Delcy Rodríguez

Venezuelan provisional president Delcy Rodríguez’s all-smiles photo op with Trump in a Manhattan hotel on September 22 proved too much for some of her erstwhile supporters. For the Spanish leftist Juan Carlos Monedero, a staunch defender of Hugo Chávez, Maduro and at first Rodríguez, her New York appearance “clashed with the previous socialist and anti-imperialist discourse” of her movement.

Shortly before the encounter, Rodríguez evaded a reporter’s question about whether she would visit jailed Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro in Brooklyn. Her decision to stay clear of Maduro is consistent with her attempt to chart a new course for Venezuela.

Rodríguez became interim president following the bloody U.S. military incursion on January 3, 2026 that resulted in the kidnapping of Maduro and the First Lady Cilia Flores. Facing the prospect of a second, more devastating military attack, Rodríguez shifted sharply toward Washington on foreign and oil policy while reshuffling the public administration and military at the expense of hardline pro-Chávez (Chavista) loyalists.

Rodriguez’s strategy goes too far

Rodríguez’s strategy from the outset was to demonstrate that she was not cowardly submitting to Washington’s dictates or acting as a collaborationist a la Vichy France. Her wholehearted embrace of policies pushed by Washington is designed to dispel any impression that she is bowing to U.S. pressure. On many key issues, she has become as Catholic as the Pope with regard to Trump, while retaining the Chavista label. Shortly after January 3, Rodríguez affirmed “there is no foreign agent” governing Venezuela, a claim unconvincingly echoed by the second in command Diosdado Cabello who alleged “we don’t depend on anyone.”

In a different vein, pro-Rodríguez analysts argue that the interim president has zero options given the U.S. threats. Either submit to Washington or expect massive bombardment and/or a return of the old regime.

But there is clear evidence that Rodríguez has some latitude, albeit limited, which she has declined to fully exercise. That’s because Trump is fully wedded to his partnership with her.

Trump decided to recognize Rodríguez rather than right-wing leader María Corina Machado – much to the disappointment of Miami-based anti-Communist hawks – for good reasons. A confidential CIA report requested by the Trump administration prior to January 3 warned that the Venezuelan opposition lacked support within the pro-Chavista armed forces as well as the police force. The conclusion was obvious: turning power over to Machado was a recipe for chaos, if not civil war.

Trump has assimilated the Pentagon’s assessment of “de-Baathification” following the U.S. invasion of Iraq as a “complete disaster,” responsible for the endless internecine conflict in that nation. Trump has repeatedly invoked the Iraq fiasco when discussing the Rodríguez government. At one press conference he noted with reference to Venezuela “We had, as you remember, Iraq, where everybody got fired…And you know what they turned into? ISIS. And we don’t want that.”

Moreover, the decision to recognize Rodríguez rather than Machado was not taken on a whim but rather followed months of careful deliberation at the highest level of the Trump administration. He now touts his partnership with Rodríguez as a major success at a time in which he has very few of them to tout. It is thus unlikely that Trump will readily turn his back on Rodríguez. The upshot is that Rodríguez has some room to maneuver.

How much wiggle room?

The Chavista movement under Rodríguez has retreated from its defining banner: the uncompromising defense of national sovereignty. To its credit, the movement’s leadership continues to cast itself as an opponent of the traditional elite and a defender of the collective production units known as “communes.” But these positive features fall short for a movement that once raised such high expectations. While retaining a sense of realism, Rodríguez could have at least maintained a more neutral position on issues that compromised national sovereignty.

One of the most troubling examples was Venezuela’s collaboration in the extrajudicial killing of Niño Guerrero, leader of the criminal Tren de Aragua, in a U.S. Southern Command missile strike in the state of Bolívar in June 2026. The Venezuelan government, which provided intelligence information to the Southern Command, issued a statement in which it “congratulated” all participants in the operation. In doing so, Caracas lent credence to Trump’s false narrative that drug traffickers are terrorists. At the very least, the Rodríguez government could have stayed out of the operation while maintaining a neutral public posture.

Equally striking was the marked presence of Israeli military officers, including senior army officer Brigadier General Elad Edri, at a formal farewell meeting on July 21 in which Rodríguez thanked Israel for its earthquake relief efforts. U.S. and Israeli military involvement in the recovery operations drew objections from Chavista social movements, such as the famed Caracas barrio-based Coordinadora Simón Bolívar. They especially resented the conspicuousness of the presence of military personnel of both nations, symbolized by a controversial photograph of a beaming Diosdado Cabello shaking hands with U.S. Southern Command chief Francis L. Donovan, who had overseen the January 3 incursion. This, then, was another instance in which the Chavista leadership offered Washington a level of support that went well beyond what was necessary given the circumstances.

Still another example of the lengths to which Rodríguez has gone in accommodating Washington is her willingness to accept the Pentagon’s participation in the Venezuelan oil industry. The mega oil deal reached between Washington and Caracas in late August gives the Pentagon 35 percent ownership of the operating company that is to exploit 17 Venezuelan oil fields representing nearly 150 percent of U.S. proven reserves. But there is no precedent for the Pentagon’s equity ownership of this nature which is of dubious legality. Venezuelan analyst Phil Gunson, who has been briefed on the deal, told the Guardian that the major oil companies “are concerned about the irregularities.” From Venezuela’s viewpoint, the involvement of the Pentagon in the nation’s oil business makes little sense.

