Drones

In early August, a Pentagon official stood in front of reporters and conceded something the department almost never says out loud: the world’s best-funded military cannot out-produce a country under invasion. Travis Metz, deputy director of the Defense Innovation Unit, put a number on it. Ukraine will manufacture six to seven million small first-person-view attack drones this year — roughly 500,000 a month, built in garages, repurposed furniture factories and basements within range of Russian glide bombs. The Pentagon’s own flagship drone program, a $1.1 billion initiative branded Drone Dominance, will have ordered fewer than 200,000 drones, cumulatively, by February 2027. Metz’s response was not defensive. It was aspirational: “I see no reason why we shouldn’t… be the world champions of this as well.” The gap he was describing is not a technology gap. It is a speed gap, and speed is the one metric wartime industry cannot fake.

The instinct is to read this as a story about Ukrainian ingenuity, and it is one. But it is also the epilogue to a specific American failure. In 2023 the Pentagon launched Replicator, a program to field “multiple thousands” of autonomous systems within 24 months to counter China. By its August 2025 deadline it had delivered “hundreds,” not thousands, after burning through roughly $1 billion — undone by drones that were unfinished at selection, software that could not command large numbers of different systems at once, and a Switchblade loitering munition priced above $100,000 a unit. Washington’s answer was not to slow down and fix the model; it was to bring in the Department of Government Efficiency to override procurement rules and reclassify small drones as disposable supplies rather than regulated weapons systems. Meanwhile, Russia’s own Shahed and decoy drone output is reportedly climbing toward several hundred, and by some Ukrainian estimates up to a thousand, units a day. The war that forced Ukraine to mass-produce cheap drones is the same war exposing how slowly America still moves.

Why the gap isn’t about money

Start with unit economics, because they explain most of the gap. A Ukrainian FPV drone can be built for as little as $300 to $500 — an airframe, a camera, a battery and a warhead, assembled by hand and flown once. The Pentagon’s comparable systems have historically cost orders of magnitude more, not because the components are better but because they were designed inside an acquisition culture built for exquisite, low-volume platforms like fighter jets, where every part is sourced, tested and certified over years. Layer onto that a July 2026 rule requiring a “wholly domestic” supply chain — no Chinese-made motors, no Chinese battery packs — and the honest tension becomes visible: the policy meant to make American drone production more secure is, in the near term, also what makes it slower and more expensive to scale. Metz’s own explanation was blunt: it is “much harder to get from zero to 200,000” than to expand an existing line. Ukraine skipped that problem by never centralizing production in the first place — thousands of small, dispersed workshops that are individually replaceable and collectively enormous.

The deeper obstacle is not money but structure. Replicator had no dedicated budget line, was bounced between the Defense Innovation Unit and a newly created Defense Autonomous Warfare Group under Special Operations Command, and repeatedly selected systems that existed as concepts rather than finished products, in a rush to hit an artificial 24-month deadline. Congress, by its own research service’s account, has struggled to get basic cost and capability data out of the program. This is what forced DOGE’s intervention: not a shortage of appropriated dollars, but a procurement system engineered for careful, low-volume exquisiteness trying to behave like a wartime factory floor, and failing at both.

The strongest objection to treating this as a straightforward American failure is that the comparison is not apples to apples. Ukraine’s FPVs are disposable, short-range and built for a static front line; American planners are chasing autonomy, jamming resistance and long-range swarm coordination for a Pacific theatre defined by vast distances rather than trench lines, and that ambition costs more and takes longer to get right. That is a fair distinction — but it does not rescue the record. Years and a billion dollars into that more ambitious bet, the Pentagon still lacks software able to command mixed fleets of different drones, while Ukrainian manufacturers are already fielding AI-assisted terminal guidance on sub-$500 airframes, refined through thousands of real combat sorties a month. The ambition gap did not produce a capability lead. It produced the same failure as the cost gap: exquisite requirements colliding with a timeline the requirements were never built to meet.

Which is why the Pentagon’s actual fix looks nothing like a bigger budget. Six Ukrainian manufacturers, including F-Drones and General Cherry, are now required to form joint ventures with American companies — near Toledo, Ohio, and in New Hampshire — as a condition of future Pentagon orders. Washington is not just buying drones. It is importing the production model, and with it the tacit admission that the expertise now runs the other way.

Three ways this goes

What happens next depends on whether the joint-venture model actually transplants Ukraine’s manufacturing tempo onto US soil, or just its branding.

Base case (roughly 50 percent probability). The Ohio and New Hampshire joint ventures scale gradually. By 2027–28, US-based output climbs into the low hundreds of thousands annually — a real improvement, but still an order of magnitude below Ukraine’s current pace, held back by the domestic-sourcing rule’s cost premium. The program becomes a credible proof of concept for a future Indo-Pacific contingency rather than a fix for any current shortfall, and “Drone Dominance” quietly redefines success downward to match what it can actually deliver.

Downside case. The DOGE-driven bypass of standard testing repeats Replicator’s failure mode at greater scale: units purchased without adequate vetting turn out unreliable in the field, a GAO or inspector-general report documents it, and Congress reimposes the very procurement safeguards that were just stripped away. Combined with a Chinese-component ban that keeps unit costs well above Ukrainian levels, US output stalls again, and the gap that Metz conceded in August widens rather than closes by the time it next matters.

Upside case. The joint-venture model works as intended — not just as a purchasing arrangement but as a transplant of Ukrainian manufacturing culture, its dispersed micro-factories, rapid iteration and tolerance for combat-tested imperfection, into the American industrial base. That model, proven on drones, becomes the template for how Washington arms the next partner already fighting a war, whether Taiwan or a Baltic state: not a slow pipeline of finished stockpiles shipped from the continental United States, but manufacturing capability transplanted onto the partner’s own soil, and now, in this instance, onto America’s.

The takeaway

So: what does the mismatch reveal? Not that Ukraine builds better drones — the Pentagon never disputed that its own designs, on paper, are more capable. It reveals that capability on paper is not the same as capability in time, and that the American defense-industrial base, even backed by an executive order, a billion-dollar program and a DOGE override of its own rules, still cannot mobilize at wartime tempo on its own. The fix Washington has actually reached for is not more money. It is outsourcing the missing ingredient — speed — to the one partner that has been forced to master it under fire. That is the real admission, and it may be the more durable one: the next time the United States arms a country fighting a live war, it may look less like supplying an ally and more like apprenticing to one.

Watch for: whether the Ohio and New Hampshire joint-venture lines are shipping US-assembled drones at anything close to Ukrainian unit costs by the next Gauntlet test cycle at Fort Carson. If the “wholly domestic” sourcing rule keeps American-made units several multiples more expensive than their Ukrainian counterparts, the joint ventures will have transferred the branding of Ukraine’s drone war without transferring its speed.

Aug. 23 (UPI) — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz have warned Hamas of military escalation if the Palestinians do not stop sending children’s kites into Israeli territory.

In a joint statement issued Sunday, the Israeli leaders said the Israel Defense Forces “will act to increase targeted strikes against those responsible” and “evacuate the population” from areas in Gaza used as launch sites for kites, drones and balloons.

The warning came after a “situational assessment” attended by top national security and military officials.

“There will be no return to the state of affairs prior to October 7,” Netanyahu and Katz said. “Israel will not allow the Hamas terrorist organization or any other element in the Gaza Strip to threaten our communities again and compromise our citizens’ sense of security.”

The IDF identified at least six children’s kites that crossed from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory during the past seven days, including four over the weekend, the Jerusalem Post reported.

Military sources said the kites are being sent over by teenagers who are acting on behalf others, most likely Hamas operatives.

IDF officials told Israeli media outlets that nothing suspicious was found on the kites.

However, residents of Kibbutz Nahal Oz, which was attacked by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023, have linked them with past efforts by Palestinian militants to use such kites to carry incendiary devices into southern Israel and have demanded action to stop them.

In 2018, Palestinians sent burning kites to the Israeli territory, causing damage to thousands of acres of agriculture and nature reserves.

Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem dismissed the latest kites as “children’s toys” released from Gaza refugee camps.

The threats issued by Israel “are based on fabricated pretexts and are an attempt to justify the continuation of the aggression and violations against our people,” he said in a statement to The Times of Israel.

The U.S. Air Force is looking for a new family of aerial targets that can replicate an extremely broad range of airborne threats, from small drones operating in swarms to stealth fighters, large uncrewed aircraft, strategic bombers, and airborne early warning aircraft.

The service wants these targets to be realistic enough to challenge modern sensors and weapons, but inexpensive and simple enough that they can be routinely risked, and even destroyed, during testing.

The requirements are laid out in a new Air Force Request for Information (RFI), which calls for a family of systems capable of representing the “full range of airborne threats, spanning from inexpensive ‘hobby drones’ to the most advanced adversary fighter and large-scale aircraft.” Responses are due September 28.

The service says the next-generation systems should be sufficiently inexpensive and straightforward to manufacture that they can be “treated as attritable or expendable when required.”

That represents a significant departure from the economics of certain existing aerial targets. The Air Force’s QF-16 full-scale aerial target, for example, is based on a converted fighter aircraft, and can be crewed when required. It solves the problem of putting a full-sized, high-performance target in the air, but consuming an F-16 for a test is fundamentally different from losing a purpose-built target designed to be produced and expended in quantity. The service also uses purpose-designed drones of many kinds as targets, as we will come back to later.

Test Missile Fired at Boeing’s QF-16

The new effort is also deliberately open to approaches outside the traditional defense-industrial base.

The RFI calls for industry proposals “including commercial, modified commercial, dual-use, and non-developmental solutions.” The government is “particularly interested in non-traditional, commercially derived, or dual-use solutions” that can offer advantages in “cost, scalability, and simplicity over legacy systems.”

That language suggests the Air Force is not necessarily looking for another clean-sheet aircraft program. Instead, it appears interested in exploiting existing commercial technologies, manufacturing methods, propulsion systems, electronics and other readily available components to produce targets in significantly larger numbers and at lower cost.

The proposed systems would cover several distinct threat categories, with requirements changing substantially depending on what the target is intended to represent.

For advanced fighter aircraft, the Air Force wants targets capable of “supersonic capabilities (up to and exceeding Mach 1.6 at 40,000 feet)” along with high-agility and high-G combat maneuvers.

Reflecting the need to mimic more advanced threats, including stealthy ones, the Air Force says the new targets should also provide precise low-observable radar cross-section profiles, multispectral infrared signatures, active radio-frequency emissions, and integrated electronic-attack capabilities.

That could be particularly important for testing weapons and sensors against fifth-generation-type threats — and what might come after. A conventional subscale target can reproduce aspects of an aircraft’s flight behavior, but it does not necessarily reproduce the radar, infrared, electromagnetic or electronic-warfare environment presented by a sophisticated combat aircraft.

The Air Force has been trying for years now to acquire new full-size target drones, or ones that can at least mimic real fast-moving tactical jets. As in the new RFI, the goal has also been for those drones to have stealth and other more modern features, or the ability to simulate those capabilities with a high degree of fidelity. So far, however, despite the launch of programs such as the 5th Generation Aerial Target (5GAT), progress in this regard has been extremely limited.

A different set of requirements are outlined for targets representing C-130-sized multi-engine aircraft.

Here, the RFI calls for “matching the physical scale, slow subsonic flight envelopes, and propeller or turbofan propulsion characteristics of larger multi-engine aircraft.”

Those targets would need representative physical volume as well as basic RF and IR emissions and realistic radar returns. The Air Force specifically says these characteristics are intended to help verify missile-seeker guidance and assess warhead lethality against large-airframe targets.

