Chinas

Chinese technology giant Huawei is facing a landmark criminal trial in the United States amid Washington’s long-running tech rivalry with Beijing.

The trial began in federal court in Brooklyn, New York, on September 9, with US prosecutors portraying Huawei as a criminal enterprise that spent two decades stealing technology from US companies, deceiving banks and circumventing sanctions on Iran.

Huawei has pleaded not guilty and says the US government is attempting to turn ordinary business disputes and the actions of individual employees into evidence of a company-wide conspiracy.

The trial is expected to last about three months and overlaps with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s September 23-25 visit to Washington, where trade, artificial intelligence, tariffs and access to critical technologies are likely to be on the agenda.

Here is what you need to know:

What are the allegations against Huawei?

US prosecutors have accused the company of racketeering, money laundering, bank and wire fraud, sanctions violations, obstruction and conspiring to steal trade secrets from five US technology companies.

Prosecutors say the alleged wrongdoing stretched from about 1999 to 2020.

“Theft, lies, cover-up,” Justice Department lawyer Taylor Stout said in his opening remarks.

Prosecutors allege Huawei stole technology, including internet-router source code from Cisco and a robotic arm used by T-Mobile to test phones.

They also accuse Huawei of concealing the nature of its operations in Iran to move US dollars through the financial system despite US sanctions.

The government also alleges that Huawei supplied equipment that could help Iranian authorities monitor protesters during demonstrations in 2009.

How has Huawei responded?

Huawei, a major manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, denies any wrongdoing.

The tech giant’s lawyer Brian Heberlig told jurors the case was about “competition, not conspiracy. Innovation, not theft. Ordinary business dealings, not criminal conduct.”

Heberlig accused prosecutors of “cherry-picking isolated events” to construct a conspiracy that did not exist. Huawei’s defence says some incidents involved individual employees whose actions were dealt with internally, rather than reflecting company policy.

He told jurors that prosecutors will describe routine activities by global tech companies “but will twist those ordinary activities to try to make them look criminal”.

Huawei separately described the broader prosecution as an attempt to undermine its competitiveness, saying the US government’s “overarching narrative is demonstrably false” and that it had “the utmost respect for intellectual property”.

The case originated during Donald Trump’s first presidency. His administration placed Huawei on a US trade blacklist in 2019 and pushed allies to exclude the company from 5G networks, arguing its equipment could present national security and espionage risks.

Huawei has repeatedly denied that its technology is used for spying.

What has China’s response been?

Beijing has strongly criticised the prosecution, which has come weeks ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the US.

On Thursday, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson said “the Chinese government firmly opposes the US side’s suppression and containment of Chinese enterprises”, when asked about the case and the American prosecutor’s “criminal enterprise” description.

China “firmly supports Chinese enterprises in safeguarding their legitimate rights and interests”, the spokesperson said at a regular news conference.

What is Huawei, and has the tech giant faced investigations before?

Huawei is one of the world’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturers. It also produces smartphones and has become increasingly important to China’s semiconductor and AI industries.

Its activities have drawn scrutiny well beyond the current US trial.

Belgian prosecutors launched an investigation in 2025 into suspected bribery involving the European Parliament allegedly for Huawei’s benefit.

The European Parliament subsequently suspended access for Huawei lobbyists. Huawei said it had “zero-tolerance” for corruption and would cooperate with authorities.

Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou made worldwide headlines in 2018 when she was arrested on a US warrant after landing in Vancouver, straining both US-China and China-Canada relations.

The warrant was filed after a sealed indictment accused her and the company of bank fraud for misleading HSBC and other banks about Huawei’s business in Iran.

She returned to China in 2021 under a deferred prosecution agreement, and the charges against her were later dismissed.

Admissions Meng made as part of that agreement can, however, be presented as evidence in Huawei’s current trial after a US judge ruled them admissible in June.

They are legally separate but form part of a much wider economic and technological competition between Washington and Beijing.

Huawei became one of the most prominent targets of US restrictions during Trump’s first term.

Since then, the rivalry has expanded from telecommunications and 5G into semiconductors and AI, with Washington restricting China’s access to advanced US chips and chipmaking technology.

Last week, Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic, warned that a “Chinese lead in AI would pose grave danger for the US and the world” and urged Washington to maintain restrictions on cutting-edge AI tech. He also called for action against alleged “distillation” of US models by Chinese AI laboratories.

China’s Foreign Ministry on September 14 accused the US tech giant of “fearmongering”.

“Fomenting various threats, engaging in confrontation and malicious competition will only disrupt the process of global governance of artificial intelligence and is not in the interests of any party,” said ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun.

The state-backed Global Times newspaper went further, describing Amodei’s proposal as a “Cold War playbook” whose real purpose was to curb Chinese AI development and preserve US technological dominance.

China and the US were engaged in a tit-for-tat tariff war at the beginning of Trump’s presidency in 2025. The trade war ended in a truce, but the world’s two largest economies have failed to strike a trade deal.

Beijing, meanwhile, has used its dominance of critical minerals as leverage and accelerated efforts to build domestic alternatives to American technology.

Currently, China controls most of the world’s rare earth minerals, including metals that are necessary for the manufacture of many technological items, from smartphones to fighter jets. The world’s second-largest economy has 60 percent of these minerals and processes 90 percent of the world’s supply.

In October, Beijing announced plans to require foreign companies to obtain permission to export Chinese rare earth equipment or material.

This meant companies anywhere in the world would need a licence to export rare earth magnets and certain semiconductor materials that contain even trace amounts of minerals sourced from China or produced using Chinese technology.

China’s Ministry of Commerce said its export controls on rare earths, which Trump had labelled “surprising” and “very hostile”, were introduced in response to a series of US measures.

The People’s Republic of China achieved a historic and unprecedented participation in the second edition of the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition (EIAS 2026), which was held at El Alamein International Airport from September 8 to 10, 2026. The Chinese participation came just days after the conclusion of the joint Egyptian-Chinese air force exercises Eagles of Civilization 2026. The significance of this Chinese military presence lay in the display of a fully integrated and realistic combat air system, not merely models. In this context, the Egyptian researcher will attempt to divide the significance of China’s participation in the El Alamein Air Show into several key areas, including:

– First: China’s prominent participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Show in Egypt as a strategic shift in the regional arms market

Here, China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Show constitutes a significant strategic shift in the regional arms market. Beijing has moved beyond the traditional approach of selling individual military components to present itself as a supplier of comprehensive and integrated air combat systems, competing with Western and American powers in the Middle East and Africa. China’s participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition focused on several strategic axes to promote and analyze the concept of a full-suite solution. This was achieved by emphasizing that China does not simply sell aircraft but rather offers a comprehensive defense solution, encompassing attack fighters, logistics support aircraft, aerial refueling, and command and control systems, known as C4ISR.

The People’s Liberation Army of China sought to highlight China’s military and defense role and promote the Chinese model as a ready-made competitive alternative. This was done by showcasing the competitive advantages of Chinese defense industries, such as the absence of complex political conditions, rapid delivery, and comprehensive technology transfer to Middle Eastern and African markets. Furthermore, the focus was on the geopolitical depth, linking the Chinese presence in El Alamein to Beijing’s broader vision of strengthening security and economic partnerships with countries in the region.

– Second: Showcasing the most prominent Chinese aircraft platforms participating for the first time outside of China at the El Alamein exhibition

As for the most prominent Chinese aircraft platforms participating for the first time outside of China, for the first time in its history, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) showcased four of its latest operational aircraft models at an air show outside of China. The most prominent of these were

– The Chinese J-16 multirole fighter (J-16)

This air superiority and heavy ground attack fighter garnered widespread international attention.