From the perspective of the Pentagon and its Israeli counterpart, Rodríguez’s conciliatory stance appears to be a vindication and a reversal of Chavista defiance – if not a payback for past grievances. In January 2000 Chávez turned back a sizable relief operation that the same U.S. Southern Command was in the process of sending in response to catastrophic floods, which had devastated the state of Vargas the previous month. Chávez’s decision was an embarrassing rebuff for the Pentagon, if not humiliating.

Along similar lines, Roni Kaplan, spokesperson for the Israeli armed forces and a member of his nation’s aid mission, told CE Noticias Financieras-English on July 22, “it’s like when you fight with someone and they come to apologize, and when they say they’re sorry, you say, “‘I’ve already forgotten all about it.’” Kaplan’s statement puts in sharp relief the extent to which Rodríguez’s posture breaks with the Chavista past.

Where things now stand

The pro-Chavista think tank Misión Verdad puts a positive spin on Rodríguez’s strategy. According to its take, the Manhattan meeting with Trump marked the point at which “Washington’s asymmetric coercion and the strategic adaptation deployed by the Chavista movement converge.” For both Trump and Rodríguez, the aim was the same: “stabilization… to reduce political costs by sacrificing ideological orthodoxy.” The asymmetry according to the Misión Verdad statement “does not erase the agency of the quantitatively weaker actor; it alters its tactics, shifting it from open confrontation toward strategic adaptation.”

The adaptation demanded by the asymmetry is captured in a slogan championed by Diosdado Cabello: “Venezuela: Reborn United.” Strip away the Misión’s lofty language, and the message is that the Chavista movement needs to make a fundamental break with its past in important ways.

Adaption is understandable given the circumstances of January 3. But if Chavismo abandons the banner of defense of national sovereignty, little remains of what defined the movement. And that is precisely where the strategy of being “as Catholic as the Pope” in accommodating Washington has led.

That’s not to say there are easy answers or that an alternative strategy would necessarily succeed, particularly given Trump’s notorious unpredictability. Nor does it mean that Rodríguez deserves to be demonized as a sellout as so many on the left are doing. Such demonization underestimates the challenges and uniqueness of the situation, at the same time that it divides the solidarity movement. The relative unity of the Chavista leadership has been one of its strengths ever since Chávez’s death in 2013, and the same needs to be preserved in the solidarity movement.

The problem is that the options available to Rodríguez are scarce, whereas Trump has many. He need not pull off another January 3. Nearly all Venezuela’s oil-derived revenue is in a U.S. account handled by Marco Rubio. All Rubio has to do is to withhold it or scale it back whenever Rodríguez steps out of line with Washington.

Even with this reality hanging over her, Rodríguez and other Chavista leaders have put forward two major demands: free Maduro and Flores and an end to the sanctions, which remain largely intact. Rodríguez, however, has not put these two demands front and center in her dialogue with the Trump administration – not by a long shot.

As pressure from Miami grows for Venezuela to set an electoral timetable, the position that elections and harsh sanctions are incompatible would shift responsibility for any delay onto Washington. Last Spring, Chavista leader Ernesto Villegas, who headed the government’s Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence, called for “elections free of sanctions.” Linking elections explicitly to the lifting of sanctions would allow the Rodríguez government to reclaim some distance from Washington, even as U.S. blackmail severely limits its ability to fully assert national sovereignty.

Steve Ellner is a retired professor of the Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela where he lived for over 40 years and is currently Associate Managing Editor of Latin American Perspectives. He is the author and editor of over a dozen books on Latin American politics and history. In 2018 he spoke in over twenty cities in the U.S. and Canada as part of a Venezuelan solidarity tour.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Source: Counterpunch

Caracas, October 6, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Justice Department has urged New York District Judge Alvin Hellerstein to reject Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores’ sovereign immunity claims amid their ongoing legal case.

In a court filing submitted on October 2, prosecutors told the court that Maduro and Flores’ motions to dismiss their indictments “should be denied.”

The Venezuelan president and first lady, who is also a legislator, were kidnapped in Caracas by US forces on January 3. They were charged with drug trafficking conspiracy and weapons possession, with Maduro additionally facing a “narco-terrorism” accusation.

The pair’s defense teams filed motions to dismiss the case in September, arguing that their respective positions in the Venezuelan government should make them immune to criminal prosecution in a third country.

In response, the Justice Department stated that the recognition of a foreign head of state is the exclusive competency of the executive branch, and that Washington has not recognized Maduro since 2019. Historically, US courts have deferred to the White House and State Department on foreign policy matters.

However, in the ongoing case, Justice Department officials sought to bolster their argument by stating that the Venezuelan government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, has declined to invoke immunity for Maduro and Flores.

“If Venezuela wished to assert its view that the defendants were entitled to immunity in this, it could have,“ the submitted document read. “The defendants’ attempt to claim the contrary is an admission that such silence is devastating to their claims.”

The prosecutors pointed to an ongoing civil lawsuit in Florida against Maduro, Rodríguez, and other defendants, where the Venezuelan government, through its US embassy, requested that the Trump administration communicate to the respective court that the acting president should “enjoy absolute immunity from judicial proceedings in foreign domestic courts.”

The State Department sent a letter in June calling on the Florida district court to “promptly dismiss the proceedings.” The White House likewise communicated to the court that all claims against Rodríguez should be “dismissed without prejudice.”

