Ethiopia

Abi Adi, Tigray, Ethiopia – Classrooms that once echoed with the voices of students have become homes for families displaced by the war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region.

At a former high school in Abi Adi, families who fled Western Tigray have spent years waiting to return home. Mattresses, cooking utensils and personal belongings have replaced school furniture as families share rooms originally designed for students.

What was supposed to be temporary shelter is now where children are growing up far from home.

“We thought we would stay here for a few months before returning home. It has been years now. Our children are growing up in this school, and we still don’t know when we will be able to go back,” said Tewolde, who was displaced from Setit Humera in Western Tigray.

His hopes of returning have been further undermined by renewed fighting, four years after Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed an agreement to end their devastating war.

The Pretoria agreement, signed in November 2022, ended two years of war that left an estimated 500,000 people dead, including from violence, famine and the collapse of healthcare, and displaced millions. But it left major political and territorial disputes unresolved, particularly over Western Tigray, where Amhara forces took control during the war.

The area remains disputed, and the return of displaced Tigrayans has been one of the most contentious outstanding issues.

Disagreements over the withdrawal of non-federal forces, disarmament and the region’s political administration further complicated implementation. Relations between the federal government and Tigray’s authorities deteriorated, while divisions within the region deepened.

Fighting escalated on September 22, 2026. TPLF forces launched an offensive the following day and seized Mekelle’s airport. Both sides disputed responsibility for the escalation, the most serious since the 2020–2022 war.

Federal forces and allied fighters counterattacked, retaking Mekelle on October 4 as Tigrayan fighters withdrew. Fighting continued elsewhere in the region, however, underscoring the fragility of the security situation.

The federal government subsequently established a six-month caretaker administration to govern Tigray, restore public services and prepare the region for elections. But the change in regional leadership has not ended the fighting, and the underlying political disputes have remained.

In an October 8 letter published the following day, Human Rights Watch and other organisations warned the United Nations Human Rights Council that renewed hostilities threatened to undo the Pretoria agreement. They cited reports of drone strikes, mortar fire and artillery attacks, including in populated areas and near camps for internally displaced people, and called for international scrutiny of violations by all parties.

The renewed fighting has exposed how little the agreement did to resolve the heart of the conflict.

Displacement with no end in sight

For families in Abi Adi, the unresolved status of Western Tigray has meant years of uncertainty.

Many fled their homes when the war broke out in 2020 and have struggled to rebuild their lives. At the displacement site, families say they face shortages of food, clean water and essential medicines. Overcrowding has made daily life particularly difficult for children, older people and those with chronic illnesses.

Selass, an internally displaced mother of two from Humera, said the lack of affordable medicine was a constant worry.

“Sometimes, we take our children to the clinic, but the medicines they need are not available. We are told to buy them from private pharmacies, but we have no money,” she said.

For families who have already spent years away from home, renewed fighting has brought renewed fears that their displacement could become permanent.

Hospitals struggle to treat patients

The crisis has also left Tigray’s health facilities struggling with shortages of essential medicines and medical supplies.

Doctors at Ayder Referral Hospital in Mekelle, who spoke to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to speak publicly, said the facility lacked sufficient supplies of essential medicines.

Patients were increasingly being asked to buy prescribed drugs from private pharmacies, where prices were often beyond their means.

“Patients have to go outside the hospital and buy the medicines they need from private pharmacies. But not everyone can afford them, and this makes it difficult for patients to get the treatment they need,” one doctor said.

Although humanitarian organisations have continued to provide medical assistance and some hospitals have resumed operations, significant gaps in healthcare remain.

Years of conflict have damaged health infrastructure and depleted medical supplies. The recent hostilities risk further disrupting services that have yet to recover.

Former fighters seek a way out of war

While displaced families wait to return home, thousands of former fighters are beginning the process of leaving military life behind.

On November 5, Ethiopia’s National Rehabilitation Commission said about 5,500 former Tigrayan fighters were receiving rehabilitation training at a centre in Mekelle. The programme aims to help former fighters return to civilian life through education, vocational training and employment opportunities.

Alem, a 28-year-old former fighter from Mekelle, said she wanted the chance to build a future beyond the conflict.

“I want to have a future and build a life for myself. I want to get married and have children, like any other woman. I survived the last war, and I do not want to go through the same experience again. I have spent enough time living with uncertainty. I want to leave that life behind and have the chance to plan my own future,” she said.

Atsbeha, another former fighter, joined the military in 2020, abandoning his university studies. He now hopes to return to civilian life and find work.

“I left my university studies and joined the military in 2020. But now I want to leave that life behind. I want to work, earn a living and rebuild the future I put on hold. I do not want to keep fighting. I want to have a chance to live a normal life,” he said.

But renewed fighting threatens to undermine a programme that depends on security and practical support to help former fighters make a lasting transition to civilian life.

There are also concerns about whether young people in Tigray can freely choose to remain civilians. In a September 25 statement, UN human rights chief Volker Turk condemned reports of forced recruitment by the TPLF, including of children and previously demobilised fighters. He also raised concerns about arbitrary conscription by government forces.

The allegations highlight the environment in which former fighters are trying to leave military life behind – voluntary disarmament cannot succeed if people continue to face pressure to join armed groups.

For those entering the rehabilitation programme, access to education, employment and lasting security will be essential to building a life outside the military.

