balancing

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia – When US President Donald Trump lands in Malaysia for Southeast Asia’s headline summit this weekend, he will be delivering Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim a diplomatic coup.

US presidents rarely visit Malaysia, a multiracial nation of 35 million people sandwiched between Thailand and Singapore, which for decades has maintained a policy of not picking sides in rivalries between great powers.

Trump is just the third US leader to travel to the Southeast Asian country, which is hosting a Sunday-to-Tuesday summit for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), following visits by former US Presidents Barack Obama and Lyndon B Johnson.

After skipping ASEAN summits in 2018, 2019 and 2020, Trump, whose disdain for multilateralism is renowned, will be attending the gathering of Southeast Asian nations for just the second time.

The US president will be joined by a host of high-profile leaders from non-ASEAN countries, including Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa.

Opting not to attend are Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping, who Trump is expected to meet in South Korea at next week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.

Trump’s visit, in many ways, is emblematic of the delicate balancing act that Anwar’s government has sought to maintain as Malaysia navigates the headwinds of the heated rivalry between the US and China.

Malaysia is deeply entwined with both the US and Chinese economies.

The US, which has a large footprint in Malaysia’s tech and oil and gas industries, was the Southeast Asian country’s top foreign investor and third-biggest trading partner in 2024.

China, a major purchaser of Malaysian electronics and palm oil, the same year took the top spot in trade and was third for investment.

But Malaysia’s efforts to walk a fine line between Washington and Beijing have become increasingly fraught as the superpowers roll out tit-for-tat tariffs and export controls while butting heads over regional flashpoints such as Taiwan and the South China Sea.

“Optimally, Malaysia wants to productively engage both China and the US on a variety of issues,” said Thomas Daniel, an analyst at the Institute of Strategic & International Studies in Kuala Lumpur.

“It is in our interest,” Daniel told Al Jazeera.

Anwar has cast Trump’s visit as a chance to bolster economic ties, champion regional peace and stability, and elevate ASEAN’s standing on the international stage.

Anwar has also pledged to use the rare opportunity for face time with Trump to constructively raise points of difference between Washington and Kuala Lumpur, particularly the Palestinian cause.

“The through-line is autonomy: avoid entanglement, maximise options, and extract benefits from both poles without becoming anyone’s proxy,” Awang Azman Awang Pawi, a professor at the University of Malaya, told Al Jazeera.

During Trump’s visit, US tariffs on Malaysia, currently set at 19 percent, and China’s mooted export controls on rare earths are expected to be high on the agenda.

For Malaysia, the priority is preserving “rules-based” trade that allows for countries to deepen economic ties despite their political differences, said Mohd Ramlan Mohd Arshad, a senior lecturer at the MARA University of Technology in Shah Alam, near Kuala Lumpur.

A prolonged economic cold war between the US and China is the “worst thing” that could happen to Malaysia, Arshad told Al Jazeera.

Trump, who has made no secret of his ambitions for the Nobel Peace Prize, is also expected to witness the signing of a peace accord between Thailand and Cambodia, which engaged in a brief border conflict in July that left at least 38 people dead.

For Anwar, who has led a multiracial coalition of parties with diverse and competing interests since 2022, the balancing act also involves political considerations at home.

US support for Israel’s war in Gaza has been a bone of contention in Muslim-majority Malaysia, where the plight of Palestinians has inspired frequent public protests.

In the run-up to the summit, critics have demanded that Anwar rescind Trump’s invitation over his role in supporting the war, which a United Nations commission of inquiry last month determined to constitute genocide.

“A person like Trump, no matter how powerful, should not be welcomed in Malaysia,” former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, Anwar’s former mentor-turned-nemesis, said in a video message last month.

Defending the invitation, Anwar has stressed his view of diplomacy as “practical work” for advancing his country’s interests “in an imperfect world”.

“It demands balance, discipline, and the courage to stay the course even when the ground shifts beneath us,” he told a conference in Kuala Lumpur earlier this month.

As a small power, Malaysia has always put pragmatism at the centre of its foreign policy, said Sharifah Munirah Alatas, an international relations lecturer at the National University of Malaysia.

“Anwar and Malaysia cannot afford to do otherwise,” Alatas told Al Jazeera.

