China

Reuters

Trump’s tariff tactics

TikTok deal done?

Oct. 26 (UPI) — President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping could “consummate” the TikTok deal announced last month this week, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.

“We reached a final deal on TikTok. We reached one in Madrid, and I believe that as of today, all the details are ironed out, and that will be for the two leaders to consummate that transaction on Thursday in Korea,” Bessent said in an interview Sunday morning on “Face the Nation.”

Trump had signed an executive order in late September to complete a deal estimated at $14 billion that would create a U.S. entity to control TikTok, with American investors owning 80% of the company and its parent company ByteDance maintaining less than 20%.

It would satisfy an April 2024 law passed by Congress in the Biden administration requiring ByteDance to divest from the company or the platform would be banned for some 170 million U.S. users.

The president said at the time that the deal was approved by Xi in a phone conversation.

Bessent did not provide new details of the deal in the interview Sunday.

“My remit was to get the Chinese to agree to approve the transaction, and I believe we successfully accomplished that over the past two days,” Bessent said.

The White House said at the time the executive order was signed that the federal government would not play a role in selecting members for TikTok’s board. And when asked if the platform would begin to favor “MAGA” content, Trump responded it will be fair.

“If I could make it 100% MAGA I would but it’s not going to work out that way unfortunately,” Trump said. “Everyone is going to be treated fairly. Every group, every philosophy will be treated fairly.”

A number of academic studies have shown that TikTok already “tends to lean toward right-wing content, with right-wing praise being a significant predictor of user engagement.”

Top trade negotiators for the U.S. and China said they came to terms on a range of contentious points, setting the table for Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping to finalize a deal and ease trade tensions that have rattled global markets.

After two days of talks in Malaysia wrapped up Sunday, a Chinese official said the two sides reached a preliminary consensus on topics including export controls, fentanyl and shipping levies.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, speaking later in an interview with CBS News, said Trump’s threat of 100% tariffs on Chinese goods “is effectively off the table” and he expected Beijing to make “substantial” soybean purchases as well as offer a deferral on sweeping rare-earth controls. The U.S. wouldn’t change its export controls directed at China, he added.

“So I would expect that the threat of the 100% has gone away, as has the threat of the immediate imposition of the Chinese initiating a worldwide export control regime,” Bessent said. He separately told ABC News he believed China would delay its rare-earth restrictions “for a year while they reexamine it.”

Bessent telegraphed a wide-ranging agreement between Trump and Xi that would extend a tariff truce, resolve differences over the sale of TikTok and keep up the flow of rare-earth magnets necessary for the production of advanced products from semiconductors to jet engines. The two leaders are also planning to discuss a global peace plan, he said, after Trump said publicly he hoped to enlist Xi’s help in ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The encouraging signals from both sides of the negotiations were a marked contrast from recent weeks, when Beijing’s announcement of new export restrictions and Trump’s reciprocal threat of staggering new tariffs threatened to plunge the world’s two largest economies back into an all-out trade war.

Staving off China’s rare-earth restrictions is “one of the major objectives of these talks, and I think we’re progressing toward that goal very well,” U.S .Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said on “Fox News Sunday.”

Trump predicted a “good deal with China” as he spoke with reporters on the sidelines of the Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian capital, saying he expected high-level follow-up meetings in China and the U.S.

“They want to make a deal, and we want to make a deal,” Trump said.

Still, markets will be closely watching the details of the ultimate agreement, after nearly a year of head-spinning changes to trade and tariff policies between Washington and Beijing.

Chinese trade envoy Li Chenggang said he believes that the sides had reached consensus on fentanyl — suggesting the U.S. might lift or reduce a 20% tariff it had imposed to pressure Beijing to halt the flow of precursor chemicals used to make the deadly drug. He said the nations would also address actions the Trump administration took to impose port service fees on Chinese vessels, which prompted Beijing to put retaliatory levies on U.S.-owned, -operated, -built or -flagged vessels.

Li, whom Bessent called “unhinged” just days ago, described the talks as intense and the U.S. position as tough, but hailed the signs of progress. Both sides will now brief their leaders ahead of a planned summit between Trump and Xi on Thursday.

“The current turbulences and twists and turns are ones that we do not wish to see,” Li told reporters, adding that a stable China-U.S. trade and economic relationship is good for both countries and the rest of the world.

The reopening of soybean purchases, if realized, could provide a significant political win for Trump.

China imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. farm goods in March, effectively slamming the door shut on American soybeans before the harvest even began. The Asian nation last year purchased $13 billion in U.S. beans — more than 20% of the entire crop — for animal feed and cooking oil, and the freeze has rocked rural farmers who represent a key political base for the president.

Perhaps more important is resolving the the U.S.’ rare-earths tussle with China, which fought back against Trump’s trade offensive earlier this year by cutting off supplies of the materials. Although flows were restored in a truce that saw tariffs lowered from levels exceeding 100%, China this month broadened export curbs on the materials after the U.S. expanded restrictions on Chinese companies.

The negotiations took place at the skyscraper Merdeka 118 as Trump met with Southeast Asian leaders at a nearby convention center, where he discussed a series of other framework trade agreements, seeking to diversify U.S. trade away from China.

The Chinese delegation was led by He, China’s top economic official, and included Vice Finance Minister Liao Min. Greer, the U.S. trade representative, was also part of the talks.

Trump’s meeting with Xi this week will be their first face-to-face sit-down since his return to the White House. The U.S. leader has said direct talks are the best way to resolve issues including tariffs, export curbs, agricultural purchases, fentanyl trafficking and geopolitical tinderboxes such as Taiwan and the war in Ukraine.

“We’ll be talking about a lot of things,” he said. “I think we have a really good chance of making a very comprehensive deal.”

Flatly and Xiao write for Bloomberg. Bloomberg writers Sam Kim and Tony Czuczka contributed to this report.

For decades, the image of maritime power centered on gray hulls and carrier groups. Today, the center of gravity has shifted to the white hulls that police, escort, ram, repel, rescue, and repair in the murky space between peace and open conflict. Call it the coast-guardification of security. In the Indo-Pacific, and especially around the South China Sea, coast guards are now the first responders for sovereignty spats, illegal fishing, disaster relief, drone sightings, and the protection of undersea infrastructure. The trend is not cosmetic. It is strategic, and it is accelerating. Recent scenes off Scarborough Shoal and near Thitu Island show why. In September and October 2025, the China Coast Guard used water cannons and ramming tactics on Philippine civilian and government vessels, injuring crew and damaging hulls, while Washington and others publicly backed Manila. These were not naval shootouts. They were high-stakes law enforcement encounters led by white hulls that managed political sensitivity without signaling immediate military escalation.

History helps explain how we got here. Through the 2010s, piracy in Southeast Asia declined as coordinated patrols tightened the Strait of Malacca. At the same time, gray zone pressure rose as coast guard and militia fleets, not destroyers, pushed claims around the Senkakus and the Spratlys. A 2015 Reuters dispatch already highlighted Japanese and Philippine coast guard anti-piracy drills, and by 2025 Japanese reporting still records routine intrusions by Chinese coast guard vessels around the Senkakus. White hull presence became the everyday instrument of statecraft at sea, a domain where legal authorities matter as much as tonnage.

Coast guards have also become the backbone of coalition building. The most telling images of 2025 are not only of naval flotillas but also of trilateral coast guard exercises among Japan, the United States, and the Philippines. Tokyo hosted large drills in June, the Philippine flagship returned from joint maneuvers later that month, and USNI News has tracked a steady tempo of multilateral activities that blend navies and coast guards. These events rehearse search and rescue, firefighting, interdiction, and uncrewed systems integration. They build habits of cooperation at the level most relevant to day-to-day friction.

What counts as “security” has widened too. Undersea cables that carry the world’s data now sit squarely on the white hull docket. Policymakers across the region are writing playbooks for detection, attribution, and rapid repair when cables are cut or damaged. Analysts urge Quad Plus partners to formalize protocols and run sabotage response drills that rely on law enforcement and coast guard authorities. New scholarship details how geoeconomic competition around cables is intensifying across the Indo-Pacific and why civilian maritime forces will need new sensors, legal tools, and public-private coordination to keep data flowing after an incident.

The mission creep is not only about geopolitics. It is also about fish. Vietnam has spent 2025 pushing to shed the European Commission’s IUU “yellow card,” tightening enforcement and compliance across its vast fishing fleet. IUU policing is classic coast guard work. It requires boarding teams, AIS analytics, community outreach, and a credible threat of penalties. Success here matters for livelihoods and for legitimacy, since foreign perceptions of fishing practices can shape export earnings as much as tariffs do.

