beijing

As a wave of cheap Chinese imports has flooded the EU in recent years, Brussels is now facing a new challenge: new import routes passing through Morocco and Turkey, the EU’s neighbouring countries, where Beijing can leverage tariff-free trade agreements with the bloc.

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By investing heavily in those countries, China is seeking to circumvent the EU’s trade barriers, including the extra duties imposed by the EU on products such as electric vehicles, and channel its industrial overcapacity into the European market.

European policymakers are now bracing for a surge in low-cost Chinese goods entering duty-free through these gateway countries, thanks to an association agreement that liberalises trade with Morocco and a customs union linking Turkey to the EU.

The European Commission launched negotiations with Beijing in June in a bid to rebalance a trade relationship that has left the EU with a €1 billion deficit. However, it is not guaranteed to reach concrete results by October — the deadline set by Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.

Brussels has already made clear it is prepared to deploy new unilateral trade defence measures. But Beijing is becoming increasingly adept at getting around the EU’s traditional trade tools, particularly trade defence tariffs.

Its circumvention strategy is now to go through Morocco and Turkey, which are becoming the new front line in the EU’s trade battle with China.

Billions in investments

Over the last four years, these investments have reached a record $6 billion in Morocco and $2 billion in Turkey, according to Rhodium Group, an independent research provider.

Cairo is also attracting Chinese money, with $6 billion invested in 2025 alone. But Chinese products made in Egypt are mainly exported to the US and Gulf countries.

In Morocco, Beijing has been investing in an entire electric vehicles (EV) manufacturing ecosystem. “There is a genuine long-term trend that began after COVID-19. We are seeing Chinese companies setting up operations in the country to manufacture high-value-added goods,” Armand Meyer, an expert at Rhodium Group, told Euronews.

Chinese battery producer Gotion is settling in the country, along with BTR, Tinci and Huayou, which produce battery materials, APG, an automotive brake manufacturer, and Sentury Tire, a tyre maker. All will soon have factories in Morocco.

The EU, which hit Chinese EVs with anti-subsidy duties in 2024, is concerned about China’s move into neighbouring countries.

In Turkey, part of the investment targets the local market, while Chinese export plans also threaten European producers. China’s EV giant BYD was granted preferential access to the Turkish market to build a factory, although the project has been suspended for now.

“The idea was to build a mega-factory in exchange for an exemption from Turkish import duties, as Turkey imposes tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles,” Meyer said. Chinese home appliance maker Haier is also investing in the country, as is Astronergy, which manufactures solar panels.

China’s manufacturing push in those countries spans multiple sectors, exploiting trade agreements with the EU that cover a wide range of products.

“The free trade agreements with Morocco and Turkey cover almost all goods. So it’s complicated to counter the Chinese export strategy,” Thomas Grjebine, an economist at the French Centre for Research and Expertise on the World Economy, told Euronews.

Grjebine added that China has understood these countries can serve as “a staging ground”, with investments rising year after year.

“Investments in these gateway countries account for about a quarter of China’s total investment in Europe and the Maghreb,” he said.

Reducing Morocco and Turkey’s access to the EU market

However, in March, the Commission proposed a landmark bill called the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) which aims to protect the EU market from foreign competitors — provoking anger from China.

The IAA creates a European preference for access to public procurement and EU public funding schemes, ruling out non-EU countries under certain conditions. China was targeted in particular, leading to threats of retaliation from Beijing.

All foreign countries are now lobbying EU lawmakers, who are discussing the bill, to be considered trusted partners, allowing their products to qualify as “Made in Europe”.

Industries with parts of their value chains outside the EU are also urging MEPs to include those countries. Euronews has learnt that ACEA, for instance, which represents European carmakers in Brussels, has been lobbying EU lawmakers to include Morocco, where many European manufacturers have production plants.

Paradoxically, if Morocco and Turkey — where European carmakers are also established — were considered trusted partners whose products could be labelled “Made in Europe”, it would also serve Beijing’s interests — despite fierce competition with the EU in the automotive sector — as China is building factories there.

“The Chinese know full well that a number of companies have located part of their value chain in those countries and are lobbying hard to ensure that Morocco and Turkey are not excluded from what is considered ‘Made in Europe’,” French socialist MEP Pierre Jouvet told Euronews.

“This is part of Beijing’s investment and tariff circumvention strategy,” he said.

