Delcys

The plot has thickened. After having him removed from the Industry and National Production Ministry, sacking his trophy wife from government and keeping him in unpublicized captivity for three months, the Rodriguez administration completed a spectacular U-turn on Alex Saab. Madurismo’s shady financier and fixer is once again in US custody, two years after Maduro and the Rodríguez siblings celebrated his return through a prisoner swap brokered with the Biden administration.

Alex Saab became the centerpiece of a years-long propaganda campaign: billboards across the country hailed Venezuela’s heroic diplomat, leftwing influencers denounced the arrest of the man supposedly helping the nation overcome the siege of US sanctions, and embassies circulated the #FreeAlexSaab dossier among allied activists and journalists. 

The long-awaited extradition of Saab is evidently not the result of the Rodríguez siblings suddenly discovering he is a Colombian criminal, as the official Saime statement describes him, but rather part of Delcy’s cooperation with Washington DC whose agents were reportedly involved in his arrest in Caracas. New York prosecutors have recovered a key witness in the US vs Maduro et al case, whose next hearing is in six weeks, and will now use a close associate of both the DEA and the presidential couple against Nicolás and Cilia.

We’ll see what happens with Alex Saab’s new stint in the US. Developments might come sooner from the other Saab: Tarek William.

A new scapegoat?

Carmen Navas passed away on Sunday, a day after the conversation about Alex Saab and Delcy’s quagmire resurfaced. We’ve covered Navas and Victor Hugo Quero Navas, her 15-month search for information about an arrested son who dissolved into the cauldron of violence and injustice that emerged from the horrid events of 2024. Navas perished ten days after the State finally admitted her son had been dead for long. The pro-democracy movement is in shock. International media and foreign politicians are also reacting to the tragedy as well. There’s ample willingness to keep highlighting the responsibility of Venezuelan officials, so don’t expect pressure over the Quero case and other desaparecidos to wane anytime soon.

Enter Delcy Rodríguez, whose role in the Quero story is far less inconspicuous than official statements suggest. The Prisons Ministry admitted Quero was dead only because Delcy gave the green light. The Ombudsman’s Office agreed to take Carmen Navas’ testimony because Delcy deemed it acceptable. Now that the 82-year-old mother has finally succumbed to this blatant episode of administrative evil, the ball is in Delcy’s court. Not just to manage another wave of widespread indignation, but to go further in the narrative that the Rodríguez siblings can make chavismo move on from the so-called excesos e ineficiencias of their predecessors.

Jorge Rodriguez has introduced the regime’s idea of a clean break with the past, the mantra of the most ambitious transitional justice projects of the late 20^th century. With that damning “get over it, forgive us, and come home” line, Jorge hoped the public could forget the last 26 years without nothing in return, not human rights trials, not a power-alternation agreement with political rivals.

Prosecutor Tarek reportedly vowed to make prisoner Tareck suffer during the scandal investigations: “You’re dead. The country hates you today, but I will make sure the whole universe hates you too.”

Unable or unwilling to go anywhere near that, the regime’s best bet would be to go against the most disposable elements of the coalition: those who combine public contempt with overt involvement in repression, and who now appear to be losing influence while their human rights dossiers grow thicker by the day.

Under the current circumstances, former Prosecutor General Tarek William Saab looks like an ideal scapegoat. Parallel developments are not helping him. 

El Aissami’s strange return

April marked the beginning of the trial of 63 individuals targeted in the 2023–2024 crackdown against Tareck El Aissami’s political clan. 

Without the January 3 events, the PDVSA-crypto case would be business as usual, perhaps a hefty sentence after a few remote hearings, perhaps no trial at all. But in 2026 Venezuela, hearings involving El Aissami, his US-sanctioned frontman Samark López, and PSUV figures like Hugbel Roa have become opportunities to expose the torture they endured and explain why they believe chavismo turned against them three years ago. 