In Abi Adi, displaced families are still living in classrooms. At hospitals, patients struggle to find medicines. Former fighters are trying to leave military life behind, but renewed fighting threatens to pull the region back into war.

For Selass, the years of displacement and the prospect of another war have left one wish above all others:

“We survived one war and lost almost everything. We don’t want our children to experience another one. All we want is to return home and live normally.”

Moyale, Kenya – When Hawa Hassan fled her home in Ethiopia’s Moyale area, she left almost everything behind. Her house was burned during the violence, she said. But one memory has stayed with her: a 13-year-old girl shot while sitting near a wall.

Hassan said the girl had not touched a flag, a detail she raised while describing tensions over flag displays in the disputed border area. Her account of the killing could not be independently verified.

The journey into Kenya was brutal. Hassan told Al Jazeera that some women gave birth while fleeing, and that families arrived without food, cooking utensils or bedding. Newborn babies were sleeping on bare floors. Diarrhoea was spreading, while families feared malaria as mosquitoes multiplied.

For many, crossing the border has meant escaping gunfire only to face another struggle: finding food and shelter. The arrivals are also stretching Kenyan communities. Families that opened their homes are sharing scarce supplies, even as some worry the violence could reach their own neighbourhoods.

A crisis growing by the day

A government-led assessment conducted on October 29 and 30 estimated that 35,950 people had been displaced as of October 24. About 25,000 were staying with host families and nearly 11,000 in temporary displacement sites.

The number has since risen. During a meeting, Kenya Red Cross regional head Malik Adan said the number of people displaced by the conflict had increased from an estimated 36,000 to more than 50,000. The figure includes people living in temporary settlements as well as those staying with relatives and host families.

The overall number of displaced people has yet to be independently established, and no final figure has been confirmed.

The assessment covered 758 households and involved government authorities, United Nations agencies, the Kenya Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations. The figures reflect different reporting periods.

The fighting is rooted in a long-standing dispute over land and administrative control between Ethiopia’s Oromia and Somali regional administrations. Tensions escalated around October 18 over the raising of the Somali regional flag in the disputed Moyale area, reflecting competing claims over territory and authority.

For those arriving in Kenya, the politics are secondary to the immediate question of where they will sleep and what they will feed their children.

Aid stretched on both sides

Mwasaru Mercy, Kenya’s acting commissioner for refugee affairs, told Al Jazeera that a multi-agency government team had been deployed to Moyale. The Department of Refugee Services is coordinating with local authorities and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

But gunfire could still be heard, Mercy said, raising fears of further displacement. Many arrivals need food, shelter, bedding and mosquito nets.

“There are no contingency food stocks specifically for this incident because it happened abruptly,” Mercy said.

Authorities are trying to mobilise humanitarian organisations and donors. A refugee camp has not been established because the security situation must improve first. The government is working with UNHCR to register arrivals and assess their needs.

Those affected include Ethiopians fleeing violence, traders, and Kenyans forced from their homes by stray ammunition, Mercy said.

Fatima Mohammed Cole, UNHCR’s representative in Kenya, said many arrivals were women and children. Families are spread across several locations, including six sites hosting Ethiopians. They need shelter, food and healthcare, while crowded conditions raise concerns about the spread of disease.

Cole said gunfire was still being heard in Moyale and appealed for a ceasefire that would allow families to return home.

The response is also under way inside Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Red Cross Society said it had provided emergency shelter and household items worth about 30 million Ethiopian birr ($182,970) to 1,000 households displaced from Moyale town and surrounding areas.

The supplies included 2,000 tarpaulins, blankets and sleeping mats, as well as dignity kits, jerrycans, kitchen sets, soap and solar lamps. Distribution was under way, the organisation said. The operation is separate from assistance in Kenya.

Host communities under pressure

In Kenya, residents who initially opened their doors are finding it harder to keep going.

Abdi Maalim, a member of the Moyale Cross-Border Peace Committee, told Al Jazeera that some Kenyan families had moved further inland after bullets and heavy weapons landed close to their homes. He called for more border patrols to prevent armed groups from crossing into Kenya.

Families that once cooked for five or six people are now feeding 20 or 30.

Moyale’s role as a trading point between Kenya and Ethiopia has added to the strain. Maalim said trucks carrying goods between Mombasa and Addis Ababa had been stranded near the border for almost two weeks. Kenyan trucks were also stuck in Ethiopia, and businesses in Moyale had slowed sharply.

Bank closures have disrupted the circulation of the Ethiopian birr. Traders reported price rises of about 20 percent as supplies became harder to move.

Fears of wider instability

Security analyst Dr Abdiwahab Sheikh Abdisamad told Al Jazeera that the clashes had grown beyond a local dispute over territory, exposing deeper ethnic divisions and political competition between Ethiopia’s regional administrations.

He said perceptions of Oromo expansionism and allegations of federal government support for Oromia’s regional leadership risked deepening mistrust. He warned that armed fighters crossing the border, stray bullets and further displacement made this a Kenyan security concern as well as a refugee emergency.

Kenya’s Inspector General of Police, Douglas Kanja, said additional officers would be deployed along the border to strengthen security. During a visit to Moyale on November 5, he said Kenya was engaging Ethiopia’s federal government to help end the conflict.