Technology is transforming these forces in real time. Maritime drones and high-altitude ISR have moved from prototypes to daily tools for search and rescue, disaster response, and wide-area surveillance. Regional programs, from Japanese UAV support to Southeast Asian partners to Malaysia’s investments, reflect a simple truth. Persistent eyes and quick cueing make small coast guards feel bigger without inviting the diplomatic blowback that armed naval build-ups can trigger.

If coast guards now run the show, two practical steps can help them run it better.

First, fund an Indo-Pacific Seabed Protection Network with coast guards in the lead. Start with an agreed checklist for cable incident response that combines attribution standards, rapid permitting for repair ships, common data on seabed maps, and a secure channel for operators to notify authorities. Build this around recurring tabletopand at-sea exercises that simulate simultaneous cable cuts, and let civilian agencies command the play unless naval forces must step in. The legal authorities and public legitimacy of coast guards make them the right first responders for cable attacks that sit below the threshold of armed conflict. Allies are already converging on this logic. They should codify it.

Second, scale coast guard capacity through targeted training pipelines and shared tech. The U.S. Coast Guard’s 2025 program that opens more than a hundred training courses to Philippine personnel is a good template. Expand it to include a regional curriculum on IUU enforcement, drone employment, incident documentation, and evidence handling for prosecutions. Pair classrooms with pooled hardware. A rotating inventory of UAVs, portable radars, and small craft that partner coast guards can book for surge operations would lift outcomes faster than waiting for each budget cycle to deliver new ships.

Coast Guard decks will never replace carrier decks, and they should not try. What they can do is shape almost every day short of war. In Southeast Asia’s crowded waters, that is where strategy lives. The white hulls are already writing the script. Policymakers should give them the resources and rules they need to keep the peace, protect the seabed, and put predatory behavior on notice.

In the context of the US-China competition and the post-COVID-19 global economic recession reshaping the international order, Vietnam has emerged as a stable and dynamic bright spot in Southeast Asia. The concept of “the era of the Vietnamese nation’s rise,” first mentioned by General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam To Lam at the 10th Central Conference of the 13th tenure, reflects the aspiration to enter a new stage of development from “renovation” to “rise.” In fact, over the past year, Vietnam has achieved a growth rate of about 5.5-6%, higher than the average of many other countries in the region. Record FDI inflows, led by technology projects of technology companies Samsung, Apple, and Intel, as the expanding “China+1” trend helps Vietnam become an important link in the global supply chain. Inflation is maintained at 3-4%, and exports and domestic consumption recover strongly, while digital transformation, green development, and the semiconductor industry are considered new growth pillars.

One of the important milestones of the year is the program of reorganizing and merging administrative units, helping to streamline the apparatus and improve the efficiency of state administration. The reduction of nearly 30% of commune-level units and more than 10% of district-level units not only saves budget costs but is also considered a step forward in institutional quality towards a professional administration.

In foreign affairs, Vietnam has shown an increasingly confident role as a middle power expanding its strategic space. The upgrade of relations with the United States to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership puts Hanoi among the few countries that maintain special relations with both Washington and Beijing. Relations with Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia continue to be strengthened, while cooperation channels and mechanisms for controlling maritime disputes with China are maintained stably.

Multilaterally, Vietnam has shown a more proactive role in ASEAN and actively participated in global initiatives on climate and energy. Its image as a trustworthy, constructive, and balanced country has been reinforced, helping Vietnam to enhance its position in the reshaping regional structure.

However, despite many positive results, Vietnam’s growth still relies heavily on capital flows from the FDI sector, while domestic enterprises lack competitiveness. Labor productivity growth is slow, the efficiency of state-owned enterprises is still low, and institutional reforms have not created breakthroughs. These are barriers that put Vietnam at risk of being stuck in the “middle-income trap.”

On the social front, Vietnam faces challenges of climate change, development disparities, and rapid population aging. The Mekong Delta is being severely impacted by rising sea levels and saltwater intrusion. These pressures require more inclusive and sustainable development policies.

Politically, the anti-corruption campaign continues to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime and national leadership. However, fear of accountability and slow decision-making are hampering the effectiveness of administrative unit mergers. Vietnam still needs extensive institutional reforms to promote transparency, innovation, and accountability to the people as the foundation for modern state governance.

In the coming time, Vietnam’s “rising” prospects in the period 2025-2030 depend on the ability to take advantage of opportunities from the wave of global supply chain shifts. The shift of supply chains away from China, along with trade agreements such as CPTPP, EVFTA, and RCEP, significantly expands the economic space. The young population base and expanding middle class give Vietnam the potential to maintain strong growth momentum in the coming decade.

However, opportunities always come with risks. Over-reliance on FDI can lead to the situation of the “FDI dependency trap.” Therefore, strong investment priority should be given to supporting industries, education, and science and technology as key factors to enhance self-reliance and domestic value.

On the foreign front, Hanoi will need to continue to maintain a delicate balance between the great powers. Deepening ties with the US and the West in technology and energy must go hand in hand with maintaining stable relations with China, its largest trading partner and strategic challenge. The East Sea, maritime security, and strategic supply chains will continue to be a test of Vietnam’s diplomatic mettle of “multilateralization and diversification.”

In conclusion, Vietnam’s “Era of Rising Power” can only be realized if the country turns its current momentum into long-term competitiveness. This requires institutional reform, productivity enhancement, and a shift to an inclusive growth model. If successful, Vietnam can position itself as a dynamic middle-class economy and contribute to the formation of a more balanced regional order in the coming decade.

The past year has shown that Vietnam is at a pivotal moment with great potential but also full of challenges. The “era of rising up” is therefore not just a political slogan but a real test of Vietnam’s leadership, reform, and integration capacity in a turbulent world.

ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE — President Trump headed for Asia for the first time this term, a trip where he’s expected to work on investment deals and peace efforts before meeting face-to-face with Chinese President Xi Jinping to try to de-escalate a trade war.

“We have a lot to talk about with President Xi, and he has a lot to talk about with us,” Trump told reporters Friday night as he left the White House. “I think we’ll have a good meeting.”

The president was taking a long-haul flight that has him arriving in Malaysia on Sunday morning, the first stop of a three-country visit.

His trip comes as the U.S. government shutdown drags on. Many federal workers are set to miss their first full paycheck next week, there are flight disruptions as already-squeezed air traffic controllers work without pay, and states are confronting the possibility that federal food aid could dry up. As Republicans reject Democratic demands to maintain healthcare subsidies for many Americans, there’s no sign of a break in the impasse.

Some Democrats criticized the president for traveling abroad during the standoff.

“America is shut down and the President is skipping town,” Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer of New York said.

Trump’s first stop is at a regional summit in Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian capital. He attended the annual Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations summit only once during his first term, but this year it comes as Malaysia and the U.S. have been working to address a military conflict between Thailand and Cambodia.

On Sunday, he’s scheduled to meet with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, followed by a joint signing ceremony with the prime ministers of Thailand and Cambodia.

Trump threatened earlier this year to withhold trade deals with the countries if they didn’t stop fighting, and his administration has since been working with Malaysia to nail down an expanded ceasefire.

The president credited Ibrahim with working to resolve the conflict.

“I told the leader of Malaysia, who is a very good man, I think I owe you a trip,” he told reporters aboard Air Force One.

Trump on Sunday may also have a significant meeting with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who wants to see the U.S. cut a 40% tariff on Brazilian imports. Trump has justified the tariffs by citing Brazil’s criminal prosecution of his ally, former President Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for plotting a coup.

Beyond trade, Lula on Friday also criticized the U.S. campaign of military strikes off the South American coast in the name of fighting drug trafficking. He said he planned to raise concerns with Trump at a meeting on Sunday in Malaysia. The White House has not yet confirmed the meeting is set to take place.

Stops in Japan and South Korea

From there, Trump heads to Japan and South Korea, where he’s expected to make progress on talks for at least $900 billion in investments for U.S. factories and other projects that those countries committed to in return for easing Trump’s planned tariff rates down to 15% from 25%.

The trip to Tokyo comes a week after Japan elected its first female prime minister, Sanae Takaichi. Trump is set to meet with Takaichi, who is a protege of late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Trump was close to Abe, who was assassinated after leaving office.

