Asia

New Delhi, India – On January 3, 2026, a single directive from the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) quietly ended the Indian Premier League (IPL) season of Bangladesh’s only cricketer in the tournament, Mustafizur Rahman, before it could even begin.

The Kolkata Knight Riders (KKR), a professional Twenty20 franchise based in Kolkata that competes in the IPL and is owned by Red Chillies Entertainment, associated with Bollywood actor Shah Rukh Khan, were instructed by India’s cricket board to release the Bangladesh fast bowler.

Not because of injury, form, or contract disputes, but due to “developments all around” – an apparent reference to soaring tensions between India and Bangladesh that have been high since ousted former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina received exile in New Delhi in August 2024.

Within days, Mustafizur signed up for the Pakistan Super League (PSL), the Bangladesh Cricket Board (BCB) protested sharply, the IPL broadcast was banned in Bangladesh, and the International Cricket Council (ICC) – the body that governs the sport globally – was pulled into a diplomatic standoff.

What should have been a routine player transaction instead became a symbol of how cricket in South Asia has shifted from a tool of diplomacy to an instrument of political pressure.

Cricket has long been the subcontinent’s soft-power language, a shared obsession that survived wars, border closures, and diplomatic freezes. Today, that language is being rewritten, say observers and analysts.

India, the financial and political centre of world cricket, is increasingly using its dominance of the sport to signal, punish, and coerce its neighbours, particularly Pakistan and Bangladesh, they say.

The Mustafizur affair: When politics entered the dressing room

Rahman was signed by KKR for 9.2 million Indian rupees ($1m) before the IPL 2026 season.

Yet the BCCI instructed the franchise to release him, citing vague external developments widely understood to be linked to political tensions between India and Bangladesh.

The consequences were immediate.

Mustafizur, unlikely to receive compensation because the termination was not injury-related, accepted an offer from the PSL – picking the Pakistani league after an Indian snub – returning to the tournament after eight years.

The PSL confirmed his participation before its January 21 draft. The BCB, meanwhile, called the BCCI’s intervention “discriminatory and insulting”.

Dhaka escalated the matter beyond cricket, asking the ICC to move Bangladesh’s matches from the upcoming T20 World Cup, which India is primarily hosting, to Sri Lanka over security concerns.

The Bangladeshi government went further, banning the broadcast of the IPL nationwide, a rare step that underlined how deeply cricket intersects with politics and public sentiment in South Asia.

The BCB on January 7 said the International Cricket Council (ICC) has assured it of Bangladesh’s full and uninterrupted participation in the ICC Men’s T20 World Cup 2026, dismissing media reports of any ultimatum.

The BCB said the ICC responded to its concerns over the safety and security of the national team in India, including a request to relocate matches, and reaffirmed its commitment to safeguarding Bangladesh’s participation while expressing willingness to work closely with the Board during detailed security planning.

Yet for now, Bangladesh’s matches remain scheduled for the Indian megacities of Kolkata and Mumbai from February 7, 2026, even as tensions simmer.

Navneet Rana, a BJP leader said that no Bangladeshi cricketer or celebrity should be “entertained in India” while Hindus and minorities are being targeted in Bangladesh.

Meanwhile, Indian Congress leader Shashi Tharoor questioned the decision to release Mustafizur Rahman, warning against politicising sport and punishing individual players for developments in another country.

A pattern, not an exception

The Mustafizur controversy fits into a broader trajectory.

While all cricket boards operate within political realities, the BCCI’s unique financial power gives it leverage unmatched by any other body in the sport, say analysts.

The ICC, the sport’s global body, is headed by Jay Shah, the son of India’s powerful home minister Amit Shah – widely seen as the second-most influential man in India after Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The IPL, meanwhile, is by far the richest franchise league in the world.

India, with 1.5 billion people, is cricket’s biggest market and generates an estimated 80 percent of the sport’s revenue.

All of that, say analysts, gives India the ability to shape scheduling of events and matches, venues, and revenue-sharing arrangements. This, in turn, has made cricket a strategic asset for the Indian government.

When political relations sour, cricket is no longer insulated.

Nowhere is this clearer than in India’s relationship with Bangladesh at the moment. India has historically been viewed as close to Hasina, whose ouster in 2024 followed weeks of popular protests that her security forces attempted to crush using brutal force. An estimated 1,400 people were killed in that crackdown, according to the United Nations.

India has so far refused to send Hasina back to Bangladesh from exile, even though a tribunal in Dhaka sentenced her to death in late 2025 over the killings of protesters during the uprising that led to her removal. That has spurred sentiments against India on the streets of Bangladesh, which escalated after the assassination of an anti-India protest leader in December.

Meanwhile, attacks on Hindus and other religious minorities in Bangladesh since August 2024 – a Hindu Bangladeshi man was lynched last month – have caused anger in India.

Against that backdrop, the BCCI’s move to kick Rahman out of the IPL has drawn criticism from Indian commentators. Senior journalist Vir Sanghvi wrote in a column that the cricket board “panicked” and surrendered to communal pressure instead of standing by its own player-selection process, turning a sporting issue into a diplomatic embarrassment.

He argued Bangladesh did not warrant a sport boycott and warned that mixing communal politics with cricket risks damaging India’s credibility and regional ties.

Echoing the concern, Suhasini Haidar, diplomatic editor of The Hindu, one of India’s largest dailies, said on X that the government was allowing social media campaigns to overpower diplomacy. She referred to how Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar had travelled recently to Dhaka to attend the funeral of former Bangladesh PM Khaleda Zia, and wondered why Bangladeshi cricketers couldn’t then play in India.

Cricket analyst Darminder Joshi said the episode reflected how cricket, once a bridge between India and its neighbours, was increasingly widening divisions.

That was particularly visible late last year, when India and Pakistan faced off in cricket matches months after an intense four-day aerial war.

The Asia Cup standoff

The 2025 Asia Cup, hosted by Pakistan in September, was meant to be a celebration of regional cricket.

But citing government advice, the BCCI informed the ICC and the Asian Cricket Council (ACC) – the sport’s continental governing body – that India would not travel to Pakistan.

After months of wrangling, the tournament was held under a hybrid model, with India playing its matches in the United Arab Emirates while the rest were hosted in Pakistan.

But in three matches that the South Asian rivals played against each other during the competition – India won all three – the Indian team refused to publicly shake hands with their Pakistani counterparts.

“There is no rule in cricket that mandates a handshake. Yet players often tie each other’s shoelaces or help opponents on the field, that is the spirit of the game,” Joshi, the cricket analyst, told Al Jazeera. “If countries are in conflict, will players now refuse even these gestures? Such incidents only spread hate and strip the game of what makes it special.

“Sporting exchanges once softened bilateral tensions; this decision does exactly the opposite, making the game more hostile instead of more interesting.”

The controversy did not end with the final. India won the tournament, defeating Pakistan, but refused to accept the trophy from ACC President Mohsin Naqvi, who is also the Pakistan Cricket Board chairman and Pakistan’s interior minister.

The trophy remains at the ACC headquarters in Dubai, creating an unprecedented limbo that has defied resolution despite multiple ICC and ACC meetings. The BCCI requested that the trophy be sent to India. Naqvi has refused.

From bridge to divider

Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh has historically enjoyed smoother cricketing ties with India. Bilateral series continued even during political disagreements, and Bangladeshi players became familiar faces in the IPL.

The Mustafizur episode marks a turning point. The current moment stands in stark contrast to earlier eras when cricket was deliberately used to soften political hostilities.

The most celebrated example remains India’s 2004 tour of Pakistan, the so-called “Friendship Series”.

That tour took place after years of frozen ties following the Kargil War, an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place from May to July 1999.

The then-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee personally met the Indian team before departure, handing captain Sourav Ganguly a bat inscribed with the Hindi words: “Khel hi nahi, dil bhi jeetiye” which translates to “don’t just win matches, win hearts too”.

Special cricket visas allowed thousands of Indian fans to travel across the border. Pakistani then-President Pervez Musharraf followed the games and publicly lauded Indian cricketers who developed followings of their own in Pakistan.

The 2008 Mumbai attacks, carried out by fighters that Pakistan acknowledged had come from its territory, froze cricketing ties.

But in 2011, when India and Pakistan faced off in the World Cup semifinal in Mohali, Indian then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh invited his Pakistani counterpart, Yousuf Raza Gilani, over – the two premiers watched the match together in what was widely seen as an act of “cricket diplomacy”.

By intervening in a franchise-level contract and linking it, however obliquely, to geopolitical tensions as has happened with the Mustafizur case, the BCCI sent a clear message, say analysts: Access to Indian cricket is conditional.

Sport journalist Nishant Kapoor told Al Jazeera that releasing a contracted player purely on political grounds was “absolutely wrong” and warned it would widen mistrust in the cricketing ecosystem.

“He is a cricketer. What wrong has he done?” Kapoor said.

