Asia

Footage shows a massive crowd filling streets to honour Sharif Osman Hadi, a leader of the 2024 student-led uprising, who was shot dead by a masked gunman while leaving a Dhaka mosque. Bangladesh’s interim leader Mohammad Yunus joined mourners days after Hadi died in a Singapore hospital.

Khan and his wife have denied accusations that they misrepresented the value of state gifts, including jewellery, and profited from them.

Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his wife Bushra Bibi have been sentenced to 17 years in prison after a Pakistani court found them guilty of illegally retaining and selling valuable state gifts.

The sentence, handed down on Saturday, capped a years-long saga that saw the duo accused of selling various gifts – including jewellery from the Saudi Arabian government – at far below market value. They have denied all charges.

In order to keep gifts from foreign dignitaries, Pakistani law requires officials to purchase them at market value and to declare profits from any sales.

But prosecutors claimed that the couple profited from the items after purchasing them at an artificially low price of $10,000, compared with their market rate of $285,521.

Khan’s supporters were quick to denounce the ruling, with his spokesperson Zulfikar Bukhari saying that “criminal liability was imposed without proof of intent, gain, or loss, relying instead on a retrospective reinterpretation of rules”.

His party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, wrote on social media that the proceedings were a “sham” and criticised international media coverage of the case.

The 73-year-old former leader served as Pakistan’s prime minister from 2018 until April 2022, when he was ousted in a no-confidence vote.

He was imprisoned starting in August 2023 on various charges of corruption and revealing state secrets, all of which he has denied and claimed to be politically motivated. He has been acquitted of some charges.

An internationally famous cricket player in the heyday of his sporting career, Khan remains popular in Pakistan, with his imprisonment leading to protests throughout the last two years.

The former leader is now confined to a prison in the city of Rawalpindi and “kept inside all the time”, his sister, Uzma Khanum, told journalists earlier this month.

Khanum, a doctor who was the first family member allowed to visit Khan in weeks, described him as “very angry” about the isolation, saying that he considered the “mental torture” of imprisonment to be “worse than physical abuse”.

Two words that largely define the economy right now: Global reordering.

President Donald Trump’s Tariffs have landed as a shock to global trade. This is 2025.

Major economies are rewriting their playbooks, and alliances are being redrawn.

From Africa’s minerals boom to the global AI race, countries are scrambling for influence – even as debt piles up.

They are spending more, borrowing more and making tough choices from defence to climate policy and labour shortages.

And through it all, people are bearing high costs.

In October, a small electronics manufacturer in the western Indian state of Gujarat shipped its first batch of chip modules to a client in California.

Kaynes Semicon, together with Japanese and Malaysian technology partners, assembled the chips in a new factory funded with incentives under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s $10bn semiconductor push announced in 2021.

Modi has been trying to position India as an additional manufacturing hub for global companies that may be looking to expand their production beyond China, with limited success.

One sign of that is India’s first commercial foundry for mature chips that is currently under construction, also in Gujarat. The $11bn project is supported by technology transfer from a Taiwanese chipmaker and has onboarded the United States chip giant Intel as a potential customer.

With companies the world over hungering for chips, India’s entry into that business could boost its role in global supply chains. But experts caution that India still has a long way to go in attracting more foreign investment and catching up in cutting-edge technology.

Unprecedented momentum

Semiconductor chips are designed, fabricated in foundries, and then assembled and packaged for commercial use. The US leads in chip design, Taiwan in fabrication, and China, increasingly, in packaging.

The upcoming foundry in Gujarat is a collaboration between India’s Tata Group, one of the largest conglomerates in the country, and Taiwan’s Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (PSMC), which is assisting with the plant’s construction and technology transfer.

On December 8, Tata Electronics also signed an agreement with Intel to explore the manufacturing and packaging of its products in Tata’s upcoming facilities, including the foundry. The partnership will address the growing domestic demand.

Last year, Tata was approved for a 50 percent subsidy from the Modi government for the foundry, along with additional state-level incentives, and could come online as early as December 2026.

Even if delayed, the project marks a pivotal moment for India, which has seen multiple attempts to build a commercial fab stall in the past.

The foundry will focus on fabricating chips ranging from 28 nanometres (nm) to 110nm, typically referred to as mature chips because they are comparatively easier to produce than smaller 7nm or 3nm chips.

Mature chips are used in most consumer and power electronics, while the smaller chips are in high demand for AI data centres and high-performance computing. Globally, the technology for mature chips is more widely available and distributed. Taiwan leads production of these chips, with China fast catching up, though Taiwan’s TSMC dominates production for cutting-edge nodes below 7nm.

“India has long been strong in chip design, but the challenge has been converting that strength into semiconductor manufacturing,” said Stephen Ezell, vice president for global innovation policy at the Washington, DC-based Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF).

“In the past two to three years, there’s been more progress on that front than in the previous decade – driven by stronger political will at both the central and state levels, and a more coordinated push from the private sector to commit to these investments,” Ezell told Al Jazeera.

Easy entry point

More than half of the Modi government’s $10bn in semiconductor incentives is earmarked for the Tata-PSMC venture, with the remainder supporting nine other projects focused mainly on the assembly, testing and packaging (ATP) stage of the supply chain.

These are India’s first such projects – one by Idaho-based Micron Technology, also in Gujarat, and another by the Tata Group in the northeastern Assam state. Both will use in-house technologies and have drawn investments of $2.7bn and $3.3bn, respectively.

The remaining projects are smaller, with cumulative investments of about $2bn, and are backed by technology partners such as Taiwan’s Foxconn, Japan’s Renesas Electronics, and Thailand’s Stars Microelectronics.

“ATP units offer a lower path of resistance compared to a large foundry, requiring smaller investments – typically between $50m and $1bn. They also carry less risk, and the necessary technology know-how is widely available globally,” Ashok Chandak, president of the India Electronics and Semiconductor Association (IESA), told Al Jazeera.

Still, most of the projects are behind schedule.

Micron’s facility, approved for incentives in June 2023, was initially expected to begin production by late 2024. However, the company noted in its fiscal 2025 report that the Gujarat facility will “address demand in the latter half of this decade”.

Approved in February 2024, the Tata facility was initially slated to be operational by mid-2025, but the timeline has now been pushed to April 2026.

When asked for reasons behind the delays, both Micron and Tata declined to comment.

One exception is a smaller ATP unit by Kaynes Semicon, which in October exported a consignment of sample chip modules to an anchor client in California – a first for India.

