debt

The Financial Times turned heads when it got the scoop that the Venezuelan government is to reveal a debt pile of over $240 billions in its recently announced foreign debt restructuring, well over previous estimates of around $150-200 bn. Although this was sold as a shocker, it’s actually misleading because it validates the false claim that all of Venezuela’s incurred debt (whether written in a contract registered with the SEC or a whisky-soaked napkin) has the same validity and ought to be paid or else to re-enter international finance markets and attract foreign investment. The truth is that not all debts are created equal, nor do Venezuelans have to pay for all of it. So what is the actual extent of debt Venezuela has to pay? And given the recent announcement, what are the chances of Delcy & Co. of pulling this off?

What is the actual debt?

Venezuela faces late payments and arrears for sovereign and PDVSA bonds issued in the US with ironclad legal and conflict-resolution provisions in US courts. All of this debt is easily quantifiable, as it was approved by the Venezuelan parliament, in the case of the Republic, or included in financial statements, in the case of PDVSA. This amounts to $60 bn, plus $40 bn in arrears. This debt is legally valid and backed by evidence, and has many provisions on cross-default and other legal remedies for bondholders. Its successful restructuring is necessary for the country to re-enter international financial markets. Thus, it is the one that requires urgent attention and probably more willingness to compromise. Some question the validity of the 2020 PDVSA bond, which was issued with a lien over the shares of Citgo’s holding company, but a recent ruling by a NY court established that the bond was validly issued, and it was a taste of the results that a strategy of contesting these bonds in courts (with provisions drafted by the best lawyers money can buy) will yield instead of negotiating.

Venezuela also owes $20 bn in unpaid arbitral awards for the expropriation extravaganza of the late Hugo Chávez. These unpaid arbitral awards expose the country to international litigation and seizure of assets, while not as fundamental to restore access to international finance as the bonds. Its payment is necessary to assuage international markets and foreign investors. There is also $4 bn in debt to development banks, which is very important to honor to regain market access and restore investor confidence.

All of this amounts, in a worst-case scenario, to around $200 bn. If the debt restructuring is indeed a serious endeavor, it will focus on renegotiating these amounts, particularly the bonds.

Venezuela also owes around $50 bn to suppliers and contractors of the oil industry. Settling this debt is necessary to significantly increase oil production. However, as much of this debt has not been properly audited and may include creditors involved in corruption schemes, quantifying, negotiating, and paying it will probably take more time, and the focus should be on paying the companies that the country needs to re-engage to increase oil production and recover oil infrastructure.

Venezuela also owes China around $10-20 bn under an “oil-for-loan” financing mechanism from the Chávez era. Given that China is a major global power player, it is important to honor this debt. The Chinese and chavismo had already negotiated oil shipments to service debt, and the Chinese are very well aware of the mistake this scheme was and will probably be accommodating as long as they keep getting paid.

Non-kosher debt

You are probably wondering why I do not mention Cadivi and unpaid FX claims in the total debt. The catch is that unsettled Cadivi claims are not foreign debt proper, but administrative authorizations to convert local currency into FX under a foreign exchange control regime. In past foreign exchange controls in Venezuela, case law determined that these authorizations were not enforceable debt and claimants took the loss and were never paid. This will happen again.

Venezuela also owes Russia around $6 bn. Considering the current circumstances, its restructuring and payment can wait.

Venezuela needs a bailout, which can only come from the IMF. But IMF intervention is an impossible demand right now for Delcy Rodríguez.

All of this amounts, in a worst-case scenario, to around $200 bn. If the debt restructuring is indeed a serious endeavor, it will focus on renegotiating these amounts, particularly the bonds. The Financial Times does not mention where this $40 bn difference comes from. Any debt that was not approved by Congress or was issued not following the legal procedure does not have to be included pari passu with the debt issued to Wall Street and the World Bank, and Venezuela is not obliged to pay it to borrow money again. Argentina did not have to renegotiate all of its debt to re-enter the credit market. Any other hidden debt that comes up during a restructuring can be challenged in court and the Venezuelan government can refuse to pay. We will not further mortgage our country’s future more than necessary to access international credit markets to enrich shady actors who profited from our misery and didn’t even bother to hire good lawyers for when shit hit the fan.

Can this work?

Renegotiating a sovereign debt this massive without the support of the IMF would be daunting to our brightest minds, not to mention to Delcy’s few English-speaking minions. There are huge obstacles in the way. PDVSA remains governed by a 19th-century bankruptcy regime that makes it very difficult to restructure its debt efficiently. Moreover, its bonds do not have collective action clauses, or CACs, meaning they can only be renegotiated with 100% agreement of bondholders, which, like in the case of Argentina, could lead to holdouts and years of litigation. Most of the bonds issued by the Republic do have CACs, so they would be easier to renegotiate with a haircut (reduction in their notional value).