Last week, TalCual obtained a court statement from former lawmaker Hugbel Roa. He claimed Tarek William Saab had him arrested in retaliation for a parliamentary inquiry into the dealings of Saab’s brother in Anzoátegui, reportedly a major PDVSA contractor in the region. Roa also accused Saab of judicial meddling to shield his brother, and said police assaulted both him and his wife at the behest of Tarek William Saab and prosecutor Farik Mora, who allegedly tried to force him into recording a confession about a fabricated coup conspiracy involving Leopoldo López. 

In a separate hearing on May 8, former vice president and oil czar Tarek El Aissami tried to implicate an entire chain of command responsible for the torture and cruel treatment he suffered, including spending eight months in a windowless room with a powerful floodlight turned on 24/7. El Aissami accused former DGCIM chiefs Iván Hernández Dala and Alejandro Marcano Tabata, along with prosecutors including Tarek William Saab and Farik Mora. He also claimed Saab buried corruption cases involving members of his inner circle, and personally threatened to link El Aissami to the killing of Venezuelan rapper Canserbero—a cold case Saab miraculously solved when Maduro needed an electoral boost ahead of the 2024 election.

Saab saw this coming and will use every card he holds. It’s hard to think of anyone with more sensitive information on the regime and their leaders than Tarek William Saab.

Prosecutor Tarek reportedly vowed to make prisoner Tareck suffer during the scandal investigations: “You’re dead. The country hates you today, but I will make sure the whole universe hates you too.” 

Saab’s behavior has also been a recurrent theme in the anti-chavista camp recently. Joel Garcia, a prominent lawyer for political prisoners, claimed he had direct knowledge of Saab filming dissidents being tortured and sending the footage to Nicolás Maduro. Former presidential candidate Freddy Superlano claimed the only reading material available in the infamous El Rodeo I prison consisted of Saab’s poetry books. La Gran Aldea also recounted a night in which Superlano and fellow political prisoners Biagio Pillieri and Perkins Rocha—the latter still under house arrest—were simultaneously taken to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office, where a deranged Saab personally pressured them to reveal the whereabouts of María Corina Machado and the vote tallies from the July 2024 election. 

Our last Political Risk Report was clear on this matter. If Delcy Rodríguez moves to charge Tarek William Saab, “it will signal something far deeper than a single prosecution: a purge serious enough to make everyone wonder whether this is a first step toward removing a far more dangerous piece from the Jenga tower. But it will not be easy.”

Saab saw this coming and will use every card he holds. It’s hard to think of anyone with more sensitive information on the regime and their leaders than Tarek William Saab. 

Roa’s court statement said Saab retains influence through his old influence among clerks and prosecutors. He even expressed having faith in Larry Devoe, Saab’s successor and an old ally of Delcy Rodriguez. Maybe the first move will come from him, as a first big demonstration that the Ministerio Público is his to govern, and to imprint Delcy’s own brand of justice.Saab’s case is shaping up to be a defining test of Delcy’s willingness—and ability—to push forward the transformation of the regime, confront the old guard, make a few sexy headlines abroad, and neutralize the potential spoilers of her rule. If she decides to go ahead, few cases better illustrate the Prosecutor’s Office’s connivance and negligence under Saab’s eight-year tenure than the Quero case. The legal record, and the trail left by Carmen Navas’ search, could hardly be more convenient.

When US Energy Secretary Chris Wright visited Venezuela in February, he left Miraflores with an ambitious message. After meeting Delcy Rodríguez in Miraflores, he told reporters: “This year, we can drive a dramatic increase in Venezuelan oil production, in Venezuelan natural gas production and Venezuelan electricity production.”

Three months later, large parts of the country are enduring heavy electricity rationing, with daily cuts lasting between five and eight hours. Even after the government imposed a 45-day electricity-saving plan in late March to cope with high temperatures and surging demand, the situation continues to deteriorate. As the system faces renewed strain, the US Embassy in Caracas publicized a meeting with Ronald Alcalá, Delcy’s new electric energy minister, where US Chief of Mission John Barrett said Washington will “work with the interim authorities to rebuild the power grid.”