For still larger aircraft, such as strategic bombers and AEW&C platforms, the emphasis shifts toward physical scale and signatures. The service wants targets capable of reproducing the “massive physical dimensions, multi-spectral thermal signatures, and heavy-aircraft radar strategic threats” associated with these aircraft.

That requirement highlights one of the limitations of today’s subscale aerial targets. A small drone can be made to generate a particular radar return, but there are important differences between artificially reproducing a signature and putting a target into the test environment that physically occupies something approaching the volume and presentation of the aircraft being simulated.

The proposed family would also encompass multiple classes of uncrewed aircraft.

For Group 5 UAVs, the targets should be capable of operating at altitudes up to 50,000 feet.

Group 3 and Group 4 targets would need to fly at approximately Mach 0.5 to 0.8 and maneuver at between 3 and 6 Gs.

At the other end of the spectrum, Group 1 and Group 2 targets should fly below 150 knots and be capable of operating in swarms.

The inclusion of swarm operations reflects the fact that the Air Force wants at least part of the new target family to be able to reproduce the massed airborne threat that small uncrewed systems can present.

That could allow weapons and sensors to be evaluated against scenarios involving numerous inexpensive targets rather than a single isolated aircraft.

The Air Force has operated remote-controlled aerial targets for decades, but many of its existing systems represent very different approaches.

The BQM-167A, which entered service in 2007, is a subsonic subscale target roughly 20 feet long with an 11-foot wingspan. It is inexpensive relative to a fighter-sized aircraft, but its physical dimensions are nowhere near those of many of the aircraft the Air Force may need to replicate.

At the other end of the scale, converted QF-16s provide a full-scale target with genuine fighter performance, making them useful for testing against fourth-generation fighter-type threats.

But a converted F-16 is expensive to operate, cannot be expended in large numbers, and increasingly falls short when it comes to replicating a fifth-generation stealth aircraft, let alone a strategic bomber, an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, or a mass of inexpensive drones.

The new RFI appears designed to bridge that gap, and potentially eliminate it altogether by creating multiple classes of targets optimized for different threats.

Significantly, the effort put the requirement for targets to reproduce the characteristics that modern weapons and sensors use to find and defeat aircraft in the foreground.

That suggests the targets are intended to support testing across the entire kill chain, from initial detection and tracking through seeker acquisition, guidance, and terminal engagement.

There is also a strong emphasis on simplicity and scalability.

A target that costs almost as much as the system being tested is of limited value if the objective is to conduct repeated, realistic engagements. A target that can be manufactured cheaply enough to be routinely expended, meanwhile, would enable much more aggressive testing and larger numbers of test scenarios.

While it is relatively straightforward to produce a low-cost drone, the challenge will be producing one that can fly above 40,000 feet at supersonic speed, perform high-G maneuvers, generate controlled low-observable radar signatures, reproduce multispectral IR characteristics and conduct electronic attack.

The Air Force is therefore effectively asking industry to find the sweet spot where high-fidelity threat representation and mass-produced affordability intersect.

If it succeeds, the resulting target fleet could look very different from today, with the Air Force employing a family of relatively inexpensive systems that can be configured to represent almost any fixed-wing aircraft that might be encountered.

As well as training, the same family of drones could support development and evaluation of radars, infrared sensors, electronic warfare systems, air defense networks, and other technologies against a much broader range of realistic airborne threats.

The breadth of the requirement is noteworthy. If it achieves its goals, it could allow the Air Force to replicate large numbers of future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) as well as simulating swarms of small drones and barrages of one-way attack drones, reflecting the expected scale and diversity of future air warfare.

The new requirement ultimately calls for targets that can reproduce the speed, maneuverability, size, radar signature, infrared signature, electromagnetic emissions and electronic warfare capabilities of an increasingly diverse range of aircraft, while being cheap enough that losing them is an acceptable cost of testing and training.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Aug. 21 (UPI) — Authorities in Germany discovered an underground weapons cache in a forest near Berlin and are seeking to extradite a suspect from Romania.

Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt described the suspect as a “low-level agent” and added that several more agents have been detained this year. The call for extradition is part of a monthslong investigation after authorities discovered two firearms and ammunition stowed away in the forest.

The weapons cache is suspected to be linked to Russian intelligence. Investigators left the weapons in place after determining they were rendered useless in hopes of observing someone coming back for them. After months of surveillance, no one had come to the site to retrieve them, leaving investigators to believe that the operation had been abandoned.

Dobrindt said authorities are investigating whether the weapons were meant for a violent threat to national security.

“This case demonstrates that we are operating under a high threat level,” Dobrindt told reporters.

German intelligence has been on elevated alert since Director General of the German Federal Domestic Intelligence Service Sinan Selen said two months ago that Russia may be preparing to carry out assassinations on supporters of Ukraine, members of the defense industry and political opponents.

The Russian embassy in Germany has not commented on the allegations.

Germany’s Leipzig/Halle international airport was the site of an incident two weeks ago in which a drone armed with explosives was discovered. Authorities suspect that the Russian government is involved in the incident.

On the same day, a DHL cargo plane had to abort its landing at Leipzig and divert to another airport after colliding midair with an unknown object. The plane suffered minor damage to its nose.

Aug. 19 (UPI) — A helicopter pilot and six passengers are dead after a crash at Mount Ololokwe in central Kenya, officials reported.

The passengers were tourists, but the Aircraft Accident Investigation Department said the nationalities of the pilot and passengers are not yet confirmed.

The accident happened in Samburu county at 9:13 a.m. local time. The helicopter was a Eurocopter EC130 B4, the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority said.

The scenic flight was from a wildlife conservancy in Loisaba to Ewaso Ng’iro, a river that flows along several national reserves.

The Kenya Red Cross said the site of the crash isn’t yet accessible but drones have assessed the scene, the BBC reported.

“Search and recovery efforts are ongoing, hampered by difficult terrain access and an active fire at the crash site,” the Kenya Red Cross said on X. “An additional team has been dispatched from Isiolo to reinforce the operation.”

Kenya has a history of multiple helicopter crashes.

In March 2024, Kenya’s Chief of Defense Gen. Francis Omondi Ogolla and nine others were killed in a helicopter crash in the country. Two people survived.

In 2019, four Americans and a pilot were killed in a helicopter crash in Kenya.

In 2012, three people were killed and six were injured in a crash on takeoff at the Masai Mara game reserve in Kenya.

Aug. 19 (UPI) — At least four people riding a minibus in Ukraine‘s frontline Kherson region were killed Wednesday morning after the vehicle was hit by a Russian drone.

Kherson Gov. Oleksandr Prokudin said in an online post that five women injured in the strike in the Korabelnyi district of Kherson city were being treated in the hospital.

“This morning, the Russians hit an ordinary minibus in Kherson with a First-Person-View drone. It is clear that the bus was civilian. The brutal Russian ‘safari’ against our people in Kherson has long gone beyond what any normal person can imagine,” said Prokudin.

He added that during the past 24 hours, nine other people had been injured in Russian strikes targeting critical infrastructure and residential areas in the province, damaging three apartment blocks, a restaurant and several cars.

“These are the realities of everyday life in Ukraine’s frontline regions. While partners hesitate over additional supplies of defense equipment, the Russians have gone long beyond the bounds of what is acceptable” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wrote on X.

The United Nations’ humanitarian chief, Tom Fletcher, just back from visiting Ukraine’s Mykolaiv and Kherson regions, told BBC Radio that Kherson was coming under attack from thousands of drones each week with civilians telling him they were the targets.

Moscow insists it only attacks legitimate military and military-related targets.

Russia overran and occupied Kherson province at the start of the war in Feb. 2022, eventually annexing the province by September, but Kyiv routed Russian forces in a fall 2022 counter-offensive, recapturing around a third of its territory, including Kherson, the provincial capital.

Ukraine’s Air Force said in an update on Telegram that it dealt with airborne attacks on the north, south and east of the country overnight involving two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 65 drones and other munitions, of which 10 got past air defenses to strike their targets.

Falling debris from downed missiles and drones fell in another three locations.

Aug. 18 (UPI) — A strike by Russian forces on a rural community in Ukraine‘s northeastern Kharkiv province on Tuesday morning killed at least 10 people and injured eight others, authorities said.

Kharkiv Gov. Oleh Syniehubov said in a post online that a missile hit a residential area of the small town of Pechenihy, 30 miles southeast of Kharkiv.

“This morning, the Russians brutally struck a crowded intersection in Pechenihy, where the post office and shops are located, and around where there are only residential buildings.

“Many people are injured, they are being provided with all necessary medical assistance. Rescuers have already extinguished the fire, all emergency and operational services continue to work at the scene. All the circumstances of this tragedy are being clarified,” wrote Syniehubov.

Syniehubov said 10 private houses, a cafe, a post office, a shop and at least seven cars were also damaged in the attack.

Meanwhile, Ukraine continued to send swarms of attack drones into Russia overnight for a third straight day, hitting and damaging a warehouse outside of Moscow belonging to Russian e-commerce giant Wildberries and setting ablaze an aluminum plant in Filimonovo, 40 miles northwest of Moscow.

Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin said 620 Ukrainian drones approached Moscow and the Moscow Region between Monday evening and 5 a.m. local time on Tuesday, of which 180 were downed by air defenses, causing some indirect damage on the ground.

“Emergency services are working at the sites where debris fell,” said Sobyanin.

The state-run TASS news agency said that by its calculations the attack was the largest in two year, eclipsing an attack overnight Saturday that saw 600 drones bear down on the Russian capital, of which 201 were destroyed in the air.

Aug. 18 (UPI) — Russia is warning Britain that there will be “consequences” following reports that Ukraine has struck within Russian territory with drones provided by London and made by British companies.

In a statement Tuesday, the Embassy of Russia to the United Kingdom accused London of escalating Russia’s war against Ukraine by providing the weaponry, while chastising it for “hypocritically professing a desire for peace.”

“London’s actions will inevitably carry consequences for which it will have to answer,” the embassy said.

“The deeper its involvement in the conflict and the greater its support of Kiev’s terrorist machinery, the higher the price it will pay.”

Britain has been an ardent supporter of Ukraine’s defense against Russia, which invaded its eastern neighbor in February 2022, launching the four-year war.

According to a July factsheet from the British government, London has committed more than $33 billion to Ukraine, including more than $21.6 billion in military assistance.

Britain has for years been focused on supplying Ukraine with drones, which have proved effective in Kyiv’s defense against the Kremlin. In April, its Ministry of Defense announced it would deliver at least 120,000 drones to Ukraine by the end of this year, a number it increased to 150,000 in June.

The threat from the embassy follows reports stating drones built by British companies were being used by Ukraine to hit targets within the borders of Russia, resulting in more than $47.3 billion in damages.

In response to the embassy, Britain’s Ministry of Defense told BBC News in a statement that London stands “shoulder to shoulder” with Kyiv.

“Russia should be in no doubt about the resolve of this government to stand against Russian aggression, in Ukraine and against the UK and our allies,” the ministry spokesperson said.

The attacks injured at least three people, including a girl, and damaged a Wildberries warehouse, Russian officials say.

Russian officials have reported more than 620 overnight drones targeting Moscow, in what appears to be one of Ukraine’s largest attacks on the Russian capital in years.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said Russian defences shot down 180 drones over the capital region between Monday evening and ‌5am (02:00 GMT) on Tuesday. He said 17 more drones were shot down en route to the capital later.

Russia’s state-run news agency TASS described the barrage as the largest drone attack on Moscow in the past two years.

The drone attack wounded three people, including a 10-year-old girl, Moscow region’s Governor Andrey Vorobyov said on Telegram. He said the “most serious consequences” were reported in the Pavlovsky Posad district, where a house burned down. Several more homes and a guesthouse were damaged in Bogorodsky district, he added.