– The Chinese YY-20A aerial refueling tanker (YY-20A)

This Chinese heavy transport aircraft provides refueling to extend the operational range of fighter jets.

– The Chinese KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft (KJ-500)

This represents an airborne command and control system.

– The Chinese Z-20K military helicopter (Z-20K)

This is a multi-role helicopter designed for search and rescue and tactical operations.

Regarding the Chinese weapons and drones on display at the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition, the AVIC (Aerospace Industries of China) showcased its advanced defense capabilities in the outdoor exhibition area through:

– A demonstration of the Chinese Wing Loong-10B stealth drone (Wing Loong-10B):

This is a high-altitude, long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed for reconnaissance and precision strikes.

– A demonstration of Chinese smart munitions and missiles:

The Chinese drone was displayed surrounded by advanced air-to-air missiles, such as the PL-108 & PL-12AE. In addition to a demonstration of the Chinese anti-radar and anti-radiation missile (YJ-9ER1).

– Third: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) showcased its capabilities through a technical display (capability integration), dividing its export-available air systems into functional groups for attack, others for support and refueling, and a third group for command and control, during China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein Air Show in Egypt.

In this context, the PLA sought to leverage China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein Air Show in Egypt as a new and strategic launchpad for China in North Africa. This included showcasing the size of the Chinese pavilion and the equipment on display, such as aerobatic aircraft and unmanned combat aerobatics. The Chinese Ministry of Defense emphasized the technical aspects of this capability integration display, highlighting the division of its export-available air systems into functional groups for attack, others for support and refueling, and a third group for command and control. As follows:

■ The offensive functional groups were represented by a display of China’s modern fighter jets and attack drones, such as the Wing Loong family.

■ As for the support and refueling functional groups, China’s strategic transport and aerial refueling aircraft, such as the Y-20, were showcased.

■ The third functional group focused on (command and control), with China displaying its early warning aircraft and airborne command centers.

– Fourth: Analyzing and understanding the strategic dimensions of China’s participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition, aimed at attracting more interest in the Chinese aerospace sector and promoting widespread military sales of Chinese military, defense, and armament equipment

Thus, we can analyze and understand the strategic dimensions of China’s participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition, which aimed to attract more interest in the Chinese aerospace sector and promote widespread military sales of Chinese military, defense, and armament equipment. Therefore, we find that the extensive Chinese presence at the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition constitutes a genuine breakthrough. Beijing did not aim to promote individual pieces but rather to demonstrate its ability to provide a comprehensive and integrated air combat system, encompassing attack, support, refueling, and command, as a competitive alternative in the Middle Eastern and African markets.

Analyzing the economic and strategic dimensions of China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein exhibition, we observe the extent to which the Chinese People’s Liberation Army focused on achieving broad military exposure for its participation during the exhibition. This included showcasing how these Chinese defense, military, and air systems can reduce operating costs for purchasing countries while ensuring their independence in defense decision-making, without imposing political conditions or prior operational restrictions, unlike many Western and American systems.

BEIJING: A week after his robot outran humanity’s fastest man, Jack Guo is already chasing a harder goal.

TianGong Ultra stunned spectators at the World Humanoid Robot Games ​when it covered 100 meters in 8.64 seconds, almost a full second faster than Usain Bolt’s world record. Behind the feat were days of round-the-clock testing and repairing battered robots between races.

“When it started smoothly and got past 50 meters, that was when I finally relaxed,” said Guo, who leads development of Ultra and Omni, a smaller model used in 400m races, at the Beijing Humanoid Robot Innovation Center, known as X-Humanoid.

Just a week later, the bespectacled 34-year-old engineer is already focused on a bigger challenge.

“We want to turn high performance into high reliability and high usability,” he told Reuters in his first interview with foreign media.

The record-breaking run offers a rare window into China’s growing lead in humanoid robotics, where state-backed research, deep supply chains and intense competition are accelerating advances in machine mobility. Yet Guo’s next goal underscores a harder task facing the industry as it struggles to turn dazzling demonstrations into useful workers.

Inside the workshop

X-Humanoid sits in Yizhuang, a high-tech development ‌zone in Beijing’s southeast ‌and one of China’s main robotics clusters. Long home to automakers, the district now boasts a robot ​sales center ‌and ⁠even a ​robot-themed ⁠restaurant, part of the capital’s push to showcase the industry.

The first-floor showroom traces generations of TianGong robots, including one that still wears the vest from a winning half-marathon run last year.

On the ninth floor, white Ultra and Omni humanoids stand suspended in metal frames. One wears a red “Champion TianGong” headband.

During a Reuters visit, engineers repaired and tested robots, with one removing a head cover, another tightening a leg, and others running walking trials.

In the adjoining office, Guo’s team develops software before testing it on physical machines.

Established in November 2023, X-Humanoid is backed by state-owned and private investors including robotics firm UBTech, along with domestic tech giants Xiaomi and Baidu. It develops hardware, motion-control software and AI for the wider industry while commercialising its own robots.

X-Humanoid has not disclosed how many of its own robots it has sold or deployed commercially.

Its customers include universities, research institutes and companies ⁠exploring industrial applications. At Foton Cummins’ engine factory in Beijing, the company’s robots have been trialled moving boxes, with its ‌Tianyi 2.0 robot lifting 8-12 kg boxes onto shelves in what the factory described as an early-stage ‌exploration.

Useful work begins

Ultra was not originally designed to win a race. It started as an experiment to ​push the boundaries of humanoid movement.

Guo likens today’s humanoids to the ‌earliest cars: first make them controllable, then pair reliable bodies with smarter AI “brains” capable of handling complex tasks on their own.

He said the immediate challenge was ‌making the robot body and movement-control system stable and reliable for everyday use. Developing the AI needed for more complex autonomous tasks would take longer.

Making a robot run develops generalized mobility, improving its ability to cope with different terrain.

The smaller Omni has already shown what that can mean in practice. In an internal test this year, it climbed from the first floor to the 17th floor of X-Humanoid’s headquarters.

Guo expects smaller humanoids to find early roles in commercial services and light industry, while Ultra could eventually perform outdoor inspection or emergency ‌rescue.

One major challenge is braking. Ultra weighs 75kg and at top speed can exceed 17 meters per second. At the Games, a crash mat sat beyond a short run-off area, leaving sprinting robots in the 100m races ⁠to slam into the barrier.

Future versions could ⁠be lighter, brake harder and adopt a safer posture, Guo said.

Conquering speed

Ultra arrived at the Games armed with three running strategies trained in simulation. One was battle-tested, two faster on paper but less proven.

Each strategy is a trained motion-control system that continuously adjusts joints and balance, allowing the robot to sprint upright without an operator directing every step.

Ultra used a different program in each race, running 9.39 seconds in the preliminary, 8.86 in the semifinal, and 8.64 in the final.

Between races, engineers returned to their test site to push faster programs harder and adjust navigation and running controls. Engineers pulled several all-nighters, sometimes testing into the following day before returning to the venue.

Pushed to their limits, robots stumbled, lost balance and crashed, forcing teams to roll out backup machines while repair crews scrambled to fix the damaged ones.

Earlier in development, the breakdowns were even more dramatic. “Legs broke, waists broke,” Guo said.

A late surge

Even on the morning of the final, the team was testing a newly trained running program. It worked repeatedly during trials, but not on the competition track. Differences between individual robots also created headaches, leaving Guo uneasy before the race.

