Delcy Rodríguez

“Cursed be you, State of Israel. Cursed be you,” Hugo Chávez said memorably on state television in 2010. Over his years in power, he floated the ancient antisemitic trope of the Christ-killing people, likened Israeli leaders to Hitler, called for them to be tried at The Hague, and in 2009 broke off relations entirely in response to the Gaza attacks, calling his own diplomats’ expulsion an “honor.” He had already withdrawn Venezuela’s envoy once before in 2006 over the IDF offensive in Lebanon, and three months after the 2009 break he recognized the Palestinian Authority. 

Although Venezuela never stopped trading with Israel, Chávez’s firm anti-Israel rhetoric was central to how the Bolivarian Revolution defined itself abroad, even after his death. Now his heirs are thawing one of the coldest relationships in chavista foreign policy. 

On Tuesday, the foreign ministries of Venezuela and Israel announced they would establish a “coordination mechanism” to provide consular services to their citizens, continuing the ongoing technical cooperation born out of Israel’s response to the June 24 earthquakes. Although the agreement falls short of full diplomatic restoration, with no mention yet of exchanging ambassadors or reopening embassies, it is the first formal coordination channel between the two countries since Chávez severed relations.

Chavista groups took to the streets in Caracas on July 25 to denounce the US-sponsored talks that began on August 1, burning Israeli and US flags.

In 2017, then-Foreign Minister Delcy Rodríguez said Venezuela wanted to restore ties, and the following year Maduro welcomed then-chief Sephardic rabbi of Israel, Shlomo Moshe Amara, to Miraflores, awarding him the Libertadoras y Libertadores order—the same honor given to the Palestinian Authority’s Abu Mazen by Chávez in 2009. 

Although the government was quick to frame the collaboration as a humanitarian matter, it was also military from the jump. Six days after the quakes, a diplomatic and military mission departed to Venezuela from Israel, comprising more than 50 personnel from the Foreign Ministry, the IDF’s Home Front Command, and the National Emergency Management Authority, joined by ZAKA search-and-rescue volunteers. It was led by Brigadier General Elad Edri, chief of staff of the IDF Home Front Command, who in a July meeting presented a “Project for the Reconstruction of the Future” to Rodríguez. Delcy was then photographed alongside uniformed IDF officers, thanked the delegation on camera, and praised its members as “highly trained and professional,” ultimately asking Sa’ar to extend the mission. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally approved the extension.

Newly-appointed canciller Félix Plasencia sealed the agreement with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar after weeks of talks, and a day after holding a meeting with Isaac Cohen, chief rabbi of Venezuela’s Israelite Association. He delivered a letter addressed to Delcy Rodríguez, asking her to consider restoring diplomatic ties between the countries given “the needs of the Jewish community in our country.” 

Plasencia thanked Israel for its earthquake assistance and praised the community’s historic contributions to Venezuela, warm words for a community that chavismo long conflated with the State it was cursing. In 2009, Chávez called on Venezuela’s Jews to answer for a foreign government’s war and linked Jews to the hoarding of the world’s wealth in his 2005 Christmas address. During the 2012 campaign, chavista media hammered Henrique Capriles over his Jewish ancestry, and state security raided the Hebraica Jewish school twice, in 2004 and 2007, as denounced by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

Signaling a willingness to rebuild relations with Israel is one more entry on a long list of things that Washington wants and that Rodríguez is willing to concede.

The government has reversed course, but some of its base has not. Chavista groups took to the streets in Caracas on July 25 to denounce the US-sponsored talks that began on August 1, burning Israeli and US flags. As the news of renewed consular relations broke, the Venezuelan Movement in Solidarity with Palestine, Al Awda, rejected “normalization with the genocidal state of Israel,” warning that “diplomacy cannot serve to whitewash crimes against humanity.” 

But the base’s anger misreads the nature of the turn. After a quarter-century defining itself against empire, chavismo is not softening but practicing what former diplomat Imdat Oner calls authoritarian pragmatism: trading diplomatic goodwill for room to consolidate power at home and attract economic opportunities. Since taking the interim presidency, Delcy Rodríguez has reversed much of the confrontational diplomacy of the Chávez and Maduro years, moving closer to Washington, restoring ties with Chile, Perú, and the Dominican Republic, withdrawing from the International Criminal Court, and distancing Caracas from Iran.

Signaling a willingness to rebuild relations with Israel is one more entry on a long list of things that Washington wants and that Rodríguez is willing to concede. Chávez cursed the State of Israel “from the depths of his soul and his viscera”, but his successors have decided that the soul of their revolution is worth sacrificing for their own survival.

Foreign policy rarely shifts as quickly as Venezuela’s has this year. And when it does, ideology is usually not the driver. Survival is—especially in autocratic systems. 

Since taking the interim presidency, Delcy Rodríguez has quietly reversed much of the confrontational diplomacy that defined the Maduro and Chávez era. As a consequence of the January 3 military intervention, she moved closer to Washington, re-established diplomatic ties with Chile and the Dominican Republic, and welcomed earthquake aid sent by El Salvador and Argentina. She also distanced Caracas from traditional partners such as Iran (currently in a war with the US and Cuba), withdrew Venezuela from the International Criminal Court in a step welcomed by the United States, and signaled a willingness to rebuild relations with Israel. Every one of these moves aligns with what Washington wants. 

