Chinas

We now have our first look at a Chinese modular, road-mobile, electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) catapult actually launching a drone. The system, which consists of multiple specially-designed trucks linked together, first emerged right at the end of last year and was soon loaded onto the deck of a cargo ship. The same vessel, named Zhong Da 79, was used to showcase a new family of containerized weapons, sensors, and other systems, images of which went viral in a big way online. It has now also been confirmed that the truck-mounted EMALS catapult is part of that family.

Video of the truck-mounted EMALS catapult in use first began circulating widely on social media earlier today, but exactly where or when it was shot is unclear. The footage looks to have originally accompanied a Chinese-language social media post from the Beijing Institute of Technology’s School of Mechanical Engineering. Screenshots said to be of the post show it was primarily on news about the development of the full family of containerized weapons and other systems, which we will come back to later on.

The video, seen in full in the social media post below, starts by showing a propeller-driven drone being launched from a mobile EMALS catapult made up of three trucks. The drone in question has a high-wing monoplane planform with a v-tail and tricycle landing gear. When the system first appeared publicly last year, it was shown in a four-truck configuration, and paired with stealthy collaborative combat aircraft (CCA)-like drones, or what were more likely mockups thereof.

The footage continues on, showing three EMALS catapult trucks traveling in a group, unlinked, in a convoy, before joining together. The convoy clip notably shows what look to be covers on top of the trucks that do not appear to have been previously seen. There are what appear to be hinges or at least large straps on the side to hold them in place.

Covers would help protect the system from the elements during transit. It might also help mask its true purpose, though the trucks have other very distinct features, including a very prominent locking point at the front. The possibility that the covers hinge to either side also raises the question of whether the system could be configured to fold out to create a wider runway, though there is no evidence of this so far.

The video also reveals that the trucks have an extreme all-wheel steering capability that allows them to turn in a roughly flat circle, even when joined together. This would allow for the launching of aircraft in any direction as long as their sufficent space to turn the complete system. This would be key for pointing aircraft into the wind ahead of launches, especially in confined spaces with limited room to maneuver. This is an essential capability for enabling this concept overall. It would be extremely hard, if not impossible, to do this with normal steering, especially to account for any major shift in the wind’s direction.

The footage caps off with another clip of the drone being launched and then one of Zhong Da 79 as it was seen earlier this year with the various containerized systems, at least some of which turned out to be mockups, onboard.

As seen earlier in this story, the video is circulating along with a graphic showing the full family of containerized weapons and other capabilities. This includes versions armed with launchers for land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as surface-to-air missiles. There are also ones that contain either a single Type 1130 30mm close-in-weapon system (CIWS) or two Type 726 close-in defensive launchers. There are also containerized radars, electronic warfare systems, and command and control suites. The graphic also notably shows a container loaded with a single EMALS catapult truck and another with a disassembled drone inside that looks very much like the one seen being launched in the opening clip.

Annual production of 2,000 of these containerized systems, collectively, is now being targeted, according to a machine translation of the apparent social media post from the Beijing Institute of Technology’s School of Mechanical Engineering that is the original source of the video.

The social media post from Beijing Institute of Technology’s School of Mechanical Engineering also says 70 other entities were also involved in the development of the various systems showcased on the Zhong Da 79. The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO), China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), and the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) are explicitly named.

Not on this list of named organizations is Tiantao Technology, a company that has been publicly discussing plans for a ground-based electromagnetic catapult system made up of modular wheeled segments since at least August 2025. As TWZ previously noted, Tiantao Technology’s renderings have shown a system that is visually different from the one now tied to the Beijing Institute of Technology’s School of Mechanical Engineering. However, its expected capabilities are in line with what have now seen in the video, especially the ability to drones weighing up to around 2.2 tons (two metric tons). The drone seen being launched is notably smaller and lighter than the CCA-type designs previously displayed with the system.

As TWZ wrote in our initial reporting on the truck-mounted EMALS catapult after it emerged last year:

“This [2.2 tons] is lighter than the expected takeoff weights of ‘loyal wingman’ type drones China has shown to date, based on the known specifications of comparably-sized Western designs. For example, the stated maximum launch weight of the XQ-58 is three tons, according to Kratos. As another point of comparison, the Chinese GJ-11, a larger flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), a catapult-capable version of which is now in development, reportedly has a payload capacity of around two tons. China’s J-15 family of crewed carrier-based fighters, derived from the Su-33 Flanker, each weighs around 19 tons (17.5 metric tons) empty without any fuel or ordnance, as well.”

“It is possible that the modular design of Tiantao Technology’s ground-based catapult system could allow for configurations capable of launching heavier designs. A core benefit of electromagnetic catapults over steam-powered ones, in general, is their ability to be more fine-tuned in terms of the forces they exert on any aircraft during launch. The capabilities of a modular system would also be dependent on its exact configuration, including how long the catapult track is overall. Tiantao Technology has said the total length of its system could be scaled between roughly 65 and 196 feet (20 and 60 meters). What limitations there might be on simply adding more segments to increase launch capacity are unknown.”

“Tiantao Technology has also shown models and renderings of truck and trailer-mounted electromagnetic catapults for launching even smaller drones. How much progress it has made in the actual development of any of the systems to date is unclear.”

As we noted at that time, other companies in China could very well have been working along similar lines. There’s also the distinct possibility that Tiantao Technology is among the dozens of unnamed partners that are said to have been working with Beijing Institute of Technology’s School of Mechanical Engineering on this project.

There is still an outstanding question about how drones are loaded onto the truck-mounted EMALS catapult to begin with, which would impact the launch tempo. TWZ has noted previously that a cycle could be established using trucks carrying drones that would drive up, one at a time, locking into the rear of an existing track, and then detaching after launch.

What kind of power and logistical footprint is required to support the mobile EMALS catapult, either on land or at sea, is also unknown. The system is not intended to support a traditional carrier air wing, and would therefore inherently have lower capability demands. It’s worth pointing out here that questions about power demands and logistical requirements would also apply to other parts of the family of containerized systems that are now in development, as well.

What limitations might exist when it comes to employing the catapult system from the deck of a ship that was not designed to have this capability from the start is another open question. Whether the truck-mounted arrangement would be stable enough for launches with the ship rocking back and forth at sea is unclear.

Overall, much more is still to be learned about the modular EMALS catapult and its capabilities. At the same time, what we’ve learned now underscores points that TWZ has made in the past about the new operational possibilities this system could enable, both in shipboard and ground-based modes. It is tailor-made for expeditionary scenarios or other situations in which traditional runways may not be available. As a mobile system that can be moved on the ground or embarked on ships, it would allow for at least a certain tier of airpower to be more readily positioned closer to operating areas.

The system’s mobility and ability to stay in relatively close proximity to the forces it is supporting would make this a very responsive capability, even as the overall operational picture and battlespace demands evolve. The less time any aircraft has to spend in transit means more on-station endurance, which could be especially valuable when employing smaller, shorter-range drones. The choice of an electromagnetic catapult system versus a steam-powered one also means shorter reset times between launches and, by extension, increased sortie generation rates.

Since it is made up of multiple modular truck-mounted segments, it would be easier for the system to disperse when not in use, creating targeting challenges for opponents and helping to increase survivability. Being able to store components of the catapult system, as well as drones to launch from it, concealed inside unassuming shipping containers would create further benefits in this regard.

All of this is relevant for a Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that has significant standing requirements to be able to provide airpower and other support during island-hopping campaigns against various potential opponents in the Pacific, where established runways may be few and far between. Another key focus area for the PLA is supporting operations in highly remote and high-altitude areas along its disputed western border with India, where runway access is also often constrained. The truck-mounted catapult could also be combined with the elements of the full family of containerized systems to help establish more robust and defensible operating locations on land, as well as rapidly turn any ship with suitable deck space into a multi-purpose naval vessel.

As an aside, the fact that the new details about the truck-mounted EMALS catapult and the other containerized system have come via Beijing Institute of Technology underscores the strong ties that state-run research institutions in China often have to the country’s government-owned defense industry and to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This is something TWZ regularly calls attention to, especially in advanced aerospace development realms, where the academic side of the ecosystem has been shown to be very deeply involved.

With the release of the video showing actual testing of the mobile EMALS catapult, and other insights into the full family of containerized weapons and other systems, more details about these new capabilities may now start coming more rapidly.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

As the European Union tries to fight its record-high €1 billion deficit per day with China, the bloc’s leaders are increasingly pointing to the problem of currency manipulation, which they say Beijing is using to make products even cheaper on the EU market – which is already flooded with Chinese imports.

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“An artificially low currency is an advantage for those who want to improve their economic competition positions,” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said after the European Council summit on 19 June.

The matter of the Chinese currency and its management was also high on the agenda of last week’s G7 summit in France.

The signs are that this is a new front in Europe’s trade battle against Beijing. To understand why the devaluation of the yuan (or renminbi) matters, here are three things to know.

What’s wrong with the Chinese currency?

According to a report by the Haut Commissariat à la Stratégie au Plan, a French government advisory body, the undervaluation of the yuan is estimated at around 20-25 percent.

“While there is no universally recognised method for determining unequivocally whether a currency is significantly overvalued or undervalued, the assessment that the renminbi (RMB) is significantly undervalued is now widely shared, including among international institutions,” the report said.

In theory, China’s trade surpluses should naturally create demand for the yuan, leading to an appreciation of the currency, but it is not the case.