Ultra’s heavier legs limited early acceleration, but once it passed about 10 meters per second, it could keep building speed and reel in rivals.

The team had shaved roughly ​half a second from its starting response by the semifinal, Guo estimated. ​From there, attention shifted to outright speed.

In the final, a faster reaction time and late acceleration allowed Ultra to pull off a more decisive overtake.

Backstage, the team celebrated. At the closing ceremony, a row of TianGong humanoids donned red capes emblazoned with “Champion,” some waving pom-poms.

“Finally, I could get a good night’s sleep,” Guo said.

New imagery appearing out of China provides the best look yet at one of the country’s most enigmatic aircraft: the very large, low-observable, flying-wing drone widely referred to as the WZ-X. Seen previously primarily in satellite imagery, TWZ broke the story of the existence of this monster high-altitude, long-endurance drone. The new views that emerged today help clear up one of the most puzzling aspects of the aircraft’s appearance, namely the unusual shape of its enormous wings.

The aircraft was first identified in satellite imagery collected in May 2025 showing the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) sprawling test facility at Malan in Xinjiang. At the time, it was difficult to determine whether some of the apparent discontinuities in the wing planform were genuine features, visual countermeasures, or artifacts of the imagery.

The new photograph, seen at the top of the article and below, as well as a new satellite image, shows that the aircraft has a broader-chord inner wing section that transitions into a substantially narrower outer section. Rather than tapering continuously from the center section toward the tips, the wing effectively becomes much more slender over its outer portion in a ‘step down’-like fashion. The resulting planform gives the aircraft an exceptionally long, narrow outer wing. The wing arrangement differs from the B-2 and other stealthy flying wing designs because it has two outer wing sections, in addition to its diamond-like central fuselage, instead of just one.

We still can’t say for sure if this feature is just the way the aircraft’s wing was designed or if it also is due to some other exotic feature, such as wing folding or removable outboard sections. While a more novel explanation is possible, it is somewhat improbable at this point.

Seen from behind, the aircraft has a relatively shallow central fuselage section, with extremely long wings extending outward from it. The landing gear is extended, revealing large main undercarriage doors and substantial landing gear consistent with an aircraft of this size. Split rudders are visible toward the outer wing areas, broadly reminiscent of those used on the B-2.

As in previous imagery, the rear of the center section of the aircraft may also reveal slot-like exhaust openings, supporting the assessment that it is twin-engined.

For an aircraft intended to spend long periods operating at high altitude, a very long overall span combined with a relatively narrow outer wing could be advantageous. Such an arrangement would increase effective aspect ratio and reduce induced drag during efficient cruise, potentially improving endurance and high-altitude performance.

It may also allow the designers to concentrate structural mass and internal volume closer to the center of the aircraft while still achieving a very large span.

There is a potential low-observable tradeoff, however. A significant change in chord introduces additional planform geometry and potential edge-alignment discontinuities that must be reconciled with the requirements of a stealth aircraft. The transition will influence radar reflections depending on its precise shape, orientation, and relationship to the aircraft’s other edges and surfaces. This will also be highly dependent on the aspect the radar is viewing the aircraft from. Modern very low observable designs try to minimize these exact types of features, with large continuous structures being the most advantageous to radar signature. This philosophy can be seen in the design of the B-21’s planform, which was also how the B-2 was supposed to look originally. You can read all about this here.

Regardless, the WZ-X does indeed have a semi-sawtooth trailing edge due to this intriguing feature.

The overall scale of the aircraft is also becoming increasingly apparent. Our initial analysis of satellite imagery put its wingspan at approximately 170 feet, roughly comparable to the 172-foot span of the B-2. That would make it considerably larger than other Chinese flying-wing drones identified to date.

Andreas Rupprecht, an analyst specializing in Chinese military aviation and TWZ contributor, assesses that the WZ-X is likely a twin-engined design similar in configuration to the supposed U.S. RQ-180, but considerably larger.

Rupprecht estimates a length of approximately 46 feet. He also assesses the aircraft as having a relatively spacious central fuselage and a dorsal satellite communications antenna. His estimates of a range exceeding 12,000 miles and a normal cruising altitude of somewhere between 59,000 and 66,000 feet remain unconfirmed.

The WZ-X is notably different from China’s smaller flying-wing designs. The CH-7, for example, has a deeper and more curved center section and is substantially smaller. The WZ-X’s broad, relatively flattened center body and enormous span instead appear particularly compatible with high-altitude endurance.

Its apparent configuration also makes a long-duration surveillance mission plausible. The central body and inner wing section would provide substantial space for fuel, sensors, and communications systems, while the outer wing, combined with its lifting central body, could support highly efficient flight at high altitude.

A low-observable platform of this size could potentially conduct many types of wide-area surveillance and networking assistance while operating in or very near contested airspace where conventional high-altitude UAVs would face greater risks. A strike capability cannot be ruled out, particularly given China’s broader development of combat-capable flying-wing UCAVs, but the aircraft’s proportions appear especially well suited to persistence and reconnaissance.

While the location of the latest imagery is unconfirmed, Malan has developed into a massive center for Chinese drone testing, with satellite imagery showing extensive expansion of its infrastructure in recent years. The facility has been associated with multiple flying-wing designs, including the WZ-X and the similarly mysterious and also very large GJ-X. This substantially different flying-wing aircraft with a cranked-kite planform is also undergoing flight testing. That aircraft is estimated to have a wingspan of around 137 feet, underscoring the breadth of China’s experimentation with large low-observable uncrewed aircraft.

China is pursuing tailless/flying-wing designs across an increasingly wide range of sizes and missions, alongside larger crewed aircraft programs including the J-36 and J-XDS and, eventually, the H-20 stealth bomber.

The WZ-X appears to be part of a much broader effort to develop highly integrated, low-observable aircraft optimized for different combinations of range, endurance, payload, and survivability.

For now, its official designation, manufacturer, propulsion system, performance, and intended mission remain unknown.

However, its configuration appears well suited to the requirements of a very large high-altitude endurance aircraft, although the trade-off between its performance and its stealth characteristics remains equally mysterious.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Sept. 3 (UPI) — South Korean shipbuilders are pouring investment, technology and expertise into a U.S. maritime industry struggling with shrinking capacity, worker shortages and competition from China, offering Washington a potential path to rebuild American shipyards without sending ship construction overseas.

The growing partnership also raises a difficult question: How much foreign participation is the United States prepared to accept in an industry considered essential to national security?

The issue has gained urgency following a White House directive aimed at increasing competition and capacity in the U.S. maritime industrial base. The administration’s plan allows greater use of foreign shipbuilding expertise under certain conditions, including investment in American shipyards, training U.S. workers, transferring production technologies and developing domestic supply chains.

Limited shipyard capacity and a shortage of skilled workers remain major obstacles to expanding the U.S. Navy fleet, according to Shelby S. Oakley, director of Contracting and National Security Acquisitions at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

“The capacity of the existing yards and the size and skill level of the current workforce are certainly a limiting factor when it comes to the U.S. Navy’s ability to increase the size of the fleet,” Oakley told UPI.

Oakley said meeting Navy shipbuilding goals will require expanding existing yards or adding new ones, increasing the skilled workforce and making greater use of technology and automation. Without those changes, she said, the Navy will struggle to meet its fleet targets.

South Korea could provide part of that capacity.

Under a broader $350 billion U.S.-South Korea investment framework, Seoul has committed $150 billion specifically to shipbuilding cooperation, with another $200 billion intended for strategic investments in other sectors.

