cold

The North Sea wind is buffeting my body and face, shaking me awake after a six-hour journey from Copenhagen on buses and trains to this rugged stretch of the Danish coast. From my high vantage point on the grassy dunes, overlooking what feels like an endless sea, there is hardly another soul to be seen, save for the specks of a few surfers who are trying their luck on the crashing waves.

Surfers, windsurfers and paddleboarders flock to this stretch of north-west Jutland, which is playfully known as “Cold Hawaii”. The phrase was coined in the 1990s by the international surfing community, and popularised by world champion windsurfer Josh Stone, to describe this laid-back shoreline and its 31 official surf spots running for around 30 miles (50km) from a little north of the industrial harbour of Hanstholm down to the sandy beaches of Agger.

On the 80th anniversary of the first flight of the de Havilland Canada Chipmunk basic trainer, an aircraft that generations of British and other military pilots learned to fly on, it’s worth recalling perhaps the most unusual episode of its career. Between 1956 and 1990, a handful of these propeller-driven trainers kept watch on Warsaw Pact forces in the divided and heavily fortified city of Berlin — a front line of the Cold War.

One of the two Chipmunks flown last week by the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight is WG486 — formerly attached to the RAF Gatow Station Flight for intelligence-gathering flights over Berlin:

At the end of World War II, defeated Germany was left divided between the Allied powers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The division of the country also extended to the former capital, Berlin, which was left deep within the Soviet occupation zone. Under the quadripartite agreement, the Western Allies retained the right of access to Berlin, using land and air corridors running into the Western-occupied zones of Germany.

The quadripartite agreement also included provisions for the Allied powers to maintain ‘liaison missions.’ Formally, these were supposed to ensure communications between the Western Allies and the Soviets. In practice, they soon became a critical way of gathering intelligence, especially since the Western missions were permitted to move, relatively unimpeded, in the Soviet zone, which would later become East Germany. The same applied to the Soviets in the West. For the British, the liaison mission was known as the British Mission to Soviet Forces in Germany (BRIXMIS), and it was based in Potsdam, just outside Berlin.

Meet The Real Cold War Spies Of BRIXMIS • FULL DOCUMENTARY | Forces TV

The agreement also ensured access to West Berlin for the Western Allies, flying through three air corridors in and out of the city. Each of the Western Allies had an airport in the city, with the British using RAF Tegel. These corridors were full of transport activity during the Berlin Airlift of 1948-49, when the Soviets attempted to cut off the Western sectors of the city by blockade. Outside the corridors, Western Allied military aircraft could also fly over the Soviet Zone of Berlin, although this was something Moscow was never happy about.

By the mid-1950s, relations between East and West were becoming more tense, and this airspace access began to be exploited for intelligence-gathering.

After the Berlin Airlift, the Western Allies were prohibited from flying combat aircraft in the corridors. Transport and training types, like the Chipmunk, were excluded from this rule, and in late 1956, the British launched the top-secret Operation Schooner (later renamed Operation Nylon), under which the trainers would conduct spy flights within the roughly 1,200-square-mile Berlin Control Zone.

Flying out of Gatow, the Chipmunk flights were officially for continuation training, which provided the required cover story. Actual training flights were also regularly conducted, also to preserve the cover.

From the mid-1950s onward, East Germany rapidly became the focal point for Soviet military expansion in Europe, and the British and other Western Allies had a growing need for precise intelligence on Soviet basing, equipment, tactics — anything, in fact, that provided a better understanding of the adversary and potential warning of an attack.

The U.K. Prime Minister’s office individually approved the Chipmunk flights from RAF Gatow. Two or three sorties were typically scheduled for each week. These were flown under visual flight rules (VFR) — so only in good weather — and not above 1,500 feet. The quadripartite Berlin Air Safety Center, which ensured the security of flights in the Control Zone, was notified in advance, and each flight was planned to last around three hours.

The primary ‘targets’ were the numerous Soviet military installations located within the Berlin Control Zone. The Soviet controller within the Berlin Air Safety Center, not coincidentally, often stamped the flight request card with the words “Safety of Flight Not Guaranteed.”

