Delcy Rodríguez

Caracas, July 8, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez held a meeting with a military and diplomatic delegation from Israel on Tuesday.

The talks represented the first official engagement between Caracas and Tel Aviv since former President Hugo Chávez severed diplomatic relations in 2009.

According to Venezuelan state media reports, Rodríguez alongside Public Works Vice President Juan José Ramírez and Transport Minister Francisco Garcés sat down with Israeli officials to discuss plans for the removal of over 1 million tons of rubble from La Guaira state in the wake of June 24’s double earthquake.

For its part, the IDF indicated that its engineering personnel delivered a “national rehabilitation” plan to the Venezuelan government. Photos published on social media showed Brigadier General Elad Edri, chief of staff of the IDF Home Front Command, presenting a slide show titled “Project for the Reconstruction of the Future” with Venezuelan and Israeli flags. 

The Israeli Foreign Ministry added that, at Rodríguez’s request, its delegation will stay in the Caribbean nation for two additional weeks to “begin implementing the reconstruction plan prepared by Israeli experts.”

Uniformed Israeli soldiers have toured multiple affected areas in Caracas and La Guaira, reportedly conducting inspections on damaged infrastructure. It has held multiple meetings with Venezuelan authorities, including a previous one with Ramírez in the Vicepresidency of Public Works. In a press conference last week, Rodríguez expressed her appreciation for the arrival of the “highly trained and professional” Israeli team.

It is not presently known whether the Israeli evaluations are being coordinated with similar assessments from specialized Venezuelan brigades.

“We are here primarily to assist in a natural disaster,” diplomat Yoed Magen said in a social media video. “Whenever we come to a country to advise or provide assistance, a relationship is formed and it can lead to a faster rapprochement.”

Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez cut ties with Tel Aviv in 2009, fiercely denouncing Operation Cast Lead as “genocide” and voicing solidarity with the Palestinian people.

President Nicolás Maduro maintained his predecessor’s position excoriating Israeli military occupation and war crimes in Gaza and Lebanon, as well as the June 2025 Twelve-Day War against Iran. The Maduro government publicly endorsed South Africa’s activation of the Genocide Convention against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2024.

The mission has drawn backlash from the Chavista grassroots.

“[Israel] is a rogue nation. Its rulers are committing a genocide against the native people of Palestine and now they supposedly help Venezuela rescue [earthquake] victims and rebuild La Guaira,” Hindu Anderi, spokesperson for the Platform of Solidarity with the Palestinian cause, wrote on social media.

Venezuelan officials have reported 3,685 people killed in the earthquake as of July 7, more than 16,000 injured, and over 15,000 displaced families. A total of 190 buildings have collapsed, with hundreds more suffering various levels of damage.

The Venezuelan government has radically shifted its foreign policy after the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Maduro. Apart from reestablishing diplomatic relations with Washington, Caracas has distanced itself from historic allies. During the recent US-Israel war against Iran, Caracas did not express support for Tehran, instead offering public backing for US Gulf allies such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The diplomatic rapprochement with the Trump administration has seen US forces hold military exercises in Caracas and conduct an extrajudicial execution in southeast Bolívar State.

Following the recent earthquakes, Washington expanded its footprint in the Caribbean nation, with 900 military personnel reportedly on the ground in Venezuela. After conducting repair works, US forces are currently running logistics and aid operations at La Guaira port and the Simón Bolívar International Airport.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

The photo is from Workers’ Day in Venezuela, when Delcy Rodríguez, wearing a blue Ronald Acuña baseball jersey, announced a long-awaited minimum income increase after several days touring the country, campaigning for a land of peace and prosperity, free of sanctions.

Us Venezuelans know that chavismo loves a propaganda makeover. They can be good at it too, in all honesty. The aftermath of the capture of one of the world’s most loathed autocrats, and the takeover by his supposedly pragmatic, corporate-like vice president was never going to be an exception when it comes to PR reinvention.

Media outlets have noticed the changes in the Caracas landscape: the image of Nicolás Maduro (and to some extent, that of former First Combatant Cilia Flores) is starting to disappear from view. Large billboards featuring the couple, including the phrase “we want them back” (los queremos de vuelta), are getting withdrawn.

This occurs as there’s serious discomfort inside chavismo about how close the Delcy-Trump relationship has become: from the drastic U-turn in the Alex Saab case to increased “supervision” from the US embassy in Caracas and the joint military operation targeting the Tren de Aragua leader, it looks like Washington’s tutelage keeps expanding and deepening at great speed.

Delcy herself is not the main focus. The idea is to convince Venezuelans that things are improving, to encourage them to imagine how the country could thrive if sanctions are lifted.

The official strategy now seems to put Maduro on the back burner, letting him fade away from short-term memory. Getting rid of his image entirely won’t be easy, of course. After all, his face and personal brand—his Super Mustache, and the tricolor M letter from his 2018 presidential campaign which became an official emblem of sorts—can still be seen on public signs, painted in walls and even in official vehicles.