However, the devaluation of the yuan might not be the direct result of central bank intervention. Alicia Ferro Herrera, an expert at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, told Euronews that China prevents its currency from appreciating faster by not bringing all of its export revenues back to the mainland.

“They stay in Hong Kong and they are not converted into RMB,” she said.

How does it impact trade between China and the EU?

The EU deficit with China hit a record-high €359.9 billion in 2025. That same year marked the first time that all EU member states had a trade deficit with Beijing, including Germany, the EU’s largest economy.

“This is simply not sustainable,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said last Friday.

According to the Haut Commissariat au Plan report, the undervaluation of the yuan plays a large part in keeping Chinese products competitive; as things stand, they are assessed by EU industry to be around 30-40 percent cheaper than European equivalents.

However, Ferro Herrera pointed out that the inflation differential also plays a great part.

“My estimate is that the inflation differential and its accumulation in Europe since the invasion of Ukraine explains about three quarters of the loss in external competitiveness,” she said.

What can the EU do?

In his remarks last Friday, Merz suggested the EU begin dialogue with China on the currency issue.

“We have to talk about this topic with each other,” he said. “It is in the interest of both sides.”

The German chancellor cited the 1985 Plaza Agreement, which saw the US, Japan, West Germany, the UK and France agree to depreciate the US dollar against the Japanese yen and the Deutsche Mark. The goal was to head off a protectionist turn from the US as its trade deficit deepened.

Merz also referred to the European Monetary System, which before the adoption of the euro relied on exchange-rate bands to limit currency fluctuations.

“That was a system where countries could coordinate through exchange-rate corridors,” he said.

Conversely, Ferro Herrera points out that the US did not push for any such negotiation when economic imbalances were discussed during the G7 last week.

In her view, Europe should monitor China’s export prices for major sector-by-sector deviations, since this is an important sign of overcapacity, as negative price growth occurs when goods cannot be sold.

China officially objected through its Foreign Ministry to the Japanese draft resolution to increase armaments and abandon Japan’s post-World War II commitment not to rearm its military, as approved by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan during its general council meeting. The draft resolution proposed amending three key security documents, which are the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Medium-Range Defense Forces Enhancement Plan. It was to be submitted to the Japanese government and parliament for further discussion. Chinese authorities officially rejected and objected to the draft, deeming it a threat to their national security and their spheres of direct influence in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific region. They considered it a radical escalation of Japan’s security strategy, detrimental to Chinese national security and to the global security initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Here, the revision of Japan’s three security documents, represented in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Force Enhancement Plan, represents a strategic shift away from its post-war pacifist constitution toward more proactive and independent military policies. The nature of this shift is evident in Tokyo’s easing of restrictions on lethal weapons exports and its reorientation of its armament toward counter-offensive capabilities and missile development. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a proactive approach, reshaping Japanese industries and institutions to address the greatest strategic challenge posed by China. The updated National Security Strategy has already fundamentally altered the country’s pacifist military doctrine by disarming the Japanese military and preventing its rearmament since World War II, a move that has drawn staunch opposition from China, which seeks to protect its own national security. The most significant amendments to the three Japanese security documents included Japan’s acknowledgment of its ability to double and enhance its counter-strike capabilities. This was achieved by allowing Japan to possess long-range missiles capable of striking enemy targets before launch. Simultaneously, Japanese authorities approved doubling defense spending, raising the military budget to 2% of GDP.

China objected to the Japanese draft resolution, which aimed to increase Japanese armament and militarize the region and global supply chains, and threatened to escalate the situation. Beijing strongly condemned these trends, describing them as new militarism. A key point of contention for China was what Chinese intelligence and military circles perceived as a warning of Japanese and foreign interference in Taiwanese affairs, as China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory. Beijing condemned the Japanese leadership’s statement that any emergency in Taiwan is an emergency for Japan, describing a potential Chinese military intervention in Taiwan as an act of aggression. Here, Beijing rejects Japan’s new military approach, characterized by advanced military deployment. China has officially protested and taken countermeasures against Japan’s plans to deploy defensive missiles on Yonaguni Island, located only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan. China has strongly accused Japan of violating its commitments, arguing that this new Japanese military expansion violates Tokyo’s international obligations and its pacifist constitution. China has warned Japan that it will pay a heavy price if it intervenes militarily in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese intelligence, military, security, and defense circles link Japan’s armament activities in Taiwan to American interference in Chinese affairs through its network of allies in the Asian region, such as Japan, given its close alliance with Washington. Here, Japan defends its military rearmament against China, with several of its officials sending political and security warnings to China. They argue that, given the uncertainty in Japan stemming from US policies and the fluctuating stance in Washington, Japan seeks to bolster its own capabilities and build regional alliances (with the Philippines, Australia, and NATO) to expand deterrence against Beijing and maintain regional security from a Japanese perspective. Strategic circles in Tokyo view the potential fall of Taiwan to China as a direct and existential threat to Japanese national security and vital shipping lanes, making the protection of the Taiwan Strait a fundamental component of Japan’s updated defense doctrine.

For these reasons, China’s decisive response was seen as a challenge to its national security, especially given Japan’s de facto official classification of Beijing as the greatest and most unprecedented strategic challenge to its security. This classification was further reinforced by Japanese authorities’ approval of developing military production, strengthening domestic defense industries, and easing restrictions on arms exports. This is where the dimensions of China’s official rejection and objection lie, as it is considered a violation of the pacifist principle enshrined in the Japanese military doctrine, which was internationally and regionally agreed upon after World War II for Japan’s disarmament. Beijing believes that Tokyo is abandoning its pacifist constitution and returning to a militaristic path, while Japan exaggerates the narrative of a China threat. Beijing accuses Japan of fabricating flimsy pretexts to justify its military expansion and arsenal, which threatens China’s regional security. Therefore, China warned that these Japanese steps to increase armament undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and jeopardize the principles of China’s global security initiative. China also registered its objection to Japan’s exclusionary approaches to its initiative based on shared and sustainable security. Furthermore, China linked this Japanese escalation in its confrontation with China in the region to the sensitive issue of Taiwan and the close alliance between the United States and Japan, while categorically rejecting Japanese interference in Taiwan’s affairs and considering the island’s security an integral part of China’s national security.

A newly emerged video offers what appears to be a first look at China’s R6000 uncrewed tiltrotor aircraft in free flight, marking a significant step beyond the tethered hover tests that had been seen previously. The design has attracted interest on account of its similarities to Bell’s MV-75A Cheyenne II, America’s crewed second-generation tiltrotor. More broadly, the development of this aircraft could have very significant implications for the People’s Liberation Army as well as civilian operators.

The footage, which first appeared on Chinese social media, shows the large drone in vertical flight, making a pedal turn (rotating around its vertical axis in the hover), and in sustained forward flight with its twin proprotors fully tilted. Previous imagery was limited to tethered evaluations that demonstrated basic hover capability. Now, with flight testing advancing, more could be revealed about the aircraft’s performance envelope.

As in the previous imagery, the aircraft’s engines are unshrouded, with their streamlined fairings removed. Like the MV-75, the R6000 features fixed engine nacelles with hinged proprotors, in contrast to the first-generation tiltrotor design found on the V-22 Osprey, in which the entire nacelle pivots up and down as a complete unit.

Previous imagery showing the R6000 conducting a tethered hover test had begun to circulate last November, as we discussed at the time.

While no details have been released about the scope of the current trials, the ability to conduct sustained untethered flight is a key milestone for any tiltrotor program, given the complexity of the aircraft’s aerodynamics and flight-control systems. Tiltrotor designs are especially challenging, as evidenced by the V-22’s checkered record through the years. 

In October 2024, a photo emerged showing the first completed prototype of the R6000 at the Wuhu United Aircraft Production Workshop in China’s eastern Anhui province. United Aircraft had unveiled the design, also referred to as the UR6000 and Zhang Ying (or Steel Shadow), at the 2024 Singapore Airshow.

Developed by the Chinese firm United Aircraft, the R6000 is one of the largest uncrewed tiltrotor designs currently in development anywhere in the world. Combining the vertical takeoff and landing capabilities of a helicopter with the speed and range advantages of a fixed-wing aircraft, it is — officially, at least — aimed at logistics, disaster relief, offshore support, and other missions requiring access to areas without prepared runways. United Aircraft has presented both crewed and uncrewed versions of the R6000 in the past.

As we have outlined previously, a crewed or uncrewed tiltrotor in the R6000 class could fulfill various military applications for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The aircraft would be particularly valuable for sustaining PLA island bases in the South China Sea, as well as isolated installations elsewhere in the Pacific and along China’s remote border regions, where conventional airfield infrastructure is limited.

This kind of aircraft could support overseas deployments and regional contingencies, including a potential operation against Taiwan, by moving troops, supplies, and equipment between dispersed locations without relying on prepared runways.

In particular, the R6000 would be well suited to operating from the Type 076 amphibious assault ship and other large People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) amphibious ships, greatly extending their reach for logistics, reconnaissance, and other missions.

As well as logistics, a fully developed R6000 has clear potential as a multi-mission platform. Its payload capacity could also accommodate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment, electronic warfare payloads, communications relay systems, or potentially even precision-strike weapons. It is worth noting at this point that a special operations version of the MV-75 is already in the works, with a gunship variant likely, and a sea control concept has been displayed, too. China is likely to at least explore similar development paths for its tiltrotors.