In August 2025, three US nationals who were imprisoned in Venezuela sued Maduro, Rodríguez, and several other current and former state officials. The plaintiffs claimed to have suffered “torture” and to have been used in “hostage diplomacy.” The judge issued a default ruling after Maduro and other defendants failed to show and awarded $314 million in damages to the plaintiffs.

“Venezuela did not request immunity in this case, despite every opportunity to do so. Indeed, there is no doubt that the current Venezuelan government knows how to request immunity,” the Justice Department’s recent filing continued.

Prosecutors went on to claim that the Trump administration’s foreign policy views, coupled with the Venezuelan government not explicitly invoking immunity, should outweigh the defense’s assertion that the United Nations recognized Maduro’s presidency.

Hellerstein is scheduled to hear oral arguments on the pre-trial motions to dismiss on November 17 before issuing a ruling. If the trial goes forward, it will begin on June 1, 2027.

Caracas has not commented on the latest developments in Maduro and Flores’ legal case. In recent months, Venezuelan officials have occasionally expressed hope that the two will eventually return to the country but without demanding their immediate release.

Rodríguez made no mention of Maduro and Flores’ kidnapping and prosecution during her recent trip to New York for the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. In a July interview, she claimed that Maduro has the right to “demonstrate the truth” before the US Justice system but did not call for his liberation.

The Venezuelan government is covering the pair’s legal defense costs after the US Treasury Department lifted restrictions blocking it.

In his UN speech on September 22, Trump celebrated the military operation that led to the abduction of Maduro, whom he called an “outlaw dictator.” Trump and Rodríguez met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, with the Venezuelan leader thanking the US president for supporting “Venezuela’s reinsertion into multilateral spaces.”

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

William Serafino is a political scientist with a master’s degree in history. His research and analysis have focused on geopolitics. In this interview, he discusses Venezuela’s current relationship with the United States, including a major oil deal and what Donald Trump and Delcy Rodríguez seek to gain from it.

In New York, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez thanked Trump for his support and described their bilateral meeting as “historic.” Nearly nine months after the January 3 US bombing and kidnapping of President Maduro, how would you describe the current relationship between Caracas and Washington? Which elements are short-term Trump gimmicks, and which ones will structurally define the relationship in the future?

It is difficult to find a precise definition. Many speak of a protectorate-like condition; some even go so far as to describe it as a relationship of colonial or neocolonial subjugation. Others, however, define it as a process of political, economic, and energy normalization in which the Venezuelan acting government makes tactical concessions, but without formally compromising national sovereignty. I believe the devil is in the details, not in one-size-fits-all approaches. At the level of inter-state relations, what I observe is a strategic attachment of Venezuela to the US sphere of influence and an energy realignment that operates with significant geopolitical restrictions in what concerns relations with Russia, China, and Iran.

At the governmental level, an asymmetrical alliance (favorable to Trump) has been forged in the wake of the military defeat on January 3, from which Caracas and Washington derive immediate and existential gains: Trump cherishes the sole geopolitical achievement of his second term, and Rodríguez gains relief and fresh revenue to govern after more than a decade of suffocating sanctions, within a framework defined by US interests. This reality can hardly be classified as a protectorate, in which a foreign power takes control of diplomacy, defense, and other strategic elements of the subordinate state. Could one speak of a sui generis, or “soft,” protectorate? Perhaps, but that would be an acknowledgment that the concept is not entirely effective in explaining the situation. 

The same is true of the thesis of a “retreat with full sovereignty,” which is difficult to sustain when the US is clearly shaping the portrayal of the new national political dynamic and controlling the country’s oil revenues. That is why I have ventured –at the risk of being wrong –to speak of “joint governance” or “co-government,” in which Washington and Caracas divide areas of responsibility and share the political costs of each move so that the alliance endures and each party can, albeit unequally, reap its corresponding share of the benefits.

Trump, despite his constant demeaning tone, needs the Rodríguez administration to be strong enough to lead the country in order to get what he wants; only under such conditions can he extract the oil. And she, too, needs Trump to remain in power so that the oil agreement and other commitments can move forward in the medium term. This is the only way to stay in power and hope to gain legitimacy through performance. I believe that, described in this way, we are talking neither of classic colonialism nor of uncompromised sovereignty, but of something more unique that requires developing other analytical categories.

In your articles, you have pointed out that the US-Venezuela oil deal must be analyzed beyond the announced figures. What do you consider to be the true political and geopolitical scope of this agreement, and what benefits do the various actors seek to extract from it?

I see it more as a political arrangement than a formal agreement. Its function is not legal or institutional, but political. The announcement gave Trump narrative ammunition to promise that gas prices will drop, a necessity driven by his debacle in Iran. By not having signed anything, he avoids going through Congress, sends a message to his core electorate that he is guaranteeing the country’s energy security, and reassures energy corporations to go ahead and invest in Venezuela because the relationship with Caracas is solid and unshakable. Rodríguez, on the other hand, benefits from the fact that the agreement shuts the door on María Corina Machado in Washington’s power circles and thereby helps reestablish her domestic legitimacy, promising a secure path to economic and social recovery underpinned by US investment.

I would go as far as saying that the agreement is Rodríguez’s trump card in a potential presidential campaign, where she will be able to present herself as the only political actor capable of boosting the economy, as opposed to potential rivals who lack influence in the White House and do not have a reliable plan to pull the country out of the spiral of inflation and economic frustration in which it finds itself after years of sanctions. 