So what is the most likely outcome? I remain skeptical about the seriousness of this whole enterprise. Without IMF support, Venezuela, with meager international reserves and a severe balance-of-payments constraint, simply cannot produce enough foreign currency for necessary imports, much less for servicing debt. This is a severe structural barrier. Venezuela needs a bailout, which can only come from the IMF.

IMF intervention is an impossible demand right now for Delcy Rodríguez. First, because it would imply fiscal austerity that would probably lead to social unrest for an already incredibly unpopular president with zero legitimacy. Additionally, the Washington Consensus has been a bête noire for chavismo since its inception, and would put her even more at odds with factions of her already fragile coalition.

Maybe there is a scenario where they will be able to negotiate some of the debt (probably in predatory terms for Venezuelans) with some liens or guarantees over oil assets. But considering the dire state of the country’s finances, the absence of the IMF from the process, the lack of any macroeconomic reforms that will enable the country to service debt again, and the “technical shortcomings” of the people running the show, even this seems unlikely.

The announcement of the debt restructuring was more of a gimmick to gain time—one of chavismo’s true gifts—by the Rodrigato to appease both the US and the naive bondholders who helped to put her in power. But, once again, there are no shortcuts to any meaningful change in the country’s economy that do not involve the now dreaded T-word: “transition.”

Television City, one of the most famous studios in the entertainment industry where generations of TV shows have been created, is expected to hit the market again as its owner grapples with debt.

It’s the latest sign of distress in Hollywood as the film and TV industry struggles from a sharp falloff in production activity across Southern California.

Television City’s owner, Hackman Capital Partners, is already in the process of selling the historic Radford Studio Center, which gave L.A.’s Studio City neighborhood its name. Hackman defaulted on a $1.1-billion mortgage in January and investment bank Goldman Sachs took over the property, which is now escrow for a sale to Netflix.

The sprawling Television City property is one of the most desirable locations in Los Angeles, sharing fences with the Original Farmers Market and the luxury Grove outdoor shopping center, each of which attracts millions of visitors every year.

If the studio at Beverly Boulevard and Fairfax Avenue where “American Idol,” “All in the Family” and scores of other shows were filmed becomes available as expected, the owners of the Grove and the Farmers Market would be among the likely contenders for the property for potential expansion of their businesses, said sources familiar with the matter who were not authorized to comment.

Grove owner Rick Caruso was among the bidders for Television City, formerly known as CBS Television City, last time it was on the market and could emerge as a possible bidder.

The highest bid when broadcaster CBS sold the studio in 2019 came from Hackman Capital Partners, an international movie studio operator and commercial property landlord that paid $750 million for the 25-acre site that is near Hollywood, Beverly Hills and and the Sunset Strip.

Hackman Capital’s plan to recoup its investment included continuing to operate Television City as a studio for rent while adding new revenue-generating features.

Last year the city approved Hackman Capital’s $1-billion plan to add 980,000 square feet of offices, sound stages, production facilities and retail space.

The original studio designed by famed Los Angeles architect William Pereira erected in 1952 has city landmark protections, but newer structures on the property do not and there are acres of surface parking that could be converted to other uses.

Both Caruso and Farmers Market owners A.F. Gilmore have sued to limit the planned expansion of the studio, calling it a “massively scaled” development that “would overwhelm, disrupt, and forever transform the community.”

The debate over the development has played out amid a serious downturn in the region’s entertainment industry, with studios shifting film and television production to Georgia, New Mexico and other out-of-state locations.

L.A.’s entertainment industry also suffered a series of blows including the COVID-19 shutdown, strikes by writers and directors in 2023 and cutbacks at studios that reduced demand for sound stages.

A group of Hackman Capital’s lenders led by Deutsche Bank filed a notice of default last month, saying they’re owed more than $357 million. Hackman Capital is still trying to renegotiate its debt.

“The studio market is evolving, and the financing environment for studio assets remains complex,” Chief Executive Michael Hackman said in a statement. “We are engaged in active discussions with our lending partners and are carefully evaluating all of the alternatives.”

A person familiar with the process but not authorized to speak about it publicly said Hackman Capital will be hard-pressed to pay its debt in light of challenges facing the industry. The notice of default is “the baby step to put Television City in play” for new buyers, the source said, “and it is in play.”

Already in play is Manhattan Beach Studios, another Hackman Capital property encumbered by a $240-million loan from Deutsche Bank that the lender is in the process of selling. A buyer could foreclose on the property and potentially change its use to advanced manufacturing such as aerospace or defense, which is in high demand in Southern California.