The MEP is campaigning to exclude Morocco and Turkey from the scope of the IAA unless both countries open their public procurement markets to EU companies.

That position is backed by French liberal MEP Christophe Grudler and German Green MEP Anna Cavazzini, who, along with Jouvet, are expected to present a report on the issue to fellow MEPs in September.

EU trade defence instruments lack effectiveness

Without such a bill, the EU’s trade defence instruments remain modest compared with the scale of the coming wave of cheap Chinese products manufactured in those neighbouring countries.

The EU can only tackle Chinese dumping — where a product is sold below its normal value — on a product-by-product basis, as well as tariff circumvention when parts of the goods come from China and have only been assembled in Morocco or Turkey. The Commission usually assesses the value added generated in those countries before deciding whether to sanction Chinese companies with duties.

“For years, it was mostly a matter of transhipment through these countries, with Chinese exporters simply changing the certificate of origin, but defending the EU market has now become far more challenging,” Laurent Ruessmann, partner at law firm RB Legal, told Euronews.

Ruessmann has represented European glass fibre producers — whose products are used as reinforcement materials — in their fight against cheap Chinese imports. Eventually, glass fibre from China and from Chinese companies located in Egypt was hit with EU anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties in 2020.

But the Commission then had to open new cases involving glass fibre fabrics — used in wind turbine blades — imported from Morocco and Turkey. In 2022, it found that they were made using Chinese glass fibre already subject to EU anti-dumping duties imposed in 2020, a textbook case of tariff circumvention.

More recently, in 2025, the Commission also slapped countervailing duties on aluminium road wheels made in Morocco after concluding China had unfairly subsidised them.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Chinese companies receive up to eight times more subsidies than Western firms.

With recent investments in Morocco and Turkey, the EU executive is facing a new challenge: Chinese companies are setting up factories abroad, generating more added value in those countries than in China.

“In those cases, the Commission can no longer rely on anti-circumvention rules and has to launch a fresh investigation. The challenge is that it is much more difficult to prove dumping or unfair subsidies, making it far harder to impose duties high enough to protect the European market,” Victor Crochet of law firm Nishimura & Asahi told Euronews.

Looking at recent judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union, however, the lawyer believes EU judges will progressively allow the Commission to be “more aggressive” towards Chinese operations located in the EU’s neighbouring countries.

“The Commission will have to come up with new instruments. It will try to push the boundaries of the concept of circumvention to keep pace with the times, even when the raw materials no longer come from China,” Crochet said.

When Washington celebrates the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence on July 4th, the celebrations will arrive bruised. There will be the customary funding disputes, a federal commission fighting against a more partisan task force from the White House, and a public worn by years of political turmoil, all of which will turn what could have been an occasion of civic healing into another USA ‘celebration’ in the world. None of this has gone unnoticed in Beijing, given that this ‘celebration’ is being interpreted more as a diagnosis than a birthday. What is being asked throughout the commentaries from Qiushi (求是), on CCTV, in Tsinghua and Peking University, is simply put, what kind of America is turning 250?

Within the last five years, the interpretation given from both the official channels and the more informal academic channels in Beijing has varied considerably. Most importantly, these streams have been diverging for some time and therefore offer significant insight into how Beijing has been interpreting the country it has been comparing itself to for the last 20 years.

From “the East rising” to a measured retreat

Many are familiar with the upbeat version of the story. After 2020, the phrases that framed China’s worldview included “great changes, unseen in a century” (百年未有之大变局) and “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降). The latter, used by Xi Jinping in remarks to senior officials in early 2021 and again in 2023, provided the slogan for the official narrative. The Covid-19 pandemic, the insurrection at the US Capitol, and a decade of US political instability seemed to provide the empirical evidence for a thesis, rooted in Chinese Marxist theory, that capitalist systems contain the principle of their own disintegration. This was rationalized and systemized after the 2008 financial crisis and has remained largely unchanged.

However, the reality is far more complicated than the slogan implies. Researchers who have traced the terminology in Chinese academic publications through the CNKI database have found that scholarly use of “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降) peaked around 2021 and has subsided since then, even though the idea itself remained more prevalent than it was during the entire duration of Donald Trump’s first presidential term. In other words, the slogan was being diplomatically retracted within scholarly circles at the very moment it was most associated with official optimism. When Xi’s speech in 2023, which was published in Qiushi in January 2025, described the West’s decline, it was more a formal, official copy of a sentiment than a newly published speech.