Mission equipment, at first, was a handheld camera, operated by a BRIXMIS member in the front cockpit of the Chipmunk, with the RAF pilot sitting behind. Each sortie required careful preparation, with the crew wearing oxygen masks at all times to prevent their identification. They would climb aboard the aircraft inside a hangar, with the cameras already loaded, and the engine would be started behind closed doors. After all, Soviet ‘watchers’ were posted around Gatow, and observation towers overlooked the base.

Though the Soviets were well aware of the real nature of these flights (once, according to one BRIXMIS account, a camera lens was accidentally dropped from an open cockpit onto a busy parade ground), the quadripartite agreement provided diplomatic immunity to the Royal Air Force pilots. Nevertheless, Moscow was upset about any Western flights outside of West Berlin, and harassment of aircraft was hardly rare. At least once, a Chipmunk was damaged by groundfire from a Soviet infantryman.

The importance of Schooner/Nylon increased as the Soviets made efforts to conceal their military activity in East Germany. To try to avoid the eyes of the liaison missions, they set up more Permanent Restricted Areas (PRA) — another provision of the quadripartite agreement. Within the Berlin Control Zone, the Chipmunks had access to several major Soviet divisional HQs, including some of its best-equipped and highest-readiness forces.

The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 underscored the East-West standoff and led to the Soviets further bolstering their military presence in and around the city, including new air defense missiles and surface-to-surface sites. According to some accounts, Chipmunks were among the first assets to bring back evidence of the extent of the border closures enacted by the Soviets in August 1961.

By the end of the 1960s, one of the Gatow Chipmunks had received a permanent camera installation, and both got new radios. According to one pilot, the new camera was powerful enough to “record the maker’s name from the inside of a tank if the turret was open.”

10 April 1978, the British BRIXMIS Liaison Mission had access to two Chipmunk aircraft, which they used for photo reconnaissance over parts of East Germany, between West Berlin and the Inner German Border. In this case they’ve captured a T-64 engine being removed for maintenance. pic.twitter.com/NQTdOn7Qul

— The Tank Museum (@TankMuseum) June 5, 2023

On one occasion, a BRIXMIS member recalled being intercepted and closely followed by a Soviet Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter, which escorted the Chipmunk from the Soviet helicopter base at Oranienburg to the north of Berlin.

Right at the very edge of the Berlin Control Zone was an especially interesting ‘target,’ the Soviet airbase at Werneuchen. This was latterly home to MiG-25 Foxbat reconnaissance jets, and it also hosted periodic deployments of Soviet long-range bombers. It was also deep within a PRA, making ground access very difficult. The Chipmunks would fly close enough to photograph every aircraft on the flight line, aware that if they strayed beyond the main runway centerline, they would be outside the Berlin Control Zone and would be shot down.

Also connected to Werneuchen and even more remarkable in terms of mission equipment is the fact that at least one Chipmunk was fitted with electronic intelligence (ELINT) gear. This modification was approved by the U.K. Prime Minister in 1981 but was only revealed by aviation journalist Ben Dunnell in 2024. It is known that the ELINT equipment was used to gather information about a new Soviet battlefield radar, equipping the 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher) short-range air defense system. However, it was also used in at least one flight over Werneuchen. No other details of the results of these missions have ever been released.

The Chipmunks remained busy until the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 heralded the end of the Cold War. Immediately before German reunification, in 1990, BRIXMIS was stood down and, with it, the need for intelligence-gathering flights came to an end. At its biggest strength, the RAF Gatow Station Flight never had more than four Chipmunks assigned.

The Gatow Station Flight remained active until 1994, when the last Chipmunk departed. Gatow finally closed as an RAF station the same year.

Last week, as the Royal Air Force marked the 80th anniversary of the classic Chipmunk trainer, it is worth remembering the unique role that the aircraft played during one of the tensest periods of recent history, during which the intelligence it collected helped keep the peace between East and West.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The world today is no longer witnessing isolated geopolitical crises. From Ukraine and West Asia to Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, almost every major flashpoint bears the imprint of an expanding strategic contest between the United States and China. The emerging order increasingly resembles a “Cold War 2.0” — though very different in structure, methods and consequences from the US-Soviet rivalry of the 20th century.