Brokerage Cushman & Wakefield, which is managing the sale, emphasized in marketing materials that the 22-acre site has “significant available power capacity” and “offers flexible uses” on “some of the most irreplaceable underlying land in the South Bay.”

EXPLAINER

China and Sudan signed off on a waiver of $50m as Sudan’s military-led government seeks support amid Western sanctions.

China has waived loans worth $50m that it had given to Sudan, the two countries said over the weekend. The agreement comes three years into a war between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that has shrunk the country’s economy by roughly 40 percent, according to the United Nations.

The sum is small compared with what Sudan owes overall to external governments or agencies, an amount estimated at more than $56bn before the war. But the waiver lands at a moment when Khartoum has few other international lenders extending any financial support.

China’s relationship with Sudan predates the war by decades, built on oil and infrastructure interests that survived multiple changes of government in Khartoum. But the war has narrowed Sudan’s options elsewhere, as Western governments have largely held back or imposed sanctions.

Here’s why this deal is significant for Sudan and China:

What do we know about the deal?

The signed protocol in Port Sudan cancels four interest-free loans worth 344 million yuan, about $50m, with immediate effect, according to Sudan’s official news agency, SUNA.

Sudan’s Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim welcomed the move, reportedly saying that China has continued investing in the country throughout the war while Western governments, including the United States and European Union members, have largely held back. Gibril himself was added to the US Treasury sanctions list in September 2025 for his alleged “involvement in Sudan’s brutal civil war and … connections to Iran”.

China’s charge d’affaires in Sudan, Xu Jian, reportedly said at the signing ceremony that China was ready to help rebuild what was destroyed during the war in Sudan.

What’s in it for Sudan?

Sudan’s external debt of more than $56bn before the war is expected to have ballooned since.

The $50m debt relief amounts to not even 1 percent of the total external pre-war debt. In fact, Sudan was close to a far bigger debt write-off in 2021. It was on track with the IMF and the World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative to have more than $50bn of its debt forgiven within three years. The 2021 military coup in October derailed that debt relief plan, and the process was formally suspended a year later.

Still, China’s waiver arrives at a moment of acute need for the country. The war is now in its third year. More than 1.5 million people have been killed, according to the UN, and the war has displaced about 14 million people – about a quarter of the Sudanese population. The World Health Organization says less than 14 percent of health facilities are still functioning. Jobs have vanished in many parts of the country, and the rising cost of living has made it difficult for households to survive.

The Sudanese pound has collapsed since the start of the war. It went from roughly 600 to the dollar before the war to more than 5000 to the dollar by June 2026.

What’s in it for China?

In many ways, Beijing’s decision to waive the $50m loan is in keeping with a broader approach it has taken in recent years, one that has helped cement China as Africa’s largest trading partner for 17 consecutive years.

China has provided interest-free loan forgiveness as a diplomatic gesture to multiple countries, and these decisions are recurrent announcements at Beijing’s frequent leader-level summits with African nations. This is especially true for smaller loans. Research from the Johns Hopkins China Africa Research Initiative found that China forgave at least $3.4bn of these kinds of debts across the African continent between 2000 and 2019.

By contrast, larger loans are usually commercial loans through state banks that come with interest, and waiving those is harder.

At a time when the West is largely trying to isolate Sudan’s leadership, a small loan waiver gives China outsized influence in a country that sits at the intersection of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

What have China-Sudan ties been like historically?

Oil has long served as a catalyst for their relationship. From the mid-1990s on, China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) poured billions of dollars into Sudanese oil fields and the pipelines carrying that crude oil to Port Sudan. This was a time when many Western companies were pushed out due to sanctions.

The relationship changed when the southern part of the country voted in favour of independence in 2011. The world’s newest country, South Sudan, left the north and took most of the country’s oil fields with it.

Chinese investment largely dried up afterwards, but Sudan still has more than $5bn of outstanding debt to China. The war has aggravated Sudan’s economic challenges. The CNPC requested a formal exit from Sudan in December 2025.

Eleven UK travel firms have collapsed into liquidation since 2025, leaving customers seeking refunds after flights and holidays were cancelled and staff made redundant, amid wider uncertainty in the travel industry.

Eleven travel companies have collapsed into liquidation over recent months as the travel industry has been battered by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.

The closures since the start of the year have triggered flight chaos and left staff facing redundancy as a result.

In a number of cases, holidays have been cancelled outright, leaving customers scrambling for refunds or compensation.

In Oxfordshire, coach and passenger land transport firm Oxfordshire Travel Limited, based near Kidlington, went into liquidation in October 2025.

The company had traded for a decade before liquidators were brought in, after it was determined the business was no longer able to continue operating or settle its debts.

Set Sail Cruises Ltd, also based in Oxfordshire, was dissolved on March 17, 2026, with all planned sailings cancelled as a consequence.