These moves add up to more than tactical adjustments. They reveal an emerging foreign-policy strategy: authoritarian pragmatism. The goal is not political liberalization but reducing external pressure, attracting economic opportunities, and creating space for the government to consolidate power at home. 

To understand how dramatic this turn is, it helps to recall where Venezuela’s diplomacy was headed under Maduro. As a young diplomat in Caracas, I watched the country move toward an increasingly divisive and isolationist posture. I still remember sitting in Venezuela’s National Assembly in early 2015 during one of Maduro’s annual addresses. I had attended many official ceremonies before, but nothing prepared me for the bluntness of that night.

The best way to understand this shift is not as a simple turn toward the West, but as an adoption of the multi-alignment model perfected by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Most leaders soften their rhetoric when foreign diplomats are present. Maduro did the opposite. He divided the world into ideological camps: Western governments as imperialist powers, left-leaning Latin American states as part of a revolutionary bloc, Russia and Iran as fellow victims of Western pressure. A few ambassadors were singled out as representatives of friendly nations; the rest of us understood, without being told, that we belonged to a lower tier. At that time, Turkey wasn’t even on Maduro’s radar. 

That speech captured the essence of Maduro’s foreign-policy doctrine. For more than a decade, Chavismo locked Venezuela into a narrow circle of partners—China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba—while confrontation with the United States, Western governments, international institutions, and several regional neighbors left Caracas with fewer diplomatic options. Ideology became a cage.

Delcy’s U-turn

Delcy is now moving in a different direction. Her early signals suggest that she is less interested in defending Maduro’s ideological map than in redrawing it. Governments once treated as adversaries are again potential partners. Regional relationships that had gone cold are being restored. Caracas is talking to institutions it once dismissed as hostile.

The best way to understand this shift is not as a simple turn toward the West, but as an adoption of the multi-alignment model perfected by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey. Turkey has shown how an authoritarian government can maintain strong economic ties with China, trade extensively with Russia, remain inside NATO, negotiate directly with Washington when useful, and still preserve tight political control at home. These relationships do not have to be mutually exclusive.

It’s important to note that the model sits differently on each leader. The two leaders reached power through opposite paths—Erdoğan through repeated elections and a genuine popular mandate, Delcy through a foreign military operation that removed her predecessor. One can afford slow, strategic bets. The other cannot. But the relevant comparison is not how they arrived in office; it is what foreign policy allows them to do once there.

A government can become more useful to Washington without becoming more democratic at home. That is precisely the space Delcy appears to be trying to create. 

Delcy does not need to sever the relations with old allies like China and Russia even though Washington is demanding to reduce the influence of Russia and China from Venezuela. China no longer takes 80 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports, but Chinese state firms still operate joint ventures in the country. The interim regime can concede the first while preserving the second, keeping protocol and trade channels open without returning to the dependency that once made Caracas useful to Beijing and Moscow. It’s true that Delcy is not in Erdoğan’s position, but she is reaching for his method—accumulating enough international goodwill that the questions about democracy at home lose their urgency. 

And there is a practical reason to move quickly. Reviving Venezuela’s oil industry is slow and complex. Rebuilding PDVSA, attracting foreign investment, issuing new licenses, and resolving sanctions and sovereign debt disputes will take years. Diplomatic decisions, by contrast, are fast and inexpensive for her regime.

Consider what these moves cost her. She hosted senior US cabinet officials in Caracas, rewrote the oil and mining laws to bring American companies back, and reopened the energy sector to foreign investment. She restored relations with neighbors that had broken with Caracas over the 2024 election—Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic all agreed to normalization roadmaps within weeks of one another. In April, the IMF resumed dealings with Venezuela after seven years, and the World Bank followed the same day. Welcoming Israeli rescue teams in June cost little more than a press conference.

The concessions to Washington were real, but they were concessions of access, not of power. What Delcy bought with them is a government that can once again be received, financed, and invested in—and that has yet to surrender any control over the courts, the security services, or the electoral machinery.

The Turkey comparison helps explain why. On July 7–8, Erdogan hosted NATO’s annual summit in Ankara, with President Trump in attendance—the first visit by a sitting US president to Turkey in more than a decade. The summit gave Erdogan an important diplomatic moment and strengthened his position internationally. Yet political pressure on Turkey’s opposition continued. Three weeks later, Turkish police detained 55 people, including an opposition mayor, in coordinated raids across nine provinces. By early August, 29 opposition mayors were under arrest, with dozens more suspended. Erdogan’s strongest rival, Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, has been in prison since March 2025, jailed the day he became his party’s presidential candidate. Western governments barely reacted to these autocratic practices.

As long as Delcy stays within the boundaries of the Donroe Doctrine, Washington has strong incentives to encourage this opening.

In today’s world, a government can become more useful to Washington without becoming more democratic at home. That is precisely the space Delcy appears to be trying to create. 