Unlike the earlier Cold War1.0, the present contest is not defined by ideological blocs alone. The US and China remain deeply intertwined economically, technologically and financially even as they posture against each other militarily, diplomatically and strategically. It is therefore a paradoxical competition: adversarial coexistence under conditions of mutual dependence.

The forthcoming summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing assumes significance far beyond bilateral optics. It is not merely about tariffs or trade balances. It is about whether the world’s two largest powers can manage competition without pushing the international system into prolonged instability.

Cold War 2.0: Similarities and Differences

There are unmistakable similarities between the old Cold War and the current strategic rivalry. Technology races, military posturing, proxy theatres, sanctions, espionage, supply-chain wars and ideological narratives are again shaping global politics. Taiwan today resembles what Berlin once symbolised during the original Cold War — a potential trigger point with global implications.

Yet the differences are even more important.

The US and Soviet Union operated largely in separate economic ecosystems. In contrast, America and China remain deeply integrated through trade, manufacturing, investment flows and technological supply chains. As a result, Cold War 2.0 is less about total decoupling and more about selective disengagement, strategic denial, and competitive coexistence. China’s rise has also changed the nature of power transition; unlike the Soviet Union, China is economically embedded within the global capitalist system while simultaneously challenging Western strategic dominance. Beijing does not seek immediate overthrow of the international order; rather, it seeks gradual restructuring of global institutions and norms to reflect Chinese power and preferences.

Because of this interdependence, direct conflict is expensive for both parties. As a result, selective disengagement, strategic denial, and competitive coexistence are more important in Cold War 2.0 than total decoupling.

The nature of power transitions has also changed as a result of China’s growth. China, in contrast to the Soviet Union, both challenges Western geopolitical dominance and is economically integrated into the global capitalist system. Beijing aims to gradually restructure international institutions and norms to reflect Chinese strength and preferences rather than topple the current international order.

Trump’s Return: Strategic Pressure with Transactional Flexibility

President Trump’s return has introduced a more personalised and transactional dimension to US-China relations. His approach combines aggressive economic nationalism with pragmatic deal-making. Trump views geopolitics substantially through the prism of economic leverage, tariffs, industrial revival and negotiated advantage.

During his earlier tenure, Trump launched the trade war against China, challenged Chinese technological expansion and questioned assumptions of unlimited globalisation. In his second term his tariff rhetoric and coercive stance seems tampering down by Beijing’s stiff retaliation and domestic vows through courts; hence appears focused on “managed competition” rather than ideological confrontation.

Current indications suggest that Trump seeks three broad objectives from Beijing:

• Reduction of trade imbalances and greater market access for American companies.
• Chinese restraint regarding Iran, fentanyl precursors and strategic technology transfers.
• Taiwan and Indo-Pacific tensions should be relatively stable to prevent unchecked escalation. At the same time, Trump appears willing to negotiate tactical understandings with Beijing if they produce visible economic or political gains domestically.

This reflects an important distinction between traditional American strategic establishments and Trump’s worldview. Washington’s institutional security establishment and deep state often sees China as a long-term systemic challenger. Trump, however, also sees Beijing through the lens of bargaining opportunity. This creates unpredictability both for allies and adversaries.

Xi Jinping’s China: Strategic Patience and Controlled Assertiveness

If Trump represents transactional nationalism, Xi Jinping represents centralised strategic continuity with greater diplomatic maturity.

Beijing’s military modernisation, naval expansion, technological aspirations, and Belt and Road outreach reflect a long-term strategy aimed at reducing dependence on the West while enhancing China’s centrality in global affairs. Under Xi’s leadership, China has evolved from a cautious economic power into an increasingly assertive geopolitical actor. Beijing’s long-term objective to lessen reliance on the West and increase China’s influence in world affairs is reflected in its military modernisation, navy expansion, technological aspirations, and Belt and Road outreach.

Xi’s leadership style is marked by centralised authority, ideological discipline and strategic patience. Unlike the short electoral cycles of Western democracies, China’s leadership can pursue long-duration geopolitical objectives with consistency.

Beijing today appears more confident than during Trump’s first presidency. Despite economic headwinds, demographic pressures and property-sector challenges, China has strengthened domestic technological capabilities and diversified export networks.

China’s approach to global dominance differs fundamentally from America’s traditional model.