Trump said Takaichi’s relationship with Abe was “a good sign” and “I look forward to meeting her.”

While there, Trump is expected to be hosted by Japanese Emperor Naruhito and meet with U.S. troops who are stationed in Japan, according to a senior U.S. official who was not authorized to speak publicly and spoke to reporters on condition of anonymity about the planned trip.

In South Korea, Trump is expected to hold a highly anticipated meeting with China’s Xi on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

The APEC summit is set to be held in Gyeongju, and the Trump-Xi meeting is expected to take place in the city of Busan, according to the U.S. official.

The meeting follows months of volatile moves in a trade war between China and the U.S. that have rattled the global economy.

Trump was infuriated this month after Beijing imposed new export controls on rare earths used in technology and threatened to hike retaliatory tariffs to sky-high levels. He has said he wants China to buy U.S. soybeans. But this week Trump was optimistic, predicting he would reach a “fantastic deal” with Xi.

The U.S. president also said he might ask Xi about freeing Jimmy Lai, a Hong Kong pro-democracy newspaper founder, saying that “it’ll be on my list.”

The only meeting that could possibly eclipse the Xi summit would be an impromptu reunion with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Speculation has been rife since South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young told lawmakers this month it was possible that Trump could again meet with Kim in the demilitarized zone, as he did during his first term in 2019.

But such a meeting is not on the president’s schedule for this trip, according to the U.S. official.

Trump suggested it was hard to reach the North Korean leader.

“They have a lot of nuclear weapons, but not a lot of telephone service,” he said.

Price and Schiefelbein write for the Associated Press. Price reported from Washington and Schiefelbein from aboard Air Force One. AP writer Darlene Superville in Washington contributed to this report.

The United States has imposed multiple sanctions on Chinese companies for assisting the Russian military-industrial complex in its war against Ukraine. The US Department of Commerce and the Treasury alleged that several Chinese companies evaded US sanctions by selling sensitive technology needed by Russia to manufacture military weapons. One of these Chinese companies subject to US sanctions and its military dealings with Russia is “Sino Electronics Chinese Company,” which is considered as a part of a network of companies that has allegedly sent shipments worth approximately $200 million to Russia since the Chinese company was placed on the US sanctions list in September 2022. The shipments sent by the “Chinese Sino Network” to Russia included several microchips, cameras, and navigation equipment, technologies critical to Russian weapons used in its war with Ukraine, according to US accusations against Beijing.

 These measures include broad US sanctions in 2024 and 2025 targeting entities in China and several other countries that support Russia’s war efforts. In October 2024, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two Chinese drone companies, accusing them of participating in the production and supply of long-range attack drones to the Russian Air Force. Immediately following, in May 2024, US sanctions targeted Chinese companies and companies in several other countries for allegedly supplying electronic components and chemicals used in the manufacture of Russian weapons and missiles. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen also warned that “the United States will take action against any Chinese companies that assist Russia in its efforts to obtain military supplies.” As a result of these US sanctions, Chinese banks have become more cautious in dealing with Russia, leading to a slowdown in trade between the two countries during 2024.

  Since July 2025, the United States has threatened to impose secondary sanctions on any entity that continues to cooperate with Russia in an attempt to isolate Moscow by striking its cross-border trade networks, particularly with China. Secondary sanctions target third parties that deal with the directly sanctioned country, Russia in particular.  The sanctions are not imposed because of the actions of the third party, but rather because of its economic ties to the sanctioned entity. Washington uses these sanctions to deter any entity that might indirectly contribute to supporting the sanctioned regime or helping it circumvent sanctions. In 2018, the United States imposed sanctions on a Chinese bank for allegedly conducting financial transactions with North Korea, even though the bank itself had not previously been subject to any sanctions.

 A series of US sanctions on China have been imposed, alleging its military cooperation with Russia in its war against Ukraine. In July 2025, US intelligence reports alleged that Chinese companies were shipping engines to the Russian arms company IEMZ Kupol by mislabeling them to evade sanctions.

The US Department of Commerce expanded its blacklist of Chinese companies and state-owned entities, alleging their cooperation with Russia and supporting it in its war against Ukraine. The US Department of Commerce added several Chinese companies to the US blacklist, including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, which was added to the US list of banned Chinese companies for supplying technology to the Russian military sector. Washington also imposed controls on the Chinese export sector, expanding export control restrictions to include Chinese companies that are 50% or more state-owned, as well as entities on the US blacklist. 

 Here, China has rejected all US accusations regarding its dealings with Russian military companies in its war against Ukraine. Beijing has repeatedly denied US accusations of providing military support to Russia. China has also taken several countermeasures, such as imposing sanctions on US companies, in a move to escalate trade tensions between the two countries. Regarding China’s response to US sanctions, China has publicly rejected all these accusations. At the same time, these US sanctions have raised concerns among Chinese banks and companies about secondary sanctions, which may indicate that these US measures are having an impact on trade relations between China and Russia.

 As for China’s official response to the US sanctions imposed on it for its dealings with Russia, the Chinese Foreign Ministry confirmed in an official statement that the United States, by demanding that countries stop purchasing Russian oil, is participating in threatening and undermining international trade.  In response to Trump’s threats regarding the purchase of Russian oil, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement that “China will take decisive countermeasures if its legitimate rights and interests are harmed, and that China opposes the United States using Beijing as a pretext to impose illegal unilateral sanctions on the Russian side.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry also stressed that “China has lodged a protest with Britain regarding the inclusion of Chinese companies on the sanctions list against Russia. Cooperation between Russian and Chinese companies should not be subject to interference or influence.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry also commented on the British sanctions imposed on it for allegedly dealing with Russian companies and entities, saying that “Beijing will take necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests.”

 China has categorically rejected all unilateral US sanctions against it, and the punitive tariffs imposed by Trump have angered Beijing. However, unlike Europe or other countries, China has shown confidence, with official Chinese authorities declaring that “it will fight to the end.” An official statement issued by China on October 13, 2025, stated that “threatening to impose high tariffs is not the right way to negotiate with China. The United States must adjust its position.” Beijing has already responded by imposing counter-tariffs and restrictions on US exports, including rare earths.

 As for the nature of the sanctions directed against Russia in 2025, these new US sanctions focus on indirectly strangling the Russian economy by pressuring countries and companies that deal with Moscow in strategic sectors such as energy, metals, and technology. In July 2025, US President Donald Trump announced a 50-day deadline for reaching a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine; otherwise, tariffs of up to 100% would be imposed on countries importing Russian oil or gas. Meanwhile, the US Congress is discussing a bill that would impose tariffs of up to 500% on Russian exports, including secondary sanctions on financing or transporting entities.  Trump warned that all companies dealing with Russia, especially Chinese companies, entities, and institutions, particularly those operating in the technology and metals sectors, could be barred from entering the US market or using the international financial system.

  Finally, regarding the impact of these unilateral US sanctions on China and other countries for allegedly dealing with Russian companies, I believe these US threats will not go unchallenged, as they could undermine confidence in the global economic system and raise questions about who has the right to punish whom and under what international legitimacy? Applying this to Russia, we find that Moscow is linked to extensive trade networks with major economies in strategic sectors such as energy, minerals, and food. These Russian entanglements with global economies make attempts to isolate Moscow a test not only of Washington’s ability but also of the ability of the entire global system to bear the cost of confrontation.

The probe comes as the US government seeks additional leverage against Beijing amid escalating trade tensions.

The United States has launched an investigation into whether China is out of compliance with a 2020 trade deal they struck together, as trade tensions ratchet up between the world’s two largest economies.

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer announced the investigation on Friday, as President Donald Trump travels to Asia to meet with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. China denies that it has failed to abide by the deal.

“China has scrupulously fulfilled its obligations in the Phase One Economic and Trade Agreement,” a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington said in a social media post.

The probe into unfair trade practices could grant President Trump greater authority to impose more tariffs on China, which he has hit with massive trade duties during his second term in office.

“The administration seems to be looking for new sources of leverage to use against Beijing, while adding another pressure point to get China to buy more US soybeans as well as other goods,” Wendy Cutler, a former US trade negotiator who is now vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told The Associated Press news agency.

The “Phase One” deal came at the end of Trump’s first term in office in 2020, when the US imposed a series of tariffs on China in the name of bringing greater “balance” to their commercial exchange.

In that agreement, Beijing agreed to buy more US agricultural and manufacturing goods.

