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FIFA decries ‘concerted’ effort to undermine Infantino as crisis deepens | Football News

Statement comes after Infantino denies claims that UEFA paid off his alleged lover while he was the body’s general secretary.

FIFA warns against what ‌it calls a “concerted and ongoing effort” to undermine President Gianni Infantino, saying attempts to challenge his ⁠leadership must follow the ⁠governing body’s statutes and democratic procedures.

The statement on Saturday came amid an increasingly bitter standoff over Infantino’s leadership following the collapse of his proposal to raise about $4.2bn by selling a stake ⁠in the commercial rights of the World Cup and other tournaments.

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The plan triggered criticism from UEFA, national associations and senior FIFA officials; led to calls for Infantino to resign; and prompted a crisis meeting in Morocco ⁠this past week, at which FIFA’s leadership reaffirmed its support for the president.

FIFA did not identify those it said were seeking to undermine Infantino or specify which reports or allegations it was referring to.

The statement followed reports by The Daily Telegraph about payments made by UEFA to a former employee with whom the newspaper said Infantino was having an intimate relationship during his time as the European governing body’s ‌general secretary.

He has denied those allegations, and FIFA has rejected them as unfounded.

When contacted by the AFP news agency, UEFA acknowledged that “a departure payment was made to the individual in question” at that time, “coupled with the payment of fees for an MBA course at a local business school”.

FIFA said recent reporting has included “unsubstantiated assertions and demonstrably false claims” concerning FIFA and its president, adding that it would challenge inaccurate or misleading reports “directly and vigorously”.

FIFA added it would not support, facilitate or tolerate any process concerning the election of its president ⁠that was inconsistent with its statutes, democratic procedures and governance framework.

“The FIFA president ⁠was democratically elected by FIFA’s member associations and continues to serve with their mandate,” it said.

“Those who do not have the support of FIFA’s Member Associations should not seek to achieve through allegation, insinuation or misinformation what they cannot achieve through FIFA’s established democratic processes,” FIFA said.

FIFA split over Infantino

After the crisis meeting in Morocco on Wednesday, FIFA apologised to its 211 member associations for mistakes in the handling of the proposed World Cup spinoff and said its leadership had ⁠reaffirmed its full support for Infantino.

The fallout has cast a shadow over Infantino’s bid for a fourth term at the FIFA Congress in Morocco in March. ⁠No clear candidate to challenge him has yet emerged.

UEFA has said it no longer has confidence in Infantino while Norwegian Football Federation President Lise Klaveness called on Friday for him to resign, saying he no longer had the institutional trust required to govern FIFA.

But Infantino continues to enjoy substantial support among FIFA’s 211 ‌members. The Confederation of African Football (CAF) unanimously backed his leadership on Thursday while South America’s CONMEBOL rejected any attempt to oust him that did not involve a vote of all FIFA members.

Mexico’s football federation (FMF) also backed ‌Infantino ‌despite its regional confederation, CONCACAF, having called for a “comprehensive reckoning” with his presidency.

“The FMF will neither recognise nor approve any process convened outside of that institutional framework,” the Mexican federation said.

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Red Cross urges international aid as Sudan crisis deepens | Sudan war News

Charity warns that shrinking humanitarian support could threaten efforts to support communities trying to rebuild lives after 1,200 days of conflict.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has called for greater international support for Sudan, saying humanitarian needs are escalating while funding falls far short.

“Sudan is one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises, yet it is also one of its most overlooked” IFRC Special Envoy for Sudan, Derk Segaar, told reporters in Geneva after returning from the Sudan.

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Sudan plunged into all-out war in April 2023 between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese military, leading to the deaths of at least 59,000 people, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, a conflict monitoring group.

Aid groups say the figure is an undercount and the true number could be many times higher.

Segaar said while some aid is trickling into Kordofan and Darfur regions, the whole of Sudan has been devastated by the war, including Khartoum, where millions lack reliable electricity, clean water and healthcare, as cholera, malnutrition and floods pose additional risks.