In this respect, the R6000 also makes for an interesting comparison with Bell’s V-247 Vigilant, which was originally pitched to meet the U.S. Marine Corps multirole, VTOL-capable drone program, known as MUX. The V-247 has also been pitched to the U.S. Navy, while Bell has presented renderings showing V-247s operating together with the crewed V-280 Valor tiltrotor design, which the U.S. Army’s MV-75 is based on.

When it comes to advanced uncrewed aviation, this is an area that China has invested heavily in over the past decade. Its projects span everything from smaller tactical drones to high-altitude reconnaissance platforms and increasingly sophisticated combat drones. The R6000 fits squarely within Chinese efforts to develop a range of uncrewed transport aircraft, including developing large autonomous logistics aircraft capable of operating in challenging environments.

In the vertical-lift segment, China is also busily exploring crewed tiltrotor designs.

Earlier this month, new footage emerged showing what is understood to be China’s first crewed tiltrotor aircraft during flight trials. That aircraft had first broken cover in August of last year, as we wrote about at the time.

Although the R6000 has, in the past, been pitched primarily for civilian applications, the technology has obvious military relevance. Large autonomous tiltrotors could provide rapid resupply to dispersed forces, support operations in remote regions, or deliver cargo to ships and austere bases without the need for conventional runways. Tiltrotors have huge potential for the PLA, which has major littoral mission demands and a growing fleet of amphibious warships to which these kinds of aircraft are especially well suited.

As such, the R6000 is worth watching as another indicator of the Chinese military’s increasingly ambitious vertical-lift programs, as well as its diverse and growing series of uncrewed aircraft.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Beijing warmly welcomes the peace agreement and memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, considering it an important step toward de-escalating regional tensions. China supports the diplomatic path to resolving the crisis, based on a clear strategy aimed at protecting its economic and strategic interests. Beijing emphasizes that a permanent ceasefire, the protection of national sovereignty, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and ensuring the safety of international navigation are top priorities. China contributed behind the scenes to shaping the negotiating framework and influencing Tehran to accept the agreement with the United States in order to safeguard its vital interests in the continued flow of Iranian oil. Accordingly, China officially welcomed the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, affirming that the agreement represents a crucial step toward de-escalating regional tensions. The Chinese diplomatic welcome focused on the key provisions of the agreement, as stated by the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These provisions guarantee a comprehensive ceasefire, freedom of navigation, energy security, an end to the naval blockade, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies. China considers this essential for its energy and economic security. This agreement, along with the nuclear framework and negotiations, marks the conclusion of the first phase, followed by a 30-60 day negotiation period to discuss the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and the lifting of sanctions). This Chinese announcement came in support of international mediation efforts ahead of the official signing ceremony in Geneva.

The most prominent points welcomed by China in the US-Iranian agreement, according to announcements and follow-up by Chinese diplomatic channels and as included in the key provisions of the memorandum of understanding, were a cessation of military operations; an immediate and permanent ceasefire on all fronts, including the Lebanese front; freedom of navigation through a commitment to end the naval blockade and open the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies; and the nuclear framework, with the conclusion of a phase one agreement stipulating that negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and sanctions relief) would take place within a specified timeframe of 30 to 60 days following the signing.

China has played a pivotal, often unacknowledged, role as a diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington to protect its strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. The dimensions of China’s behind-the-scenes role include ensuring the flow of energy. Beijing seeks to maintain stability in the Gulf region to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of Iranian oil and to protect its interests and investments in the Belt and Road Initiative. Iran represents a crucial geographical and strategic hub in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. To this end, Beijing has sought to leverage its strong economic ties and strategic partnership with Tehran to persuade it to make flexible concessions during critical times, while offering support to avoid military escalation. Beijing fears that the collapse of diplomatic channels could lead to a regional war that would jeopardize its extensive investments in the region.

On the other hand, Beijing seeks to counterbalance American influence. China prefers a negotiated framework between Tehran and Washington that limits American unilateral hegemony and positions itself as a responsible international player capable of peacemaking. China’s vision for diplomatic balancing between Washington and Tehran is shaped by several key strategic axes, most importantly (establishing the principle of a political settlement). Here, Beijing consistently emphasizes that dialogue is the only solution to the Iranian crisis, rejecting military escalation that harms the security of navigation and global trade. This is coupled with regional and international networking, where China supports parallel diplomatic efforts, such as Pakistani mediation. Beijing maintains continuous communication with the parties to the crisis to ensure the opening of indirect negotiation channels that prevent a full-scale confrontation and safeguard vital interests. China has maintained the flow of Iranian oil while simultaneously strengthening its extensive economic partnerships with the Gulf states, granting it unique diplomatic weight and influence that Western powers lack. Despite this notable progress, Beijing faces ongoing challenges due to US containment policies. China rejects Washington’s classification of its major technology companies as military entities and threatens retaliatory measures, making Beijing’s attempts to create a strategic balance with the United States an extremely delicate and sensitive process.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can see how successful Beijing has been in transforming escalating tensions in the Middle East into strategic gains. China has played an active mediating role by supporting diplomatic talks and the memorandum of understanding for peace between Washington and Tehran, thus positioning itself as a responsible international power seeking to establish stability and move away from unilateral hegemony.

June 11 (Asia Today) — China’s renminbi, also known as the yuan, has strengthened sharply in recent months as Beijing seeks to elevate the currency’s global standing, but its rapid gains may create new risks for the Chinese economy.

The yuan recently reached its strongest level in three years and three months, prompting some Chinese media to describe the move as an advance by the currency. The trend is expected to continue for the time being.

According to recent reports by Chinese media, including National Business Daily, the yuan was poorly regarded until the end of the last century. Although the official exchange rate hovered around 8.2 yuan per dollar, the currency often traded at about 9 yuan per dollar on black markets in Beijing and other cities.

The yuan’s status began to change after China’s economy expanded rapidly in the early 2000s. After the 2008 global financial crisis weakened confidence in the U.S. economy, the yuan strengthened past 8 per dollar, then 7 per dollar, at times trading in the 6-yuan range.

The currency weakened again early last year and stayed around the 7-yuan level for about a year. Some analysts warned it could fall as low as 7.5 yuan per dollar.

Those concerns proved temporary. The yuan rebounded early this year and returned to the 6-yuan range. It strengthened further and traded around 6.77 yuan per dollar Wednesday, its highest level since Feb. 15, 2023, when it was at 6.8183 yuan per dollar.

Markets widely expect the yuan could strengthen further to around 6.5 per dollar. The currency was worth about 90 won at the end of the last century, but it now trades at about 225 won.

Several factors are driving the yuan’s gains. The prolonged war in the Middle East has increased demand for the yuan alongside the dollar, while China’s large trade surplus, supported by strong exports, has also lifted the currency.

A stronger yuan, however, is not necessarily good for China. It could become a burden for export-dependent companies by making Chinese goods more expensive overseas. Cheaper import prices could also deepen China’s chronic deflationary pressure, which remains a major concern for the economy.

Even so, Chinese economic authorities are not expected to intervene aggressively to slow the yuan’s rise.

Pan Gongsheng, governor of the People’s Bank of China, said during an economic news conference at the National People’s Congress in Beijing on March 6 that the yuan’s recent movement against the dollar reflected China’s stable economic recovery, weakness in the dollar index and a seasonal increase in corporate foreign exchange settlement.

Pan also said China did not need a yuan depreciation, signaling that authorities were comfortable with the currency’s strength.

The yuan’s transformation from a weak and undervalued currency into one with rising global influence has become increasingly difficult to ignore. But its continued ascent could create new pressure on China’s exporters and complicate Beijing’s fight against deflation.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260611010003994

Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, condemns designation, calling it ‘discriminatory’.

The United States has designated Chinese corporate giants Alibaba, BYD and Baidu as companies that support China’s military, expanding its blacklist to some of the country’s best-known commercial brands.

The Pentagon included the firms in an update on Monday that is likely to complicate the fragile detente under way between Washington and Beijing after years of rocky relations.

China’s embassy in Washington, DC, condemned the listing as “discriminatory” and an example of the US government “overstretching” the concept of national security.

“Chinese companies that do business overseas have been strictly observing laws and regulations of their host countries,” an embassy spokesperson said.

“The US should stop its wrong practice and create a fair, just and non-discriminatory environment for Chinese companies.”

Alibaba, BYD and Baidu did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The Pentagon’s list of “Chinese military companies,” which is updated annually, now includes 188 firms, up from 134 in 2025.

Firms included on the list, which was created in 2021, will be barred from consideration for US defence contracts from later this month.

The Pentagon defines “Chinese military companies” as entities owned or controlled by the Chinese military, or that contribute to China’s “military civil fusion”, referring to Beijing’s strategy of melding civilian and defence-related research and innovation.

Companies must also carry out some of their operations in the US to be designated.

The expansion of the blacklist comes less than a month after US President Donald Trump met Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing for a two-day summit aimed at lowering the temperature in their countries’ years-long trade war and tech rivalry.

Alibaba, Baidu, and BYD are among China’s most prominent brands, claiming the top spots in the e-commerce, internet search and electric vehicle markets, respectively.

The addition of several household brands not normally associated with the defence sector mirrors last year’s designation of tech firm Tencent, the owner of the ubiquitous messaging app WeChat.

Other additions to the list include RoboSense Technology, an AI and robotics company with headquarters in Shenzhen, and Hangzhou-based Unitree Robotics.