Kanja said about 10,000 people were staying in temporary shelters and public institutions, while others had been taken in by host families. He said one Kenyan had died after being hit by a stray bullet, while a police report indicated that an Ethiopian man had also died from gunshot wounds sustained in Kenya.

The 10,000 figure refers to people in temporary shelters and public institutions, not the total number displaced. It is not directly comparable with the Red Cross estimate of more than 50,000, which includes people staying with host families.

Hassan wants to return home, but only when it is safe. Until then, she and thousands of others depend on host communities and humanitarian agencies. The longer the fighting continues, the harder it will be for those communities to keep absorbing the cost.

Maalim said residents had already stretched their resources to accommodate the new arrivals.

“Previously, we were supplying this town alone. Now we are literally taking care of two towns together,” he told Al Jazeera.

Sudan accuses Ethiopia of aiding RSF attacks, while Ethiopia claims Sudan backs Tigray rebels.

Ethiopia has ordered six Sudanese diplomats to leave the country within 48 hours and closed Sudan’s consulate in the border town of Asosa, according to Ethiopian and Sudanese officials.

The orders on Tuesday came as tensions between the countries rise, with Sudan accusing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group of using Ethiopian territory to launch drone attacks on civilian infrastructure. Ethiopia claims Sudan backs rebels in its northern Tigray region.

On Sunday, ⁠Sudan lodged a complaint against Ethiopia with both the United Nations Security Council and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, accusing Ethiopia of allowing the RSF to use its territory to launch deadly drone attacks against civilian infrastructure in Sudan.

“The Sudanese government remains committed to its right to defend its territory. Nevertheless, it is making ⁠every possible effort to avoid an open war with Ethiopia,” Amjad Farid, political and foreign affairs adviser for Sudan’s Transitional Sovereign Council, said.

A direct military confrontation with Addis Ababa would severely strain an already exhausted Sudanese military apparatus, which is still involved in intense battles with the RSF in the southeast of the country.

Sudan’s military has repeatedly accused Ethiopia of aiding the RSF, which it has been fighting in a civil war since April 2023. Addis Ababa denies it supports the RSF in Sudan’s civil war.

Meanwhile, Ethiopia has accused the Sudanese military of backing rebels linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, a charge Khartoum denied.

Severing diplomatic ties

Ethiopia also accused Egypt and Eritrea of supporting the Tigrayan rebels who launched an offensive ⁠against government forces in September. All three countries have rejected the accusations.

The latest expulsions of Sudanese diplomats follow Ethiopia’s decision to expel 10 Eritrean diplomats and close its embassy in Eritrea on October 1. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic ties.

Ethiopia also expelled an Egyptian diplomat last month. For Egypt, its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains a major strategic concern that has long strained relations between the neighbours.

Attacks the latest to disrupt electricity supplies; army reports new defections from paramilitary RSF.

Drone strikes are reported to have hit three electricity substations in eastern and northern Sudan, the latest attacks in a concentrated campaign.

The attacks on Monday, which caused widespread power outages across parts of the country, brought the number of strikes reported to target Sudan’s electricity network to 18 over the past week.

Sudan’s military government has claimed that Ethiopia is aiding the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – which it has been fighting since April 2023 – in carrying out the attacks.

Facilities in New Halfa and Aroma in eastern Kassala state were hit early on Monday, while the al-Ghazali substation in Sudan’s Northern State was also targeted, according to local media.

Videos circulating on social media appeared to show fires at the facilities, with civil defence teams trying to extinguish the fires. Al Jazeera was not able to immediately verify the footage and reports.

On Sunday, Sudan’s government said it had filed complaints against Ethiopia with the United Nations Security Council and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, accusing Addis Ababa of involvement in the ongoing campaign of attacks on civilian infrastructure and power stations.

The Sudanese army also reported on Monday that a group of RSF members had defected by surrendering to its forces in Damazin, the capital of southeastern Blue Nile state.

The announcement follows a declaration, in video footage obtained exclusively by Al Jazeera, by senior RSF commander Siddiq Ander that he had defected.

In a statement, the army said that the development was the latest in increasing defections from the paramilitary group in Blue Nile state.

It added that the group’s commander had provided information concerning the management of military operations in Damazin, including “Ethiopian support” for the RSF.

One-way drone attacks have killed or wounded 484 civilians since February, Khartoum says.

Sudan has lodged a complaint against Ethiopia with both the United Nations Security Council and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council after a series of deadly drone attacks this year.

In a statement late on Sunday, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group of using Ethiopian territory to launch “brazen aggression” against “civilian sites and power stations” in Sudan, resulting in hundreds of casualties and disruptions to essential services.

The string of incidents “places Ethiopia before international law”, the ministry added.

Sudan’s military has repeatedly accused Ethiopia of aiding the RSF, which it has been fighting in a civil war since April 2023. Ethiopia, meanwhile, has accused the Sudanese military of backing rebels linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, a charge Khartoum denied.

The ministry’s statement came alongside a report from Sudan’s army-led Transitional Sovereignty Council that alleged 70 assaults from February 15 to October 27 involving 187 one-way attack drones.

The attacks killed or wounded 484 civilians and killed 176 Sudanese soldiers, the report said, with another 200 soldiers wounded.

“Since February 2026, armed drones have taken off from Ethiopian soil … to strike Sudanese cities and civilians,” the report said.