He said 35 million people require humanitarian assistance, more than 9 million are internally displaced, and fighting has driven 4.5 million people out of Sudan.

Fighting

Speaking before a gathering of soldiers, Sudanese Army Lieutenant-General Yasser al-Atta on Monday said the military is advancing on all fronts with the aim of eliminating the RSF before the end of the year.

The location of the gathering was not specified.

“We are implementing the theory of advancing in all directions, with all fronts moving simultaneously, as happened during the recapture of Khartoum state,” al-Atta said.

“Before the end of this year, there will not be a single Janjaweed fighter,” he said, using a term to refer to the RSF, “or a foreign fighter, and we are determined to achieve that”.

Al-Atta’s remarks came days after the army and allied forces carried out a rapid operation in which they seized Bara, Jabra al-Sheikh, Um Sayala and other positions along a key road connecting Omdurman with el-Obeid in North Kordofan.

Sudan’s three Kordofan states – North, West and South – have witnessed continued fighting between the army and the RSF since October 2025.

Diplomacy

Meanwhile, the United Nations is ramping up efforts to get the stalled political process on track.

The UN says representatives from five international organisations, including the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the European Union and the League of Arab States held talks with Sudanese political parties on Monday.

“Building on exploratory consultations held in Addis Ababa in June, the Quintet engaged Sudanese civilian political leaders in recent days. Discussions continued on proposals and perspectives for advancing the political process, including through the establishment of confidence-building measures,” said UN deputy spokesman Farhan Haq.

The UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto, is also talking with RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo to discuss reducing escalation.

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Azerbaijan deepens ties with Germany beyond oil and gas

Azerbaijan’s relationship with Germany is shifting beyond energy, with the two countries deepening ties across industry and logistics as Europe works to diversify its supply chains away from Russia.


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“Azerbaijan is gradually ceasing to be perceived by Germany solely as an energy supplier and is increasingly becoming part of a new Eurasian industrial and logistics architecture,” said Orkhan Yolchuyev, director of the CASPIA Analytical Center.

Bilateral trade between the two countries reached around €1.7 billion in 2025, driven by German exports of industrial equipment, machinery and transport systems, Yolchuyev said.

Over 250 German companies now operate in Azerbaijan, spanning manufacturing, construction, logistics and energy.

The shift has accelerated since Azerbaijan began supplying gas directly to Germany and Austria in early 2026, part of a wider European push to reduce dependence on Russian energy following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Beyond energy

The real change, Yolchuyev said, is not in the trade figures but in what they represent.

“[They] indicate that bilateral relations are evolving toward a higher level of industrial cooperation,” he said, pointing to Germany’s need for new export markets and more resilient supply networks.

German companies already active in Azerbaijan could soon be drawn into its reconstruction programmes and expanding industrial zones, particularly in engineering, transport, renewable energy and advanced manufacturing.

Much of this shift runs through the Middle Corridor, the transport route linking China and Central Asia with Europe via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has given the route new urgency, as European firms hunt for alternatives that insulate their supply chains from disruption.

Azerbaijan sits at its logistical centre, with sea and rail links increasingly central to the transcontinental route.

Yolchuyev said the corridor’s value lies less in cargo volumes than in what it carries.

“The higher the share of high value-added products, such as automotive components, industrial machinery, electrical equipment, electronics or chemical products, the greater the economic efficiency of the route,” he said, pointing to the expansion of the Port of Baku and the Alat Free Economic Zone as drivers of new manufacturing and logistics investment.

Energy still at the core

Energy remains central despite the widening scope of cooperation. Azerbaijan has positioned itself as a dependable gas supplier and, since early 2026, has been sending gas directly to Germany and Austria.

Farid Shukurlu, a non-resident fellow at the Research Institute for European and American Studies, said Russia’s invasion marked a turning point.

“Traditionally, economic relations between Azerbaijan and Germany were concentrated in a limited number of sectors, including heavy machinery, automobiles and pharmaceuticals,” he said.

“However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine fundamentally reshaped the bilateral economic relationship.”

