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News Analysis: Uncertainty, frustration define messy midterm battles for mayor, governor and Congress

With little more than a week left until primary voters winnow the candidates for Los Angeles mayor, California governor and Congress, there remains a palpable sense of political uncertainty among the electorate — attributable to a lack of clear front-runners, redrawn political maps, messy party infighting and competing voter frustration with both President Trump and the state’s Democratic establishment.

In a state where Democrats hold a substantial advantage among registered voters and Trump lost in 2024 by more than 20 percentage points, MAGA-aligned Republicans are nonetheless competing on a message of ineptitude from longtime liberal leaders to address the state’s most intractable problems. Even some Democrats have railed against the status quo.

With Trump’s grip on the Republican base intact despite abysmal overall approval ratings, many Republican candidates have courted his approval — and been hammered for it by their Democratic opponents.

But those same Democrats have found it harder to explain why their own party should continue to lead the state despite allowing its affordability, housing and homelessness crises to take root and persist — taking little responsibility while swiping at each other for having failed to find solutions sooner.

All that party infighting — present before every primary, but at a fever pitch now — comes against a backdrop of broader voter unease about the war in Iran, volatile oil and gas prices, and the burgeoning threat of AI to the American workforce.

Republican voters are being warned of a blue wave in November giving Democrats control of Congress and grinding Trump’s agenda to a halt. Democratic voters are being warned of Trump administration efforts to undermine local and state elections, and of control of Congress unfairly slipping from reach thanks to further Republican redistricting following a U.S. Supreme Court decision undermining the Voting Rights Act and its protections for majority-Black districts across the South.

Many California voters — some already shaken or burned by former Rep. Eric Swalwell dropping from the gubernatorial race amid sexual assault and rape allegations last month — appear hesitant to cast ballots early, despite warnings that the Trump administration may try to discount those mailed at the last minute.

“Voters don’t want to make a mistake. They’re not absolutely certain,” said Rob Stutzman, a Republican consultant in California. “It’s just not real clear where to land.”

James Adams, a political science professor at UC Davis who studies elections and public opinion, said California Democrats this cycle “have a candidate problem and they have a message problem,” in that they are trying to convince voters to back them “not because they offer exciting ideas or inspiring leadership, but because their Republican opponents are even worse.”

And that message — offered as they gerrymander California in a race to the bottom with Republicans nationally — isn’t cutting it, Adams said.

“People are alienated from our current politics not because Americans are cynical, but because people recognize that they deserve better.”

Outsider shakes up L.A. mayor’s race

Amid entrenched homelessness, affordability concerns and lingering anger over the bungled response to last year’s wildfires, the L.A. mayor’s race was “supposed to be a referendum” on embattled Mayor Karen Bass, Stutzman said.

And yet, Bass remains in the lead, and many voters remain confused about which way to turn away from her — if at all.

Bass has won the endorsement of three council members who are members of the Democratic Socialists of America, despite City Councilmember Nithya Raman, an ally who’d previously endorsed Bass and is a member of the DSA herself, entering the race to her left.

Unable to consolidate support from the city’s progressive flank, Raman is now running neck and neck for a second-place finish and a chance to face Bass in the November runoff with former reality TV personality Spencer Pratt, who has remained in contention in ultra-liberal L.A. despite pushing a MAGA-aligned message to Bass’ right.

Pratt, who did not respond to a request for comment, lost his Pacific Palisades home in the fires and has won over many frustrated city residents with his anti-establishment message and cheeky AI videos — including one casting him as Batman, taking on a corrupt Democratic bourgeoisie.

Pratt, a registered Republican, has tried to dance around politics in the race, calling his campaign a “nonpartisan” one and comparing himself to President Obama politically. But he is backed by many Republicans, has echoed Trump’s rhetoric around restoring “common sense” and a “Golden Age” to L.A., and recently responded to Trump saying that he’d heard Pratt “is a big MAGA person” — and Raman posting the quote to X — with a meme of himself shrugging.