Another project by CG Semi, part of India’s Murugappa Group, is in trial runs, with commercial production expected in the coming months.

The semiconductor projects under the Tata Group and the Murugappa Group have drawn public scrutiny after Indian online news outlet Scroll.in reported that both companies made massive political donations after they were picked for the projects.

As per Scroll.in, the Tata Group donated 7.5 billion rupees ($91m) and 1.25 billion rupees ($15m), respectively, to Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) just weeks after securing government subsidies in February 2024 and ahead of national elections. Neither group had made such large donations to the party before. Such donations are not prohibited by law. Both the Tata Group and the Murugappa Group declined to comment to Al Jazeera regarding the reports.

Meeting domestic demand a key priority

The upcoming projects in India – both the foundry and the ATP units – will primarily focus on legacy, or mature, chips sized between 28nm and 110nm. While these chips are not at the cutting-edge of semiconductor technology, they account for the bulk of global demand, with applications across cars, industrial equipment and consumer electronics.

China dominates the ATP segment globally with a 30 percent share and accounted for 42 percent of semiconductor equipment spending in 2024, according to DBS Group Research.

India has long positioned itself as a “China Plus One” destination amid global supply chain diversification, with some progress evident in Apple’s expansion of its manufacturing base in the country. The company assembles all its latest iPhone models in India, in partnership with Foxconn and Tata Electronics, and has emerged as a key supplier to the US market this year following tariff-related uncertainties over Chinese shipments.

Its push in the ATP segment, however, is driven largely by the need to meet the growing domestic demand for chips, anticipated to surge from $50bn today to $100bn by 2030.

“Globally, too, the market will expand from around $650bn to $1 trillion. So, we’re not looking at shifting manufacturing from China to elsewhere. We’re looking at capturing the incremental demand emerging both in India and abroad,” Chandak said.

India’s import of chips – both integrated circuits and microassemblies – has jumped in recent years, rising 36 percent in 2024 to nearly $24bn from the previous year. An integrated circuit (IC) is a chip serving logic, memory or processing functions, whereas a microassembly is a broader package of multiple chips performing combined functions.

The momentum has continued this year, with imports up 20 percent year-on-year, accounting for about 3 percent of India’s total import bill, according to official trade data. China remains the leading supplier with a 30 percent share, followed by Hong Kong (19 percent), South Korea (11 percent), Taiwan (10 percent), and Singapore (10 percent).

“Even if it’s a 28 nm chip, from a trade balance perspective, India would rather produce and package it domestically than import it,” Ezell of ITIF said, adding that domestic capability would enhance the competitiveness of chip-dependent industries.

Better incentives needed

The Modi government’s support for the chip sector, while unprecedented for India, is still dwarfed by the $48bn committed by China and the $53bn provisioned under the US’s CHIPS Act.

To achieve scale in the ATP segment for meaningful import substitution – and to advance towards producing chips smaller than 28nm – India will need continued government support, and there is a second round of incentives already in the works.

“The reality is, if India wants to compete at the leading edge of semiconductors, it will need to attract a foreign partner – American or Asian – since only a handful of companies globally operate at that level. It’s highly unlikely that a domestic firm will be competitive at 7nm or 3nm anytime soon,” Ezell said.

According to him, India needs to continue focusing on improving its overall business environment – from ensuring reliable power and infrastructure to streamlining regulations, customs and tariff policies.

India’s engineers make up about a fifth of the global chip design workforce, but rising competition from China and Malaysia to attract multinational design firms could erode that edge.

In its latest incentive round, the Indian government limited benefits to domestic firms to promote local intellectual property – a move that, according to Alpa Sood, legal director at the India operations of California-based Marvell Technology, risks driving multinational design work elsewhere.

“India already has a thriving chip design ecosystem strengthened by early-stage incentives from the government. What we need, to further accelerate and build stronger R&D muscle – is incentives that mirror competing countries like China [220 percent tax incentives] and Malaysia [200 percent tax incentives]. This will ensure we don’t lose the advantage we’ve built over the years,” Sood told Al Jazeera.

Marvell’s India operations are its largest outside the US.

The Trump effect

India’s upcoming chip facilities, while aimed at meeting domestic demand, will also export to clients in the US, Japan, and Taiwan. Though US President Donald Trump has threatened 100 percent tariffs on semiconductors made outside the US, none have yet been imposed.

A bigger concern for India-US engagement – so far limited to education and training – is Washington’s 50 percent tariff on India over its Russian crude imports. Semiconductors remain exempt, but the broader trade climate has turned uncertain.

“Over half the global semiconductor market is controlled by US-headquartered firms, making engagement with them crucial,” Chandak said. “Any alignment with these firms, either through joint ventures or technology partnerships – is a preferred option.”

The global chip race is accelerating, and India’s policies will need to keep pace to become a serious player amid growing geo-economic fragmentation.

“These new 1.7nm fabs are so advanced they even factor in the moon’s gravitational pull – it’s literally a moonshot,” Ezell said. “Semiconductor manufacturing is the most complex engineering task humanity undertakes – and the policymaking behind it must be just as precise.”

Legislation reflects Democrats’ efforts to seek tighter oversight of Trump administration’s military action.

The United States Senate has passed a $901bn bill setting defence policy and spending for the 2026 fiscal year, combining priorities backed by President Donald Trump’s administration with provisions designed to preserve congressional oversight of US military power.

The National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) was approved in a 77-20 vote on Wednesday with senators adopting legislation passed by the House of Representatives last month. It now goes to Trump for his signature.

Several provisions in the bill reflect efforts by Democratic lawmakers, supported by some Republicans, to constrain how quickly the Trump administration may scale back US military commitments in Europe.

The bill requires the Pentagon to maintain at least 76,000 US soldiers in Europe unless NATO allies are consulted and the administration determines that a reduction would be in the US national interest. The US typically stations 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers across the continent. A similar measure prevents reductions in US troop levels in South Korea below 28,500 soldiers.

Congress also reinforced its backing for Ukraine, authorising $800m under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative with $400m allocated for each of the next two years. A further $400m per year was approved to manufacture weapons for Ukraine, signalling continued congressional support for Kyiv and cementing Washington’s commitment to Europe’s defence.

Asia Pacific focus, congressional oversight

The bill also reflects priorities aligned with the Trump administration’s national security strategy, which places the Asia Pacific at the centre of US foreign policy and describes the region as a key economic and geopolitical battleground.