A Federal Register notice (PDF) from the Office of the US Trade Representative alleges that China has not followed up on that promise or others related to intellectual property protections, forced technology transfers or financial services.

September, for instance, marked the first month since 2018 that China imported no soya beans from US farmers.

“The initiation of this investigation underscores the Trump Administration’s resolve to hold China to its Phase One Agreement commitments, protect American farmers, ranchers, workers, and innovators, and establish a more reciprocal trade relationship with China for the benefit of the American people,” Greer said in a statement.

A new round of US-China trade talks is set to take place on Saturday, and discussions will focus on China’s restrictions on the export of rare earth metals, essential for many US tech products.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia – When US President Donald Trump lands in Malaysia for Southeast Asia’s headline summit this weekend, he will be delivering Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim a diplomatic coup.

US presidents rarely visit Malaysia, a multiracial nation of 35 million people sandwiched between Thailand and Singapore, which for decades has maintained a policy of not picking sides in rivalries between great powers.

Trump is just the third US leader to travel to the Southeast Asian country, which is hosting a Sunday-to-Tuesday summit for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), following visits by former US Presidents Barack Obama and Lyndon B Johnson.

After skipping ASEAN summits in 2018, 2019 and 2020, Trump, whose disdain for multilateralism is renowned, will be attending the gathering of Southeast Asian nations for just the second time.

The US president will be joined by a host of high-profile leaders from non-ASEAN countries, including Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa.

Opting not to attend are Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping, who Trump is expected to meet in South Korea at next week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.

Trump’s visit, in many ways, is emblematic of the delicate balancing act that Anwar’s government has sought to maintain as Malaysia navigates the headwinds of the heated rivalry between the US and China.

Malaysia is deeply entwined with both the US and Chinese economies.

The US, which has a large footprint in Malaysia’s tech and oil and gas industries, was the Southeast Asian country’s top foreign investor and third-biggest trading partner in 2024.

China, a major purchaser of Malaysian electronics and palm oil, the same year took the top spot in trade and was third for investment.

But Malaysia’s efforts to walk a fine line between Washington and Beijing have become increasingly fraught as the superpowers roll out tit-for-tat tariffs and export controls while butting heads over regional flashpoints such as Taiwan and the South China Sea.

“Optimally, Malaysia wants to productively engage both China and the US on a variety of issues,” said Thomas Daniel, an analyst at the Institute of Strategic & International Studies in Kuala Lumpur.

“It is in our interest,” Daniel told Al Jazeera.

Anwar has cast Trump’s visit as a chance to bolster economic ties, champion regional peace and stability, and elevate ASEAN’s standing on the international stage.

Anwar has also pledged to use the rare opportunity for face time with Trump to constructively raise points of difference between Washington and Kuala Lumpur, particularly the Palestinian cause.

“The through-line is autonomy: avoid entanglement, maximise options, and extract benefits from both poles without becoming anyone’s proxy,” Awang Azman Awang Pawi, a professor at the University of Malaya, told Al Jazeera.

During Trump’s visit, US tariffs on Malaysia, currently set at 19 percent, and China’s mooted export controls on rare earths are expected to be high on the agenda.

For Malaysia, the priority is preserving “rules-based” trade that allows for countries to deepen economic ties despite their political differences, said Mohd Ramlan Mohd Arshad, a senior lecturer at the MARA University of Technology in Shah Alam, near Kuala Lumpur.

A prolonged economic cold war between the US and China is the “worst thing” that could happen to Malaysia, Arshad told Al Jazeera.

Trump, who has made no secret of his ambitions for the Nobel Peace Prize, is also expected to witness the signing of a peace accord between Thailand and Cambodia, which engaged in a brief border conflict in July that left at least 38 people dead.

For Anwar, who has led a multiracial coalition of parties with diverse and competing interests since 2022, the balancing act also involves political considerations at home.

US support for Israel’s war in Gaza has been a bone of contention in Muslim-majority Malaysia, where the plight of Palestinians has inspired frequent public protests.

In the run-up to the summit, critics have demanded that Anwar rescind Trump’s invitation over his role in supporting the war, which a United Nations commission of inquiry last month determined to constitute genocide.

“A person like Trump, no matter how powerful, should not be welcomed in Malaysia,” former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, Anwar’s former mentor-turned-nemesis, said in a video message last month.

Defending the invitation, Anwar has stressed his view of diplomacy as “practical work” for advancing his country’s interests “in an imperfect world”.

“It demands balance, discipline, and the courage to stay the course even when the ground shifts beneath us,” he told a conference in Kuala Lumpur earlier this month.

As a small power, Malaysia has always put pragmatism at the centre of its foreign policy, said Sharifah Munirah Alatas, an international relations lecturer at the National University of Malaysia.

“Anwar and Malaysia cannot afford to do otherwise,” Alatas told Al Jazeera.

“And given the current highly unpredictable Sino-American tension induced by the Trump 2.0 era, ASEAN will remain actively non-aligned, without taking sides.”

Awang Azman, the University of Malaya professor, said that while Trump’s visit will elevate Malaysia and ASEAN’s profile by itself, the true test of the summit’s success will be tangible outcomes on issues such as the Thailand-Cambodia conflict and trade.

“It’s not just a photo op if a ceasefire accord and concrete trade language land on paper,” Awang Azman said.

“If either track stalls, the visit is still symbolically significant – given the rarity of US presidential trips to Malaysia – but the narrative will revert to optics over outcomes.”

For decades, China powered spectacular growth through exports, infrastructure and cheap credit. But that old model is running out of steam, even as it hits a record trade surplus with the world this year.

The property sector is drowning in debt, confidence is fading, and consumers are holding back. Now, Beijing faces its toughest test yet: how to keep the world’s second-largest economy growing without relying much on the engines that once drove it.

A new five-year plan promises “high-quality growth” built on technology and self-reliance. But trade tensions with the United States could make the climb even steeper.

Washington has announced new sanctions against Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, in an effort to pressure Moscow to agree to a peace deal in Ukraine. This marks the first time the current Trump administration has imposed direct sanctions on Russia.

Speaking alongside Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte in the Oval Office on Wednesday, US President Donald Trump said he hoped the sanctions would not need to be in place for long, but expressed growing frustration with stalled truce negotiations.

“Every time I speak to Vladimir [Putin], I have good conversations and then they don’t go anywhere. They just don’t go anywhere,” Trump said, shortly after a planned in-person meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Budapest was cancelled.

Trump’s move is designed to cut off vital oil revenues, which help fund Russia’s ongoing war efforts. Earlier on Wednesday, Russia unleashed a new bombardment on Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, killing at least seven people, including children.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the new sanctions were necessary because of “Putin’s refusal to end this senseless war”. He said that Rosneft and Lukoil fund the Kremlin’s “war machine”.

How have Rosneft and Lukoil been sanctioned?

The new measures will freeze assets owned by Rosneft and Lukoil in the US, and bar US entities from engaging in business with them. Thirty subsidiaries owned by Rosneft and Lukoil have also been sanctioned.

Rosneft, which is controlled by the Kremlin, is Russia’s second-largest company in terms of revenue, behind natural gas giant Gazprom. Lukoil is Russia’s third-largest company and its biggest non-state enterprise.

Between them, the two groups export 3.1 million barrels of oil per day, or 70 percent of Russia’s overseas crude oil sales. Rosneft alone is responsible for nearly half of Russia’s oil production, which in all makes up 6 percent of global output.

In recent years, both companies have been hit by rolling European sanctions and reduced oil prices. In September, Rosneft reported a 68 percent year-on-year drop in net income for the first half of 2025. Lukoil posted an almost 27 percent fall in profits for 2024.

Meanwhile, last week, the United Kingdom unveiled sanctions on the two oil majors. Elsewhere, the European Union looks set to announce its 19th package of penalties on Moscow later today, including a ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas.

How much impact will these sanctions have?

In 2022, Russian oil groups (including Rosneft and Lukoil) were able to offset some of the effects of sanctions by pivoting exports from Europe to Asia, and also using a “shadow fleet” of hard-to-detect tankers with no ties to Western financial or insurance groups.

China and India quickly replaced the EU as Russia’s biggest oil consumers. Last year, China imported a record 109 million tonnes of Russian crude, representing almost 20 percent of its total energy imports. India imported 88 million tonnes of Russian oil in 2024.

In both cases, these are orders of magnitude higher than before 2022, when Western countries started to tighten their sanctions regime on Russia. At the end of 2021, China imported roughly 79.6 million tonnes of Russian crude. India imported just 0.42 million tonnes.