This mirrors what happened earlier with the visual trademarks of the late Hugo Chávez, like his famous eyes and rabo e’ cochino signature. Maduro had reduced their public use and replaced them with his own iconography, for better or for worse. 

Blue-hued efficiency

This sudden shift in dropping Maduro’s image brings an important question to mind: what will replace it? 

One option would be to have Delcy’s face in huge billboards across avenues and highways. But that has not been the case so far. 

Two elements are noticeable. First, Delcy herself is not the main focus. Instead, the idea is to convince the Venezuelan people that things are improving, and to encourage them to imagine how the country could thrive if (more) US sanctions are lifted.

She has embraced a more traditional “head of state” role, prioritizing highly-publicized formal meetings where she signs letters of understanding (often disguised as actual contracts) with foreign investors as signs that the country is back on track and open for business. That completely aligns with how the Trump administration and POTUS himself sell their role here.

Political advertising from the Delcy Rodríguez government tries to project a nation of diverse, forward-looking citizens, which is a huge departure from the Chávez-era exaltation of the all-red masses. Note the Star of David on the left-hand side of the image above, a nod to both the US and a Jewish community famously insulted by Chávez. 

Even Miraflores Palace got its own new styling for such occasions: the Cabinet Room was stripped of not only anything related to both Chávez and Maduro but also the pictures of the late Argentine President Néstor Kirchner. The room was named in his honor in 2011. In its place there’s now a large, White House-styled logo for Miraflores, which has been in use since 2018.

Then there’ the blatant decision of dropping chavismo’s traditional rojo-rojito red for a dark blue. 

Curiously enough, the Rodrigato has taken advantage of the full visual rebrand of the government launched last year by Maduro, which dropped the term Gobierno Bolivariano and related symbols used since the mid 2000s. 

The national flag and formal country name are front and center. The use of a broader institutional look is another stark contrast with the more personalized presentation from the Maduro years.

Delcy has used social media and trips both inside and outside the country in order to compensate for her brand-new stateswoman persona. But she doesn’t go as far as doing an Aló Presidente-style TV show or starting her own podcast like Maduro did with Con Maduro + (where Delcy was once a guest).

Delcy probably knows she is not exactly the most marketable presidential candidate. This rebrand is also an attempt to push her image in that direction while her aides and consultants still have time to sketch something viable.

So far, Delcy´s deeper involvement in mass events this year happened in late April, during the so-called “Great National Pilgrimage for a Venezuela Free of Sanctions,” better known for its shorter slogan Venezuela vuela libre (Venezuela flies free). At its core, it looks like an early balloon trial for what her campaign could look like in a snap election. On the surface, it seemed like an appropriation of the religious frenzy around the canonization of two Venezuelan saints—several months after that event, when Maduro was not in Brooklyn—and of the symbols and rituals of the Machado campaign: rosaries, people embracing a politician’s caravan across a village, blue and white clothes.

This particular change didn’t go unnoticed by former state television host Mario Silva, a longtime supporter of the revolución who has become Delcy’s most outspoken critic within chavismo. Silva recently told the Wall Street Journal: “Red used to mean combat… The pale blue is to put the masses to sleep.” The campaign itself became part of a heated debate between Silva and other figures related to the chavismo’s media ecosystem, such as Indira Urbaneja and the Argentine influencer known as Michelo last month.

Its launch was linked with the grand minimum wage announcement on May 1^st after a four-year wait. It wasn’t really the real wage increase that teachers, healthcare workers and public officials were hoping for. Since January 3rd, Jorge Rodríguez regularly takes over for her sister in public events. By the looks of the recent lack of activity in the official YouTube channel, it’s currently not at the same level of the spring period. The amount of related outdoor ads and street banners seemingly will do heavy lifting this summer.

Presidential disguise

Uncertainty hangs over Venezuela’s political future for the second half of 2026, but Delcy Rodríguez is clearly capitalizing on her position, using every resource at her disposal without facing any pushback from Washington. Yet, when it comes to the raw talent of a traditional politician, her shortcomings are no secret. Her speeches tend to be quite brief and dry. She has sounded nervous when caught off guard. She lacks the charismatic oratory of Chávez and the brazen rhetoric of her brother or her predecessor. She probably knows she is not exactly the most marketable presidential candidate. This rebrand is an attempt to push her image in that direction while her aides and consultants still have time to sketch something viable.

Coming back to Maduro, the little sympathy he had outside the most hardcore chavista supporters won’t improve. People are not missing him, never mind care that Delcy is shedding his old propaganda. Ordinary Venezuelans are generally too busy, dealing with their everyday problems, to pay attention to the politics of chavista PR.

In the end, this stealth attempt to erase Maduro’s image isn’t as simple as turning the page and moving on. Delcy needs to build a whole new persona that fits both the mainstream chavismo she wants to rally (and that still represents her voter base), and the one Donald Trump can be happy with.