A warehouse east of Moscow belonging to e-commerce giant Wildberries was damaged in Tuesday’s drone assault. In a statement, the company said its logistics complex sustained “minor damage” after “debris hit the wall of the building”.

Ukraine has struck multiple Wildberries warehouses in recent weeks, saying the company supplies components for Russian drones.

Five injured in Ukraine’s Kharkiv

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian air force reported shooting down or suppressing 111 of 147 “enemy” drone attacks overnight.

Kharkiv’s regional Governor Oleh Syniehubov said five people, including a nine-year-old boy, were injured in an overnight Russian attack on the city of Izyum.

Russian drones also sparked fires and damaged buildings in Kyiv region’s Brovary city, including an office building and warehouses, said Mayor Ihor Sapozhko.

With front-line fighting at a near standstill and talks frozen, Ukraine and Russia have significantly stepped up long-distance attacks, pushing the civilian death toll to its highest levels since the war’s first months in 2022.

In July alone, 437 civilians were killed in Ukraine, the highest monthly toll since May 2022, according to a United Nations tally.

Russian authorities reported 79 civilians killed in Ukrainian attacks in July, up from the previous month.

During the two most recent major Middle East conflicts it has been involved in, the U.S. Army swatted down more than 1,400 Iranian missiles and drones, according to the officer in charge of the Army’s air and missile defense. The figures provided by Lt. Gen. John Rafferty, commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and Joint Task Force-Gold, offer new context about the number of Army interceptions during these fights. His comments also come amid concerns about the tremendous expenditure of U.S. interceptors that has exacerbated the stress on America’s magazine depth of these high-end defensive weapons, an issue that TWZ has raised frequently for years. 

“For the last 14 months,” the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), based at Fort Bliss, Texas, “has been in the largest air and missile defense fight in U.S. history,” Rafferty said during a panel at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium (SMD) in Huntsville, Alabama, attended by TWZ. “Over the 12-day war [between Iran and Israel], they successfully engaged 125 ballistic missiles, and during Operation Epic Fury, over 1,200 ballistic, cruise and UAS threats have been neutralized.”

The 32nd AAMDC, which is responsible for all U.S. Army air and missile defense in the region, “adapted and innovated to overcome advanced threats,” Rafferty added. “The THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense], the Patriot, and our counter-UAS systems are the envy of the world, and that’s due in no small part to some of the efforts of the organizations that are represented by the leaders in the front row here, but also by the contributions of many of our industry partners and industry teammates here.”

Though he didn’t mention how many interceptions were performed by the U.S. Navy’s ship-launched SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, or Air Force air-to-air missiles and rockets, Rafferty’s comments added insight into the extent of the U.S. military’s defense of the region during numerous Iranian missile and drone barrages. It represented just a part of a much larger regional effort involving several nations that came under Iranian attack.

In May, Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), testified before Congress that Epic Fury “validated, at full scale and in actual combat, a combined Middle East Air Defense (MEAD) network – a concept the region had exercised for years but never fully operationalized.”

“During OEF, for the first time in history, U.S. air defenders stood shoulder to shoulder with partner air defenders across national systems… Over the course of the operation, this integrated architecture intercepted over 6,000 one-way attack drones and more than 1,500 ballistic missiles aimed at U.S. forces, Israel, and our Arab partners.”

Cooper did not break down how many interceptions were carried out by each country, but the figures provided by Rafferty suggest that the Army was responsible for about 16% of all of them. CENTCOM declined our request for the numbers of interceptions carried out by the Navy and Air Force.

As a result of this intense air and missile defense activity, partner nations, minus Israel which uses its own systems, have had their missile stocks backfilled by the U.S. due to the massive consumption of interceptors. It’s also worth noting that it is common to use multiple interceptors against each target to increase kill probability, so one target often doesn’t mean one missile was used to shoot it down.

LIVE: Head of Central Command testifies before Senate committee on Iran war

As for the 12-Day War, Iran fired about 550 ballistic missiles and around 1,000 drones at Israel, according to the IDF. About 90% were intercepted by the U.S. and Israel, the Jerusalem Post reported at the time. While the Army engaged 125 Iranian missiles, the U.S. Navy played a large role in swatting down these threats as well. It is unclear just how many interceptions the Navy performed during that conflict, but former acting Chief of Naval Operations Adm. James Kilby told the Senate Appropriations Committee in June 2025 that the service fired interceptors at incoming Iranian threats “at an alarming rate.”

As we noted earlier in this story, we have been sounding the alarm about magazine depth for years, especially in regard to America’s air and missile defenses. In fact, we laid out in detail these exact concerns and how they would be a major issue in war with Iran just prior to the conflict starting in a feature you can read in full here.

The U.S. has burned through hundreds of THAAD and Patriot interceptors since a shaky ceasefire went into effect on April 8, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) latest assessment. CSIS was updating a previous analysis of munitions expenditures during Epic Fury that you can read more about here.

According to CSIS, the U.S. had about 2,300 Patriot interceptors in its inventories before Epic Fury, 1,030 by the time the ceasefire was agreed to, and between 759 and 827 as of July 27.

As for THAADs, there were 452 interceptors in the U.S. inventory before Epic Fury, between 232 and 262 on the date of the ceasefire, and between 234 and 278 as of July 27.

During the SMD panel, Rafferty addressed magazine depth concerns but did not provide any granularity about the number of interceptors used. The bottom line, he said, is that THAAD and Patriot munitions are just one part of an overall defense.

“I cannot add anything to the emphasis on magazine depth… or for the need for cheaper and wide-ranging mix of interceptors,” he explained. “I mean that couldn’t be made more loud and clear from the highest levels of our government. But I do want to highlight the need that interceptors alone won’t do it, right? We need more of a comprehensive missile defeat strategy that focuses on interceptors, equally so on non-kinetic effects, both electronic warfare and directed energy.”

“And the type of targeting C2 enabled by a data strategy, and a cross-domain solution that works that helps us take data from TS [top secret], move it down to secret, and even down to CUI [controlled unclassified information], that’ll enable us to use that data to make decisions to engage targets faster,” he continued. “That’s the kind of comprehensive missile defeat strategy that isn’t just about more interceptors. It’s about integrating other capabilities, non-kinetics, and also decision-making into that.”

For the moment, things have calmed between the U.S. and Iran, with no major attacks against each other for several weeks. Media reports have suggested that President Trump has shifted to economic, rather than military pressure against Iran in large measure over concerns about the ability to sustain a conflict with greatly diminished magazine depth.

Still, Trump has been unable to compel Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, pare its ballistic missile stocks or stop supporting proxies like the Houthis and Hezbollah. Given that, it remains possible the notoriously impatient president could resume hostilities at any time. So too could the Iranians, who have done it before.

Meanwhile, the heavy use of these expensive, hard-to-build, long-lead-time weapons raises additional questions about how the U.S. can defend itself from another major threat, and especially should a war break out with China. 

Rafferty didn’t bring up concerns about whether the supply of air defense munitions and general capacity was sufficient for a China fight, nor was he asked about it in the ensuing question and answer session. Still, he did imply that the U.S. Army’s air defenders were under significant stress battling Iran.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Iran used multiple drones to help target the U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle that was brought down over Iran in April of this year, a new report claims. According to an unnamed senior U.S. military official speaking to The New York Times, the Iranians employed tactics inspired by Ukraine in its war with Russia, leading to the high-profile combat loss of a Strike Eagle and a daring U.S. Special Operations Forces mission to retrieve the missing Weapon Systems Officer (WSO).

The military official told the newspaper that the Pentagon concluded that Iranian drones fed “critical pieces of information to Iranian commanders that helped them target the F-15E.” Thanks to these drones, Iranian forces were provided with the jet’s GPS location, speed, and direction, the same official said.

The New York Times reports that the F-15E’s defensive countermeasures suite provided only half a second of warning before the shoulder-launched missile — thought to be Chinese-made — struck its target. In fact, it would have provided none, since the F-15E is not equipped with missile approach warning systems (MAWS) to detect incoming infrared-guided threats.

While the pilot was recovered not too long after ejecting, there followed a frantic effort to find and retrieve the WSO, a rescue mission that involved hundreds of troops, scores of aircraft, and diversion operations over more than a half dozen different parts of Iran. The effort also saw the loss of a second aircraft, an A-10 attack jet in the air, as well as two MC-130J Commando II special operations cargo planes and several H-6 Little Bird special operations helicopters that were destroyed on the ground.

The latest account comes after a reported testimony from the Strike Eagle pilot, who described a “jellyfish-like” swarm of drones in the sky, moments before they ejected from the stricken jet. The pilot saw “multiple drones interconnected and moving as one with smaller drones below the bigger drones like legs,” CNN had previously reported, based on statements it said came from four unnamed sources familiar with the matter. Another source told the broadcaster that the same pilot described seeing a “minefield of drones” in the air.

We previously analyzed the possibilities behind this seemingly bizarre phenomenon here.

While they both come with the usual caveats, the two reports together paint an interesting picture of what might have happened over southern Iran on April 3, during the U.S.-Israeli war with that country.

Provided the available accounts are even partially accurate, the information is slowly painting a picture that suggests Iranian use of drone-based airborne sensors to help bring down an F-15E penetrating its airspace.

Previous reports had suggested that the apparent ‘jellyfish’ drone swarm could have been some kind of networked formation, while also emphasizing that the pilot had been concussed and it may have been unclear exactly what they had seen. It is also very possible that a drone system unrelated to whatever the localized ‘jellyfish’ sighting was was actually responsible for spotting the F-15E, and the two are unrelated.

At this point, it should be noted that, while the term ‘drone swarm’ is often used loosely in media reporting, having a large number of drones flying in roughly coordinated formations doesn’t necessarily mean Iran possesses a sophisticated autonomous cooperative swarming technology, although this isn’t much of a reach.

While talk of drone swarms is intriguing, even a single drone with a camera could have provided an alert that the jet was headed in a certain direction and at an approximate speed and altitude. Using multiple sensor-equipped drones would meanwhile provide commanders with a distributed network of relatively expendable airborne sensors that could possibly spot aircraft, even if doing so would provide rudimentary situational awareness information that can be used, at best, to assist in targeting.

As an asymmetric ad-hoc air defense solution, using even drones equipped with basic sensors to spot aircraft could offer a fallback, relatively resilient option, especially if Iran’s conventional air defense architecture, which relies on more expensive and more vulnerable radars and other sensors as well as command posts, was largely destroyed. This was indeed the case after extensive U.S. and Israeli attacks. Still, a spotting network of drones would be far less capable than those traditional systems, with luck being a large factor in spotting anything. A more advanced, networked system is something of a different story, but that would require a higher level of technology and would need complex command and control infrastructure behind it.

Drones could also be paired with payloads used to detect a hostile aircraft’s radar and other radio-frequency emissions, which could give away their presence and potentially geolocate them. This is especially true when drones are working in a network over a wider area. Ground stations can also be used in this manner, but they do not benefit from the line-of-sight at altitude, flexibility, and the possibility of pairing these operations with airborne decoys to stimulate an enemy aircraft’s radar, thus giving its location away.

Again, provided the account is accurate, many questions still remain about the kinds of sensors on the drone or drones, and how tracking information was obtained and then transmitted to what was, in the end, a relatively inexpensive shooter in the form of a shoulder-launched missile. But once again, simple spotting networks used to spot and track hostile aircraft are an art form going back to the dawn of military aviation. Putting parts of that in the air aboard rudimentary drones is hardly a complex achievement.