Islamabad, Pakistan – Less than a week into the new year, after a meeting between Pakistan’s Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Babar Sidhu and his Bangladeshi counterpart Air Chief Marshal Hasan Mahmood Khan, the Pakistani military announced that a deal to sell its domestically produced JF-17 Thunder fighter jet could be imminent.

A statement by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the military’s media wing, said Khan praised the Pakistan Air Force’s combat record and sought assistance to support the Bangladesh Air Force’s “ageing fleet and integration of air defence radar systems to enhance air surveillance”.

Alongside a promise of fast-tracked delivery of Super Mushshak trainer aircraft, the statement, issued on January 6, added that “detailed discussions were also held on potential procurement of JF-17 Thunder aircraft.”

The Super Mushshak is a light-weight, two-to-three seater, single-engine plane with fixed, non-retractable, tricycle landing gear. The plane is primarily used for training purposes. Besides Pakistan, more than 10 countries currently have deployed the plane in their fleet for pilot training, including Azerbaijan, Turkiye, Iran, Iraq and others.

Just a day later, it was reported by the Reuters news agency that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were in talks to convert about $2bn of Saudi loans into a JF-17 fighter jet deal, further strengthening military cooperation between the two longtime allies. The discussions come only months after they signed a mutual defence pact in September last year.

Both developments followed reports in late December that Pakistan had reached a $4bn deal with a rebel faction in Libya, the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), including the sale of more than a dozen JF-17 Thunder jets.

While the Pakistani military has yet to formally confirm any agreement with Libya or Saudi Arabia, and Bangladesh has so far only expressed “interest” rather than signing a contract, analysts say events in 2025 have boosted the JF-17’s appeal.

However, the relatively cheap price of the plane, estimated at $25m-$30m, has meant that several countries in the last 10 years have shown interest in it, with Nigeria, Myanmar and Azerbaijan already having the jet in their fleets. And recent events have bolstered the reputation of Pakistan’s air fighting capabilities, say analysts.

In May, India and Pakistan fought an intense four-day air war, firing missiles and drones at each other’s territories, parts of Kashmir that they administer, and at military bases, after gunmen shot down 26 civilians in Indian-administered Kashmir. India blamed Pakistan, which denied any link to the attack.

Pakistan said it shot down several Indian fighter jets during the aerial combat, a claim Indian officials later acknowledged after initially denying any losses, but without specifying the number of jets downed.

“The PAF demonstrated superior performance against much more expensive Western and Russian systems, which has made these aircraft an attractive option for several air forces,” Adil Sultan, a former Pakistan Air Force air commodore, said.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has traditionally relied on Russian Mirage-2000 and Su-30 jets, but in the 2025 fighting also used French Rafale jets.

Pakistan, for its part, relied on its recently imported Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon and the JF-17 Thunder as well as the United States’ F-16 Fighting Falcon jets, with 42 planes in the formation that took on 72 IAF planes, according to the PAF.

So what is the JF-17 Thunder, what can it do, and why are so many countries showing interest?

What is the JF-17 Thunder?

The JF-17 Thunder is a lightweight, all-weather, multi-role fighter aircraft jointly manufactured by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC).

Pakistan and China signed an agreement in the late 1990s to develop the aircraft, with work beginning in the early 2000s at the PAC in Kamra, situated in Pakistan’s Punjab province, just more than 80km (50 miles) away from the capital, Islamabad.

A retired Pakistan Air Force air commodore who worked closely on the programme said production is split between the two countries, with 58 percent carried out in Pakistan and 42 percent in China.

“We are manufacturing the front fuselage and vertical tail, whereas China makes the middle and rear fuselage of the plane, with a Russian engine being used, as well as British manufacturer Martin Baker’s seats are installed. However, the complete assembly of the plane is carried out in Pakistan,” he told Al Jazeera, speaking on condition of anonymity due to his involvement in the project.

He said the aircraft was first unveiled to the public in March 2007, with the induction of the first variant, Block 1, in 2009. The most advanced Block 3 variant entered service in 2020.

“The idea was to replace Pakistan’s ageing fleet, and subsequently, in the next decade or so, they made the bulk of our air force, with more than 150 combat jets part of the force,” he said.

Before the JF-17, Pakistan was primarily relying on French manufacturer Dassault’s Mirage III and Mirage 5, as well as Chinese J-7 fighter planes.

The Block 3 variant places JF-17 in the so-called 4.5 generation of fighter jets. It has air-to-air and air-to-surface combat capabilities, advanced avionics, an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, electronic warfare systems and the ability to fire beyond-visual-range missiles.

Their avionics and electronic capabilities are an upgrade from the fourth generation of fighter planes, such as the F-16 and Su-27, which were primarily built for speed and dogfighting.

The AESA radar gives these planes the capability to track multiple targets at once and provides more visibility at longer distances. However, unlike fifth-generation planes, they lack stealth capabilities.

The Pakistan Air Force says the jet offers high manoeuvrability at medium and low altitudes and combines firepower, agility and survivability, making it “a potent platform for any air force”.

Who has bought the JF-17?

Myanmar was the first country to buy the JF-17, ordering at least 16 Block 2 aircraft in 2015. Seven have been delivered so far.

Nigeria became the second buyer, inducting three JF-17s into its air force in 2021.

Azerbaijan followed with an initial order of 16 jets in February 2024, worth more than $1.5bn. In November 2025, Azerbaijan unveiled five JF-17s during its Victory Day parade, formally making it the third foreign operator of the aircraft.

That same month, the Pakistani military announced it had signed a memorandum of understanding with a “friendly country” for procurement of the JF-17, describing it as a “noteworthy development” without naming the buyer.

Other countries, including Iraq, Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia, have also explored the option of buying the JF-17 over the past decade, though those plans did not materialise.

While JF-17 makes the bulk of the PAF’s fighting squadron, the plane is not used by the Chinese air force, which is more reliant on its J-10, J-20 and J-35 fighter planes.

With the plane’s entire assembly carried out in Kamra, Pakistan is the primary seller of the JF-17 fighter plane, including its after-sales services.

How does the JF-17 compare to other fighter jets?

The most advanced fighters currently in service globally are fifth-generation jets such as the US F-22 and F-35, China’s J-20 and J-35, and Russia’s Su-57. These aircraft feature stealth technology – unlike all previous generations of jets.

The JF-17’s Block 3 variant, by contrast, belongs to the 4.5 generation, alongside jets such as Sweden’s Gripen, France’s Rafale, the Eurofighter Typhoon, India’s Tejas and China’s J-10, among others.

Still, while they don’t have stealth capabilities, 4.5 generation planes have specialised coating on them to reduce their radar signature, making them harder – though not impossible – to detect.

So, for instance, when a 4.5-generation jet enters the enemy’s radar zone, it can get detected, but it can also try to jam signals by using its electronic jamming capabilities, or use long-range missiles to attack the target, before turning back.

On the other hand, a fifth-generation plane remains entirely undetected by radars due to its physical design and weapons, which are stored internally.

While official pricing has not been disclosed, estimates put the JF-17’s unit cost at between $25m and $30m. By comparison, the Rafale costs more than $90m per aircraft, while the Gripen is priced at more than $100m.

An Islamabad-based regional security analyst who has closely monitored the development of the JF-17 planes said the jet’s appeal lies in its cost-effectiveness, lower maintenance requirements and combat record.

“The JF-17’s appeal is less about headline performance than the overall package, which includes lower price, flexible weapons integration, training, spares and generally fewer Western political strings,” he told Al Jazeera, requesting anonymity because of his involvement with the JF-17 project.

“In that sense, the JF-17 is a ‘good enough’ multirole jet optimised for accessibility. It can suit air forces modernising on tight budgets, but it is not a direct substitute for higher-end fighters like the J-10C or F-16V in range, payload, electronic warfare maturity and long-term upgrade headroom.”

Sultan, who is also dean of the Faculty of Aerospace and Strategic Studies at Islamabad’s Air University, said the JF-17’s performance against Indian aircraft in 2025 underscored its capabilities.

However, he cautioned that outcomes in air combat depend not only on the aircraft but on who is operating it.

“The jets’ integration with other systems such as ground and airborne radars, communication systems and the human skills mastered during training play the most vital role,” he said.

Why is the interest in JF-17s growing?

Pakistan’s air force again drew attention during the four-day conflict with India in May 2025, particularly on the night of May 7, when Indian aircraft struck targets inside Pakistani territory.

According to the PAF, Pakistani squadrons flying Chinese-made J-10C jets shot down at least six Indian aircraft. Indian officials initially denied losses but later acknowledged that “some” planes had been lost.

US President Donald Trump, who has claimed credit for brokering a ceasefire between the two countries, has repeatedly highlighted the performance of Pakistani jets, a claim India has strongly rejected.

Although the JF-17 was not involved in the reported shoot-downs, the PAF says it was part of the formations that engaged Indian aircraft.

Three days later, on May 10, the ISPR claimed a JF-17 was used to strike India’s Russian-made S-400 air defence system with a hypersonic missile. India has denied any damage to its defence system.

The Islamabad-based security analyst said Pakistan is using the May conflict to market the JF-17 as a combat-proven, affordable option for countries with limited defence budgets.