The report identified launch sites at Asosa Airport in western Ethiopia, the Kurmuk-Gizen border area and Bahir Dar airbase in northwestern Ethiopia’s Amhara region.

Last month saw 28 attacks carried out by 97 drones, the report said.

It cited an October 9 attack on displaced families in Wad el-Mahi, located in Sudan’s Blue Nile region near the Ethiopian border, which it said killed 30 civilians – 26 women and four children – and wounded 100.

A spokesman for UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said on Saturday that he was “appalled” by the impact of drone strikes in Sudan, days after another strike on a market in RSF-controlled territory in Darfur killed more than 100 people.

The secretary-general “strongly condemns the escalating drone attacks in Sudan by the parties to the conflict and the catastrophic toll these attacks are inflicting on civilians”, the spokesman said, adding that the strikes constitute violations of international humanitarian law.

Ethiopia has received 12 Russian Su-35 fighter jets and will acquire four S-400 air defence batteries, in a deal experts say strengthens Moscow’s foothold in the Horn of Africa while bolstering Addis Ababa’s military amid conflict at home and tensions with neighbouring Eritrea.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced the deal in Moscow during the two-day Russia-Africa Summit.

“I value the friendly relations between Russia and Ethiopia,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a statement. “Russia and Ethiopia stand together in international affairs.”

Experts say the agreement builds on decades of military cooperation, offering Moscow arms revenue and diplomatic influence while allowing Ethiopia to strengthen its armed forces amid its ongoing conflict in Tigray.

Here is what we know:

What weapons is Ethiopia acquiring?

Abiy said Ethiopia had taken delivery of its first 12 Su-35s under an earlier agreement with Russia, with four S-400 batteries to follow, but did not say when the air defence systems would arrive.

The aircraft would expand an air force already equipped with Russian fighter jets. The S-400 systems would complement this existing fleet by helping the military defend itself against aerial threats, experts say.

“They would be best used against conventional air threats,” Benedict Manzin, a lead analyst on the Middle East and Africa at risk consultancy Sibylline, told Al Jazeera. “In a war with Eritrea, they could be used against Eritrea’s limited air force and drones.”

However, air defences do not provide protection against every kind of attack.

“As we have seen in Ukraine, conventional air defence systems can be overwhelmed by small, cheap drones,” he said.

Why does Russia want closer ties with Ethiopia?

The relationship predates the current competition for influence in Africa.

“Russia has been engaged in Ethiopia for decades, part of the legacy of the Cold War,” Manzin said.

The Soviet Union backed Ethiopia’s former communist government. Today’s cooperation builds on those foundations, with the two countries having signed military agreements intended to improve the Ethiopian armed forces’ capabilities through technology, knowledge and training, according to the Ethiopian News Agency.

Commercial interests also matter.

“Russia is also in the business of making money through arms sales,” Manzin said. “This is one of Russia’s primary exports to Africa.”

Weapons sales provide revenue while sustaining relationships with governments that require training, maintenance and replacement equipment. But the partnership extends beyond defence.

Abiy said his talks with Putin covered nuclear energy, health and trade, alongside bilateral and multilateral cooperation, while in a statement, Putin said bilateral trade exceeded $1.3bn in January-September, more than twice the figure for all of 2025.

He identified energy, agriculture, industry and education among potential areas for further cooperation.

Ethiopia’s size also makes it attractive to competing powers, with experts saying that because it is Africa’s second-most populous country, it offers a substantial market.

“Everyone engages a bit, and Ethiopia tries to maximise its gains,” Manzin said.

Does this mean Ethiopia is turning away from the West?

Manzin suggested Ethiopia is widening its options rather than committing exclusively to Moscow.

“African states are aware that they are a focus of geopolitical competition,” he said.

That competition gives governments room to seek weapons, investment and diplomatic backing from different partners. Ethiopia’s relationship with Russia coexists with a significant Chinese presence and continuing Western investment in the country.

“China has a huge presence in Ethiopia, and Russian arms have always been a huge factor,” Manzin said. Moscow is seeking to turn those established connections into broader influence as Western sanctions over its war in Ukraine constrain its international relationships.

Russia supplied 15 percent of African imports of major weapons in 2021–2025, behind the United States at 19 percent and China at 17 percent, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Could the weapons be used in Tigray?

In his statement, Abiy thanked Putin for ensuring the aircraft were delivered a year ahead of schedule and said the equipment would strengthen Ethiopia’s ability to “preemptively deter aggression”.

The delivery comes amid renewed fighting in Tigray, a separate rebellion in Amhara and concerns about a possible conflict with Eritrea.

“Ethiopia is buying a lot of aircraft,” Manzin said. “The timing comes as Ethiopia is going through conflict in Tigray, with speculation about war with Eritrea.”

He cautioned against assuming the latest battlefield developments directly prompted purchases negotiated earlier.

“Aircraft are helpful regardless, as they are using aircraft and the air force heavily during any suppression,” he said.

What’s the conflict about?

Fighting between Ethiopia’s federal army and Tigrayan forces intensified in late September, in effect unravelling the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement that ended a devastating two-year war.

Each side has blamed the other for renewed violence. Tensions grew following the formation of a seven-group alliance seeking to overthrow Abiy’s government and establish a transitional administration.