The agency was just two years old, having been incorporated on February 4, 2024.

In the same county, The Padel Travel Club Limited also shut its doors with approximately £41k in short-term debts — any trips that had yet to depart were subsequently cancelled.

The business was incorporated in February 2023 and has since been struck off the Companies House register following a voluntary strike-off.

Documents suggest the company folded with short-term debts of just over £40,000 and insufficient assets to repay creditors in full, though a final liquidation statement has yet to be made available. Several other travel firms have also felt the full force of the struggling industry.

London-based Regen Central Ltd, an ATOL-licensed travel agency selling flight-and-hotel packages to Europe and Southeast Asia, lost its ATOL on January 13.

Following this, the company fell into liquidation and cancelled all bookings.

Another travel firm, Simply Florida Travel Ltd, based in Glasgow and well-known for selling “dream holidays” including trips to Disney World, was stripped of its ATOL holder status after dissolving in early January.

Holidaymakers were left chasing refunds as all packages and flights were subsequently cancelled.

Gold Crest Holidays, a coach-tour operator running trips across the UK and abroad, also collapsed and ceased trading in early 2026.

Following the liquidation, all members of staff were made redundant.

Numerous other travel companies have also stopped trading or dissolved since 2025. These include Asiara UK Ltd, Jetline Travel Ltd, Great Little Escapes LLP and New Era Travel.

Most recently, Strachan Travel Ltd, a Lancashire-based firm incorporated in 1983, entered voluntary liquidation.

Resolutions to wind up the company were recorded on June 11, with liquidators appointed on June 16, according to The Gazette.

The collapse of these firms comes amid a period of widespread uncertainty in the travel sector, following warnings issued by the Government and airlines in response to the conflict in the Middle East.

However, with a peace agreement now signed and several travel restrictions lifted, there is renewed hope for the industry.

A BBC expert has warned more than 270,000 people in England, Wales and Northern Ireland

More than 270,000 people across England, Wales, and Northern Ireland have received letters through the post, according to a BBC expert – and those who ignore them could find themselves facing court action. Viewers of BBC Morning Live were recently warned about the thousands of letters connected to county court judgements that have been dispatched over the past 12 months.

Expert Laura Pomfret explained to viewers that a County Court Judgement (CCJ) is essentially a court order issued in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland when someone fails to repay a debt and the creditor pursues enforcement action. She noted it could come from a council, company, landlord or a private individual – and if left unpaid, it can appear on the person’s credit report.

She said: “I think that’s what a lot of people resonate with that they’ve heard of CCJs can be bad for your credit. They stay on your credit report for six years. It can impact you getting a mortgage, even getting um a rental property. Sometimes credit checks are done, even when getting a mobile phone contract.

“It’s definitely something to avoid if someone can avoid it, and worryingly, in the first quarter of this year, over 270,000 new CCJs were registered, and that’s 17.5% up on last year. So this is obviously showing that people are struggling and in the energy industry is something that you know it’s it’s getting bigger and bigger.” She explained that these are frequently issued to those falling behind on energy bills — with the latest Ofgem figures revealing debt standing at £4.5 billion — while Energy UK puts the figure even higher at £5.5 billion.

She added: “That’s like such a big bill that lots of people are pay and people pay every month clearly struggling with it. And interestingly as well, credit card transactions in February were up 6% versus last February whereas debit transactions were only up 1%. And that also shows, you know, that people are having to rely on credit for even the most basic of bills.”

Ms Pomfret noted that receiving a CCJ typically follows a series of threatening letters, meaning the householder will already be feeling anxious. She said: “Firstly, it is upsetting to receive a formal document like that. If you get that through the post, it’s got a court seal on it it’s very formal. It might have followed you, you know, debt demand letters with red writing all over, which is overwhelming.”

“Firstly don’t be overwhelmed is easy to say but don’t be alarmed like it’s just a formal process it’s essentially a document asking you asking you for money and so it if it comes through the post you it will tell you what you owe it’ll tell you how to pay it and it will also tell you the deadline by which to pay so you have a few options when you receive a CCJ.” She explained that the first option was to repay the debt – and if someone does so within a month, it could be removed from their credit file. She said: “After that, it stays on your report, but it says that you paid it. So, please make sure you prioritise paying it.”

It’s also possible to vary the terms of a CCJ, she noted, which involves approaching the court to attempt to alter the conditions of the judgement. “Another thing that you may be able to do is apply for what’s called breathing space. So this is formerly called in England and Wales the debt respite scheme. “What this does is it gives you space from creditors, including the CCJ, and maybe gives you time to make a plan to pay it back or speak to a debt advisor, which is super helpful. The last thing that you may be able to do is you may actually be able to get the judgment or CCJ set aside. or recalled if you believed um that it’s an error.””