Fernando Guerra, founding director of the Center for the Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University, said he’s glad city voters have choices this race, because they clearly aren’t happy. He said Angelenos are less optimistic today than ever before and are deeply frustrated with “this same liberal Democratic regime from Bradley to Bass over 50 years” — a reference to former Mayor Tom Bradley, who first took office in 1973.

Voters are clearly tired of that regime, which has succumbed to “policy paralysis” in the name of “inclusion” and trying to please everyone, Guerra said — but not so much that they will consider going MAGA for Pratt.

“People say, ‘Yeah, Democrats have really f—d it up, but there’s no way we’re going to [back] Republicans. Look what they’ve done to the nation.’”

Others aren’t so sure. In its voter guide, the progressive group LA Forward wrote that the “most important thing” in the June 2 primary is to block Pratt — whom it called a “right-wing reality TV buffoon” — from advancing, and the best way to do so is to vote for Raman.

“We would much rather see a Bass/Raman runoff, with no chance of Pratt becoming mayor, than a Pratt/Bass runoff where a Pratt win would be a real possibility — plunging LA into a Trumpian mayoral nightmare,” the group wrote.

An unsettled gubernatorial contest

In the gubernatorial race, none of the many Democratic candidates has been able to consolidate a sizable lead, creating a lingering apprehension that Republicans could somehow eke out a stunning upset in the biggest of blue states.

That’s in part thanks to leading Democratic candidate Xavier Becerra, the former California attorney general and U.S. Health secretary under President Biden, being dogged by insinuations, including from fellow Democrats, that he was somehow complicit in a scheme by underlings to steal from his campaign coffers, despite prosecutors in the case — which resulted in his former chief of staff pleading guilty — never alleging wrongdoing on his part.

It’s also thanks in part to the fact that the leading progressive, Tom Steyer, is a billionaire who has bought his way into contention with nearly $200 million of his own money — in an election cycle in which progressive voters nationwide are decrying billionaires as the clearest symbol of all that is wrong with the nation’s lopsided economy.

“This kind of weird self-loathing rationale of why he’s the right guy to take on billionaires because he is one? You can’t build a Mamdani movement around that,” said Stutzman, referring to New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani, who shot to power on a democratic socialist platform last year.

The Democrats have also struggled to combat the criticism — leveraged time and again by their Republican competitors — that their party has failed for years to solve California’s most substantial problems, and deserves to be ousted from power.

Republican Steve Hilton and Democrat Xavier Becerra speak during a break in the April 28 gubernatorial debate.

Republican Steve Hilton and Democrat Xavier Becerra speak during a break in the April 28 gubernatorial debate.

(Eric Thayer / Los Angeles Times)

Former Fox News commentator Steve Hilton has hammered that message in ads and on the debate stage, lambasting the Democratic establishment for pushing so much unnecessary regulation that it has chased out business and investment and made everything from gas to housing to groceries more expensive for average residents.

He has blamed Democrats for California’s high rates of poverty and unemployment, its high cost of living and high taxes, its record homelessness and its poor public school results.

In an interview, Hilton said he understands that California voters may not like Trump — who endorsed him — and may have conflicting beliefs about federal and international policy, but that California’s biggest problems have “nothing to do with President Trump.”

“Voters need to decide on what direction they want to take in terms of the policies that affect their daily lives in California,” he said, and those are “devised and enacted within California by our politicians here in Sacramento.”

He also said it’s no surprise that some of his Democratic rivals have also acknowledged that the Democratic establishment has been a failure, because “if you pretend otherwise, you show that you’re just completely out of touch with public opinion.”

Rusty Hicks, chair of the California Democratic Party, said “every campaign is entitled to run the race that they believe matches their story,” even if that means questioning the party’s past performance. But he also said polling hasn’t shown that message to be an effective one, and he’s confident that voters will show their ongoing trust in the party at the polls.

Redistricting, sniping and name-calling

The decision by California voters last November to pass Proposition 50 and allow the state’s Democratic leaders to redraw the state’s congressional maps to favor Democratic candidates in a handful of additional districts — part of a wider redistricting war sparked by Trump — has intensified the primary races in those areas.