South Korea moved toward implementing the maritime portion in June when the Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Corporation, Korean policy finance institutions and shipbuilders HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, Hanwha Ocean and Samsung Heavy Industries agreed to identify projects and coordinate financing.

The arrangement combines something Washington needs: capital and industrial expertise.

For decades, U.S. commercial shipbuilding has lost ground to Asian competitors. China now dominates global commercial ship construction, while South Korea and Japan retain substantial production capacity. The United States accounts for only a fraction of global commercial output.

President Donald Trump recently elevated shipbuilding capacity to a national security priority, directing his administration to look abroad for models that could help rebuild the U.S. maritime industrial base.

“I have determined that it is in the national security interest of the United States to increase domestic shipbuilding capacity,” Trump said in the memorandum, pointing to the October 2025 U.S. Finland Agreement on icebreaker construction as a model for cooperation with foreign companies.

China adds urgency to that effort.

China’s enormous civilian shipbuilding industry supports an expanding naval industrial base, allowing shipyards, suppliers and skilled workers to serve both commercial and military production. That industrial scale has made shipbuilding an increasingly important element of U.S.-China strategic competition.

The United States faces a different reality. The Government Accountability Office reported this year that Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding programs have repeatedly exceeded budgets and fallen years behind schedule, while yards face skilled-worker shortages, capacity constraints and fragile supplier networks.

South Korea offers an alternative source of expertise. Its yards have decades of experience with modular construction, automation, digital design and high-volume production. Korean companies also build sophisticated naval vessels, including Aegis-equipped destroyers and submarines.

Hanwha has moved furthest into the U.S. market.

Hanwha Ocean and Hanwha Systems acquired Philly Shipyard for $100 million in 2024, giving the conglomerate a direct U.S. manufacturing foothold. Hanwha subsequently announced plans for billions of dollars in additional investment to expand the yard and introduce Korean shipbuilding technology.

Hanwha employs nearly 30,000 workers at Hanwha Ocean’s Geoje Shipyard in South Korea, where advanced manufacturing and automation help produce more than 40 ships a year.

“In the coming years, we will continue to bring trainers to develop our workforce at the Hanwha Philadelphia Shipyard as well as transfer technology to expand commercial and naval shipbuilding capacity,” Hanwha Defense USA spokesman James Hewitt told UPI.

Hanwha Ocean also completed a major overhaul of the Military Sealift Command dry cargo ship USNS Wally Schirra at Geoje in March 2025. The seven-month project was the first large-scale regular overhaul of a Military Sealift Command vessel awarded to a South Korean yard.

HD Hyundai Heavy Industries is pursuing a different route.

Rather than acquiring a U.S. yard, HD Hyundai has developed partnerships with American shipbuilders. The company and Huntington Ingalls Industries are cooperating on shipbuilding technology and production, including an August pilot program to expand automated welding at HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding yard in Mississippi.

“The United States is a strong ally and a key business partner for us,” said Hannae Choi, Executive Vice President at HD Hyundai Shipbuilding and Offshore Engineering.

Such arrangements offer Washington a possible compromise: Korean companies can bring capital, technology, automation and production methods into American yards while training U.S. workers and developing domestic supply chains.

That distinction — foreign investment in U.S. shipbuilding rather than shifting construction overseas — has emerged as a key dividing line for the domestic industry.

The Shipbuilders Council of America supports foreign investment when it expands U.S. shipyard capacity but opposes sending construction abroad, said Danielle Hagen, the council’s executive vice president for communications.

“If South Korean capital and automation expertise flow into American facilities, employ American workers and produce American-built hulls, that model is consistent with our longstanding position,” Hagen told UPI.

“The SCA’s concern has never been the nationality of capital, but whether the work, the workforce and the industrial capability remain here in the U.S.,” she said.

Federal law has long restricted construction of U.S. naval vessels in foreign shipyards, while the Jones Act requires vessels operating in U.S. coastwise trade to be U.S.-built, U.S.-owned and U.S.-crewed.

“Any foreign partner needs to operate their U.S. yard as a genuinely American enterprise, with real decision-making authority here,” the council said, adding that foreign acquisitions should face national security scrutiny and continued congressional oversight.

Despite the backlog at U.S. yards, bipartisan opposition remains strong in Congress to building Navy vessels overseas. Rep. Jared Golden, D-Maine, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, has been among lawmakers seeking to preserve domestic construction requirements and prevent naval shipbuilding from migrating to foreign yards, including South Korea and Japan.

Those concerns extend beyond jobs. Modern warships contain classified systems, sensitive designs and specialized supply chains. Greater participation by even close allies raises questions about intellectual property, cybersecurity and control over technologies considered essential to U.S. military power.

Few U.S. allies, however, can match South Korea’s shipbuilding scale, speed and technical expertise. The emerging model seeks to use those capabilities to increase production in the United States rather than substitute foreign yards for American ones.

Whether that approach succeeds will depend not only on transferring Korean technology and manufacturing expertise into U.S. yards, but also on Washington’s ability to integrate those investments into a broader shipbuilding strategy.

Managing competing demands for Navy ship construction and repair requires such an approach, Oakley told UPI. A 2025 GAO report found that the Navy lacked a comprehensive strategy for managing the private shipbuilding and repair industry on which it depends, complicating efforts to coordinate investment, yard capacity and workforce needs.

The challenge is magnified by China. Its dominance of commercial shipbuilding has created a vast network of yards, suppliers and skilled workers that the United States cannot quickly replicate. South Korea cannot close that gap alone, but its capital, technology and expertise could help expand U.S. capacity as American yards modernize, train workers and rebuild supply chains.

For Washington, the central policy question is whether greater South Korean participation can strengthen U.S. shipbuilding capacity without creating a new dependence on foreign production.

China has long been a rare partner to Iran, with the economic heft to blunt the United States’ efforts to strangle the Iranian economy.

Yet even as China opposes US President Donald Trump’s latest pressure campaign, few observers expect it to go much further than the modest economic links it has thus far forged with Iran to shield it.

While China opposes the Trump administration’s military attacks and sanctions against Iran, Beijing’s relationship with Tehran is just one consideration in a foreign policy that seeks to balance relations with numerous countries, including the US and the Gulf states, limiting its appetite to prop up the Iranian leadership at any cost, analysts say.

“China, with broader global interests, can only actively promote de-escalation of the US-Iran conflict, and cannot and will not engage in fierce confrontation with the US for Iran’s sake,” said Hongda Fan, director of the China-Middle East Center at Shaoxing University in China.

“Ultimately, the US-Iran conflict must be resolved by the two countries themselves,” Fan said.

China and Iran share substantial trade links, particularly in energy, and a mutual suspicion of US dominance, but their relationship is heavily lopsided, with Tehran depending on Beijing far more than vice versa.

That asymmetry in ties was on full display this week at the annual gathering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a 10-member bloc widely seen as a counterbalance to US hegemony, where Chinese President Xi Jinping joined more than a dozen non-Western leaders, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

While Iranian state media reported that Pezeshkian held a “brief meeting” with Xi on the sidelines of the summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Chinese outlets made no mention of the encounter.

Xi immediately followed his attendance at the summit with his first visit to Egypt in a decade on Tuesday, using the visit to call on countries in the Middle East to oppose “external interference” and reiterate his calls for a diplomatic resolution to the Iran war.

As Iran’s top trade partner, China has taken up to 90 percent of Iranian oil exports since the US and Israel launched their war in late February.

Iranian crude, however, accounts for only about 2 percent of China’s overall energy mix.