She stressed that there would need to be a legitimate reason to apply for it to be set aside, including submitting evidence, primarily that the individual doesn’t owe the money or that it’s a mistake. She added: “Another reason is that you didn’t receive the original claim form. So before a CCJ is issued or a decree is issued, you will get a claim form put forward and there’s an opportunity to respond.

“So you could have, for example, the wrong address, it could have been sent somewhere else. You may not have received it. Now, the court’s not going to take kindly to just saying, ‘I didn’t receive it.’ It’s kind of like the dog ate my homework sometimes for some people, but you may genuinely not have done. So that could be an option. Ultimately, you’re going to need evidence, you’re going to have to fill in the correct forms. You may have to pay fees to get it set aside, but you know, in the long run, it may be worth doing tha if you don’t want it to damage your credit.”

To find the steps and court forms involved in asking a court to vary the terms of a CCJ or decree, such as requesting to pay in instalments, or even how to get a judgment cancelled, you can click on the links below.

For England, Wales and Northern Ireland you can click here.

For Scotland you can click here., external

There temporary protection from your creditors while you get debt advice and make a plan.

In England and Wales this is called Breathing Space, and you can find information on that by clicking here., external

In Scotland this is called a moratorium, and you can find more information on that here.

One of the memorable moments of Venezuela’s crazy January ‘26 was ExxonMobil Chairman Darren Woods sitting across from President Trump, telling him Venezuela was “uninvestable.” His company is owed billions from Chávez-era expropriations, spent years in arbitration tribunals, and had watched its assets nationalised without fair compensation. Four months later, ExxonMobil’s technical teams were on the ground in Venezuela, evaluating assets including the Cerro Negro project. Woods was telling investors he felt positive about the opportunities.

The arc from expropriated creditor to ¿partner? is not happening by accident. In April 2026, the IMF and World Bank resumed dealings with Venezuela for the first time since 2019, opening the path to a formal economic assessment and potentially unlocking $4.9 billion in frozen special drawing rights. In May, the Delcy administration announced a “comprehensive restructuring of its sovereign debt” and PDVSA obligations, appointing Centerview Partners as financial adviser and pledging a macroeconomic framework by June. This did not include a request for a macroeconomic programme established by the Fund, which distanced itself from Venezuela’s announcement shortly after. According to Reuters, Venezuela’s total liabilities could be above $150 billion.

On June 2, Venezuela added Hogan Lovells as legal counsel for the restructuring under a dual mandate that also covers strategic lobbying for the Venezuelan embassy in Washington. The account is led by Norm Coleman, a former Republican senator with deep political connections in the capital. Neither selection has been free of political entanglement. Former Trump official Mauricio Claver-Carone, earmarked by The Washington Post as Venezuela’s unofficial viceroy, has vouched for Centerview. His business partner, Jessica Bedoya, was on the same chartered flight to Caracas as two Centerview executives on February 12, weeks before the firm finalized its contract (Centerview denied Bedoya played any role in their assignment).

Some of the companies that spent a decade winning arbitration awards against Venezuela may now be considering turning those claims into something more useful: an operating agreement, a new oil deal. Whether the game is actually changing, and the extent to which Delcy’s technical cadres can manage the process her government is trying to kickstart, are two of the huge questions for Venezuela’s “transition” observers.

Without the IMF as an anchor, the most aggressive litigants will extract preferential recoveries while others are left with worthless paper.

The shape of how Venezuela got here is also visible in a Delaware courthouse. In December, a judge signed the order transferring Citgo to Amber Energy, an affiliate of Wall Street hedge fund Elliott Management, for 5.9 billion dollars. The gavel came down, but the sale did not close. CITGO is now in legal and political limbo.

The transaction requires approval from OFAC, which has repeatedly extended the freeze on CITGO-related transactions. The State Department is now the main barrier blocking the sale, while Treasury, Commerce, and Energy favour letting it proceed. Ten days ago, OFAC issued General License 5W, extending the freeze on CITGO share transfers to June 19. A World Bank delegation visited Caracas last month. Everything suggests Delcy Rodríguez now feels compelled to show she can find a way to pay them back. That she has a plan.

In the meantime, Amber Energy is pressing daily for access to CITGO’s financial and operational details even though it is not formally in control, while CITGO itself cannot make major investment decisions or hire key personnel. A company valued at $13 billion is being run in slow motion, waiting for Washington to decide what Venezuela’s most valuable foreign asset is actually worth, to whom, and under what terms.

None of this happened overnight. The process was set in motion by Hugo Chávez when he went on a nationalisation spree that expropriated the assets of ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Crystallex, and dozens of other foreign companies across the oil, mining, and manufacturing sectors. Those companies didn’t go home quietly. They went to arbitration. And they won.