He added, however, that the possibility of a “potential procurement” should be treated cautiously.

“‘Expressions of interest’ should be treated cautiously as fighter jet procurements typically take years to translate from exploratory talks to signed contracts and deliveries,” he said, adding that “while PAF is continuing to market the JF-17 aggressively, the JF-17 for debt swap isn’t what PAF envisions.”

Other observers agree that Islamabad sees an opportunity to leverage its air force’s performance to secure defence exports and project itself as a rising middle power.

The retired air commodore involved in the JF-17 programme said combat performance remains the ultimate benchmark.

“Very few countries are making fighter jets, with most of the market dominated by Western developers who often attach many conditions to sales,” he said. “But everybody wants to diversify and avoid putting all their eggs in one basket, and that is where Pakistan comes in.”

On Bangladesh, he said Dhaka’s posture towards Pakistan has shifted sharply since a change of government in 2024.

“Such deals are not just about sale of a platform or a plane. It is a collaboration, an agreement at national level, showing strategic alignment between two countries,” he said.

Fighter jets, he added, are a long-term commitment, with service lives of three to four decades.

“If Bangladesh is getting a JF-17 or Super Mushshak trainers, you can be certain that they are in it for the long haul with training and after-sales services. They are also showing interest in Chinese J-10s, which means that strategically, they have decided who they want to align with in the future,” he said.

BCB refutes reports saying ICC had issued an ultimatum over Bangladesh’s refusal to play its World Cup games in India.

Cricket authorities in Bangladesh have agreed to “work closely” with the International Cricket Council (ICC) to resolve security concerns regarding their team’s participation in the upcoming T20 World Cup in India.

The Bangladesh Cricket Board (BCB) will cooperate with the tournament’s organisers in order to ensure the country’s participation, it said in a statement on Wednesday, three days after saying its men’s team will not travel to the neighbouring country.

“The ICC has conveyed its willingness to work closely with the BCB to address the concerns, and has assured that the board’s inputs will be welcomed and duly considered as part of the detailed security planning for the event,” the BCB’s statement said.

“The BCB will continue constructive engagement with the ICC and relevant event authorities in a cooperative and professional manner to arrive at an affable and practical solution that ensures the smooth and successful participation of the team in the ICC Men’s T20 World Cup 2026,” the statement added.

The sport’s governing body and the BCB reportedly held a virtual meeting on Tuesday in response to Bangladesh’s request for a change of venue for its fixtures.

India and Sri Lanka are co-hosting the 20-team tournament from February 7, but all of Bangladesh’s group matches were allocated to Indian venues.

Bangladesh’s refusal to travel to India stemmed from a recent controversy, when its star fast bowler Mustafizur Rahman was dropped by his Indian Premier League (IPL) franchise Kolkata Knight Riders at the directive of the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI).

It led to an outcry from cricket fans and administrators in Bangladesh, urging the BCB to take reciprocal action. In turn, the BCB asked the ICC to relocate its games from India to Sri Lanka over security concerns, saying its team will not travel to India.

Following two days of silence, the ICC – led by former BCCI chief Jay Shah – and BCB held a call to discuss the issue, with the tournament’s and Bangladesh’s opening match just more than a month away.

According to a report on ESPNCricinfo, the ICC told the BCB during the meeting that Bangladesh will need to travel to India or risk forfeiting points.

However, the BCB refuted the report and termed its claims as “completely false”.

“The BCB has taken note of certain reports published in a section of the media suggesting that the board has been issued an ultimatum. Such claims are completely false, unfounded and do not reflect the nature or content of the communication received from the ICC,” it said.

Earlier, Bangladesh’s interim government also banned the broadcast ‍of the IPL, saying the unceremonious dumping of a “star player defied logic” and had “hurt people”.

It is the latest flashpoint in a growing dispute with neighbouring India, which has now extended to cricket ties between the two nations.

The ongoing tensions flared in recent weeks after a 25-year-old Hindu man was lynched and burned publicly in Bangladesh following allegations of blasphemy.

A few days later, Hindutva activists tried to storm the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi as they rallied against the neighbouring nation for failing to protect its Hindu minorities.

Diplomatic relations between the once-close allies have been sharply tested since August last year, when former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled to New Delhi from Dhaka after an uprising against her rule.

Bangladesh blames India for a number of its troubles, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s support for Hasina when she was in power.

The move comes after star Bangladesh fast bowler Mustafizur Rahman was dropped by his IPL team on the BCCI’s directives.

Bangladesh’s interim government has banned broadcast ‍of this ‍year’s Indian Premier League (IPL), the latest flashpoint in a growing row with neighbouring India, which has now extended to cricket ties between the two nations.

The move follows the decision by the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) to have the Kolkata Knight Riders drop Bangladesh pacer Mustafizur Rahman, ​who had signed for the IPL franchise for ‍this season.

The unceremonious dumping of a “star player” like Mustafizur from the IPL “defied logic” and had “hurt people”, the country’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting said in a statement explaining its decision.

Bangladesh have also refused to play their matches of next month’s Twenty20 (T20) World Cup in India, demanding that those ‍be staged ⁠in Sri Lanka, co-host of the 20-team tournament.

The Bangladesh Cricket Board’s directors met in an emergency meeting on Sunday and confirmed their decision shortly afterwards.

“Following a thorough assessment of the prevailing situation and the growing concerns regarding the safety and security of the Bangladesh contingent in India and considering the advice from the Bangladesh Government, the board of directors resolved that the Bangladesh national team will not travel to India for the tournament under the current conditions,” it said.

“The board believes that such a step is necessary to safeguard the safety and wellbeing of Bangladeshi players, team officials, Board members and other stakeholders and to ensure that the team can participate in the tournament in a secure and appropriate environment,” the statement added, urging the ICC to take swift action.

The International Cricket Council (ICC) has not publicly responded to Bangladesh’s ‌demand to play World Cup matches in Sri Lanka.

Tensions have risen ‌in recent weeks between India ⁠and Bangladesh.

Following the protests, the Indian board asked ‍Knight Riders to drop Mustafizur.

The IPL, the ​world’s richest T20 league, is scheduled ‌from March 26 to May 31.

Amid growing political tension, a Bangladeshi official voices concerns over safety of players in India during the upcoming tournament.

Bangladesh will request the International Cricket Council (ICC) to shift its team’s T20 World Cup fixtures from India to Sri Lanka over concerns about its players’ safety, following the removal of a top Bangladeshi player from the Indian Premier League (IPL), a government official has said.

Amid growing political tension between the South Asian neighbours, the Bangladesh Cricket Board (BCB) has been asked by its government to write to the ICC, requesting a change of venue for its games and seeking clarity on fast bowler Mustafizur Rahman’s abrupt removal from the IPL, youth and sports adviser Asif Nazrul said in a statement on Saturday.

“As the adviser in charge of the Sports Ministry, I have asked the BCB to explain the entire matter to ICC. The board should inform that where a Bangladeshi cricketer cannot play in India despite being contracted, the entire Bangladeshi cricket team cannot feel safe going to play in the World Cup,” Asif wrote in a social media post.

“I have also instructed the board to request that Bangladesh’s World Cup matches should be held in Sri Lanka,” he added.

“We will not accept any insult to Bangladeshi cricket, cricketers and Bangladesh under any circumstances. The days of slavery are over.”

BCB President Aminul Islam Bulbul said the board will hold an emergency meeting later on Sunday.

“The dignity and security of our cricketers are our top priorities, and we will take a decision at the appropriate time, keeping these in mind,” he told reporters late on Saturday.

Defending champions India and 2014 winners Sri Lanka will cohost the ICC Men’s T20 World Cup 2026 from February 7 to March 8.

Bangladesh are scheduled to play all their group-stage matches in India, with three fixtures allocated to Eden Gardens in Kolkata and one to the Wankhede Stadium in Mumbai.

Should the ICC – headed by former BCCI chief Jay Shah – consider the BCB’s request, Bangladesh will become the second country to have its games moved out of India.

Sri Lanka will host all of Pakistan’s matches as the 2009 champions will not travel to India in an ICC-brokered agreement that allows the bitter rivals to avoid travelling across their mutual border.

Earlier on Saturday, the team Kolkata Knight Riders (KKR) confirmed that Mustafizur had been released from the franchise’s squad for IPL 2026 after the BCCI advised it to do so, and the move was confirmed by the Indian cricket board’s secretary, Devajit Saikia.

“Due to the recent developments which are going on all across, BCCI has instructed the franchise KKR to release one of their players, Mustafizur Rahman of Bangladesh, from their squad, and BCCI has also said that if they ask for any replacement, BCCI is going to allow that replacement,” Saikia told Indian news agency ANI.

Political tension spills over into sport

The ongoing tensions between India and Bangladesh have flared in recent weeks after a 25-year-old Hindu man was lynched and burned publicly in Bangladesh following allegations of blasphemy.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs last month condemned what it called “unremitting hostility against minorities”.