While China’s oil purchases have been an economic lifeline for Tehran, Chinese importers have not been immune to fears of exposure to US sanctions.

China’s major state-owned refiners such as Sinopec and PetroChina have shunned Iranian oil for years, leaving the trade to independent “teapot” refiners with minimal links to the dollar-based global financial system.

Though the Trump administration has imposed sanctions on these “teapot” refiners and a limited number of China- and Hong Kong-based firms and individuals, it has yet to target major Chinese banks accused of facilitating Iranian oil purchases.

The Trump administration has hinted at targeting China’s financial system as part of its ramped-up sanctions campaign, dubbed “Operation Economic Outcast”, though analysts are sceptical that Washington will risk provoking Beijing’s ire as the sides seek to lower the temperature in their trade war before a scheduled summit between Xi and Trump on September 24.

“The legitimate question is why third countries should be expected to adopt Washington’s unilateral economic policy towards another sovereign state,” said Zichen Wang, deputy secretary-general of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) think tank in Beijing.

“That does not, however, mean that Beijing will provide Tehran with a blank cheque,” Wang said.

“China is likely to continue opposing US secondary sanctions politically and to defend what it considers legitimate Chinese commercial interests. But past behaviour also shows that major Chinese banks and state-owned companies are highly conscious of sanctions exposure.”

Rhetoric versus reality

Even as Beijing and Tehran have forged closer ties, their relations have for years been marked by a substantial gap between rhetoric and reality.

While China pledged to invest up to $400bn in Iran over 25 years as part of a “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” signed in 2021, few projects have materialised amid what analysts say is Chinese firms’ reluctance to navigate sanctions and the opaque Iranian bureaucracy.

In 2023, Iran’s then deputy economy minister, Ali Fekri, complained that he was “not satisfied” with China’s level of investment since the agreement, saying it had only amounted to about $185m.

“Iranian experts often blame their government for not doing enough to attract Chinese investors or not pushing Chinese companies to share more technology,” said Andrea Ghiselli, head of research at the ChinaMed Project.

“However, the reality is that there is no point for Chinese companies to give up their ties with the international financial system to expand their business in Iran,” Ghiselli said.

“It is much easier and more profitable to trade and invest elsewhere. Iran’s own domestic physical and bank infrastructure is also an obstacle.”

Meanwhile, the most tangible measure of China’s economic support, purchases of Iranian oil, has been dwindling amid the US blockade of Iranian ports.

Iranian crude exports via the Strait of Hormuz, mostly bound for China, fell from an estimated 1.85 million barrels per day (bpd) in March-April to just 240,000bpd in August, according to data from ship-tracking platform Kpler, though millions more barrels shipped before the blockade are still at sea.

In an interview with CNBC on Monday, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said “only” about 30 million barrels of Iranian oil remained on the water and Chinese remittances to Iran were “going to run out”.

Kpler last month estimated that about 80 million barrels were in on-water shortage, enough to provide revenues to Tehran for up to six months.

“For China, Iran is valuable – but replaceable across many dimensions. Iranian oil matters, but China can obtain energy from Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, the UAE, and numerous other suppliers,” said Mordechai Chaziza, an expert on China’s Middle East policy who lectures at Ashkelon Academic College in Israel.

“Iran offers geopolitical access, but China possesses relationships throughout the region. Iran supports China’s multipolar agenda, but so do many other states.”

China’s support for Iran is also not risk-free for Beijing, given its important relationships with Iranian rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Chaziza said.

“Saudi Arabia and the UAE are major energy and commercial partners.

“Gulf stability is vital because China obtains roughly half of its crude imports from the Middle East,” he added.

The “ideal outcome” for Beijing, Chaziza said, would be “a stable, sovereign, economically connected, and internationally non-Western” Iran, but not one “whose confrontation with Washington, Israel, or the Gulf monarchies forces China to choose sides”.

Wang, at the CCG, said that while Beijing appears determined to defend Chinese commercial interests, it is unlikely to sacrifice its broader interests in the region or elsewhere.

Beijing’s warning that it is ready to take countermeasures against unilateral sanctions is “not the same thing as promising to underwrite the Iranian economy”, Wang added.

For China, Iran is seen more as a customer than an ally, said Kerri Bitsoff, a former senior official at the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.

“I don’t think this is the alliance some people think it is, even though there’s real support. I think of a more like a customer relationship that Iran can’t walk away from,” Bitsoff said.

“And it was good for China – they got cheap oil, they got a US tied up in the Middle East, but I think that only lasts up until the point where it threatens China’s other interests,” she added.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly expanding a secretive airbase in the northwest of the country that is loosely akin to America’s top-secret proving ground at Area 51. The facility is used to test experimental platforms and next-generation combat aircraft, sporting one of the longest runways in the world at 16,400 feet. It has transformed from a relatively austere and remote airstrip into an increasingly sprawling People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flight-test center over the past few years, and there is no sign that construction will slow anytime soon. In fact, it’s accelerating, and one of its newest features is of significant interest.

Satellite imagery taken by Planet Labs on August 27, 2026, shows the scale and scope of the buildout in high-resolution detail.

The installation is located near the infamous Lop Nur Nuclear Test Base in the desolate, arid Xinjiang autonomous region of northwestern China. Lop Nur is the PRC’s primary testing facility for nuclear weapons and where China detonated its first nuclear device, codenamed Project 596, in 1964, becoming the world’s fifth nuclear power.

Last year, TWZ spotted both of China’s sixth-generation stealth fighter designs, the J-36 and J-XDS, at the base for the first time − far from the home airfields of their respective manufacturers, Chengdu and Shenyang. Before supporting the development of advanced air combat technologies, the facility was linked to military space development efforts and testing reusable space planes as far back as 2020. At that point, the site was nothing more than a 3.1-mile runway with a small hangar and a few scattered vehicles.

In 2023, the main apron was significantly expanded, and a new large hangar was added. In 2025, new hangars were added on both sides of the main ramp area via extensions. These shelters appeared to be optimized for tactical fixed-wing aircraft. Not long after those facilities were complete, the two 6th-generation fighter aircraft showed up. The pace of further construction ramped in May 2025 and hasn’t let up since. The time-lapse below visualizes the gradual, then all-at-once progression over the past six years.

“New taxiways, aircraft turning pads, hangars and possible fuel-storage infrastructure substantially increase the airfield’s capacity to support aircraft movements and sustained flight-test activity,” Damien Symon, a geo-intelligence researcher and friend of TWZ, told us. Symon assisted TWZ in identifying the new structures.

Several key areas of the site have been reshaped since the beginning of the year, marked on the annotated graphic near the top of this story.

Below the southern end of the runway, construction is moving fast on a new taxiway extension running parallel to the runway, connecting it to the central apron and main hangar. The nearly completed route will allow additional aircraft to move more freely without having to back-taxi on the runway, which is a huge problem for higher operations tempos and more complex sortie launches and recoveries.

“Of particular interest are several large aircraft hangars in the southern section of the airbase, each measuring approximately 80 by 40 meters (262 by 131 feet),” Symon said of the three hangars grouped together that are being constructed on the south ramp. A fourth appears on its own just farther south on the apron, with different dimensions. The hangars, with direct access to the new southern taxiway, are sized to accommodate all of the tactical and strategic aircraft in the PLA’s current fleet. For scale, the PRC’s only strategic bomber in active service, the Xi’an H-6, has a wingspan of approximately 108 feet. But what’s already flying operationally isn’t the focus of these new facilities, it’s a unique class of aircraft, some of which are in testing now and more will be in the future.