Within five months of Azerbaijan’s first crude shipment to Germany, the country had exported 360,300 tonnes of crude oil and petroleum products worth approximately $210.9 million (€196mn), Shukurlu said.

He believes Azerbaijan could eventually become a transit route for Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas bound for Germany and other European markets.

Germany’s shift carries weight given its past reliance on Russian gas. Italy remains the largest European buyer of Azerbaijani gas via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, but Germany is now moving in the same direction.

Manfred Scherer, mayor of the Verbandsgemeinde Sprendlingen-Gensingen, a collective municipality in Germany’s Mainz-Bingen district, recalled meeting Azerbaijan’s current energy minister, Parviz Shahbazov, during his time as ambassador to Germany.

“Economic relations between Germany and Azerbaijan have developed positively in recent years. There is strong potential to further strengthen cooperation,” Scherer said.

“I have fond memories of the visit of the current minister of energy, Parviz Shahbazov, to our municipality during his time as ambassador of Azerbaijan to Germany,” he continued.

“At that time, we discussed opportunities to deepen our relations through a municipal partnership and to strengthen cooperation between our regions.”

A wider European shift

Germany’s pivot fits a broader European turn toward the South Caucasus and Central Asia, partly in support of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, which could unlock further energy diversification and regional connectivity.

The high-level visits have piled up. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the partnership with Azerbaijan “matters greatly to the European Union” and had “real momentum”.

European Council President António Costa travelled to Baku for talks on deeper EU re-engagement, while EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas visited in May.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Slovak President Peter Pellegrini have also held high-level talks with President Ilham Aliyev.

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US launches more strikes on Iran as Strait of Hormuz standoff deepens | US-Israel war on Iran

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The US has launched a new wave of strikes on Iran targeting what it says is Tehran’s ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. US President Donald Trump has declared the waterway open while Iran insists it is closed leading to a further escalation of attacks, as Heidi Zhou Castro reports from Washington DC.

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Iran’s inflation spiral deepens as rial slides and tensions rise

The latest data from the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) shows the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the period 22 May–21 June 2026 was 88.6% higher than in the corresponding period a year earlier. In practical terms, a household that spent 100 monetary units on the same basket of goods and services a year ago would now need to spend approximately 189 monetary units to purchase that basket.


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Economists attribute the sharp increase in prices to a combination of long-standing structural challenges and more recent pressures. These include weak economic management, persistent fiscal and monetary imbalances, the continued impact of international sanctions, subdued growth prospects, heightened uncertainty in the business environment and widening fiscal deficits. More recently, military conflict and heightened regional tensions have placed further strain on Iran’s economy by increasing investment risks, disrupting economic activity and adding pressure on public finances.

Statistical Centre versus Central Bank figures

Alongside the figures published by the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI), the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) has reported different inflation estimates. According to the CBI, year-on-year inflation reached 83.1% at the end of the period 22 May–21 June 2026, while the annual inflation rate stood at 57.7%.

These estimates differ from those published by the SCI, which reported an annual inflation rate of 62.0% and a year-on-year inflation rate of 88.6% for the same period.

The gap between the two sets of estimates amounts to 4.3 percentage points for annual inflation and 5.5 percentage points for year-on-year inflation. Such discrepancies are not unusual in Iran and have recurred over recent years.

The differences largely reflect variations in methodology, including the composition of household consumption baskets, the weighting assigned to individual goods and services, and data collection and sampling techniques. Although both institutions seek to measure changes in the general price level, methodological differences can lead to materially different inflation estimates.

Despite these statistical differences, both sets of figures point to the same underlying trend: Iran is experiencing one of its most severe episodes of inflation in decades. Persistently rapid price growth has become a structural feature of the economy rather than a temporary shock.

Inflation accelerates from 52% to nearly 90%

Recent data indicate that inflationary pressures have continued to intensify rather than ease. Year-on-year inflation increased from 52.6% in December 2025 to approximately 68% in February 2026, before rising further to 88.6% for the period 22 May–21 June 2026.

This trajectory suggests that inflationary pressures have become increasingly entrenched, reflecting deeper structural imbalances rather than a temporary or purely monetary phenomenon.