The United States historically exercised leadership through alliances, military presence, financial systems and institutional influence. Its dominance relied substantially on coalition-building and normative legitimacy, an approach, which seems to be eroding under President Trump, America First/America only agenda.

China’s model is more infrastructure-centric, economically transactional and state-driven. Beijing prefers influence through trade dependency, technology ecosystems, strategic investments and manufacturing centrality. It avoids formal alliances but expands leverage through economic penetration and calibrated coercion.

In essence, Washington exports political influence backed by military power to dislodge all potential competitors; Beijing exports economic dependency backed by state capacity aims at not dislodging potential markets to include U.S., EU and India.

The Taiwan Factor and Indo-Pacific Competition

No issue captures Cold War 2.0 more sharply than Taiwan.

For China, Taiwan remains a core sovereignty issue tied to national rejuvenation. For the United States, Taiwan represents strategic credibility, Island chain dominance in the Indo-Pacific and the larger balance of power against China.

Neither side currently appears to seek direct military confrontation. Yet both are steadily preparing for prolonged strategic competition around Taiwan. China continues military signalling and grey-zone pressure, while the US strengthens Indo-Pacific partnerships and defence arrangements.

Trump’s Beijing visit is therefore expected to prioritise “stability management” rather than dispute resolution. Beijing seeks assurances against perceived American encouragement of Taiwanese independence and military capacity building, while Washington seeks deterrence against coercive reunification efforts.

With recent claims of President Trump on Greenland, Canada, and Panama and actions in Venezuela, he doesn’t have any moral leverage to lecture China on Taiwan, because his security concerns over these areas are woefully short of Chinese security concerns of Island chains. Thus the reality of Cold War 2.0 is more of escalation management more than genuine reconciliation, as competition remains.

The Real Issue: Supply Chains and Technology Agendas

Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, rare earths, cyber systems, quantum technologies and critical supply chains have become strategic weapons. Economic security is increasingly inseparable from national security.

America still leads in advanced innovation ecosystems, financial influence and military alliances. China dominates large parts of manufacturing, industrial supply chains and infrastructure scalability.

The contest is therefore asymmetric. Washington seeks to slow China’s technological ascent through export controls and alliance-based restrictions. Beijing seeks self-reliance through indigenous innovation and strategic diversification.

Simultaneously, both nations are competing to shape global narratives.

The US projects democratic resilience and rules-based order. China projects efficiency, development delivery and non-interference. Many countries in the Global South increasingly engage both sides pragmatically rather than ideologically.

US-Israel War on Iran: Uneasy Calm Amid Strategic Contestation

China and the United States both need  regional stability in Middle East to avoid economic shockwaves and disruption of global energy flows, but their strategic intentions are quite apart. Trump led America’s action plan, duly influenced by Israeli lobby includes military action, coercive deterrence, and the retaining American strategic dominance in West Asia, especially Petro-dollar domination. China, on the other hand, is attempting calibrated balance, openly supporting de-escalation while covertly defending its long-term geopolitical, economic, and energy links with Tehran.

Beijing will refrain from any overt alignment that could lead to direct conflict with Washington, but it is unlikely to desert Iran. China seems confident that it can endure supply chain crisis in Strait of Hormuz longer than Trump and Iran. In any case a over-engaged US with depleted reserves works towards Chinese strategic advantage.

The larger strategic picture shows for Beijing, the crisis offers an opportunity to project itself as a responsible stabilising power while gradually expanding influence through economic leverage and diplomatic positioning; as a result, the likely outcome is not cooperation in the classical sense, but competitive crisis management—limited convergence to avoid uncontrolled escalation, while China advances through strategic patience, economic penetration, and calibrated diplomacy. Demonstrating credibility and deterrence to adversaries, such as China, is another goal for Washington in the Iran theatre.

Thus, Iran becomes yet another arena in which China gains through strategic patience, economic penetration, and calibrated diplomacy, while the US primarily depends on military power and a weakening alliance structures.

Likely Outcomes of the Trump–Xi Engagement: Competitive Coexistence, Not Resolution

Expectations from the Trump–Xi engagement must remain realistic and free from rhetorical overstatement. The structural contradictions driving US–China rivalry — Taiwan, technological dominance, supply chain control, military competition, sanctions regimes and competing visions of global order — are too deep to be resolved through summit diplomacy alone. At best, both sides may seek temporary stabilisation of tensions to avoid simultaneous economic disruption and strategic overstretch. Therefore, the likely outcome is not reconciliation, but managed confrontation under conditions of deep interdependence.