As for the shoulder-launched missile that appears to have brought down the F-15E, Iran has no shortage of these, widely dispersed, and these are known weapons of opportunity. They were also likely pre-placed in areas where U.S. and Israeli warplanes were known to be penetrating, especially since the rest of the Iranian air defense system had been extensively taken down already.

The claim that Ukrainian experiences helped inform the Iranian tactics is also interesting. It is unclear if this relates to a specific drone-based sensor network, or whether it is a reference to the Ukrainian use of drones more generally.

At the very least, Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated how relatively inexpensive drones can perform reconnaissance, detect movement, track targets, identify air-defense activity, and help cue more expensive weapons. This is in addition to them being used as effectors themselves, or carrying weapon payloads. Ukraine also pioneered interceptor drones, as well, which also act as airborne spotters. With so many U.S. and Israeli drones to hunt over Iran, the lessons of interceptor drones from Ukraine would not have been lost on Iran, especially considering the country was the first to build and deploy a so-called ‘loitering SAM.’

Meanwhile, the broader lessons from the war in Ukraine include recognizing the value of layered networks of relatively cheap sensors, communications, decoys, and shooters, rather than relying on more expensive and vulnerable solutions alone. Iran clearly had planned for the demise of their traditional air defense network, so fallback concepts like using drones to spot enemy aircraft shouldn’t be a surprise.

Nevertheless, the new report combined with the ‘jellyfish’ sighting provides another fascinating, but still puzzling layer to one of the most dramatic air combat incidents of recent times.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Aug. 13 (UPI) — The Trump administration on Thursday announced tariffs on imports of drones and related components, saying that the U.S. was ‘too reliant’ on drones produced overseas.

According to a White House fact sheet, a 100% tariff will be levied on “certain capabilities that are particularly sensitive for national security purposes, docking stations of these drones, and certain critical components of these drones.”

The category includes drones that have a top takeoff weight of more than 25 kilograms and those with thermal imaging features, the proclamations says.

The U.S. “is too reliant on foreign sources of [unmanned aircraft systems] and UAS components,” a proclamation signed by U.S. President Donald Trump says.

Meanwhile, smaller drones that do not have certain features that do not affect national security will face a 25% tariff. Drones and components produced in the European Union, Japan, Liechtenstein, South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan will see a 15% levy. UK-produced drones will be assessed 10%.

The percentage of the tariffs will depend if “substantially all hardware, software, and technology originates from within these countries and the United States,” the fact sheet says.

The White House said the tariffs take effect in 21 days, but tariffs on drone components “that are not particularly sensitive,” will take effect in 180 days

For products and components that the Department of Defense has approved an exemption from the Federal Communications Commission’s Covered List within 20 days after being signed by Trump, the tariffs will take effect 180 days after signing.

The ability to counter individual drones and complex swarms is becoming increasingly critical on the battlefield of today and will be even more so on those of the future. In response to such threats, Lockheed Martin recently unveiled the MORFIUS X-Rotor. TWZ’s Jamie Hunter spoke with Jason Reynolds, Lockheed Martin’s Vice President of Integrated Air & Missile Defense, at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, about MORFIUS in detail.

This counter-UAS system features a High Power Microwave (HPM) payload that can reportedly neutralize more than 50 adversary drones during a single sortie. The cross-wing configuration allows MORFIUS to take off and land vertically, and it is designed specifically for field recovery and rapid reuse. After launch, the drone uses proprietary algorithms to hunt and kill enemy drones using an active radio-frequency seeker onboard. The big advantage is that MORFIUS X-Rotor can kill a lot of drones and be reused to kill more over and over. Many interceptor drones in use today are self sacrificing in order to do their job.

Lockheed Martin says it has completed live-fire testing and is accelerating production to meet demand.

“Counter-UAS is a hot topic around the world. We took MORFIUS to the Farnborough Airshow; every single person was interested in understanding the technology, the availability, the production rates. This system is going to be proliferated because we need to basically protect against drones that are single or swarming and protect our critical assets, critical sites, and defend what matters most,” Reynolds told us.

Watch the video below and subscribe to our channel on YouTube here.

Meet MORFIUS: The Drone Designed To Zap Other Drones

South Korea plans to upgrade a key Army battle tank and an anti-ship missile program for the Navy in an effort to boost military capabilities against evolving enemy threats, the arms agency said Tuesday.

It will launch a 3.43 trillion-won (US$2.43 billion) project to upgrade the K2 main battle tank to be equipped with an active protection system (APS) to intercept anti-tank missiles and drones, a drone and improvised explosive device (IED) jammer and a remote-controlled weapons station (RCWS), the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said.

The APS system is dubbed a smart shield system that uses radar to automatically spot incoming enemy missiles or drones and attack them.

The drone and IED jammer blocks enemy radio signals and the RCWS enables the crew to safely aim and fire from inside the armored vehicle.

The K2 upgrade program will run from 2028 through 2046, with the new tanks expected to enter into service in 2033, DAPA said.

The agency will launch another upgrade project for the new Haeseong-II long-range anti-ship missile, aiming to double its strike range, backed by a more powerful turbofan engine.

With a budget of around 1.63 trillion won, the military aims to complete the development by 2033 and start mass production in 2034.

The upgraded Haeseong-II missiles are expected to be mounted on South Korea’s next-generation KDDX destroyer, a source familiar with the matter said. The government recently signed a formal contract with Hanwha to build its lead ship.

The upgrade plans were approved during DAPA’s key decision-making meeting on Tuesday.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

Aug. 11 (UPI) — At least nine people were killed and 25 injured in Russian strikes targeting Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky saying that Zaporizhzhia, where six people were killed and 19 injured, was hit with North Korean-made missiles.

In a post on X on Tuesday morning, Zelensky said emergency response efforts were still in progress dealing with the aftermath of a “vicious” attack on the city of Zaporizhzhia that involved North Korean ballistic missiles, Zircon hypersonic missiles and guided aerial bombs.

“It was a vicious attack, calculated to inflict maximum damage specifically on civilian infrastructure. Unfortunately, as of now, six people have been reported killed and nineteen wounded in the city. First responders are continuing to extinguish a fire at one of the impact sites,” wrote Zelensky.

He said a missile strike also damaged an infectious diseases hospital building and businesses in Kyiv and the Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv and Donetsk regions also came under attack.

The other fatalities were all in Dnipropetrovsk, where five districts were attacked with artillery and drones, with Gov. Oleksandr Ghanza reporting in an online update that a middle-aged man was killed in the Synelnyky area, east of Dnipro, a teenage boy was killed In Kryvyi Rih and one person was killed in Pavlohrad.

The Russian Defense Ministry said it launched strikes against hubs for transport and logistics in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia, as well as “defense industry” targets. Officials in Russia’s southwest said a man was killed and two were injured in a Ukrainian drone attack on the Voronezh Region with two warehouses belonging to e-commerce giant Wildberries set ablaze.

Zelensky said more than 120 drones were sent into Ukraine as frontline regions continued to experience what he described as “drone terror” on an almost daily basis, with power outages in Kherson and Kharkiv after strikes overnight.

“Every step Russia takes — increasing ballistic missile production, bringing in North Korean equipment, preparing for mobilization — all of this shows that Moscow is preparing not for peace, but for escalation. And the world needs to respond now, not wait. More sanctions pressure specifically on enterprises that fuel Russia’s war, more air defense assistance for Ukraine — all of this is needed to give peace a chance,” said Zelensky.

Tuesday’s strikes came hours after Zelensky warned in a televised address Monday that North Korea was gaining battlefield experience and boosting its military capabilities through its support for Russia, posing a growing threat to U.S. allies and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Zelensky said North Korea had supplied the Russian military with additional ballistic missiles and was preparing to deploy tens of thousands of troops to Russia.

On Sunday, Zelensky called for increased co-operation between Seoul and Kyiv, particularly on air defense systems, warning that North Korea was preparing to send an additional 30,000 to 50,000 personnel to Russia on top of the 15,000 it already provided.

Aug. 8 (UPI) — Overnight Russian attacks on Kyiv and the surrounding region killed at least 4 people, one of which was a 3-year-old child, officials said Saturday.

Two of boy’s grandparents were also killed in the strike from Russian drones in the Brovary district of the Kyiv region, northeast of the capital city. Four others — the boy’s 15-year-old brother, his parents and a neighbor — were injured as they tried to help the three. They were all hospitalized.

In Kyiv, the city’s military administration said one other person was killed and four others wounded.

Ukraine‘s air force reported that it had downed or intercepted 135 of 151 drones launched by Russia overnight. The attack also involved six ballistic missiles and other guided missiles, CBS News reported.

“Last night, Russia killed three people in Pukhivka, Kyiv region, with drone strikes — a grandfather, a grandmother and their grandson. The boy was only 3 years old,” Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky posted on X. “Four more people were hospitalized: the child’s parents, his 15-year-old brother and a neighbor who came to the family’s aid and was wounded in a double-tap strike. The victims suffered thermal burns and shrapnel wounds. My condolences. It was an ordinary residential building. The Russians could not have been unaware of this. There was also a strike involving six ballistic missiles against civilian infrastructure in Kyiv. As of now, one person has been reported dead. My condolences to the family and loved ones. The Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv and Poltava regions also came under attack.”

Zelensky went on to reiterate that Ukraine needs more support, including stronger sanctions on Russia and anti-ballistic missile weapons.

The Ukrainian president is on an official visit to Serbia, a close ally of Russia. It’s a first for Zelensky, and the two countries agreed to work toward closer economic ties. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić said his country will support Ukraine’s territorial integrity with “no buts” during a joint press conference, The Kyiv Post reported. Serbia is trying to join the European Union.

Zelensky has been trying to get the United States to license its Patriot interceptor missiles, but President Donald Trump has hesitated.

The U.S. Senate passed a bill Friday that imposes new sanctions on Russia and Iran. The bill was once championed by the late Sen. Lindsey Graham. On Friday, the Senate voted 86 to 11 in favor of passing The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026.

A drone also entered Bulgarian airspace Saturday after crossing from Romania and exploded near an international gas pipeline, the BBC reported Bulgarian prime minister Rumen Radev said. He said there was a “significant” amount of explosives aboard the drone, but that there were no casualties or reports of damage. It’s not clear where the drone originated.

Kratos has built the first landing gear-equipped versions of its stealthy XQ-58 Valkyrie drone, with several additional examples now in various stages of construction. The company is also still producing XQ-58s designed for rocket-assisted takeoffs via static launchers, and Valkyrie production is ramping up overall. Both types offer certain advantages in different operational scenarios. Valkyrie flight test activities are currently paused following the crash of one of the drones on Tuesday, which TWZ was first to report and that readers can get caught up on first here.

In reporting on the crash, TWZ had a chance to speak yesterday with Steve Fendley, President of Kratos’ Unmanned Systems Division, who provided additional updates on the Valkyrie program. The U.S. Marine Corps notably previously announced that it is acquiring a fleet of Valkyries in the landing gear-equipped configuration under its Marine Air-Ground Task Force Uncrewed Expeditionary Tactical Aircraft (MUX TACAIR) Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. Fendley also discussed developments across other parts of the company’s tactical drone portfolio.

To provide some quick additional context, the rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO) and landing gear-equipped conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) versions of the Valkyrie are the two main known configurations of the design. The RATO type, which first flew in 2019, also lands via parachute. Kratos has also developed a special launch trolley that allows RATO Valkyries to conduct runway takeoffs, though they still land using the parachute recovery system.