In line with that approach, the NDAA provides $1bn for the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative, aimed at strengthening defence cooperation as the US seeks to counter China’s growing military influence.

The legislation authorises $600m in security assistance for Israel, including funding for joint missile defence programmes, such as the Iron Dome, a measure that has long drawn broad bipartisan support in Congress.

The NDAA increases reporting requirements on US military activity, an area in which Democrats in particular have sought greater oversight.

It directs the Department of Defense to provide Congress with additional information on strikes targeting suspected smuggling and trafficking operations in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, adding pressure on Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to provide lawmakers with video footage of US strikes on alleged drug-smuggling boats operating in international waters near Venezuela.

Lawmakers moved to strengthen oversight after a September strike killed two people who had survived an earlier attack on their boat.

Some Democratic lawmakers said they were not briefed in advance on elements of the campaign, prompting calls for clearer reporting requirements.

Sanctions and America First

The legislation repeals the 2003 authorisation for the US invasion of Iraq and the 1991 authorisation for the Gulf War. Supporters from both parties said the repeals reduce the risk of future military action being undertaken without explicit congressional approval.

The bill also permanently lifts US sanctions on Syria imposed during the regime of President Bashar al-Assad after the Trump administration’s earlier decision to temporarily ease restrictions. Supporters argue the move will support Syria’s reconstruction after al-Assad’s removal from power a year ago.

Other provisions align more closely with priorities advanced by Trump and Republican lawmakers under the administration’s America First agenda.

The NDAA eliminates diversity, equity and inclusion offices and training programmes within the Department of Defense, including the role of chief diversity officer. The House Armed Services Committee claims the changes would save about $40m.

The bill also cuts $1.6bn from Pentagon programmes related to climate change. While the US military has previously identified climate-related risks as a factor affecting bases and operations, the Trump administration and Republican leaders have said defence spending should prioritise immediate military capabilities.

New Delhi, India – A newly released Bollywood spy thriller is winning praise and raising eyebrows in equal measure in India and Pakistan, over its retelling of bitter tensions between the South Asian neighbours.

Sunk in a sepia tone, Dhurandhar, which was released in cinemas last week, is a 3.5-hour-long cross-border political spy drama that takes cinemagoers on a violent and bloody journey through a world of gangsters and intelligence agents set against the backdrop of India-Pakistan tensions. It comes just months after hostilities broke out between the two countries in May, following a rebel attack on a popular tourist spot in Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Kashmir, which India blamed Pakistan for. Islamabad has denied role in the attack.

Since the partition of India to create Pakistan in 1947, the nuclear-armed neighbours have fought four wars, three of them over the disputed region of Kashmir.

The film stars the popular actor Ranveer Singh, who plays an Indian spy who infiltrates networks of “gangsters and terrorists” in Karachi, Pakistan. Critics of the film argue that its storyline is laced with ultra-nationalist political tropes and that it misrepresents history, an emerging trend in Bollywood, they say.

What is the latest Bollywood blockbuster about?

Directed by Aditya Dhar, the film dramatises a covert chapter from the annals of Indian intelligence. The narrative centres on a high-stakes, cross-border mission carried out by India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), and focuses on one operative who conducts operations on enemy soil to neutralise threats to Indian national security.

The film features a heavyweight ensemble cast led by Singh, who plays the gritty field agent tasked with dismantling a “terror” network from the inside. He is pitted against a formidable antagonist played by Sanjay Dutt, representing the Pakistani establishment, and gangsters such as one portrayed by Akshaye Khanna, while actors including R Madhavan portray key intelligence officers and strategists who orchestrate complex geopolitical manoeuvering from New Delhi.

Structurally, the screenplay follows a classic cat-and-mouse trajectory.

Beneath its high-octane set pieces, the film has sparked an angry debate among critics and audiences over the interpretation of historical events and some key figures.

Why is the film so controversial in Pakistan?

Despite the longstanding geopolitical tensions between the two countries, India’s Bollywood films remain popular in Pakistan.

Depicting Pakistan as the ultimate enemy of India has been a popular theme retold for years, in different ways, especially in Bollywood’s spy thrillers, however. In this case, the portrayal of Pakistan’s major coastal city, Karachi, and particularly one of its oldest and most densely populated neighbourhoods, Lyari, has drawn strong criticism.

“The representation in the film is completely based on fantasy. It doesn’t look like Karachi. 
It does not represent the city accurately at all,” Nida Kirmani, an associate professor of sociology at Lahore University of Management Sciences, told Al Jazeera.

Kirmani, who has produced a documentary on the impact of gang violence in Lyari of her own, said that like other megacities in the world, “Karachi had periods of violence that have been particularly intense.”

However, “reducing the city to violence is one of the major problems in the film, along with the fact the film gets everything about Karachi – from its infrastructure, culture, and language – wrong”, she added.

Meanwhile, a member of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has taken legal action in a Karachi court alleging the unauthorised use of images of the late former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated in 2007, and protesting against the film’s portrayal of the party’s leaders as supporters of “terrorists”.

Critics, including Kirmani, say the film also bizarrely casts gangs from Lyari into geopolitical tensions with India, when they have only ever operated locally.

Kirmani said the makers of the movie have cherry-picked historical figures and used them completely out of context, “trying to frame them within this very Indian nationalistic narrative”.

Mayank Shekhar, a film critic based in Mumbai, pointed out that the film “has been performed, written, directed by those who haven’t ever stepped foot in Karachi, and perhaps never will”.

“So, never mind this dust bowl for a city that, by and large, seems wholly bereft of a single modern building, and looks mostly bombed-out, between multiple ghettos,” Shekhar said.

He added that this is also in line with how Hollywood “shows the brown Third World in action with a certain sepia tone, like with Extraction, set in Dhaka, Bangladesh”.

How has the film been received in India?

Dhurandhar has been a huge commercial success in India and among the Indian diaspora. However, it has not escaped criticism entirely.

The family of a decorated Indian Army officer, Major Mohit Sharma, filed a petition in Delhi High Court to stop the release of the film, which, they claim, has exploited his life and work without their consent.

The makers of the film deny this and claim it is entirely a work of fiction.

Nonetheless, the film’s storyline is accompanied by real-time intercepted audio recordings of attacks on Indian soil and news footage, film critics and analysts say.

Is this an emerging pattern in Bollywood films?