Trump’s pressure tactics may slow certain aspects of China’s technological rise and compel tactical adjustments, but they are unlikely to reverse Beijing’s long-term strategic trajectory or ambition for greater influence in global governance structures.

Equally, China is not positioned to replace the United States as a singular global hegemon, as yet. Internal economic pressures, demographic decline, debt vulnerabilities, trust deficits and the absence of robust alliance structures remain important constraints on Chinese power projection.

Consequently, the more plausible scenario is a prolonged strategic contest marked by partial economic bifurcation in critical technologies, competing digital and AI ecosystems, intensified military signalling in the Indo-Pacific, and expanded geopolitical competition across the Global South through infrastructure financing, trade dependency, arms transfers and narrative warfare.

Emerging World Order: What should remaining World Do?

Cold War 2.0 will not produce a neat bipolar world nor purely multipolar. Unlike the 20th century, today’s international system is multipolar, economically interconnected and technologically diffused. Middle powers such as India, regional blocs and strategic swing states will play increasingly important roles in shaping outcomes through strategic balancing avoiding bloc politics. The aim remains to avoid collateral damage in a competition, which neither U.S. nor China can decisively win in the foreseeable future.

The prudent course lies in strategic autonomy backed by economic resilience, technological self-reliance, diversified partnerships and flexible diplomacy. Nations will increasingly pursue sector-specific alignments while resisting pressure to become instruments of either camp’s maximalist strategic narratives.

In this evolving landscape, Trump’s coercive unilateralism and “America First” orientation may paradoxically accelerate the very multipolarity Washington seeks to resist. Many nations, including close American partners, increasingly seek strategic hedging against unpredictability in US policy, even while remaining cautious of China’s expanding influence and coercive economic practices

Cold War 2.0 is unlikely to end through a dramatic collapse or military victory. It will instead remain a long geopolitical test of endurance, adaptability, economic resilience and strategic patience in an era of competitive coexistence, issue based cooperation and crisis management below the threshold of military confrontation.

Trump’s leadership may make the contest louder, sharper and more transactional, while Xi’s China may continue pursuing calibrated expansion with long-term strategic discipline. Yet the underlying structural reality remains unchanged: the US–China rivalry is here to stay, and the rest of the world must learn to navigate carefully between pressure and prudence, rhetoric and reality, competition and coexistence.

The Wende Museum of the Cold War announced on Saturday that it plans to build a $16-million expansion in Hawthorne.

The Culver City museum has purchased a historically significant midcentury modern building in Hawthorne, which it plans to transform into a research institute and interactive storage facility for its collections — a “living archive,” as it’s calling the facility.

The Wende plans to debut the space in spring 2028.

“In the museum world, there’s typically public space and storage space — meaning dead storage,” Wende founder and Executive Director Justin Jampol said in an interview. “And this living archive is a hybrid that combines both. It houses the collections and makes them accessible for discovery.”

The 24,000-square-foot building was erected in 1965 by shopping mall pioneer and developer Ernest Hahn to serve as his corporate headquarters. It was designed by movie theater architect George Nowak, who also designed the Writers Guild Theater.

The Wende plans to renovate the building, adding a 7,000-square-foot extension, with flexibility to further expand in the future. The facility will include state-of-the-art, climate-controlled storage for the museum’s more than 250,000-object collection of paintings, sculptures, photographs, tapestries and Cold War-era ephemera from the Soviet Union, East Bloc, China and other countries.

Interactivity, however, is the goal: so there will be spaces for “respite and inspiration,” Jampol said, such as a “scholar’s garden,” reading rooms and a library with a community learning lab and free coffee for visitors.

“The idea is to make it as engaging and comfortable as possible,” Jampol said. “Most archives are places that are very uncomfortable and uninspiring — think fluorescent lights blinking in a basement. The idea here is to open this up in a way that makes people want to be here. And focus on the content and not the space itself. We’re trying to create an experience that makes visitors want to go on an adventure.”

