Bangladesh

A week into the United States-Israeli war on Iran, and Iran’s attacks on its Gulf neighbours, Jaya Khuntia spoke – as he often did – to his Doha-based son Kuna on the phone.

It was March 6, about 10pm, and Khuntia and the family were worried. “He told me, ‘I am safe here, don’t worry,’” the father recalled from the conversation with Kuna.

It was the last time they spoke.

The next day, the family in Naikanipalli village of India’s eastern Odisha state received a phone call from Kuna’s roommate telling them that the son had suffered a heart attack after hearing the sound of missiles and debris from interceptions falling near their residence. He collapsed and was later declared dead. Kuna’s body reached home days later.

Al Jazeera cannot independently confirm the cause of Kuna’s death, but the family of the 25-year-old, who worked as a pipe fitter in Qatar’s capital, is among millions across South Asia directly affected by the war in the Middle East.

Of the eight people killed in the United Arab Emirates in Iranian attacks, two were Emirati military personnel, a third a Palestinian civilian, and the remaining five were from South Asia: Three from Pakistan, and one each from Bangladesh and Nepal. All three people killed in Oman were from India. An Indian national and a Bangladeshi national are the only deaths in Saudi Arabia.

Migrant workers from South Asia total nearly 21 million people in the Gulf nations, a third of the total population of the region. At stake, for their families back home, is the safety of their loved ones and the future of their dreams.

The Khuntia family had taken on a 300,000-rupee ($3200) debt in 2025 for the marriages of their two daughters. Kuna’s income in Doha – where he had moved only in late 2025 – of 35,000 rupees ($372) was helping them collect what they needed to pay back the loan. Kuna had been sending back about 15,000 rupees ($164) every month.

“We thought our suffering was finally ending,” Jaya said, his voice trembling. “My only son would say, ‘Baba, don’t worry, I am here.’ He was our only hope… our everything.”

That hope is now extinguished. “That one call finished us,” Jaya cried. “He promised to return after clearing our debts … but he came back in a coffin. We have nothing left now. Losing our only son is the biggest debt we have to live with.”

‘I thought we would be next’

In all, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – the six Arab countries in the Gulf – host 35 million foreign nationals, who form a majority of their total population, 62 million.

They include 9 million people from India, 5 million each from Pakistan and Bangladesh, 1.2 million from Nepal, and 650,000 from Sri Lanka. Most of them are engaged in blue-collar work, building or supporting the industries and services that are at the heart of the Gulf’s success and prosperity.

But since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran, these migrant workers have often been among the most vulnerable. That vulnerability extends beyond deaths and injuries to the very nature of their work: Oil refineries, construction areas, airports and docks, where many work, have been targeted in Iranian attacks.

The suspension of work at many of these facilities, coupled with fears of a major economic downturn in the region, has also left many workers and their families worried about the future of their jobs.

Hamza*, a Pakistani migrant labourer working at an oil storage facility in the UAE, recalled a recent attack that he witnessed. “A drone struck a storage unit right in front of us. We were completely shaken. Most of us there are from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

“We couldn’t sleep for nights after that. The drone was so close that it could have killed us, too,” Hamza added. “For a moment, I thought we would be next.”

Despite these dangers, he said, leaving is not an option.

“We want to go back, but we can’t,” Hamza said. “Our families depend on us. It’s dangerous here, but if we stop working, they will have nothing to eat. We have no choice.”

Experts say Hamza’s sentiment is common across South Asian blue-collar workers in the Gulf, because of poverty and limited employment opportunities back home.

Imran Khan, a faculty member at the New Delhi Institute of Management working on migration economics, said migrant labourers from South Asia are often driven by desperation to take up jobs in the Middle East. He said Western countries have, in recent years, dramatically raised entry barriers for less-educated blue-collar foreign workers.

“These workers are the worst affected during crises – whether war or natural disasters,” he says. “I have been speaking to several migrant labourers, particularly Indians in the Middle East, and many are living in distress since the conflict began.”

But, like Hamza, most cannot afford to leave, Khan said.

“They cannot simply quit. Their income would stop immediately, and there are very limited opportunities back home,” he explained. “They have families to support, and without these jobs, survival becomes difficult.”