The emerging model is less about ideological loyalty than strategic flexibility. Caracas can cooperate with Washington on oil while maintaining ties with China. It can reopen relations with countries it previously alienated while preserving its partnerships with traditional allies. It can accept humanitarian assistance from governments once labeled enemies without altering its domestic political system.

In other words, Venezuela does not have to become less authoritarian to become more internationally flexible. That is the part of the interim regime’s strategy that deserves the most attention.

As long as Delcy stays within the boundaries of the Donroe Doctrine, Washington has strong incentives to encourage this opening. Those boundaries are narrower than they first appear, and they are not about democracy. Washington’s requirements are resource access, the exclusion of Russian, Chinese, and Iranian strategic presence from the hemisphere, and cooperation on migration and counter-narcotics. Everything else has proved negotiable. A more cooperative Venezuela creates opportunities for American businesses, investment, energy cooperation, and a more predictable bilateral relationship—something the United States could never achieve under Maduro’s siege mentality.

Venezuela may be changing how it deals with the world without changing how power is exercised at home. If this continues, the new administration’s foreign-policy shift could mark the beginning of a new phase of Chavismo—less ideological, more adaptable, and potentially more durable.

Y así arrancó.

August 1 arrived with no sign the talks would begin, nor confirmation about those involved in each delegation. Mauricio Claver-Carone, the Americans’ informal intermediary coordinating the talks, announced his departure from the famous “Viceroy” role the day before, though several sources claim he was pushed out. The uncertainty just increased until radio silence broke, when Dinorah Figuera and Jorge Rodríguez published their respective statements at around 6 pm Caracas time, via X.

Both of them claimed to have held a phone call “to commence” the so-called dialogue process between the Rodríguez administration, under the Trump administration’s tutelage, and an opposition group also under the Trump administration’s tutelage. This looks nothing like the start of previous talks featuring chavismo and the opposition, with pictures of mediators and negotiators in a meeting hosted by some Caribbean nation.

We can imagine that, as nothing was really prepared for last weekend, Rodríguez and Figuera simply rang each other on WhatsApp and agreed what they would put in writing to leave a public record that the thing had begun. That’s if the call actually happened.

All statements established the same three-point agenda: the earthquake response (surely a subject Rodríguez is invoking to postpone anything that is not reconstruction), the strengthening of democracy (which has a different meaning for each stakeholder), and political rights and guarantees (what Venezuelans are demanding, in third place). 

Rodríguez skipped any mention of a transition, or the United States, or the chavista National Assembly.

Shortly after, a State Department official called Dylan Johnson said the “US welcomes this announcement.” Today’s press statement by State echoes the agenda points shared by Figuera and Rodríguez.

When both camps confirmed the start date on July 14, the response to the disaster did not appear as an agenda point for the Figuera-led delegation. It seems Jorge Rodríguez managed to sneak it in with the gringos’ approval.

Rodríguez addressed Figuera as the “representative of a sector of the Venezuelan opposition” and skipped any mentions of a transition, or the United States. His statement did not mention the chavista National Assembly or display its logo either. Instead, he spoke of a national government delegation where he stands out as coordinador and includes six members. Second in the list is Ana María Sanjuan, a close advisor of the Rodríguez siblings who joined the government as minister of education in March. Then there is Jorge Arreaza (one of the most senior chavista figures in the current legislature and a usual suspect in prominent commissions), Pedro Infante (the parliament’s vice president), and two PSUV lawmakers strongly linked to the ruling party’s youths: América Pérez and Génesis Garvett. The latter is a chavista politician-influencer born in 1999.

Machado said disagreements with the Trump administration concern the speed and urgency of the transition, and demanded short-term results.

Figuera said the first in-person meeting is set to take place next week in Caracas. She confirmed the US-backed opposition delegation is composed of a political technical commission of six members (Marco Aurelio Quiñones, Ramón López, Jorge Millán, Juan Miguel Matheus, and Sergio Vergara and herself) and a supporting commission (Macario González, Julio César Moreno, Desiree Barboza and Elimar Díaz). Figuera thanked the US and Marco Rubio for their backing of the transition before signing off on behalf of the 2015 National Assembly, which doesn’t actually exist anymore.

In an August 2 interview, María Corina Machado restated what she and Edmundo González had already established: she will not join the talks nor block them. Venevisión aired 15 minutes of the conversation between the opposition leader and Luis Olavarrieta, the first broadcast of a Machado interview on the network in ages.

“Everything that brings us closer to fulfilling the July 28 mandate will have our support,” she said, “but from a very firm perspective of always telling the truth. At this point no one is going to put a muzzle on me.” Asked about her disagreements with Washington’s agenda, Machado stated that these concern the speed and urgency of the transition and demanded short-term results: freeing political prisoners, allowing the return of exiles, renewing the National Electoral Council (CNE), and establishing a date for new elections. 

Whoever now runs Nicolás Maduro’s X and Telegram accounts announced that he welcomes “any path of dialogue that helps to consolidate peace, coexistence, and encounter among Venezuelans.”

Caracas, July 28, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez hosted a US Congress delegation in Caracas on Friday. 

The team of US politicians was led by Florida Republican Representative Brian Mast, a military veteran who also served voluntarily in the Israeli armed forces. It also included Florida Republican representatives Randy Fine and Kat Cammack alongside Illinois Democratic representative Jonathan Jackson. 