The CTOL version was first publicly announced in 2024. Drones in this configuration can also be launched via rocket, but then land conventionally. The addition of the landing gear does reduce the available internal payload space, as well, something we will come back to later on. In January, Kratos had told us it was targeting the early 2026 timeframe for a first flight, but we cannot confirm whether this has occurred. The Valkyrie crash on Tuesday did come after “takeoff from a test-range runway,” but Kratos would only say the drone in question was in “test configuration.” Whether or not this may have been the first flight of the CTOL variant is not clear.

More generally, Valkyrie is a highly modular design with an open mission systems architecture intended to be readily configurable to meet customer needs. Kratos has told TWZ in the past that it has developed at least five distinct versions of the drone. The company has also been steadily working to expand the performance envelope of the design.

“We have several CTOL aircrafts [sic] … we’ve been working on it for about a year and a half,” Kratos’ Fendley told TWZ. The CTOL configuration is now “in production. Started on those earlier this year, and again, those aircraft are – some are ready, and some still in the pipeline.”

Overall, work on the CTOL version is pressing ahead, he added, while noting that RATO versions are also still being actively produced. Kratos has customers now for both versions.

The U.S. Air Force was the first known XQ-58 operator, and continues to utilize RATO types in support of research and development and test and evaluation activities. The Marine Corps also has a handful of RATO Valkyries, which it has been using to help lay the groundwork for its future operational fleet of CTOL types, which are now sometimes also referred to as MQ-58Bs. The Marines are hoping to see the delivery of the first of these drones in 2029.

Kratos has also publicly announced a partnership with European aviation giant Airbus to develop a version of the Valkyrie aimed at meeting German requirements for a CCA-type drone. When asked about other Valkyrie sales opportunities yesterday, Fendley told TWZ that there are a “number of other international customers,” but could not elaborate.

“We have a set of customers for each configuration, and in many cases, we have customers that want both configurations,” he did note. “They’ll do test and training ops generally with the CTOL variant, but then for forward-deployed scenarios or for scenarios where they want to maximize the payload capacity, they’ll use the RATO configuration. which allows capacity inside the bomb bay.”

At the time of writing, Kratos’ website says RATO XQ-58s can carry up to 1,200 pounds of stores in their internal centerline bay, as well as payloads weighing up to 600 pounds on a single hardpoint under each wing. The bay itself is also said to be sized around a loadout consisting of four 250-pound-class GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB). The SDB is just under 71 inches long and has a body that is 7.5 inches in diameter. The CTOL has half the internal payload capacity, both in terms of weight and physical space, per Kratos’ factsheet. RATO and CTOL types can both also carry additional payloads weighing up to 600 pounds on two external hardpoints, one under each wing.

As TWZ has noted in the past, the ability to operate from traditional runways and conduct static RATO launches both offer certain advantages in different contexts. As Fendley reiterated yesterday, RATO types offer valuable runway independence for forward-deployed operations, and dramatically expand the total number of potential launch and recovery points. Previously, Kratos has shown a concept for an entirely containerized static launch system, which would offer further operational flexibility.

All of this, in turn, could help enable distributed concepts of operations that are also intended to reduce vulnerability and otherwise complicate an opponent’s decision-making cycles. The U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force, in particular, see distributed deployment concepts as critical to success in future conflicts, especially a potential high-end fight, such as one against China in the Pacific. The Air Force’s particular set of operational concepts, which it currently calls Aegis Combat Employment (ACE), were baked into the requirements for its CCA drone program from the start.

In general, static RATO launch does impose constraints on maximum takeoff weight and, by extension, on range and payload capacity. Kratos has previously told TWZ that just using the trolley launch method offers an increase “in the 10s of % for both fuel and payload capacity.” How exactly the CTOL’s payload and performance compare to the RATO version in either of these different launch modes is unclear. As already noted, the CTOL version does have less capacity available in its internal bay because of the landing gear.

Kratos Valkyrie Trolley Launch System

Still, as we have previously written:

“The CTOL version offers a single platform with the flexibility to take off from conventional runways, which could allow for heavier overall weights, or to use the existing rocket-boosted method from a much wider array of potential operating locations. In a real-world operational scenario, the drones could fly a rocket-boosted mission to start, recover on a runway at a tertiary site, and then continue to fly sorties from there, or be deployed elsewhere. This would combine the benefits of runway independence, including the difficulties imposed on enemies trying to target what could be widely distributed launch points, during an initial wave, and the advantages offered by normal runway-centric tactical air operations for follow-on sorties.

…

“An XQ-58 that can land like any other fixed-wing aircraft on a runway offers advantages for resetting the drones and getting them back into the fight. It takes far more time and effort to get runway-independent types ready for relaunch after they touch down via parachute. That method of landing also relies on airbags to cushion the impact, and a failure of that element of the system can lead to significant damage. There is, of course, always the potential for accidents while operating from traditional runways. Regardless, a Valkyrie that uses a runway should be able to achieve significantly higher sortie rates.”

“The CTOL variant’s flexibility could also have benefits outside of a tactical scenario. TWZ has previously noted that a landing gear-equipped version would be easier to integrate, overall, with other tactical air assets that rely on traditional runways, which would also be relevant for training and other day-to-day peacetime activities. That being said, a significant portion of the Marine Corps’ future CCA fleets, as well as those that the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy plan to acquire and field, may not ever be daily fliers.”

As noted earlier, Fendley spoke directly to these latter points as important benefits of the CTOL configuration during his interview with us yesterday. There are still tradeoffs with the landing gear-equipped Valkyries, especially since they have to find a runway to touch down on even after a rocket-assisted launch. All of this, in turn, speaks to Fendley’s other comments about interest from customers in operating mixed fleets of RATO and CTOL types.

Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie Test Flight

Beyond the core RATO and CTOL configurations, “we have many different configurations of Valkyrie for many different mission profiles and scenarios that our customers want to resolve, handle, address with unmanned, uncrewed systems,” Fendley also told us. “The ability for that system to couple with either a fourth-gen or a fifth-gen system and increase the survivability, increase the lethality of either of those systems is fantastic.”

This “has really served us with respect to our customers who want to be able to have a defensive capability like that without expending their entire annual budget,” he continued.

The current price point for Valkyries in either the RATO or CTOL configurations is unclear. Kratos has told TWZ in the past that RATO versions are in roughly the $4 and $6 million unit cost range. Years ago, the company also said it was hoping to eventually drive the purchase price down to around $2 million. Economy of scale benefits could be on the horizon as Kratos works to ramp up Valkyrie production. The company is hoping to see the annual production rate rise to 40 airframes by 2028.

“We have increased our full year 2026 organic revenue growth forecast up to approximately 18 percent to 23 percent as compared to full year 2025, which now also includes an expectation of approximately 10 percent organic growth for our Unmanned Systems business based upon recent contract awards, including Valkyrie,” Kratos’ President and CEO Eric DeMarco said just earlier this week around the comapny’s release of its second quarters earnings report.

Kratos is also seeing a surge in interest across its tactical portfolio more broadly, driven by demand both for reusable platforms and long-range one-way attack drones. In speaking to us yesterday, Fendley specifically highlighted the company’s Tactical Firejet design, also known as Airwolf, which has now been adapted into a kamikaze drone. That work has been done in partnership with Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). You can read more about this variant, which is also called the Chien Feng IV (Mighty Hornet IV), here.

“And then, of course, our Mako system, which was our original tactical system, that we have a couple of customers who have become very interested in that,” Fendley also noted. This “is interesting because we developed that system in about the 2015-2016 timeframe, and all was quiet for a long time, and it’s really heated up in the, I would just say, in this calendar year. And I think some of that is based on world events, and some of it is based on the increase in budgets, particularly.”

Mako, also known as the UTAP-22, is a tactical combat drone derived from the BQM-167A Skeeter target drone, which Kratos also produces. Mako was at the center of a number of important experimental U.S. military drone programs in the late 2010s and early 2020s, but had appeared to be overtaken by the XQ-58, as well as more advanced designs from other companies. The design does still offer a tier of loyal wingman-type capability that could also come at lower cost compared to other options on the open market now. Mako might be adaptable to the one-way-attack role like the Tactical Firejet/Airwolf, as well.

In addition, Fendley offered positive assessments of ongoing development of the secretive Apollo, Athena, and Thanatos drones, but said he could not offer additional details given the level of classification surrounding those programs. This also just represents work the company is doing in the classified realm that we know about.

The Valkyrie family does remain front and center in Kratos’ tactical drone portfolio. This only looks set to continue with CTOL versions now being built and production ramping up overall for a growing number of customers globally.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Aug. 6 (UPI) — The Leipzig/Halle Airport in Schkeuditz, Saxony, Germany, resumed flights on Thursday after a drone fitted with an explosive device was discovered there a day before.

German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said on Wednesday that the discovery of an explosive device points to a “new threat scenario” facing Germany.

“Drone sightings, drone threats including in a hybrid context, are something we know from the past,” Dobrindt said. “That a drone armed with explosives is at an airport is a new threat scenario. We are dealing with a competition here which may also include foreign powers.”

The drone was discovered near a Ukrainian cargo plane, causing several flights to divert to other airports. In a separate incident, a DHL cargo plane collided with a drone during, causing it to abort its landing.

There were no injuries reported from either incident. The plane that collided with a drone suffered mild damage to its nose.

Germany is the largest national supporter of Ukraine‘s military operations.

“Any speculation on these matters may not be heading in the right direction; could simply be completely wrong,” Dobrindt said. “The priority right now is to investigate in all directions.”

After the explosive device was discovered on the drone, its detonator was safely removed by a bomb disposal robot.

German newspaper Bild reports that a technical malfunction may have been the only thing that stopped the explosive device from detonating.

Boeing and Northrop Grumman are laying the groundwork to take teaming between the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol plane and the MQ-4C Triton long-endurance maritime surveillance drone to a new level. A first-of-its-kind test has demonstrated common command and control architectures that will enable P-8A crews to issue orders to MQ-4Cs. The drones would then perform their assigned missions autonomously and report back. The Poseidon and Triton were designed to operate as a team from the start, but the ability to task the uncrewed aircraft directly in flight would offer new flexibility, especially to respond to sudden changes in the battlespace.

Press releases today from Boeing and Northrop Grumman shared details of the recent P-8/MQ-4 teaming test. The testing was conducted in a laboratory environment and no real aircraft were involved.

“A P-8A operator issued machine readable, machine actionable mission tasking to a simulated MQ-4C Triton using UCI [Universal Command & Control Interface] formatted messages,” according to Boeing’s release. “The P-8A cued the Triton transit to a specific area. After receiving the request, the Triton autonomously planned and executed a transit to the area, employed sensors per the tasking, processed findings onboard, and reported results back to the P-8A Poseidon.”

“In the exchange, Triton’s system used AI [artificial intelligence] algorithms to collect, process and share intelligence data with P-8A Poseidon in response to a request sent by the P-8A Poseidon system,” Northrop Grumman also said in its release.

“Data routes included satellite relay to reflect realistic operational communications. Mission management and autonomy layers communicated via OMS/UCI [Open Mission Systems/Universal Command & Control Interface] rather than custom point to point interfaces,” Boeing’s release adds. “Using UCI, the platforms can collaborate with any U.S. or allied asset sharing the same interface – reducing operator workload by distributing the mission tasks and accelerating commander decisions, making integration across platforms quicker and more cost effective.”

The P-8A was designed primarily as a maritime patrol platform, but has substantial additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities baked in. This includes a surface search radar that also has a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode, allowing it to capture still radar ‘images,’ even through cloud cover, smoke, and dust, and at night. It also has a sensor turret with electro-optical and infrared full-motion video cameras, as well as a robust signals intelligence suite, as you can read more about here. Its communications capabilities are also critical to making use of all the intelligence it gathers, as well as leveraging data gathered by other platforms. The U.S. Navy also operates more specialized versions of the Poseidon with very advanced add-on sensor systems.