A few days later, Hindutva activists tried to storm the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi as they rallied against the neighbouring nation for failing to protect its Hindu minorities.

Diplomatic relations between the once-close allies have been sharply tested since August last year, when former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled to New Delhi from Dhaka after an uprising against her rule.

Bangladesh blames India for some of its troubles, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s support for Hasina when she was in power.

Political tensions have spilled over into sport in recent months, with the Bangladeshi women’s cricket team’s recent tour of India postponed indefinitely, and the Indian men’s team’s tour of Bangladesh meeting the same fate in August.

The BCCI’s move to have Mustafizur removed from the IPL has met with backlash in Bangladesh, where the popular franchise league may face a blackout.

Bangladeshi government official Nazrul said he had requested the national broadcasting body to “stop broadcasting of IPL tournament in Bangladesh”.

Court sentences journalists in absentia over alleged links to violent unrest after ex-PM Imran Khan’s May 2023 arrest.

A court in Pakistan has sentenced several journalists and social media commentators to life imprisonment after convicting them of inciting violence during riots in 2023 linked to the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan.

An anti-terrorism court judge, Tahir Abbas Sipra, announced the verdict on Friday in the capital, Islamabad, after completing trials held in absentia.

The convicted include former army officers-turned YouTubers Adil Raja and Syed Akbar Hussain; journalists Wajahat Saeed Khan, Sabir Shakir and Shaheen Sehbai, commentator Haider Raza Mehdi, and analyst Moeed Pirzada, according to the court’s decision.

None of the accused was present in court as they have been living abroad after leaving Pakistan in recent years to avoid arrest.

The convictions stem from cases registered after unrest in May 2023 saw some of Khan’s supporters attack military facilities and government property in response to his brief arrest in a corruption case.

Since then, the Pakistani government and military have launched a sweeping crackdown on Khan’s party and dissenting voices, using anti-terrorism laws and military trials to prosecute hundreds accused of incitement and attacks on state institutions.

The Committee to Protect Journalists said in 2023 that the investigations amounted to retaliation against critical reporting.

“Authorities must immediately drop these investigations and cease the relentless intimidation and censorship of the media,” CPJ Asia programme coordinator Beh Lih Yi said.

Journalist Sabir Shakir, who previously hosted a popular television programme on ARY TV before leaving Pakistan, told The Associated Press news agency on Friday that he was aware of his conviction.

He said that he wasn’t in the country when police accused him of encouraging mob violence.

“The ruling against me and others is nothing but a political victimisation,” Shakir told AP.

Under Friday’s court order, those convicted have the right to file appeals within seven days.

The court also directed police to arrest them and transfer them to prison should they return to Pakistan.

As of December 2025, new laws came into effect making Hainan a separate customs zone and consolidating a favorable regulatory environment in the southernmost province of China.

The move contrasts with the current global trend of protectionism, as many countries move to tighten trade rules and investment controls.

Hainan is now effectively the world’s largest free trade port by area. Encompassing over 35,000 square kilometers, it is roughly fifty times bigger than Singapore and even slightly bigger than Belgium.

China is attempting to offer a solution for the “growing uncertainties in the global economy” and trying to replicate the success of Singapore, with a free trade port the size of a European nation.

According to the state-run Xinhua news agency, the launch of “special customs operations” is not merely a policy tweak but a fundamental restructuring of how the island province interacts with international markets.

The unique framework, instituted by the Chinese Communist Party, could make Hainan the most business-friendly jurisdiction in the world.

This is not the first time the state-led economy, described as a socialist market economy, takes a page from the capitalist playbook to boost its global dominance.

Special economic zones (SEZs) have been successfully implemented in China since the late 1970s, as part of the country’s economic open-door policy. These SEZs allow Beijing to experiment with capitalist mechanisms, in limited areas, while maintaining broader state control over the economy.

In 2020, the CCP unveiled a comprehensive plan to shift Hainan from a mere special economic zone to a strategic hub designed to rival Hong Kong, Singapore and Dubai.

Creating a completely separate trade and investment system for the province was the objective until the end of 2025. Going forward, the party projects that Hainan will reach “institutional maturity” by 2035 and achieve a “strong global influence” by the middle of the century.

First line open, second line controlled

The province comprises Hainan Island and various smaller islands in the South China Sea, and now operates under a “two-line” customs system designed for greater openness while maintaining domestic security.

The first line marks the boundary between Hainan and the global economy, where most trade barriers have been removed. Under the new legislation, the majority of goods can enter the province freely, with a significantly expanded list of zero-tariff imports covering raw materials, equipment and consumer products.

The second line functions as a filter between Hainan and mainland China. There, standard customs rules apply, with goods subject to tariffs and controls intended to protect domestic markets.

However, the system creates a powerful incentive for manufacturers. Goods entering Hainan that achieve at least 30% added value within the province can enter mainland China duty-free, a policy designed to encourage additional production on the islands rather than using it solely as a transit hub.

For example, Australian beef can be imported into Hainan duty-free. Then, if the beef is sliced and packaged for China-destined hotpot products on the island province itself, it can enter mainland Chinese supermarkets with the same exemptions.

China’s strategic gateway

The scope of the CCP’s plans for Hainan extends well beyond customs arrangements.

The province applies a flat corporate tax rate of 15%, lower than those in Hong Kong (16.5%), Singapore (17%) and mainland China (25%).

Hainan is now also operating under a distinct regulatory framework in several other areas, which differs significantly from regulation on the mainland.

For instance, if a pharmaceutical product or medical device is approved by one of many regulatory agencies anywhere in the world, it can be used on the island province despite being banned on the mainland.

Similarly, companies registered in Hainan can apply for broader internet access, allowing them to bypass the so-called “Great Firewall of China”, a system of laws and technologies enforced by the CCP to control online activity nationwide.

Foreign companies can also open special bank accounts in Hainan, with capital flows exempt from mainland foreign-exchange controls, while foreign universities are permitted to establish campuses without a Chinese partner.

Visa-free entry to the province has also been expanded from 59 to 86 countries, now including the United States, Germany and Australia, as well as several countries in the Middle East and South America.

Visitors can stay for up to 30 days without a visa for business, medical treatment or tourism, as the authorities also promote the island province as a major travel destination.

Amid rising tensions in the global economy, Hainan serves as China’s “pressure valve” offering a low-tax, zero-tariff, high-access gateway to Asia-Pacific markets.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has invited South Korean President Lee Jae Myung to a state visit in Beijing, signalling China’s desire to reinforce relations with South Korea amid regional turbulence.

South Korea’s national security adviser, Wi Sung-lac, told reporters on Friday that Lee will meet Xi in Beijing on Monday before travelling to Shanghai to visit the historic site of South Korea’s provisional government during Japan’s 35-year colonial rule.

Wi said the leaders are expected to discuss “practical cooperation” in areas including supply-chain investment, tourism, and responses to transnational crime, according to Yonhap News Agency.

Lee is also expected to persuade China to take a “constructive” role in achieving “a breakthrough in resolving issues on the Korean Peninsula”, Wi added.

It will be the second meeting between Xi and Lee in just two months, in what analysts have described as an unusually short interval, reflecting Beijing’s interest in bolstering ties before the next meeting between the leaders of South Korea and Japan takes place.

Relations between China and Japan remain at a low point after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested in November that a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan could provoke a military response from Tokyo.

On Friday, Wi reaffirmed South Korea’s position on Taiwan, saying the country does “respect the one China policy and act in accordance with that position”. The position acknowledges Beijing’s view that Taiwan remains part of its sovereign territory, while allowing for separate ties with the self-governing island.

Kang Jun-young, a professor of political economics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, said “China wants to emphasise South Korea’s importance slightly more than before.

“China appears to have strategically decided that it would be better to have [Lee] visit China before South Korea holds a summit with Japan again,” Kang told the Reuters news agency.

For its part, the Lee administration has stressed its goal of “restoring” ties with China, which remains South Korea’s largest trading partner. At the same time, it has said Lee’s approach of “practical diplomacy” aims to maintain strong ties with Japan and the United States, South Korea’s most important ally.

Under Lee’s predecessor, Yoon Suk Yeol, Seoul leaned closer to Washington and Tokyo and increased criticism of China’s stance on Taiwan.

Lee, in contrast, has said he will not take sides in the dispute between China and Japan, a position he maintains as tensions around the Taiwan Strait rise following Beijing’s recent large-scale military drills near Taiwan.

Security alliances, regional strategy

The two leaders may also address contentious issues such as efforts to modernise the South Korea-US alliance, which some see as a counterbalance to China’s dominance in the Asia Pacific region, according to Shin Beom-chul, a former South Korean vice defence minister and senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute.

Currently, roughly 28,500 US troops are stationed in South Korea to deter threats from North Korea. US officials have signalled plans to make those forces more flexible in responding to other regional challenges, including Taiwan and China’s growing military reach.

“Korea is not simply responding to threats on the peninsula,” General Xavier Brunson, commander of US Forces Korea, said at a forum on December 29. “Korea sits at the crossroads of broader regional dynamics that shape the balance of power across Northeast Asia.”