Families – and societies – that depend on remittances

Middle Eastern countries remain a key source of remittances for South Asian nations such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. The remittances these five countries receive from the region, $103bn, are comparable to Oman’s total gross domestic product (GDP).

Just the remittances that India receives from the Gulf, $50bn, are more than Bahrain’s entire GDP. Pakistan receives $38.3bn in remittances, Bangladesh $13.5bn, Sri Lanka $8bn, and Nepal $5bn.

With the recent escalation of conflict in the Middle East, experts warn these flows could be significantly affected, especially if Gulf economies contract and layoffs follow.

Faisal Abbas, an expert in international economics and director at the Centre of Excellence on Population and Wellbeing Studies, a Pakistan-based research institute, said remittances from the Middle East form a crucial economic backbone for South Asian nations, not just families.

“Remittances are a critical pillar for Pakistan and other South Asian economies, and a large share comes from Middle Eastern countries,” he explained. “If the situation worsens, it will not be a positive development for the region.”

Pakistan’s remittances from the Gulf constitute nearly 10 percent of its GDP, about $400bn.

Abbas added that the effect may extend beyond remittance flows. “Migration patterns could also be disrupted. Many workers may return home, while those planning to migrate might reconsider,” he said. “This could further increase unemployment in a region already facing job shortages.”

Unlike Hamza, a number of South Asian workers are planning to return home.

Noor*, a migrant worker from Bangladesh employed at an oil facility in Saudi Arabia, said he no longer feels safe and plans to return home once his contract ends.

“I will never come back here again,” he said. “It’s too dangerous. We can’t even sleep at night. The fear never leaves us.”

Noor said drone attacks had occurred close to his workplace. “We saw it happen in front of us,” he said. “That fear stays with you… It doesn’t go away.”

His family, too, is deeply affected. “My children cry every time they call me. They are scared for my life,” he added.

He said he knows that returning to Bangladesh would mean more economic hardship for his family. But Noor said he had made up his mind.

“I would rather go back and struggle to survive with my family than live here in constant fear,” he said. “At least there, I will be with them.”

*Some names have been changed at the request of workers who fear retribution from contractors for speaking to the media.

The war involving Iran, United States and Israel is increasingly affecting energy supplies far beyond the Middle East, with Bangladesh now scrambling to secure fuel imports after disruptions to regional shipping routes.

Bangladeshi officials say the country has begun receiving diesel shipments from suppliers including China and India, allowing authorities to secure enough fuel to meet roughly one month of national demand. Arrangements are also being made to secure supplies for an additional month.

The South Asian nation of about 175 million people depends heavily on imported energy, with roughly 95% of its fuel requirements sourced from abroad. The disruption of Middle Eastern oil flows following the war has therefore exposed Bangladesh to severe supply risks.

Fuel Rationing and Economic Disruptions

To manage the supply shortage, authorities have introduced emergency measures including fuel rationing for vehicles, restrictions on diesel sales and the temporary closure of universities.

Energy shortages are also affecting Bangladesh’s critical export industries. The country is the world’s second-largest clothing exporter after China, and many garment factories rely on diesel-powered generators during power outages.

Industry leaders say the situation has worsened since the conflict began in late February. Power cuts have doubled to as much as five hours per day, forcing factories to rely more heavily on backup generators.

Mahmud Hasan Khan, president of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association, said many companies are struggling to obtain sufficient diesel to keep their operations running during electricity outages.

The shortages threaten to disrupt production in one of Bangladesh’s most important economic sectors, which accounts for the majority of the country’s export earnings.

Emergency Diesel Shipments Arrive

To stabilise supplies, the state-run Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC) has arranged diesel shipments from international traders.

Energy officials say around 60,000 metric tons of diesel are currently being delivered by three trading companies, with another 90,000 metric tons expected to arrive later this month.

A cargo of approximately 27,000 metric tons from PetroChina has already arrived at Chittagong Port, while another shipment of roughly 28,000 metric tons from Vitol is waiting at the port’s outer anchorage.

Additional supplies are also arriving through a cross-border pipeline from India’s Numaligarh Refinery, which is currently providing about 5,000 metric tons of diesel. Officials said negotiations are underway to secure a further 30,000 metric tons from Indian Oil Corporation.