Both sides stand to gain politically, and the agreement appears to be designed to avoid institutional resistance: neither is forced to face the hassle of legislative approval nor the criticism from political opponents. Since there are no specific clauses, they can more easily divert attention and focus their message on the eventual economic benefits. This level of coordination is a sign of partnership, not of one-sided imposition. If that were the case, Trump could force Rodríguez to sign a bilateral treaty in the National Assembly, and that is not what we are seeing.

You have paid special attention to the role of the Pentagon and the involvement of its Office of Strategic Capital in the structure of the agreement. Why is it so significant that the US defense establishment is a formal actor in a Venezuelan oil deal?

It seems to me that the Pentagon’s involvement serves as a coercive cover—an insurance policy backed by force—to ensure, in the medium and long term, US commercial and financial advantages in the exploitation of the oil fields included in the agreement. Let us imagine that the current government, or another one in the future, wants to modify the arrangement and secure better terms. At that point, it would not be dealing with a conventional transnational corporation, but with one controlled by the Department of War. It doesn’t take much thought to realize that negotiating under such conditions would scare anyone off: the language of business would be replaced by the language of weapons, and after January 3, no one would want to venture into this murky territory.

Furthermore, I believe that the Pentagon’s involvement sends a message to companies to invest and feel secure in the knowledge that the Department of War guarantees their investments and capital commitments in the Venezuelan energy sector. For the US, Venezuela’s oil reserves are not being treated as an economic asset, but rather as a matter of “national security.” As we well know, when that term is used, any coercive tool is fair game against a country’s sovereignty.

You have argued that the relationship between Caracas and Washington is taking on the characteristics of a negotiation marked by a profound power asymmetry. And many official spokespeople or analysts ask, “But what alternative do we have?” whenever criticism is raised about the path the government has chosen. What real ability does Venezuela have today to negotiate different terms or reject certain demands from the United States?

Right now, those capabilities are very limited, because, as I said, it’s not just a matter of US impositions, but also of calculating how to obtain tangible benefits from an asymmetrical relationship. But politics also takes place outside institutional spaces, and I believe there is much to be done there. What I’m about to say won’t, I don’t think, resolve the dilemma you’ve raised, but it could be a path toward regaining political vitality and initiative: strengthening social consensus on national sovereignty, refusing to concede the battle for historical memory regarding a century-long history of US plunder, and fostering a broad discussion on the vision for the nation’s future. These steps could help break the inertia somewhat and prepare the country for more favorable political conditions in the near future. In contrast, suggesting specific policies or positions to the current government would be irresponsible, because I’m not the one who has to deal with a Trump and his violent ego.

My message is directed at all of us who do not hold such high-stakes positions and can contribute, from our own small spheres of influence or through our individual activism, to rebuilding a patriotic consciousness that must adapt to a new reality. How many open forums are being promoted to discuss the educational model, the economic model, and the model of income distribution? Which bodies are evaluating the trajectory of the bilateral relationship with the US in order to better address it? Are these discussions conceptually limited? Perhaps these debates will not change the current situation of Trump’s disproportionate influence, but they would give us autonomy in our vision and in shaping the future. If Venezuela does not have its own vision on major national issues, there is a risk that they will end up being imposed from Washington. That would be committing the perfect crime, and I believe we must avoid it: with national unity, transcending political divisions.

In your articles and social media posts, you have criticized political elites who, historically, have lacked “imagination” beyond offering lucrative deals to the US. How did Chávez manage to break that mold? How could Venezuela return to a more sovereign path?

To be fair, Chávez broke the mold but the political and geopolitical conditions were ripe for it. The weakness of the national elites, discredited by a society weary of inequality and injustice, coincided with the US being drunk on power at the end of the Cold War. In its plans to establish itself as a unipolar superpower, Latin America did not figure as the central battleground. The inattention of an empire more concerned with reshaping West Asia, forcing China into the “rules-based order,” and eliminating the last strongholds of the socialist bloc (Tito’s Yugoslavia) in turn allowed Chávez to implement his agenda without facing a full-scale war, although he did face numerous coup attempts. 

The present conditions are different. There is a hemispheric imperial retreat underpinned by a militarized reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, which drastically raises the cost of sovereignty-oriented proposals. Still, I believe that what is most commendable about Chávez, and which can be of use in this new context, is his ability to clearly identify favorable conditions and act upon them.

I believe that anyone who considers themselves a political figure must build upon these principles to take on the new challenges of the present, developing and defending a dignified vision of the nation’s future. I believe that, rather than waiting for another Chávez to emerge, we should instead study his thought in depth and draw on the best of it to renew political practices, always interpreting the situation for what it is: changing, volatile, and full of opportunities. Chávez is a great political school, but it has been reduced to a crude tool for private interests of all kinds.

Just a few months ago, amidst the avalanche of uncertainties surrounding the kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro by the US military in collusion with Venezuelan forces, we identified six indicators pointing to a clear political reality: the remaining chavista leadership was successfully adapting to the new board under conditions of vassalage to the invading power.

Since then, the core underlying conditions have not changed—the government continues to prevail over the conflict—but new windows of opportunity have opened for the opposition, and new situations have arisen that put this new, Rodríguez-led neochavismo in a tight spot.