Trump has repeatedly urged Beijing and New Delhi to halt Russian energy purchases. In August, he levied an additional 25 percent trade tariff on India because of its continued purchase of discounted Russian oil. He has so far demurred from a similar move against China.

However, Trump’s new sanctions are likely to place pressure on foreign financial groups which do business with Rosneft and Lukoil, including the banking intermediaries which facilitate sales of Russian oil in China and India.

“Engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions,” the US Treasury Department’s press release on Wednesday’s sanctions says.

As a result, the new restrictions may force buyers to shift to alternative suppliers or pay higher prices. Though India and China may not be the direct targets of these latest restrictions, their oil supply chains and trading costs are likely to come under increased pressure.

“The big thing here is the secondary sanctions,” Felipe Pohlmann Gonzaga, a Switzerland-based commodity trader, told Al Jazeera. “Any bank that facilitates Russian oil sales and with exposure to the US financial system could be subject.”

However, he added, “I don’t think this will be the driver in ending the war, as Russia will continue selling oil. There are always people out there willing to take the risk to beat sanctions.

“These latest restrictions will make Chinese and Indian players more reluctant to buy Russian oil – many won’t want to lose access to the American financial system. [But] it won’t stop it completely.”

According to Bloomberg, several senior refinery executives in India – who asked not to be named due to the sensitivity of the issue – said the restrictions would make it impossible for oil purchases to continue.

On Wednesday, Trump said that he would raise concerns about China’s continued purchases of Russian oil during his talk with President Xi Jinping at the 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in South Korea next week.

Have oil prices been affected?

Oil prices rallied after Trump announced US sanctions. Brent – the international crude oil benchmark – rose nearly 4 percent to $65 a barrel on Thursday. The US Benchmark, West Texas Intermediate, jumped more than 5 percent to nearly $60 per barrel.

Pohlmann Gonzaga, however, predicted that the “market will correct from this 5 percent over-jump. You have to recall that sentiment in energy markets is still negative due to the gloomy [global] economic backdrop.”

China and the United States are set to resume high-level trade talks in Malaysia from Friday as both sides work to contain a sudden surge in tensions ahead of a crucial leaders’ summit in South Korea. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng will meet U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer during his visit to attend an ASEAN summit from October 24 to 27.

The renewed strain in ties comes after Beijing expanded curbs on rare earth exports critical materials used in electronics and defense in retaliation for Washington’s decision to blacklist more Chinese companies from purchasing U.S. technology. The move has reignited fears of another trade war just as the two powers had shown tentative signs of improvement in recent months.

Why It Matters

These talks carry significant global implications. The world’s two largest economies are deeply interlinked, and renewed hostilities threaten to disrupt global supply chains, technological cooperation, and regional stability. Both Washington and Beijing are under pressure to prevent economic confrontation from spilling into diplomatic isolation ahead of the scheduled Trump-Xi summit.

The flare-up also underscores the fragility of U.S.-China relations. Despite earlier progress including a successful TikTok-related deal at a Madrid summit and a constructive Trump-Xi call in September the latest export and sanctions measures have quickly derailed the momentum toward reconciliation.

The main negotiators, He Lifeng, Scott Bessent, and Jamieson Greer, are expected to focus on two issues: China’s rare earth export restrictions and U.S. curbs on technology access. These topics strike at the heart of both countries’ strategic priorities industrial self-sufficiency for China and tech security for the U.S.

Southeast Asian nations, particularly Malaysia as the host, are watching closely. They stand to benefit economically if tensions ease but risk becoming collateral in any escalation, as both superpowers compete for influence in the region. Meanwhile, global markets are bracing for volatility, with tech and manufacturing sectors especially vulnerable to disruptions.

What’s Next

The Malaysia talks are being seen as a last attempt to restore calm before the Trump-Xi summit next week in South Korea. Both sides are expected to seek at least a symbolic agreement to keep communication channels open, though a comprehensive deal is unlikely given the current mistrust.

If the talks fail, trade and diplomatic friction could deepen, potentially leading to expanded sanctions or retaliatory measures that reverberate across Asia. For now, the focus is on whether Washington and Beijing can manage their rivalry without derailing global economic stability.

With information from Reuters.

Chinese President Xi Jinping places great importance on environmental protection and sustainable development, distinguishing him from previous Chinese leaders who focused solely on economic and social development. It’s worth noting that Xi’s concern for the environment and climate change predates his rise to power in China. From 2000 to 2007, while serving as Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province, he published approximately 232 articles in the provincial newspaper, 22 of which addressed the importance of environmental conservation. This was exceptional at the time, as no other provincial party official routinely promoted environmental protection and sustainable development, and the topic was not a topic of political debate within the Communist Party.

 China is working to maximize its benefits from the global trend toward a green economy by enhancing its image as a global leader in combating climate change. This was evident in China’s establishment of the South-South Climate Cooperation Fund in 2015 and its pledge of approximately 20 billion Chinese yuan (3.1 billion US dollars) to enhance international climate cooperation through the “10-100-1000” initiative. This initiative aims to support developing countries in addressing climate change by developing 10 low-carbon industrial parks, 100 climate change mitigation and adaptation projects, and implementing 1,000 climate-related capacity-building activities.

 In addition, China has announced several initiatives to deepen climate change cooperation through infrastructure projects implemented through the Belt and Road Initiative. For example, in 2022, China announced increased engagement in green transformation efforts with Belt and Road Initiative countries, particularly in the areas of infrastructure and energy.

   A public opinion poll conducted by China’s People’s Daily in February 2021, which included more than 5 million people, showed that climate issues ranked fifth in terms of interest among Chinese social media users, an important indicator of the growing importance of climate change in the consciousness of the Chinese people.

   Air pollution and water scarcity are among China’s most pressing environmental issues. Now, three Chinese government departments are monitoring the climate change, which are the Ministry of Emergency Management, the State Forestry and Grassland Administration, and the China Meteorological Administration. In this context, China has relied extensively on cloud seeding technology to generate rain and reduce pollution levels in the capital, Beijing, ahead of the centenary celebration of the Communist Party on July 1, 2021. This confirms that the Chinese Communist Party has begun to sense the danger of environmental deterioration.

  Faced with some countries going against the trend and withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, China, as a responsible major country, is determined to make arduous efforts in this regard. I think that China should continue to lead by example and further promote global climate governance by raising many Chinese initiatives from various perspectives, such as technology transfer, investment cooperation, multilateral trade, talent cultivation, infrastructure construction, etc. Here, a favorable and open international environment is an essential factor for China’s leadership for global climate governance.

  China affirms its support for global climate governance by committing to achieving carbon neutrality before 2060 and setting ambitious targets for 2035, including reducing greenhouse gas emissions, expanding clean energy use, and deepening international cooperation in green technology and industries. China supports multilateralism and calls for genuine global cooperation to address the challenges of climate change and achieve sustainable development, strengthening its leadership role in efforts to protect the planet.

–            China’s 2035 Climate Goals:

1)       Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions:

 Through reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 7-10% from peak levels.

2) Expanding Non-Fossil Energy:

Through increasing the share of non-fossil fuels in total energy consumption to more than 30%.

3)       Promoting Renewable Energy:

Through increasing installed wind and solar power capacity sixfold compared to 2020 levels, reaching 3,600 gigawatts.

4) Enhancing Forest Reserves:

Through increasing the total forest reserve to more than 24 billion cubic meters.

5) Shifting to New Energy Vehicles:

Through making new energy vehicles prevalent in new car sales.

6) Expanding the Carbon Market:

 Through expanding the National Carbon Emissions Trading System to include key high-emission sectors.

7) Building a Climate-Resilient Society:

 Fundamentally establishing a climate-resilient society.

·       The principles and efforts supporting China’s global climate governance efforts are:

1) China’s call for genuine global multilateralism on maintaining climate balance:

 Reaffirming commitment to the principles of multilateralism to enhance international cooperation in addressing climate change.

2)       China’s call for common but differentiated responsibilities on climate change for the developing global South and the international community:

Adhering to the principle of common responsibility while recognizing the different capabilities and circumstances of each country in addressing climate change.

3) China’s Leadership in International Climate Cooperation Efforts:

 Through China’s call for deepening cooperation in green technology and industries to enable all countries to achieve green development.