Bangladesh typically consumes about 380,000 metric tons of diesel each month. However, officials estimate that rationing measures have reduced current demand to around 270,000 metric tons per month.

Oil Imports Threatened by Hormuz Disruptions

While refined diesel cargoes have continued to arrive, Bangladesh faces greater risks in securing crude oil shipments for its domestic refineries.

The country imports about 1.4 million metric tons of crude oil annually under long-term supply agreements with Saudi Aramco and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.

However, shipments from these suppliers must travel through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, which has been heavily disrupted by the war. Officials say at least one cargo of around 100,000 tons from Saudi Aramco has already been delayed in the Gulf due to the ongoing crisis.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy transit routes, and any prolonged disruption could have far-reaching consequences for countries heavily dependent on imported fuel.

Gas Shortages Add to Energy Crisis

Bangladesh’s energy difficulties extend beyond diesel shortages. Severe natural gas shortages have already forced the closure of four of the country’s five state-run fertiliser factories.

Authorities have redirected the available gas supply toward electricity generation in an effort to stabilise power production during the crisis.

The combination of diesel shortages, disrupted oil imports and limited gas supplies is placing growing pressure on Bangladesh’s energy system at a time when global fuel markets are already experiencing heightened volatility.

Analysis: Energy Dependence Exposes Economic Vulnerability

Bangladesh’s struggle to secure diesel supplies illustrates how the war involving Iran is affecting energy-importing economies far beyond the immediate conflict zone.

Countries that rely heavily on imported fuel are particularly vulnerable to disruptions in global energy shipping routes, especially those linked to the Strait of Hormuz. Even temporary interruptions can lead to fuel shortages, higher prices and broader economic disruption.

For Bangladesh, the situation highlights the structural risks created by its dependence on imported energy. Industries such as garments, which rely on stable electricity supplies and backup diesel generators, are especially exposed to supply shocks.

Although emergency shipments from China and India have temporarily stabilised supplies, the situation remains fragile. If the conflict in the Middle East continues to disrupt oil shipments or drive up prices, Bangladesh could face prolonged energy shortages with significant implications for its economy and export industries.

With information from Reuters.

Introduction

In 1974, Muhammad Yunus began experimenting with an initiative to give small loans to impoverished rural women to foster a sense of empowerment through entrepreneurial start-ups – an initiative that was institutionalised through the famous Grameen Bank. In just a couple of years, this initiative had snowballed into the United Nations declaring 2005 the International Year of Microcredit, with Yunus winning the Nobel Peace Prize for economic development.

In an age of international globalisation and neoliberal theories, microcredit seemed to be the solution to the ills of the developing world. Economists, development theorists, and journalists began to discuss the multiple success stories from the Grameen Bank and the vast impact small loans were having on people.

But a much darker reality came to take place. Although Yunus said that credit is a human right, he failed to address the fact that debt follows. Stories like Razia’s became far too frequent.

The Feminisation of Debt: Razia’s Story

Razia had taken out an initial microcredit loan of around $50 from Grameen Bank to put food on the table and pay for her children’s education; to her, this money was a lifeline to meet her family’s immediate needs. She was offered an interest rate of 20%, which she did not initially realise due to her limited fiscal literacy, and she could not pay.

Loan sharks targeted her family with violent threats when they were unable to meet payment deadlines; she had to sell her heirloom jewellery, her belongings, and eventually her home to make the payment – and even now, she continues to face threats from the loan sharks.

Razia’s story is not uncommon and illustrates how a linear model of microcredit has led to the feminisation of debt: women took out these loans to cover basic needs and fulfil their societal roles as caretakers, only to be uniquely burdened and targeted because they were unable to meet deadlines. This led women to be prone to economic vulnerability, social shame due to the procurement of debt, and violence from debt collectors.

Questioning the Efficacy of Microfinance

In addition to Razia’s story, the reality of the Grameen Bank’s efficacy is also up for debate. More and more economists became wary of the narrative that microfinance helps start income-generating enterprises, and recognised that this led many to feed their families or afford education. Another fundamental assumption was that microfinance would empower the poor, especially women, through microenterprises, given their financial bargaining power within the community. The neoliberal social policies used to model microenterprises for poor rural women to sell their labour or to ‘sub-contract’ their services were broadly not adopted, and forced women into disempowering roles in the informal sector.