She may not be able to deliver the rousing speeches of Chávez in his prime, or pull off the theatrical antics that Maduro leaned on for years, but playing the dignified role of “the President” may just work for her. At least for the foreseeable future.

On January 3, the US bombed Venezuela’s capital region and kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro. The unprecedented attack represented the culmination of a quarter-century of imperialist hybrid war, including devastating unilateral sanctions, mercenary incursions, “color revolution”-style insurrections, media disinformation, and NGO infiltration.

The four months since have brought a flurry of developments, from renewed diplomatic ties with the US to an overhaul of key legislative pillars of the Bolivarian Revolution. Additionally, the Trump administration established semi-colonial control over Venezuelan oil revenues, with the amounts and timings of disbursements back to Caracas left entirely at US officials’ discretion. The arrangement is similar to the one Washington has forced on Iraq since the 2003 invasion.

This compromised sovereignty is a catalyst for other issues. On the one hand, it makes it tougher for the Venezuelan government to improve living standards without challenging business interests. On the other, the burden of Venezuela’s external debt might see Washington attempt to impose an IMF loan that will bury the country in debt and dependency for decades.

The holy grail of foreign investment

The acting Rodríguez government’s tenure has been marked by accelerated political and economic transformations. On the international front, Caracas has restored diplomatic ties with Washington and recently resumed dealings with the US-controlled International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

Domestically, Rodríguez has changed key cabinet and military posts, while pushing through the National Assembly a number of reforms with the explicit goal of making the country more attractive for private sector investment, especially from Western multinationals.

Plans to reform pension, tax, housing, and the landmark 2012 labor law are in motion. Mining and hydrocarbons have already undergone pro-business overhauls, with slashed fiscal responsibilities, decreased oversight, and disputes subjected to international arbitration. In contrast to Chávez’s reassertion of oil sovereignty, which underpinned the massive sociopolitical achievements of the Bolivarian Revolution, the reformed energy law brings back the old concession model that puts operations and sales in the hands of private corporations.

In tandem, the Trump administration has issued licenses to pave the way for Western conglomerates to return to Venezuela, and several have already struck deals under the new highly favorable conditions. The licenses maintain and even double down on US sanctions by barring dealings with China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia and mandating that all Venezuelan state revenues from oil and mining be deposited in US Treasury-run accounts.

The subordination to US impositions saw Venezuelan authorities extradite former diplomatic envoy and minister Alex Saab to face charges in the US with little to no explanation. The move was shocking but not out of context. In recent weeks, there has been a succession of ceremonies at Miraflores presidential palace where Trump officials get the red-carpet welcome and escort corporate executives to sign contracts under the new pro-business incentives. Far-right tech moguls, including Palantir founder Peter Thiel, are already taking advantage of Trump’s leverage to establish a lucrative foothold in the country. For his part, the US chargé d’affaires holds regular publicized meetings with Venezuelan cabinet ministers. 

Caracas’ technocratic and pragmatic approach has dovetailed with a corresponding shift in discourse. On foreign policy, the anti-imperialist rhetoric has all but vanished. As Trump unleashes a savage war against Iran and threatens to “take over” Cuba, Venezuelan leaders have refrained from condemning the escalating imperialist aggression while emphasizing their desire to build good relations with Washington. At the same time, references to Maduro have drastically decreased, as documented in a recent investigation. Domestically, the central focus has become macroeconomic stability and attracting foreign investment. Both Acting President Rodríguez and her brother, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, acknowledged receiving “recommendations” and “suggestions” from oil majors amid the recent hydrocarbon overhaul. 

Rodríguez and the Bolivarian leadership, under ongoing US pressure, are betting that the pro-business opening will lead to accelerated economic growth that will trickle down into improved living conditions, thus allowing the government to rebuild social legitimacy and political prospects. However, this plan faces serious roadblocks.

Rising domestic pressure

The first issue is that the acting authorities may not have a lot of time to improve the living conditions of the Venezuelan people. 

Over the previous seven years, with the economy asphyxiated by the US economic blockade, the Maduro government prioritized macroeconomic stability and reduced inflation first and foremost, through a strict monetarist policy package. While the approach, coupled with a modest oil industry recovery, did lead to slowed down inflation and modest economic growth, it came at a price of freezing wages, consumer credit, and public spending. The minimum wage, last raised in 2022, is now worth less than US $1 per month, with further increases replaced by non-wage bonuses that cheapen labor costs for employers.

Though these bonuses have increased periodically (the income floor is now $240/month for public sector workers), they are still far from covering living costs. On May 1, Rodríguez ignored growing calls for a minimum wage hike, the conversion of bonuses to wages, and the restoration of collective bargaining rights, instead doubling down on the bonus policy. With government officials announcing a labor reform soon, it is likely that the return of the minimum wage will come alongside a significant erosion of workers’ rights and employer responsibilities.