“And given the current highly unpredictable Sino-American tension induced by the Trump 2.0 era, ASEAN will remain actively non-aligned, without taking sides.”

Awang Azman, the University of Malaya professor, said that while Trump’s visit will elevate Malaysia and ASEAN’s profile by itself, the true test of the summit’s success will be tangible outcomes on issues such as the Thailand-Cambodia conflict and trade.

“It’s not just a photo op if a ceasefire accord and concrete trade language land on paper,” Awang Azman said.

“If either track stalls, the visit is still symbolically significant – given the rarity of US presidential trips to Malaysia – but the narrative will revert to optics over outcomes.”

Los Angeles loves dogs. The city was ranked as the most popular across the country for dog ownership, according to data gathered by U.S. News, and with get-outside weather and an abundance of green spaces to explore, it’s easy to see why.

Pet ownership skyrocketed during pandemic shutdowns, with local shelters experiencing a rare shortage of dogs and cats. But as the world reopened, dog owners were faced with the challenge of balancing return-to-office demands and expanded social lives with the responsibilities of pet ownership, making dog-friendly spaces all the more important.

Thankfully, the local restaurant scene offers countless settings to socialize with your pup, from an Eagle Rock coffee shop with an attached dog park to an Arts District pizzeria and a Lincoln Heights cider house. Here are 12 dog-friendly patios in L.A. to visit with your pup this summer.

Among the geopolitical dynamics of the Southeast Asian region, cultural heritage has become a battleground of identity that presents both challenges and opportunities for ASEAN regional solidarity. As a manifestation of national identity inherent in a nation’s collective identity, claims over cultural heritage often trigger diplomatic tensions when they intersect with nationalistic sentiments. The case of the Cambodia-Thailand dispute over Phra Viharn Temple is clear evidence of how cultural heritage can transform a simple conflict into a multidimensional sovereignty issue. But behind its destructive potential, nationalism also holds constructive power that can strengthen ASEAN cultural integration through respect for diversity and diplomacy based on cultural exchange. This article explores the complex role of nationalism in the dynamics of ASEAN cultural cooperation, offering perspectives on how such sentiments can be managed and directed to strengthen the region’s collective identity without compromising the cultural uniqueness of each member state.

Based on cases of conflict related to cultural heritage that have occurred in the ASEAN region, it can be said that nationalist sentiment has a major effect on exacerbating conflict. The reason is, as is known, that cultural heritage itself is the “identity” of a nation that represents the nation, which provides meaning for individuals and groups in understanding the world and their position in it. The presence of this culture also distinguishes it from other nations, which is the point of an identity itself. If the identity is claimed by other parties, of course this becomes a sensitive issue because the identity itself is already an ownership that reflects the characteristics of the nation.

Cultural heritage becomes a national identity, which will build its own pride for a nation. As happens in Indonesia, which consists of various provinces with their respective cultural identities, these differences make people from different cultures unite to represent Indonesia as a nation that has many cultures. This form of pride then creates a sense of “nationalism,” where a nation will love and preserve its identity.

Then what if the cultural heritage that is the identity of this nation is claimed by another party? It will certainly bring up feelings like losing self-identity. This feeling then triggers conflict when a nation fights for its identity in the form of cultural heritage, as in the Cambodia-Thailand dispute over the Phra Viharn Temple claim, where both parties have different views regarding the claimed cultural heritage. Preah Vihear Temple is located on Mount Dangrek, Preah Vihear Province, in the northern part of Cambodia and Sisaket Province in southwestern Thailand, which has led to unclear boundaries between the two countries. Preah Vihear Temple was named a world heritage site in 2007, triggering a territorial dispute over the temple’s claim. This claim issue then shifted into a more serious political issue that threatened national sovereignty with the support of nationalist demonstrations. Thus, nationalist sentiments can be influential in exacerbating conflicts and creating issues that spill over into the realm of politics and sovereignty for the reasons explained earlier.