As an example, longtime incumbent Reps. Ken Calvert (R-Corona) and Young Kim (R-Anaheim Hills) are now competing to represent the same redrawn swath of Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino counties, and have bitterly attacked one another. Kim has called Calvert a “swampy,” “sleazy” and “corrupt” politician guilty of “sabotaging President Trump’s agenda.” Calvert has called Kim a “RINO,” or Republican In Name Only, and a “Trump-hating liberal.”

Democrats have also sniped at each other, including in the race to replace retiring Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Bonsall) in his redrawn district in San Diego and Riverside counties — where Trump also holds an outsize presence.

Rep. Young Kim and Rep. Ken Calvert are opponents in a heated race in a newly redrawn congressional district.

Rep. Young Kim and Rep. Ken Calvert are opponents in a heated race in a newly redrawn congressional district.

(Associated Press)

Stutzman said it will be interesting to see how those primaries play out, but also how Democrats there and in other races perform in November — when Democrats are expected to perform well nationally given Trump’s lousy ratings, but Democrats in California could underperform thanks to statewide frustration with affordability, housing and homelessness here.

“People are like, ‘Eh, you know, yeah, Trump — but there’s some problems here,’” Stutzman said.

Hicks said he expects California voters to not only elect another Democratic governor, but to “push back on a Trump administration and congressional Republicans and Republicans around the country that have sought to rig the game in their favor,” including by “ensuring that we fulfill the promise of Proposition 50 by winning congressional seats and retaking the House of Representatives.”

He said the current political moment “can feel like a pressure cooker,” but Californians will “continue to adapt and overcome and be resilient, just as they always have been.”

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After the Iran War: Seven Dynamics That Will Define the New Middle East

Every major war in the Middle East has left the region permanently altered in ways that nobody fully anticipated at the time. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war created a refugee crisis whose consequences are still being negotiated seventy-eight years later. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran reorganized the entire regional security architecture around a new fault line that nobody had planned for. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq created a vacuum that Iran filled faster and more effectively than anyone in Washington had anticipated, reshaping the balance of power across the Levant in ways that took a decade to fully understand.

The 2026 Iran war belongs in that category. Not because the outcome is clear, it is not, and the ceasefire that is currently holding is fragile enough that anyone claiming certainty about what comes next is not paying close enough attention. But because the war has already crossed several thresholds that cannot be uncrossed, set several precedents that will shape behavior for years, and broken several assumptions that the regional order was quietly depending on without anyone fully acknowledging it.

Here are seven dynamics that will define the Middle East that emerges from this war, whenever the shooting finally stops for good.

1.      Iran Survives, But the Rules It Played By Are Gone

The Tehran regime is still standing. That matters, and it is worth saying plainly before anything else, because a significant part of the war’s logic, the publicly unstated part, was the hope that Operation Epic Fury would produce regime collapse or at minimum regime change. It did not. The Islamic Republic absorbed the largest US-Israeli military campaign in the region’s modern history, lost its Supreme Leader, saw its nuclear facilities damaged and its military degraded, and is still there.

What has changed is the calculation the regime makes about its own survival. Iran’s leadership watched the same sequence of events that every other government in the region watched: a country that was in active nuclear negotiations got bombed twice during those negotiations. The deterrence lesson available from that sequence is not subtle. Iran’s longstanding policy of maintaining a threshold nuclear capability, staying close to the bomb without building one, using ambiguity as leverage has been tested and found insufficient. The regime that emerges from this war is going to look at that record and draw conclusions about what kind of deterrence actually works. North Korea tested a weapon and got personal summits with an American president. Iran negotiated in good faith and got bombed. Those two data points are now sitting side by side in every serious strategic conversation happening in Tehran.

The regime will also be more paranoid domestically. The war followed the January 2026 protests in which security forces killed at least 30,000 people. A weakened regime with depleted military resources and a traumatized population is not a stable combination. The survival instinct will dominate everything else in the near term, including any serious diplomatic engagement, which is part of why the Islamabad nuclear talks failed and why any future negotiations will start from an even lower baseline of trust than the ones that preceded the war.