The hangars’ wide proportions are similar to those of new ones found at China’s other secretive major test airbase in Xinjiang, located near Malan, which is largely focused on unmanned aircraft. The buildout comes as two massive stealth flying wing drones are in flight testing and we await the H-20 stealth bomber. It remains unclear where the H-20, which still hasn’t made a public appearance, will be tested. However, Lop Nur would be an ideal locale considering how sensitive the program is, and these new hangars could very well be in preparation for its arrival. It’s also worth noting that this installation appears more focused on crewed platforms, not drones, like at Malan. So sending the H-20 here for at least part of its test program would make sense, although this is just speculation at this time.

Broad construction continues behind the central apron area, with several buildings that were in development late last year now completed. A cluster of prefabricated containers arranged in tight rows for storage and accommodation has appeared since our last review. The additional laborers, materials, or equipment could be housed there to support the aggressive pace of development, as a much larger workforce would be required to speed up the construction process. Excavation and construction have started at other locations nearby, but they are in the early stages of development and their future purpose is unknown. Farther east, on the outskirts of the facility, a concrete batching plant with wash-water ponds and segregated aggregate stockpiles was recently built.

Grading is underway for another taxiway that will connect the central apron to the northern part of the main runway. The latest imagery suggests that concrete has just started to be poured. A circular pad with a 400-foot diameter has taken shape at the northern end with direct access to both the runway and the main base, which TWZ assesses to be an engine run and turnaround pad. If a shelter were added, it could also act as a “scoot and hide” area for keeping sensitive test articles from being seen by satellites passing overhead. An apron extension near the circular pad is also under construction, with at least two large hangars being built there, although they will have more traditional proportions compared to the four wide ones on the south ramp.

Additionally, Symon identified possible fuel-storage infrastructure under construction that would “further expand the base’s aviation-support capacity.” If confirmed, “the additional infrastructure could support a higher sortie rate and longer periods of sustained flight activity, consistent with an expansion in the scale or tempo of operations at Lop Nur,” he added.

The facility is clearly in the process of taking on a very important role in China’s advanced aerospace development ecosystem, and its significance will only grow as it expands to accommodate more, and bigger, airframes. With the hangar additions we are seeing, major programs are about to migrate there, even on a detachment basis, for extensive testing. The new southern hangars, in particular, suggest the PLA expects to be testing aircraft with far wider wingspans in the not-too-distant future.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io or on X @ianellisjones

Author’s note: Special thanks to Damien Symon for assisting with the imagery analysis, be sure to follow him on X at @detresfa_

Bangladesh is moving toward formal negotiations with China over a potential purchase of J-10CE fighters and attack helicopters, in what could become one of the country’s most significant defense acquisitions in years. The development also underscores the growing international interest in a Chinese fighter that has gained considerable attention since seeing combat in Pakistani service last year.

Bangladesh’s Prime Minister’s Information and Broadcasting Adviser Zahed Ur Rahman said Tuesday that a government panel is preparing a draft agreement that could pave the way for negotiations with Beijing. The government has not disclosed how many aircraft it intends to acquire, the potential value of the deal, or a delivery schedule, with those details expected to be determined during negotiations.

Local reporting has previously pointed to a potential requirement for as many as 24 J-10CEs.

If ultimately contracted and delivered, Bangladesh would become only the second confirmed foreign customer of the export version of the J-10C, after Pakistan. However, there has been growing speculation about other potential customers, too, fueled by imagery showing apparent export-standard J-10s being tested in China.

The potential acquisition comes as Bangladesh seeks to modernize its aging combat aircraft fleet. Dhaka already maintains a long-standing defense relationship with Beijing, which has supplied Bangladesh with combat aircraft, naval vessels, tanks, missile systems, and other military equipment over the past two decades.

The J-10CE is a much more capable proposition than many of the older fighters still operated by air forces that have historically relied on Chinese or Soviet-designed equipment, of which Bangladesh is a prime example. Currently, the Bangladesh Air Force’s fighter fleet is made up of different versions of the Chengdu F-7 (an updated Chinese version of the MiG-21 Fishbed) and much smaller numbers of MiG-29 Fulcrums.

Maintaining aging Soviet-designed fleets increasingly presents challenges in terms of airframe life, avionics, spare parts, weapons, and overall readiness. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and accompanying sanctions serve to make Russia an even less reliable source of military aircraft and other arms.

The J-10C is a single-engine multirole fighter equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, modern avionics, electronic warfare capabilities, and the ability to employ a growing range of Chinese precision-guided weapons. The export J-10CE also provides access to weapons such as the much-vaunted PL-15 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile.

The aircraft’s growing reputation has been helped considerably by Pakistan.

Pakistan became the first foreign operator of the J-10CE, and the aircraft received intense international attention during the May 2025 conflict between Pakistan and India. Pakistan said its Chinese-made fighters were involved in shooting down several Indian aircraft, while the precise circumstances, numbers, and tactics involved remain the subject of competing claims and outside analysis.

Nevertheless, the conflict provided the J-10CE with an unusual degree of combat visibility for a Chinese export fighter. Now, Bangladeshi officials have explicitly acknowledged that the aircraft’s reported performance during that conflict has attracted attention in Dhaka.

The J-10CE is also particularly well positioned within China’s emerging fighter-export portfolio.

China is developing more advanced stealth aircraft, including the FC-31/J-35 family, but that program represents a different proposition for prospective customers, coming with greater cost and potential uncertainty attached. The J-10C is a much more mature design already in operational foreign service, giving China an aircraft that can be offered today rather than relying entirely on future capabilities.

That combination of modern systems and an established production line could prove attractive to countries that need to replace aging fighters without taking on the financial, political, or industrial commitments associated with acquiring a Western combat aircraft.

As well as the potential Bangladesh deal, Uzbekistan has been linked to the J-10CE.

For months, Chinese military aviation observers have speculated that Tashkent could become another customer for the fighter. More recently, imagery of an aircraft carrying the serial number 1020 has generated renewed interest, with low-visibility markings on its tailfin appearing to resemble the Uzbek flag.

Aug. 23 (UPI) — China’s space agency on Sunday postponed the launch of an ambitious mission to search the south pole of the moon for ice due to poor weather.

The robotic lunar probe Chang’e-7 had been slated to take off on Sunday night but failed to meet launch conditions, the China Manned Space Agency said.

The agency added an “assessment was conducted following the principle of prudence, reliability and absolute mission success,” Xinhua reported.

The main reason for the delay was poor weather due to Tropical Depression Narra in the Gulf of Tonkin, Space.com reported.

Officials had at first pushed the launch back by a day, the news outlet reported. Now, it is unclear when the launch will happen.

The Chang’e-7 mission would have been the first in history to probe ice on the moon’s south pole.

“It looks like an incredibly capable and ambitious mission with multiple scientific components on the orbiter, lander, rover and hopper,” Katherine Joy, a professor at the University of Manchester, told SpaceNews. “There is a potential for a huge science return if the mission can successfully land at its intended landing site close to Shackleton crater.”

Joy, who studies lunar and planetary science, added the mission would represent “a really important step for understanding the future human exploration potential of the south pole of the moon, and for investigating the origins of lunar volatiles.”

This time last year, Antelope Reef was mostly submerged underwater and barely visible unless you were steaming past at low tide. New satellite imagery, provided to TWZ by Vantor, showcases what the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can construct after 10 months of nonstop dredging: a nearly 1,500-acre artificial island with a deep-water port, 2,000-plus-foot quay capable of berthing warships, and the beginnings of a 10,000-foot-long military-grade runway. Hardly recognizable today, Antelope Reef has become the latest, and one of the largest, man-made outposts in Beijing’s aggressive campaign to militarize and dominate the South China Sea.