“The three-phase plan of President Trump and Secretary Rubio focuses on restoring reliable energy supply through experience, investment, and collaboration with the US,” Barrett’s brief statement read.

Caracas has resorted to nationwide measures like banning cryptocurrency mining, as power consumption recently reached its highest levels in nearly a decade. El Pitazo reported that current nationwide rationing has exceeded those seen in 2012 across much of the country, with Caracas remaining the main exception.

The latest chapter of this long-running crisis arrives at a sensitive moment for the post-Maduro regime. As has been widely reported, Rodríguez is trying to boost some parts of the economy and attract foreign investment into oil, gas and mining. But the country’s electrical system—weakened by decades of underinvestment, mismanagement and institutional collapse—has re-emerged as an obstacle.

For Luisa Palacios, a Venezuelan professor and energy executive that served as CITGO’s chairwoman, the current blackout cycle reveals something deeper than previous ones.

“This new episode should serve as a wake-up call about the urgency of restructuring the country’s electrical system,” she says. “We are witnessing a stress test of the system even under a modest recovery in demand.

One huge challenge is to bring back investment and expertise required, Palacios wrote in February along with Francisco Morandi, an AES Corporation executive who did strategic planning for Electricidad de Caracas. However, some major companies are hesitating to join after meetings with officials last month, Reuters reported. One executive shared his view: “I returned very skeptical from Venezuela (…) The power plants have not been properly repaired in 10 years, so the needs are almost infinite. But they still have no clue on how we would get paid.”

“The electricity sector is a highly capital-intensive sector that requires large investments to be made before a single cent of profit is seen,” Palacios told Caracas Chronicles. “That is why counterparty risk is fundamental in the electricity sector: ensuring that the user pays you, and on time, is essential.”

The most immediate problem is straightforward. Except for Haiti, Venezuela is the only country in the region where power consumption has actually declined over the past decade, according to OLADE, with per capita consumption falling by roughly 30% since 2014. Nevertheless, the country still does not generate enough electricity to meet demand.

Palacios was firm in the idea that it is necessary to move beyond the State’s central role in power generation, which can’t afford the necessary investments, and that the time to do so is now. 

“Without increasing power generation offered significantly by the private sector and improving transmission and distribution, the country won’t recover from the structural electric crisis that today remains the main bottleneck in terms of infrastructure”.

One of the central proposals advanced by Palacios and other energy experts is to restore thermal generation using Venezuela’s own natural gas resources. Large volumes of gas currently burned or flared during oil production could instead feed thermal plants and combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) facilities, systems that generate electricity more efficiently by combining gas and steam turbines. Such a shift would not only reduce pressure on the hydroelectric system but also lower emissions associated with gas flaring.

“This could be the single biggest climate action Venezuela could take in the short term,” Palacios argues. 

Other proposals involve allowing independent power producers to generate electricity for specific industrial regions and oil hubs, reducing pressure on the fragile national grid. She has also suggested the creation of autonomous microgrids operating in “island mode” (localized systems capable of functioning independently when the national grid fails) to provide more reliable service to critical industrial, commercial, and residential areas. Battery storage systems could also help stabilize electricity supply.

Renewable energy is also part of the conversation. Venezuela relies on largely clean, hydroelectric energy, but Palacios sees potential for solar, wind and biofuel projects. Other oil-producing neighbors like Brazil, Colombia and Argentina serve as prime examples in that sense.

The challenge is not just technical. Broadly speaking, there is agreement among specialists about what Venezuela’s electrical system needs, and what requires fixing: new thermal generation, modernization of transmission infrastructure, decentralized generation capacity, tariff reform, and a new regulatory framework capable of attracting investment. The financing problem is huge: rebuilding Venezuela’s grid would require enormous amounts of long-term capital. Gelvis Sequera, who chairs the domestic Association of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, places the required investment at around $20 billion.