However, apart from its commitment to fiscal discipline, the Rodríguez acting government has little room to maneuver because of its lack of direct management over oil revenues. At the mercy of the Trump administration to return export earnings in the amount and timing of its choosing, Venezuelan authorities are unlikely to commit to anything that might unsettle the budget. Rodríguez herself warned that wage increases must be “responsible.”

There is a delicate balance to strike. To implement the current pro-business agenda, not to mention the US rapprochement, the government needs social peace, and only improved material conditions for the working-class majority can ensure that in the short term.

The specter of debt

It is not just the pressure for better living standards that looms large on Venezuela’s economic front. There is a growing expectation that creditors will soon reengage with Venezuelan authorities to collect on a sizable external debt: a combination of defaulted bonds, unpaid loans, and arbitration awards that, with interest accrued over years, may amount to as much as $170 billion. The Venezuelan government recently announced the launch of a debt restructuring process, while Washington issued a license allowing the hiring of financial and consulting services. 

Given the recent overtures to foreign capital, Venezuelan leaders will be hard-pressed to honor whatever commitments necessary to render the country a favorable investment climate. Nevertheless, a major chunk of this debt is illegitimate.

On the one hand, debt ballooned in the mid-2010s as Venezuela’s credit rating was unjustifiably downgraded and borrowing costs went up, as Washington slapped its first rounds of sanctions on the Caribbean country. The Maduro government made a strategic choice to prioritize debt service as the economy reeled following a collapse of global oil prices, hoping that this “discipline” would stave off a scenario where the country was shut out of financial markets. It turned out differently.

Venezuela was gradually locked out of global finance after the Trump administration’s 2017 financial sanctions. Bonds defaulted one after another and have been accruing interest ever since. And the notoriously corrupt US-backed “interim government” also played its part in running up Venezuela’s liabilities and pilfering state assets abroad.

The diverse group of bondholders and corporations owed arbitration awards is sure to receive the backing of the White House, which holds the purse of Venezuela’s export proceeds. This mechanism could be utilized to directly transfer Venezuelan state income to creditors in what would effectively amount to international wage garnishing. Given how Venezuelan bonds have risen in recent months, investors are eagerly eyeing a significant windfall.

Venezuela’s unsustainable debt burden opens the door for further US imperial predations. Even if there is an agreement to pay 50 cents on the dollar for Venezuela’s $170 billion debt for a period of 15 years, that comes to $5.6 billion a year, roughly a quarter of the present budget. It is simply unpayable.

While Caracas may be able to settle with some creditors by privatizing Venezuelan state assets, it will not amount to much. Venezuelan leaders will stress that, with the recent reforms and US opening, the economy will grow tremendously, and they will be able to honor all commitments. But creditors are not willing to wait when they can cash in now, especially given Venezuela’s weak bargaining position. The government cannot maintain a functioning country in the short term with a huge debt burden. As a result, the US might take advantage of the crisis to impose a major loan from the IMF or some lending coalition.

Sovereignty under threat

An IMF or similar loan program is more than just an agreement to lend some amount under certain repayment conditions. It is an opportunity to impose neocolonial arrangements on Global South countries. In Venezuela’s case it is even more symbolic: it would mean exacting the proverbial pound of flesh for Chávez’s revolutionary audacity to challenge US hegemony in the Western hemisphere.

An eventual long-term credit program would surely come alongside a structural adjustment package of mass privatizations, gutted social expenditure, and all-around liberalization of the economy. Given the current leverage over Venezuela, US officials may attempt to further entrench the rollback of the Caribbean nation’s sovereignty.

Between the growing domestic demands for improved living conditions and the specter of debt renegotiation, the acting Rodríguez government will find it increasingly difficult to walk the tightrope of maintaining social peace while continuing to make one concession after another to monopoly capital and the Trump White House. 

With the limits of US imperialism nakedly exposed in Iran, Trump needs a victory in Venezuela. But that victory does not entail a buoyant economic recovery with social justice, let alone the survival of a sovereign and revolutionary project. Victory for the US is a dependent country, mired in debt and underdevelopment, where Western corporations plunder natural resources and geopolitical rivals are kept at bay.

Ultimately, any long-term plan for sovereign development needs to start from the fact that US imperialism, to echo Che Guevara,  is “not to be trusted even a little bit,” much less considered a “partner” in a “cooperation agenda.” It will undoubtedly be a major hill to climb. But thankfully, even if it means starting over, the Bolivarian Revolution is not starting from scratch.

Source: Sovereign Media

Four months have passed since US Starfighters breached the Fuerte Tiuna Death Star, captured Darth Maduro and celebrations broke out all around the galaxy. Venewoks in the diaspora embraced a renewed sense that victory, this time, might be permanent. But back in the country, the Empire has managed to reorganize and adapt to the demands of Viceroy Trump and leading members of the Trade Federation. Darth Delcy, albeit disdained by many, is becoming stronger. The rebellion yearns for the return of Master Machado, who isn’t getting the Viceroy’s authorization to negotiate a proper matchup with Darth Delcy and subsequent terms of surrender.