Shekhar told Al Jazeera that focusing on a deliberately loud, seemingly over-the-top, hyper-masculine hero’s journey is not a new genre in Bollywood. “There’s a tendency to intellectualise the trend, as we did with the ‘angry young man’ movies of the 1970s,” he said, referring to the formative years of Bollywood.

In recent years, mainstream production houses in India have, however, favoured storylines that portray minorities in negative light and align with the policies of the Hindu nationalist government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Kirmani told Al Jazeera that this frequently means “reducing Muslims across India’s borders and within as ‘terrorists’, which further marginalises Muslims in India culturally”.

“Unfortunately, people gravitate towards these kinds of hypernationalistic narratives, and the director is cashing in on this,” she told Al Jazeera.

Modi himself lavished praise on a recent film called Article 370, for what he said was its “correct information” about the removal of the constitutional provision that granted special autonomous status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019. Critics, however, called the film “propaganda” and said the film had distorted facts.

Another Bollywood film Kerala Story released in 2023 was accused of falsifying facts. Prime Minister Modi praised the film, but critics said it tried to vilify Muslims and demonise the southern Kerala state known for its progressive politics.

In the case of Dhurandhar, some critics have faced online harassment.

One review by The Hollywood Reporter’s India YouTube channel, by critic Anupama Chopra, was taken down after outrage from fans of the film.

Went looking for Anupama Chopra’s Dhurandhar review? It’s gone. The Hollywood Reporter India quietly made the video private.

For context, The Hollywood Reporter India was launched by RPSG Lifestyle Media, part of the RP-Sanjiv Goenka Group, which also owns Saregama –…

— newslaundry (@newslaundry) December 9, 2025

India’s Film Critics Guild has condemned “coordinated abuse, personal attacks on individual critics, and organised attempts to discredit their professional integrity”, in a statement.

“More concerningly, there have been attempts to tamper with existing reviews, influence editorial positions, and persuade publications to alter or dilute their stance,” the group noted.

Alang, India – Standing on the windswept coastline of the Arabian Sea in the western Indian state of Gujarat, Ramakant Singh looks towards the empty, endless horizon.

“In the olden days, ships lined up at this yard like buffaloes before a storm,” says the 47-year-old. “Now, we count the arrivals on our fingers.”

Ramakant works at Alang — the world’s largest ship-breaking yard, located in Bhavnagar district of Gujarat, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home state. For two decades, Ramakant has cut apart vessels as large as oil tankers and cargo carriers that sailed in from Europe and other Asian countries for his livelihood.

With its unique tidal pattern and gently sloping beach, Alang in the 1980s became the backbone of India’s ship recycling industry, where ships could be beached and dismantled at a minimal cost.

Over the decades, more than 8,600 vessels — collectively weighing roughly 68 million tonnes of light displacement tonnage (LDT), which is the actual weight of a ship without fuel, crew and cargo — have been taken apart here, accounting for nearly 98 percent of India’s total and about a third of the global ship recycling volume.

Across the world’s oceans, an ageing fleet of cargo ships, cruise liners, and oil tankers is nearing the end of its life. Of the roughly 109,000 vessels still in service, nearly half are more than 15 years old — rusting giants that will soon be retired.

Each year, close to 1,800 ships are declared unfit to sail and sold for recycling. Their owners pass them on to international middlemen, known as cash buyers — operating out of global shipping hubs such as Dubai, Singapore, and Hong Kong. These brokers, in turn, resell the vessels to dismantling yards in South Asia, where the final act of a ship’s life unfolds.

In Alang, ships are driven ashore at high tide — a process called beaching. Once grounded, hundreds of workers cut them apart piece by piece, salvaging steel, pipes, and machinery. Almost everything — from cables to cupboards — is resold for use by construction and manufacturing industries.

However, over the past decade, the number of ships arriving on Alang’s coast has dwindled. Once a skyline of giant hulls that looked like high-rise buildings against the town’s asbestos roofs, only a few cruise ships and cargo carriers dot the horizon today.

“Earlier, there was plenty of work for everyone,” Chintan Kalthia, who runs one of the few yards still open, tells Al Jazeera. “Now, most of the workers have left. Only when a new ship beaches do a few come back to Alang. My own business is down to barely 30-40 percent of what it used to be.”

According to data from India’s Ship Recycling Industries Association, 2011-12 marked Alang’s busiest financial year since it began operations in 1983, with a record 415 ships dismantled. Since then, the yard has faced a steep decline — of the 153 plots developed along the 10km (6-mile) coastline, only about 20 remain functional, and even they are operating at barely 25 percent capacity.

“But what’s going wrong in Alang has multiple reasons,” says Haresh Parmar, secretary of the Ship Recycling Industries Association (India). “The biggest is that globally, shipowners are not retiring their old vessels. Post-COVID, a surge in demand led to record profits in shipping. With freight rates soaring, owners are pushing ships beyond their usual operational life instead of sending them for dismantling.”

A key factor behind the surge in freight rates is global disruptions. Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza has had a ripple effect on global trade routes, with Yemen’s Houthi rebels repeatedly attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea in solidarity with the Palestinians. The resulting security crisis has forced ships to bypass the Suez Canal and instead take the longer Cape of Good Hope route, sending freight rates soaring and delaying cargo worldwide.

Similarly, an analysis by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conducted in June 2022 found that the Russia-Ukraine war and other Middle East tensions had pushed up marine fuel costs by more than 60 percent, adding to operational expenses and shipping delays.

Together, these factors have sharply reduced the supply of end-of-life ships heading to Alang. “When owners are earning well, they don’t scrap their vessels,” says Parmar. “That’s why our yards are standing empty.”

Compliance raising costs

But that is not the only reason why Alang is struggling.

India’s ship recycling industry has undergone a significant transformation since the country acceded to the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships (HKC) in November 2019, becoming one of the first top ship-breaking nations to do so. Under the HKC and the 2019 Recycling of Ships Act, yards at Alang upgraded their infrastructure, installed pollution control systems, lined hazardous waste storage pits, trained workers, and maintained detailed inventories of toxic materials used in vessels.

These measures made Alang-Sosiya Ship Recycling Yards (ASSRY) one of the most compliant ship-recycling clusters in the developing world, with 106 of ASSRY yards having received HKC Statements of Compliance (SoC). Sosiya is a village located right next to Alang on the Gulf of Khambhat coast in Gujarat. Together, Alang and Sosiya form the entire stretch of beach where ship-breaking plots operate.