2.      The Gulf Has Been Permanently Unsettled

The Gulf Cooperation Council states did not start this war. They absorbed it anyway. Bahrain depleted 87% of its Patriot interceptor stocks. Kuwait and the UAE spent roughly 75% of theirs. Saudi Arabia’s critical east-west pipeline was struck directly. Abu Dhabi’s main gas complex caught fire. Fujairah’s oil refinery burned. More than 60 combined drone and missile attacks hit Kuwait and the UAE in a single day during the Project Freedom escalation. The Gulf’s carefully constructed image as a zone of stability, safety, and economic transformation, the image that had attracted trillions in foreign investment and tens of millions of expatriate workers, was shattered in a way that will take years to rebuild, if it can be rebuilt at all.

The Middle East Council on Global Affairs described the war as having “irreversibly shaken” the region’s image, exposing deep-seated fragility beneath the facade of the Gulf’s rapid economic transformation. The word “irreversibly” is doing real work in that sentence. Previous crises, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 2019 Aramco attacks, were absorbed and the narrative of Gulf stability recovered relatively quickly. This war lasted over seventy days, struck civilian infrastructure repeatedly, disrupted food supplies across countries that import the vast majority of their calories, and demonstrated that the bilateral security relationships with Washington that Gulf states had invested so heavily in did not prevent them from becoming targets.

The UAE’s decision to leave OPEC on May 1 is one visible expression of the strategic rethink underway. The Gulf states are going to emerge from this war less willing to subordinate their security architecture to any single patron and more interested in building the kind of integrated regional defense capacity that would give them options Washington cannot or will not provide. The differences among the six GCC states will make a NATO-style collective defense treaty unlikely, but closer integration is no longer aspirational. It is a necessity that the war has made impossible to defer.

3.      The Normalization Project Is Frozen

Before February 28, the Abraham Accords logic seemed to be holding. The UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco had normalized relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia was the prize, and the conversations about a potential Saudi-Israeli normalization — in exchange for a US defense pact and civilian nuclear cooperation — were genuinely advanced. The underlying premise was that Arab publics had moved far enough past the Palestinian cause that their governments could afford to formalize what was already functionally a security alignment.

The Iran war destroyed that premise in full view of everyone. Arab public opinion, which was already running at 87% opposition to normalization in the Arab Opinion Index before the war, has hardened further after watching Israel conduct sustained bombing campaigns across Lebanon, Gaza, and Iran simultaneously over more than seventy days. For many Arab observers, the war is not an isolated conflict. It is the latest chapter in a broader Israeli military dominance project that encompasses Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and now Iran, enabled throughout by American military and diplomatic support.

Any Arab leader who signs a normalization deal with Israel in the current environment faces a domestic political cost that no US security guarantee or economic package can fully offset. The Saudi normalization conversation is not dead permanently, the strategic logic that made it attractive for Riyadh has not entirely disappeared but it is frozen for long enough that the entire US regional architecture that depended on it as a centerpiece needs to be rethought. Washington’s ability to build a US-Israel-Gulf security framework against Iran was the strategic bet the war was supposed to vindicate. The war has made that framework harder to assemble, not easier.

4.      The US-Israel Relationship Has a New Fracture

American support for Israel has been the most durable constant in US Middle East policy across administrations since 1948. It has survived Israeli settlement expansion, military operations in Gaza that generated international condemnation, and political disputes that have occasionally grown heated. The 2026 Iran war has introduced a new variable into that relationship that previous strains did not: the growing belief among a significant portion of the American public that Israel drew the United States into a war it did not want and cannot easily end.

More than 60% of Americans disapprove of the Iran war. Trump’s approval ratings sank to record lows partly on the back of rising energy prices and cost of living impacts that are directly attributable to the Hormuz closure. The war’s unpopularity has given political traction to positions that were previously confined to the progressive wing of the Democratic Party: conditioning military assistance on specific Israeli behavior, demanding accountability for civilian casualties in Lebanon and Iran, and subjecting the strategic value of the bilateral relationship to the kind of cost-benefit scrutiny it has historically been shielded from.