As China remains North Korea’s principal ally and economic lifeline, experts expect Lee to seek Beijing’s assistance in encouraging dialogue with Pyongyang.

North Korea dismissed Lee’s outreach last year, calling him a “hypocrite” and “confrontational maniac”.

China and North Korea have, in turn, continued closer coordination, with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un appearing alongside Xi at a major military parade in September.

Trade and culture

Lee’s visit is also expected to focus on cooperation in critical minerals, supply chains, and green industries, his office said.

Nearly half of South Korea’s rare earth minerals, which are essential for semiconductor production, come from China. The trading partner accounts for a third of Seoul’s annual chip exports, its largest market.

Last month, officials from both countries agreed to work towards stable rare earth supplies. The visit may also explore partnerships in AI and advanced technologies.

Huawei Technologies plans to launch its Ascend 950 AI chips in South Korea next year, providing an alternative to US-based Nvidia for Korean firms, Huawei’s South Korea CEO, Balian Wang, said at a news conference last month.

Another potential topic is Beijing’s effective ban on K-pop content, which stretches back to 2017 following the deployment of the US’s THAAD missile defence system in South Korea.

SM Entertainment’s chief executive, who heads one of the country’s leading K-pop agencies, will join Lee’s business delegation, according to local media.

Kim Ju Ae’s first public visit to the Kumsusan Mausoleum added to speculation she may become the next in line.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Ju Ae, who is widely speculated to be his potential successor, made her first public visit to the Kumsusan Mausoleum in Pyongyang alongside her parents, state media images show.

Photographs released by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Friday captured the family paying respects to Ju Ae’s grandfather and great-grandfather, Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung, the founder of the North Korean state. Analysts say that propaganda surrounding the Kim family’s “Paektu bloodline” has allowed its members to dominate daily life in the isolated country and maintain power for decades.

Over the past three years, Ju Ae has appeared more frequently in state media, prompting speculation from analysts and South Korea’s intelligence services that she may be positioned as the country’s fourth-generation leader.

Photographs show Ju Ae accompanying her father, mother Ri Sol Ju, and senior officials on the visit on January 1, standing between her parents in the main hall of the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun.

Ju Ae was first publicly introduced in 2022 when she accompanied her father to the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Believed to have been born in the early 2010s, she also took part in this year’s New Year celebrations, and in September made her first public overseas visit, travelling to Beijing with her father.

The visit to the mausoleum coincided with key dates and anniversaries, reinforcing the dynastic narrative of the nuclear-armed state. North Korean media have referred to her as “the beloved child” and a “great person of guidance” – or “hyangdo” in Korean – a term traditionally reserved for top leaders and their designated successors.

Prior to 2022, Ju Ae’s existence had only been indirectly confirmed by former NBA player Dennis Rodman, who visited the North in 2013.

North Korea’s leaders have never formally announced their successors, instead signalling transitions gradually through public appearances and expanding official responsibilities.

Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un has pledged to further increase production of missiles and artillery shells, describing them as a “war deterrent” amid heightened military readiness from the United States and South Korea.

Legislation signed by President Serdar Berdimuhamedov establishes a licensing scheme overseen by country’s central bank.

Turkmenistan, one of the world’s most isolated nations, has officially legalised mining and exchanging cryptocurrency in a major shift for the country’s tightly controlled, gas-dependent economy.

President Serdar Berdimuhamedov signed the legislation on Thursday, regulating virtual assets under civil law and establishing a licensing scheme for cryptocurrency exchanges overseen by the country’s central bank.

However, digital currencies will still not be recognised as a means of payment, currency or security.

Turkmenistan, a former Soviet country in Central Asia, relies heavily on the export of its vast natural gas reserves to support its economy.

China is the country’s main importer of gas, and Turkmenistan is currently working on a pipeline to supply gas to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Turkmenistan has been taking steps to digitalise government functions as well as its economy.

In April, it adopted a law introducing electronic visas aimed at simplifying entry for foreigners.

After gaining independence in 1991, the tightly governed nation typically placed strict entry requirements on would-be visitors, with many visa applications turned down for unclear reasons.

A mostly desert country of seven million people with the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, Turkmenistan declared itself officially neutral in 1995 under its first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, who spurned both Western and Russian influence.

Until his death in 2006, Niyazov maintained tight control over politics, a policy of isolationism from the outside world, and an economy heavily based on natural gas exports.

Since succeeding his father as president in 2022, Berdymukhamedov has signalled some opening.

In December, he hinted at possible political reforms ahead of a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iran’s Masoud Pezeshkian.

“We are carrying out extensive work aimed at transforming our neutral country into a powerful, democratic, and rule-of-law state where citizens live happy lives,” Berdymukhamedov said in the article, without giving further details.

While Turkmenistan’s internet remains tightly regulated and controlled by the government, curbs on social media have been eased, and the government has pledged to open new air transport links and liberalise its visa system.

Still, the country is ranked by the Committee to Protect Journalists as one of the worst in the world for independent media.

Kyrgyzstan, another former Soviet Central Asian republic, has also positioned itself as a regional leader in the sector, launching a national stablecoin in partnership with cryptocurrency exchange Binance.

As we enter 2026, one truth is impossible to ignore: children around the world are facing their greatest levels of need in modern history – just as the humanitarian system meant to protect them and their futures is battling some of its biggest challenges in decades.

The events of 2025 marked a dramatic rupture in global humanitarian and development efforts. When the United States abruptly halted foreign aid in January, billions of dollars vanished overnight. Critical programmes were suspended, offices closed, and millions suddenly lost access to food, healthcare, education, and protection. Overnight, lifelines that communities had depended on for decades were thrown into jeopardy – and children, as always, paid the highest price.

For international NGOs, the shock was immediate and severe. At Save the Children, we were forced to take some of the toughest decisions in our 106-year history. We had to close country offices, cut thousands of staff positions, and wind down life-saving operations. We estimated that about 11.5 million people – including 6.7 million children – would feel the immediate impacts of these cuts, while many more would be impacted in the longer term.

The aid cuts came at a time when children globally were already facing major challenges, from conflict to displacement, to climate change, with decades of progress at risk of being reversed.

The facts are startling. In 2025, one in every five children was living in an active conflict zone where children are being killed, maimed, sexually assaulted and abducted in record numbers. About 50 million children globally are displaced from their homes. Nearly half the world’s children – about 1.12 billion – cannot afford a balanced diet, and some 272 million were out of school.

These numbers point to a global failure. Behind each statistic is a child whose childhood is being cut short, a childhood defined by fear, hunger and lost potential.

For children, the collapse of aid was not an abstract budgetary decision, but it was deeply personal.  Health clinics closed, classrooms closed, and protection services disappeared just as violence, climate shocks and displacement intensified. Years of hard-won progress in child survival, education and rights were suddenly at risk of being undone, leaving millions of children more vulnerable to hunger, exploitation and violence.

The crisis also revealed the fragility of the global aid system itself. When humanitarian support is concentrated among a handful of government donors, sudden political shifts reverberate directly through children’s lives. The events of 2025 showed how quickly international commitments can unravel – and how devastating that can be for the youngest and least protected.

Yet amid this turmoil, something extraordinary happened.

In many places, families, teachers, health workers and local organisations found ways to keep learning going, to provide care, and to create spaces where children could still play, heal and feel safe. These efforts underscored a simple truth: Responses are strongest when they are rooted close to children themselves.

There were also moments of progress. In a year marked by pushback against human rights, important legal reforms advanced children’s protection – from a ban on corporal punishment in Thailand, to the criminalisation of child marriage and the passing of a digital protection law in Bolivia. These gains reminded us that change is possible even in difficult times, when children’s rights are put at the centre of public debate and policy.

Out of the shocks of 2025 has come a moment of reckoning and an opportunity: to adapt, to innovate, towards approaches that are more sustainable, more locally led and more accountable to the people they are meant to serve. For children, this shift is critical. Decisions made closer to communities are more likely to reflect children’s real needs and aspirations.

This period of reinvention has also revived difficult questions that can no longer be postponed. How can life-saving assistance be insulated from political volatility? How can funding be diversified so that children are not abandoned when a single donor withdraws? And how can children and young people meaningfully participate in decisions that shape their futures?

Innovation alone will not save children, but it can help. When digital tools, data and community-led design are used responsibly, they can improve access, accountability and trust. Used poorly, they risk deepening inequalities. The challenge is not technological — it is political and ethical.

Children do not stop wanting to learn, play or dream because bombs fall or aid dries up. In camps, cities and ruined neighbourhoods, they organise, speak out and imagine futures that adults have failed to secure for them. They remind us why our work – and our ability to adapt – matters so profoundly.

In Gaza this year, I witnessed the horrors that children are living through daily, with the war now raging for more than two years and most of the Strip covered in rubble. I saw children facing malnutrition at our healthcare clinics and heard how some now wish to die to join their parents in heaven. No child should ever be living under such terror that death is preferable. They are children, and their voices need to be heard.