The MQ-4C, which was derived from the RQ-4 Global Hawk drone, has a radar with a SAR mode, as well as electro-optical and infrared cameras, as well. In addition, the drones have electronic support measures systems that allow for the collection of electronic intelligence passively. Unlike Global Hawk, Triton also notably has the ability to descend to lower altitudes to more closely investigate targets of interest.

So far, the United States and Australia are the only countries to operate the MQ-4C, and both of them also have fleets of P-8s. Canada, Denmark, Germany, India, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, and the United Kingdom all fly P-8s or are in the process of acquiring them, as well. Last month, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Norway announced a new joint plan to acquire and operate a fleet of Triton drones under the umbrella of the NATO alliance.

As already noted, the intention has always been for the P-8A and MQ-4C to work closely together, and the U.S. Navy actively teams the two platforms up today.

“Currently, the MQ-4C is being used as a long endurance, maritime ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] asset, that often times feeds us updated posits [positions] on contacts of interest,” a P-8A pilot assigned to the Navy’s Patrol Squadron Five (VP-5), the “Mad Foxes,” explained to TWZ in an interview years ago. “They can fly significantly higher and longer than us and are able to provide a more constant feed of ISR.”

“The Triton will be flown and monitored out of NAS Jacksonville [Naval Air Station Jacksonville in Florida], and we have already seen some pilots and NFOs [naval flight officers] being selected to operate the aircraft,” the Navy P-8A pilot also noted at that time, and this is the crux of the matter.

What Boeing and Northrop Grumman have now demonstrated, at least in a test lab, is the ability of P-8A crews to dynamically task and retask MQ-4Cs without having to go through a command center on the ground that could be thousands of miles away. This, in turn, can only speed up the process of responding to sudden developments, which could include potential threats that pop up unexpectedly or targets of interest that appear to be fleeting.

As the pilot from VP-5 previously explained, the MQ-4C already offers a valuable broad-area maritime surveillance asset that can cover vastly more area, and do so more persistently, than a P-8A can by itself. This, in turn, can also help keep Poseidons further away from potential dangers.

Though treated as something of an aside in the press releases today, work to enable the MQ-4C to do at least some level of immediate autonomous processing of the data it collects using AI-driven systems is also an important development. The amount of data that drones like the Triton can collect can easily be overwhelming for sensor operators and intelligence analysts. A new electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) suite is in development now for the MQ-4C that will only expand the breadth and volume of data the drones can collect. The U.S. Navy is also in the process of upgrading its P-8As with the explicit aim of improving their already substantial ISR, targeting, and networking capabilities.

With all this in mind, the ability to detect and classify potential items of interest and then highlight them for human personnel offers immense benefits for shrinking down the time it takes to go from data collection to appropriate action. Having a collection platform, crewed or uncrewed, do at least some of that work in an automated fashion upfront can only help further speed up the process. Not having to send as much data can help reduce bandwidth demands and, by extension, latency in the transfer, too.

The OMS/UCI architecture used to support the new P-8/MQ-4C teaming testing could further open the door to pairing the Poseidon with other uncrewed teammates, as well. General Atomics has already been pitching the SeaGuardian version of its MQ-9B drone as a new partner for the P-8A. In its standard configuration, the SeaGuardian is also primarily intended for maritime surveillance and reconnaissance. However, there has also been work to give the drone new capabilities to support anti-submarine warfare missions, including with underwing dispensers for sonobuoys and the ability to pass data they collect along to other nodes.

We could see more teaming opportunities emerge for the P-8A in the future on the smaller tactical side if the aircraft gain the ability to launch drones of their own. TWZ has laid out a detailed case for adding this capability to the Poseidon in the past. More broadly speaking, the U.S. military is investing heavily in crewed-uncrewed teaming capabilities in the air and in other domains, and this is also a growing trend globally.

Especially with the P-8 user base already large and continuing to expand, a new level of interoperability between the Poseidon and the Triton, specifically, could be valuable for the U.S. military and its allies and partners during future coalition operations. This could also create new interest in the MQ-4C among existing and future P-8 operators.

“MQ-4C Triton and P-8A are the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s maritime patrol and reconnaissance force, delivering complementary capabilities unmatched by any other platforms,” Jane Bishop, Vice President and General Manager of the Global Surveillance Division at Northrop Grumman, said in a statement today. “This demonstration underscores the flexibility of our systems, our unwavering industry investment and the strength of our industry relationships. Our commitment to pushing the boundaries of advanced technology ensures that the U.S. and allied nations operators maintain an unparalleled edge against evolving maritime threats.”

“This Poseidon-Triton teaming demonstration unlocks real-world capability and interoperability for the U.S. and allies,” Tory Peterson, Vice President of the P-8 program at Boeing, also said in a statement. “We’re investing so that current and future global P-8A operators can expand the scope and effectiveness of their missions with low risk, evolutionary enhancements on the most advanced maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft already in service.”

It remains to be seen when Boeing and Northrop Grumman might demonstrate the new P-8/MQ-4C teaming capabilities in a real-world flight test.

“Next steps and timing will depend on customer requirements and would follow established acquisition, testing and fielding paths,” a Boeing spokesperson told TWZ when asked about any potential flight testing plans. “This was a jointly funded technology collaboration between Boeing and Northrop Grumman, demonstrating a practical, low-risk approach for integrating standards-based capabilities into existing platforms.”

The recent laboratory test is still an important step toward a future in which P-8A crews are able to issue direct commands to their uncrewed MQ-4C partners.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Egypt has moved from rhetorical backing of Sudan’s army to active enabler of its war effort, with a covert drone hub on Egyptian soil symbolising how Cairo has tied its regional strategy to the survival of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Since fighting erupted between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, Egypt has framed its stance as defence of Sudan’s “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” and of its “national institutions, particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces.” Officially, President Abdel Fattah al‑Sisi repeats pledges of “non‑interference,” presenting Egypt’s role as limited to mediation, humanitarian aid and hosting Sudanese refugees.

In practice, that line has steadily eroded. Years of joint drills, intelligence sharing and arms ties since 2019 created deep interoperability between the two militaries, well before the civil war began. Egyptian troops captured by the RSF at Merowe airbase in April 2023 were explained away as being on pre‑scheduled exercises, a narrative few regional observers accepted.

The New York Times investigation into East Oweinat in Egypt’s Western Desert crystallises this shift from backstage support to direct operational involvement. Satellite imagery, flight records and videos show a once‑civil agricultural airstrip expanded since 2018 with a second runway, new hangars and satellite links, and by 2025 hosting Turkish Akinci combat drones.

According to U.S. and European officials cited in that reporting, those drones have for at least six months flown strike missions into Sudan, hitting RSF targets up to hundreds of miles inside the country, including convoys on supply routes from Libya and Chad. The drones and their munitions match Turkish systems, but are based on Egyptian territory and shield Sudan’s military assets from RSF retaliation, blurring whether Cairo is merely hosting or also directing the campaign.

For Cairo, East Oweinat offers plausible deniability: operations are embedded in a desert reclamation project far from public scrutiny, yet close enough to Sudan’s border to project sustained air power. For Sudan’s army, it is a lifeline in a war where the RSF has excelled at capturing bases and shooting down drones; at least several Akinci units have reportedly been lost to RSF fire in recent months.

RSF statements and battlefield evidence further illuminate the depth of Egyptian support. In January 2026 the RSF published what it called “irrefutable” proof of Egypt’s direct role, citing captured Egyptian‑made ammunition, armoured vehicles and testimonies from detained SAF‑aligned commanders who described arms, training and medical support routed from Egypt.

Egypt’s wager on the SAF is rooted in hard security and regime‑survival logic. Egyptian strategists see Sudan’s collapse as an existential threat, evoking fears of refugee flows and arms smuggling on a porous southern frontier. Control of the Nile is still more fundamental: since the 2019 fall of Omar al‑Bashir, Cairo has tightened security and military coordination with Khartoum to present a united front against Ethiopia’s GERD and protect its historic water share.

There is also an ideological affinity. General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan is a career officer with long‑standing ties to Egyptian commanders, and his military rule mirrors Sisi’s own path from barracks to presidency. Backing the SAF fits a long‑standing Egyptian instinct to side with Sudan’s regular army “whoever is in charge of it,” and more broadly to prefer strong central militaries over unruly civilian transitions in the Arab world. The SAF’s reliance upon Muslim Brotherhood–aligned militias and ideologues, including the glorification of early militant figures such as Bara Bin Malik, against the backdrop of Washington’s formal designation of key Muslim Brotherhood chapters as terrorist organisations, should be unsettling to Cairo.

Yet by 2026, Egypt’s bet looks increasingly brittle. The war has killed tens of thousands, displaced more than 14 million and pushed parts of Sudan close to famine, while neither side has secured decisive control. Burhan’s legitimacy is deeply disputed: he led the 2021 coup that derailed a fragile civilian‑military transition, and many of the forces that drove the 2018–19 uprising see him as the continuation of military dominance, not a route to elections.

Cairo’s categorical rejection of “parallel entities” and alternative governments in exile is presented as a defence of Sudanese unity, but in effect delegitimises broad civilian coalitions trying to organise outside the SAF–RSF binary. By equating Sudan’s “national institutions” with the current military leadership, Egypt narrows the field of acceptable interlocutors to a junta whose territorial control and popular backing are both eroding.

At the same time, Egypt seeks recognition as a mediator, through formats like the Quad and by hosting conferences of Sudanese civil and political actors in Cairo. That posture sits uneasily with explicit promises not to be “lax or late in supporting the legitimate Sudanese government” under Burhan, and with mounting evidence of Egyptian‑based air operations in the conflict. The covert base in the desert, and the drones that rise from its runways toward Sudanese skies, have become emblematic of a policy that claims non‑interference while in practice helping to lock Sudan into a devastating, externalised war.

As a keen reminder of the threats Ukraine is facing, Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh had to stop a recent interview with TWZ to scramble to a shelter as Russian ballistic missiles were approaching. A 35-year-old architect by training, Terekh helped turn Fire Point from a Ukrainian start-up making weapons in a garage into a leading producer of indigenously made long-range strike drones and missiles, and we talked to her about the company’s weapons and future plans. 

Fire Point’s FP-1 and FP-2 drones have been striking Russian targets to devastating effect and its heavy-hitting Flamingo cruise missiles are adding a new level of long-range threat. 

Beyond these, Fire Point is developing the FP-9 ballistic missile to hit targets up to about 500 miles away and the FP-7.x ballistic missile interceptor, intended to provide a more plentiful and cheaper alternative to Patriot munitions.

Among the many topics discussed, Terekh talked about the status of the FP-9 ballistic missile program, roadblocks to fielding an indigenous Patriot interceptor alternative, how her firm is using AI, why the FP-2 drones were so successful against Russian ships in the Sea of Azov and the challenges of building complex weapons systems while under constant Russian fire. Some of the questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity.

Q: Tell me how Fire Point came to build drones and missiles.

A: Well, we started with the intention to win the war and destroy the Russian Empire, some knowledge in engineering, physics, mathematics, and industrial production, and we started with the FP-1 drone, which was basically the idea behind this. There were two ideas. First is to make an analog of the Shahed drone by technical characteristics, and the second was to utilize a huge stock of Fab 50 bombs. It’s an old Soviet aviation bomb. There was a rumor that there were dozens of thousands of these in Ukrainian stocks, so we decided to build a platform to carry this huge stock.