Alex Saab has a substitute

The first sign of chavismo’s remarkable capacity for subservience was the sacrifice of some of its own key figures in exchange for US validation. Handing over Alex Saab was a well-calibrated move by the interim government. The primary financial operator of late chavismo had transformed into the manager of an opaque economy, eventually elevating himself into a political actor and a banner of anti-imperialism. Yet his fall came with a successor, a new financial lobbyist bearing the same signature of corruption, but who does not answer solely to chavismo: Alejandro Betancourt is a hinge operator, a pragmatic and elastic figure whose nature allows him to serve multiple partners with conflicting interests at the same time. Thus, the ideological flexibility of chavismo’s newest protagonists aligns perfectly with its broader mutation from a political project into a commercial consortium.

Rising social demands

In our previous analysis, we identified supervised economic liberalization as the government’s biggest gamble to buy time. Accelerating economic recovery was seen as a critical opportunity to relieve political and social pressure. However, the expected results have failed to materialize on schedule. No matter how many headlines trumpet investments in the oil, energy, and mining sectors, and regardless of the photos documenting memorandums of understanding with international capital, the revival of the economy remains a fantasy—just as it has been for the past twenty years. If Venezuelans are accustomed to anything, it is chavismo’s delusions. Today, the government faces a scenario in which the domestic economy and access to basic public services deteriorate at the exact same rate that rejection of foreign tutelage grows. Simply put: the strategy of accelerating economic recovery to defuse political pressure has been a complete failure.

In the electricity sector alone—one of the main triggers of protests and street pressure in recent weeks—there is a stark divide between grand announcements and actual binding agreements. Throughout 2026, investment announcements in Venezuela’s electrical grid were measured in megawatts, nearly all framed as recovery agreements with state-owned Corpoelec. In April, talks with Siemens and General Electric were announced to address the crisis in Zulia, but to date, no public contract exists with either company, and the situation remains critical: blackouts lasting between 5 and 12 hours (or more) persist.

On one hand, we see the return of exiled politicians who were persecuted for years. On the other, isolated attempts at arrests.

To date, no agreement has disclosed financial amounts or funding sources. Furthermore, megawatt figures vary depending on the source, and it remains unclear how INSA and Impsa are dividing the work at the Tocoma hydroelectric plant. All of this is unfolding against a backdrop of undeniable social demands that cannot be pacified by press headlines and investment promises. The timeline for economic relief is slipping away, while the timeline for public demand is accelerating.

The repressive apparatus doesn’t wane, it just loosens its grip

Ten months later, we can affirm that the relaxation of the repressive system and the amnesty law were purely symbolic gestures directed at Trump, carrying no real dismantling of the persecution apparatus. That tactic of erecting façade after façade regarding human rights has been maintained. Repression cooled down and political prisoners were released—some only partially—during these months under foreign tutelage. However, based on several statements from Washington detached from reality, the interim government confirmed that human rights are simply not on the US agenda. In that sense, there have even been small trial balloons replicating the repression of past months, testing American indifference. The Trump administration is not dismantling the repressive apparatus in Venezuela because its own government is also repressive—one that, in many cases, shares victims with chavismo: Venezuelans on US soil.

Nevertheless, a novel phenomenon is taking place that sends contradictory signals. On one hand, we see the return of exiled politicians who were persecuted for years. On the other, isolated attempts at arrests. This tension within the security apparatus has yet to show a clear trend and will ultimately be defined by the political force deployed by the actors involved.

Ambiguity toward China

In the initial months of US tutelage, the most dramatic shift in the interim government’s foreign policy—and the clearest sign of its ability to mutate to survive—was severing its alliance with Cuba. That move brought an alarming deterioration to the island’s economic situation, which had depended on Venezuelan oil for more than two decades. Remaining Chavismo did not hesitate to drop its oldest ideological partner when the cost of sustaining it became Washington’s disapproval. In that sense, it was primarily an existential rupture: one that demonstrated their capacity to sacrifice even their own founding narrative to guarantee the continuity of power.

In Venezuela, China is not competing in the short term. Instead, it is waiting for its window of opportunity to open.

With the discursive framing of the divorce from Cuba settled, this new period in international affairs—beyond the relationship with the US—is marked by the positioning and balancing act required regarding China, particularly concerning its oil assets amidst U.S. penetration into the sector. Unlike Cuba, China is not an ally that can be abruptly discarded without consequences. It is the country’s primary creditor following years of loans repaid with crude oil, and it holds stakes in joint ventures across the Orinoco Petroleum Belt.

For now, the interim government operates in the realm of pure pragmatism: avoiding any signal of alignment with China that might irritate the US, while simultaneously leaving existing Chinese investments untouched. That balance can hold only as long as Washington refrains from directly targeting Chinese assets in the country. Should that happen, Rodriguez-led Neochavismo would find itself trapped between its tutor and its creditor, with no room left to manage ambiguity. China, for its part, is in no rush. Its strategy in the region has long been defined by patience and long-term calculation: it is not competing in the short term; instead, it is waiting for its window of opportunity to open. And under a government that has proven its loyalties are entirely negotiable, that window will open sooner or later.

The alliance with Trump consolidates

The other major successful mutation for chavismo coming into view this year has been the dissolution of its anti-imperialist rhetoric. For over two decades, confrontation with the United States served as the narrative anchor of the movement’s project, the story that justified shortages, explained sanctions and failures, unified the militant base, and gave chavismo a distinct place on the international map. Today, that story is entirely untenable for a government cooperating directly with those who kidnapped its president and bombed its country: chavismo can no longer posture as a fortress against empire.