If 2025 exposed the failures of the old aid model, 2026 must become a turning point. A different choice is possible — one that builds systems resilient to political shocks, grounded in local leadership and accountable to the children they claim to serve. The challenge now is to reshape our systems so that, no matter how the world changes, we can put children first, always, everywhere.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Dhaka, Bangladesh – On Tuesday, the premises of Evercare Hospital in Bangladesh’s capital turned into a sombre focal point for a nation’s grief as news filtered out of the medical facility: Khaleda Zia, three-time prime minister and longtime leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was dead.

Khaleda had been receiving treatment at the hospital since the night of November 23.

Supporters, party leaders and common citizens stood silently in front of the hospital gates, wiping away tears and offering prayers. “The news made it impossible for us to stay at home,” said BNP activist Riyadul Islam. “Since there is no opportunity to see her, everyone is waiting outside. There are tears in everyone’s eyes.”

Her funeral at Dhaka’s Manik Mia Avenue on Wednesday drew tens of thousands of BNP supporters from across the country, alongside leaders of other political parties, interim government head Muhammad Yunus and foreign diplomats – underscoring the imprint of Khaleda’s legacy, and how it extended well beyond Bangladesh’s borders.

But beyond the grief, Khaleda Zia’s death marks a decisive political rupture for the BNP at a critical moment, say political analysts.

With national elections scheduled for February 12, the party is entering the campaign without the leader who remained its ultimate symbol of unity, even during years of illness and political inactivity.

Her passing pushes BNP into a fully post-Khaleda phase, concentrating authority and accountability on her son and acting chairperson, Tarique Rahman, as the party seeks to consolidate its base and compete in a reshaped political landscape following the July 2024 upheaval and the subsequent banning of the Awami League’s political activities.

Legacy as anchor, absence as test

For decades, Khaleda Zia’s relevance extended beyond formal leadership.

Even when absent from front-line politics, she functioned as the party’s moral centre and final authority, helping to contain factionalism and defer leadership questions.

Mahdi Amin, adviser to Tarique Rahman, told Al Jazeera that Bangladesh had lost “a true guardian”, describing Khaleda Zia as a unifying symbol of sovereignty, independence and democracy.

He said the BNP would carry forward her legacy through its policies and governance priorities if elected.

“The hallmark of her politics was a strong parliamentary democracy – rule of law, human rights and freedom of expression,” Amin said, adding that the BNP aims to restore institutions and rights that, he claimed, were eroded during the Awami League’s 15-year rule, between 2009 and 2024, under then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Khaleda’s longtime rival.

Amin insisted that Tarique has already emerged as a unifying figure, citing his role in coordinating the movement against Hasina and formulating a 31-point reform agenda aimed at restoring voting rights and institutional accountability.

Despite these assertions, however, analysts say Khaleda’s absence removes a critical layer of symbolic authority that long helped stabilise the BNP’s internal politics.

Writer and political analyst Mohiuddin Ahmed said Khaleda’s personal charisma played a key role in keeping the party energised and cohesive.

“That rhythm will be disrupted,” he said. “Tarique Rahman now has to prove his leadership through a process. His leadership remains untested.”

Ahmed noted that Khaleda herself was once an untested political figure, rising to national prominence during the mass pro-democracy movement of the 1980s that ultimately led to the fall of military ruler General Hussain Muhammad Ershad. Her husband, the then-President Ziaur Rahman, was assassinated in 1981 during a failed military coup.

Ahmed argued that the February election could play a similar defining role for Tarique Rahman: Success would validate his leadership, while failure would intensify scrutiny.

A tougher electoral terrain

BNP’s challenge is compounded by a transformed opposition landscape.

For more than three decades, Bangladesh’s electoral politics were shaped by a near-binary rivalry between the Awami League and the BNP, a pattern that emerged after the fall of military rule in 1990 and hardened through successive elections in the 1990s and 2000s.

With the Awami League now absent – its political activities banned by the Yunus administration – that two-party dominance has fractured, forcing BNP to compete in a more crowded field that includes a strong alliance led by the Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s biggest Islamist force. The Jamaat coalition includes the National Citizen Party, launched by many of the youth leaders who drove the July 2024 mass movement that forced Hasina out of power and into exile in India.

“This will not be easy for BNP,” Ahmed said. “Post-July [2024] politics has changed the equation. New polarisation is emerging, and the dominance of two parties no longer holds,” he added.

Analysts also point to key uncertainties that linger: whether the election will be held on time, whether it will be peaceful, and whether major parties can ensure public confidence in the process.

Dilara Choudhury, a political scientist who observed both Khaleda and her husband closely, said Khaleda Zia functioned as a “guardian figure” for not just her party, but also the country, and that her death represents the loss of a senior stabilising presence in Bangladesh politics.

Tarique, Khaleda’s son, was in exile in the United Kingdom from 2008 until December 25, 2025, when he returned after a series of cases against him that were initiated by a military-backed government in power between 2006 and 2009, or by the subsequent Hasina government, were closed.

She argued that Tarique’s return to the country has reduced fears of internal division within the party and that his recent speeches – reaffirming Bangladeshi nationalism, rejecting authoritarianism and honouring victims of the 2024 July uprising violence – have reassured party supporters about ideological continuity.

“BNP and Awami League have both been personality-centred parties,” she said. “After Khaleda Zia, it is natural that Tarique Rahman occupies that space within the BNP.”

From legacy to verdict

Yet BNP leaders acknowledge that legacy alone will not determine the party’s future.

Allegations of extortion involving some party activists continue to surface – an issue that adviser Mahdi Amin described as mostly exaggerated, though he said the party plans to address it through stricter internal controls.

At the grassroots level, some party members say Tarique’s leadership transition will not be without challenges.

“It would be unrealistic to say there will be no difficulties,” said Kamal Uddin, senior joint secretary of the Chakaria upazila unit of Jubo Dal, the BNP’s youth wing, in Cox’s Bazar district. “In the past, there were disagreements with senior leaders who worked closely with Khaleda Zia – and even with Ziaur Rahman. That could be a challenge in decision-making. But I believe he will be able to manage.”

Kamal Uddin travelled with three other BNP activists from Cox’s Bazar, a coastal city on the Bay of Bengal about 350km (217 miles) south of Dhaka, to attend Khaleda Zia’s funeral on Wednesday.

Senior BNP leaders, however, dismiss doubts over Tarique’s authority.

Standing committee member Amir Khasru Mahmud Chowdhury, who served as commerce minister in Khaleda Zia’s cabinet from 2001 to 2004, said Tarique’s leadership credentials were already established.

“His leadership has been proven,” Chowdhury told Al Jazeera earlier this month. “He is capable of leading the party effectively.”

As BNP prepares for the polls, analysts say the party’s ability to ensure discipline, project reform and contribute to a peaceful election will itself be a test of Tarique’s leadership.

A separate discussion has emerged on social media and among political rivals.

On November 29, ahead of his eventual return, Tarique wrote on his verified Facebook page that the decision to come home was not “entirely within his control” and not “under his sole control”. Critics interpreted this as raising questions about possible external influence – particularly India – on whether and when he would return.

BNP leaders rejected these claims, insisting his return was a political and legal matter tied to domestic realities rather than foreign negotiation, and that national interest would guide the party’s policy if it comes to power.

For many supporters, however, politics remains deeply personal.

Fifty-seven-year-old Dulal Mia, who travelled from the northeastern district of Kishoreganj to attend Tarique’s reception rally in Dhaka on December 25, still recalls the moment that made him a lifelong BNP supporter.

When he was a sixth-grader in 1979, he said, then-President Ziaur Rahman visited the paddy field where he was working and shook his hand. Ziaur Rahman is remembered for addressing drought by digging canals across the country and visiting remote areas barefoot, often without formal protocol.

“Tarique Rahman will have to carry the legacy of his parents,” Mia said. “If he doesn’t, people will turn away. The BNP’s politics is people’s politics – it began with Ziaur Rahman and was carried by Khaleda Zia for so long. I believe Tarique Rahman will do the same. Otherwise, it is the people who will reject him.”

New Year’s Eve celebrations are unfolding across the world as countries move into 2026 one time zone at a time.

The first major cities to mark the new year welcomed midnight with fireworks over their waterfronts, and large crowds gathered at public viewing points.

As the night continues, countries across the Americas will close out the global transition with events stretching from Rio de Janeiro’s beaches to Times Square in New York City and beyond.

This gallery shows how people are marking the start of 2026 around the world.

Bangladesh bade farewell to former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia in a state funeral that drew vast crowds mourning a towering political figure whose leadership shaped the nation for decades.

Zia, the first woman to serve as prime minister in the South Asian nation of 170 million people, died on Tuesday aged 80. Flags flew at half-mast across the country on Wednesday as thousands of security personnel lined Dhaka’s streets while her flag-draped coffin travelled through the capital.

Massive crowds gathered outside Bangladesh’s parliament building for the funeral prayers. People from Dhaka and beyond streamed towards Manik Mia Avenue, where the parliament building is located, since early morning to pay their last respects.