When we finished designing the aircraft, it turned out that this rumor was just a rumor about the huge stocks of Fab 50s. But anyway, this was a start for FP-1. And when we started to really scale up the production and design a model that would be fitting to be scaled at volume, then we were forced to build a lot of satellite productions around the main production because very soon we met all the possible bottlenecks. And while developing this huge satellite network of productions of the spare parts of different components, we understood that probably we now have enough missiles to go into missile design. That’s the short story.

Footage of the production and testing of the FP-1/2 attack UAVs and the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile

Q: The Flamingo ground-launched cruise missile, which broke cover last fall, has a claimed range of about 1,800 miles. It uses Ivchenko AI-25 turbofan engines that are commonly found on the L-39 Albatros jet trainer. How many of these engines still exist and how long can you sustain production with those surplus powerplants without switching to something that can be produced en masse cheaply today?

A: First of all, the AI-25 TL was the initial engine with which we started to fly, but this is just one of five different engines that we use on Flamingo. So it’s not the only engine, and Flamingo was initially designed to be flexible and to be able to work with different types of engines. So we can really widen up the stock of used engines. 

But at the same time, we started to develop our own turbojet engine with the same design bureau that designed the 25 TL many years ago, and we built it specifically for the purpose of UAV, not for aviation. And it took quite some time, more than a year and a half. And now we are assembling our first 10 prototypes of the future turbojet fan engines of our production.

The AI-25 turbofan engine, part 1

Q: And when will that be ready?

A: As soon as possible. Obviously it is harder to make a turbojet engine than it is to make a missile.

Q: What’s the timeline?

A: The goal is to finish testing all the samples and making all the improvements by the end of this year, and next year go into mass production. 

Q: Fire Point has said that it aims to increase Flamingo production to a daily rate of at least seven missiles by October of this year. This would translate to 2,555 built annually. How can you make this happen?

A: We did not increase the production to these numbers. This is the maximum capacity of our production that we built. Unfortunately, since Ukraine was waiting for the funds coming from the European Union loan, the orders did not match the maximum capacity of the production, so the production was lowered to a lower percentage of what it could possibly provide. We expect to ramp it up to the named number. Probably by the end of this year or beginning next year. It depends on how the contracts will arrive. 

Q: How does the Flamingo do its job? Can you run us through what mission preparation, launch, navigation, impact and after action activities look like? 

A: I personally place Flamingo in the drone category, despite the fact that it’s a big missile, because the process looks almost the same. 

Of course, there are nuances that we need to count on during mission planning, but the mission planning is on the side of Ukrainian armed forces. In terms of our company, as a manufacturer, we do a very detailed after-action review. After each mission, we understand how it reacted to electronic warfare. We were able to do a very effective countermeasure against on-ground air defense systems like Pantsir and Tor. So basically, there is just one threat that is really left for Flamingo, and this is aviation. Against this, we cannot really fight. Otherwise, it’s half of the technical perfection of the missile and half of the art of mission planning. So, to fly as low as possible to plan the mission correctly, to understand the altitudes, we cannot afford the luxury of doing the ramp up before the final attack, because then we would be visible to radars. 

Therefore, when you plan the ramp up picket, it is much easier than to plan a very smooth, almost horizontal few degrees attack. 

Anyway, our armed forces already mastered this as well, and from our side, it is important that we provide a navigation solution that is completely resistant towards electronic warfare, jamming, spoofing, any sort of interference, and this we did. So we see the improvements after each mission on both sides, both on our software part and on the mission planning part.

Q: What navigation and target package suites are available for Flamingo at this time? What about in the future?

A: I don’t want to name exact systems for obvious reasons, but it’s a combination of a [Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna] antenna, inertial navigation system, of specific software, of additional data sources, and sometimes it’s visual navigation as well.

Q: Olena Kryzhanivska, a defense fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, recently told the New York Times that the Flamingo missiles have shown “low effectiveness,” possibly because of accuracy problems and that the “results that we see are not the ones that Ukraine would like to have.” How do you respond?

A: Honestly, I don’t respond to such things at all because in the end, we are no magicians. If anybody could create a cruise missile in one year and then already pay back all of the money spent on this missile with the effect of the damage on the enemy’s territory, they can show better and more effective results.

Ukraine’s New FP-5 Missile Has Twice the Range of a Tomahawk | WSJ Equipped

Q: Let’s talk about the FP-9. Ukraine getting its own ballistic missile is a big deal. What went into developing it and what can you tell us about its design?

A: The FP-9 is a missile that we planned would be able to reach Moscow with a range of 850 kilometers. It required building the whole new infrastructure specifically for casting solid rocket propellants in such a huge amount. The engine itself is 4.6 tons of solid rocket fuel, compared to FP-7, where it’s just one ton of solid rocket fuel, so a whole set of factories of preparation infrastructure. 

Anyway, as we are speaking now, the engines are being cast. Therefore, we expect test launches soon, as soon as possible. The navigation solution, everything else on this missile is already ready. So basically, it’s the last touch on the engine, and we are ready to start. 

Ukrainian FP-9 ballistics ready to strike! 800 km range – MOSCOW is now within reach!

Q: So when will it be operational? It hasn’t been used yet, right?

A: No, we are preparing for the first flight.

Q: When do you think that will be?

A: I understand the curiosity behind the question on when exactly this would happen, but we have our specific dates in mind where we are aiming. But I don’t like naming them because a lot of things could go wrong on the way, so my expectation is that this would be autumn. I would not specify better at this moment.

Q: For the FP-9 ballistic missile, Ukraine had to build a new solid-fuel engine casting facility. How difficult was that and what is the status of it?

A: Obviously, it was quite a challenge because we do have such a factory. Ukraine had such a factory in Pavlograd, but Pavlograd is under constant attack, and also they’re using a little bit different technology for that. We understand if we do not build an alternative to Pavlograd, then we will have no future for the missile program. 

So we built multiple factories in Ukraine and one in Denmark for the sake of solving this task. Of course, it’s extremely challenging. It’s equipment. It’s mixers for casting. It’s a specific post-curing process, casting process. This is a dangerous production, and we had to reinvent in a way this whole technology almost from scratch. Therefore, it was quite a challenge, but I like how it went out. Since we are already casting a lot of solid rocket fuel for smaller rockets, I like how it’s developing and how it’s going. 

Q: How difficult is it to put all this together from so many dispersed locations?

A: Well, the logistics are hell, to be frank (chuckles). But we do not have the luxury to have the factory in a classic way, with the walls and roof, we if when I say factory and we have 90 of them in the moment, when I say factory I mean this whole ecosystem with logistics, with warehouses, everything is hidden and dissolved in a way that the critical components are always duplicated, triplicated, quadruplicated. It’s a lot of additional investments and, of course, a lot of risks and a lot of additional time for logistics specifically, but again, we do not have any other choice. Therefore, the factory in this matter is a whole ecosystem.

Q: Fire Point claims that Ukraine can build missiles faster than Russia by building cheaper, less complex missiles. How would that work?

A: I personally believe that if you want to build something in volume, you need to think of this from day one of future product development, and this is probably a critical thing that we changed in this culture at Fire Point. So understanding how the production works is a very important thought to be established as a fundament of the future development. So in practice, how it looks when we start the R&D process, our chief designer has a lot of ideas. But I have the power to interrupt and to block any idea that will not be possible to mass produce later. Therefore, we are rethinking and rethinking until we get the solution that is possible to mass produce. 

And when you think of this in the design stage, then of course it is easier to do it. In fact, and also technological sovereignty is very important for all the critical components and processes. We have our own capabilities inside Fire Point, all the critical, even the machine production. So we do cover lots of things. We rely at least on subcontractors and contractors, and we try to set up the maximum control over the supply chain. 

Author’s note: At this point Terekh stops talking and looks at her phone.

Terekh: I am looking to see if this is a ballistic missile attack or not. Yeah, it’s ballistics. So, I would be glad to maybe talk more with you on this point, but I have to evacuate now to the shelter. The flight time is like two minutes.

Author’s note: A week later, we continued the conversation.

Q: Can you talk about the arrangement with Diehl Defense to build Flamingos in Germany? How does this help Fire Point and Ukraine? Can you provide any details about the new seeker Diehl is working to outfit the weapon with and any other details about how Diehl will improve the munition?

A: I cannot provide many details yet because the negotiations are ongoing. But basically, in terms of Germany, we are in negotiations with Diehl Defense, they initiated this discussion. We, I’m sure, can be a mutually interested industrial partner for each other. There is something that Diehl can bring to the table in terms of technology. There is definitely something that we could bring to the table in terms of technology and industrial knowledge.

So I consider such types of negotiations and cooperations very useful. Because the way big primes rethink their future by learning from Ukrainian companies and at the same time using their legacy knowledge for future development – I think is very fruitful for both sides. And of course, it all started by an initiative of the German government because everybody wants to have long-range capabilities of domestic production. 

Q: Let’s talk about the FP-1 drone. Created in 2023, it has been widely used in Ukrainian attacks on targets deep inside Russia. How did you ramp up production of this system and improve it to keep it effective against always adapting Russian defenses?

A: At the beginning, I thought that just constantly analyzing the feedback in a correct way, and then adapting and making changes would be enough. But from today’s point of view, I would say that’s definitely not enough. You have to be so deep in the context of what’s happening on the front line, and in general of the development of enemy tactics of electronic warfare. So you have to be able to make some sort of forecast and try to predict what will happen in the future, find a solution for this future problem, test it, validate it, and when the problem actually comes, you have to have something on your shelf already ready for solving this solution. 

So we are trying to trick the timelines a little bit, even if in some cases, my forecasts are not correct. Eighty percent of the time, they are correct, and that’s definitely enough to always keep up in this technological race. 

You can see video of an FP-1 drone being used in an attack below:

Q: There are now two configurations of this drone, one for longer range and one for a larger warhead. Can you talk about them and how they were adapted to be useful over such a wide range of target sets?

A: You know, when we just made the FP-1, it was just 700 kilometers, and then we found a way to increase the distance and increase the accuracy as well. The same logic happened with FP-2. It started as a middle strike of 200 kilometers, and now it’s up to 500 kilometers. So these are gentle improvements, or as I call them, nuanceful improvements. You can work with an engine. You can work with engine consumption. You can work with reassembling some part of the aircraft in a way that is more aerodynamically effective. So when you make a product that you are satisfied with, there is always room for improvement, to be frank. 

In the case of the longer-ranged version of FP-1, it is a little bit more complicated in production. So it’s not possible, at the moment, to make 300 of them per day, but it allows us to go such long distances. It has a different wing. This wing contains additional fuel tanks, and there are also some minor improvements here and there that provide this result.

Q: And the FP-2?

A: The same logic. It could be different changes, but the same logic.

Q: Can you provide any insights into the ongoing Sea of Azov campaign against Russian shipping that relies heavily on the FP-2 drone? What makes this a good weapon for such attacks?

A: It is controlled manually. There is additional AI assistance on that control. So basically, that makes it the best option to fight dynamic moving targets. Especially, it has multiple options for content streamline. I would explain it like this. So, in case one type of connectivity does not work, there are other options for this as well, and it is very effective when you are controlling your aircraft in real time. Then the pilot can target the most vulnerable part of the ship, and unfortunately, as far as I can see, these are the only sanctions that our enemy really understands.

Q: What other options are there when one type of connectivity doesn’t work?

A: I don’t really want to share exactly what the setup we use is because the more detailed I will explain it, the faster the enemy will find the countermeasures for this.

The following video shows Fire Point drones being used to attack Russian ships in the Sea of Azov:

Q: News reports state that you look to arm this drone with rockets to take on multiple ground targets at standoff ranges. Can you talk about this concept and how you aim to see it be used on the battlefield? 