Government troops and allied forces entered Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, earlier in October after Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) fighters withdrew.

Addis Ababa subsequently installed a six-month caretaker administration, but rebel commanders have promised to continue fighting.

In a surprising development, Ethiopia has taken receipt of 12 Russian-made Su-35 multirole fighters, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced, adding a significant new capability to the Ethiopian Air Force. The agreement also calls for four batteries of Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system, although their delivery schedule remains unclear.

Abiy said the fighters arrived a year ahead of schedule under an agreement with Moscow and thanked Russian President Vladimir Putin for facilitating the accelerated delivery. The financial terms of the deal, the aircraft’s basing locations, and whether additional fighters are included in the agreement have not been disclosed. The Ethiopian leader announced the development on his X account, also posting photos and a video showing himself and other Ethiopian and Russian officials alongside two of the jets. The location appears to have been the third Russia-Africa Summit, taking place in Moscow on October 28-29.

The acquisition comes as Ethiopia seeks to strengthen its military capabilities amid persistent domestic security challenges and tensions across the Horn of Africa.

The Su-35 is a heavily modernized derivative of the Soviet-era Su-27, known by NATO as the Flanker. It combines twin thrust-vectoring engines for a high degree of maneuverability, advanced radar and other sensors, and the ability to carry a range of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons.

Its radar and long-range air-to-air missile capabilities, in particular, represent a notable improvement for Ethiopia’s ability to detect and engage hostile aircraft, while its multirole design allows it to perform a wide range of strike missions.

Su-35 Multirole supermaneuverable fighter / AERO INDIA 2021

Ethiopia already operates Russian-designed Su-27 fighters, providing a considerable degree of familiarity with the Flanker family. The current fleet comprises around 10 (and perhaps as many as 15) secondhand Su-27s, including two-seaters, supplemented in 2024 by a pair of Su-30Ks. The latter were originally produced for India as interim equipment, and then ended up in storage in Belarus before being refurbished and delivered to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Flankers saw action against Eritrean opposition in the 1990s, and there have also been a handful of non-combat attrition losses.

However, introducing the Su-35 will still require specialized pilot training, additional maintenance infrastructure, weapons integration, and a dependable supply of spare parts. The latter, in particular, is something that Moscow has not always been able to guarantee in practice.

The planned acquisition of four S-400 batteries could prove equally significant.

The S-400 is a mobile air-defense system designed to engage aircraft, cruise missiles, and certain ballistic missile threats.

If delivered, the systems would considerably strengthen Ethiopia’s ability to protect military installations, critical infrastructure, and other strategic sites against aerial attack.

Ethiopia occupies a strategically important position in the Horn of Africa, bordering Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Its security environment includes various unresolved regional tensions, longstanding border disputes, and internal armed conflicts.

Ethiopia’s relationship with Eritrea remains particularly relevant given their history of war and continuing tensions. Relations with Egypt and Sudan are also shaped by disputes over the Nile.

Abiy has presented the acquisition as a means of deterring aggression and strengthening national sovereignty.

At the same time, the delivery reinforces Russia’s position as a supplier of advanced military equipment to African countries. Russian exports to the continent have included combat aircraft, helicopters, armored vehicles, and ground-based air-defense systems.

Su-35s, specifically, have previously been delivered to Algeria, a long-term recipient of Russian military equipment on the African continent, as you can read about here.

Interesting report indicating Algeria has purchased at least some of the Russian Su-35s originally built for Egypt and later reported to be sought by Iran.https://t.co/0soV9aOopn

— John Hardie (@JohnH105) April 9, 2025

The Algerian jets are understood to have originated in a batch of Su-35s built for Egypt, which had ordered 24. However, the planned transfer to Egypt fell through, under the threat of U.S. sanctions and a teased offer of F-15s. In particular, Washington had said it would put sanctions on Cairo under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

CAATSA includes provisions for sanctions against parties found to have knowingly engaged in significant transactions with Russia’s defense or intelligence sectors. Washington previously invoked the provision against China over its acquisition of Su-35 fighters and S-400-related equipment, although any action against Ethiopia would depend on a separate U.S. determination.

The Su-35s built for Egypt were repeatedly connected with a sale to Iran, but this also never materialized.

Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN announced on Friday that Iran has finalized buying #Sukhoi fighter jets from Russia.

Here is what Iran has purchased: pic.twitter.com/aw7EVkc18N

— IRNA News Agency ☫ (@IrnaEnglish) March 11, 2023

Potentially, the 12 jets for Ethiopia could also have been left over from the abandoned Egyptian deal.

For Moscow, the deal provides a prominent example of continued defense cooperation with an important country in the Horn of Africa. The transfer also comes amid broader efforts by Russia and African governments to deepen political, economic, and military ties.

The agreement’s cost and financing arrangements have not been made public, leaving questions about the long-term expense of operating the fighters and maintaining their supporting infrastructure.

The deal also needs to be seen in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent international sanctions, have hampered efforts to secure sales for any kind of military equipment, other than to a handful of selected close allies, with little prospect that this will change any time soon. Amid those same sanctions, as well as Moscow’s increasing pariah status, any kind of export success will be very welcome for Moscow, even if it involves jets previously built for another customer.