Retired government official Minhaz Uddin, 70, came despite never having voted for her. “I came here with my grandson, just to say goodbye to a veteran politician whose contributions will always be remembered,” he said, watching from behind a barbed wire barricade.

Zia entered politics following her husband’s death and rose to prominence opposing a military ruler who was ultimately ousted in a 1990 mass uprising. She first became prime minister in 1991 after a landslide victory when parliamentary democracy was introduced, and remained leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party until her death.

Known for her calm demeanour, Zia maintained a strong political rivalry with her archrival Sheikh Hasina, who led the Bangladesh Awami League party and ruled for 15 years before being ousted in a 2024 mass uprising.

Security was extensive, with authorities deploying approximately 10,000 personnel, including soldiers, to maintain order. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus’s interim government announced three days of mourning and declared Wednesday a public holiday to honour the three-time prime minister’s legacy.

BREAKINGBREAKING,

Bangladesh’s first female prime minister dies after a prolonged illness in Dhaka, her party says.

Bangladesh’s first female prime minister, Khaleda ⁠Zia, has died at a hospital in the country’s capital, Dhaka, ​after a ‍prolonged illness, according to her party and local media.

In a statement on Tuesday, the Bangladesh National Party said Khaleda died at 6am local time.

She was 80 years old.

“Our beloved national leader is no longer with us. She left us at 6am today” the BNP said in the statement posted on Facebook.

Khaleda had advanced ​cirrhosis ‌of the liver, arthritis, diabetes, chest ‌and heart ‌problems, her doctors said.

She died at the Evercare Hospital in Dhaka, where she was admitted to on November 23 with symptoms of a lung infection, according to local media.

More soon…

Myanmar’s election is unlikely to change the reality for more than 1M Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh who fled what the UN called ‘genocidal violence’ in Myanmar. Efforts to repatriate the Muslim minority have stalled since the junta seized power in 2021. Al Jazeera’s Tanvir Chowdhury reports from Cox’s Bazar.

Horsemen from across Afghanistan converged for the dramatic final match of the nation’s prestigious annual buzkashi tournament on Kabul’s outskirts, attracting crowds that included high-ranking Taliban officials witnessing this centuries-old sporting tradition.

Buzkashi, Afghanistan’s national equestrian competition, showcases elite riders who must carry a leather-wrapped bundle – historically a goat carcass but now a weighted facsimile – across a designated goal line to earn points.

Amid swirling dust clouds kicked up by galloping horses, a victor ultimately prevailed. The winning team took a celebratory circuit around the field, proudly displaying their flag in triumph.

Afghanistan’s cherished buzkashi tournament maintains its status as a traditional sport characterised by limited formal rules and fierce physical competition.

In its classic format, two teams compete to score using what was traditionally a goat carcass, though contemporary matches utilise a leather-and-rope substitute filled with straw to replicate the weight of an animal.

Competitors – with 12 riders on each side – demonstrate extraordinary horsemanship, stretching dangerously from their mounts to retrieve the bundle from the ground before racing towards the goal while pursued by opposing riders.

Though prohibited during the Taliban’s earlier governance in the 1990s, buzkashi experienced a revival following their removal and has continued since their return to power in 2021, with government officials now attending competitions.

In this week’s championship, northern Sar-e-Pul province overwhelmed northeastern Badakhshan with a commanding 7-0 victory, concluding the 11-day national tournament. Baghlan claimed third place, while Kunduz finished fourth among the 11 provincial teams competing.

The competition featured eight international participants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, according to Atal Mashwani, spokesman for Afghanistan’s General Directorate of Physical Education and Sports.

Corporate sponsorship from a petrol company funded the tournament, providing automobiles as prizes for the top four teams, alongside trophies, medals, and certificates.

Thousands of male spectators filled the stands at the central Kabul venue, with enthusiastic fans even climbing nearby trees and electricity pylons to gain better vantage points of the action.

Tensions are flaring along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border in Central Asia with the Tajik government reporting multiple armed incursions this month, straining its fragile relationship with Afghanistan’s Taliban leaders.

More than a dozen people have been killed in attacks by men whom Tajik authorities call “terrorists” and the resulting clashes with Tajik forces, officials in Dushanbe and Beijing said. Victims include Chinese nationals working in remote areas of the mountainous former Soviet republic.

In the latest fighting this week, at least five people were killed in Tajikistan‘s Shamsiddin Shokhin district, including “three terrorists”, officials said.

Tajikistan has long opposed the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, a country it shares a largely unsecured 1,340km (830-mile) border with.

Despite cautious diplomatic engagement between the two countries to adjust to new regional realities, analysts said, the frequency of the recent border clashes risks eroding the Taliban’s credibility and raises questions about its capacity to enforce order and security.

Here is all we know about the clashes along the Tajik-Afghan border and why they matter:

What’s happening on the Tajik-Afghan border?

The border runs along the Panj river through the remote, mountainous terrain of southern Tajikistan and northeastern Afghanistan.

On Thursday, Tajikistan’s State Committee for National Security said in a statement that “three members of a terrorist organisation” crossed into Tajik territory on Tuesday. The committee added that the men were located the following morning and exchanged fire with Tajik border guards. Five people, including the three intruders, were killed, it said.

Tajik officials did not name the armed men or specify which group they belonged to. The officials, however, said they seized three M-16 rifles, a Kalashnikov assault rifle, three foreign-made pistols with silencers, 10 hand grenades, a night-vision scope and explosives at the scene.

Dushanbe said this was the third attack originating from Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province in the past month that has resulted in the deaths of its personnel.

These attacks, Tajik officials said on Thursday, “prove that the Taliban government is demonstrating serious and repeated irresponsibility and non-commitment in fulfilling its international obligations and consistent promises to ensure security … and to combat members of terrorist organisations”.

The Tajik statement called on the Taliban to “apologise to the people of Tajikistan and take effective measures to ensure security along the shared border”.

Tajikistan has not suggested what the motive for the attacks may be, but the assaults have appeared to target Chinese companies and nationals working in the area.

How is China involved in all this?

Beijing is Tajikistan’s largest creditor and one of its most influential economic partners with a significant footprint in infrastructure, mining and other border-region projects.

China and Tajikistan also share a 477km (296-mile) border running through the high-altitude Pamir Mountains in eastern Tajikistan, adjacent to China’s Xinjiang region.

Two attacks were launched against Chinese companies and nationals in the last week of November. On November 26, a drone equipped with an explosive device attacked a compound belonging to Shohin SM, a private Chinese gold-mining company, in the remote Khatlon region on the Tajik-Afghan border, killing three Chinese citizens.

In a second attack on November 30, a group of men armed with guns opened fire on workers employed by the state-owned China Road and Bridge Corporation, killing at least two people in Tajikistan’s Darvoz district.

Tajik officials said those attacks had originated from villages in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province but did not disclose any affiliation or motive behind the attacks.

Chinese nationals have also come under attack in Pakistan’s Balochistan province and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

China’s embassy in Dushanbe advised Chinese companies and personnel to evacuate the border area. Chinese officials demanded “that Tajikistan take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of Chinese enterprises and citizens in Tajikistan”.

Who is carrying out these attacks?

While the attackers have not been identified, analysts and observers believe the attacks carry the hallmarks of the ISIL (ISIS) affiliate in Khorasan Province (ISKP), which, they said, aims to discredit Afghanistan’s Taliban leaders.

“The ISKP has attacked foreigners inside Afghanistan and carried out attacks on foreigners inside Afghanistan as a key pillar of their strategy,” said Ibraheem Bahiss, a Kabul-based analyst at the International Crisis Group think tank.

“The aim is to shatter the Taliban’s image as a security provider with whom the regional governments should engage,” Bahiss told Al Jazeera.

How has the Taliban reacted to these attacks?

Kabul expressed its “deep sorrow” over the killings of Chinese workers on November 28.

The Taliban blamed the violence on an unnamed armed group which, it said, is “striving to create chaos and instability in the region and to sow distrust among countries”, and it assured Tajikistan of its full cooperation.

After this week’s clashes, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s interior minister, said Kabul remains committed to the 2020 Doha Agreement, its deal with the United States for a phased foreign troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in exchange for Taliban commitments to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for attacking other countries.

Addressing a police cadet graduation ceremony at the National Police Academy in Kabul on Thursday, Haqqani said Afghanistan posed no threat to other countries and the door to dialogue remains open.

“We want to address problems, distrust or misunderstandings through dialogue. We have passed the test of confrontation. We may be weak in resources, but our faith and will are strong,” he said, adding that security had improved to the extent that Taliban officials now travel across the country without weapons.

The Taliban insists that no “terrorist groups” are operating from Afghanistan. However, in a recent report, the United Nations sanctions-monitoring committee cited the presence of multiple armed groups, including ISKP, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, al-Qaeda, the Turkistan Islamic Party, Jamaat Ansarullah and Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan.

Jamaat Ansarullah is a Tajik group linked to al-Qaeda-aligned networks and active primarily in northern Afghanistan near the Tajik border.