4) China’s Confrontation with US and Western Unilateral Climate Protectionism:

China warns that unilateral practices weaken the global economy and hinder the sustainable development agenda.

–            China’s Role in Global Climate Governance, through:

1) China’s Leadership in Global Climate Efforts:

Through its commitments, China aims to play a leading role in advancing global efforts toward a sustainable future.

2) China’s Partnership with the United Nations to Maintain Environmental and Climate Balance:

China aspires to play a greater role with the United Nations in addressing global challenges such as climate change and the governance of artificial intelligence.

3) China’s Contribution to a Just Global Climate Order:

Beijing contributes to building a more just and equitable global order and expanding the representation of countries of the Global South in multilateral climate mechanisms.

  Accordingly, we understand that climate change has become one of the most important issues of concern to China at the governmental, popular, and even international levels, and that climate change has become a significant factor in the Chinese political arena. Therefore, China is working to launch numerous international, regional, and local initiatives to contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, thereby improving the environmental conditions of its citizens and developing countries of the Global South in particular, and fulfilling its international commitments in this area.

Economists credit US President Donald Trump’s tariff campaign with reducing trade between Germany and the US, its top trading partner last year.

China overtook the United States as Germany’s largest trading partner during the first eight months of 2025, preliminary data from the German statistics office has shown.

The data indicated that German imports and exports with China totalled $190.7bn (163.4 billion euros) from January to August, while trade with the US amounted to $189bn (162.8 billion euros), according to Reuters calculations.

The US was Germany’s top trading partner in 2024, ending an eight-year streak for China. Germany had sought to reduce its reliance on China, citing political differences and accusing Beijing of unfair practices.

But trade dynamics shifted again this year, with US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House and his renewed tariff campaign.

The tariffs have pushed down German exports to the US, which fell 7.4 percent in the first eight months of the year compared with 2024.

In August, exports to the US also fell 23.5 percent year-on-year, showing that the trend is accelerating.

“There is no question that US tariff and trade policy is an important reason for the decline in sales,” said Dirk Jandura, president of the BGA foreign trade association.

Jandura added that US demand for classic German export goods, such as cars, machinery and chemicals, had fallen.

With the ongoing tariff threat and the stronger euro, German exports to the US are unlikely to rebound any time soon, said Carsten Brzeski, global head of macro at the financial institution ING.

Exports to China fell even more sharply than those to the US, dropping 13.5 percent year-on-year to $63.5bn (54.7 billion euros) in the first eight months of 2025.

By contrast, imports from China rose 8.3 percent to $126.4bn (108.8 billion euros).

“The renewed import boom from China is worrying – particularly as data shows that these imports come at dumping prices,” said Brzeski.

He warned that the trend not only increases German dependence on China, but could add to stress in key industries where China has become a major rival.

“In the absence of economic dynamism at home, some in Germany may now be troubled by any shifts on world markets,” said Salomon Fiedler, an economist at the bank Berenberg.

Relations between the United States and China are tense, once again, with experts saying that the administration of US President Donald Trump “doesn’t quite know how to deal with China”.

The latest flare-up took place when Beijing, on October 9, expanded its restrictions on the export of rare-earth metals, increasing the number of elements on the list.

China has the largest reserves and the majority of processing facilities of rare-earth metals that are used in a range of daily and critical industries like electric vehicles, smartphones, laptops and defence equipment.

In a first, it also required countries to have a licence to export rare-earth magnets and certain semiconductor materials that contain even trace amounts of minerals sourced from China or produced using Chinese technology.

China’s actions on rare-earths also came after the US expanded its Entity List, a trade restriction list that consists of certain foreign persons, entities or government, further limiting China’s access to the most advanced semiconductor chips, and added levies on China-linked ships both to boost the US shipbuilding industry and loosen China’s hold on the global shipping trade. China retaliated by applying its own charges on US-owned, operated, built or flagged vessels.

“For the US, its actions on chip exports and shipping industry fees were not related to the trade deal with China,” said Vina Nadjibulla, vice president for research and strategy at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

Since then, the two countries have also been in an “information war”, said Nadjibulla, each blaming the other for holding the world hostage with its policies.

But beyond the rhetoric, the world is seeing China really up its game.

“For the first time, China is doing this extra-terrestrial action that applies to other countries as well [with its amped up export restrictions on rare-earths]. They are prepared to match every US escalation, and have the US back down,” Nadjibulla said. “This is a very different kind of a trade war than we were experiencing even three months ago.”

This was a “power play” by China in the run-up to a planned meeting later this month between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in South Korea because “China has decided that the leverage is on their side,” said Dexter Tiff Roberts, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, pointing out that after some initial noise with Trump saying there was no reason to meet Xi any longer, the meeting is back on.

“If you look at the approach of the Trump administration right now, they are all over the place,” said Roberts.

Roberts was referring not only to the multiple tariff threats that the US has issued both on China and on specific industries and the carve-outs that were soon announced on those, but also in its statements on the Trump-Xi meeting, with Trump saying it was not happening, only to reverse that two days later.

“The Trump administration doesn’t quite know how to deal with China,” said Roberts. “They don’t understand that China is willing to accept a lot of pain,” and will not be easily cowed by US threats.

Beijing, on the other hand, has realised that Trump is determined to get his big deal with China and wants his state visit to seal that, maybe because “he feels that is important to his credentials as a big deal maker,” added Roberts, but that he cannot get there without giving more to China.

“China saw that they could push harder in the lead-up to the meeting.”

Wei Liang, a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies who specialises in international trade and Chinese economic foreign policy, agrees.

“Trump has a track record of TACO,” she said, referring to a term coined by a Financial Times columnist in May, which stands for “Trump always chickens out” in reference to his announcing tariffs and then carving out exemptions and pushing out implementation dates.

“He cares more than any other US president [about] stock market reactions, so definitely will be more flexible to making concessions. This is the inconsistency that has been captured by his negotiation partners,” Liang said.

China’s defiant stance also comes at a time of its own political concerns, Liang added.

While the domestic economy is “a black box” with no reliable data available on growth, employment and other criteria, the consensus among China experts is that the country has been hit by the tariffs, economic growth has slowed, and unemployment has ramped up.

As China started its four-day fourth plenary session on Monday where it plans to approve the draft of its next five-year national economic and social development plan, Xi can use the moment to tell his domestic audience that the country’s problems are stemming from Trump’s policies and the whole world is suffering because of those tariffs and it’s not related to Chinese policies, Liang said.

A possible decoupling

All of this also signals that Beijing seems to be prepared to “decouple” from the US more than ever, a significant change in mentality, as, in the past, the standard response to the idea was that it would be a “lose-lose” situation for both countries, Liang told Al Jazeera.

But in the last few years, China has diversified its exports to other countries, especially those in its Belt and Road Initiative, the ambitious infrastructure project that it launched in 2013 to link East Asia through Europe and has since expanded to Africa, Oceania and Latin America.

Even when it comes to things that it needs from the US – soya beans, aeroplanes and high-tech chip equipment – it can find other suppliers or has learned to work around that need, as is the case for the chip equipment, Liang pointed out.

In the meantime, especially in the years since the US-China trade war started under Trump as president in his first term, China has brought in a set of national security laws – including its version of the US Entity List, through which it is setting limits on those exports, Nadjibulla said.

“Everybody should have been preparing the way the Chinese have been preparing. We breathed a sigh of relief when there was a change in government [in the US after the first Trump administration], but China kept preparing,” she said.

“This should be a wake-up call for all countries to find other sources for its needs. Everyone should be redoubling their efforts to diversify, because we have now seen the Chinese playbook.”

The recent agreement between the United States and Australia to invest $3 billion in critical minerals and rare earths projects represents a significant step in the Western effort to reduce dependency on China for strategically vital resources.
While the deal has been heralded by Washington as a turning point in global supply diversification, a closer examination suggests that China’s entrenched dominance in rare earth mining, refining, and magnet manufacturing will remain largely unchallenged in the foreseeable future.

This analysis situates the agreement within the broader geopolitical and economic context of resource security, outlines its potential and limitations, and assesses its implications for the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region.

Rare Earths and Strategic Dependence

Rare earth elements (REEs) are indispensable for modern technology spanning clean energy, defence systems, electric vehicles, and semiconductors. Despite their name, REEs are relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust; their scarcity lies in the technically complex, costly, and environmentally damaging refining process.

Over the past three decades, China has systematically consolidated control over this value chain, developing low-cost refining and magnet production capabilities that now underpin 90% of global processing capacity, 69% of mining, and 98% of magnet manufacturing (Goldman Sachs, 2024).