Is nationalism always an obstacle to cultural cooperation in ASEAN? Not always. There will be a role for nationalism in both directions, either as an obstacle or a driver of cultural cooperation in ASEAN, depending on how the sentiment is “expressed.” If seen from the cases that have occurred, it is true that there are times when nationalism is an obstacle. Where the impact of this conflict affects cultural cooperation, such as the refusal to recognize sovereignty and cultural development, as done by Thailand against Cambodia. It also affects cultural exchange policies, which, as we know, can be a platform for diplomacy between countries. With cases related to nationalism, there can be a feeling of fear of pollution of national culture by foreign influences so that cultural exchanges are limited on the grounds of “protecting” local culture. In ASEAN itself, nationalism affects cultural cooperation, which is a regional vision, which in turn creates competition rather than cultural collaboration.

Considering these things, it is evident that nationalism is an obstacle. However, the role of nationalism as a driver cannot be denied and ignored. The existence of nationalism also plays a role in encouraging cultural cooperation in the ASEAN region, such as strengthening cultural cooperation itself by respecting mutual forms of identity between nations in the ASEAN region. Nationalism also strengthens cultural cooperation through cultural exchanges where the cultures of each country are introduced to each other. Within the ASEAN framework, this cultural exchange is a forum for cultural diplomacy, which is soft power. In addition, each country can also support cultural collaboration so as to create an ASEAN image that supports the preservation of ASEAN culture and identity diversity.

Because of the two-way influence of nationalist sentiment, it proves that it is not always an obstacle. What needs to be done is to have countries and nations turn the sentiment of nationalism into a driver of cultural cooperation in ASEAN, for example, by viewing the sentiment as a cultural interaction rather than a threat that must be limited to foreign cultures or by strengthening ASEAN integration, where its role is to facilitate cultural cooperation in the ASEAN region.

There was hope that it would be Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meeting in Turkiye this week, for the first time since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

That wasn’t to be, after Russia confirmed that Putin would not be travelling to Turkiye. But both countries still sent delegations – agreeing to a prisoner swap – and the meeting in Istanbul on Friday was the first direct talks since shortly after the war began in February 2022.

Some of those talks in 2022 were also hosted by Turkiye, highlighting the central role the country has played in the search for a resolution to one of the world’s most significant geopolitical conflicts.

Turkiye is also poised to expand its influence in Syria, where the US has lifted sanctions on the Turkish-allied government, and has a significant win on the domestic front, after the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced this week that it was disbanding, ending a 40-year war against the Turkish state.

A direct meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy on Turkish soil would have capped off a strong week for Turkiye, but analysts say that its central role to the process is a victory nonetheless.

“Turkiye stands to win diplomatically whichever way the talks go,” Ziya Meral of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) said, even if the analyst ultimately was sceptical of any peace framework emerging from the talks. “It fulfils Ankara’s desire to be a negotiator and key player in regional developments. The fact that Ankara is in a position to engage both with the United States and Russia, as well as Ukraine is indeed a diplomatic success.”

Over the last 15 years or so, Turkiye has established itself as a significant diplomatic player, extending its influence across Africa and playing a pivotal role in the overthrow of long-term Syrian leader, Bashar al-Assad, all while maintaining an intensely delicate balancing act between belligerents in the Russia-Ukraine war.

“There are many reasons why Turkiye is hosting the talks,” Omer Ozkizilcik, a non-resident fellow at The Atlantic Council, told Al Jazeera.

“Turkiye started a peace process independent of the US shortly after the invasion, leading to the Istanbul protocols of 2022. This is also a new model of negotiation, pioneered by Turkiye,” he said, referring to the draft peace agreement brokered between the two states that Russia has since accused Ukraine and the West of walking away from.

“Before, neutral states such as Switzerland with no stake in the conflict would mediate. Now, under a new model, Turkiye is successfully negotiating in conflicts where it does have diplomatic, economic and geopolitical stakes,” Ozkizilcik added, listing a number of disputes where Turkiye had played a mediating role, such as that between Ethiopia and Somalia, where Turkiye was able to negotiate in December a “historic reconciliation” in President Recep Tayyip Erodgan’s words.

Turkiye has its own interests across these countries, including its supply of drones to Ukraine and a significant military presence in Somalia. However, it is still able to present itself as a reliable arbitrator in peace talks involving these countries.