The official rhetoric, however, did not soften. A Brookings study found a near doubling in the use of “American decline” terminology in official Chinese documents from 2025. State Security Minister Chen Yixin wrote in Qiushi in December of 2025, what could be described as a near complete inventory of the ills of the world: the usurpation of unipolar dominance gives way to economic decline and social disintegration, a domestic credit crisis and the collapse of foreign mythic structures. Around the same time, a popular phrase borrowed from gaming, the “kill line” (斩杀线) found its way to official Chinese publications. A Qiushi article from January 2026 described an America, the working class of which had been pushed (beyond the point of no return) along the path of ruin by an unrepairable (decomposing) industrial base while financial capitalism strangled the benefits. The conclusion that was drawn was that we had already entered the post-American world.

The correction of early 2026

Then the story changed once more, and the correction was from within Beijing’s own strategic community.

The consensus in Chinese policymaking following the Busan summit in October 2025, was that China had won the trade war and forced the US into a stalemate. The years of maximum pressure, they said, did not lead to the systemic concessions China had sought, but rather worsened American inflation and reduced productivity. For a few months, the optimism was high. However, by 2026, the optimism was replaced by apprehension. A series of adverse events for China, from losing equity in a German port buyout, to the Nexperia debacle, to the Iran war, led many to wonder if China’s victory was, in fact, a loss. The dominant question that the strategic community was debating was whether American power was in decline or if it was in fact, power rebounding.

What was most interesting was who took the cautious side. Both Chen Wenling and Yan Xuetong argued that the US had, and has, the military and economic capability to project power. In their view, the US had the edge, and Trump’s high stakes, risky policy decisions were based on the belief that the US had the dominant position. The gap was definitely closing, but was not yet a reality. The advice they gave was to be patient. If China was able to “manage its own affairs well,” it was likely that the US would be compelled to return to a more stable relationship.

The key observation regarding prominent intellectuals in Beijing is this. They have never been champions of the triumphalist position. Yan Xuetong has spent a great deal of time dismissing talks of “The East is rising and the West is declining” and multipolarity as delusional. His recently published book, Inflection of History (历史的拐点), which was published by CITIC Press in December of 2025, predicts a US-China bipolarity which, during the next decade, would be expected to stabilise rather than destabilise. In this scenario, over the next decade the gap in capability between the two powers would be expected to converge, although the US would retain an overall advantage. In this scenario, the US would retain overall dominance in services, cyberspace and global influence, while China would retain relative superiority in manufacturing and be dominant in the international arena. In this scenario, Yan does argue that Trump would be expected to damage American power, especially with regards to the international balance, through the closure of laboratories, the loss of researchers, and a declining international trade. However, damage to the leader of the bipolar order is not the same as the collapse of the order, and Yan is very cautious not to make confuse the two.

As China’s foremost authority on US studies, Wang Jisi (王缉思) of Peking University, has placed the greatest emphasis on the need for a clear and level-headed approach. His influential essay, titled, “Has America really declined? Chinese people should hold a sober understanding” ( 美国到底有没有衰落？中国人应有清醒认识), leads with the argument that the most important factors influencing the relationship are domestic political issues, and are not to be found in some quantifiable assessment of relative national strength, or within the confines of the Thucydides Trap. He has argued that the effects of Trump’s immigration restrictions would be more symbolic than real, and would not negatively impact the long-term potential of the US economy. Along with American scholar David Lampton, he wrote, that while both societies have convinced itself that the other is an existential threat, which is a dangerous narrative trap, similar to a noticeable shift of power.

Why AI keeps rewriting the script

If the quest for technological dominance was to be provided as a single reason for the inconsistency in the narrative, it would be the most accurate. The same confidence that characterized 2025 is the same that will characterize the sobriety of 2026. When Trump had his second inauguration in January 2025, DeepSeek had launched their R1. It disrupted the presumption of AI dominance in America and had a day effect of 200 billion on Nvidia’s valuation. For Chinese decision makers, since then, it has been electric. Carnegie researchers described it as the rediscovery of technological confidence. The effect was the realization of the theory of “The East is rising and the West is declining” (东升西降): a monumental achievement with controls on exports from a young lab in Hangzhou.