RoboSense Technology and Unitree Robotics did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Dennis Wilder, a national security expert who worked on China at the CIA and the White House’s National Security Council, expressed scepticism about the feasibility of implementing such a “broad-brush” blacklist.

“Although it may make some US firms wary of engaging with the labelled entities, in fact, many US firms already have deep relationships with these entities, that they are not going to give up unless there are real penalties attached to working commercial deals with them,” Wilder told Al Jazeera.

“Sanctions that range this widely are sanctions that don’t work. Unless the US is willing to decouple from the Chinese economy altogether, these sanctions are simply performative,” Wilder said.

China strongly condemns the Israeli airstrikes and ground incursion into southern Lebanon, describing these operations as a dangerous escalation that threatens the stability of the entire region. China demands that Israel immediately cease its military operations and fully withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory, warning of the dangers of its incursions and violations of established lines. China views the fourth round of Washington talks between Lebanon and Israel and the military tensions as an extension of a broader crisis. Beijing sees this conflict as a consequence of the Gaza war, emphasizing clear principles in its intelligence and military assessment of the situation across several axes, most notably the necessity of an Israeli withdrawal and a ceasefire. Beijing calls for an immediate cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, warning that expanding ground operations will drag the region into chaos. China’s efforts in the reconstruction of Lebanon focus on providing urgent humanitarian aid packages, signing development cooperation agreements, and encouraging Chinese companies to participate in infrastructure projects and long-term investments within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China also defended the Lebanese position in the face of Israeli escalation at the United Nations, with its representative to the Security Council emphasizing that Israel’s advance to Beaufort Castle (Qalaat Al-Shaqif) was the most serious incursion into southern Lebanon in 30 years. He called on the international community to take urgent measures before the situation in Lebanon deteriorated further, demanding respect for Lebanese sovereignty and the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.

The most prominent features of these Chinese efforts for joint cooperation with the Lebanese side and the international community in the reconstruction of Lebanon and the cessation of Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon are the provision of direct financial and development support. The Chinese and Lebanese governments signed a development cooperation agreement in Beirut worth 50 million Chinese yuan to support reconstruction and sustainable development efforts, along with the provision of urgent humanitarian aid. China delivered shipments of emergency humanitarian aid through the Port of Beirut to alleviate the economic and living burdens on the Lebanese people. Furthermore, China encouraged the participation of Chinese companies and investments in reconstruction and development efforts in Lebanon. Beijing has expressed its readiness to encourage its major companies and national institutions to participate in Lebanon’s reconstruction projects and support the development of the energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure sectors through China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Lebanon has been a partner in this Chinese initiative since joining in 2017. China aims to enhance Lebanon’s role as a pivotal hub for trade and logistics in the Middle East. In addition to sustained Chinese diplomatic efforts, China has continued its diplomatic and developmental support for Lebanon, alongside its active participation in UN peacekeeping operations in southern Lebanon.

China’s role in halting the Israeli war on Lebanon has focused on exerting diplomatic pressure through the United Nations and utilizing international platforms to call for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, while supporting political and diplomatic solutions to prevent the conflict from escalating. China has consistently called for an end to Israeli military operations against Lebanon during UN sessions and warned that the collapse of ceasefires places the region on a more dangerous precipice. Beijing called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the devastated Lebanese territories, emphasizing the need to respect international resolutions, Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, and the protection of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). China stressed the importance of ensuring that UN peacekeepers could carry out their duties freely and safely and condemned any attacks against UNIFIL personnel. China also emphasized the need to intensify humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people to address the repercussions of the war and expressed its full readiness to contribute to restoring regional stability.

Here, Chinese diplomatic and intelligence agencies affirmed that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security must not be violated, stressing that extending the authority of the Lebanese state and protecting its stability are the fundamental pillars for preventing the entire region from sliding into a comprehensive regional war. They reiterated the necessity of respecting Lebanon’s sovereignty and security, considering the stability and protection of the Lebanese state as essential to preventing a full-blown regional war. China also expressed its full support for the role of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and emphasized the need to provide guarantees for its protection and freedom of movement to carry out its mission. From an analytical perspective, Beijing believes that a political solution to the crisis must include respect for international resolutions and adherence to the two-state solution for Palestine and Israel. It also expressed concern that these negotiations might lead to regional arrangements that serve the interests of certain major powers and marginalize other parties in the region. On the other hand, China welcomes dialogue and diplomatic solutions as a means to ease tensions in the Middle East and supports efforts to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty. However, Beijing has criticized unilateral US actions in managing interconnected issues such as Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, emphasizing the need to adhere to international resolutions and support regional stability, avoiding military interventions and the expansion of conflict.

Beijing adopts a clear strategic vision regarding the Lebanese crisis, which is summarized in its emphasis on respecting sovereignty. Chinese diplomacy strongly condemns any violations of Lebanese sovereignty and calls for an immediate halt to foreign military operations on Lebanese territory to ensure the safety of civilians. With Chinese intelligence and military agencies calling for a monopoly on weapons, a position reiterated by the Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council, China supports the Lebanese state as the sole guarantor of internal stability. This signifies Beijing’s strong support for the principle of state monopoly on weapons, considering official institutions the only guarantor of internal stability and the prevention of the country’s disintegration. China also supports the UNIFIL forces, opposing the termination of the UNIFIL mandate and demanding that it be enabled to fulfill its mission to ensure stability in southern Lebanon and contribute to regional de-escalation. Beijing emphasizes that escalation will not resolve crises, urging conflicting parties (including Washington and Tehran) to prioritize diplomacy and political negotiation to exercise restraint.

China’s state-linked media system is preparing a major investment in artificial intelligence aimed at advancing and disseminating President Xi Jinping’s political ideology. According to Shanghai Stock Exchange filings, Xinhuanet, owned by the official Xinhua News Agency, plans to invest over 1.1 billion yuan (about $162 million) in an AI system called “Xinhua Yudian,” or “Xinhua lexicon.”

The AI agent is designed as an “authoritative” tool for learning, researching, and distributing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. It will draw on a curated state-controlled database and is intended to deliver official narratives, current affairs, and political content in a structured format.

The project builds on China’s broader national strategy to integrate artificial intelligence across governance, industry, and society under the “AI+” initiative launched in 2025, which encourages widespread adoption of AI technologies in both public and private sectors.

Why It Matters

This development highlights how artificial intelligence is increasingly being used not only as a technological tool but also as an instrument of political communication and ideological reinforcement. Unlike commercial AI systems designed for open-ended information retrieval, this platform is explicitly structured to promote state-approved interpretations of policy and leadership thinking.

The initiative reflects Beijing’s growing emphasis on controlling information ecosystems in an era of information overload and competing narratives. By positioning AI as a “trust layer” for political and policy information, China is attempting to address concerns about misinformation while simultaneously strengthening ideological consistency across digital platforms.

The project also signals a broader convergence between state power and emerging technologies. As AI systems become more integrated into education, media, and governance, they are increasingly shaping not only what information is accessed but how it is interpreted. This raises important questions about transparency, bias, and the role of algorithmic systems in political messaging.

Chinese Government and Communist Party
Seeking to strengthen ideological cohesion and ensure consistent dissemination of Xi Jinping’s political doctrine.

Xinhuanet and Xinhua News Agency
Acting as the implementing body, responsible for building and deploying the AI system using state-approved datasets.

Technology Sector in China
Participating in the broader “AI+” initiative, which encourages integration of artificial intelligence across industries.

Chinese Citizens and Digital Users
Target users of the system, particularly students, officials, and professionals seeking policy-related information and official references.

Global Technology Community
Observing China’s use of AI in state communication as part of a wider debate on governance, censorship, and AI ethics.

Future Outlook

The rollout of “Xinhua Yudian” is likely to deepen the integration of artificial intelligence into China’s political and information architecture. If successful, it could serve as a model for other state-backed AI systems designed to standardize ideological communication and policy interpretation.

In the near term, the platform is expected to function as both an information retrieval system and a citation verification tool for official discourse. This may reduce ambiguity in policy communication but also further centralize control over authoritative narratives.

Longer term, the project raises questions about how AI will shape political legitimacy and information control in authoritarian systems. As AI becomes more capable of generating and filtering content at scale, its role may shift from a neutral tool to an active participant in shaping public perception and ideological alignment.

The initiative underscores a broader global trend in which artificial intelligence is not only transforming economies and industries but also becoming a strategic instrument in statecraft and governance.

With information from Reuters.

Stephen Curry is a free agent no more.

A sneaker free agent, that is.

The four-time NBA champion has spent his entire playing career with the Golden State Warriors and is under contract through the end of next season.

He has been playing without a shoe deal, however, since parting ways with Under Armour in November.

That won’t be the case when Curry starts his 18th NBA season in the fall. The man who holds the NBA record for most career three-pointers announced on Monday that his Curry Brand is teaming with Chinese sportswear and athletic equipment company Li-Ning for a partnership that is “bigger than a shoe deal” and “bigger than a signature series.”

”This is the partnership of a lifetime. The future of Curry Brand is with Li-Ning,” Curry wrote in a post announcing the deal on his Thirty Ink site. “I couldn’t be more proud to build a long-term vision with Li-Ning that will fuel Curry Brand for years to come and unlock the full potential of this company on a global scale.”

ESPN reports that the deal is for 10 years. Terms were not released.