According to Venezuelan state media, the high-level meeting saw the two sides “assess progress in bilateral relations and the joint agenda in strategic areas.”

“Both sides reviewed bilateral cooperation schemes geared toward fighting transnational organized crime and border security,” the official report said.

For his part, Fine wrote on social media that he was “honored” to take part in the first congressional delegation to Venezuela in a decade. He added that the US’ January 3 kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro “set Venezuela on a trajectory to be a key ally” of the US. 

Fine, like Mast, is a major advocate of Israeli interests in the US legislature and has the backing of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). He has publicly called for starving and dropping nuclear bombs on the Gaza Strip. 

Also participating in the summit were US Chargé d’Affaires in Venezuela John Barrett, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia, and Vice Minister for Europe and North America Oliver Blanco.

Blanco, who comes from the ranks of the opposition Democratic Action (AD) party, has been the main government liaison with US officials in the country. He was recently appointed First Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to “strengthen Venezuela’s foreign policy and peace diplomacy around the world.”

In addition, the US Congress members held talks with National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, who described the meeting as “fruitful” and said discussions focused on “the legislative agenda and international investment.” Rodríguez added that Venezuela took the opportunity to “thank the United States for its support” following the June 24 twin earthquakes.

The US lawmakers held subsequent meetings with officials from Venezuela’s Ministry of Defense and the National Anti-Drug Superintendency (Sunad), according to reports.

Following the January 3 US military strikes and Maduro kidnapping, the Rodríguez-led acting government fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement with Washington following seven years of severed ties. Both administrations have opened their respective embassies.

Venezuela’s acting president has hosted a number of US officials in Caracas in recent months, including Energy Secretary Chris Wright, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe.

Last March, Rodríguez had already received a delegation from the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee as part of the ongoing “peace dialogue” between Washington and Caracas.

At that time, the presidential press office said the Senate delegation had traveled to Caracas for a “technical and political” visit intended to continue the bilateral “roadmap” focused on “direct communication to manage historical differences and strengthen energy cooperation in light of global challenges.”

Venezuela and Peru Move Toward Restoring Relations

Caracas’ foreign policy shift has likewise seen authorities mend ties with regional US allies that had sought to isolate the Caribbean nation.

On Friday, the governments of Venezuela and Peru announced the start of a gradual process to fully restore diplomatic relations, which were severed in 2024 after the Peruvian government refused to recognize Venezuela’s official electoral results that saw Maduro secure a third term in office.

“In a first stage, both countries have agreed to reactivate consular relations as an initial step toward the full restoration of bilateral ties,” the foreign ministries of Venezuela and Peru said in a joint statement.

The immediate objective is to guarantee protection and consular services for Venezuelan and Peruvian citizens residing in each country. The diplomatic rapprochement comes days before a change of government in Peru, where conservative leader Keiko Fujimori is set to replace interim President José María Balcázar after a narrow and disputed electoral triumph.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

This is one pic Telesur picked to try to make Delcy look competent. Draw your own conclusions.

On July 7th, Delcy Rodríguez presented her “Venezuela Reborn” (Venezuela Renace) plan to recover all buildings and areas hit by the earthquakes. The promise is not only rebuilding infrastructure but also offering economic assistance to those affected thanks to funds from the IMF and other multilateral organizations.

This happened just a week after her press conference on July 2nd, in which she faced multiple questions from foreign reporters about the government’s late and disorganized response to the disaster in La Guaira. Rodríguez denied those claims, blaming disinformation from “media labs” while defending the military.

The “media labs” argument was immediately taken up by State outlets and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello on his weekly TV show Con El Mazo Dando, in which he insulted international correspondents who covered the disaster.

The saying “old habits die hard” can be applied here: the Rodrigato has been unable to avoid and hide the public backlash over its management of the earthquakes’ aftermath, which has been front and center of the reporting made by mainstream international media, like when a crew of Norway’s TV2 recorded La Guaira resident Damely Díaz, who lost both her daughter and her home, openly berating Nicolas Maduro Guerra.

Now, the regime is once again blaming the messenger, taking advantage of the actual problem of disinformation on social media to point at “political interests that want to take advantage of the humanitarian tragedy.” 

This comes as the official attempt to establish the narrative that Delcy Rodríguez is in full control has been undermined by self-imposed limitations. TalCual editor Víctor Amaya offered a glimpse: “Outside of fleeting visits to collapsed areas, (Delcy) Rodríguez has appeared almost always indoors, meeting rescue workers who she interrupts in their labor to thank them in from of the camera, decorating government officers, greeting Hernán Gil (a security guard rescued after eight days trapped in Catia La Mar) and more recently, in visits to stokepile centers and shelters. His brother Jorge became the de facto spokesperson for official figures of dead and wounded.”

The Great Mission Venezuela Renace actually merged three existing infrastructure-related government programs: Barrio Nuevo Barrio Tricolor, Juntos Todo es Posible and Venezuela Bella. It also shares its name with an online initiative launched back in May to register young Venezuelans with diverse skills to return and help out. The difference is that the word order changes.