None of this means the alliance is breaking. It is not. But the domestic political foundation that made unconditional US support for Israel possible regardless of what Israel did has developed a crack that the Iran war has widened. Future US administrations will face a political environment in which the Israel relationship is a genuine electoral liability in ways it simply was not before, and Israeli policymakers who have operated on the assumption that US support is structurally guaranteed regardless of circumstances will need to update that assumption.

5.      China Emerged as the Indispensable Power

Beijing did not fire a shot. It did not spend significant diplomatic capital publicly. It did not take on any formal mediation role. What it did was position itself, with considerable patience and skill, as the actor that both Washington and Tehran needed more than either wanted to admit, and then collect the diplomatic credit when the ceasefire materialized.

China helped bring Iran to the Islamabad table, according to Trump’s own public statements. Wang Yi hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi in Beijing days before the Trump-Xi summit, called for Hormuz to reopen, and generated the impression of Chinese diplomatic activism at exactly the moment when Washington needed Beijing’s cooperation and was prepared to pay for it. China invoked its blocking rule against US sanctions on Chinese refiners buying Iranian crude — the first time that tool had ever been used — demonstrating that it had economic instruments available to defend its interests that it had not previously deployed. And it arrived at the Beijing summit as the power that had something Trump badly needed, which is a considerably stronger negotiating position than the one it occupied at Busan in October.

The 2023 Saudi-Iran normalization deal established China as a capable Middle East diplomatic actor. The 2026 Iran war established it as an indispensable one. The distinction matters. Capable means you can play a role when conditions are right. Indispensable means the outcome changes if you are not involved. Beijing has crossed that threshold, and it has done so without making any of the military commitments, incurring any of the costs, or absorbing any of the domestic political blowback that Washington’s Middle East involvement routinely generates.

6.      The Nuclear Domino Is Now Spinning

Iran was bombed twice during active nuclear negotiations. That sequence of events is now permanently part of the strategic record, and every government that has been quietly calculating its own nuclear options has updated its spreadsheet accordingly.

Saudi Arabia has been the most explicit. Mohammed bin Salman said before the war that if Iran developed a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would pursue one too. The war has moved that conversation from hypothetical to urgent. Riyadh has been building civilian nuclear infrastructure with American assistance and insisting on retaining enrichment rights in any cooperation agreement. The Islamabad talks’ collapse on the nuclear issue, Iran refusing to permanently renounce enrichment in exchange for promises from a government that had bombed it twice during negotiations, has removed any expectation that a clean nonproliferation settlement is achievable in the near term.

Turkey, South Korea, and Japan are all running versions of the same calculation at different registers. The Iran war gave each of them new data points. US Pacific munitions were depleted to feed the Iran campaign. THAAD components were pulled from South Korea. US allies in Asia were publicly rebuked for declining to join the coalition. The message received in Seoul, Tokyo, and Ankara was not the one Washington intended to send, and the conclusions being drawn in those capitals about the reliability of American security guarantees will shape nuclear policy decisions that play out over the next decade.

The nonproliferation architecture was already under serious strain before February 28. The Iran war has accelerated the deterioration of a regime that depended on the belief that non-nuclear states were better off without weapons than with them. That belief is harder to sustain after a country was bombed during the negotiations designed to preserve it.

7.      The Gulf’s Self-Image Is Broken, and Rebuilding It Will Take a Generation

There is a dimension of what the Iran war changed that resists purely strategic analysis, and it is worth naming directly. The Gulf states spent the past two decades building a narrative about themselves: modern, open, economically dynamic, safely removed from the instability that characterized other parts of the Middle East. Dubai and Abu Dhabi positioned themselves as global hubs. Riyadh launched Vision 2030. Doha hosted the World Cup. The region was selling itself as a destination, not a danger zone.

The war shattered that narrative in ways that will outlast the ceasefire. The conflict was described by one analyst as marking the “end of the narrative” that the Gulf is a permanently safe destination for expatriates, immigrants, and tourists. The psychological impact on the tens of millions of people who live and work in the Gulf, who sheltered from missile alerts, watched refineries burn, and scrambled to find formula and medicine during the food import disruption, is not something that press releases about ceasefire agreements can quickly undo.