It’s more evident by the minute that Darth Delcy’s plan is to avert the creation of the New Republic by giving the Empire a technocratic, trade-friendly outlook. The path between defeating Darth Maduro and dismantling the Empire has turned out to be treacherous. Master Machado has tried to reassert her leadership by visiting foreign galaxies, but can’t find a breakthrough with the Viceroy.

Delcykrats are trying to conduct a swift takeover of the layered system Darth Maduro inherited from the Emperor. Madurokis are being neutralized or quietly assigned to minor planets, as is the case of Grand Moff Padrino in Agraria. Grand Admiral González López and Envoy Plasencia, old friends of Darth Delcy, are making strides, one within the Imperial High Command, the other across intergalactic diplomacy. Grand Vizier Jorge, Darth Delcy’s cunning brother, is running the senate and recasting the new imperial order through the language of old Scarlet propaganda.

The new imperial order

In Carascant, to keep the Scarlet Coalition from fragmenting, Darth Delcy tries to keep the echo of Stormtrooper boots and official dismissals contained within Imperial Offices. She still has to contend with Diosdado the Hutt, whose power lies in coercion and galactic hunting squads. More than 450 rebellion prisoners, many captured on the Hutt’s orders, are still in Imperial detention centers.

Viceroy Trump looks unwilling to press the ruling Delcykrats as long as he gets unrestricted access to on-demand resources such as kyber crystals and beskar steel. As Darth Delcy’s power and appeal before the Trade Federation has grown, she has terminated initial gestures of reconciliation that were initially needed for appeasement. A new Death Star is in the works, and to build a superior weapon for durable rule, Darth Delcy knows time is her most valuable asset.

Chief Envoy Rubio has reassured Master Machado that the galaxy first needs to stabilize and revive its economy before any transition can take place. Lately, however, the envoys that visit Carascant have said nothing about Republican reform, and a great deal about kyber crystals and the resumption of intergalactic travel.

The Empire does not need either Darth Maduro or Darth Delcy to prevail. It only needs the New Republic project to fail.

Master Machado has also witnessed how the regime restricts the activity of allies like Han Guanipa and Lando Armas, dropping threats every now and then. In the domestic senate, separatist opponents led by Count Capriles have failed to influence Imperial policy. A series of looming Imperial appointments, and the November referendum on Viceroy Trump, can determine Master Machados’ chances to a great extent.

Aligning the interests of the victors of the November referendum with those of the New Republic will be a challenge for rebel aides Mon Meda and Pedro Organa. They won’t just need to keep a level of coordination with allies of growing importance, but to safeguard Master Machado’s position before Viceroy Trump while keeping the new hope alive.

The struggle for Republican foundations

In the coming weeks, the Scarlet Coalition will be forced to appoint a new InterGalactic Banking Board (IGBB) and, even sooner, fill roughly two-thirds of the Imperial High Court. The figures chosen to lead these bodies could prove decisive in shaping the fate of Darth Delcy’s emerging Death Star project. A competent IGBB will be essential for the stabilization phase, key to aligning both the Trade Federation and the Galactic Senate behind the prospect of Venezuela’s economic rebound.

At the same time, a genuinely independent Imperial High Court could become the first meaningful check on Imperial power. The courts are also expected to oversee the Council of Electoral Battles, still controlled by Madurokis whom Darth Delcy has left untouched to avoid triggering her pending matchup with Master Machado. These two institutions will be critical to the third phase that Chief Envoy Rubio is purportedly pursuing, and might determine the success of Viceroy Trump’s plan after capturing Darth Maduro. Control over courts and the Battles Council will determine whether the final electoral contest—backed by the Trade Federation—can take place on credible terms.

The Rebel struggle will gradually shift toward navigating a far more intricate web of factions within a fragmented Trade Federation.

But Darth Delcy is expected to attempt cosmetic reshuffles rather than a transformative change of Imperial personnel. One unresolved question is whether forces aligned with Master Machado, such as national support and diplomatic pressure, will be enough to force a true transfer of power, or whether the Empire will once again adapt without changing.

The near future provides an opportunity for the new order to strengthen. The Trade Federation’s influence over Darth Delcy depends on Viceroy Trump’s grip on power, which will face its biggest challenge in the November referendum. The unchecked power the Viceroy currently has allows him to circumvent any criticism over Carascant. But change in the Trade Federation’s balance of power could make bipartisan support essential for the future of the New Republic.

The Trade Federation’s reckoning

Competing views in the Trade Federation on how to advance with the Empire’s transition will give more time and less scrutiny to Darth Delcy’s actions. It also provides an opportunity for Imperial Envoy Plasencia to bolster views which are more aligned with the Empire. For the Rebellion, the fallout from Viceroy Trump’s eroding grip on power hinges entirely on the alliances Master Machado has tried to forge.