“The electricity sector is a highly capital-intensive sector that requires large investments to be made before a single cent of profit is seen,” Palacios told Caracas Chronicles. “That is why counterparty risk is fundamental in the electricity sector: ensuring that the user pays you, and on time, is essential.”

But many investors remain cautious. According to Reuters, several companies that recently held meetings with Venezuelan officials left unconvinced about the prospects of doing business. One executive summarized the dilemma bluntly: “The power plants have not been properly repaired in 10 years, so the needs are almost infinite. But they still have no clue how we would get paid.”

The vicious cycle of regional power cuts affecting refineries and fuel production, and therefore also undermining the power sector, needs a major overhaul to finally be brought to an end.

When considering whether to deploy capital in Venezuela, investors are less confused about the needs and more about the ifs. They are uncertain about whether the Venezuelan State can offer credible guarantees, stable regulation, enforceable contracts, and reliable payment mechanisms over the long term.

As Palacios put it: “Power infrastructure is a low-margin business, established for the long term and highly dependent on regulatory and macroeconomic risks.” For that reason, she argues that regulatory clarity, transparent tariffs, and technically competent institutions are indispensable if Venezuela hopes to attract serious capital into the sector.

This also raises uncomfortable political questions about the future role of CORPOELEC, the omnipotent overseer of Venezuelan electricity. Founded by Hugo Chávez in 2007, the public company serves as the power grid’s service provider, operator and developer.

“Venezuela needs to seriously rethink the role of CORPOELEC and the State in providing such a fundamental service,” Palacios says. “It is not possible to solve this crisis with the current management structure.” At the moment, however, there are few signs that such reforms are imminent.

“To build and rebuild a reliable system will depend on having the right actors on the table”, she continues, pointing out that multilateral organizations can provide technical capacity and long-term financing that can “de-risk investment”, giving some assurances to the private sector.

“There’s a lot of Venezuelan entrepreneurship more than willing to invest in a system with clear rules based on international standards”.For now, as hopes of an economic recovery reach their highest levels since the Chávez era, Venezuelans long accustomed to blackouts are desperate to avoid a repeat of the worst 2019-esque scenarios. The contradiction is also acute for Delcy Rodríguez, whose critical infrastructure problem is one of the most immediate constraints on the reopening she is attempting. The vicious cycle of regional power cuts affecting refineries and fuel production, and therefore also undermining the power sector, needs a major overhaul to finally be brought to an end.

Venezuela has spent three months measuring the exact moment when a collective expectation begins to turn into disappointment. The monthly surveys conducted by AtlasIntel and Bloomberg for LatAm Pulse Venezuela, fielded in February, March, and April 2026, document a political process with a name, a direction, and a speed. What they show is unequivocal: Delcy Rodríguez is not consolidating a transitional government. She is managing one that is eroding by disguising that transition rather than carrying it out.

This is not a collapse in her popularity, but a clear downward trend is already visible.

The numbers are precise. In February, 37% of Venezuelans approved of Rodríguez’s performance. By April, that figure had fallen to 31.4%. Disapproval rose from 44.3% to 47.1%. In absolute terms, the gap between those who approve and those who disapprove widened from 7 to nearly 16 points in 90 days.

The most revealing data point is not approval but performance evaluation. Those rating her government as “excellent or good” dropped from 23.4% to 16.2%. That share did not migrate into outright rejection. It moved into the “average” category, which grew from 34.7% to 45.3% and is now dominant. That shift suggests disappointment more than anger, and the former is far harder to reverse than open rejection.

The segment that once supported Rodríguez is the one moving the most. A first conclusion is that the management of expectations created on January 3 is not working. Almost 120 days into her time in power, people are not really buying the narrative.

To understand why these segments are shifting, the economic data must be read in parallel. In February, 78% of Venezuelans believed the country would improve over the next six months. That was the optimism of the historical moment, the expectation unleashed on January 3. Three months later, that optimism has dropped 23 points. Today, 55% still expect improvement.

According to these figures, public perceptions of the opposition remain intact.