International forecasts also point to a challenging outlook. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that Iran’s annual inflation rate will average around 68.9% in 2026, placing the country among the highest-inflation economies in the world. At the same time, the IMF forecasts a contraction in real GDP of around 6.1%, indicating continued pressure on economic activity.

Short-term price dynamics are also noteworthy. The Consumer Price Index increased by 5.9% over a single month, from 22 April–21 May 2026 to 22 May–21 June 2026 (the periods corresponding to the Iranian months of Ordibehesht and Khordad, respectively).

A monthly increase of this magnitude illustrates the speed at which prices are rising, making it increasingly difficult for households to maintain purchasing power and plan their finances.

Exchange-rate depreciation and inflation

Iran’s inflation surge – one of the most severe experienced by the country since the Second World War – has been closely associated with the sharp depreciation of the rial. Inflation has eroded the currency’s purchasing power, while successive declines in the rial have, in turn, fuelled further inflation by increasing the cost of imports and raising inflation expectations.

At the beginning of the year, the US dollar traded at around 1.35 million rials on Tehran’s open market. Following the start of US and Israeli air strikes against Iran on 28 February, the exchange rate rose to approximately 1.72 million rials per US dollar.

During the conflict, the exchange rate temporarily strengthened to around 1.46 million rials per US dollar as economic and commercial activity slowed, reducing demand for foreign currency. However, after Donald Trump threatened further US air strikes against critical Iranian infrastructure on 7 April, the rial came under renewed pressure, with the exchange rate weakening to around 1.63 million rials per US dollar.

Following the announcement of a ceasefire, the exchange rate recovered to approximately 1.525 million rials per US dollar. However, as economic activity resumed and Iranian officials estimated war-related damage at around US$300 billion, the rial weakened sharply again, with the exchange rate reaching a record 1.9 million rials per US dollar.

The subsequent signing of a memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington led to a temporary appreciation of the rial, bringing the exchange rate back to around 1.53 million rials per US dollar. Renewed tensions between Iran and the United States, however, pushed the exchange rate higher once again, approaching 1.7 million rials per US dollar.

These developments illustrate the extent to which exchange-rate movements have become a key transmission channel for inflation in Iran. Fluctuations in the rial affect not only the domestic cost of imported goods and production inputs but also the inflation expectations of households and businesses, reinforcing upward pressure on prices.

An uneven burden

Inflation has not affected all segments of society equally. Official data show that lower-income households have experienced a greater erosion of purchasing power than higher-income groups.

Year-on-year inflation reached 108.1% in rural areas, compared with 85.2% in urban areas. This disparity is particularly significant because lower-income households typically spend a larger share of their income on essential goods and services, especially food, leaving them more exposed to rising prices.

From a distributional perspective, inflation acts as an implicit tax, disproportionately reducing the real incomes of households with the least capacity to save, invest or protect themselves against rising prices.

Food at the centre of the cost-of-living crisis

The steepest price increases have been recorded in categories most closely associated with everyday household spending. Official statistics indicate that food prices have more than doubled compared with the same period a year earlier.

Year-on-year inflation reached 173.8% for tobacco, around 178% for meat, poultry and related products, approximately 152% for milk, cheese and eggs, and around 139% for bread and cereals.

Non-food categories have also recorded substantial price increases. Prices for furniture and household equipment rose by more than 111%, while transport costs increased by over 103%.

These figures suggest that the inflationary shock extends well beyond food prices. Alongside the rising cost of everyday essentials, households are also facing substantially higher costs for household goods and transport, further eroding purchasing power and placing increasing pressure on household budgets.

Wages fall behind the cost of living

One of the clearest consequences of sustained inflation is the widening gap between wages and the cost of meeting basic living expenses.

According to the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA), the official minimum monthly wage for the current year was set at 166.255 million rials (approximately €85), while representatives at a meeting of the Supreme Labour Council on 13 March 2026 estimated that a minimum household living basket would cost around 450 million rials (approximately €225) per month.