The second installment was more sobering. The launch of DeepSeek’s next model, V4, in April 2026, was received with indifference. In fact, DeepSeek’s own internal product documentation stated that V4 was between three and six months behind American models. Furthermore, V4 was reliant on domestic chips from Huawei, and was, in most assessments, dependent on American technology that was not easily replaceable. For Chinese analysts, this was not a case of falling behind, but one of the more difficult problems of maintaining the technological edge. Reshoring and tariffs told a similar story. The American industrial base, which the “kill line” (斩杀线) commentary presumed was a terminally stagnated industrial base, was the target of a renewed, aggressive, and partially successful push to bring industry back to America. A competitor with such a focus on rejuvenation and renewal is not, on the surface, a declining competitor.

The G2 Puzzle

There’s another element coming from Washington that adds to the complexity of the story of American decline. This element relates to Trump. Before the Busan meeting, Trump used the term “G2,” and several Washington officials followed suit. The decline thesis cannot account for this. If America is indeed in decline, why is it offering G2 (shared leadership) with China?

Chinese reflexive responses are interesting. The official position, as expressed in Zhou Li’s (周力) December 2025 article, is that G2 as a hegemony is incompatible with China’s commitment to a multipolar world and would alienate the Global South which China is trying to court. These scholars have found their own workarounds. Yan Xuetong and Zheng Yongnian have suggested that G2 is more a description of a scenario of existing bipolarity than a policy to adopt. Xia Liping of Tongji University has suggested that G2 be rephrased as “China-US coordination” (中美协调) instead of “China-US co-governance” (中美共治), which makes it easier for Beijing to accept peer status while not succumbing to a duopoly. The attempt to manage the terminology suggests that the US at 250 is still sufficiently powerful that its offer of co-leadership is significant, even to a China that is more confident than ever.

A mirror, not a verdict

What emerges from five years of this commentary is not a single Chinese view of America at 250 but a layered one. The loudest polemical phrase is that the US, a hegemon, is in an irreversible decline. Within a Chinese context, this serves a purpose unrelated to the US. The state media have found it convenient to juxtapose gun violence and homelessness against the backdrop of Chinese economic performance. The decline of the US economy flouts the-premise, as socialism is the ultimate victor among capitalist competition.

But that was in the loud tier. In the reserved tier, the people in Beijing who are actually relying on reading Washington have converged on a more cautious and, frankly, more accurate assessment. They have described America as a relative decline, but erratic, and still very formidable as well as technologically advanced, especially in the field of the upcoming and new challenges of competition. The assessments have consistently referred to America as “declining but dangerous,” and this phrase has proven to be the most accurate of the lot. Reality has justified the phrase. The same cannot be said of unqualified and total victory.

The inconsistency in narratives can be attributed to the fact that the accounts are serving two purposes simultaneously. They are both analysis and propaganda, and the two types of work are at odds with each other. After AI successes or trade wins, the propaganda is ahead of analysis. After the impacts of reshoring or when a Chinese model stays behind, the analysts bring it back. The occasion is provided by the anniversary, but the underlying reason is that China has not decided, and maybe cannot decide, if they think that simply waiting will work in their favour or if the gap they have slowly been closing over the past 25 years is going to be a stubborn gap.

At 250, in other words, the United States functions in Chinese discourse less as a subject to be judged than as a mirror. What Beijing sees in it, in any given month, tells you a great deal about how confident Beijing is feeling about itself

A US trade expert says the US, Mexico, and Canada need to hold trilateral talks to get a cross-border trade deal signed. Ex-lead US international trade negotiator Harry Broadman says the longer it takes Trump to get a trade deal with his neighbours, the weaker he looks to China.

EXPLAINER

China and Sudan signed off on a waiver of $50m as Sudan’s military-led government seeks support amid Western sanctions.

China has waived loans worth $50m that it had given to Sudan, the two countries said over the weekend. The agreement comes three years into a war between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that has shrunk the country’s economy by roughly 40 percent, according to the United Nations.

The sum is small compared with what Sudan owes overall to external governments or agencies, an amount estimated at more than $56bn before the war. But the waiver lands at a moment when Khartoum has few other international lenders extending any financial support.

China’s relationship with Sudan predates the war by decades, built on oil and infrastructure interests that survived multiple changes of government in Khartoum. But the war has narrowed Sudan’s options elsewhere, as Western governments have largely held back or imposed sanctions.