Curry signed with Nike for the first four seasons of his career before switching to Under Armour in 2013. After announcing his sneaker free agency early in the 2025-26 season, Curry wore shoes from a variety of companies during warmups and games. In April, Curry auctioned off more than 70 pairs of those shoes through Sotheby’s, raising more than $1.7 million for his charitable foundation.

While many of his shoe choices had special significance — like when he honored Kobe and Gianna Bryant by warming up in Nike Kobe 6 Protro “Mambacita” sneakers — Curry also was doing his due diligence as a businessman.

“Throughout my sneaker free agency, I was impressed by the quality, comfort and performance of Li-Ning’s shoes,” Curry said. “It was during that time playing in Dwyane Wade and Jimmy Butler’s sneakers, that I knew that Li-Ning could be the right partner that can deliver on the innovation and design that I want Curry Brand to stand for.”

Li-Ning (the company) was founded by Li Ning — the Chinese gymnast who won six medals, including three gold, during the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics — in 1990. A handful of NBA players have signed with the company , starting with then-Cleveland Cavaliers guard Damon Jones in 2006 and also including former Clippers guard Baron Davis and future Hall of Famers Wade and Shaquille O’Neal.

In addition to Curry’s Golden State teammate Butler, other current NBA stars signed with Li-Ning include Atlanta’s C.J. McCollum and Washington’s D’Angelo Russell.

According to Curry, Li-Ning will open Curry Brand stores in the United States and China.

“We’ll be proudly building Curry Brand into a future leading company that will leave its mark in Basketball, in Golf and across the lifestyle space,” Curry wrote.

“We’ll aim to create game-changing products, launch elevated platforms and bring storytelling that will inspire young boys and girls around the globe. My hope is for young athletes to find the same purpose, joy and drive through sports that I’ve long enjoyed throughout this journey.”

China’s decision to send a largely academic delegation instead of senior defence leadership to the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore has been described by Australia as a missed opportunity for strategic engagement at a time of rising regional tensions.

Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said the Asia Pacific region needs greater strategic reassurance from Beijing, particularly given China’s ongoing military expansion and its growing influence across the Indo Pacific.

The Shangri La Dialogue is the region’s most prominent defence and security forum, bringing together senior ministers, military leaders, and policymakers from across the world to discuss security challenges and regional stability.

For the second consecutive year, China’s Defence Minister Dong Jun did not attend the meeting, with Beijing instead sending a delegation made up mainly of academics and military experts.

Why It Matters

The absence of senior Chinese defence officials comes at a sensitive moment for regional security dynamics.

Australia and its allies have repeatedly raised concerns about China’s rapid military buildup, which is widely regarded as the largest conventional expansion since the Second World War. Regional governments argue that this military growth has not been matched by sufficient transparency or reassurance about China’s long term intentions.

The lack of direct high level engagement at forums such as the Shangri La Dialogue limits opportunities to reduce misunderstandings, build trust, and manage rising tensions through dialogue.

For countries in the Indo Pacific, especially smaller states, the absence of senior Chinese representation can increase uncertainty about regional security and long term strategic balance.

Key Stakeholders

China

China’s approach reflects a more controlled engagement strategy in defence diplomacy, relying on lower profile participation while continuing to expand military capabilities and regional influence.

Australia

Australia views sustained dialogue as essential for regional stability, while simultaneously strengthening its alliance with the United States and deepening defence cooperation across the Indo Pacific.

United States

The United States remains a central security partner in the region and continues to position itself as a counterbalance to China’s military rise through alliances and defence agreements.

Regional Partners

Countries such as Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and others attending the forum are closely watching China’s engagement level as they navigate their own security concerns in a shifting regional order.

Future Outlook

If China continues limiting senior level participation in regional defence forums, diplomatic channels for managing tensions in the Indo Pacific may become more constrained. This could increase reliance on bilateral alliances and military deterrence rather than multilateral dialogue.

At the same time, ongoing military expansion by China will likely keep regional security concerns elevated, particularly among Southeast Asian and Pacific nations.

However, if future editions of the Shangri La Dialogue see higher level Chinese participation, it could open pathways for improved communication and reduced strategic mistrust.

For now, the gap between China’s military rise and its diplomatic engagement remains a key concern for regional powers seeking stability in an increasingly competitive Indo Pacific environment.

With information from Reuters.

Less than a year after we got our first proper look at China’s wing-in-ground effect (WIG) craft, dubbed the ‘Bohai Sea Monster,’ the aircraft has appeared again, with evidence that it has a combat role, likely including launching weapons. We can also confirm that, contrary to some earlier assessments, the craft is powered by four turboprop engines, rather than turbofans. This confirms our original analysis that the craft may have propeller engines as opposed to jets.

The Bohai Sea Monster was first identified by submarine warfare analyst HI Sutton in June 2025. The aircraft, with its distinctive flying-boat hull and joined v-tail, was spotted on a pier on the Bohai Sea, at the northwestern end of the Yellow Sea. The following month, better imagery appeared, showing the craft on the water, but without its propellers fitted, adding to speculation that it might be jet-powered.

New images show the Bohai Sea Monster in greater detail, including its powerplants, which appear to be regular turboprops, rather than a hybrid-electric propulsion system, something that would make a lot of sense for an aircraft of this kind. Each of the four engines drives a three-bladed propeller.

Perhaps even more interesting is the appearance under each wing of a pair of hardpoints, which appear to be intended to release stores. Potentially, these pylons could be used to mount external fuel tanks or sensor pods. However, they appear to be fitted with shackles, which would clearly indicate a plan to release stores. While some kind of search-and-rescue payload, such as life-raft containers, is a possibility, the military paint scheme and PLA doctrine point more to the craft being armed with some kind of offensive weapons. Air-launched drones could be another payload, with this being an area of growing interest for the Chinese military.

The development raises questions about some reports that this is a “civilian” program nominally tied to the China Coast Guard, although cover stories of this kind are hardly unusual for Chinese military programs.

At the very least, the Bohai Sea Monster is certainly not a pure transport craft. Some kind of multi-role platform is also a strong possibility.

There is also the possibility, one that we raised in the past, that the Bohai Sea Monster is actually a subscale demonstrator, one that’s intended to prove out the WIG concept. If successful, this could then lead to a much larger craft and one that would, of course, have a different powerplant and much greater payload — including weapons.

The Bohai Sea Monster’s broad similarities to the now-abandoned, U.S.-designed Liberty Lifter could also point to the Chinese craft being a subscale technology demonstrator.

Notably, subscale demonstrators of flying boats are nothing new. Indeed, Germany built one to trial the flight characteristics of its planned Dornier Do 214 transatlantic flying boat back in World War II. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union built a single example of its first jet-powered flying boat, the Beriev R-1, before the same company fed this experience into the much larger and more ambitious Be-10 Mallow.

As for WIG craft in general, these were extensively explored by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, leading to some enormous vehicles, including anti-ship strike platforms and assault craft, which even saw some military service. In Russian parlance, they are known as Ekranoplans.

A video showing the Soviet Lun class missile-armed Ekranoplan:

Video Lun class Ekranoplan (Caspian)

Post-Cold War, the WIG concept fell from favor, but it has made something of a return in more recent years. These craft are able to skim the dense air above the surface of the water with relatively high efficiency and speed, while most are also capable of less-efficient higher-altitude flight.

In the context of the Pacific, specifically, WIG craft are seen as a potential partial answer to some of the challenges of fighting in that theater. This includes moving cargoes (including very heavy ones), as well as personnel and materiel to far-flung locations that may not be served by runways. In the process, large distances may need to be covered, and fast. It is for the logistics mission that the U.S. military was looking to the Liberty Lifter.

There is also the very important fact that, by skimming low over the water, a WIG craft can stay below the radar horizon, avoiding the gaze of surface- and land-based sensors. At the same time, it is immune to mines, submarines, and other hazards that can threaten even relatively safe waters. These advantages have to be weighed up against an airframe that remains generally vulnerable in a heavily contested combat zone.

For China, a platform of this kind would also be very useful, especially in the highly strategic South China Sea. In peacetime, a WIG craft could be used to support bases in the region, as well as search and rescue, and other missions. In a conflict, the same types of craft could perform rapid resupply, as well as surveillance, in island chains and littoral regions.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is expected to be a recipient of the AG600 amphibious flying boat, which could perform similar missions. Unlike most militaries, the PLA has never fully moved away from operating flying boats, most recently the SH-5, a handful of which were completed, primarily for anti-submarine warfare, but were apparently withdrawn in recent years.

When it comes to an armed WIG craft, even in its current size, the Bohai Sea Monster could be a very useful sea control platform, undertaking both anti-submarine warfare and anti-shipping strike over regional distances, perhaps as a more ‘tactical’ counterpart to the AG600 and shore-based types. It would still be large enough to accommodate sensors, with up to four torpedoes or smaller anti-ship missiles carried underwing. Depth charges are another possibility.

Such a craft would be suitable for local patrols of littoral areas, as well as support of special forces, etc. A smaller WIG craft would also be valuable for combat search and rescue (CSAR), likely to be a key mission should China go to war in the Pacific.

Of course, a scaled-up Bohai Sea Monster would be much more capable across all these kinds of missions. It would likely offer the capacity for an internal stores bay, as well as a heavier payload, a more comprehensive sensor suite, and a longer range.

Exactly what role the Bohai Sea Monster will ultimately fill, and whether it represents an operational platform or merely a stepping-stone toward something far larger and more capable, remains unclear.