“It’s a new Turkish model that is seeing the country emerge as a regional diplomatic power,” Ozkizilcik said.

Hot and cold relations with Russia

The balancing act Turkiye has followed in negotiating between Russia and Ukraine hasn’t been easy – particularly when Ankara has had to take into account its opposition to Russian expansionism in the Black Sea region and Moscow’s support for parties opposed to Ankara in the Middle East and North Africa.

Turkiye labelled Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a “war” early in the conflict, allowing it to implement the 1936 Montreux Convention – effectively confining Russia’s military vessels to the Black Sea.

Ankara and Moscow have also found themselves on opposing sides in Libya and Syria. In Libya, Turkiye backs the United Nations-recognised government, in contrast to Russia’s support for armed forces in the insurgent east, while in Syria, Turkiye supported the ultimately victorious opposition forces against the Russian-backed al-Assad regime.

Syria was the source of the biggest tension between the two when, in 2015, Turkiye shot down a Russian fighter jet near the Turkiye-Syria border. The incident triggered a severe deterioration in diplomatic and economic ties, but a Turkish statement of regret led to a rapprochement the next year, and relations have remained strong.

Those strong ties have also survived Turkiye’s supply of drones and other military equipment to Ukraine throughout the course of the war.

Russia has seemingly turned a blind eye to that, and maintains “economic, diplomatic and energy relations” with Turkiye, Ozkizilcik said.

The benefits of good relations with Turkiye seem to outweigh Russia’s unhappiness with some aspects of Turkish policy, and Turkiye’s position as a member of NATO that Russia can still deal with is in itself useful.

In 2022, Turkiye was prominent in opposing Western sanctions on Russia; describing them as a “provocation“. And Turkiye has rarely been content to toe the NATO line, for a time opposing Sweden and Finland’s entry into the alliance, and also agreeing on a deal to buy Russia’s S-400 missile system in 2017.

Turkiye’s purchase of the missile system led to US sanctions, exclusion from the F-35 defence programme and accusations in some quarters that Ankara was “turning its back” on the West as part of a pivot towards Russia.

“Both sides have learned to compartmentalise differences,” Ozkizilcik said. He referred to an attack in 2020 that killed more than 33 Turkish soldiers in Syria by regime forces acting in coordination with Russia. “There were talks, both sides met and addressed the issue and they moved on. More recently, when Turkish-backed forces overthrew the Assad regime, Erdogan still called Putin on his birthday and congratulated him.”

Friendship with Ukraine

But Turkiye has been able to strengthen its relationship with the West in the years since, demonstrating its usefulness, particularly when it came to Ukraine.

Turkiye was instrumental in brokering a deal in 2022 to allow Ukraine to export its grain by sea, and has also been firm in its stance that Russian-occupied Crimea – the homeland of the Turkic Muslim Crimean Tatars – be returned to Ukraine.

Steven Horrell, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, believes that Ukraine “appreciates Turkiye’s past support to them”, even if it has some qualms about its ties with Russia.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly thanked Erdogan for his role in facilitating talks and in supporting Ukraine. On Thursday, the Ukrainian leader highlighted Turkiye’s support for Ukraine, and even said that his country’s participation in direct talks – despite Putin’s absence – was “out of respect” for Erdogan and US President Donald Trump.

Earlier in the week, Zelenskyy had thanked Erdogan for his support “and readiness to facilitate diplomacy at the highest level”.

I spoke with the President of Türkiye @RTErdogan to discuss key details of the meeting in Türkiye, which could help bring an end to the war. I am grateful for his support and readiness to facilitate diplomacy at the highest level. We share a common view on the need for a… pic.twitter.com/BX1pw28f3x

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) May 12, 2025

The emphasis on mutual respect and friendship highlights that for Ukraine, Turkiye is not an ally it can afford to lose.

And that gives Turkiye some leeway in its ability to maintain close ties to Russia without any negative backlash from the West, and a chance to fulfil some of its own goals.

“Turkiye would certainly gain some prestige from hosting the talks, even more so if they are successful,” said Horrell. “Turkiye views itself not just as a regional leader, but truly a leader on the global stage. They gain in both of the bilateral relationships with Russia and Ukraine if they help achieve the goals of peace.”