How are relations between Tajikistan and the Taliban?

For decades, the relationship between Tajikistan and the Taliban has been defined by deep ideological hostility and ethnic mistrust with Dushanbe one of the group’s fiercest critics in Central Asia.

In the 1990s, Tajikistan aligned with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, led by Afghan military commander and former Defence Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud.

After the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Tajikistan stood as the lone holdout among its neighbours in refusing to officially recognise the new government.

However, pragmatic diplomatic engagement quietly began about 2023, driven by economic necessity and shared security fears over the presence of ISKP. Stepping up the restoration of relations, a high-level Tajik delegation visited Kabul in November, the first such visit since the Taliban’s return to power.

But the two governments continue to trade accusations that the other is harbouring “terrorists”, the major thorn remaining in their bilateral relationship, and that drug smuggling is occurring across their border.

The Tajik-Afghan border has long been a major trafficking route for Afghan heroin and methamphetamine into Central Asia and onwards to Russia and Europe, exploiting the area’s rugged terrain and weak policing.

“The rising frequency [of the clashes] is new and interesting and raises a point: whether we might be seeing a new threat emerging,” Bahiss said.

Badakshan province, from which Tajik authorities said the attacks on Chinese nationals originate, presents a complex security situation for the Taliban as it has struggled to stem the threat from armed opposition groups, Bahiss added.

This security issue has been further complicated by the Taliban’s crackdown on poppy cultivation in the province, he said. The Taliban has faced resistance to this policy from farmers in the north. This is largely because the terrain of Badakshan means poppies are the only viable cash crop.

How is the Taliban faring with other neighbours?

Since the Taliban retook control of Afghanistan in 2021, some of its neighbours have maintained a pragmatic transactional relationship while others have not.

Relations with Pakistan, previously its patron, have particularly deteriorated. Islamabad accuses Kabul of harbouring fighters of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, also known as the Pakistan Taliban. Tensions over this issue boiled over in November when Pakistan launched air strikes in Kabul, Khost and other provinces, prompting retaliatory Taliban attacks on border posts.

Dozens of people were killed before a ceasefire was brokered by Qatar and Turkiye. However, both sides have engaged in fighting since, blaming each other for breaking the fragile truce.

The Taliban denies Islamabad’s allegations and has blamed Pakistan for its “own security failures”.

Meanwhile, the Taliban is now invested in developing a new relationship with Pakistan’s archrival, India, with delegations visiting Indian cities for trade and security discussions. New Delhi was earlier part of the anti-Taliban alliance. However, that approach has changed with the deteriorating ties between Pakistan and the Taliban.

The incident is the third of its kind in recent weeks in which Tajik border guards and civilians have been killed.

Five people have been killed in a firefight between border guards and intruders on Tajikistan‘s border with Afghanistan, the Tajik border protection agency says.

Heavily armed raiders from Afghanistan crossed into Tajikistan at the village of Kavo in the Shamsiddin Shokhin district on Tuesday and were located on Wednesday, according to a statement by the border agency published by Tajik news agency Khovar.

The border agency said the men attacked a guard post, killing two border guards, and three of the intruders died in the ensuing gun battle.

The agency said the incident was the third of its kind in recent weeks in which Tajik border guards and civilians were killed.

The border guards secured the weapons and ammunition used by the intruders, including grenades, three M-16 rifles, a Kalashnikov assault rifle, three foreign-made pistols with silencers, 10 hand grenades, a night-vision scope, explosives and other ammunition at the scene, the agency said.

“The terrorists refused to obey orders from Tajik border guards to surrender and offered armed resistance. They intended to carry out an armed attack on one of the border posts of the Border Troops of the State Committee for National Security of the Republic of Tajikistan,” the statement said.

Chinese citizens working for a mining company in the region have also been among those killed.

The latest incident demonstrated “the Taliban government’s failure to fulfil their international obligations and repeated commitments to ensuring security and stability along the state border with the Republic of Tajikistan and to combating members of terrorist organisations, reflecting serious and recurring irresponsibility”, the statement added.

It agency said that it expected an apology from the Afghan leadership.

Tajikistan will defend its territorial integrity against “terrorists and smugglers” by all means, it added.

Afghanistan has not yet commented on the incident.

Drugs from Afghanistan are smuggled into Central Asia across the largely unsecured 1,340km (830-mile) border. Russian forces are stationed in Tajikistan and have in the past participated in joint exercises with Tajik forces to help secure the border.

From Israel’s genocide in Gaza and the Russia-Ukraine war to devastating global weather events – including floods, storms and earthquakes – this year was defined by turmoil and humanitarian crises.

Prolonged violence in Sudan, marked by attacks by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), added to the mounting civilian toll and displacement across the country.

The year also saw heightened tensions between India and Pakistan, a deadly blaze in Hong Kong, United States and Israeli attacks on Iran, revelations from the Epstein files, and waves of “Gen Z” protest movements across multiple regions.

Together, these developments dominated international headlines, reflecting deepening political instability, social unrest and growing humanitarian needs worldwide.

View the gallery below for powerful photographs that documented and encapsulated these pivotal 12 months.

BNP plans historic rally as Rahman, seen as a key leader, marks his highly anticipated homecoming.

Bangladesh’s main opposition party says it is preparing a vast show of support as its leader, Tarique Rahman, prepares to return home after nearly 17 years in exile.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) aims to mobilise up to five million supporters in the capital to welcome Rahman, who is widely viewed as the party’s prime ministerial frontrunner for the country’s parliamentary elections scheduled for February.

His expected arrival from London on Thursday comes as the BNP regains momentum after the removal of longtime leader Sheikh Hasina in a student-led uprising last year.

Rahman, 60, is the son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and currently serves as the BNP’s acting chairman.

Since 1991, power in Bangladesh has largely alternated between Zia and Hasina, apart from brief caretaker administrations. With Hasina’s Awami League barred from contesting the February 12 vote, the BNP now appears positioned to dominate the race.

‘A defining political moment’

BNP leaders say they are coordinating security arrangements with authorities for what they call an “unprecedented” mobilisation, with supporters expected to line the route from the airport to the reception venue.

“This will be a defining political moment,” senior BNP leader Ruhul Kabir Rizvi said.

Rahman has lived in London since 2008 after facing multiple criminal convictions in Bangladesh, including money laundering and charges linked to an alleged plot to assassinate Hasina. Courts acquitted him following Hasina’s removal from office, removing the legal obstacles that had delayed his return.

BNP officials said Rahman will proceed directly from the airport to the rally venue before visiting his mother, who has been seriously ill for months.

The homecoming unfolds during a fragile transition overseen by an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. The election is seen as a critical test of Bangladesh’s ability to restore democratic legitimacy after years of political turmoil.

Concerns persist over sporadic violence and recent attacks on media outlets, raising questions about the state’s capacity to ensure a credible vote.

The National Citizen Party (NCP), which emerged from the youth protest movement that toppled Hasina, welcomed Rahman’s return.

“Rahman was forced into exile under severe pressure and threats, so his homecoming carries symbolic weight,” said NCP spokesperson Khan Muhammad Mursalin. “His arrival will undoubtedly energise party leaders and supporters … On the path to democracy, we will stand with him.”

Beyond armies and violence, France built its empire through language, schooling and cultural influence. This film explores how assimilation became a method of rule and a source of resistance.

At the heart of French colonial rule was the mission “civilisatrice”, a doctrine that claimed to lift up colonised societies through education, administration and the French language. In practice, this system sought to reshape colonised people’s identities, loyalties and cultures, replacing local traditions with French norms while maintaining strict political and economic control. Schools, legal systems and bureaucracies became tools of empire as powerful as armies.

Through case studies in Algeria, Indochina and West Africa, the documentary shows how colonial administrations operated on the ground. In Algeria, settler colonialism and mass repression led to war. In Indochina, education and bureaucracy coexisted with exploitation and nationalist resistance. In West Africa, language policy and indirect rule reshaped social hierarchies and governance.

This episode examines how resistance movements challenged the promise of civilisation, forcing France to confront the contradictions at the heart of its empire. Anticolonial struggles, intellectual movements and armed uprisings not only weakened imperial rule but reshaped French politics, culture and identity itself.

The documentary also places French colonial strategies in a broader modern context. In the contemporary world, the United States projects influence less through formal empire and more through soft power. Hollywood cinema, television and digital platforms circulate American values, lifestyles and narratives globally, shaping cultural imagination in ways that echo earlier imperial projects. At the same time, US dominance in higher education, academic publishing and institutional standards helps define what knowledge is valued, taught and legitimised worldwide.

It also draws direct connections between French colonialism and the modern world. Contemporary debates over language, immigration, secularism and inequality are deeply rooted in colonial systems designed to classify, discipline and extract. Many modern state institutions, education models and economic relationships reflect structures first imposed under empire.

By tracing how cultural control, education and administration functioned as instruments of power, the documentary reveals how the legacy of French colonialism continues to shape modern capitalism, global inequality and postcolonial relations today.