But achieving these standards came at a high cost: each yard had to invest between $0.56m and $1.2m to meet compliance norms, raising operational costs at a time when competition from neighbouring countries remains fierce.

“Think of it like a roadside eatery versus a global burger chain — the chain has shinier rules, cleaner kitchens, and safer gear, but you pay extra for the sparkle. The Hong Kong Convention works the same way,” said Kalthia, whose company, RL Kalthia Ship Breaking Private Limited, became the first ship recycling facility in India to receive HKC compliance certification from ClassNK in 2015, as their website shows. ClassNK is a leading Japanese ship classification society that audits and certifies international maritime safety and environmental standards.

“Compliance makes things safer and brings us up to international standards — it gives us an edge only on paper,” says Chetan Patel, a yard owner at Alang. “But it has also raised costs significantly.”

That, in turn, has made it hard for Alang’s ship-breakers to offer prices comparable to those of competitors.

“When neighbouring markets can pay more, shipowners go there,” Patel said.

Competing ship-recycling yards are thriving. In Bangladesh’s Chattogram port and Pakistan’s Gadani yard, shipowners are being offered $540-550 per LDT and $525-530 per LDT, respectively, compared with $500-510 per LDT at Alang.

“We can’t match the rates offered by Bangladesh and Pakistan,” says Parmar. “If we tried, we’d be running at a loss.”

This is reflected clearly in the data: the number of ships decommissioned in India dropped from 166 in 2023 to 124 in 2024. In contrast, Turkiye’s figures nearly doubled to 94 from 50, and Pakistan’s rose from 15 to 24 during the same period.

Supporting industries struggle

Alang is not just a ship-breaking yard, but a vast recycling ecosystem that sustains the surrounding region’s economy.

From the coastal town of Trapaj — the last big settlement before Alang — an 11km (7-mile) stretch of road is lined with sprawling, makeshift shops selling remnants of decommissioned ships. Everything that used to be part of life at sea eventually finds its way here: rusted chains, rescue boats, refrigerators, ceramic crockery, martini glasses, treadmills from shipboard gyms, air conditioners from cabins, and chandeliers from officers’ quarters.

“Whatever is there on the ship, we own it,” says Parmar. “Before the cutting begins, all valuable items are auctioned and reach these stores.”

Ram Vilas, who runs a ceramic shop selling salvaged crockery by the kilo, says most of his customers used to come from commercial establishments across Gujarat. “Now, business has gone dead,” he tells Al Jazeera. “This stretch you see doesn’t even have one-tenth of the crowd it used to. With fewer ships coming in, we don’t have enough stock to fill our shops.”

The ripple effects of Alang’s decline extend to other industries as well. Waste is handled by specialised facilities, while reusable steel is supplied to more than 60 induction furnaces and 80 rerolling mills, some 50km (30 miles) away in Bhavnagar, converting it into TMT bars – reinforced steel rods – and other construction materials.

But with fewer ships arriving, the supply of scrap steel has dropped sharply, disrupting operations of furnaces, mills, and hundreds of small businesses that depend on ship-derived goods. More than 200 retail and wholesale shops that once bustled with activity now face dwindling sales.

“Gas plants, rolling mills, furnace units, transporters, drivers — everyone connected to this chain has lost their livelihood,” says Parmar.

In Bhavnagar, 29-year-old Jigar Patel, who runs a flange manufacturing unit, says his business has suffered.

“I opened my unit in 2017, seeing the opportunity with steel sheets easily available from Alang,” he says. “But in the past two years, the slowdown has hit hard. Now, I have to buy sheets from Jharkhand. It’s not just expensive, but the raw steel is harder to cut and process. The Alang sheets were more malleable and ductile — they were made for work and of international standard.”

Workers at Alang, most of them migrants from poorer Indian states in the north and east, including Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh, have also begun to leave. “They only show up when ships arrive at the docks,” Vidyadhar Rane, president of the Alang-Sosiya Ship Recycling and General Workers’ Association, tells Al Jazeera.

“Yard owners call them when there is work. The rest of the time, they find other jobs in nearby towns,” he says.

At its peak, Alang employed more than 60,000 workers. Today, that number has shrunk to fewer than 15,000, according to the union.

Ramakant, who first arrived in Alang at the age of 35, recalls working for seven straight years before the slowdown began. “Now, I only return when my employer calls,” he says, adding that he spends the rest of his time working in the industrial town of Surat.

The work at the yard, he admits, has become far safer than it once was. “This was once the deadliest job — we would see workers dying every other day. Now there’s training, safety gear, and order,” Ramakant says, looking towards the silent coast.

“But what’s the point of safety when there’s no work? Everything now depends on whether the next [ship] arrives at the yard or not.”

Lionel Messi’s tour of India got off to chaotic start in Kolkata as fans vented their anger over the Argentina legend’s brief appearance at a city stadium. Fans paid up to $150 for a ticket to see their football idol – but many barely caught a glimpse of him.

Argentina football icon Lionel Messi is on a three-day GOAT tour of India ahead of the 2026 defence of FIFA World Cup.

Lionel Messi’s much-hyped tour of India got off to a rocky start on Saturday with angry fans throwing bottles and attempting to vandalise a stadium after many of them failed to get more than just a glimpse of their hero.

The Times of India reported that many ticket holders said that they failed to see Messi at all – either in person or on the stadium’s big screens – despite waiting for hours.

West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee apologised to the Argentinian football star for the “mismanagement” of the event.

“I am deeply disturbed and shocked by the mismanagement witnessed today at Salt Lake Stadium,” Banerjee wrote on social media, where she also apologised to fans who had expected more after paying for tickets.

Banerjee said a committee would be constituted to “conduct a detailed enquiry into the incident, fix responsibility, and recommend measures to prevent such occurrences in the future”.

Messi’s three-day “GOAT (Greatest of All Time) India Tour” was to bring the World Cup winner from Kolkata to Hyderabad and then Mumbai before concluding in New Delhi on Monday.

He was joined by longtime teammates Luis Suarez and Rodrigo De Paul.

Earlier on Saturday, Messi remotely “unveiled” a 21-metre (70-foot) statue of himself in Kolkata.

Former FIFA President Sepp Blatter once described India as a “sleeping giant” in the football arena, but the sport in the country has run into many problems in recent years.

The Indian Super League (ISL) – India’s top football competition – has been in danger of collapse over a dispute between the federation and its commercial partner.

ISL side Bengaluru FC stopped paying the salaries of its first team’s players and staff as a result of the turmoil.