On this basis, the official minimum wage covers only around 37% of the estimated cost of a basic living basket, leaving a shortfall of approximately 63%.

The figures illustrate how rapid inflation has eroded real wages. Although nominal wages have increased over time, they have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of essential goods and services, placing increasing pressure on household living standards.

More broadly, Iran’s inflation challenge extends beyond rising prices alone. A combination of persistent inflation, currency depreciation and weakening purchasing power has created a self-reinforcing cycle that continues to undermine household finances and economic stability.

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Press Freedom Crisis Deepens Across South Asia as Media Credibility Faces Growing Scrutiny

Across South Asia, concerns over press freedom, political influence, and media credibility are drawing increasing international scrutiny. From Bangladesh and Pakistan to India, journalists and independent media organisations face mounting political, economic, and legal pressures that are reshaping how information is produced and consumed.

Recent international assessments point to what rights groups describe as a broader regional decline in media independence. The 2026 World Press Freedom Index placed multiple South Asian countries near the lower end of global rankings, reflecting concerns over censorship, political pressure, and growing ideological polarisation within news ecosystems.

Among these cases, India continues to attract the most sustained global attention due to its scale, democratic profile, and influence as the world’s largest electoral democracy.

When a country that defines itself as a global democratic model falls to 157th out of 180 nations on the World Press Freedom Index, the question is no longer whether there are challenges within its media environment. The question is how deeply those challenges have reshaped journalism itself.

Together with other regional indicators, the findings suggest not isolated failures but a structural transformation in how media systems operate across South Asia.

The concerns highlighted in global reports do not exist in isolation. Across South Asia, governments and political actors are increasingly accused of exerting pressure on journalists through legal action, advertising influence, regulatory scrutiny, and informal intimidation.

According to World Press Freedom Index in 2026, Bangladesh stood at 152nd. Afghanistan remained among the lowest-ranked countries globally, reflecting ongoing restrictions on press activity. Nepal, while comparatively better positioned at 87th, has also faced periodic concerns over political influence and media ownership concentration.

Analysts argue that while each country’s political context differs, a shared pattern is emerging: fragile media economies, heightened political polarisation, and increasing hostility toward independent journalism.

However, India’s trajectory is often singled out due to its democratic stature and its role as a regional political and cultural benchmark. This contrast between democratic identity and media freedom rankings has intensified global debate about the state of its information ecosystem.

Political Influence and the Changing Nature of News

Within India, one of the central concerns raised by international observers is the perceived growth of political influence over large sections of mainstream media.

A detailed report by Genocide Watch described what it termed a “severe crisis of credibility” in parts of the Indian media landscape, arguing that dominant narratives in some outlets increasingly align with those of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party rather than independently scrutinising power.

This does not imply uniformity across the entire media sector. India still has a diverse ecosystem of investigative journalists, regional newspapers, and independent digital platforms producing critical reporting. However, critics argue that the dominant tone of mainstream television and high-visibility digital media increasingly reflects political messaging rather than adversarial journalism.

The Reporters Without Borders (RSF) assessment echoed concerns about structural vulnerabilities. It highlighted the heavy dependence of Indian media on advertising revenue, including significant spending by both central and state governments. Critics argue that this financial structure creates subtle incentives for compliance, where editorial decisions may be influenced not through direct censorship, but through economic dependency.

In such an environment, formal restrictions are often unnecessary. Editorial caution can emerge internally, as news organisations weigh political and financial risks before pursuing certain stories.

The Rise of Divisive Television Narratives

Another recurring concern involves the increasing polarisation of televised political discourse.

Genocide Watch and other rights-focused assessments have warned that sections of mainstream media increasingly frame political and social issues through identity-based narratives, often centred on religion and nationalism. Complex policy debates are frequently simplified into binary positions, contributing to heightened social tension.

Human Rights Watch, in its World Report 2026, also documented concerns that hostile rhetoric in parts of media and online spaces has coincided with rising incidents of discrimination and attacks against minority communities, including Muslims in different parts of the country.

While causation is difficult to establish definitively, observers argue that repeated framing of communities through suspicion or collective identity can contribute to an environment where social hostility becomes easier to normalise.