These alliances will likely be essential to maintain pressure and decisively advance the New Republic’s agenda. Nonetheless, Viceroy Trump’s polarizing grip on the narrative has created deep seated resistance amongst potential allies. The struggle will gradually shift away from merely managing and appeasing Viceroy Trump and his Envoys, and toward navigating a far more intricate web of factions within a fragmented Trade Federation.

When Darth Maduro was defeated but no New Republic was allowed to emerge, the Empire did not dissolve, it adapted. Its new faces and colors are not signs of weakness but mechanisms of survival, designed to delay or prevent the formation of a New Republic. “Permanent victory” is an illusion. The Empire does not need either Darth Maduro or Darth Delcy to prevail. It only needs the New Republic project to fail.

What follows for Master Machado and the Rebellion is therefore not a triumphant return, but a sequence of calculated risks. The next chapter will depend on whether Master Machado returns as the leader of a Rebellion or as the effective architect of a New Republic. The Empire is determined to prevent her return or neutralize her immediately. If she returns solely as a symbol of resistance, Imperial forces will seek to frame her as a destabilizing threat to Viceroy Trump’s plan, increasing the risk of escalation against her.

If, however, her return becomes the centerpiece of a multilateral New Republic project backed by the Trade Federation, it would directly undermine Darth Delcy’s strategy. In that scenario, any move against Master Machado would signal to Viceroy Trump that Delcy cannot control the coalition she leads. At the same time, Master Machado’s movement can position itself as a more credible alternative for institutional reconstruction.

This shift, from diplomatic cover during resistance to an instrument of internal legitimacy, opens a narrow but meaningful window for the New Republic’s success.

The past 12o days show that Venewoks have not yet earned their Endor moment. As in the Star Wars movies, dismantling an Empire and building a New Republic will take a long and arduous journey. Normally the credits would unroll now, but the crisis continues and Darth Delcy’s intentions are crystal clear.

Venezuela has spent three months measuring the exact moment when a collective expectation begins to turn into disappointment. The monthly surveys conducted by AtlasIntel and Bloomberg for LatAm Pulse Venezuela, fielded in February, March, and April 2026, document a political process with a name, a direction, and a speed. What they show is unequivocal: Delcy Rodríguez is not consolidating a transitional government. She is managing one that is eroding by disguising that transition rather than carrying it out.

This is not a collapse in her popularity, but a clear downward trend is already visible.

The numbers are precise. In February, 37% of Venezuelans approved of Rodríguez’s performance. By April, that figure had fallen to 31.4%. Disapproval rose from 44.3% to 47.1%. In absolute terms, the gap between those who approve and those who disapprove widened from 7 to nearly 16 points in 90 days.

The most revealing data point is not approval but performance evaluation. Those rating her government as “excellent or good” dropped from 23.4% to 16.2%. That share did not migrate into outright rejection. It moved into the “average” category, which grew from 34.7% to 45.3% and is now dominant. That shift suggests disappointment more than anger, and the former is far harder to reverse than open rejection.

The segment that once supported Rodríguez is the one moving the most. A first conclusion is that the management of expectations created on January 3 is not working. Almost 120 days into her time in power, people are not really buying the narrative.

To understand why these segments are shifting, the economic data must be read in parallel. In February, 78% of Venezuelans believed the country would improve over the next six months. That was the optimism of the historical moment, the expectation unleashed on January 3. Three months later, that optimism has dropped 23 points. Today, 55% still expect improvement.

According to these figures, public perceptions of the opposition remain intact.

Meanwhile, reality has not moved: 77% still rate the country’s economic situation as bad. The labor market is perceived as equally deteriorated. The Consumer Confidence Index fell from +14.7 in February to -1.9 in April. The expectations index dropped from +58.3 to +34.6.

The gap between what was expected and what is being experienced is the engine behind everything else. And that gap does not weigh equally on everyone. That vulnerable Venezuelan who, even in crisis, continued to rely on Chavismo out of necessity, obligation, or support (the lower-income, less-educated, a beneficiary of the Patria system who gave Rodríguez the benefit of the doubt) also expected that the post–January 3 shift would be felt in their pocket, their job, their daily life. Three months later, they do not feel it.

Chavismo and the opposition

The leadership approval ranking measured by AtlasIntel completes the picture. María Corina Machado holds a positive image among 56% of participants without losing a point in three months, with a +30 net rating. Edmundo González stands at 49% with +24 points. According to these figures, public perceptions of the opposition remain intact.

The contrast with the Chavista bloc is stark. No government figure has a positive net rating. Diosdado Cabello stands at -52 points, Jorge Rodríguez at -51, and Nicolás Maduro at -46. Rodríguez is the “least negative” within the bloc at -30, but still deeply in negative territory. The Chavista leadership, without exception, occupies extremely high rejection levels, a clear reflection of how the public views anything associated with Maduro.