The restructuring announcement tries to change the terms of the conversation. Venezuela is no longer being asked whether it will engage with its creditors. It has begun doing so. Centerview Partners is on the ground. A macroeconomic framework is due soon. The creditor committee, which includes GMO, Greylock Capital, Fidelity, and T. Rowe Price has been ready to negotiate since January.

ConocoPhillips has been explicit: recovering the billions owed from past expropriations takes priority over any new drilling.

An IMF programme, if it materialises, could signal credibility. It would serve as the anchor for the entire restructuring process. IMF conditionality establishes a debt sustainability framework that defines how much Venezuela can actually pay, which in turn defines what creditors can realistically expect. It also catalyses coordination. Rather than pursuing individual enforcement actions against Venezuelan assets, creditors have an incentive to wait for an orderly process. Without that anchor, the most aggressive litigants will extract preferential recoveries while others are left with worthless paper.

Delcy Rodríguez announced the restructuring without first securing that anchor. She has stated there are “no plans” to contract an IMF loan. The IMF, for its part, says it is willing to support a programme but requires clarity on economic data and external debt that Caracas has not yet provided. Very soon, we will find out whether Venezuela is building toward an IMF-anchored process or trying to engineer one without it.

Several of the companies owed the largest arbitration awards are well positioned to operate Venezuelan assets: ExxonMobil at Cerro Negro, ConocoPhillips at its former Petrozuata and Hamaca projects. ConocoPhillips has been explicit: recovering the billions owed from past expropriations takes priority over any new drilling. A negotiated settlement that converts arbitration claims into operational stakes, with revenue streams tied to production, would give creditors a return and Venezuela a rebuilt industry. The OFAC licensing architecture already enables this. Since January 2026, OFAC has issued or updated more than eight general licenses expanding authorised activity in Venezuela’s energy and financial sectors. Washington has built the tools, such as General License 58. The question is whether Venezuela can use them. 

What this push does not resolve is the harder question: whether Venezuela has the institutional capacity to negotiate on its own terms rather than simply accept whatever is offered. Woods’s shift from “uninvestable” to “positive” in four months signals appetite, not commitment. ExxonMobil wants its assets back or a return on its claims. So does ConocoPhillips. So does every creditor in the queue. The question is whether Venezuela can show up to this negotiation as a party with a strategy, not just a debtor with a problem.

The path forward requires exactly what fifteen years of chavismo didn’t build: legal capacity, a coherent negotiating strategy, and the institutional infrastructure to distinguish between claims that should be settled, claims that should be contested, and claims that might be converted into something more useful than a judgment. The latter could amount to an oil agreement like the one Chevron got in the early 2020s. Venezuela’s reformed Hydrocarbons Law allows international arbitration to resolve disputes in the oil and gas sector. So does the new Mining Law for gold and strategic minerals.

The framework now exists in writing. Whether Venezuela can implement it coherently, and whether it can hold up against the inevitable tension between Venezuelan law as established in the new statutes and US jurisdiction as required by OFAC licenses, are the open questions that will determine whether this moment becomes the start of something durable or another lost opportunity.

None of that sounds like glamorous policymaking. It doesn’t play well in a speech. But the alternative, continuing to treat international arbitration as someone else’s problem, has a documented price tag. It is measured in refineries.

Caracas, June 1, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – A Venezuelan delegation representing the acting Delcy Rodríguez administration held talks with the International Monetary Fund leadership on Saturday in Washington, DC.

The Venezuelan team was led by Economy Vice President Calixto Ortega alongside Central Bank (BCV) President Luis Pérez and other finance officials. In a statement, Caracas called the meeting “productive,” focused on “technical assistance mechanisms” and the Caribbean nation’s efforts to “recover funds” to boost economic recovery.

“With these kinds of meetings, Venezuela ratifies its disposition for dialogue and international cooperation, with independence and self-determination,” the communiqué read. Venezuelan authorities emphasized the country’s “new stage of stability and growth” alongside a commitment to “reestablish ties with multilateral organizations.”

For her part, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva also classified the meeting as “productive” and reiterated the US-based institution’s disposition to “support efforts to strengthen macroeconomic stability.”

Venezuela reestablished ties with the IMF and the World Bank in April after a seven-year hiatus. The move followed the Trump administration’s recognition of Rodríguez as the South American country’s “sole leader” as part of a fast-tracked diplomatic rapprochement between Washington and Caracas.

The acting president hosted a World Bank delegation on May 15 and emphasized “technical cooperation” prospects.

Though Venezuela has been a member of the IMF and the World Bank since 1946, former President Hugo Chávez effectively disengaged from both bodies in the 2000s, labeling them “instruments of US imperialism” and seeking to create Global South integration and lending alternatives.