The RSF report additionally pointed to structural imbalances within media representation, noting concerns about concentration of leadership within certain social groups and the underrepresentation of women in prominent political debate programming. These imbalances, critics argue, shape not only who speaks in media spaces, but also which perspectives are amplified or marginalised.

Self-Censorship and Invisible Constraints

Not all constraints on journalism are explicit. In many cases, they manifest as self-censorship.

According to Genocide Watch, journalists and editors increasingly avoid topics that could lead to political backlash, regulatory scrutiny, legal threats, or coordinated online harassment campaigns. Over time, this produces a newsroom culture in which certain subjects are quietly excluded before formal editorial decisions are even made.

This form of pressure is difficult to measure, but its effects can be significant. When reporters internalise risk calculations, the range of publicly available information can narrow without any formal ban or directive.

RSF similarly highlighted concerns over actions taken against independent journalists, commentators, and publications. It cited instances of restrictions, legal pressure, and bans on certain media outlets in sensitive regions, including Jammu and Kashmir, where authorities have taken action against publications accused of promoting separatism.

Critics argue that such measures contribute to a wider climate of caution, particularly around politically sensitive reporting.

A Broader Democratic Stress Test

The implications of these developments extend beyond journalism alone.

Genocide Watch framed the weakening of press freedom as part of a broader institutional credibility challenge linked to political polarisation and majoritarian dynamics. In this view, media independence is not an isolated issue but part of a wider ecosystem that includes accountability, governance, and civic trust.

A free press plays a central role in democratic systems by enabling scrutiny of power and facilitating informed public debate. When that role weakens, the consequences extend into how citizens engage with institutions and interpret political realities.

India’s trajectory in the RSF index over recent years reflects this concern. The country ranked 150th in 2022, fell further to 161st in 2023, improved slightly to 151st in 2025, and then declined again to 157th in 2026. Analysts interpret this pattern not as random fluctuation but as part of a longer-term structural challenge.

At the same time, government supporters argue that India remains a robust electoral democracy with active institutions, a vibrant political opposition, and a highly diverse media landscape. They contend that international rankings often fail to capture the complexity of India’s scale, security challenges, and internal diversity.

The debate, therefore, is not solely about classification, but about how democratic quality itself should be assessed.

South Asia in a Global Decline

These concerns are unfolding within a broader global downturn in press freedom. RSF’s 2026 index noted that worldwide media freedom has reached its weakest level in 25 years, with more than half of all countries classified as having “difficult” or “very serious” conditions.

South Asia reflects this global trend particularly sharply. Alongside India, countries such as Bangladesh remain in the lower tiers of the global rankings, highlighting shared regional challenges around political influence, media ownership concentration, and journalist safety.

Yet despite this broader pattern, analysts continue to emphasise that each country’s trajectory is shaped by its own political history and institutional structures. In India’s case, its global influence and democratic identity make developments in its media landscape particularly consequential for international observers.

What Is Ultimately at Stake

The credibility of media systems plays a central role in shaping the health of democratic life. Journalism informs not only public debate but also citizens’ ability to evaluate leadership, understand policy decisions, and hold institutions accountable.

When trust in media declines, democratic accountability becomes harder to sustain.

The findings from Genocide Watch and RSF should therefore be viewed not simply as criticism of individual outlets or governments, but as indicators of broader institutional stress across South Asia.

Addressing these challenges would require a combination of stronger protections for editorial independence, more diversified ownership structures, reduced reliance on state advertising, and greater safeguards for journalists facing intimidation or harassment.

Despite these pressures, the region continues to produce significant investigative journalism and independent reporting under difficult conditions. Many journalists continue to work at considerable personal and professional risk to maintain public access to information.

Acknowledging structural challenges across South Asia is not an indictment of any single democracy. Rather, it is increasingly seen by analysts as a necessary step toward strengthening the democratic principles that the region’s constitutions and institutions claim to uphold.

With information from Reuters.