In a statement in August, the 2018-19 ISL champions said they had taken the decision “in view of the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Indian Super League season”.

Afghanistan’s International Olympic Committee member Samira Asghari says the Taliban authorities must face the stark truth that if they are ever to be accepted internationally, they must respect the rights of women to education and sport.

Asghari, who at 31 is living in exile for the second time, does, however, favour engaging with Afghanistan’s rulers.

The Taliban government have banned girls from schools beyond the age of 12, and barred women from most jobs and public services – and from playing sport.

Asghari, who in 2018 became Afghanistan’s first ever IOC member, accepts her “situation is quite challenging” and beating the drum for Afghan women’s sport “does require certain precautions”.

Nevertheless, the former international basketball player, like many top Afghan women athletes, is undeterred in speaking out about the treatment of women under the Taliban authorities.

“The reality is that when you take a public stand for women’s rights you do become a target, but I believe strongly in communication and engagement,” she said in an email interview with the AFP news agency.

“As long as the Taliban remain the reality on the ground in Afghanistan, we cannot afford to waste time doing nothing.

“In my role, I have tried to help smooth the discussions between the IOC and those currently in control, focusing on the sport rights of women and girls and particularly primary school girls who are still inside Afghanistan.”

Asghari, one of four children born to a retired professional makeup artist mother and a father who was a manager in the Afghan Olympic national committee, says the “conversations are not always easy”.

“They are not about legitimising any government,” she said.

“But they are very important for creating tangible opportunities for future generations of young boys and girls in Afghanistan.”

‘I hope FIFA can align with IOC talks with the Taliban’

With Afghan sportswomen spread around the globe, putting together teams is complex.

However, a women’s football team, Afghan Women United, made up of players based in Europe and Australia, recently competed in FIFA Unites: Women’s Series 2025 in Morocco.

“This support for athletes outside Afghanistan is just the first step, and I hope FIFA can align with the IOC’s ongoing talks with the Taliban,” she said.

Asghari, who had been involved in the “project” for more than a year, hopes the message gets through to Afghanistan’s rulers.

“The Taliban were given the country and now they’re trying to maintain power while ignoring fundamental human rights, particularly for women,” she said.

“It’s very difficult for them to continue ruling Afghanistan this way in the long term, and the Taliban need to understand that their international acceptance is directly linked to respecting human rights, including the rights of women to education and sport.”

Asghari, who attended the recent Islamic Solidarity Games in Riyadh, where Afghan women and men competed, said she hoped for “small openings” in the Taliban’s stance.

“I also believe that if we can find small openings — like developing sport in primary schools where girls are still allowed to attend up to sixth grade — we should take them,” she said.

“This isn’t about accepting the Taliban’s restrictions, it’s about not abandoning the girls and women of Afghanistan.

“We have to work with reality, while continuing to push for fundamental change.”

Asghari says even achieving small breakthroughs like that could prevent the long-term harm women suffered during the Taliban’s first spell in power, from 1996 to 2001.

She said she had seen the impact on her return from her first period of exile, in Iran.

“What concerns me deeply is that we’re creating another lost generation,” she said.

“I remember when I was in sixth grade aged 12, and there was a 20-year-old woman sitting next to me in the same class because she couldn’t go to school during the previous Taliban era.

“I didn’t know how to communicate with her and it was difficult for both of us, but especially for her because she had lost so many years.

“I cannot accept seeing this happen again. That’s why even small opportunities matter so much.”

Asghari retains hope despite the bleak outlook and believes in “continued engagement and dialogue” with the Taliban.

“The future of Afghanistan is this young generation. We need to give them every opportunity we can, no matter how small, and never, ever give up on them.”

India is hedging between energy security and strategic partnerships.

Despite pressure from the United States, it has continued buying cheap Russian oil and has recently strengthened economic ties with Russia — from trade to weapons and critical minerals.

But this is a delicate balancing act for Prime Minister Narendra Modi: he wants to cut deals with Moscow, while staying friends with Washington, his biggest trading partner.

For President Vladimir Putin, it shows Russia still has powerful partners and is not completely isolated despite Western sanctions.

And Syria’s economy one year after the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

Plus, the bidding fight over Warner Bros.

Surat, India – In 2018, Alpesh Bhai enrolled his three-year-old daughter in an English-language private school in Surat. This was something he never imagined possible while growing up in his village in the Indian state of Gujarat, where his family survived on small fields of fennel, castor and cumin, with their earnings barely enough to cover basic needs.

He had studied in a public school, where, he recalled, “teachers were a rarity, and English almost didn’t exist”.

“Maybe if I knew English, I would have been some government worker. Who knows?”, he said, referring to the dream of a majority of Indians, as government jobs come with tenure and benefits.

His finances improved once he joined the diamond cutting industry in Surat, a city perched along India’s Arabian Sea coast, where nearly 80 percent of the world’s diamonds are cut and polished. Monthly earnings of 35,000 rupees ($390) for the first time brought Alpesh a sense of stability, and with it, the means to give his children the education he never had.

“I was determined that at least my children would get the kind of private education I was deprived of,” he said.

But that dream did not last. The first disruption to business came with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The sanctions on Russia hurt supply chains, as India sourced at least a third of its raw diamonds from Russia, leading to layoffs.

Alpesh’s earnings fell to 18,000 rupees ($200) a month, then to 20,000 rupees ($222). Soon, the 25,000 rupees ($280) annual school fee became unmanageable. By the time his older daughter reached grade three, just as his younger child started school, the pressure became impossible.

Earlier this year, he pulled both children out of private school and enrolled them in a nearby public one. A few months later, when new United States tariffs deepened the crisis as demand slumped further, his polishing unit laid off 60 percent of its workers, Alpesh among them.

“Seems like I’ve come back to where I started,” he said.

Surat, India’s diamond hub, employs more than 600,000 workers, and hosts 15 large polishing units with annual sales exceeding $100m. For decades, Surat’s diamond‑polishing industry has offered migrant workers from rural Gujarat, many with little or no education, higher incomes, in some cases up to 100,000 rupees ($1,112) a month, and a path out of agrarian hardship.

But recent shocks have exposed the fragility of that ladder, with close to 400,000 workers having faced layoffs, pay cuts, or reduced hours.