At the same time, the ability of the Russian defense industry to provide in-service support for these jets, once they are delivered, is even more questionable than it was in the past. Since the invasion, Moscow’s need to prioritize its own forces, combined with Western sanctions restricting access to key components, has further complicated the situation. For Ethiopia, any disruption to parts deliveries or maintenance support could have an outsized impact on operational readiness, and this is compounded by the requirement of Russian industry to support Moscow’s own Su-35S jets, its primary fighter.

Ultimately, the acquisition represents a substantial reported addition to Ethiopia’s combat aircraft fleet. The planned S-400 systems could extend that modernization into ground-based air defense, and further influence the military balance in the Horn of Africa region.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Race walker Koki Ikeda returns to competition immediately; Ethiopia’s marathon runner Ruti Aga given 6-year doping ban.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) upheld an appeal by Japanese race walker Koki Ikeda against World Athletics, clearing the Tokyo Olympic silver medallist of an anti-doping rule violation and making him immediately eligible to compete again.

The 28-year-old was provisionally suspended in November 2024 before receiving a four-year sanction from the Athletics Integrity Unit (AIU) in February 2025 for allegedly using or attempting to use a banned drug.

Ikeda was not allowed to participate in the Japan Race Walking Championships in February 2025, and all his competitive results between June 20, 2023 and November 1, 2024 were disqualified.

Ikeda challenged the ruling at CAS in March 2025, rejecting the doping allegations brought by World Athletics, which had alleged blood manipulation based on abnormalities in his Athlete Biological Passport.

The case was heard by a CAS panel in Lausanne in May. While the panel accepted that several readings in Ikeda’s biological profile were abnormal, it found there was a reasonable non-doping explanation for the findings.

CAS said Ikeda supported his case with substantial medical and expert evidence, providing a broader factual basis than was available during the proceedings before the World Athletics tribunal.

The appeal body overturned the four-year sanction, concluding that the anti-doping charge had not been established and that no ban should apply.

Ikeda placed second in the 20km event at the Tokyo Games as well as at the World Championships in Eugene in 2022. He finished seventh at the 2024 Paris Olympics.

Ethiopia’s Aga handed six-year doping ban

Ethiopian marathon runner Ruti Aga, winner of the 2019 Tokyo Marathon, was given a six-year ban for the presence or use of the prohibited substance methylprednisolone and tampering with evidence, the AIU said on Thursday.

The AIU said Aga, 32, received a two-year ban after testing positive for methylprednisolone, a prohibited steroid that can reduce pain and fatigue and aid recovery, after winning a half marathon in China in March.

It added four years to the ban after finding she had misled investigators during an interview and submitted a fake prescription to justify her use of the substance.

Aga has been provisionally suspended since September 10, with the ban running from that date.

She has finished second three times and third twice at World Marathon Majors.

Hundreds of Ethiopians have crossed into Kenya, fleeing ⁠⁠fighting in ⁠⁠the border town of Moyale, which was reportedly prompted by loyalists publicly raising the flag of a neighbouring majority-Somali state.

Kenyan police said on Thursday that hundreds of Ethiopians, mostly women and children, crossed into Kenya through several entry points in Moyale, including the Sessi, Kore, Biashara, Foundation and Miti areas.

The people who crossed the border were fleeing tensions between leaders of Ethiopia’s Oromia and Somali regional states, according to Kenyan police.

The police reported gunfire and chaotic scenes in Moyale.

Ethiopian media reported that the fighting in Moyale started as a dispute over raising the flag of the Somali Regional State, a regional state in eastern Ethiopia, on Sunday.

Tensions escalated into fighting between forces from the Oromia and Somali regions.

Gunfire, chaos

The Kenya Red Cross said it was setting up temporary shelter and distributing essential items including cereal and porridge flour.

“The response will initially reach 1,000 households,” the Kenya Red Cross said in a statement on Thursday.

It added that experts were conducting an assessment to work out how many people were ⁠affected and what their needs were.

The regional clash is hundreds of kilometres away from ‌‌a larger conflict in the northern Tigray region between government forces and a rebel alliance led by the Tigray People’s ‌‌Liberation ‌‌Front.

Mekelle, Ethiopia- In Mekelle, shops are reopening, and banks are resuming services, but residents remain anxious about what comes next. Ethiopian federal forces and allied fighters retook the Tigray regional capital on October 4, as renewed fighting raised fears that the region’s fragile recovery could be derailed once again.

Tigray, in northern Ethiopia, is still recovering from the 2020–2022 war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the region’s dominant political movement. For residents, the return of fighting has brought new uncertainty over jobs, education, security and the future.

Daily life resumes, but hardship remains.

Businesses and financial services are gradually reopening in Mekelle, but many households are struggling to afford necessities. Delayed salaries have left public employees struggling to cover food, rent and school costs, while years of conflict have depleted family savings.

“Things may be reopening, but that does not mean our problems are over. We still have expenses every day, and without our salaries, it is difficult to know how we will manage,” said Gebregziabher, a public servant in Mekelle.

The funding crisis has affected the wider public sector. In March, Tigray’s interim administration said it could no longer cover monthly salaries for about 137,000 civil servants because expected federal budget transfers had not arrived. In April, the regional finance bureau reported an 8.5-billion-birr (about $52,000) funding shortfall affecting salary payments and development projects.

For many residents, the reopening of businesses offers only a partial return to normality. Without reliable incomes and greater security, everyday expenses remain difficult to manage.