Meanwhile, reality has not moved: 77% still rate the country’s economic situation as bad. The labor market is perceived as equally deteriorated. The Consumer Confidence Index fell from +14.7 in February to -1.9 in April. The expectations index dropped from +58.3 to +34.6.

The gap between what was expected and what is being experienced is the engine behind everything else. And that gap does not weigh equally on everyone. That vulnerable Venezuelan who, even in crisis, continued to rely on Chavismo out of necessity, obligation, or support (the lower-income, less-educated, a beneficiary of the Patria system who gave Rodríguez the benefit of the doubt) also expected that the post–January 3 shift would be felt in their pocket, their job, their daily life. Three months later, they do not feel it.

Chavismo and the opposition

The leadership approval ranking measured by AtlasIntel completes the picture. María Corina Machado holds a positive image among 56% of participants without losing a point in three months, with a +30 net rating. Edmundo González stands at 49% with +24 points. According to these figures, public perceptions of the opposition remain intact.

The contrast with the Chavista bloc is stark. No government figure has a positive net rating. Diosdado Cabello stands at -52 points, Jorge Rodríguez at -51, and Nicolás Maduro at -46. Rodríguez is the “least negative” within the bloc at -30, but still deeply in negative territory. The Chavista leadership, without exception, occupies extremely high rejection levels, a clear reflection of how the public views anything associated with Maduro.

Ruling is easy when you control the entire State. Legitimizing power requires improving people’s lives. That is the debt the public is now charging to Rodríguez.

Venezuela is moving from the expectations born on January 3 toward reality. And the reality is that Rodríguez’s government is not being perceived as the solution—it is increasingly being identified as the continuation of the problem left behind by Maduro. AtlasIntel identifies corruption as the country’s number one issue for 53% of respondents. The weakening of democracy ranks third at 32.8%. The public does not confuse management with change.

Rodríguez has not lost her critics, a majority that was never with her. What she is losing is politically more costly: her believers. Those who, without being part of the opposition, expected something to change. Those who gave her the benefit of the doubt at the peak of collective expectation Venezuela had not seen in years. That movement, which is quiet and without headlines, is what AtlasIntel’s data captures month after month with a clarity that official discourse cannot conceal.

AtlasIntel sampling

The data for this analysis comes from a random digital recruitment survey (Atlas RDR) conducted among 4,629 Venezuelans between April 24 and 28, 2026. Like all digital polling in Venezuela, the method carries a known structural bias: it overrepresents populations with active internet access, implying a relative underrepresentation of rural areas, older adults, and lower-income sectors without stable connectivity. Absolute figures should be interpreted with caution.

However, the instrument’s real value lies not in a snapshot but in its month-to-month tracking. If the bias is constant (as it is in this case, given that the digital profile captured remains structurally the same each month) then movements between measurements reflect real changes in opinion. A miscalibrated thermometer still detects a fever. And what this three-month series detects is unequivocal: erosion is real, sustained, and advancing among the segments Rodríguez could least afford to lose.

Managing power is relatively simple when the instruments of the State are in hand. Legitimizing it requires improving people’s lives. That is the debt these three months of surveys are charging to Rodríguez’s government.

If this continues, her own base could withdraw its support in the worst possible way: through the disappointment of those making a final bet on trust after years of having lost it. That kind of disappointment does not reverse, and may represent a more dangerous political rupture than outright rejection.

Chavismo wants to remain in control. But time is charging the opportunity for change that people saw on January 3. If that change does not arrive, it will be demanded. Without elections, it will be very difficult for them to claim to represent the country’s leadership before a population that no longer believes in them. Elections are necessary and urgent. Can chavismo avoid them?

American sanctions on the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) have been relieved, generating a flurry of speculations over what is next for the financial sector and the broader economy. After the big news, Delcy Rodríguez announced the resignation of BCV President Laura Guerra on Thursday night. Guerra is the sister of Nicolás Maduro’s first wife, and the aunt of Nicolasito Maduro Guerra.