This dominance has translated into a form of strategic leverage. Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to weaponize resource supply chains, most recently through export curbs on gallium, graphite, and rare earth magnets, heightening Western concerns about supply security and industrial resilience.

The United States and its allies, including Japan, Australia, and the European Union, have consequently prioritized critical mineral diversification as a matter of both economic sovereignty and national security.

Key Issues:

Technological Dependence:
Western economies lack refining and magnet manufacturing infrastructure comparable to China’s mature ecosystem, which benefits from decades of state investment and technological standardization.

Environmental and Regulatory Constraints:
High environmental standards, community opposition, and lengthy approval timelines in the U.S. and Australia increase project costs and delay production, deterring private investment.

Market Distortion by State Subsidies:
Chinese producers benefit from state-backed financing, subsidized energy, and vertically integrated industrial networks that suppress global prices, making it difficult for Western firms to compete without government intervention.

Investor and Consumer Behavior:
Global manufacturers continue to prioritize low-cost Chinese supply, perpetuating dependency despite policy rhetoric about diversification.

Geopolitical Fragmentation:
Efforts to “de-risk” supply chains are hindered by divergent national strategies among Western allies, with varying levels of commitment to resource security versus environmental and economic priorities.

The U.S.-Australia Critical Minerals Pact

On October 20, 2025, President Donald Trump announced a joint U.S.-Australia agreement committing $3 billion to the exploration, mining, and processing of critical minerals.
The pact includes provisions for a price floor a mechanism designed to ensure profitability for Western miners operating in markets distorted by Chinese state subsidies and environmental cost advantages.

According to the White House, U.S. investments will “unlock deposits worth over $53 billion” in Australian reserves. The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) has issued seven Letters of Interest totaling $2.2 billion to Australian mining firms, including Arafura Rare Earths, developer of the Nolans project in Western Australia.

While these measures indicate a serious financial commitment, they also highlight the industrial asymmetry between emerging Western projects and China’s mature, vertically integrated supply chains.

Economic Feasibility and Industry Timelines

Industry experts have expressed caution regarding the feasibility of rapid supply diversification.
Barrenjoey analyst Dan Morgan noted that the “time frame for various projects to be ready even by 2027 would be heroic,” reflecting the inherent capital intensity and regulatory delays in rare earth development.

Similarly, Dylan Kelly of Terra Capital observed that the current pricing of NdPr oxide the most traded rare earth compound “does not reflect a market dynamic that can sustain a significant fall in prices,” implying that a price floor mechanism may be essential for commercial viability.

Such perspectives underline the structural constraint that industrial policy cannot compress geological and technological timelines. New rare earth projects require multi-year investments in exploration, environmental clearance, and processing technology transfer.

Strategic and Geopolitical Dimensions

The U.S.-Australia pact is emblematic of a broader strategic realignment in the Indo-Pacific, wherein critical minerals are increasingly framed not merely as commodities but as strategic enablers of power projection.
For Washington, the deal aligns with its economic security agenda to “de-risk” supply chains and reduce China’s capacity to use resource dependencies as geopolitical tools.

For Canberra, it represents both an economic opportunity and a strategic burden. Australia possesses abundant mineral reserves but faces pressure to align its export policies with U.S. strategic interests, potentially straining its trade relations with China still its largest trading partner.

At a deeper level, the agreement signals the emergence of a critical minerals bloc, mirroring patterns seen in energy geopolitics. Yet, the absence of comparable refining infrastructure, skilled labor pools, and environmental cost advantages continues to limit Western competitiveness.

Market Reactions and Corporate Beneficiaries

The deal has already produced identifiable commercial winners.
Arafura Rare Earths and Syrah Resources have reported increased investor interest following the announcement, reflecting market confidence in Western government-backed financing.
Arafura’s CFO, Peter Sherrington, emphasized that the U.S.-Australia initiative “de-risks raising money from an equity perspective,” while its CEO projected full project funding by early 2026.

However, as Syrah CEO Shaun Verner noted, unless global consumers “cure their addiction to lowest-cost supply from China,” even well-financed Western projects will struggle to secure stable demand. This underscores a behavioral dimension of market dependency, wherein private-sector procurement patterns perpetuate Chinese dominance despite political rhetoric of diversification.

Implications for Global Resource Governance

In the short term, the U.S.-Australia agreement is unlikely to materially alter the global rare earth landscape.
China’s entrenched advantages in scale, technology, and regulatory flexibility will ensure continued dominance through the decade.
Nevertheless, the pact marks an important symbolic and structural step toward building alternative supply chains, particularly if accompanied by coordinated policies on processing technology, environmental standards, and market access.

In the medium to long term, such agreements could catalyze a Western-led industrial ecosystem, reducing strategic vulnerability and fostering innovation in cleaner extraction methods. However, success will depend on sustained political will, technological breakthroughs, and a willingness to absorb short-term economic inefficiencies for long-term security gains.

Analysis: Strategic Patience Over Political Rhetoric

The U.S.-Australia rare earths pact represents a strategically coherent but operationally constrained response to China’s resource hegemony. It reflects the increasing securitization of economic policy in an era of great-power competition.

Yet, as this analysis indicates, the pathway to rare earth independence will be long, capital-intensive, and geopolitically fraught.
While the agreement sends a strong signal of Western resolve, the transformation of intent into industrial capability will take years, not electoral cycles.

Until then, China’s dominance will persist not simply because of its mineral reserves, but due to its unparalleled integration of industrial policy, technological expertise, and geopolitical strategy.

With information from Reuters.

In a realist world, power is rarely exercised alone. It takes coordination, sustained support, and mutual loyalty to project strength. That is the foundation of any enduring alliance. Since the Cold War, Western powers have built a sophisticated web of strategic alliances, sometimes tested but still intact. Even amid nationalist disruptions under figures like Donald Trump or Viktor Orbán, the Western alliance remains functional and coherent. But what about the non-Western bloc, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and others?

The truth is that non-Western alliances remain weak, fragmented, and often symbolic. Lacking geographic proximity, institutional architecture, or political cohesion, these alliances fail to act in unison, especially in moments of crisis. Military cooperation, defense technology sharing, and strategic communication remain alarmingly underdeveloped.

The recent Israeli attack on Iran exposed this blatantly. Reportedly Isreal forces used the Jordanian and Iraqi airspace, struck Iranian nuclear and military facilities, killing multiple top officials. While rumors circulated about an imminent war, Iran’s response was surprisingly feeble. It’s defense systems failed to intercept the attacks, and its military preparedness appeared outdated from the start. But recent retaliation followed a little bit of promise.

The United States denied direct involvement. Yet Washington, alongside the European allies, refrained from condemning the strike. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom stood silent, indirectly backing Israel through intelligence sharing, military cooperation, and diplomatic support. Their strategic coordination remains strong, despite tensions over Iran’s nuclear program.

What about Iran’s Non-Western allies?

Russia, arguably Iran’s closest partner, is deeply engaged in its own war in Ukraine. Yet strategic alliances are tested precisely in such moments. Iran and Russia have long shared regional interests in Syria and other part of the Middle East. Now, that cooperation seems one-sided. While Russia uses Iranian drones in Ukraine, Tehran receives little in return. No warning, no defense coordination, and certainly no technological assistance ahead of Israel’s strike.

Why hasn’t Russia helped accelerate Iran’s nuclear program as Western powers once did for Israel? Where was the intelligence sharing, the strategic dialogue? These absences raise serious questions about Russia’s role in the non-Western alliance framework: Is it simply a transactional partner or something more?

China is a different story. With an advanced defense industry and growing geopolitical clout, Beijing has demonstrated capability. The recent deployment of Chinese J-10C jets to Pakistan, for example, during tensions with India, signaled a serious technological and symbolic counterweight to Western influence. China even provided real-time intelligence to Pakistan. But where was this level of support for Iran? Through recent rumor said, there are couple of military assistance provided to Iran but still not like ally.

A newly inaugurated Iran-China railroad project suggests growing economic ties, but modern alliances require more than trade. Strategic defense coordination is fundamental. Despite Iran’s geopolitical relevance, Beijing remains largely absent in Iran’s security calculus.