Venezuela Renace doubles down on the “stateswoman” role Delcy tried to carve for herself in her public showings while adapting it to the current circumstances. 

It can be said to some extent that Venezuela Renace works as a reboot of the government’s communicational strategy, even if that’s not its main purpose. And taking in consideration what’s been seen so far, it couldn’t be more different from the previous one: Venezuela Vuela Libre.

While Venezuela Vuela Libre was like a trial balloon of what Delcy’s election campaign could look like in a hypothetical snap presidential election, Venezuela Renace doubles down on the “stateswoman” role that she has tried to carve for herself in her public showings while adapting it to the current circumstances. 

Unlike in Venezuela Vuela Libre, where Delcy’s image was absent, she’s front and center in Venezuela Renace, supervising works or in official meetings. Even their visuals differ drastically: Venezuela Vuela Libre’s iconography was mostly related to peace and faith, while its main logo showed color (with blue, not red, dominating the palette). 

Venezuela Renace is clearer on its communication goals than whatever Venezuela Vuela Libre was trying to achieve (before it was minimized and later unceremoniously dropped after June 24 for quite obvious reasons). But which audience is it going to appeal to? The Venezuelan people? International media? Maybe it targets the biggest supporter of the Rodrigato since January 3 and one of the most (if not the biggest) sources of assistance after the quakes: the Trump administration. No wonder, in their “media labs” response, State propaganda avoided mentioning Trump or the US, instead blaming María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia.

Most probably, Delcy Rodríguez only interested in convincing the Americans that her government is doing things right.

Caracas, July 8, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez held a meeting with a military and diplomatic delegation from Israel on Tuesday.

The talks represented the first official engagement between Caracas and Tel Aviv since former President Hugo Chávez severed diplomatic relations in 2009.

According to Venezuelan state media reports, Rodríguez alongside Public Works Vice President Juan José Ramírez and Transport Minister Francisco Garcés sat down with Israeli officials to discuss plans for the removal of over 1 million tons of rubble from La Guaira state in the wake of June 24’s double earthquake.

For its part, the IDF indicated that its engineering personnel delivered a “national rehabilitation” plan to the Venezuelan government. Photos published on social media showed Brigadier General Elad Edri, chief of staff of the IDF Home Front Command, presenting a slide show titled “Project for the Reconstruction of the Future” with Venezuelan and Israeli flags. 

The Israeli Foreign Ministry added that, at Rodríguez’s request, its delegation will stay in the Caribbean nation for two additional weeks to “begin implementing the reconstruction plan prepared by Israeli experts.”

Uniformed Israeli soldiers have toured multiple affected areas in Caracas and La Guaira, reportedly conducting inspections on damaged infrastructure. It has held multiple meetings with Venezuelan authorities, including a previous one with Ramírez in the Vicepresidency of Public Works. In a press conference last week, Rodríguez expressed her appreciation for the arrival of the “highly trained and professional” Israeli team.

It is not presently known whether the Israeli evaluations are being coordinated with similar assessments from specialized Venezuelan brigades.

“We are here primarily to assist in a natural disaster,” diplomat Yoed Magen said in a social media video. “Whenever we come to a country to advise or provide assistance, a relationship is formed and it can lead to a faster rapprochement.”

Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez cut ties with Tel Aviv in 2009, fiercely denouncing Operation Cast Lead as “genocide” and voicing solidarity with the Palestinian people.

President Nicolás Maduro maintained his predecessor’s position excoriating Israeli military occupation and war crimes in Gaza and Lebanon, as well as the June 2025 Twelve-Day War against Iran. The Maduro government publicly endorsed South Africa’s activation of the Genocide Convention against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2024.

The mission has drawn backlash from the Chavista grassroots.

“[Israel] is a rogue nation. Its rulers are committing a genocide against the native people of Palestine and now they supposedly help Venezuela rescue [earthquake] victims and rebuild La Guaira,” Hindu Anderi, spokesperson for the Platform of Solidarity with the Palestinian cause, wrote on social media.

Venezuelan officials have reported 3,685 people killed in the earthquake as of July 7, more than 16,000 injured, and over 15,000 displaced families. A total of 190 buildings have collapsed, with hundreds more suffering various levels of damage.

The Venezuelan government has radically shifted its foreign policy after the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Maduro. Apart from reestablishing diplomatic relations with Washington, Caracas has distanced itself from historic allies. During the recent US-Israel war against Iran, Caracas did not express support for Tehran, instead offering public backing for US Gulf allies such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The diplomatic rapprochement with the Trump administration has seen US forces hold military exercises in Caracas and conduct an extrajudicial execution in southeast Bolívar State.

Following the recent earthquakes, Washington expanded its footprint in the Caribbean nation, with 900 military personnel reportedly on the ground in Venezuela. After conducting repair works, US forces are currently running logistics and aid operations at La Guaira port and the Simón Bolívar International Airport.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

The photo is from Workers’ Day in Venezuela, when Delcy Rodríguez, wearing a blue Ronald Acuña baseball jersey, announced a long-awaited minimum income increase after several days touring the country, campaigning for a land of peace and prosperity, free of sanctions.