This shift carries heavy political costs. Internally, it opens deep fractures: segments of the rank-and-file and mid-level cadres trained on that narrative watch as their leadership cuts deals with the very enemy they were taught to fight for years, eroding the loyalty that the narrative once guaranteed. Externally, it means losing international alliances that relied precisely on that shared identity. Chavismo can no longer offer its former partners the epic tale of resistance.

The opposition’s challenge lies in constructing a vision of its own—one capable of appealing to an exhausted society that has watched both the revolutionary narrative and promises of a swift transition collapse.

Yet the dissolution of anti-imperialism also poses a serious dilemma for the opposition. For years, the opposition built its moral standing in direct opposition to a regime that simultaneously claimed the anti-imperialist mantle, violated human rights, and destroyed the economy. Now, with chavismo falling in line with Washington, that contrast becomes blurred. The opposition can no longer define itself solely by its antagonism to chavismo, nor can it present alignment with the U.S. as its own unique banner, because the interim government occupies that exact same space.

This forces the opposition to transform, which brings its historical weakness to the surface: its limited capacity for transformation. The Venezuelan opposition has proven effective at resisting, denouncing, and mobilizing during high-tension moments, but it has struggled immensely to renew its discourse, leadership, and strategies when the political terrain shifts. On this new board, its challenge is no longer to prove that chavismo is illegitimate, but to construct a vision of its own. A vision capable of appealing to an exhausted society that has watched both the revolutionary narrative and the promises of a swift transition collapse. If it fails to do so, it risks remaining trapped in a political language aimed at a chavismo that no longer exists.

Caracas, September 25, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) –  Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez outlined a foreign policy built on “peace” and “dialogue” in her address at the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Wednesday.

Speaking before world leaders, Rodríguez insisted on peace over conflict, thanked the Trump administration for diplomatic backing, and committed to international cooperation on environmental, energy, and AI regulation. She went on to urge young Venezuelan migrants to return home and laid out a proposal for structural “democratic transformation” of the Caribbean nation. 

Opening her address, Rodríguez underscored Caracas’ rejection of warfare, linking global stability to diplomatic resolution. 

“Venezuela, which today knows what it is to lift its children out from under the rubble, extends its deepest solidarity to all peoples who suffer from war, and reaffirms that peace […] is not a naive aspiration, but the only truly human path,” she declared.

Rodríguez explicitly addressed the diplomatic rapprochement with Washington after the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. She expressed thanked Trump for aiding Venezuela’s reintegration into international forums following years of heavy economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

“I want to thank President Donald Trump and his government for their willingness to resume the path of diplomatic and cooperative relations with Venezuela,” Rodríguez stated, referencing the recent oil deal as “one of the largest ever signed” and pledging that it will contribute to regional energy stability.

Rodríguez refrained from condemning the US attack, calling it a “difficult moment” that resulted from the “exhaustion of domestic policies and heightened confrontation with the US.” She likewise made no mention of Maduro and Flores, presently detained 10-15 miles away from the UN headquarters and facing trial for charges including drug trafficking conspiracy.

The Venezuelan acting president had conveyed similar gratitude in a face-to-face meeting with Trump on Tuesday that she labeled as “historic.”

Turning to domestic affairs in her UN address, Rodríguez spoke of the severe wave of migration triggered by past political and economic crises, and vowed to the Venezuelan youth residing abroad that there will be improved conditions for their return.

“To the young people, who have grown up seeing a fractured country and who often decided to leave seeking what they could not find here: I tell you that it is worth believing again,” the acting leader affirmed. “This is the moment to build the country that many want to return to, and not just the one that many wanted to flee.”

This message was framed as part of what Rodríguez termed a “democratic transformation for a rebirth,” which she described as an institutional, orderly, and verifiable process.

“In Venezuela, there will be elections. We have already initiated a political dialogue with sectors of the opposition that leads to a process on equal terms for all,” she noted.

Though Rodríguez did not explicitly name unilateral sanctions from Washington and its allies, she stated that the country needs to be “free from economic restrictions” and pledged to “guide Venezuela toward an era of full democracy, recognized by its people and the world.”

The acting president’s UN speech came amid a flurry of diplomatic activity in New York, including meetings with International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, World Bank President Ajay Banga, and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) President Ilan Goldfajn.

On the sidelines of the UN assembly, Rodríguez also held bilateral meetings with Chilean far-right president José Antonio Kast to discuss regional trade and stability, as well as with a delegation from Trinidad and Tobago, led by Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, initiating a “new stage in bilateral relations” centered on joint offshore natural gas exploration and maritime security.

Venezuela had suspended cooperation with neighboring Port of Spain after Persad-Bissessar backed the US’ military build-up on the country’s shores in late 2025.

Rodríguez’s New York trip coincided with a second round of US-backed talks between government negotiators led by National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez and a sector of the opposition led by former deputy Dinorah Figuera.

The latest negotiations reportedly focused on electoral guarantees, freedom of expression, institutional reform, including renewing the Supreme Court, and efforts to secure the unfreezing of Venezuelan assets abroad, including gold reserves worth approximately US $4 billion. The gold held by the Bank of England is set to be transferred to the US, to be released for post-earthquake recovery efforts under White House oversight.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

On the same day Delcy Rodríguez was in New York meeting Donald Trump and representing Venezuela at the United Nations, María Corina Machado was trying, unsuccessfully, to get closer to her own country.