Then there is Iran’s own regional network, its so-called “axis of resistance.” Historically, Iran projected strength through proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. But this too is unraveling. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh were both reportedly killed by Israeli operations, Haniyeh during an official visit in Tehran itself. These assassinations not only reflect Tehran’s inability to protect its partners but also signal a crisis of credibility. No meaningful retaliation followed. This absence of action weakens Iran’s reputation as a guarantor of its proxies’ survival.

The broader picture is troubling. Non-Western powers often operate like solo actors in a system that punishes isolation. The world is a dark forest; walk alone, and sooner or later, the wolves will find you. This is the lesson non-Western allies must internalize. Shared struggle requires shared commitment. Each country will always have its own domestic priorities, but alliances demand sacrifice, coordination, and strategic depth.

It seems like their trust-building process is yet to work. Or are they afraid to confront Western allies’ wrath over sanctions? China and Russia have been conducting business and various forms of economic cooperation with most of the Western blocs, despite sanctions threats and targeted regulations. These two nations need to step up and anchor the non-Western bloc. A multipolar world needs a table where bipolar allies can collaborate and pave the path for a democratic alliance for the world. Trump’s approach to Europe and other Western countries is not seen as a sign of alliance. So at this moment, non-Western countries can show unity. This not only gives the world new hope for cooperative living ideas but also threatens Trump’s leadership position on global order.

China has the defense capacity to empower allies but remains hesitant. Russia, once a superpower, is now locked in a war that undermines its influence and exposes its limits. In today’s geopolitical landscape, superpowers act more like coaches than players. Mediation, defense sharing, and regional stabilization efforts, rather than confrontation, are what build strategic resilience.

For the non-Western bloc, the Israel-Iran crisis must serve as a wake-up call. Without solidarity, without trust, and without strategy, they risk becoming a coalition of convenience. This also reflects unity in rhetoric but division and defeat in reality.

WASHINGTON — President Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed a critical-minerals deal at the White House on Monday as the U.S. eyes the continent’s rich rare-earth resources at a time when China is imposing tougher rules on exporting its own critical minerals.

The two leaders described the agreement as an $8.5 billion deal between the allies. Trump said it had been negotiated over several months.

“Today’s agreement on critical minerals and rare earths is just taking” the U.S. and Australia’s relationship “to the next level,” Albanese added.

This month, Beijing announced that it will require foreign companies to get approval from the Chinese government to export magnets containing even trace amounts of rare-earth materials that originated from China or were produced with Chinese technology. Trump’s Republican administration says this gives China broad power over the global economy by controlling the tech supply chain.

“Australia is really, really going to be helpful in the effort to take the global economy and make it less risky, less exposed to the kind of rare-earth extortion that we’re seeing from the Chinese,” Kevin Hassett, the director of the White House’s National Economic Council, told reporters Monday morning before Trump’s meeting with Albanese.

Hassett noted that Australia has one of the best mining economies in the world, while praising its refiners and its abundance of rare-earth resources. Among the Australian officials accompanying Albanese are ministers overseeing resources and industry and science, and the continent has dozens of critical minerals sought by the U.S.

The prime minister’s visit comes just before Trump is planning to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea later this month.

The prime minister said ahead of his visit that the two leaders will have a chance to deepen their countries’ ties on trade and defense. Another expected topic of discussion is AUKUS, a security pact with Australia, the U.S. and the United Kingdom that was signed during President Biden’s administration.

Trump has not indicated publicly whether he would want to keep AUKUS intact, and the Pentagon is reviewing the agreement.

“Australia and the United States have stood shoulder-to-shoulder in every major conflict for over a century,” Albanese said before the meeting. “I look forward to a positive and constructive meeting with President Trump at the White House.”

The center-left Albanese was reelected in May and suggested shortly after his win that his party increased its majority by not modeling itself on Trumpism.

“Australians have chosen to face global challenges the Australian way, looking after each other while building for the future,” Albanese told supporters during his victory speech.

Kim and Madhani write for the Associated Press.

US President Donald Trump said the deal had been negotiated over the last four to five months.

United States President Donald Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese have signed an agreement on rare earth and critical minerals as China tightens control over global supply.

The two leaders signed the deal on Monday at the White House.

Trump said the agreement had been negotiated over four or five months. The two leaders will also discuss trade, submarines and military equipment, Trump said.

Albanese described it as an $8.5bn pipeline “that we have ready to go”.

The full terms of the agreement were not immediately available. The two leaders said part of the agreement had to do with processing of the minerals. Albanese said both countries will contribute $1bn over the next six months for joint projects.

China has the world’s largest rare earths reserves, according to the US Geological Survey data, but Australia also has significant reserves.

The two leaders also planned to discuss the $239.4bn agreement, reached in 2023 under then-US President Joe Biden, in which Australia is to buy US nuclear-powered submarines in 2032 before building a new submarine class with Britain.

US Navy Secretary John Phelan told the meeting the US and Australia were working very closely to improve the original framework for all three parties “and clarify some of the ambiguity that was in the prior agreement”.

Trump said these were “just minor details”.

“There shouldn’t be any more clarifications, because we’re just, we’re just going now full steam ahead, building,” Trump said.

Australian officials have said they are confident it will proceed, with Defence Minister Richard Marles last week saying he knew when the review would conclude.

China’s rare earth export controls

Ahead of Monday’s meeting between the two leaders, Australian officials have emphasised Canberra is paying its way under AUKUS — a trilateral military partnership between the US, Australia and the United Kingdom, contributing $2bn this year to boost production rates at US submarine shipyards, and preparing to maintain US Virginia-class submarines at its Indian Ocean naval base from 2027.

The delay of 10 months in an official meeting since Trump took office has caused some anxiety in Australia as the Pentagon urged Canberra to lift defence spending. The two leaders met briefly on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York last month.

Australia is willing to sell shares in its planned strategic reserve of critical minerals to allies including Britain, as Western governments scramble to end their reliance on China for rare earths and minor metals.

Top US officials last week condemned Beijing’s expansion of rare earth export controls as a threat to global supply chains. China is the world’s biggest producer of the materials, which are vital for products ranging from electric vehicles to aircraft engines and military radars.

Resource-rich Australia, wanting to extract and process rare earths, put preferential access to its strategic reserve on the table in US trade negotiations in April.

Global stock markets kicked off the week on a strong note after data showed China’s economy performing better than expected despite ongoing trade tensions with the United States. Investor optimism was also buoyed by expectations of Japanese stimulus and a strong outlook for artificial intelligence (AI) companies during the U.S. earnings season.

Why It Matters

China’s stronger-than-forecast GDP growth (1.1% in Q3) and industrial output gains (6.5%) helped calm fears about a global slowdown triggered by U.S.-China trade frictions.
Meanwhile, optimism surrounding AI-driven tech earnings particularly Nvidia continued to lift global equities, reinforcing investor belief in the sector’s long-term profitability.
At the same time, expectations of further U.S. Federal Reserve rate cuts kept global borrowing costs lower and strengthened risk appetite.

Asia: Japan’s Nikkei surged 2.8% to a record high amid hopes of stimulus under likely new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

Europe: The Stoxx 600 rose 0.7% in early trade.

U.S.: Futures pointed to gains of 0.4–0.5% for the S&P 500 and Nasdaq.

Bonds & FX: Treasury yields dipped to 4.02%, while the euro climbed to $1.1662 on a softer dollar.

Commodities: Gold stayed elevated around $4,266/oz, reflecting persistent geopolitical caution, while Brent crude slipped 0.4% to $61.02 on OPEC+ supply signals.

Jason da Silva (Arbuthnot Latham): “There’s still enough scope for healthy returns from big tech; I’m not selling the AI theme yet.”

Kevin Thozet (Carmignac): Warned of “froth” in some AI stocks but said it’s too soon to exit the trade.

Lorenzo Portelli (Amundi): Predicted gold could rise to $5,000 as central banks diversify reserves and the dollar weakens.

What’s Next

Looking ahead, investor attention will pivot to major U.S. corporate earnings that could shape the market’s next moves. Reports from Tesla, Netflix, Procter & Gamble, and Coca-Cola will offer a clearer picture of consumer demand and how well companies are weathering tariffs and inflation pressures. On the policy front, traders expect the Federal Reserve to deliver two more rate cuts by December, a move that could further support equities, weaken the dollar, and sustain global liquidity. However, the upcoming U.S.–China tariff truce deadline on November 10 looms large, and any breakdown in talks could quickly reverse market optimism. Investors will also watch for fresh data on inflation and labor markets to gauge how long central banks can maintain their dovish stance.

With information from Reuters.