The Rodríguez government’s IMF meeting came amid announced plans to execute a “comprehensive and orderly” restructuring of the country’s foreign debt, estimated to be as high as US $170 billion.

Caracas’ liabilities stem from a combination of defaulted bonds and loans, international arbitration awards, and accrued interest. Venezuela began to default on its debts in 2017 as US sanctions heavily aggravated the Caribbean nation’s economic crisis and blocked payments. The restructuring process may be one of the largest in history, surpassing Russia (1998) and Argentina (2001).

The acting Rodríguez government is scheduled to present its macroeconomic framework and public debt sustainability analysis to the international finance community this month. The Trump administration issued a license allowing Venezuela to contract financial and advisory services, but direct negotiations with creditors remain prohibited.

The Venezuelan executive hired Centerview Partners as financial advisor for the debt restructuring process. According to Reuters, the decision was taken without a thorough selection process and on the recommendation of Mauricio Claver-Carone, a former Trump administration official and close associate of Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Multiple reports in recent days have documented Claver-Carone’s role as a “gatekeeper” for businesses interested in investing in Venezuela as well as a conduit between Rodríguez and the Trump White House.

Venezuelan bonds have risen significantly in recent months as investors expect a windfall after purchasing the defaulted bonds at highly depreciated levels.

Venezuelan authorities have stated that there are “no plans” to take on IMF loans, instead prioritizing access to around $5 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) to address infrastructure and public services needs. The IMF issued the SDRs to help countries deal with a liquidity crunch during the Covid-19 pandemic, but its non-recognition of the Nicolás Maduro government barred Venezuela from accessing its share.

For her part, Georgieva has previously stated that Venezuela “desperately needs help” and that the fund would support a loan program, but that prior steps, including clarity on macroeconomic data, are necessary.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Maduro, the Trump administration has extracted significant concessions from the Venezuelan government, including pro-business oil and mining reforms, lucrative deals for Western corporations, and external auditing of the Central Bank. The White House has also seized control of Venezuela’s oil export revenues.

Acting President Rodríguez has additionally installed a commission to evaluate the “strategic” value of Venezuelan state assets and possible privatizations. Plans to reform the country’s tax, labor, and pension laws are likewise underway.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

Optimism has been the name of the game since Operation Absolute Resolve took Maduro out. Such optimism doesn’t just come from Venezuelans, where polls showed support for the intervention, but also from the investment community, which has flocked into the country to assess all kinds of opportunities. Since then, oil revenues have increased, driven not just by output increments but also by favourable price tailwinds and sanctions relief, which meant the reintroduction of Venezuelan crude into the global market. Today, Venezuela is the second largest source of imported crude in the United States, something unthinkable five months ago.

The petro dollars haven’t come in by themselves. A mechanism was designed so American officials could control how and where those funds would be deployed in order to avoid the disappearance of half of all oil revenues, as was the case under the previous administration. Additionally, licenses were granted to the BCV, new laws were passed for the hydrocarbon and mining sectors, with new MoUs being signed with international energy companies. Even macroeconomic data sets have been released for the first time in over a decade. So much appears to have changed that even multilaterals (chiefly the IMF) reemerged as crucial partners for a potential debt restructuring and stabilization program. Optimism is granted and the illusion of recovery does not come without merit, given the changes the country has experienced in less than five months.

However, that mirage breaks against the harsh reality on the ground and macroeconomic indicators that tell a different story. A year-to-date inflation of 90%, a 70% depreciation of the official exchange rate, and a widening gap between multiple dollar rates that continues to punish businesses and individuals alike. Meanwhile, the Bolívar printing press is working overtime while BCV reserves remain flat, deepening macroeconomic uncertainty and destroying what little credibility the institution still retained.

The almighty bond market will need far more than an Instagram post to bite the bait. Sovereign creditors respond to numbers, rules, and enforceability. Venezuela remains deeply deficient on those fronts.

None of this reflects an economy that is stabilizing, despite the interim authorities having a golden opportunity to do so. Instead, it reflects a government trying to politically manage deterioration without implementing the reforms necessary to stop it. 

The current model is not designed to solve the crisis but to preserve political control while generating just enough liquidity, oil revenue, and international flexibility to postpone its inevitable collapse. The interim authorities continue to rely on the same mechanisms that created the disaster in the first place with an unsustainable monetary expansion, exchange-rate distortions, opaque fiscal management, and complete control over all institutions. So while oil revenues and external prospects may have improved, the underlying structure of the economy remains unchanged. 