Foreign investment into Gulf real estate and infrastructure had been tracking the region’s stability narrative for years. That narrative is now complicated by the demonstrated reality that the Gulf can be struck repeatedly during a regional conflict in ways that its air defenses cannot fully absorb. Rebuilding the confidence that underwrites that investment will require not just a ceasefire but a durable regional security architecture that the current situation is nowhere near producing.

The Middle East that emerges from the 2026 Iran war will be defined by the space between what was promised and what was delivered; by US security guarantees that did not prevent the Gulf from being struck, by Israeli military operations whose strategic gains remain unclear, by an Iranian regime that survived when the operational logic suggested it might not, by a ceasefire that is holding without resolving anything, and by a regional order that has been disrupted deeply enough that the shape of what replaces it is genuinely unknown.

That uncertainty is not a failure of analysis, but it is the honest description of where the region actually is.

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Chargers 2026 schedule: Grueling early slate could define season

The Chargers essentially lived on an airplane last season, traveling more miles than any other NFL team.

This season, they will have a long runway followed by a dramatically sharp ascent.

They open against three first-time head coaches in succession, then face four Super Bowl-winning head coaches in a row.

Their first three games are against Arizona (Mike LaFleur), Las Vegas (Klint Kubiak) and Buffalo (Joe Brady), before squaring off against Seattle (Mike Macdonald), Denver (Sean Payton), Kansas City (Andy Reid) and — after a week off — the Rams (Sean McVay).

And it’s not as if the Chargers will be homebodies, as they have four coast-to-coast trips with road games at the Bills, Baltimore, Tampa Bay and Miami. So they will still be racking up the frequent-flier miles.

The NFL made an effort to put some space between those cross-country games for the Chargers.

“We’re always being sensitive, trying to make sure we’re not pingponging a team across the country with travel to the East Coast and back,” said Hans Schroeder, the NFL’s executive vice president of media distribution. “So we try to make sure those trips are broken up where we can, and we’re not doing too much of that back and forth.”

This marks the third season under Jim Harbaugh, who has had remarkable success at every stop in his coaching career but has yet to win a playoff game with the Chargers. Same goes for quarterback Justin Herbert, who was drafted in 2020 and is still looking for his inaugural postseason victory.

SoFi Stadium will host the Super Bowl next February, and the Battle For Los Angeles in Week 8 when the Chargers play at the Rams, a rare meaningful matchup of the crosstown foes.

The Chargers will play three preseason games, all Thursday night games against opponents they will face in the regular season. They will play at Houston on Aug. 13, followed by home games against San Francisco (Aug. 20) and the Rams (Aug. 27). All will be broadcast on CBS-LA.

Here is a game-by-game look at the regular-season schedule (all times Pacific):

Sept. 13, ARIZONA, 1:25 p.m. (CBS): It’s a gentle start against the rebuilding Cardinals, who figure to have Jacoby Brissett at quarterback in place of the familiar Kyler Murray, who is now with the Minnesota Vikings. The last time these teams played was in Arizona two years ago, and the Cardinals won, 17-15.

Sept. 20, LAS VEGAS, 1:05 p.m. (CBS): Back-to-back home games for the Chargers, who opened last season in Brazil. The Chargers swept the Raiders last season. Could No. 1 overall pick Fernando Mendoza be starting at quarterback for the Silver and Black?

Sept. 27, at Buffalo, 10 a.m. (Fox): The first of four East Coast trips for the Chargers, who are stepping into a tough environment but at least won’t have to deal with a Buffalo winter. This is the start of a rugged seven-game stretch for the Chargers.

Oct. 4, at Seattle, 1:25 p.m. (CBS): The last time these teams played was 2023, so the rosters have pretty much turned over since then. Kenneth Walker III ran for 167 yards in that 37-23 win by the Seahawks. He was Super Bowl MVP last season and is now playing for Kansas City, so the Chargers will see enough of him.

The Chargers and quarterback Justin Herbert scrambles against the New England Patriots.

The Chargers and quarterback Justin Herbert are set to play host to the New England Patriots on Thanksgiving weekend.