Us Venezuelans know that chavismo loves a propaganda makeover. They can be good at it too, in all honesty. The aftermath of the capture of one of the world’s most loathed autocrats, and the takeover by his supposedly pragmatic, corporate-like vice president was never going to be an exception when it comes to PR reinvention.

Media outlets have noticed the changes in the Caracas landscape: the image of Nicolás Maduro (and to some extent, that of former First Combatant Cilia Flores) is starting to disappear from view. Large billboards featuring the couple, including the phrase “we want them back” (los queremos de vuelta), are getting withdrawn.

This occurs as there’s serious discomfort inside chavismo about how close the Delcy-Trump relationship has become: from the drastic U-turn in the Alex Saab case to increased “supervision” from the US embassy in Caracas and the joint military operation targeting the Tren de Aragua leader, it looks like Washington’s tutelage keeps expanding and deepening at great speed.

Delcy herself is not the main focus. The idea is to convince Venezuelans that things are improving, to encourage them to imagine how the country could thrive if sanctions are lifted.

The official strategy now seems to put Maduro on the back burner, letting him fade away from short-term memory. Getting rid of his image entirely won’t be easy, of course. After all, his face and personal brand—his Super Mustache, and the tricolor M letter from his 2018 presidential campaign which became an official emblem of sorts—can still be seen on public signs, painted in walls and even in official vehicles.

This mirrors what happened earlier with the visual trademarks of the late Hugo Chávez, like his famous eyes and rabo e’ cochino signature. Maduro had reduced their public use and replaced them with his own iconography, for better or for worse. 

Blue-hued efficiency

This sudden shift in dropping Maduro’s image brings an important question to mind: what will replace it? 

One option would be to have Delcy’s face in huge billboards across avenues and highways. But that has not been the case so far. 

Two elements are noticeable. First, Delcy herself is not the main focus. Instead, the idea is to convince the Venezuelan people that things are improving, and to encourage them to imagine how the country could thrive if (more) US sanctions are lifted.

She has embraced a more traditional “head of state” role, prioritizing highly-publicized formal meetings where she signs letters of understanding (often disguised as actual contracts) with foreign investors as signs that the country is back on track and open for business. That completely aligns with how the Trump administration and POTUS himself sell their role here.

Political advertising from the Delcy Rodríguez government tries to project a nation of diverse, forward-looking citizens, which is a huge departure from the Chávez-era exaltation of the all-red masses. Note the Star of David on the left-hand side of the image above, a nod to both the US and a Jewish community famously insulted by Chávez. 

Even Miraflores Palace got its own new styling for such occasions: the Cabinet Room was stripped of not only anything related to both Chávez and Maduro but also the pictures of the late Argentine President Néstor Kirchner. The room was named in his honor in 2011. In its place there’s now a large, White House-styled logo for Miraflores, which has been in use since 2018.

Then there’ the blatant decision of dropping chavismo’s traditional rojo-rojito red for a dark blue. 

Curiously enough, the Rodrigato has taken advantage of the full visual rebrand of the government launched last year by Maduro, which dropped the term Gobierno Bolivariano and related symbols used since the mid 2000s. 

The national flag and formal country name are front and center. The use of a broader institutional look is another stark contrast with the more personalized presentation from the Maduro years.

Delcy has used social media and trips both inside and outside the country in order to compensate for her brand-new stateswoman persona. But she doesn’t go as far as doing an Aló Presidente-style TV show or starting her own podcast like Maduro did with Con Maduro + (where Delcy was once a guest).

Delcy probably knows she is not exactly the most marketable presidential candidate. This rebrand is also an attempt to push her image in that direction while her aides and consultants still have time to sketch something viable.

So far, Delcy´s deeper involvement in mass events this year happened in late April, during the so-called “Great National Pilgrimage for a Venezuela Free of Sanctions,” better known for its shorter slogan Venezuela vuela libre (Venezuela flies free). At its core, it looks like an early balloon trial for what her campaign could look like in a snap election. On the surface, it seemed like an appropriation of the religious frenzy around the canonization of two Venezuelan saints—several months after that event, when Maduro was not in Brooklyn—and of the symbols and rituals of the Machado campaign: rosaries, people embracing a politician’s caravan across a village, blue and white clothes.

This particular change didn’t go unnoticed by former state television host Mario Silva, a longtime supporter of the revolución who has become Delcy’s most outspoken critic within chavismo. Silva recently told the Wall Street Journal: “Red used to mean combat… The pale blue is to put the masses to sleep.” The campaign itself became part of a heated debate between Silva and other figures related to the chavismo’s media ecosystem, such as Indira Urbaneja and the Argentine influencer known as Michelo last month.

Its launch was linked with the grand minimum wage announcement on May 1^st after a four-year wait. It wasn’t really the real wage increase that teachers, healthcare workers and public officials were hoping for. Since January 3rd, Jorge Rodríguez regularly takes over for her sister in public events. By the looks of the recent lack of activity in the official YouTube channel, it’s currently not at the same level of the spring period. The amount of related outdoor ads and street banners seemingly will do heavy lifting this summer.