Dr. Lamia Karim conducted research on the particular claims on gender empowerment by microcredit programmes and ended up creating a ‘local economy of shame’; repayment of these loans was tied to a woman’s standing and honour within the community, and these norms created environments of disempowerment, subjugation, and stress to repay the loans.

Theoretical Frameworks: From WID to GAD

Yunus’s microcredit initiative followed the theoretical prescriptions of Women in Development (WID), which sought to address gender-based economic disparities and integrate women into existing economic systems. The Grameen Bank was able to meet these goals; however, the linear model of empowerment used and the integration of women within the neoliberal economic market failed to meet the overall goals of empowerment.

As organisations, advocates, and economists saw the initial model struggling to meet the holistic goals of empowerment, they integrated theoretical prescriptions from Gender and Development (GAD), which sought to confront the root causes of gender inequality and to meet both the practical and strategic needs of women. This empowers women not only to meet economic goals to ensure survival, but also to develop collective action skills to confront power structures that lead to their subjugation.

Proshika: A New Model for Empowerment

Proshika was formed in 1979 under the WID model and focused on targeting rural communities, but realigned its goals with a GAD model in 2009. Their mission statement was revised to reflect the integration of collective-action training into their microcredit initiatives. As an organisation, they planned to “develop their capacity, so they can claim their due rights from the government” and “ensure life security” – a revolutionary shift within the broader conversation about microcredit.

Proshika had a model very similar to the Grameen Bank microcredit programmes; however, they added organisational spaces for women to meet and discuss community issues, embedding collective action within the programme. When a woman signed up for a loan, she was connected with other women in her community and asked to discuss pressing issues. Proshika organised a total of 42,809 groups; these various groups looked into important societal issues, such as the prevention of child marriage, the prevention of violence against women, and the abolition of dowry practices.

These trainings connected women with existing government systems and taught them how to access the judicial system, enabling them to pursue institutional avenues of change.

Building Social Capital and Political Agency

These spaces within the community allow women to build social credit, serving as places where information flows and as essential spaces for building trust and relationships. They increase social awareness, social interaction outside of one’s family unit, and increase domestic power and civic participation.

Dr Paromita Sanyal studies the role of microfinance agencies in Bangladesh, and credits NGOs such as Proshika for building both vertical and horizontal lines of social credit. Vertical social credit enables women to build essential connections within their own communities, and horizontal social credit allows them to connect with NGOs, politicians, and governing bodies. This axis of power builds political agency within communities and empowers women to challenge restrictive gender norms.

Proshika operates in 8,784 villages, 1,639 unions, 266 sub-districts, 42 districts, and 7 divisions within Bangladesh – they have organised 33,982 female groups across the nation. Through their collective action programmes, they were able to see a statistically significant decrease in child marriages, dowries, and gender-based violence within rural villages.

Towards True Empowerment

Proshika’s microfinance initiative not only enabled income-generating activities in rural villages but also empowered women to make a difference in their communities. Proshika’s success story should serve as a model for reforming existing microfinance institutions and incorporating collective action mechanisms into programmes.

Unlike the Grameen Bank, which focused solely on women’s practical needs, Proshika made an effort to address women’s and community members’ strategic needs. This led to statistically significant decreases in domestic violence and child marriages, as well as increased awareness of government systems and the justice system as a whole, with civic engagement opening accessible avenues for change.

Dr. Andrea Cornwall’s critical feminist analysis of women’s empowerment suggests that true empowerment is about changing asymmetrical power relations and requires building critical consciousness to help people recognise fundamental inequalities. Empowerment is relational and involves the interplay between personal and political to create a process, rather than focusing on an outcome.

Unlike the Grameen Bank, Proshika focused more on the various aspects of empowerment, without adopting a linear view of tangible results. This led to successful grassroots movements that brought attention to women’s structural needs and raised awareness of women’s value to community spaces.

Empowerment comes from changing power relations within the community, and Proshika met both women’s practical and strategic needs. It is essential to address the extreme poverty that women face, but also to build avenues for them to challenge the institutions they participate in.