The “first phase” of construction is now complete, according to a report from Reuters, following the departure of a fleet of dredgers that have been on station for months. Vantor, a spatial intelligence company, shared the images, dated August 11, with TWZ that show the results of the rapid transformation in detail, which you can view in high resolution below.

Reports surfaced in early 2026 about unusual PRC activity around the reef, which is located in the northwest part of the South China Sea, approximately 160 nautical miles (nm) south of Hainan, China, and 200 nm east of Da Nang, Vietnam. The fleet of PRC cutter-suction dredgers appeared late last year, assembling at the Zhujiang River Estuary and transiting with their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders dark to avoid unwanted attention. Once on the scene, they began working around the clock to move sand from the seabed to create ground above.

The pace of construction and rate of change have been staggering, and show how much progress the PRC has made in its reclamation and land-building capabilities. In less than a year, the PRC dredged more than a million tons of sand to reclaim approximately 1,500 acres of land. The teardrop-shaped island is now 3.7 miles long, surrounded by seawalls and internal roads, with ongoing construction underway at three primary locations around the lagoon – which you can see marked on the graphic above. For comparison, construction of the artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, more than a decade ago, took several years.

Antelope Reef, or Lingyang Jiao to the Chinese and Đá Hải Sâm to the Vietnamese, is part of the Crescent archipelago in the Paracel Island chain. China has occupied the Paracels since 1974, but the territory is still disputed by Vietnam and Taiwan.

In the latest satellite imagery from Vantor, several notable features are discernible and were first identified by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI). On the northwest side, preparations are being made for what will likely eventually be a 10,000-foot-long, 180-foot-wide runway, similar to those built at Fiery Cross, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, and Woody Island. The northwest edge of the island is the only area long enough to accommodate a runway capable of landing large military and commercial aircraft, and grading appears to be about halfway complete – but no concrete has been poured yet. AMTI also identified excavation for a 200-by-200-foot structure nearby, which mirrors the footprint of the large aircraft hangars at China’s other island-airfields.

On the southern part of the island, a 680-meter – roughly 2,200 feet – quay where both military and civilian ships can dock inside the lagoon is clearly visible. Reuters noted that a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel was spotted dockside at the quay recently. The east side of the island, just below the channel entrance, hosts the only part of the base in active use, with green space areas, a helicopter pad, and parking lots, as well as buildings for administrative spaces and housing. Temporary piers are visible at each of the major points. Two concrete plants, located along the northwestern and southern edges of the lagoon, are supporting construction efforts. TWZ has not independently confirmed AMTI’s assessments.

According to PRC state media, Antelope will be used for commercial and civilian purposes – a similar tale told during construction of the other military outposts while they were being developed. It’s worth noting that in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping stood in the Rose Garden next to then-President Barack Obama and said, “China does not intend to pursue militarization” in the South China Sea. “Relevant construction activity that China is undertaking in the Nansha Islands does not target or impact any country and there is no intention to militarize,” he claimed, using the Chinese name for the disputed Spratly Islands. Since Xi’s head fake, which epitomizes the notorious PRC “say-do” gap, Beijing has built up multiple artificial islands as military bases, and has used them to press its territorial claims and confront its neighbors across the nine-dash line, in strict defiance of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Antelope Reef sits in a key strategic location south of Sanya Port and Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island, home to two of the three People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) aircraft carriers, CNS Shandong and CNS Fujian, as well as a significant submarine force at Longpo Naval Base. A military base there could extend PLA radar and electronic surveillance coverage, add another dispersed airfield to the PLA’s rolodex to launch sorties from and an additional port to dock ships at, and further expand China’s sweeping air defense umbrella.

The constellation of artificial islands would be instrumental in enforcing total control over the South China Sea, serving as key anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) nodes. They act as logistical and persistent surveillance nodes, among other uses, today, and the more that China has dispersed throughout the South China Sea, the greater its options are as well as the credibility of its anti-access capabilities.

“I have no doubt that this marginally benefits China in that it’ll be able to forward deploy more Coast Guard and more militia in the Paracels persistently. It will, I’m sure, facilitate more persistent aerial patrols,” Greg Poling, the senior fellow who oversees AMTI, said on the Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific podcast earlier this year. “But the main benefit is probably the ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance] component; the ground-based sensing you get just building stuff.”

Beijing’s land grab in the South China Sea shows no signs of slowing down, and Antelope Reef marks the latest in a decades-long string of island seizures that it can leverage during a potential dustup in the future. But whether it will eventually run out of islands to claim remains unclear. “China doesn’t have a lot left to dig,” according to Poling, “so unless China plans to seize another island, I don’t see it building anything, at least anything substantial.”

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io

A new Chinese aircraft carrier, commonly referred to as the Type 004, is continuing to take shape, notably now featuring a more complete bow. This is set to be China’s fourth carrier, and there is strong evidence it will be its first nuclear-powered type, bringing an even more significant boost to the country’s naval power projection capabilities.

The ongoing progress on the carrier is plainly visible in satellite imagery taken just yesterday, seen at the top of this story and below, which TWZ obtained from Vantor. The ship has been under construction at Dalian Shipyard, in the city of the same name in China’s northeastern Liaoning province, since at least 2024.

The Type 004 is being constructed in the same dry dock where China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, was completed, and where its second carrier, Shandong, was built. Liaoning was originally laid down as a Kuznetsov class carrier in the Soviet Union (first named Riga and then Varyag). Authorities in post-Soviet Ukraine sold the unfinished vessel to ostensible Chinese businessmen in 1998. It was subsequently brought to Dalian in 2002 and then commissioned into operational service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) a decade later. China’s third carrier, the Fujian, the country’s first catapult takeoff but assisted recovery (CATOBAR) configured type, was built at the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai. Liaoning and Shandong are short takeoff but assisted recovery (STOBAR) carriers with ski jump bows and arresting gear at the stern.

Based on additional satellite imagery from Planet Labs that TWZ reviewed, the current length of the Type 004’s hull now appears to be around 1,050 feet (320 meters). Its maximum width, or beam, is some 151 feet (46 meters). Carriers are typically built with hulls that get progressively longer and wider as they rise from the waterline, meaning these dimensions are all but certain to grow further as the ship gets closer to completion and gains its flight deck.

The Type 004, which is also expected to be a CATOBAR type, is already shaping up to be significantly larger than any of the PLAN’s three existing carriers. Fujian, also known as the Type 003, is currently the largest. It is approximately 994 feet (303 meters) long at the waterline and 1036.75 feet (316 meters) in total length, according to previous analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank. Its beam at the flight deck level is assessed to be just over 249 feet (76 meters). As another point of comparison, the U.S. Navy’s new operational supercarrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, is 1,106 feet (337 meters) long overall and has a beam of 256 feet (78 meters) at the flight deck.

As noted, there is already strong evidence that the Type 004’s will be nuclear-powered. This is based on what looks to be two distinct reactor containment structures that are visible in previous satellite imagery and pictures taken closer to the ground. The designs of these structures are very broadly consistent with what is found on U.S. nuclear-powered carriers. Other, more general evidence of Chinese work in support of future naval nuclear propulsion capabilities has also emerged. There have been various media reports over the years about work on nuclear powerplants for future warships and commercial vessels, as well. However, it has still not been definitively confirmed that the Type 004 will be nuclear-powered.