Presidential disguise

Uncertainty hangs over Venezuela’s political future for the second half of 2026, but Delcy Rodríguez is clearly capitalizing on her position, using every resource at her disposal without facing any pushback from Washington. Yet, when it comes to the raw talent of a traditional politician, her shortcomings are no secret. Her speeches tend to be quite brief and dry. She has sounded nervous when caught off guard. She lacks the charismatic oratory of Chávez and the brazen rhetoric of her brother or her predecessor. She probably knows she is not exactly the most marketable presidential candidate. This rebrand is an attempt to push her image in that direction while her aides and consultants still have time to sketch something viable.

Coming back to Maduro, the little sympathy he had outside the most hardcore chavista supporters won’t improve. People are not missing him, never mind care that Delcy is shedding his old propaganda. Ordinary Venezuelans are generally too busy, dealing with their everyday problems, to pay attention to the politics of chavista PR.

In the end, this stealth attempt to erase Maduro’s image isn’t as simple as turning the page and moving on. Delcy needs to build a whole new persona that fits both the mainstream chavismo she wants to rally (and that still represents her voter base), and the one Donald Trump can be happy with.

She may not be able to deliver the rousing speeches of Chávez in his prime, or pull off the theatrical antics that Maduro leaned on for years, but playing the dignified role of “the President” may just work for her. At least for the foreseeable future.

On January 3, the US bombed Venezuela’s capital region and kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro. The unprecedented attack represented the culmination of a quarter-century of imperialist hybrid war, including devastating unilateral sanctions, mercenary incursions, “color revolution”-style insurrections, media disinformation, and NGO infiltration.

The four months since have brought a flurry of developments, from renewed diplomatic ties with the US to an overhaul of key legislative pillars of the Bolivarian Revolution. Additionally, the Trump administration established semi-colonial control over Venezuelan oil revenues, with the amounts and timings of disbursements back to Caracas left entirely at US officials’ discretion. The arrangement is similar to the one Washington has forced on Iraq since the 2003 invasion.

This compromised sovereignty is a catalyst for other issues. On the one hand, it makes it tougher for the Venezuelan government to improve living standards without challenging business interests. On the other, the burden of Venezuela’s external debt might see Washington attempt to impose an IMF loan that will bury the country in debt and dependency for decades.

The holy grail of foreign investment

The acting Rodríguez government’s tenure has been marked by accelerated political and economic transformations. On the international front, Caracas has restored diplomatic ties with Washington and recently resumed dealings with the US-controlled International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

Domestically, Rodríguez has changed key cabinet and military posts, while pushing through the National Assembly a number of reforms with the explicit goal of making the country more attractive for private sector investment, especially from Western multinationals.

Plans to reform pension, tax, housing, and the landmark 2012 labor law are in motion. Mining and hydrocarbons have already undergone pro-business overhauls, with slashed fiscal responsibilities, decreased oversight, and disputes subjected to international arbitration. In contrast to Chávez’s reassertion of oil sovereignty, which underpinned the massive sociopolitical achievements of the Bolivarian Revolution, the reformed energy law brings back the old concession model that puts operations and sales in the hands of private corporations.

In tandem, the Trump administration has issued licenses to pave the way for Western conglomerates to return to Venezuela, and several have already struck deals under the new highly favorable conditions. The licenses maintain and even double down on US sanctions by barring dealings with China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia and mandating that all Venezuelan state revenues from oil and mining be deposited in US Treasury-run accounts.

The subordination to US impositions saw Venezuelan authorities extradite former diplomatic envoy and minister Alex Saab to face charges in the US with little to no explanation. The move was shocking but not out of context. In recent weeks, there has been a succession of ceremonies at Miraflores presidential palace where Trump officials get the red-carpet welcome and escort corporate executives to sign contracts under the new pro-business incentives. Far-right tech moguls, including Palantir founder Peter Thiel, are already taking advantage of Trump’s leverage to establish a lucrative foothold in the country. For his part, the US chargé d’affaires holds regular publicized meetings with Venezuelan cabinet ministers. 

Caracas’ technocratic and pragmatic approach has dovetailed with a corresponding shift in discourse. On foreign policy, the anti-imperialist rhetoric has all but vanished. As Trump unleashes a savage war against Iran and threatens to “take over” Cuba, Venezuelan leaders have refrained from condemning the escalating imperialist aggression while emphasizing their desire to build good relations with Washington. At the same time, references to Maduro have drastically decreased, as documented in a recent investigation. Domestically, the central focus has become macroeconomic stability and attracting foreign investment. Both Acting President Rodríguez and her brother, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, acknowledged receiving “recommendations” and “suggestions” from oil majors amid the recent hydrocarbon overhaul. 

Rodríguez and the Bolivarian leadership, under ongoing US pressure, are betting that the pro-business opening will lead to accelerated economic growth that will trickle down into improved living conditions, thus allowing the government to rebuild social legitimacy and political prospects. However, this plan faces serious roadblocks.

Rising domestic pressure

The first issue is that the acting authorities may not have a lot of time to improve the living conditions of the Venezuelan people. 