It was her third attempt in barely 24 hours. First came a planned maritime departure from Panama, which was canceled after the company operating the vessel reported mechanical problems. Then came an attempted flight to Aruba, from where Machado intended to continue by sea. Finally, there was another flight plan, this time for Curaçao. That trip did not happen either. Her team now says she has attempted to return to Venezuela seven times since she left in December 2025 to get her Nobel Prize in Oslo.

The exact responsibility for the latest failures remains unclear. But what happened during previous attempts is better documented. Axios reported in July that the Trump administration’s position was that third countries should not help Machado enter Venezuela. When Deputy Secretary of State Chris Landau appeared to tell the Dutch government otherwise, officials in Washington corrected the message. Curaçao withdrew permission for Machado’s plane to land while she was already in the air. According to the same account, Secretary of State Marco Rubio subsequently reiterated the policy to Machado personally.

This sits awkwardly beside Washington’s public position. Rubio said this month that Machado, as a Venezuelan citizen, has every right to return “whenever she wants.” A State Department official told Congress in July that the US would not obstruct her return. Trump himself has denied telling her to stay away.

After World War II, keeping Emperor Hirohito in power did not mean preserving his capacity to decide who could participate in Japanese politics.

All of those statements may be technically true. The US does not issue Venezuelan visas and cannot legally forbid a Venezuelan citizen from entering Venezuela. But Machado cannot teleport into Caracas. Getting home requires aircraft, airports, territorial waters, neighboring governments and, increasingly, governments that want to know Washington’s position before helping her. There is a meaningful difference between saying that the US will not prohibit her return and telling American partners that facilitating it is not US policy.

This would already be an odd arrangement for any opposition leader. It is stranger still in Machado’s case. She is hardly a geopolitical threat to Washington. She has gone out of her way to present a democratic Venezuela as a close strategic partner of the US. In December, she said explicitly that America would be Venezuela’s “main ally.” She has spoken about opening the country to Western investment, rebuilding the energy sector with foreign capital and transforming Venezuela from a security liability into a partner for the US. After Maduro’s removal, she publicly thanked Trump and Rubio and described the outcome as a potential “win-win” for both countries.

Yet Reuters reported last week that US officials remain wary of her return because they fear her presence could disrupt the transition Washington is supporting around Rodríguez. Machado’s movement is not part of the current US-backed negotiating mechanism, while Delcy’s government has become Washington’s main Venezuelan interlocutor.

That raises a question that goes beyond Machado.

The postwar parallel

The Trump administration has repeatedly defended its approach as a matter of sequencing. Venezuela needs stability first, then economic recovery and reconciliation, and “ultimately democratic transition.” The White House argues that rebuilding the economy is a precondition for elections rather than a substitute for them.

There is a serious argument behind that position. Venezuela inherited a devastated public administration, a crippled oil industry, enormous external debt and institutions hollowed out by years of authoritarian rule. Abruptly dismantling the bureaucracy, military hierarchy or State-owned companies could reproduce some of the worst mistakes made in other post-authoritarian or post-conflict transitions. A functioning State matters.

But preserving the State is not the historical equivalent of preserving the regime.

After World War II, the United States repeatedly confronted versions of this distinction. In Japan, the occupation retained Emperor Hirohito partly because American planners believed institutional continuity could make the transition less destabilizing. But keeping the emperor did not mean preserving the emperor’s capacity to decide who could participate in Japanese politics. On October 4, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to remove restrictions on political and civil liberties and release political prisoners. Among those released were prominent Japanese Communists who had been imprisoned by the old order. American officials later acknowledged that the resulting political opening was so broad that some Japanese mistakenly concluded that the occupation itself favored the Communist Party.

When it comes to the geopolitical role of the US, the Trump administration depicts itself as the decisive actor reshaping Venezuela. When questions turn to the lack of institutional reforms, Venezuela’s sovereignty becomes a much more convenient explanation for the limits of American responsibility.

Something similar happened in Italy. The Allies initially worked through King Vittorio Emanuele III and Marshal Pietro Badoglio because they needed an Italian government capable of administering the country during the war. At the same time, political exiles were allowed to come home and anti-Fascist parties returned to public life. The contrast is particularly striking in the case of Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communist Party and a former senior official of the Communist International. When Togliatti sought to return from Moscow in 1944, the US State Department explicitly said it had “no objection.” He returned and soon participated in the new political order.

Neither Japan nor Italy offer a blueprint for Venezuela. The historical circumstances were radically different, and American occupation policy was hardly politically neutral. But the underlying distinction is useful. Administrative continuity did not require preserving the old regime’s monopoly over politics. The State could survive while the political system opened around it.

That is precisely where Washington’s current Venezuelan policy becomes harder to understand.

The art of deflecting

Keeping experienced civil servants at their desks is State continuity. Avoiding a wholesale purge of the armed forces may be State continuity. Keeping PDVSA pumping oil while new rules are negotiated is State continuity. None of those choices inherently require preventing opposition politicians from returning, organizing, or campaigning.

And Venezuela’s political opening remains incomplete. A UN Fact-Finding mission reported this month that, despite prisoner releases and some liberalization, the structures responsible for years of repression remain largely intact. Officials linked to previous abuses remain in important positions, restrictive laws survive and arbitrary detention and mistreatment have not disappeared.

This makes the widening gap between economic opening and political opening particularly important. Washington is moving rapidly on the former. Rodríguez traveled to New York accompanied by officials discussing oil, mining, debt restructuring and access to international financial institutions. American companies are negotiating their return to Venezuela’s energy sector. Trump has made the oil agreement one of the centerpieces of his foreign-policy narrative.