At least for now, the central bank will be led by Guerra’s former deputy, Luis Pérez-González, a name that is as underwhelming as any of his predecessors. Pérez has been a member of the BCV board since April 2025. Before that, his experience in monetary policy was nil. He was in charge of Carbones del Zulia and of “Monitoring and Control of Eco-mining Development” in Maduro’s Ministry of Mining. You can find him playing Frank Sinatra songs in his spare time.

It doesn’t look like this will be Delcy’s permanent pick.

Before diving into the immediate and medium term effect that recent developments could have, it is worth highlighting what the BCV’s actual purpose is and the spectacular failure that has driven the institution to near irrelevance. 

Ironically, Venezuelan law mandates the BCV to ensure price stability and preserve the value of the currency. We don’t have to go far back to remember the multiple zeros stripped from the bolívar after one of the longest hyperinflationary episodes in modern history, directly contradicting its constitutional mandate. After all, this is a central bank that went years without publishing any data, and when it resumed, it released incomplete figures, forcing economists to reconstruct years of missing information. It is the same BCV that despite its constitutional mandate did not make any counterbalance to the completely irresponsible fiscal policy of the Chávez and Maduro era, shattering any sort of credibility it may have had. 

Nevertheless, reviving the BCV is crucial to the reintegration of the financial sector into the wider Venezuelan economy. In the near term, the effects of sanctions relief will likely be most visible in exchange rate auctions. Greater transparency and reliability in these operations will help reduce the gap between the official and the black market rates. This would directly affect daily life, reducing price distortions and helping stabilize inflation expectations for ordinary Venezuelans. It would also reopen the door to multilateral institutions and international markets, particularly renewed engagement with the International Monetary Fund, which is a necessary step toward debt restructuring and access to credit.

However, there is no on and off switch in terms of trustworthiness, and the BCV is supposed to be in the credibility business.The effectiveness of any central bank relies on its independence from political pressures and ability to communicate a coherent monetary policy, not just on the technical capacity of who runs it. Undermining that independence is what ultimately kills the effectiveness of any policy it may attempt to implement. 

Delcy needs to set up an independent central bank to satisfy the economic discourse, attract investment, and control inflationary pressures. Doing so will require establishing the first institution capable of challenging the administration from within.

This is true everywhere, as hard fought-battles are being waged around the economic world on this matter. From Trump’s challenges to Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, which unsettled financial markets, to standout regional cases like Peru, where the central bank has been single-handedly supporting the economy despite near-permanente political turmoil. These examples highlight just how crucial central bank independence is to real economic stability.

Restoring trust in the BCV goes beyond who runs it, but the naming of the new president is one of the most crucial decisions that the interim administration of Delcy Rodríguez will have to make. Whoever is chosen will be scrutinized by both ordinary Venezuelans and international investors to gauge the commitment of Rodríguez to carry out the necessary economic reforms. Someone that falls short of being able to implement true independence and restore confidence in the system will just undermine all the political speech of the economy first that is currently being put on display. 

The paradox is that Delcy needs to set up an independent central bank to satisfy the economic discourse, attract investment, and control inflationary pressures. But doing so will require establishing the first institution capable of challenging the administration from within. This is where the political and economic reality clash.

The decision comes with a level of urgency, as patience is starting to run out in an internal political climate that is heating up. Trade unions and pensioners have recently taken to the streets to demand higher wages and benefits. Appointing someone close to the previous administration will increase frustration and complicate the weak equilibrium that Rodríguez has built around the promise to rebuild the economy.  

The interim government is attempting to make itself useful to the American overlords by convincing them that they have the ability and willingness to commit to economic reform. Failure to follow through with an independent BCV board could strain the relationship further and make it even harder to justify. Now that sanctions have been lifted and oil money is flowing through US-backed accounts, it is time for the interim authority to live up to their side of the bargain, as Delcy risks losing the little goodwill her administration has left.  

Attention is now focused on who will be appointed to lead the BCV, and whether that choice signals a genuine shift toward institutional autonomy or a continuation of past policy constraints.