Even before Russia’s war on Ukraine began in February 2022, Surat’s diamond industry faced multiple challenges: disrupted supplies from African mines, weakening demand in key Western markets, and inconsistent exports to China, the second-largest customer. With the onset of the war, India’s exports of cut and polished diamonds in the financial year ending on March 31, 2024, fell by 27.6 percent, with sharp declines in its top markets – the US, China, and the United Arab Emirates.

The 50 percent tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump have worsened the downturn.

Alpesh now works loading and unloading textile consignments for about 12,000 rupees ($133) a month, barely enough to cover food and rent.

“If I had kept them in the private school, I don’t know how I would have survived,” Alpesh said. “People here have killed themselves over debts and school fees. When you don’t have enough to eat, how will you think of teaching your children well?”

His daughters are still adjusting. “They sometimes tell me, ‘Pupa, the studies aren’t as good now’. I tell them we’ll put them back in the private school soon, but I don’t know when that will happen.”

‘An exodus’

Some workers have returned to their villages, as many migrant families in Surat can no longer afford rent or find alternative work.

Shyam Patel, 35, was among them. When exports slowed and US tariffs hit in August, the polishing unit where he worked shut down. With no other work available, he returned to his village in the Banaskantha district the following month.

“What other option was there?” he said. “In the city, there’s rent to pay even when there’s no work.”

He now works as a daily-wage labourer in cotton fields in his village. His son, who was in the final year of high school, dropped out after four months of the new academic session.

“We’ll put him back in school next year,” Shyam said. “The government school said they can’t take new students in the middle of the term. Till then, he helps me in the fields.”

Across the city, the disruption is evident in government data. More than 600 students left school mid-session last year as their parents lost work or returned to their villages, mostly in Saurashtra and north Gujarat.

“Most migrants come to Surat to settle – the city has entire [neighbourhoods] and housing clusters built for diamond workers,” said Bhavesh Tank, vice president of the Diamond Workers Union Gujarat. “An exodus in the middle of the year is unprecedented, and the drop in school enrolment suggests many are not coming back soon.”

The union estimates that about 50,000 workers have left Surat over the past 12 to 14 months.

The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a Hindu nationalist group allied with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has been closely observing the diamond industry crisis in Surat.

“The number of dropouts has reached a point where even government schools are struggling to take in new students, said Purvesh Togadia, a VHP representative in the city. “The poor quality of education is making the transition even more disheartening for families.”

The poor quality of education in public schools is well established. In 2024, only 23.4 percent of grade three students could read at a grade two level, compared with 35.5 percent in private schools. By grade 5, the gap persisted – 44.8 percent in government schools versus 59.3 percent in private ones.

Kishor Bhamre, director at Pratham, an organisation working on children’s rights across education and labour, said the setback is not just academic but psychological.

“Children moving from private to government schools lose the environment they grew up in – their friends, familiar teachers, and a sense of community. For many, it also means shifting from an urban to a rural setting, which makes the adjustment even harder and affects their learning,” he said.

Al Jazeera reached out to the Surat Municipal Corporation and the state’s education minister for comment, but did not receive a response.

Limited help

The Diamond Workers Union has repeatedly appealed to the state government to provide an economic relief package and revise salaries in line with inflation. The union has also urged authorities to address the equally pressing situation of the growing number of school dropouts among workers’ children.

The Gujarat government in May introduced a special assistance package for affected diamond workers – a rare move in the industry.

Under the scheme, the state government committed to paying for one year of school fees for diamond polishers’ children, up to 13,500 rupees ($150) annually. To qualify, workers must have been unemployed for the past year and have at least three years of experience in a diamond factory. The fees will be paid directly to the schools.

The government received nearly 90,000 requests from diamond workers across Gujarat, including about 74,000 from Surat alone.  After a slow start – it had provided assistance to only 170 children by July – officials reported disbursing 82.8 million rupees ($921,000) towards school fees for 6,368 children of jobless diamond workers in Surat by mid-September.

But about 26,000 applicants were rejected, reportedly due to “improper details mentioned” in the forms, leading to frustration and anger among workers. In the past few days, nearly 1,000 diamond polishers have filed applications with the local government, demanding to know who rejected their forms and on what grounds, and alleging opacity in the process.

The scheme’s rigid eligibility criteria have also excluded workers.

“The scheme only covers those who have completely lost their jobs, but it leaves out many who are facing partial cuts or reduced work,” said Tank. “They’re struggling just as much and need support equally.”

Tank added that education remains one of the most common concerns among workers reaching out to the union’s suicide prevention helpline, which was set up by the Diamond Workers Union after Surat had already recorded at least 71 suicides among diamond workers by November 2024. It has received more than 5,000 calls so far.

Divyaben Makwana, 40, lost her 22-year-old son, Kewalbhai, who had been working as a diamond polisher for three years. On June 14, he died by suicide.

Kewalbhai had been under immense mental stress after losing his job in the diamond market, his mother told Al Jazeera.

“He was earning around 20,000 rupees ($220) a month, and when even that collapsed,” he took his life, she said. “We took him to the hospital and did everything we could. I borrowed 500,000 rupees ($5,560) from relatives and friends, but we couldn’t save him. Now, I don’t have a son – only a loan.”

She lives in Surat with her husband, who has been unable to work due to prolonged illness, and their younger son, Karmdeep, 18. With no means to return to their village in Saurashtra, Divyaben has begun working as a domestic worker to make ends meet. Karmdeep dropped out after grade 11, and now attends a local coaching centre, where he is learning diamond faceting while looking for work.

“Education has become so expensive,” Divyaben said. “At least with coaching, he’ll learn a skill. By the time the market recovers, if he’s trained as a craftsman, maybe we’ll be able to repay some of our debts.”

She paused, her voice low. “I don’t know if education, whether taken on loan or given free, can really change our fate. Our only hope is still the diamond.”

If you or someone you know is at risk of suicide, these organisations may be able to help.

You can access the Diamond Workers Union helpline at +91-92395 00009.

The moment a deadly fire broke out at a nightclub in Goa, India, was caught on camera. The blaze killed at least 25 people, including four tourists. Authorities are investigating safety violations and the venue’s operators.

A New Financial Reality

The release of Digital Yuan 2.0 in 2025 will change the way money works in Asia. This technology links the People’s Bank of China directly to the ASEAN cross-border payment network, which speeds up transactions compared to older systems like SWIFT, which take 3 to 5 days. Beijing is developing the groundwork of a regional financial infrastructure that speeds up transaction settlements while minimizing reliance on the US dollar.