Students fear losing more time

For students in Tigray, renewed fighting has revived fears of another interruption to their education. Many already lost valuable study time during the previous war and worry about falling further behind.

In Adigrat, Shewit, a grade 10 student, said uncertainty about classes and security had left him worried about his future.

“I have already lost so much time because of the war. I am afraid that if our education is disrupted again, I will lose another year and fall further behind,” he said.

Some university students have left Tigray for Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital, to seek transfers to other public universities. The Ministry of Education announced temporary placements at universities elsewhere in the country for students enrolled at institutions in Tigray. More than 5,000 returning students had applied by September 17–18, according to reporting on the ministry’s programme.

Abel, a third-year student at Axum University, travelled to Addis Ababa to request a transfer.

“I didn’t want to leave, but I also can’t keep putting my education on hold. I came to Addis to see if I can transfer to another university and continue my studies. I just want to finish what I started,” he said.

For students who have already lost years to conflict, the uncertainty means more than interrupted classes. It threatens to delay graduation and make an already difficult path to employment even harder.

Border communities fear a wider conflict

Near the Eritrean border, military movements and conflicting accounts of troop deployments have heightened fears that the fighting could spread beyond Tigray.

On October 8, The Associated Press reported claims by a commander allied with Ethiopia’s government that Eritrean troops had entered Adigrat earlier that week and Idaga Hamus the following day. The AP said it could not independently verify those accounts. The conflict-monitoring organisation ACLED separately reported Eritrean troops crossing the border at Zalambessa.

On October 13, Reuters reported that Ethiopian government forces had advanced into Zalambessa, citing people in contact with residents and other sources. The report said it remained unclear whether Eritrean troops or Tigrayan opposition fighters were still present in the town. The differing accounts underscored the difficulty of establishing control of individual towns as the fighting shifted.

The developments have unfolded amid worsening relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara. On October 8, Ethiopia’s foreign minister, Gedion Timothewos, accused Eritrea of sending troops as far as 60km (37 miles) into Ethiopian territory in several areas of Tigray and appealed to the United Nations Security Council to respond.

Eritrea has denied invading Ethiopian territory. Its government said Ethiopia’s accusations amounted to a declaration of war and called on the Security Council to take action against Ethiopia. The competing claims have raised fears that renewed fighting in Tigray could lead to a direct confrontation between the two neighbours.

Ethiopia and Eritrea fought on the same side during the 2020–2022 Tigray war, when Eritrean forces supported the federal government against the TPLF. Their deteriorating relations have added a regional dimension to the renewed conflict.

In Zalambessa, residents are watching developments with concern. One resident, who declined to be named, said the uncertainty made it difficult to know what to expect in the coming weeks.

An uncertain road ahead

On October 16, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced a six-month caretaker administration for Tigray, tasked with restoring public services, helping displaced people return and preparing the region for elections. The announcement followed the federal forces’ takeover of Mekelle and other major towns.

The federal government says the temporary administration will help restore stability and pave the way for elected regional leadership. The TPLF has opposed the federal advance, and it remains uncertain how effectively the new administration will operate across the region.

For residents, the immediate concerns are whether salaries will be paid, schools and health facilities will function, and displaced families will be able to return safely.

In Zalambessa, Gebrehiwot said residents knew from experience what another conflict could bring.

“People are worried because we know what war means for this area. We have already suffered enough, and nobody wants to see things reach that point again,” he said.

East African neighbours Ethiopia and Eritrea are once again perilously close to all-out war.

Territorial disputes have dogged their relations since Eritrea gained independence in 1993.

They fought a bitter war between 1998 and 2000. And despite a truce, they remained in a state of war for nearly 20 years.

The Jeddah accord in 2018 brought peace. But tensions have lingered.

Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of supporting rebels in its Tigray region, while Eritrea accuses landlocked Ethiopia of planning to capture one of its key Red Sea ports.

Can diplomacy end this deep-rooted conflict?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Faisal Roble – Political analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa

Jervin Naidoo – Senior political analyst at Oxford Economics Africa

Matt Bryden – Strategic adviser at Sahan, a think tank focused on governance, politics and security in the Horn of Africa

Eritrea denies troop movement inside northern Ethiopia as US calls for de-escalation.

Ethiopian forces and allied fighters say they have expanded control across Tigray and entered the historic city of Aksum, as fighting in the northern region continues.

The pro-government militia, the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), also claimed on Thursday that troops from neighbouring Eritrea have retreated towards the border.

Solomon Hailemariam, spokesperson for the TPF, said Eritrean forces had sustained significant casualties during the fighting.

But Eritrea’s Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel rejected the claims as false in comments to local media. The extent of the reported losses could not be independently verified.

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), an independent conflict-monitoring organisation, documented Ethiopian government forces and TPF fighters entering Aksum, while rival Tigrayan fighters remained in surrounding mountainous areas.

ACLED also reported Eritrean troops withdrawing across the border through Zalambessa, following advances by Ethiopian forces and their allies into several strategic towns.

“Ethiopian troops are on one side, and Eritrean troops are on the other,” Selam, a resident of Zalambessa whose first name was changed for security reasons, told the AFP news agency on Thursday.

AFP reported that there is no fighting now, but the town has been without power or water for a week.

“We are caught in the middle and living in deep anxiety,” Salem told the news agency.