In general, naval nuclear propulsion does offer important advantages, including functionally unlimited range. It can also provide a valuable boost in onboard power generation for more modern designs packed with advanced weapons, sensors, and other systems. The Fujian already features electromagnetic catapults for launching aircraft, also commonly referred to as an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS). This is a feature that seems likely to carry over to the Type 004, and that would benefit from nuclear power. Any windfalls from nuclear power do come at the price of cost and complexity.

China’s Fujian Aircraft Carrier Showcases Advanced Electromagnetic Catapult System

As an aside, what may turn out to be the world’s largest dedicated naval replenishment vessel is also currently being built in China. As TWZ has previously noted, that ship will be especially important for supporting conventionally-powered PLAN aircraft carriers, their air wings, and their escorts, during long-duration blue water operations far from Chinese shores and friendly ports. A nuclear-powered carrier does also still require a regular flow of conventional fuel and other resupply for its air wing and crew, as well as its conventionally-powered escorts.

Much still remains unknown about the Type 004’s overall design and expected capabilities. What appear to be official renderings and models of next-generation Chinese carriers that have emerged in the past do point to a design broadly in line with the U.S. Ford class and other modern carriers in the works globally. This is also now reflected in the configuration of China’s full-size, land-based aircraft carrier test facility in Wuhan. Key aspects include a more truncated island structure positioned further to the rear of a flight deck optimized for maximum open space. Just this week, TWZ explored the general benefits of this flight deck arrangement in the context of the Ford class design. This followed reports this past weekend that President Donald Trump is now pushing the Navy to move the island on future carriers in that class for aesthetic reasons. Trump is also notably a long-time critic of the EMALS catapults and electromagnetic Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE) on the Ford. Last week, he publicly ordered the U.S. Navy and the Pentagon to draw up a plan for going back to using steam catapults and hydraulic elevators starting with the fourth ship in the class, currently set to be named USS Doris Miller.

There are also questions still to be answered about the composition of the Type 004’s air wing. The PLAN is already working to significantly expand and improve its fleet of carrier-based aircraft with the addition of the stealthy J-35 fighter and the KJ-600 airborne early warning and control plane. This is on top of the growing J-15 family of multirole combat jets, which now includes an electronic warfare version. Various new drones, including navalized versions of the GJ-11 uncrewed combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), and helicopters, are also likely to be embarked on the Type 004. It is worth noting here that China has also built a huge new big-deck amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan, which features a single electromagnetic catapult and is expected to have a drone-heavy air component.

Chinese PLA Navy’s First Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship “Sichuan” Conducts First Sea Trial

The relative speed with which the Type 004 continues to come together is also reflective of the broader capabilities and capacity of the Chinese naval shipbuilding enterprise. China currently produces a multitude of increasingly modern warships and submarines at an ever-quickening pace. There were reports last year that construction of another conventionally powered carrier might also be underway in China. The Pentagon has previously assessed that the PLAN is aiming for a fleet of nine carriers in total by 2035.

This has all, in turn, created a more and more worrisome disparity with naval shipbuilding in the United States, or lack thereof. The U.S. Navy has continued to face delays and other setbacks with major shipbuilding programs in recent years despite efforts to reverse these trends, including by leveraging foreign shipbuilders.

When the Type 004 will be launched, let alone commissioned into service, remains to be seen. What is clear from the latest satellite imagery of Dalian is that China’s next carrier is increasingly taking shape.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

China is set to launch its Chang’e-7 unmanned, robotic space mission, possibly as early as Monday morning, to look for ice water in the permanently shadowed craters of the moon’s south pole.

This marks China’s seventh and most ambitious moon mission so far. Here is what we know about it.

What do we know about Chang’e-7?

The Chang’e‑7 launch window runs from Monday, August 24 to Monday, August 31, according to launch observers. That means the mission could lift off on any day in that period.

The Chang’e-7 comprises an orbiter, a lander, a rover and a hopper.

• The orbiter is the main spacecraft which will remain in the moon’s orbit, mapping the surface and taking images while the mission is under way. It will also relay data and communications between the other Chang’e‑7 components and Earth.
• The lander is the vessel that will touch down on the lunar surface, loaded with the necessary scientific instruments for lunar exploration, near the edge of the Shackleton Crater, a 21km-wide (13-mile-wide) pit close to the moon’s south pole. Lunar missions before this have never come this close to the pole.
• The rover is a small robotic vehicle which can drive around the landing site and which carries equipment to analyse the local environment, including rocks and soil.
• The hopper is a small robotic craft powered by solar energy, designed to “hop” – or fly – short distances from the surface of the moon and land again. It will be used to explore the Shackleton Crater.

How do we know there is water on the moon?

Over the past two decades, several space missions have established that there is water on the moon.

Since the 1960s, even before the first Apollo landing in 1969, scientists speculated that water could exist on the moon. However, when Apollo crews returned samples for testing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they appeared to be dry.

Finally, in 2009, NASA deliberately crashed a rocket segment and its probe into a shadowed lunar crater to analyse the dust plume it kicked up. This provided one of the clearest direct confirmations that significant ice water does exist on the moon, building on earlier detections of water and hydrogen by probes.

In October 2020, NASA scientists announced that water on the moon is more widespread than previously known. They said water molecules had been found to be encapsulated within mineral grains on the lunar surface and speculated that more water is hidden in ice patches which are in permanent shadows.

NASA describes these permanent shadows as dark areas inside deep craters near the north and south poles of the moon where sunlight has not reached for millions or even billions of years. In 2018, prior to confirming it in 2020, NASA had detected water ice in shadowed parts of the moon through mapping.

Why is it important to find out more about the water on the moon?

Expanding knowledge about water on the moon is vital because ancient polar ice may have preserved a record of lunar volcanic activity and of water delivered by comets and asteroids to the Earth-moon system, offering clues to how our own oceans originally formed.

Additionally, if there is enough water on the moon that is realistically accessible, it could serve as a source of drinking water for crewed lunar missions, and could also help to keep equipment cool.

Hydrogen could also be extracted from moon water to provide fuel, while oxygen could be extracted to breathe, supporting onward missions to Mars or lunar mining.

Could anyone ‘own’ the water on the moon?

The 1967 United Nations Outer Space Treaty bans any nation from claiming sovereignty over the moon or owning it as territory. It does not explicitly prohibit commercial operations, but it requires private activities in space to be authorised and supervised by states and leaves key questions about resource ownership unresolved.

Which recent space missions have searched for frozen water on the moon?

In 2023, Russia’s lunar spacecraft, Luna-25, was launched to look for frozen water in the moon’s south pole. However, the Luna-25 spun out of control and crashed. The crash prevented any scientific data collection or water discovery.

Racing against the Luna-25 mission was India’s Chandrayaan-3, which also aimed to expand knowledge of lunar water ice. Chandrayaan-3 successfully landed in August 2023 and found critical new evidence of water on the surface of the moon’s south pole through soil temperature readings.

Why is exploring the moon’s south pole a challenge?

Attempted landings at the moon’s south pole have failed before because of its challenging terrain, which is full of craters and deep trenches.

The south pole is far from the equatorial region targeted by previous missions, including the crewed Apollo landings.

What is different about the Chang’e-7 mission?

The upcoming Chang’e-7 is aiming to expand knowledge about where, exactly, water is located in the craters of the moon, how deep it is, what form it is in and whether it is indeed possible to access it.

The Chang’e-7’s six-legged hopper has been designed to jump into and out of the deep, shadowed craters near the south pole that are hard for traditional rovers to reach, to look for water ice and other resources.

No previous space mission has used a dedicated hopper to jump in and out of lunar craters in this way.