Reports from Yuan Adoption Tracker say that in the first quarter of 2025, the Renminbi was used a lot more in international trade settlements, and its share of the global foreign currency market kept growing. This shows that the e-CNY project is not just a test in China, but also part of the country’s larger plan to make its currency more global.

This push for growth is also in line with the global trend of de-dollarization. China is using the competition between its economy and the US to spread the use of e-CNY across Asia. Experts say that 2025 will be a key year for the digital yuan to become more powerful outside of China, notably in Hong Kong’s retail sector and beyond ASEAN borders.

The Digital Yuan raises a strategic problem for ASEAN: should they prioritize transaction efficiency or monetary sovereignty? On the one hand, integrating e-CNY is cheap and fast. Beijing’s control over cross-border payment systems, on the other hand, could limit ASEAN central banks’ policy options. The fact that Thailand is involved in the m-CBDC initiative, Indonesia is involved with Rupiah Digital, and Vietnam is focused on regulating crypto in its own country shows that the region is not the same in how it reacts to Chinese financial technology entering its markets.

China’s Strategic Intent

Since its 2020 inception, Beijing has never limited e-CNY to local innovation. ASEAN trade aggressively promotes the digital Yuan as a cross-border payment method. The China Crunch analysis found that ASEAN e-CNY transactions exceeded 500 billion yuan in the first three quarters of 2025. This suggests that e-CNY is becoming a popular SWIFT alternative.

China views the US dollar’s dominance as a political weakness. Beijing is creating an alternative financial system by making e-CNY more popular. This will reduce global dollar dependence, which Russia and other BRICS countries want. Observer Research Foundation predicts that e-CNY will aggressively spread internationally in 2025, particularly in Hong Kong’s retail sector and beyond ASEAN.

Digital Yuan boosts soft power and speeds up transactions. Beijing becomes a rule-maker by adding ASEAN to e-CNY. China gains political leverage because ASEAN countries that use the e-CNY will find it tougher to oppose Beijing’s economic and diplomatic aims.

China is advancing the Multiple Central Bank Digital Currency Bridge (mBridge) project with Hong Kong, Thailand, and the UAE. This experiment tests how rapidly e-CNY can be utilized for cross-border transactions and improves regional financial strength. Beijing is utilizing mBridge to provide technology and create a new financial system to replace the West.

ASEAN’s Dilemma

The initiative is handled differently by each ASEAN nation. Thailand hopes to cut cross-border money transfer costs and strengthen financial integration. Indonesia made only the Rupiah Digital legal for digital payments. Clear goal: retain rupiah independence and prevent foreign currency takeover. Vietnam is regulating crypto more internally. According to PwC, Vietnam views crypto as an investment tool, rather than a payment method. Singapore’s latest project, BLOOM, uses tokenization and stablecoins to enable cross-border payments, maintaining system flexibility and preventing the dominance of a single currency. This suggests that several Southeast Asian countries are eyeing the growth of e-CNY.

Adding e-CNY may constrain ASEAN central banks’ policy options. If not regulated, cross-border CBDCs might cause capital flight and monetary instability, according to the IMF. Transaction efficiency may cost domestic stability through loss of influence. If ASEAN approves the e-CNY, the system would be more efficient and cost-effective, but more dependent on Beijing. If ASEAN rejects e-CNY integration, it would maintain monetary sovereignty but risk falling behind in global financial innovation.

Long-Term Risk for ASEAN

The digital yuan in ASEAN’s cross-border payment system could complicate monetary policy decisions. Each country’s central bank, which previously regulated liquidity and monetary instruments, will face new challenges when many cross-border transactions rely on the e-CNY.

Weaker economies in ASEAN, such as Timor-Leste, Laos, and Cambodia, that trade substantially with China will lose the ability to adjust their fiscal and monetary policies. The Digital Yuan is a data-driven payment system. China’s financial system may log all e-CNY cross-border transactions. The Atlantic Council CBDC Tracker notes that the e-CNY helps Chinese regulators track cash movements in real time. Others worry that Beijing could use financial data to influence politics, such as pressuring ASEAN countries that don’t support its strategic aims.

People desire to use e-CNY because it simplifies cross-border transactions, but widespread use could lead to structural reliance. ASEAN countries that overrely on China’s payment system will struggle to diversify their trade and maintain financial independence. E-CNY’s quick expansion in Hong Kong’s retail sector and beyond ASEAN boundaries by 2025 suggests that Beijing wants the Renminbi to be the region’s most significant currency. Beijing’s payment structure makes it difficult for countries to reject China’s diplomatic and investment offers.

Policy Implication

ASEAN needs to develop the Digital Payment Hub as a framework for regional integration. This will reduce the risk of single-party dominance of the e-CNY while strengthening interoperability between central banks. Cross-border coordination in CBDC development can prevent fragmentation of the global payment system and maintain regional monetary stability.

Digital Yuan carries financial surveillance risks. ASEAN must strengthen related regulations, Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), and Countering Financing of Terrorism (CFT). Strong regulation of fintech and CBDC is necessary to protect state sovereignty from excessive external influence.

Indonesia, with Rupiah Digital, and Vietnam, with domestic crypto regulations, show that a hedging strategy can maintain monetary policy space. ASEAN needs to encourage each country to develop a domestic digital currency as a bulwark against external domination. Small countries can maintain policy space by developing alternative monetary instruments that strengthen financial sovereignty.

Finally, ASEAN must act as a collective bloc in international forums such as the G20 and the IMF to negotiate global CBDC standards. This will strengthen ASEAN’s bargaining position in the face of payment system dominance from major powers. Regional coordination in the face of global pressure is key to maintaining economic stability and national security.

Conclusion

The digital yuan has evolved from a mere financial innovation into a geopolitical instrument challenging the global monetary architecture. Its presence in Southeast Asia places ASEAN in a strategic dilemma: accept the cross-border transaction efficiencies offered by Beijing or maintain monetary sovereignty by developing a regional alternative.

The long-term risks that arise cannot be ignored. The integration of e-CNY has the potential to narrow policy space central bank, opening up opportunities for financial surveillance by Beijing, and creating structural dependencies that undermine the political and economic autonomy of ASEAN countries. The fragmentation of responses between countries further increases the region’s vulnerability to single-party domination.

Therefore, ASEAN needs to assert its collective position through the development of a regional CBDC framework, diversification of financial partners, strengthening regulations, and coordination in global forums. Without concrete steps, the region risks becoming an arena for great power competition, rather than an actor capable of determining the direction of the regional financial future.