The Glorya Kaufman Community Center at the Wende Museum debuted this past fall.

(Stella Kalinina / For The Times)

The Wende’s Collections Department will be headquartered in the new building. The facility will also house a conservation center for endangered objects and paper archives, and will feature a digitization and imaging lab that will make the collections available online, free of charge.

It will also include reading rooms and research offices for up to 100 visiting scholars or artist fellows annually.

“The collections, instead of being hidden in a box, will be on full view,” Jampol said. “When you walk through, you won’t see boxes. You’ll see vases, tapestries, ceramics and more.”

Construction on the building, at 2311 W. El Segundo Blvd., starts May 15. Funds for the project came from the Arcadia Fund, the Kaufman Foundation and the Ralph M. Parsons Foundation, among other capital supporters.

The Wende Museum in Culver City opened its doors in 2017 inside a former 1949 atomic bomb shelter. It now draws about 25,000 visitors annually, who come to take in four exhibitions and more than 60 public programs. Admission is free.

Rapid expansion has been a hallmark of the Wende of late.

In September, it debuted a $17-million culture and wellness center offering free yoga, meditation, sound baths and therapy. The 7,500-square-foot facility was made possible with funding from the late philanthropist Glorya Kaufman who died a month before the building opened to the public. It’s called the Glorya Kaufman Community Center.

The Wende’s Glorya Kaufman Community Center includes a century old A-frame theater, an old MGM prop house, for free culture and wellness events.

(Stella Kalinina / For The Times)

In February, the Wende bought a three-bedroom house built in the 1940s adjacent to the museum’s campus that will be used as a live-work space for photographers in residence. It will include a community space for photography workshops and a post-production studio. The Nikita Foundation and the Victor Family Foundation provided funding.

It debuted a tiny home on its campus last fall, nicknamed “The Stevie” after donor Steve Markoff. It’s used for cross-disciplinary artist residencies.

A facility for interactive museum storage and research is not a new concept in Los Angeles.

The Autry Museum of the American West — after merging with the Southwest Museum of the American Indian in 2003 and since stewarding its collection of Indigenous art and artifacts — debuted a $32-million, 100,000-square-foot facility in Burbank in October 2022.

The so-called “Resources Center” was built to house, conserve and care for both museums’ collections in a state-of-the-art, climate-controlled and fire-safe environment. It also serves as a research destination for scholars, artists, tribal representatives and others to study the collections.

Jampol said that the project will enable the Wende to serve a wider swath of visitors, from specialists to the general public, and to venture outside of Culver City to engage other communities.

“It’s about making the collections both safe and accessible,” he said. “We looked to the Autry for inspiration alongside the V&A East in London — they both invite people in from the community, alongside scholars, to explore the collections. It’s the democratization of art — I love the ethos and spirit of that.”

It’s hard to believe, as Matt Damon noted in his monologue in this week’s “Saturday Night Live,” that the actor of this summer’s “The Odyssey” has only guest hosted three times during his lengthy career. (In case you’re wondering, his frequent writing and acting partner Ben Affleck has hosted five times.)

That’s a shame because Damon checks all the boxes for what an A-list actor should do when they host the show: be super present, take every opportunity to do the silliest sketches without seeming uncomfortable, and bring at least some of their acting chops to bear to give otherwise lightweight sketches a little extra gravitas or emotion.

Damon did all that and helped start the show off with an extra jolt of energy by returning as Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh in the cold open, along with last week’s ringer, Aziz Ansari as FBI Director Kash Patel.

Not every sketch worked, like an early Godzilla parody set in a command center that was simply a series of increasingly anticipated spit takes on poor Mikey Day. Things improved when Damon played himself in a pre-taped sketch about a movie made just for moms ahead of Mother’s Day; mom’s fantasy? No conflict among the kids and a blissful marriage to Matt Damon.

Damon also played one of a trio of middle-aged men (including Marcello Hernández and Kenan Thompson) constantly getting beat up by “tough guys” who are sometimes just children. He also played a frustrated dad in a strange cat litter commercial, a substitute teacher trying to get a classroom of students to dance (unsuccessfully) and, memorably, an auctioneer in a fight with his auctioneer wife (Sarah Sherman). In these sketches in particular, Damon’s acting skills helped elevate the characters he played, grounding them in sadness or frustration. It definitely helped.