Ruling is easy when you control the entire State. Legitimizing power requires improving people’s lives. That is the debt the public is now charging to Rodríguez.

Venezuela is moving from the expectations born on January 3 toward reality. And the reality is that Rodríguez’s government is not being perceived as the solution—it is increasingly being identified as the continuation of the problem left behind by Maduro. AtlasIntel identifies corruption as the country’s number one issue for 53% of respondents. The weakening of democracy ranks third at 32.8%. The public does not confuse management with change.

Rodríguez has not lost her critics, a majority that was never with her. What she is losing is politically more costly: her believers. Those who, without being part of the opposition, expected something to change. Those who gave her the benefit of the doubt at the peak of collective expectation Venezuela had not seen in years. That movement, which is quiet and without headlines, is what AtlasIntel’s data captures month after month with a clarity that official discourse cannot conceal.

AtlasIntel sampling

The data for this analysis comes from a random digital recruitment survey (Atlas RDR) conducted among 4,629 Venezuelans between April 24 and 28, 2026. Like all digital polling in Venezuela, the method carries a known structural bias: it overrepresents populations with active internet access, implying a relative underrepresentation of rural areas, older adults, and lower-income sectors without stable connectivity. Absolute figures should be interpreted with caution.

However, the instrument’s real value lies not in a snapshot but in its month-to-month tracking. If the bias is constant (as it is in this case, given that the digital profile captured remains structurally the same each month) then movements between measurements reflect real changes in opinion. A miscalibrated thermometer still detects a fever. And what this three-month series detects is unequivocal: erosion is real, sustained, and advancing among the segments Rodríguez could least afford to lose.

Managing power is relatively simple when the instruments of the State are in hand. Legitimizing it requires improving people’s lives. That is the debt these three months of surveys are charging to Rodríguez’s government.

If this continues, her own base could withdraw its support in the worst possible way: through the disappointment of those making a final bet on trust after years of having lost it. That kind of disappointment does not reverse, and may represent a more dangerous political rupture than outright rejection.

Chavismo wants to remain in control. But time is charging the opportunity for change that people saw on January 3. If that change does not arrive, it will be demanded. Without elections, it will be very difficult for them to claim to represent the country’s leadership before a population that no longer believes in them. Elections are necessary and urgent. Can chavismo avoid them?

One day Delcy Rodríguez calls for a reform to the justice system after announcing the sudden revocation of the amnesty law her brother sponsored. The other, rumors suggest she’ll reshuffle the country’s higher court without providing any indication of who the new magistrates are going to be. The central bank president she recently named prepares to disclose figures to the IMF for the first time in decades.

The public does little else than follow the news, as if things were normal. Futile debate has emerged on social media over whether the new US chief of mission in Caracas is more hawkish than his predecessor. Or if the opposition has racist tendencies because a singer (once popular in the 2000s) called Delcy an ape in the opposition’s largest rally in years.

The picture of the country in recent weeks is one of Delcy Rodríguez calling the shots with near-total freedom. She has been enjoying a clear head start over a potential presidential election, as she crisscrosses Venezuela on what amounts to an unofficial campaign tour. In Caracas, she keeps changing everything so that nothing really changes. She is intent on controlling government offices in the next four years through newly promoted loyalists and a clean inflow of petrodollars. The chavista elite has looked more confident in the meantime, touring with Delcy in sky-blue outfits, leading cartoonish chants for peace and national union as if the internal contradictions that surfaced two months ago were now less important, because the possibility of survival looks clearer.

Back in February, optimists would discuss the scope of Washington’s coercion capacity over the “caretaker” regime, the boundaries that (if crossed) would trigger a “second wave” of attacks, the disappearance of Alex Saab as a prelude of a broader purge against other “untouchables” that overtly normalized the commission of terror. Now, lunatics like Diosdado Cabello’s nephew, Alejandro Rondón, claim on social media that “the recess is about to end” the same day Delcy says the amnesty scheme ran its course and Cabello recounts an unlikely justice system crackdown.

What followed January 3^rdwas a paradigm change with positive practical consequences for society that chavismo quickly learned to manage if not reverse.

Alejandro doesn’t look like the brightest dude. He’s another chavista nepo-kid working for the other Cabello uncle that controls Venezuela’s taxing authority, Jose David, though Alejandro made a name for himself with rage-baiting tweets that celebrated Maduro’s “victory” in 2024 and claimed the opposition were terrorists who falsified the official voting records (i.e. Diosdado’s talking points during the tun-tun operation).]

But an emboldened member of the Cabello Rondón clan is a troubling sign for those who fled the country after being placed on “treason” blacklists. It also undercuts the very notions of pluralism and national reconciliation that Marco Rubio invoked three months ago when outlining his vision for Venezuela’s democratic transition before US senators. Shortly thereafter, Rondón drove the point home by publicly wishing Donald Trump well after the shooting at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner. The message seems clear: the arrangement with Team Trump is comfortable enough that, however fraught the geopolitical backdrop, they can afford to be flippant—even in public. They remain, unmistakably, the bullies in town. 

