backfired

Two decades ago, political scientists identified a certain breed of self-defeating gerrymander that backfired on mapmakers who tried to rig congressional district lines for partisan advantage.

They called it a “dummymander.”

“A dummymander is a gerrymander by one party that, over the course of the decade, benefits the other party, and actually looks as if it was designed by that party rather than the party in power,” Bernard Grofman and Thomas Brunell wrote in “The Art of the Dummymander.”

The phenomenon came out of Democratic legislatures in the Deep South in the 1990s. Attempting to protect incumbents amid a political realignment toward Republicans, they spread what was left of their voting strength across too many districts after the 1990 census.

Grofman and Brunell compared their situation to a lifeboat. “The carrying capacity of any lifeboat is limited,” they said. “If you try to overload it, the boat may sink, or at least tip over, washing a number of people overboard.”

Over the last two years, Democrats and Republicans have battled to redraw House districts, in a process kicked off by Texas Republicans’ adoption of a new map — at the direction of President Trump — that shifted as many as five seats their way. Other states joined in, including retaliation by Democrats in California. Courts blocked some of both parties’ efforts, with the resulting national map tilted toward Republicans by about nine seats, on net.

Now, as analysts forecast a potential “blue wave” of support for Democrats, election watchers are studying whether Republicans’ efforts could backfire. The upshot? Probably not this year. But the election will test just how much partisan advantage mapmakers can squeeze out before a gerrymander starts working against them.

‘A perfect storm’

The Democrats’ 1990s dummymander wasn’t apparent immediately: For one election, in 1992, the Democratic maps worked. Across North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, Democrats won 18 of 29 House seats. Their only misstep: In trying to gerrymander Republican Newt Gingrich out of his district, they forced him to move to a new district where he won narrowly.

Two years later, the weather turned. Gingrich led the “Republican Revolution” during President Clinton’s first midterm and was rewarded with the speaker’s gavel. The 18 dummymandered Democratic seats were reduced to 10.

Today’s potential dummymanders are different. For starters, House districts are meant to be redrawn once a decade, following the U.S. census. The Democratic dummymanders in the ‘90s came after constitutionally required reshuffling. The mid-decade gerrymanders of 2025 and 2026 were purely opportunistic. Republican-led states such as Texas and Florida redrew maps at Trump’s urging, not to protect vulnerable seats, but to extend their partisan advantage.

These gerrymanders are also different in that they could conceivably backfire in their first election, rather than producing the delayed reaction of the Southern Democrats’ earlier dummymander.

“We are in a perfect storm for dummymanders,” said Brunell, now a political science professor at the University of Texas at Dallas. The formula: extreme partisan gerrymandering — mostly by Republicans — and a midterm election with an unpopular president and economic headwinds.

Margin for error

Some dummymanders are dumber than others. The real test isn’t whether Republicans lose seats in Tuesday’s elections — it’s whether they’re left worse off than if they had left the old districts in place. “There can be degrees of dummyness,” Brunell said.

Republicans drew their maps to withstand a blue wave that crests at about a 10- to 12-point margin. The RealClearPolitics average of generic congressional polls now gives Democrats an advantage of just over 8 points — meaning that if the polls are broadly right, Republicans will still likely end up benefiting from the new maps.

Jonathan Cervas, a Carnegie Mellon University professor who has drawn his own maps as a court-appointed special master, said a true dummymander seems unlikely and is “wishful thinking” by Democrats.

And even if it happens, Cervas argues, it won’t be bad mapmaking that loses the House for Republicans, who now control the chamber by just a few seats.

“Everything is so nationalized that the shifts that happen in Texas are the same shifts that happen everywhere,” Cervas said.

Assuming that voters move toward Democrats in roughly equal measures across the country, Republicans will have lost dozens of competitive districts in states that weren’t redrawn — such as Michigan, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Iowa, Wisconsin and Colorado — before any blue wave gets to Texas and Florida.

“At that point,” said Cervas, “it would not have mattered because they would have lost so many seats anyway.”

Korte writes for Bloomberg. Adrienne Tong of Bloomberg contributed to this report.

You don’t want to hear from me. You want to hear from Dave Roberts, the Dodgers’ manager.