The “Odyssey” might turn out to be the summer’s biggest movie hit. If that’s the case, let’s hope Matt Damon isn’t kept from hosting “SNL” for so long after this week’s solid job.

Musical guest Noah Kahan performed “The Great Divide” and “Doors.”

At Martin’s Tavern in Washington, D.C., Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (Colin Jost) returned yet again to shout-bark at those around him, brag about the Iran War he claims he started and, of course, talk about drinking alcohol. But this time, he was joined by his apparent drinking buddy Kavanaugh, who held a gavel and immediately ordered a “six-three decision” (six beers, three shots of Jameson whiskey). Glowing in their victories, Hegseth bellowed, “Can you believe I just started a war?” Kavanaugh replied, “Can you believe I ended abortion? Your body, my choice!” Kavanaugh went on to show off what at first looked like a dinosaur-shaped district map for Tennessee before revealing it’s his field sobriety test, when he was asked to draw a circle. Kavanaugh bemoaned the male loneliness crisis just before they were joined by Patel, who cried, “Does this bar take Kaaaaash?” Patel showed off the bourbon that bears his name. (“Somehow this is a real thing that I, the FBI director, have made. This is real!”) Kavanaugh revealed a secret: that the court is going to let Trump do a third term. “Trump found the original Constitution and on the end, he wrote, ‘Psych!’ ” The three ended the sketch by singing Chumbawamba’s “Tubthumbing” with its callouts of their drink orders.

Damon previewed his upcoming film, even though he had to mention several times that “The Odyssey” won’t be out for another nine weeks. He also had to break the news that the lovely “SNL” tradition of bringing on moms of cast members wouldn’t be happening this year due to Spirit Airlines shutting down. It turns out, after an audience member (“SNL” writer Jack Bensinger) asks, that only Hernández’s mom was able to make it. Damon then recorded a video message to moms out there for anyone who didn’t get a gift for them. “You deserve a night out… nine weekends from now,” he said, suggesting the movie would make a great date night.

Best sketch of the night: Do I hear best sketch of the night? Sold!

A sketch as gimmicky as this one — in which the premise is two auctioneers (Damon and Sherman) are having a marriage-ending fight — only works if the performers are up to the task, and luckily both Damon and Sherman navigated the super-fast dialogue expertly and without looking like they were eyeing cue cards the entire time. The two went back and forth, auctioneering a discussion about weight, infidelity, drinking, their sex life and, eventually, terms of their divorce in front of their four young sons (who, adorably, hold up little numbered signs. Yes, they were played by adult cast members.). Even for “SNL” and for the last-sketch-of-the-night slot, it was a bold sketch for live TV and Damon and Sherman expertly walked the tightrope on this one.

Also good: Your mom will only make it through 23 minutes of this

“SNL” is no stranger to spiky sketch comedy takes on motherhood: remember “Mom Jeans?” For this year’s Mother’s Day take, it presented “Mom: The Movie,” a film devoid of conflict or dramatic tension because “Moms have enough stress. Why not let them feel good for a day?” Ashley Padilla plays the mom in the film, enjoying argument-free time with her kids (Jeremy Culhane, Tommy Brennan and Veronika Slowikowska), who only deliver good news. She’s married to Matt Damon, making her Rhonda Damon, and they met when he noticed her giant turquoise necklace after a movie screening. The film is streaming where moms are expected to find it: on HomeGoods Plus.

‘Weekend Update’ winner: This ‘Update’ segment is bananas — the round kind

This week’s “Update” featured three guest segments. Hernández and Day played kamikaze dolphins who work for the government, giving them a sense of porpoise (their joke, not mine). Jane Wickline expressed her anger at people caring that she’s always late in a funny musical rant. But Culhane’s return as Tucker Carlson continued a dead-on impersonation that covered several topics, including the Met Gala’s wild outfits, the new Michael Jackson biopic, and why eating round bananas is less gay than eating traditionally shaped ones. Culhane’s impression is a thing of beauty, and this time it leaned harder into Carlson’s tendency to express things from a very white point of view. In describing ASAP Rocky’s pink robe from the Met Gala, he said the performer was, “Wearing my least favorite color … African-American.”