(Robert Gauthier / Los Angeles Times)

Oct. 11, DENVER, 1:05 p.m. (CBS): The Chargers and Broncos split last season, with each team holding serve at home. The Chargers won by three at SoFi, but the Broncos held their second-stringers to a mere field goal in the regular-season finale with Denver winning at home, 19-3.

Oct. 18, at Kansas City, 1:25 p.m. (CBS): As is the case with the Buffalo game, the Chargers are sidestepping some potentially harsh weather. They beat the Chiefs in Brazil in last season’s opener, then beat them by three points at Arrowhead in Week 15.

Oct. 25: Bye week. In recent years, the Chargers have almost always gotten their week off in the first half of the season. They had so many injuries last season, they could have used a week off every other week.

Nov. 1, at Rams, 1:05 p.m. (Fox): This is a home game for both teams, so the Chargers catch a break in terms of travel. It will be the third time these stadium-mates have met since the Rams returned in 2016. They split in the previous two meetings, with the Rams winning in 2018 and the Chargers in 2023.

Nov. 8, HOUSTON, 1:05 p.m. (CBS): Harbaugh’s Chargers are 0-2 against the Texans, losing by four to them at SoFi last season, and getting clobbered at Houston in the opening round of the 2024 playoffs, 32-12.

Nov. 16, at Baltimore, 5:15 p.m. (ESPN): This is a “Monday Night Football” game, and for good reason. It isn’t Harbaugh versus Harbaugh — as it would have been when brother John Harbaugh was coach of the Ravens — but Jim Harbaugh vs. Jesse Minter, his former Chargers defensive coordinator.

Nov. 22, JETS, 1:05 p.m. (Fox): Finally, something of a respite after a battering stretch of games. Of course, in the NFL, you can never breathe easy. The Chargers have beaten the Jets five times in a row, true, but those games were played over the past 14 seasons so those lopsided numbers aren’t relevant to this matchup.

Nov. 29, NEW ENGLAND, 5:20 p.m. (NBC): Back to the grind for the Chargers, who generated next-to-no offense in the playoffs last season against the eventual AFC champions. It was a low-scoring game all around, but the Patriots never looked concerned in their 16-3 victory.

Dec. 6, at Tampa Bay, 10 a.m. (CBS): The Buccaneers have beaten the Chargers four times in a row, although that’s dating to 2012, so much of that is ancient history. Baker Mayfield has revived that franchise — and his own career.

Dec. 13, at Las Vegas, 1:05 p.m. (CBS): Sure, the Chargers might face Mendoza in Week 2, but there’s an even greater likelihood they will see him the second time around.

Dec.17, SAN FRANCISCO, 5:15 p.m. (Amazon Prime): This is a Thursday night game, and Harbaugh will be facing the franchise he got to the Super Bowl in the 2012 season. If the NFC West turns out to be as competitive as expected, the Chargers could do the Rams a solid here.

Dec. 27, at Miami, 10 a.m. (Fox): The Chargers won at Miami last season on a last-second field goal by Cameron Dicker. December is a good time of year to play in South Florida.

Week 17, KANSAS CITY, TBD: This is where the schedule gets squishy and the NFL pushes games around to give the most exciting ones the most exposure. This game is TBA. It could be a good one, considering the rivalry.

Week 18, at Denver, TBD: Just like last season, the Chargers finish at the Broncos. A difficult final exam, and maybe another gateway to the postseason.



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Control of the Strait of Hormuz May Define the Next Phase of the Iran Conflict

The Strait of Hormuz has become the central strategic battleground in the ongoing confrontation involving Iran, the United States, and regional Gulf powers. What initially appeared to be a military conflict is increasingly evolving into a struggle over maritime control, energy security, and geopolitical influence.

Since the outbreak of hostilities following the joint United States and Israeli strikes on Iran in February, Tehran’s near closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Washington’s retaliatory naval blockade have severely disrupted global energy markets. The conflict has reduced the movement of oil and liquefied natural gas through one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, creating economic instability far beyond the Middle East.

Recent tanker movements coordinated through informal understandings with Tehran suggest that Iran may now be shifting from blocking Hormuz entirely to selectively controlling access. This emerging dynamic could fundamentally reshape Gulf security and international energy politics.