Trading accusations

ACLED also documented Ethiopian tanks and heavy weapons moving towards the Eritrean border on Tuesday, raising concerns about a possible confrontation between the neighbouring countries.

Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea, as well as Sudan and Egypt, of backing a rebel alliance of seven groups that is fighting the government of Abiy Ahmed.

Eritrea has denied accusations that its forces entered Tigray to support the armed opposition groups, accusing Ethiopia of threatening its sovereignty.

Eritrea, which fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal army in the 2020-2022 war, severed diplomatic ties with Ethiopia over the accusations earlier this month.

Khartoum and Cairo have also denied involvement in the conflict.

The TPF supports Ethiopia’s federal government in its campaign against the Tigrayan rebels linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Ethiopian forces captured Tigray’s regional capital Mekelle earlier this month, and the TPLF confirmed that it had withdrawn from the city and moved its regional administration “temporarily” to another location. Government forces also retook the towns of Adwa and Adigrat from the TPLF without a fight. Further, there are reports of Ethiopian advances in the town of Rama, close to the border with Eritrea.

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called for de-escalation in a phone call with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy, following reports of the alleged confrontation between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.

Rubio said the region could not tolerate more conflict, according to a statement from the US Department of State.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – As renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa, public backing by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of Ethiopia’s federal government and Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy are drawing scrutiny.

Both Gulf powers have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, but their roles differ. The UAE has publicly backed Ethiopia’s government while Saudi Arabia has previously helped broker an Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and was reported to have offered to mediate between the two countries in 2025.

The renewed fighting threatens to unravel the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended a war between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan forces. As tensions with Eritrea add to the risks of a wider confrontation, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh offer a window into the interests of external powers in the crisis.

The UAE: Clear alignment, unproven leverage

On September 25, the UAE condemned attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray and the escalation in the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara.

Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE minister of state, expressed solidarity with Ethiopia’s government and people, reaffirmed support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement.

The statement made Abu Dhabi’s public position clear: It backs Ethiopia’s federal government while calling for de-escalation and dialogue. It did not establish whether the UAE was providing military assistance or had secured commitments from the parties to end the fighting.

The UAE also has commercial interests across the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) operates Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 connects the port with Jebel Ali in the UAE, providing an additional corridor for cargo serving inland destinations, such as Ethiopia. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade.

These commercial links help explain Abu Dhabi’s interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa. However, they do not establish that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de-escalate or change Ethiopia’s military calculations.

The extent to which Abu Dhabi can use its relationship with the federal government to encourage a political response to the conflict remains unclear.

Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic experience, uncertain engagement

Saudi Arabia has yet to publicly announce its position on the latest fighting in Tigray.

The kingdom has not publicly commented on the renewed war, according to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, although it undertook diplomatic efforts earlier this year to reduce tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF.

Saudi Arabia has previously sought to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that sources said Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two countries amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security.

A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank said previous Saudi mediation efforts had failed, partly because negotiations did not address Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.

The kingdom’s broader regional alignment also matters. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as backing Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

This is an assessment of regional alignment, however, not evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly providing military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting.

Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in Red Sea security, a vital corridor for international shipping and its own oil exports. Whether Riyadh will take a more public diplomatic role as tensions escalate remains unclear.

Egypt’s rivalry with Ethiopia adds to regional tensions

Egypt’s role in the crisis is shaped by its longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its growing ties with Eritrea.

Cairo has also stressed that responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with countries bordering the waterway, a position shared by Asmara. The issue has added to regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks reliable access to the sea.

In September, Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

His remarks, reported by Al Jazeera on September 28, did not provide evidence substantiating the accusation. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, subsequently reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference, rejecting suggestions that it had departed from those principles.

He did not directly address the specific allegation of Egyptian support for the TPLF.

Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea has nevertheless become an important part of the regional picture. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026.

According to Egypt’s presidency, the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security.

The two leaders also stressed the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting highlighted closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but did not establish that either country was involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.

For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

Its relations with Eritrea and its disagreements with Addis Ababa form part of the wider regional context, but they are not evidence of direct Egyptian involvement in the renewed conflict. Whether these regional relationships will affect the course of the fighting remains uncertain.

From Tigray to a wider regional crisis

The risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable access to the sea is a national priority while Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups. Eritrea denies the allegations and has called on the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The allegations remain contested, but deteriorating relations have raised the stakes of renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.

A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, complicate humanitarian access and disrupt regional trade and security. It would also test whether external partners could encourage restraint without appearing to endorse either side’s military objectives.

The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could provide a channel for diplomatic engagement while Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy offers a possible opening for renewed talks. However, the available public evidence does not establish that either country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

Influence must be measured by outcomes

The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be cast as pursuing opposing strategies simply because one has publicly backed Ethiopia’s federal government while the other’s current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not show that either has decisive influence over the fighting.

Their contribution should be assessed by whether they can help secure concrete steps towards de-escalation, renewed political dialogue and a reduction in tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic achievements may create opportunities for engagement, but they are not substitutes for progress on the ground.

The Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, yet renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of sustaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A durable settlement will depend primarily on the parties themselves. External partners could contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations.

For now, the UAE’s public alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic record offer different potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can turn those relationships into a meaningful contribution towards de-escalation remains unresolved.