However, its reappearance with apparent weapons-carrying provisions strongly suggests China is exploring far more than a niche transport or utility aircraft. Instead, it points to a broader effort to revive and adapt the WIG concept for modern military operations in the Pacific, where speed, range, payload, and access to austere maritime areas could all prove critical.

At the same time, the craft joins a growing list of highly ambitious and sometimes novel Chinese aerospace and naval programs that are emerging at a remarkable pace, often revealing themselves only in fragments before their true purpose becomes apparent.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

China’s Xi Jinping has welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin to Beijing. The two leaders praised their strong ties, and spoke about the importance of maintaining their ‘comprehensive partnership’.

DEVELOPING STORYDEVELOPING STORY,

Xi and Putin hold talks just days after US President Donald Trump made an official visit to China.

A meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin has started in Beijing, Chinese state media report.

Xi welcomed Putin to the Chinese capital on Wednesday, shaking hands with the Russian leader outside the Great Hall of the People before their talks, video by Russian media showed.

Before entering the Great Hall, Putin and Xi walked down a red carpet, rolled out to greet the Russian leader, and stood as a military band played their two national anthems.

Putin began the talks by hailing the “strong, positive” momentum in cooperation between Russia and China, according to Russian media.

“Even amid unfavourable external factors, our cooperation and economic cooperation is showing strong, positive momentum,” Putin told Xi.

Addressing Putin, Xi lauded the “unyielding relationship” between China and Russia.

“We have been able to continuously deepen our political mutual trust and strategic coordination with a resilience that remains unyielding despite trials and tribulations,” Xi told Putin, according to China’s Xinhua news agency.

The Chinese leader also addressed war in the Middle East, telling his Russian counterpart that further conflict was “inadvisable” and a ceasefire was necessary.

“A comprehensive ceasefire is of utmost urgency, resuming hostilities is even more inadvisable and maintaining negotiations is particularly important,” Xi said, according to Xinhua.

Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu, reporting from Beijing, noted that Putin’s visit and that of the recently concluded trip by US President Donald Trump to China were very different.

Putin, she said, is marking 25 years of the Sino-Russian friendship, has visited China dozens of times, and met with Xi on more than 40 other occasions.

“So this visit will really be about deepening existing coordination and cooperation,” Yu said.

“We are expecting that the two sides will update each other on the situation in the Middle East, as well as Ukraine. No doubt, Xi Jinping will also talk to Putin about what was discussed with Donald Trump last week,” Yu said.

Putin is being accompanied by a large delegation of Russian businesspeople and government leaders, and the Kremlin has announced that the two leaders will sign some 40 different agreements, Yu said, covering everything from the economy and tourism to education.

“But I think for Putin, the main topic of discussion with Xi Jinping is going to be on energy security,” Yu said.

“Since the war in Ukraine, any gas sales that were previously heading to Europe – that is all dried up – and Russia is in desperate need of revenue to replace that, especially since we are in the fifth year of the Ukraine war,” she added.

In a video address released before meeting Xi, Putin said Beijing and Moscow are prepared to cooperate with each other on “core interests ‌of ⁠the two countries, including the protection of sovereignty and national unity”, the Reuters news agency reports.

Both countries are actively expanding ⁠ties in economy, politics and defence, Putin said, adding that “a close” and “strategic” connection between Moscow and Beijing ⁠was playing “a stabilising role” in global relations.

“We are not aligning against anyone, but working ⁠for the cause of peace and universal prosperity,” Putin said.

US President Donald Trump said he discussed US arms sales to Taiwan with Chinese leader Xi Jinping during talks in Beijing. Trump also said he is considering lifting sanctions on Chinese companies that buy Iranian oil.

In China, Elon Musk has gained both admiration and criticism. While he is seen as a visionary, he has faced scrutiny from regulators and the public due to issues with customer complaints. The success of Musk’s SpaceX and its Starlink satellite service has also led to concerns from the People’s Liberation Army, especially as Tesla faces growing competition from Chinese electric vehicle (EV) manufacturers, which threatens Musk’s standing in the market.

Musk recently attended a summit in Beijing with U. S. President Donald Trump, alongside other CEOs like Tim Cook and Jensen Huang, focusing on resolving business issues with China. After a formal welcome, Musk expressed his desire to achieve “many good things” in the country. At the same event, Xiaomi’s CEO Lei Jun, an admirer of Musk, took a selfie with him, which became popular on social media, showcasing the public’s interest in Musk.

Despite facing competition on technology and pricing from local companies, Musk and Tesla remain influential in China. Experts note that Musk’s business goals align with China’s technological priorities, including electric vehicles, AI, and advanced robotics, making Tesla’s self-driving technology the standard in the industry. In 2018, Tesla became the first foreign automaker permitted to operate in China without a local partner, and its sales in the country reached about 626,000 vehicles last year, contributing significantly to its revenue.

Other Chinese carmakers, like Chery, draw inspiration from Tesla’s focus on innovation, blending it with Toyota’s emphasis on quality. However, Musk’s other ventures, particularly SpaceX, provoke concern among Chinese military and government officials due to its dominance in satellite communications, especially in light of geopolitical tensions, hinting at efforts to develop domestic alternatives.

Though Musk’s social media platform, X, is banned in China, he has a significant following on Weibo and has been celebrated as a global icon in the country. His recent visit pertains to an attempt to purchase $2.9 billion in solar manufacturing equipment from Chinese suppliers, although this may be affected by China’s potential export restrictions on advanced technologies to the U. S.

Musk’s company is also seeking regulatory approval for more advanced self-driving technology. However, his relationship with China has been delicate, particularly when Tesla faced backlash in 2021 over its handling of customer complaints, highlighted by a public protest at an auto show. Additionally, Teslas were previously banned from military areas due to security concerns.

Looking ahead, organizations believe that Tesla’s standing might challenge Musk’s popularity in China as local companies continue to progress. However, he is likely to remain an influential figure in China’s tech scene for his achievements in the automotive and technology industries.

With information from Reuters

BEIJING — President Trump arrived in Beijing on Wednesday for his hotly anticipated talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the Iran war, trade and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

The meat of the summit doesn’t start until Thursday, when the leaders hold bilateral talks, visit the Temple of Heaven, where Chinese emperors once prayed for bumper crops, and take part in a formal banquet. But the Chinese offered Trump a pomp-filled welcome, literally rolling out the red carpet for him after Air Force One landed in the Chinese capital.

The president was greeted by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng; Xie Feng, China’s ambassador to Washington; Ma Zhaoxu, executive vice minister of foreign affairs; and the U.S. envoy to Beijing, David Perdue.

The welcoming ceremony included a military honor guard, a military band and some 300 Chinese youths waving Chinese and American flags and chanting, “Welcome, welcome! Warm welcome!” as Trump made his way to his waiting limousine. The youth greeters were decked out in white and robin’s egg blue outfits that matched the paint job of the iconic presidential plane.

President Trump walks with China’s Vice President Han Zheng during an arrival ceremony Wednesday at Beijing Capital International Airport, as Eric and Lara Trump, Elon Musk, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer follow.

(Mark Schiefelbein / Associated Press)

“We’re the two superpowers,” Trump told reporters as he departed the White House on Tuesday for the long flight to Beijing. “We’re the strongest nation on Earth in terms of military. China’s considered second.”

While Trump likes to project a sense of strength, the visit occurs at a delicate moment for his presidency as his popularity at home has been weighed down by the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran and rising inflation as a consequence of that conflict. The Republican president is seeking a win by signing deals with China to buy more American soybeans, beef and aircraft, saying he’ll be talking with Xi about trade “more than anything else.”

The Trump administration hopes to begin establishing a Board of Trade with China to address differences between the countries. The board could help prevent the trade war ignited last year after Trump’s tariff hikes, an action China countered through its control of rare earth minerals. That led to a one-year truce last October.

But Trump is visiting Beijing when Iran continues to dominate his domestic agenda. The war has led to the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, stranding oil and natural gas tankers and causing energy prices to spike to levels that could sabotage global economic growth. The U.S. president declared that Xi didn’t need to assist in resolving the conflict, even though Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was in Beijing last week.

Fellow rescuers carry the coffins of two members of the civil defense who were reportedly killed in Israeli airstrikes in Nabatieh the previous day, during their funeral in the southern city of Sidon on May 13, 2026. Israel hammered south Lebanon with strikes on May 12 ahead of talks between the two countries in Washington, as Beirut reported 380 people killed in Israeli attacks since an April 17 ceasefire took effect.

(Mahmoud Zayyat/AFP via Getty Images)

“We have a lot of things to discuss. I wouldn’t say Iran is one of them, to be honest with you, because we have Iran very much under control,” Trump told reporters Tuesday.

Taiwan high on the agenda

The status of Taiwan also will be a major topic as China is displeased with U.S. plans to sell weapons to the self-governing island, which the Chinese government claims as part of its own territory.

Trump told reporters on Monday that he would be discussing with Xi an $11 billion weapons package for Taiwan that the U.S. administration authorized in December but has not yet begun fulfilling. The arms package is the largest ever approved for Taiwan.

But Trump has demonstrated greater ambivalence toward Taiwan, an approach that’s raising questions about whether the U.S. leader could be open to dialing back support for the island democracy.

The Taiwanese flag at Democracy Boulevard is lowered at the end of the day as the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is seen in the background in Taipei on May 13, 2026.