Hormuz Is No Longer Just a Trade Route

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most strategically important waterways in the global economy. Before the conflict, roughly one fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments passed through the narrow corridor each day.

Its disruption has exposed the vulnerability of global energy markets to geopolitical conflict. Asian economies have been particularly affected because of their heavy dependence on Gulf energy exports. Oil supply disruptions and rising transportation risks have intensified inflationary pressure, energy insecurity, and market volatility across multiple regions.

The recent passage of a limited number of oil and gas tankers with apparent Iranian approval demonstrates that Tehran may now be exercising selective authority over maritime transit rather than enforcing a complete blockade.

This distinction is critical because it suggests Iran is attempting to transform military leverage into long term political and economic influence.

Iran’s Emerging Strategy of Selective Access

The limited reopening of shipping lanes indicates that Tehran may be developing a new model of strategic control. Rather than permanently shutting down the strait, Iran appears to be determining which countries, companies, or shipments can safely transit through the waterway.

This selective access system gives Tehran several advantages.

First, it allows Iran to maintain pressure on global energy markets without fully halting trade flows that could trigger overwhelming international military intervention.

Second, it creates potential economic benefits through informal transit arrangements, leverage over energy dependent states, and indirect influence on oil pricing.

Third, it positions Iran as a gatekeeper within one of the world’s most important strategic corridors, expanding its geopolitical relevance despite sanctions and military pressure.

The reported coordination involving Pakistan and Qatar also demonstrates how regional diplomacy is becoming intertwined with energy security and conflict management.

Gulf States and the United States Face Strategic Risks

For Gulf Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, any arrangement that allows Iran to regulate maritime access poses a direct strategic threat.

Their economies depend heavily on uninterrupted hydrocarbon exports, and Iranian control over transit patterns would increase Tehran’s regional influence at their expense.

Asian importers are equally vulnerable because selective access introduces political uncertainty into global energy supply chains. Countries dependent on Gulf oil and gas would become increasingly exposed to Iranian political calculations.

For the United States, accepting Iranian dominance over Hormuz would undermine Washington’s broader strategic objectives in the region. The Trump administration has repeatedly emphasized restoring unrestricted freedom of navigation as a core war aim.

Allowing Iran to effectively manage maritime access would signal a major geopolitical shift and weaken perceptions of American regional dominance.

Why the Current Situation May Become More Dangerous

The most concerning aspect of the emerging situation is that temporary wartime arrangements could solidify into a long term strategic reality. Even if a ceasefire is eventually reached, Iran may resist fully restoring unrestricted navigation because Hormuz now represents its strongest source of leverage against the United States and regional rivals.

This creates the conditions for a prolonged state of instability rather than genuine conflict resolution.

A system based on selective transit rights would likely produce repeated confrontations as regional powers, Western navies, shipping companies, and energy importers challenge or negotiate the limits of Iranian control.

Such a situation would institutionalize uncertainty in global energy markets and increase the likelihood of future military escalation.

Analysis

The battle over the Strait of Hormuz reflects a broader transformation in modern geopolitical conflict where control over trade routes and economic chokepoints can become more strategically valuable than territorial conquest.

Iran appears to recognize that its greatest strength lies not in conventional military superiority but in its ability to disrupt the global economy through maritime leverage. By controlling the flow of energy through Hormuz, Tehran can influence oil prices, inflation, international diplomacy, and political stability in rival states.

This gives Iran asymmetric power against economically stronger adversaries.

The United States faces a difficult strategic dilemma. Military escalation aimed at fully reopening Hormuz could deepen regional conflict and further destabilize global markets. However, tolerating selective Iranian control risks weakening American credibility and altering the regional balance of power in Tehran’s favor.

The current situation also exposes the limits of military power in resolving structural geopolitical disputes. Even if active fighting declines, the underlying contest over maritime control, energy security, and regional influence will likely persist.

Ultimately, the future of the Gulf may increasingly depend not on battlefield victories, but on who shapes the rules governing the movement of energy through the Strait of Hormuz. If selective Iranian control becomes normalized, the region could enter a prolonged era of economic coercion, strategic competition, and recurring confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

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