The Dodgers are one loss from an abrupt ending to their season, and from a National League Championship Series sweep by the Milwaukee Brewers.

Let’s take you through the critical decisions Roberts made Wednesday night, the ones you second-guessed at home. They all pretty much backfired on him.

Situation: In the third inning, and again in the fifth inning, Tommy Edman comes to bat with Miguel Rojas on first base, none out, and the Dodgers trailing, 1-0. By the end of the fifth, the Dodgers had gone nine consecutive innings without scoring, and with a game plan of getting ahead before the Brewers’ vaunted bullpen could take over. Roberts does not ask Edman, one of the team’s most accomplished bunters, to sacrifice the runner into scoring position.

Roberts: “I just didn’t feel like giving up an out right there. … We could have bunted, but I felt I wanted to give Tommy an opportunity to drive in a run. … We haven’t been getting hits with runners in scoring position (3 for 32 in the postseason). To give up an out, to bank on getting a hit with runners in scoring position, I’d rather just try to maybe slug, hit a double.”

Result: Edman flied out both times. The Dodgers did not score in either inning.

———

Situation: In the sixth inning, with the Dodgers still trailing, 1-0, the Brewers turn to Abner Uribe, who had faced 26 batters and walked two in the postseason. Uribe walks the first two batters, and Roberts deploys his primary left-handed bench threat, Max Muncy. That takes right-handed Andy Pages out of the game; the only Dodgers with more hits than Pages this October are Kyle Tucker and Mookie Betts.

Roberts: “Abner is death on righties. You’re trying to guard against — you want to keep the inning going, and you don’t want a double play ball. Muncy’s not starting, and you want to fire that bullet in a leverage spot. First and second base, nobody out, it gives us the best chance to keep the inning going, in my opinion, and it gets Shohei up, and you have a chance to build an inning.”

Result: Muncy struck out.

———

Josue DePaula’s presence was wasted in Game 3.

(Robert Gauthier/Los Angeles Times)

Situation: After Muncy, Ohtani walks to load the bases, and Will Smith follows with a two-run double to give the Dodgers a 2-1 lead. With the right-handed Rojas due up, Roberts opts for the left-handed Josue De Paula as a pinch-hitter. Brewers manager Pat Murphy promptly replaces Uribe with left-hander DL Hall, who had been warming up. Roberts counters with the right-handed Kiké Hernández.

Roberts: “It’s a decision: Do I want Uribe facing Rojas? Then I chose De Paula, and they made the move. At that point in time, I felt we had the matchup advantage with Kiké. … For me, all the experience that Kiké’s had, I feel very confident with Kiké taking a bat with a guy on second and third, infield in.”

Result: Hernandez struck out, and so did Edman. The inning was over, and the Dodgers would not advance another man past first base the rest of the evening. The Dodgers could have used De Paula to bat against right-handed closer Trevor Megill in the ninth inning, but Roberts had already burned him.

Murphy said Uribe was coming out after Smith’s double no matter what — at that point, Uribe had thrown six strikes and 14 balls — so Roberts could have saved De Paula had he waited to see what Murphy would do.

———

Situation: Blake Snell has retired 14 consecutive batters entering the seventh inning, with the Dodgers leading, 2-1. It’s the first time the left-handed Snell has pitched beyond the sixth inning this season, with the right-handed Andrew Vaughn leading off and the left-handed Jake Bauers and Garrett Mitchell to follow. Evan Phillips is warming up in the Dodgers bullpen.

Roberts: “His stuff was really good. I don’t think they were seeing him well. I was trying to get him three more hitters. We had Evan for that fourth hitter.”

Result: Vaughn walks, on six pitches. Bauers homers, on 11 pitches. The Brewers have the lead, 3-2.

Roberts: “Hasn’t given up a homer all year, but it just — it’s baseball. For me, I felt good with where Blake’s stuff was at. You’ve got to give Bauers credit.”

Situation: By that time, Snell is at 99 pitches, two shy of his season high, after the exhausting battles with Vaughn and Bauers. Roberts sticks to his plan: Snell for Mitchell, then Phillips for the right-handed Cooper Pratt.

Result: Mitchell homers, giving the Brewers a 4-2 lead. Hall and Megill combine for 3 1/3 innings of scoreless relief, and the Dodgers are one defeat from winter vacation.