(I-Hwa Cheng/AFP via Getty Images)

At the same time, Taiwan — as the world’s leading chipmaker — has become essential for the development of artificial intelligence, with the U.S. importing more goods so far this year from Taiwan than China. Trump has sought to use Biden-era programs and his own deals to bring more chipmaking to America.

The Chinese Communist Party’s news outlet, People’s Daily, published a strongly worded editorial ahead of Trump’s arrival underscoring that Taiwan is “the first red line that cannot be crossed in China-U.S. relations” and is “the biggest point of risk” between the two nations.

Trump was already portraying the trip as a success before he even left White House grounds. He openly mused about Xi’s planned reciprocal visit to the U.S. later this year, lamenting that the White House ballroom under construction would not be completed in time to properly fete the Chinese leader.

“We’re going to have a great relationship for many, many decades to come,” Trump said of the U.S. and China.

Counter snipers and other security forces watch over Air Force One while refueling at Joint Base Elmendorf during a trip with US President Donald J. Trump in Anchorage, Alaska, on May 12, 2026. Donald Trump was due in Beijing on May 13, 2026 on the first visit to China by a US president in nearly a decade, as he seeks to ramp up trade despite potential friction over Taiwan and Iran.

(Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images)

Trump embarked on Air Force One for the big meeting with a coterie of aides, family members and business world titans, including Nvidia’s Jensen Huang and Tesla and SpaceX’s Elon Musk. While en route to Beijing, he posted on social media that his “first request” to Xi during the visit will be to ask the Chinese leader to bolster the presence of U.S. firms in China.

“I will be asking President Xi, a Leader of extraordinary distinction, to ‘open up’ China so that these brilliant people can work their magic, and help bring the People’s Republic to an even higher level!” Trump wrote.

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon and China’s President Xi Jinping attend a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People on Tuesday, in Beijing.

(Maxim Shemetov—Pool / Getty Images)

Despite Trump’s outward confidence, China appears to be entering the meeting from “a much stronger place,” said Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser on Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

China would like to reduce tech restrictions on accessing computer chips and find ways to reduce tariffs, among other goals.

“But even if they don’t get much on any of those things, as long as there’s not a blow-up in the meeting and President Trump doesn’t go away and look to re-escalate, China basically comes out stronger,” Kennedy said.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng met on Wednesday to discuss economic and trade issues at Incheon International Airport, just west of the South Korean capital of Seoul, according to the Chinese state run Xinhua News Agency.

Bystanders are kept back by police tape as they film the motorcade of President Donald Trump as he arrives at the Four Seasons Hotel on Wednesday in Beijing.

(Kevin Frayer / Getty Images)

Trump wants 3-way nuclear arms deal

Trump also intends to raise the idea of the U.S., China and Russia signing a pact that would set limits on the nuclear weapons each nation keeps in its arsenal, according to a senior Trump administration official who briefed reporters ahead of the trip. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the White House.

China has previously been cool to entering such a pact. Beijing’s arsenal, according to Pentagon estimates, exceeds more than 600 operational nuclear warheads and is far from parity with the U.S. and Russia, which each are estimated to have more than 5,000 nuclear warheads.

The last nuclear arms pact, known as the New START treaty, between Russia and the United States expired in February, removing any caps on the two largest atomic arsenals for the first time in more than a half-century. As the treaty was set to expire, Trump rejected a call by Russia to extend the two-country deal for another year and called for “a new, improved, and modernized” deal that includes China.

The Pentagon estimates China will have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.

Madhani, Weissert and Boak write for the Associated Press. Boak reported from Washington. AP writers Darlene Superville in Washington, Huizhong Wu in Bangkok, Hyung-jin Kim in Seoul, South Korea, and Kanis Leung in Hong Kong contributed to this report.

Taipei, Taiwan – Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to seek concessions on Taiwan and US tariffs when he meets United States President Donald Trump for a high-stakes summit taking place in the shadow of the war on Iran.

Trump will arrive in China on Wednesday evening for a three-day visit that will mark the first trip by a US leader to the country since 2017, when Trump visited in the early days of his first term.

Unlike Trump, who is renowned for his mercurial policymaking, Xi is widely seen as predictable in his goals for the summit, particularly as they concern Beijing’s longstanding “core interests” related to national security and territorial integrity.

At the top of that list is Taiwan.

While Taiwan’s government considers itself the head of a de facto sovereign state, Beijing views the island as an inalienable part of its territory.

The US formally cut ties with Taiwan – also known as the Republic of China – decades ago, but is committed to aiding the self-governing democracy’s defence under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.

Under the law, Washington has provided Taiwan with billions of dollars in arms and pursued cooperation in areas such as military training and intelligence sharing, which Beijing considers interference in its internal affairs.

The US government officially acknowledges that China views Taiwan as part of its territory, but does not express a stance on whether it agrees.

Washington is also intentionally vague about whether it would intervene to defend Taiwan if China sought to annex it by force.

In a call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio last month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made clear that Taiwan would be raised at the summit, describing the issue as “the biggest risk in the China-US relationship”, according to a Chinese readout of the call.

China’s embassy in Washington, DC, reiterated that message after Trump’s departure for the summit on Tuesday, naming Taiwan as the first of “four red lines” that “must not be challenged”.

While analysts say it is unlikely that the US will change its position on Taiwan due to Chinese pressure, Trump said this week that the summit’s agenda would include US arms sales to the island, raising questions about the future of a stalled multibillion-dollar arms deal.

The US Congress approved the arms package reportedly worth $14bn earlier this year, but the sale still requires Trump’s final approval.

Xi will use his meetings with Trump to “influence and potentially convince Trump to agree to scale back, if not completely suspend, sales to Taiwan,” William Yang, a Taipei-based analyst at the Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera.

If Trump were to make concessions on weapons sales to Taiwan, he would be breaking with a longstanding policy against consulting with Beijing that dates back to former US President Ronald Reagan.

Cancelling or watering down the deal would be a serious blow to Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te, who is locked in an intense fight with the opposition over defence spending, Yang said.

“They are hoping to first influence Trump’s decision around this issue and potentially create a situation where it will be much harder for [Lai’s] government to request more special defensive spending in the future,” Yang said.

Restoring the US-China framework

Xi is also eager to smooth over US-China relations after a tumultuous 18 months that saw Trump launch a second trade war with the world’s second-largest economy, according to analysts.

The standoff saw each side roll out escalating tit-for-tat tariffs – briefly sending duties well above 100 percent – and other punitive measures, such as export controls, before Washington and Beijing hit pause in May.

During their last meeting in South Korea in October, Xi and Trump agreed to a one-year reprieve in their trade war, while keeping some trade measures in place, including certain tariffs and export controls.

Over the past month, the US has rolled out several rounds of new sanctions targeting Chinese firms, including refiners accused of buying Iranian oil and companies accused of helping Tehran obtain materials to build drones and missiles.

Earlier this month, Beijing issued a “prohibition order” directing firms to disregard the US sanctions on its oil refineries.

“Beijing wants predictability and certainty for the remainder of Trump’s term through January 2029, because Beijing needs to be able to plan its own economic policies,” Feng Chucheng, a founding partner of Beijing-based Hutong Research advisory, told Al Jazeera.

These policy considerations include understanding tariff levels the US will apply to China and its trade partners, Feng said.

Wang Wen, dean of the school for global leadership at Renmin University in Beijing, said China wishes to return to a relationship based on “peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation”.

“We hope that this meeting will bring the US policy towards China back to these three principles,” Wang told Al Jazeera.

The stakes are high for Beijing, where the view of Trump has shifted from a “predictable transactional counterpart” to a “more action-oriented and harder-to-restrain opponent,” Hung Pu-Chao, deputy executive director of the Center for Mainland China and Regional Development Research at Taiwan’s Tunghai University, told Al Jazeera.

Restoring the US-China relationship to a stable footing is one way to mitigate these risks, Hung said.

Rather than secure concessions, Hung said, China’s priority is “trying to adjust the current strategic position and negotiating pace that are unfavourable to it, and bring US-China interactions back into a framework that it can better control”.

At the summit, Xi is likely to agree to increase purchases of US agricultural exports and Boeing planes, Feng said, and could also back Trump’s plan to create a “Board of Trade” and a “Board of Investment” to oversee US-China economic ties.

But China is unlikely to make compromises on rare earths – a sector it dominates – unless the US makes major political concessions, Feng said.

Calling for dialogue on the war on Iran

The US-Israel war on Iran will loom large over the summit.

Although not a main player in the conflict, China has been hit by the economic fallout of the war and the shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of global oil and natural gas supplies usually pass.

Beijing has called for negotiations and a comprehensive ceasefire since the start of the conflict, a message Xi is likely to reiterate in his talks with Trump, according to Jodie Wen, a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

“Xi will talk about this issue with Donald Trump and say that we all know that the war has a huge impact on the world, on Asian countries and the US, so we must have dialogue,” Wen told Al Jazeera.

Trump said on Tuesday that he does not need China’s “help” resolving the war, though the White House has pressured Beijing to lean on Iran to reopen the strait.

Xi and his top diplomat, Wang, have met more than a dozen global leaders and high-level officials since the start of the war, playing a behind-the-scenes mediating role.

China has had a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Iran since 2016, and buys more than 80 percent of its oil.

Wen, the postdoctoral fellow at Tsinghua University, said Xi is unlikely to agree to any involvement except as a mediator, which she described as consistent with China’s longstanding approach to global affairs.

“China’s foreign policy principle is non-intervention,” she said. “This is our principle.”