Over the previous seven years, with the economy asphyxiated by the US economic blockade, the Maduro government prioritized macroeconomic stability and reduced inflation first and foremost, through a strict monetarist policy package. While the approach, coupled with a modest oil industry recovery, did lead to slowed down inflation and modest economic growth, it came at a price of freezing wages, consumer credit, and public spending. The minimum wage, last raised in 2022, is now worth less than US $1 per month, with further increases replaced by non-wage bonuses that cheapen labor costs for employers.

Though these bonuses have increased periodically (the income floor is now $240/month for public sector workers), they are still far from covering living costs. On May 1, Rodríguez ignored growing calls for a minimum wage hike, the conversion of bonuses to wages, and the restoration of collective bargaining rights, instead doubling down on the bonus policy. With government officials announcing a labor reform soon, it is likely that the return of the minimum wage will come alongside a significant erosion of workers’ rights and employer responsibilities.

However, apart from its commitment to fiscal discipline, the Rodríguez acting government has little room to maneuver because of its lack of direct management over oil revenues. At the mercy of the Trump administration to return export earnings in the amount and timing of its choosing, Venezuelan authorities are unlikely to commit to anything that might unsettle the budget. Rodríguez herself warned that wage increases must be “responsible.”

There is a delicate balance to strike. To implement the current pro-business agenda, not to mention the US rapprochement, the government needs social peace, and only improved material conditions for the working-class majority can ensure that in the short term.

The specter of debt

It is not just the pressure for better living standards that looms large on Venezuela’s economic front. There is a growing expectation that creditors will soon reengage with Venezuelan authorities to collect on a sizable external debt: a combination of defaulted bonds, unpaid loans, and arbitration awards that, with interest accrued over years, may amount to as much as $170 billion. The Venezuelan government recently announced the launch of a debt restructuring process, while Washington issued a license allowing the hiring of financial and consulting services. 

Given the recent overtures to foreign capital, Venezuelan leaders will be hard-pressed to honor whatever commitments necessary to render the country a favorable investment climate. Nevertheless, a major chunk of this debt is illegitimate.

On the one hand, debt ballooned in the mid-2010s as Venezuela’s credit rating was unjustifiably downgraded and borrowing costs went up, as Washington slapped its first rounds of sanctions on the Caribbean country. The Maduro government made a strategic choice to prioritize debt service as the economy reeled following a collapse of global oil prices, hoping that this “discipline” would stave off a scenario where the country was shut out of financial markets. It turned out differently.

Venezuela was gradually locked out of global finance after the Trump administration’s 2017 financial sanctions. Bonds defaulted one after another and have been accruing interest ever since. And the notoriously corrupt US-backed “interim government” also played its part in running up Venezuela’s liabilities and pilfering state assets abroad.

The diverse group of bondholders and corporations owed arbitration awards is sure to receive the backing of the White House, which holds the purse of Venezuela’s export proceeds. This mechanism could be utilized to directly transfer Venezuelan state income to creditors in what would effectively amount to international wage garnishing. Given how Venezuelan bonds have risen in recent months, investors are eagerly eyeing a significant windfall.

Venezuela’s unsustainable debt burden opens the door for further US imperial predations. Even if there is an agreement to pay 50 cents on the dollar for Venezuela’s $170 billion debt for a period of 15 years, that comes to $5.6 billion a year, roughly a quarter of the present budget. It is simply unpayable.

While Caracas may be able to settle with some creditors by privatizing Venezuelan state assets, it will not amount to much. Venezuelan leaders will stress that, with the recent reforms and US opening, the economy will grow tremendously, and they will be able to honor all commitments. But creditors are not willing to wait when they can cash in now, especially given Venezuela’s weak bargaining position. The government cannot maintain a functioning country in the short term with a huge debt burden. As a result, the US might take advantage of the crisis to impose a major loan from the IMF or some lending coalition.

Sovereignty under threat

An IMF or similar loan program is more than just an agreement to lend some amount under certain repayment conditions. It is an opportunity to impose neocolonial arrangements on Global South countries. In Venezuela’s case it is even more symbolic: it would mean exacting the proverbial pound of flesh for Chávez’s revolutionary audacity to challenge US hegemony in the Western hemisphere.

An eventual long-term credit program would surely come alongside a structural adjustment package of mass privatizations, gutted social expenditure, and all-around liberalization of the economy. Given the current leverage over Venezuela, US officials may attempt to further entrench the rollback of the Caribbean nation’s sovereignty.

Between the growing domestic demands for improved living conditions and the specter of debt renegotiation, the acting Rodríguez government will find it increasingly difficult to walk the tightrope of maintaining social peace while continuing to make one concession after another to monopoly capital and the Trump White House. 

With the limits of US imperialism nakedly exposed in Iran, Trump needs a victory in Venezuela. But that victory does not entail a buoyant economic recovery with social justice, let alone the survival of a sovereign and revolutionary project. Victory for the US is a dependent country, mired in debt and underdevelopment, where Western corporations plunder natural resources and geopolitical rivals are kept at bay.

Ultimately, any long-term plan for sovereign development needs to start from the fact that US imperialism, to echo Che Guevara,  is “not to be trusted even a little bit,” much less considered a “partner” in a “cooperation agenda.” It will undoubtedly be a major hill to climb. But thankfully, even if it means starting over, the Bolivarian Revolution is not starting from scratch.

Source: Sovereign Media