The long wait for elections (or just a calendar?)

What followed January 3^rd was a paradigm change with positive practical consequences for society that chavismo quickly learned to manage if not reverse. Allies of Maria Corina  Machado who spent the past two years jailed or hiding are back in the street, even providing testimonies about their imprisonment. The student movement has undergone a revival, liaising with human rights groups to set up carefully-controlled protests. Censorship isn’t what it used to be, so journalists have tried to take advantage of that opening. Pensioners and public workers have perhaps become the loudest actor in confronting Rodríguez, despite having to face colectivos and National Guards whenever they hit the streets.

Repression has become less intense, but the lack of a clear electoral calendar keeps the opposition on the sidelines, waiting for the arrival of Machado, which is no less paralyzing. The amnesty law passed on February 19 effectively funneled the release of political prisoners, shattering expectations of a “landmark outcome” that would speed up the process. 

Indeed, the statute’s contents make more than 180 supposed military rebels ineligible, although the release of a handful of FANB officers in recent days reinforces the idea that a law wasn’t necessary to get people out of jail. Nearly 300 civilians are still imprisoned, and we haven’t seen significant breakthroughs in the past few weeks.

According to figures from NGO Foro Penal (based on documented cases), the political prisoner population fell by 40% in the two months following the US military intervention—dropping from 863 detainees in late December to 526 by March 2. The pace has clearly slowed since then. Chavismo released 36 people between March and April, and 17 over the past 18 days (about 6% of the pre–January 3 total). The regime still resorts to sporadic arbitrary arrests and intimidation. Alexis Paparoni, an opposition figure in Mérida (and brother of Carlos Paparoni), was briefly detained while traveling and later released under precautionary measures. A similar incident occurred last weekend with a government employee in Guárico, who was detained for having a note on his desk bearing the now-infamous slur directed at Delcy.

“These prisoners are currently incarcerated because POTUShas chosen to appease and praise the perpetrators instead of supporting their victims,” Burelli recently told Senator Scott.

The White House appears satisfied with results so far. Venezuela is now subject to sweeping sanctions relief across oil, gas, minerals, and fertilizers, while OFAC has issued waivers allowing operations with public banks. Most notably, Delcy Rodríguez has been removed from the Specially Designated Nationals list—effectively unfreezing her US-based assets and clearing the way for financial dealings under American jurisdiction. 

The opposition leadership has largely stuck to its 2025 strategy of projecting trust and patience toward Donald Trump. María Corina Machado continues to argue that Trump is the head of state who has done the most to advance Venezuela’s liberation and maintains that the Rodríguez government is dismantling the Maduro-era “structures of corruption and repression.” However, she acknowledged last week that a bout of political instability cannot be ruled out. 

“The risk is that if people feel the path [toward freedom and democracy] is beginning to close, they may start to push back in a disorganized and potentially anarchic way,” she told esRadio hosts in Madrid. “That’s why a clearly defined electoral calendar is a guarantee of peace and stability. That would help people accept that this process will last a bit longer, as institutions must be strengthened and we need to take time to prepare for a truly impeccable election.”

Running out of patience

Criticism of the Trump administration’s handling in Venezuela continues to grow among groups of scholars and foreign policy observers, while opposition parties remain largely quiet and prefer to let Machado formulate their stance.

But in general, there’s a tense awareness that the waters are getting muddy. Some in journalism, and other opposition allies are starting to lose their patience.

Venezuelan journalist Sebastiana Barraez, an outspoken critic of chavismo and popular source on repression, told her audience that Venezuelan people have no guarantees about their future. Two days ago, she admitted the overthrow of Nicolás Maduro had raised hopes of a new democracy and true institutional recovery.

“It turns out none of that is happening,” Barráez said. “In Venezuela, Trump is promoting the interests of the United States. The problem is that those interests are not compatible with what we Venezuelans are looking for.”

Pedro Mario Burelli, an independent advisor for the opposition, is among the few figures to be pressing Washington over its ties with Delcy Rodríguez, calling Trump’s decision to elevate her an “incoherent strategy.” He has warned that doing business with Minerven makes the US an effective enabler of environmental crimes in Venezuela’s south. In March, he told The Atlantic that the remaining political prisoners now belong to Trump and Rubio.

“These prisoners are currently incarcerated because POTUS has chosen to appease and praise the perpetrators instead of supporting their victims. Constantly praising Delcy is disgraceful and an insult to the vast majority of Venezuelans”, Burelli told GOP Senator Rick Scott on Sunday.“Faulting her, as you and some of your colleagues do, is disingenuous. Venezuelans rightfully expect, and deserve, much more from democratically elected US officials.”