Here’s why this deal is significant for Sudan and China:

What do we know about the deal?

The signed protocol in Port Sudan cancels four interest-free loans worth 344 million yuan, about $50m, with immediate effect, according to Sudan’s official news agency, SUNA.

Sudan’s Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim welcomed the move, reportedly saying that China has continued investing in the country throughout the war while Western governments, including the United States and European Union members, have largely held back. Gibril himself was added to the US Treasury sanctions list in September 2025 for his alleged “involvement in Sudan’s brutal civil war and … connections to Iran”.

China’s charge d’affaires in Sudan, Xu Jian, reportedly said at the signing ceremony that China was ready to help rebuild what was destroyed during the war in Sudan.

What’s in it for Sudan?

Sudan’s external debt of more than $56bn before the war is expected to have ballooned since.

The $50m debt relief amounts to not even 1 percent of the total external pre-war debt. In fact, Sudan was close to a far bigger debt write-off in 2021. It was on track with the IMF and the World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative to have more than $50bn of its debt forgiven within three years. The 2021 military coup in October derailed that debt relief plan, and the process was formally suspended a year later.

Still, China’s waiver arrives at a moment of acute need for the country. The war is now in its third year. More than 1.5 million people have been killed, according to the UN, and the war has displaced about 14 million people – about a quarter of the Sudanese population. The World Health Organization says less than 14 percent of health facilities are still functioning. Jobs have vanished in many parts of the country, and the rising cost of living has made it difficult for households to survive.

The Sudanese pound has collapsed since the start of the war. It went from roughly 600 to the dollar before the war to more than 5000 to the dollar by June 2026.

What’s in it for China?

In many ways, Beijing’s decision to waive the $50m loan is in keeping with a broader approach it has taken in recent years, one that has helped cement China as Africa’s largest trading partner for 17 consecutive years.

China has provided interest-free loan forgiveness as a diplomatic gesture to multiple countries, and these decisions are recurrent announcements at Beijing’s frequent leader-level summits with African nations. This is especially true for smaller loans. Research from the Johns Hopkins China Africa Research Initiative found that China forgave at least $3.4bn of these kinds of debts across the African continent between 2000 and 2019.

By contrast, larger loans are usually commercial loans through state banks that come with interest, and waiving those is harder.

At a time when the West is largely trying to isolate Sudan’s leadership, a small loan waiver gives China outsized influence in a country that sits at the intersection of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

What have China-Sudan ties been like historically?

Oil has long served as a catalyst for their relationship. From the mid-1990s on, China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) poured billions of dollars into Sudanese oil fields and the pipelines carrying that crude oil to Port Sudan. This was a time when many Western companies were pushed out due to sanctions.

The relationship changed when the southern part of the country voted in favour of independence in 2011. The world’s newest country, South Sudan, left the north and took most of the country’s oil fields with it.

Chinese investment largely dried up afterwards, but Sudan still has more than $5bn of outstanding debt to China. The war has aggravated Sudan’s economic challenges. The CNPC requested a formal exit from Sudan in December 2025.

June 27 (UPI) — The local authorities acknowledged the plane crash that hit Beijing’s tallest building Friday, saying the pilot died and 13 people were injured.

A short statement on WeChat from the local Chaoyang District government said only the pilot was on the plane and was killed in the crash. The statement said 13 people in the building and on the ground were injured. They didn’t identify the pilot or a motive.

The statement said, a “single-engine double-seat light sports aircraft collided with a high-rise building in flight.” It said the incident is being investigated. It didn’t name the building and only called it a skyscraper near the East Third Ring Road.

All references to the crash, video and images were scrubbed from social media in China. The state media, whose headquarters is across the street from the 109-story Citic Tower, hasn’t reported anything about the crash.

It’s not known if the crash was intentional.

Beijing airspace is tightly controlled, and even drones are mostly banned within the city. It’s not clear how the pilot got around the tight controls.

FL360Aero.com, an aviation news site, posted images and video on X from the scene, showing a plane’s tail lying on the sidewalk. The post estimated that it hit around the 65th floor of the building.

Flightradar24 posted on X flight data that appeared to show a deviated flight path for the plane after it took off from Shifosi airport in Beijing’s eastern Pinggu district.