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US deepens European uncertainty with deployment of 5,000 troops to Poland | NATO News

United States President Donald Trump has announced plans to deploy an additional 5,000 troops to Poland.

Trump announced the surprise deployment on social media late on Thursday, citing his friendship with right-wing Polish President Karol Nawrocki.

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The move came days after a planned deployment to Poland was apparently scrapped and will deepen uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration’s approach to NATO allies and its long-term commitment to maintaining a military presence in Europe. It leaves European partners increasingly unclear about which areas they should prioritise as they formulate defence strategies.

“Based on the successful Election of the now President ⁠of Poland, Karol Nawrocki, who I was proud to Endorse, and our relationship with him, I am pleased to announce that the United States will be sending an additional 5,000 Troops to Poland,” Trump wrote.

Nawrocki welcomed the announcement on social media.

“Good alliances are those based on cooperation, mutual respect, and a commitment to our shared ‌security,” he wrote on Thursday evening.

Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski also welcomed the news on Friday, saying it ensures that “the presence of American troops in Poland will be maintained more or less at previous levels”.

About-face

The announced deployment is a sudden about-face from US declarations of plans to reduce military support to Europe under Trump’s “America First” doctrine.

The US president has for years been lambasting European NATO partners for failing to spend enough on defence. His opprobrium has risen in recent weeks as European states have criticised the US-Israeli war on Iran and refused to join the conflict.

The Pentagon abruptly announced a week ago that it was scrapping the planned deployment of 4,000 troops to Poland.

Earlier this month, Trump announced he was withdrawing 5,000 troops from Germany following a spat with Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who said Washington had been “humiliated” by Iranian negotiators.

The US president later said that he would be “cutting a lot further than 5,000”.

Polish officials have noted that Warsaw pays significant sums towards the cost of US troop deployments. The suggestion of a pullback has caused concern over security in Poland and elsewhere in Europe, as Russia’s war on neighbouring Ukraine continues, with the Trump administration largely ceasing efforts to mediate a ceasefire.

European states report that they are getting to grips with the need to replace US defence capabilities, albeit slowly. However, sources suggest that the erratic policies emerging from the White House are creating confusion over which elements should be prioritised.

“It is confusing indeed, and not always easy to navigate,” Swedish Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard told reporters ahead of hosting a meeting of NATO foreign ministers on Friday, which will be attended by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

US defence officials are also confused, according to the AP news agency.

“We just spent the better part of two weeks reacting to the first announcement. We don’t know what this means either,” said one official.

 

‘America First’

The US president has lashed out at fellow NATO members in recent months for failing to support the US-Israeli war on Iran, suggesting Washington could withdraw from the military alliance as a result.

State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott said Rubio would discuss the need for NATO allies to increase defence spending and shoulder greater responsibility at Friday’s meeting of NATO foreign ministers.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who has worked hard in recent months to attempt to soothe the US president’s displeasure with his alliance peers, welcomed Trump’s deployment to Poland and cautioned that Europe must become less reliant on the US.

Rubio said before meeting his NATO counterparts in Sweden: “Like any alliance, it ⁠has to be good ⁠for everyone who’s involved. There has to be a clear ⁠understanding of what the expectations are.” ⁠

He also suggested, however, that the meeting is likely to prove less than comfortable.

“The president’s views, frankly disappointment, at some of our NATO allies and their response to our operations in the Middle East – they’re well documented – that will have to be addressed,” he insisted, before adding “that won’t be solved or addressed today”.

While Rubio meets with NATO counterparts, senior Pentagon officials will brief partners at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels about Washington’s commitment to European defence.

On Tuesday, the Pentagon announced it plans to reduce the number of combat brigades based in Europe from four to three.

Many of Washington’s allies in Europe remain frustrated with Trump’s handling of the war with Iran, which has damaged their economies and prompted some European leaders to question the reliability of the US.

European NATO countries also remain concerned about Trump’s threats to annex Greenland, which is an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, a NATO ally.

It remains unclear whether the deployment to Poland announced on Thursday includes the same soldiers as those the Pentagon said would no longer be deployed to the Central European country, or if they will include redeployments from Germany.

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