At the United Nations this week, Trump went further. After celebrating Maduro’s capture, the release of prisoners and Washington’s relationship with Venezuela’s current leaders, he described the new oil arrangement in unmistakably triumphalist terms. “It was a war,” he said, before invoking the old expression: “to the victor belong the spoils.” He then presented Venezuela as proof that the US would once again impose its power against threats in the Western Hemisphere.

If Machado returns, travels freely, organizes her movement, holds rallies and begins preparing for an eventual presidential campaign, Delcy’s continued presence can still be understood as part of an administrative transition.

The rhetoric creates an uncomfortable asymmetry. When discussing oil, geopolitical alignment or American power, the administration depicts itself as the decisive actor reshaping Venezuela. When questions turn to the remaining coercive apparatus, restrictions on political competition or the continued exclusion of important opposition actors, Venezuela’s sovereignty becomes a much more convenient explanation for the limits of American responsibility.

Washington cannot have unlimited responsibility for everything that happens inside Venezuela. Delcy Rodríguez still controls a government, a bureaucracy and a security apparatus of its own. But the US plainly possesses enormous leverage over the political and economic environment in which that government operates. The history of Machado’s attempts to return suggests that this influence may extend even to whether neighboring governments are prepared to help a Venezuelan opposition leader reach her country.

That is why Machado’s return matters beyond Machado herself.

If she returns, travels freely, organizes her movement, holds rallies and begins preparing for an eventual presidential campaign, Delcy’s continued presence can still be understood as part of an administrative transition: an imperfect bridge between the regime that existed under Maduro and a genuinely competitive political order.

If her return continues to be regarded as destabilizing, however, the logic starts to invert. Political competition itself becomes a threat to stability. The government is no longer merely being preserved so that the State can function while politics reopens; political reopening is being limited because it might endanger the government being preserved.

Venezuela does not need another collapse of the State. But avoiding State collapse and protecting the political equilibrium inherited from chavismo are two different objectives.

The distinction between them may ultimately define this transition.

Caracas, September 22, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez and US President Donald Trump held a first face-to-face meeting on Tuesday night in New York amid the rapid rapprochement between Washington and Caracas.

The closed-door gathering took place at the Lotte New York Palace hotel during a reception for world leaders participating in the ongoing 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly. Trump was flanked by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and other White House officials, while Rodríguez was joined by Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia.

The Venezuelan government published photos of the meeting, with the two leaders smiling for the cameras in front of the countries’ flags.

On her social media channels, Rodríguez praised the “historic” sit-down with Trump and reported that the discussions focused on strengthening “cooperation in strategic areas such as energy and mining.”

“We thanked President Trump and his government […] for its support for Venezuela’s reinsertion into multilateral spaces,” she stated. “Venezuela and the United States share a historic relation that, in this new era, we must drive forward through dialogue.”

Tuesday’s summit was the first between US and Venezuelan leaders since a brief encounter between Barack Obama and Nicolás Maduro during the 2015 Summit of the Americas in Panama.

Rodríguez is also set to be the first Venezuelan head of state to participate in the UN General Assembly since Maduro in 2018, during Trump’s first term. In 2019, then as vice president, Rodríguez addressed the UN General Assembly, denouncing US sanctions as a form of “state terrorism” and accusing Trump of “sticking his imperial claws” against Venezuela and Cuba

The high-level meeting follows a rapid diplomatic rapprochement between Caracas and Washington following the January 3 US bombings and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. In the months since, the acting Rodríguez administration has fast-tracked energy and mining reforms tailored to US and Western corporate interests while also realigning the country’s foreign policy.

The Venezuelan acting president and her diplomatic team have yet to mention Maduro in their New York trip. Maduro and Flores are presently detained in Brooklyn, some 10 miles from the UN headquarters, and facing drug trafficking conspiracy charges. Both pleaded not guilty.

At the time of writing, the White House has offered no details on Tuesday’s summit with Rodríguez.

However, in his UN speech earlier in the day, Trump hailed the US’ military operation to kidnap “outlaw dictator” Maduro.

“Our actions in Venezuela are proof that the United States will no longer permit threats to America to gain a foothold anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. And if necessary, we will use our unmatched military might to secure the vital national interests of the United States,” he said.

Trump went on to boast about US corporations entering the Venezuelan energy sector and praised a recent deal giving privileged access to more than 20 percent of the Caribbean nation’s reserves to a Pentagon-controlled firm as “perhaps the biggest deal ever made.”

“To the victor belong the spoils,” he added. Rodríguez and the Venezuelan delegation were shown listening to Trump’s speech in the UN live broadcast.

Prior to the high-profile Trump sit-down, Venezuela’s acting president held meetings with Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) President Ilan Goldfajn, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, and World Bank President Ajay Banga to discuss Venezuela’s reintegration into international financing and cooperation mechanisms.

“We are promoting new stages of engagement with the international financial system and working to ensure joint efforts for the benefit of the Venezuelan people. Venezuela’s future is built through partnerships, hard work, and the firm determination to keep moving forward and creating opportunities for our nation,” Rodríguez said. 

She also met with UN Secretary-General António Guterres, with whom she reportedly discussed Venezuela’s political and economic situation, cooperation with the UN, human rights, and dialogue.

The Venezuelan leader likewise held a brief conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.