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is in Beijing, seeking support on a deal with the US, while US President Trump will be in China next week, and Iran will be on the agenda.

Why is everyone turning to China? What role is Beijing playing in the US-Israel led war on Iran?

Chinese military and intelligence analyses for 2025 and 2026 indicate that China views the expansion of the Egyptian Armed Forces in establishing numerous naval and air bases, such as the Bernice and Gargoub bases, with strategic interest. Beijing considers this trend, spearheaded by the Egyptian political leadership under President El-Sisi and the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, a vital component of a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, aimed at securing shared interests in strategically vital regions. Chinese intelligence and military agencies view the Egyptian expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib base, the July 3 base, and bases east and west of the Suez Canal, as part of a comprehensive Chinese strategy to develop the Egyptian Armed Forces and enhance their deterrent capabilities against Beijing’s adversaries in the region. This perspective aligns with Beijing’s view of Egypt as a key strategic partner in Africa and the Middle East. The Chinese military establishment’s vision for this Egyptian military development of air and naval bases up to 2026 can be detailed, as follows: Supporting the Egyptian political leadership’s vision, from a Chinese perspective, of Egyptian military development under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is seen as a serious attempt to modernize the army and transform it into a smart deterrent force capable of protecting national security and the country’s economic interests. This aligns with China’s +1 strategy (localization), as China seeks to leverage the development of Egyptian bases to become centers for localizing Chinese military technology in Egypt, particularly in the areas of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Wing Loong and advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B.

In this context, China views Egypt’s expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib Base, the July 3 Base, and the bases east and west of the Suez Canal, with strategic interest as a crucial element in strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership between Cairo and Beijing. China considers these Egyptian military bases, especially those located on the Mediterranean Sea and near the Suez Canal. Bases like the July 3rd Air Base serve as vital support points for protecting China’s commercial interests and the routes of its Belt and Road Initiative, which passes through the Egyptian Suez Canal. Egypt represents a cornerstone in China’s 21st-century strategy. Therefore, China aims to bolster Egypt’s deterrent capabilities (a defense partnership). Chinese military officials believe that modernizing the Egyptian armed forces through these naval and air bases and localizing Chinese defense industries in Cairo, in accordance with President Sisi’s vision, enhances the independence of Egyptian military decision-making, paves the way for multipolarity, supports developing countries in the Global South, and contributes to regional stability. Relations between Egypt and China have moved beyond mere arms deals to the localization of Chinese technology within Egypt, enabling Egypt to confront regional challenges more effectively and creating a kind of regional balance of power. Here, Beijing, by supporting Egyptian military expansion through these bases, aims to create a strategic balance in the region amidst a growing Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement seen as an alternative to or complement to traditional partnerships with the West. This can be inferred from the military exercises. The air capabilities and joint military exercises between Egypt and China are reflected here. Joint air exercises, such as Eagles of Civilization 2025, and cooperation at Wadi Abu Rish Air Base are Egyptian-Chinese joint training exercises aimed at exchanging expertise in air combat and protecting maritime routes. This coincides with Egypt’s interest in military and arms deals with China, such as the J-10C. Other Egyptian military negotiations with China regarding the purchase of advanced submarines, known as the Yuan class, are also underway. This reduces Egypt’s military dependence on Washington and the West and strengthens the Chinese presence in the Egyptian military arsenal. This reflects a convergence of military visions between the two countries, with China supporting Egypt’s efforts to modernize its military infrastructure. The new bases are considered a cornerstone for securing shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Beijing also aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership. Here, the Chinese vision extends beyond mere arms deals; it views this as a core partnership aimed at establishing a broad military alliance with Egypt to develop the Chinese military Silk Road. This includes joint operational planning and training exercises, as demonstrated in the Civilization Eagles 2025 maneuvers. China seeks to effect a comprehensive shift in the regional balance of power. Chinese intelligence believes that establishing bases and developing naval and air forces will grant Egypt strategic independence and reduce its dependence on the West. This, in turn, opens the door for China to enhance its influence in the region through defense cooperation, thereby securing shared Chinese and Egyptian military interests. Beijing considers securing Egyptian bases for maritime routes (the Suez Canal) and the Red Sea to be in line with Chinese economic and security interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. In general, the Chinese military establishment views Cairo as working to build a strong regional pivot point, and Beijing sees this expansion as an opportunity to deepen defense and technological ties with Cairo, paving the way for the formal declaration of a Chinese-Egyptian military Silk Road partnership.

China views the new Egyptian military bases as a means of protecting its strategic interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. These bases, particularly those located on the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Suez Canal, occupy vital maritime chokepoints, and China considers them a guarantee for the security of its international trade routes. The relationship between Egypt and China has evolved from mere arms purchases to the localization of defense industries, such as the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and electronic warfare systems, increasing Egypt’s military reliance on Chinese technology. These Egyptian military bases, which enhance Egypt’s rapid deployment capabilities, align with China’s interests in establishing a multipolar regional order that reduces American influence in the Middle East. Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security reports indicate a qualitative shift in Egyptian military doctrine. Chinese military institutions affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that Egyptian military bases, such as the July 3rd base, provide strategic depth and protection for economic assets (gas fields and the Dabaa nuclear power plant), thus contributing to the economic stability in which China participates. For this reason, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking to train and qualify the Egyptian military elite through the Military Academy for Advanced Studies as an alternative to Western and American training.

The Chinese intelligence and military establishments view the Egyptian army’s expansionist vision in establishing naval and air bases within Egypt as part of the development strategy adopted by the Egyptian Armed Forces and the political leadership of President El-Sisi. This strategy aims to complete the modernization of the Egyptian Armed Forces and advance the Chinese military Silk Road with Egypt’s assistance. China supports the Egyptian Armed Forces’ efforts to modernize Egyptian military infrastructure, considering the new Egyptian military bases a cornerstone for securing China’s shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. China views these new Egyptian military bases, particularly on the Red Sea, as essential for securing Chinese trade routes (the military/maritime Silk Road) and mitigating risks. In addition to the significant role Egypt plays for China as a regional power center and a key player in the balance of power, relevant military circles in Beijing analyze the modernization of the Egyptian army as a center of gravity for stability in the Middle East and Africa. A strong and stable army serves China’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, China translates its vision into tangible support, including modernizing Egypt’s military infrastructure to align with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in its maritime, air, and naval components and equipping it with advanced weapons systems.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we conclude that the new Egyptian military bases (naval and air) are considered, according to the Chinese military and strategic vision, strategic strengths. Their benefits extend beyond Egypt, securing China’s commercial and military interests in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. They also provide a Chinese technological alternative in a region previously dominated by Western and American platforms, paving the way for China’s gradual expansion of its military Silk Road initiative.

Iran’s foreign minister meets his Chinese counterpart one week before President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is holding talks with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Beijing amid tensions with the United States in the Strait of Hormuz.

Araghchi’s one-day trip on Wednesday comes a week before US President Donald Trump’s scheduled ⁠visit to Beijing for a summit with President Xi Jinping on May 14 and 15.

China’s official Xinhua news agency reported the meeting between Araghchi and Wang had begun, without providing further details.

Araghchi’s visit to Beijing marks the first time he has travelled to China, a close ally of Tehran, since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28. Araghchi had spoken with Wang by telephone at least three times following the start of the war.

Earlier in Washington, DC, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed hope that Beijing would reiterate to Tehran the need to release its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran effectively closed the strait, through which major oil and gas supplies passed, after the war began, sending prices of fuel and fertiliser skyrocketing and rattling the global economy.

Following a ceasefire in April, the US imposed its own blockade on Iranian ports in a bid to compel Tehran to agree to Washington’s terms in peace talks.

Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu, reporting from Beijing, said two things will be front and centre on the agenda of Araghchi and Wang’s meeting – maintaining the ceasefire and reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

“We know that China has been very critical of the US’s naval blockade on Iranian ports, calling it dangerous. But increasingly, Beijing has also been critical of Iran’s decision to continually close that vital chokepoint,” Yu said.

Wang is expected to speak to Araghchi about what kind of support China can continue to offer Iran if it continues to close the strait.

“Iran will need Chinese backing, for example, at the United Nations, to continue to block any action that would put any additional sanctions on Iran because of its closure of the strait,” Yu said.

“Reportedly, the Iranian foreign minister is looking for clarity from Beijing as to what it will put on the table when Xi meets with Trump, and whether Beijing will be making any concessions to Washington that could make Tehran nervous.”

China, in return, “wants its own assurances that Iran won’t act in any escalatory way or any dramatic fashion in the lead up to that very important meeting”, she added.

Araghchi and Wang’s meeting came as Trump announced a pause on a US military operation to escort stranded ships out of the Strait of Hormuz.

The effort, which began on Monday, ratcheted up tensions, with the US military claiming it sank several Iranian boats that attempted to interfere in the operation. The United Arab Emirates also reported coming under missile and drone attacks from Iran, with one assault sparking a fire at an oil refinery. Tehran denies the launching the attacks.

Trump said on Truth Social the pause was based “on the request of Pakistan and other Countries” and because “Great Progress has been made toward a Complete and Final Agreement with Representatives of Iran”.

Pakistan has been leading efforts for a peace deal between Iran and the US.

The two sides held direct talks in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, but the negotiations ended without an agreement. Key sticking points include US demands for Iran to halt all nuclear enrichment and Tehran’s wish to continue to exercise control over the Strait of Hormuz.