A: Actually, the FP-1 and FP-2 are pretty universal platforms. There are so many versions of this that we didn’t announce it publicly yet, however these airplanes can make a lot of different side quests, and one of these side quests is of course carrying uncontrolled short-range missiles. We do have a huge stockpile of this missile in the Ukrainian army that is not largely used, and it is the way to utilize them with the most possible sense. It helps to counterattack the mobile interceptor groups, and when the aircraft is done with letting the missiles out, it can go further for the initial mission. So it’s really like a side quest. 

Q: What kind of rockets are you talking about?

A: Old Soviet 57mm S-5 rockets.

Soviet 57mm S-5KO High Explosive Anti-Tank FRAG Aircraft Rocket #military #coldwar #airforce #rocket

Q: How many S-5 rockets can it carry?

A: But it could be any, to be frank. But that does not matter much.

Q: But how many can the drone carry?

A: Eight.

You can see an FP-1 drone launching rockets in this video:

Q: How do you use AI in these drones and other weapons? Where is this headed in the future? 

A: Since we are using quite a big platform, our user experience with AI is slightly different from smaller FPV or reconnaissance drones. We use it for visual map-matching for final target corrections. But I do not say that it’s largely changing the narrative of how we’re using drones because I still believe there should be a person behind making a final decision. So we do use AI a lot in our daily work in software development, in technical consultancy, but in terms of directing the flight, it is still in the end a human who makes the final decision.

Q: Do you use man-in-the-loop or man-on-the-loop?

A: Both.

Q: Can you provide more details about how you use AI in the terminal phase of an attack?

A: There are multiple versions for this type of terminal work. At the moment, we are mostly at the point of collecting more precise data for more inertial platforms like ours. At the same time, it helps to correct and lead the aircraft if the connectivity is lost for quite some time because it has the target recognition possibility and the final targeting as well. But it should still be human-in-the-loop at this moment. 

Q: Where is this headed in the future? 

A: You know, AI companies are now hiring philosophers to decide on where it’s heading in the future. My perfect scenario would be that we will use AI for finding alternative deterrence options. What I mean is, instead of just relying on nukes as a deterrent, it could be that we will build some sort of drone walls, or we will operate the kill zones where the decision-making would be solely on AI. 

There are pros and cons to this as well. For example, we all knew of cases where Russians were infiltrating their agents in the governments of different countries, and when it came to making a fair response to barbarian actions, somebody sabotaged this fair response. So probably AI could be an instrument to provide an immediate response for aggressive actions in the future of whoever this could be, the aggressor. I don’t have a clear answer. Obviously, we are all thinking about this: to what point we can delegate the responsibility, and it’s still an open question.

Q: Satellite communications are also key to long-range strikes against dynamic targets like ships. How has the miniaturization of this technology changed how your products are used? 

A: Miniaturization is crucial, but that is all the detail I can share at this stage.

Q: Let’s talk about Project Freya and the FP-7.x interceptor missile you are developing. Who is providing the seeker to make this work? What is the timeline and what are the expected costs per interceptor? And how will it compare to PAC-3 Patriot?

A: We are working with two European and one Ukrainian company on secret development, and I don’t know which of the options would be the fastest out of this. The final goal is to make the whole interceptor cheaper than 1 million euros. I think with the expected price range of the seekers that we discussed with our partners, this is doable. Probably not from the first iterations, but definitely in serial production. 

Q: What seekers are you using, and from which companies?

A: It is [imaging infrared] seekers. One deal is public, so one option is from Diehl Defense that we are currently integrating. The other is – I don’t know if they’re comfortable with public disclosure yet, so I have to talk with them first.

Q: What’s the timeline for this?

A: Nobody can answer at this point. So the deep technical integration is happening right now. We expect, of course, it to be in the nearest months, because the seekers aside, we are on a good level of readiness. But nobody can answer this point. 

Q: What’s the major issue that still has to be overcome?

A: On technical integration?

Q: On being able to produce the interceptor at scale.

A: If we look at everything but the seeker, our production is already ready, even for mass production, and we finished all the tests on this matter. But the amount in which we will have seekers and their accuracy and the results of technical integration – it’s still something that we are cooking at the moment. Of course, we will be doing our best to maximize both the accuracy, the energy consumption, and the mass production in the future. But we have to understand that even the seeker manufacturers are doing this for the first time in such an integration. So it requires a lot of talent, a lot.

Q: How will it compare to PAC-3 Patriot interceptor?

A: The PAC-3 is a different missile designed for different consumption levels. I think FP-7.x is more comparable in the first iteration to the Patriot PAC-2 because we do not expect immediate success with hit-to-kill, and the first interception we expect to do with the blast interception. Hit-to-kill is the next iteration. So at the beginning we will have more the analog of the PAC-2, but more mass-produced and cheaper.

Q: How many do you think you will be able to make?

A: From our side, we are ready to make almost an infinite amount. So we are targeting to do at least 2,000 a year as a starter, and then develop the production. Right now, we are solving the bottlenecks again, especially on the seeker part of this. But everything that is dependent on Fire Point, we can scale these numbers up.

Q: What do you think about the Patriot interceptor licensing deal Presidents Trump and Zelensky discussed before the American leader backed away from that? Would this affect anything you are doing?

A: No, it could be a good addition to what we are already doing.

Q: Why?

A: Because, in my opinion, every industrial corporation is like the greatest university of all. And the more you cooperate with different companies – there are not that many companies in the world who can produce anti-ballistic capabilities, and we have to kind of stay together on solving massive threats.

Q: On his last day as defense minister, Mykhalio Fedorov wrote that “a successful ballistics test was conducted, which was developed within the Ministry of Defense’s area of responsibility. We significantly changed the technical specifications and demonstrated maximum accuracy. We reduced the price by 30%. Ukraine will enter a new league.” Is this something you are working on or is it the government-run Sapsan program? What can you tell me about this?

A: I don’t know what exactly his words meant to be about because around the same time we were both testing our missiles and Pivdenne was testing theirs [the Sapsan], but from what I know, Sapsan also got a big improvement, and they had recently one of their first big successes with accuracy and technologically. So I think probably he meant both of us or just Sapsan. I don’t know.

🚀 Moscow has a new reason to worry. Ukraine has tested a new ballistic missile

In his farewell post, Mykhailo Fedorov revealed that successful tests of a Ukrainian ballistic missile took place on the very day the government stepped down. He did not specify which missile it was.… pic.twitter.com/PoprVjAUx8

— NEXTA (@nexta_tv) July 16, 2026

Q: A little more than six months after naming the tech-savvy Fedorov defense minister, Zelensky fired him, ultimately replacing him with Major General Yevhen Khmara, who now serves as acting defense minister. How has the change in command in the Ministry of Defense affected Fire Point and Ukrainian domestic weapons development in general?

A: I think in general, our president has a big vision on why he’s doing specific things. The team of Mykhailo Fedorov helped a lot to develop Ukrainian industry, specifically with removing a lot of bureaucracy from the process. I think this initiative alone was the reason why Ukrainian industry is looking like this today. It was back in 2023. But the new minister is a war person. He is deep in the knowledge of asymmetric actions. So we expect a positive future.

Q: Fire Point has talked about the need for a Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) UAS armed with a 30mm cannon that can intercept glide bombs before they hit their targets. What details can you provide about that?

A: There is a version of this, like an interceptor. We have multiple versions for interceptors on the platform of FP-1. One is with a gun, the other with small interceptors, like the ones that are popular now, the [General Cherry] Bullet interceptors. And there are also a few other options. As I mentioned at the beginning, it’s a pretty universal platform that can do a side quest. 

Q: What kind of gun are you talking about?

A: Honestly, it was created to intercept Shaheds. I think for intercepting the glide bombs, it’s almost impossible to do so after the glide bomb has left the aircraft. It looks unrealistic to me, to be frank. Maybe, there would be a way, for example, to try and catch the aircraft before it launches. But the most effective way to fight glide bombs is to destroy Russian aviation, and I don’t know yet a more effective way to do this. 

⚡ Russia may have brought back UMPB-5R jet-powered glide bombs. Recent strikes suggest the weapons can reach targets about 150 km away.https://t.co/xiZ6Nf0H1X

— Militarnyi (@militarnyi) August 2, 2026

Q: What else is on the horizon for Fire Point? What new capabilities and platforms are you looking at developing and what battlefield realities are driving those developments?

A: Aside from everything that is well known, we are also focusing on creating our own satellite constellation, so we have an independent connectivity for the drones. So this is one of the focuses, and of course we are working on improving the autonomous flight for the drones, so there are many small and big developments, but the biggest one is probably satcom.

Q: Tell me about this. Are you actually going to launch your own satellites? Are you building satellites for someone else to launch?

A: We are working together with a company that produces satellites, and we are also starting to develop our future possibility to deliver satellites. We are far from that yet, but we already have the equipment, and we already are experimenting with the bigger rocket engines. So this development had already started. It’s not the main focus at the moment, of course, because at the moment we have to win the war first. But this is something we are preparing for the future. 

Q: What company are you working with?

A: Again, I have to talk with them whether or not they want to be public.

Q: Finally, what about Fire Point as a weapons exporter? Where do you see the company as a global arms provider in the near future and after the war hopefully ends?

A: We have a big interest from a majority of European countries to have Fire Point products in their armies, and we already started to work on that because they all saw the threat that may potentially come from Russia. Of course, we also have other negotiations, but now we have to be more careful how we ensure that our products do not wind up with the bad guys. So every export movement would be treated with the maximum cautiousness.

Q: How could your weapons land in the hands of the bad guys?

A: Ah, that’s a good question, how these deals could be possibly secured from being redirected to the wrong place? We have a huge level of trust with our partners, but those countries that are new to us, we do not yet have this relationship and this level of trust.

Q: Are you selling any weapons right now to either the U.S. or, say, some of the Gulf Arab nations, given what’s going on there? 

A: Not at the moment.

Q: Are you in negotiations with the U.S. and/or Gulf Arab nations?

A: Yeah, we have a lot of negotiations and discussions going on in parallel. I will comment once the negotiations are successful.

Q: Are there any weapons or products that you’re developing that I haven’t asked about?

A: I think it is important to understand that we will soon consider all the weapons more in terms of security subscription rather than actual hardware product.

Q: What do you mean?

A: I mean the amount of updates that we make, even on the software side, is huge and happens so often. It kinda reminds me of how you update your smartphone. This does not mean that you have to buy each new smartphone every month, but the software updates quite fast, and also could be that in a year or two you will need a new smartphone. So Ukraine is rethinking the weaponry more in the possibility of how the company can ensure that the army will always have a capability, and how this capability is provided is now a headache of the company. 

So in the old model, when a defense contractor delivers the contract, that’s it. Maybe after some time he will be called for maintenance. But our responsibility isn’t finished on the day that we deploy the weapon, but after I finally receive the post-flight analysis and I’m happy with this. So the whole logistic services, software updates, up-training, any changes that are happening on the way we do by ourselves. The end user can focus on launching and planning the missions, and of course we work shoulder to shoulder to ensure that we will use the battlefield data to a maximum level of usefulness.

The post-Cold War order was built on assumptions russia never shared.

Today’s queues at the Fire Point stand suggest Europe has understood the assignment.

Exceptional second day at Eurosatory. pic.twitter.com/hwMLEMcZXN

— terekh (@iraterekh) June 16, 2026

Q: What can the U.S. learn from Fire Point?

A: Make the market more transparent and attractive to younger startups. Remove bureaucracy as much as possible, share the risks with the contractors to make everybody more flexible, and probably that’s it. 

Contact the author: howard@twz.com