticism comes as North Korea continues expanding its own military capabilities.

State media recently reported that leader Kim Jong Un observed the launch of a strategic cruise missile and inspected weapons systems aboard the newly built 5,000 tonne destroyer Kang Kon.

Kim has instructed that the vessel enter operational service within two months as part of efforts to strengthen North Korea’s naval combat capabilities.

Pyongyang has also commissioned another destroyer, the Choe Hyon, and announced plans to construct additional warships, including larger 10,000 tonne vessels.

The exchange of criticism reflects broader security tensions across Northeast Asia.

Japan has strengthened defence cooperation with the United States and regional partners while increasing military investment in response to North Korea’s expanding nuclear and missile programmes and China’s growing military activities.

North Korea has responded by accelerating weapons development, conducting missile launches and modernising its naval forces, further contributing to regional strategic competition.

The latest comments highlight the increasingly confrontational security environment in Northeast Asia, where military modernisation by one country is often cited by others to justify their own defence expansion.

As Japan strengthens its deterrence capabilities and North Korea continues developing advanced weapons, the risk of heightened regional tensions and military competition is likely to remain elevated.

North Korea

Seeking to strengthen its military capabilities while criticising Japan’s expanding defence posture.

Japan

Modernising its armed forces in response to growing regional security threats.

United States

Supporting Japan’s defence strategy as part of its broader Indo Pacific security framework.

South Korea

Closely monitoring military developments involving both North Korea and Japan.

Regional Neighbours

Watching the evolving security balance as military competition intensifies across Northeast Asia.

Regional attention will remain focused on Japan’s continuing defence modernisation and North Korea’s naval expansion, including the planned deployment of its new destroyers.

Any additional missile tests, military exercises or defence announcements by either country are likely to be closely monitored by neighbouring governments and could further shape the security dynamics of the Indo Pacific region.

With information from Reuters.