Refusing to address the obvious

A country benefiting from stronger revenues should be rebuilding reserve buffers and restoring institutional confidence, and prioritizing the reconstruction of the essential services. Instead, every dollar is consumed by a State that remains just too large, too inefficient, and politically unwilling to reform. The central bank continues injecting Bolívares into an economy where there is effectively no confidence that the currency can preserve value over time, nor in the institutional capacity to sustain credible long-term policy.

This lack of confidence is central to understanding our persistent inflation problem. It is not solely driven by the irresponsible monetary expansion but by high money velocity resulting from the complete lack of credibility in our currency. As soon as businesses and individuals receive Bolívars, they rush to buy dollars, inventory, or any asset capable of preserving value, accelerating velocity and pushing inflation into a spiral. This is not speculation; it is rational economic behavior in response to the collapse of trust in the Bolívar. Without restoring that confidence, inflation will remain entrenched.

The foreign exchange market remains one of the clearest indicators of the country’s fragility. As the gap between the official and parallel rate distort prices throughout the economy. The widening gap between the official and parallel exchange rates distorts prices across the economy, leaving businesses struggling to establish stable cost structures or expansion plans. International investors also face enormous uncertainty regarding how those multiple rates affect their ability to move capital in and out of the country. Meanwhile, the BCV continues wasting precious dollar inflows trying to defend an artificial exchange rate that is fundamentally unsustainable. 

Without institutional legitimacy, no restructuring effort or investment cycle will prove durable or beneficial for the country.

Addressing these distortions may still be too politically costly for Rodriguez. Closing the gap would require a fiscal discipline alien to chavismo, while also dismantling one of the most important corruption mechanisms for rewarding insiders. 

The solution appears straightforward: transition toward a system in which dollar-auction pricing is transparent and the USD is allowed to float. Furthermore, the government should let the dollars circulate freely, letting businesses and individuals use the greenback for both transactions and contract setting. While alleviating the economic distortions, this will also contribute to slowing the velocity, and keeping inflation under control. Venezuela should pursue this approach while keeping the Bolívar alive so it can gradually recover credibility through discipline and a coherent fiscal and monetary framework. 

Yet the changes necessary to stabilize the economy are the same changes that would reduce the government’s discretionary control over the economy. As previously argued, setting an independent board in the likes of Petroleos de Venezuela or the Venezuelan Central Bank would threaten the political hegemony of the interim authorities across all institutions.

What sound debt restructuring implies

The next collision with reality, where fundamental flaws will be hard to conceal, lies in the newly announced debt restructuring process. Interim authorities are about to face the almighty bond market which will need far more than an Instagram post to bite the bait. Sovereign creditors respond to numbers, rules, and enforceability. And on those fronts, Venezuela remains deeply deficient.

Venezuela’s total debt is estimated at $200 billion or about 200% of GDP. Despite Venezuela receiving a license to be able to hire Centerview, one of the most prestigious boutique firms in the market, any meaningful and fair progress would be impossible without a coherent macroeconomic plan bound by institutional legitimacy and backed by multilateral oversight, particularly from the IMF.

For Venezuela to avoid setting itself up for failure through a restructuring process that could hinder its financial capacity to grow sustainably, the Fund becomes an indispensable partner. The IMF would need to conduct an assessment of the country’s current financial stance via an Article IV consultation that hasn’t been conducted since Chavez withdrew from the organization. This assessment would be a key piece in understanding Venezuela’s repayment capacity and debt sustainability, setting the base from where to negotiate towards an agreeable debt haircut, tenor, and coupon.

Nothing will come out of the great opportunity created by the January events if there is no fundamental change over the who and hows of economic management.

An IMF-backed restructuring would eventually demand fiscal transparency, monetary discipline, reserve accumulation, independent oversight, and credible institutional reforms. Additionally, creditors will call for legal certainty and enforceable agreements that provide confidence that rules will not arbitrarily change once capital enters the country, or years later when investors seek to exit . To provide such guarantees, Venezuela would need a legitimate political and legal framework capable of signing long-term agreements recognized both domestically and internationally 

Without institutional legitimacy, no restructuring effort or investment cycle will prove durable or beneficial for the country. Proceeding without these elements would leave the country exposed to holdout creditors and future arbitration battles. The cornerstone for avoiding that is a credible electoral timeline that renews and legitimizes the National Assembly and executive power.

Yet that process is also set to collide with the interim authorities’ apparent intention to manipulate political timing in their favor. The current leadership wants the benefits of the stability phase brought in by oil revenue, sanctions relief, and fresh capital without surrendering the mechanisms of control that produced the crisis in the first place.

That formula is destined to fail. The authorities are neither serious enough nor committed to making the necessary reforms. In the meantime, we can keep going over the distortion caused by the exchange rate, what new law is being proposed or the deceiving debt announcement from last week. But nothing will come out of the great opportunity created by the January events if there is no fundamental change over the who and hows of economic management.