ASEAN

Min Aung Hlaing stressed that his government was focused on ending the civil war and restoring peace.

The head of Myanmar’s military-backed government has met Thailand’s prime minister in Bangkok as he seeks to boost his government’s legitimacy more than five years after seizing power.

President Min Aung Hlaing arrived in Thailand’s capital on Thursday, on his first official visit to the country since taking power in a coup in 2021.

Myanmar remains in the midst of a bloody civil war triggered by the coup, which has killed more than 100,000 people, according to monitoring group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).

During a meeting with Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, Min Aung Hlaing stressed that Myanmar’s military-backed government was focused on ending the civil war and restoring peace to the resource-rich country.

“Myanmar has now reestablished itself on the path to democracy and is moving toward a better future,” Min Aung Hlaing said. “As the new government, we have now begun working on national stability, peace, and national reconciliation.”

Min Aung Hlaing is pushing for Myanmar to be readmitted to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), from which his government was barred after failing to implement a peace plan agreed with member states in 2021.

Thailand is one of Myanmar’s top foreign investors and has called for a “calibrated re-engagement approach” with its neighbour, with which it shares a 2,400km (1500-mile) border.

Following the meeting, the two leaders delivered speeches at the Thailand-Myanmar Business Forum.

Anutin said Thailand and Myanmar are ready to “step into the new chapter of economic cooperation that is built upon mutual trust and benefit for the people of the two countries”.

Min Aung Hlaing told attendees they could “invest with confidence” in Myanmar’s energy, agriculture, manufacturing, healthcare, technology and other sectors.

The visit has drawn criticism from activist groups such as Justice For Myanmar, which stated that the trip lends “false legitimacy” to Min Aung Hlaing and the ruling generals.

About a dozen demonstrators gathered outside the United Nations regional headquarters in Bangkok to oppose the visit. Some protesters could be seen holding placards denouncing him as a “criminal” who was not welcome in Thailand.

Min Aung Hlaing was sworn in as president of Myanmar in April following an election that UN experts dismissed as a “sham”.

Western governments have shunned and sanctioned Min Aung Hlaing and his associates for overthrowing Aung San Suu Kyi’s government. Subsequent serious rights violations followed a deadly military crackdown on protests, which subsequently triggered a nationwide armed resistance movement and a bloody civil war.

Aung San Suu Kyi, who was overthrown in 2021 and remains under house arrest, was allowed to meet a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Monday.

Suu Kyi’s son Kim Aris welcomed the development but cautioned that he has not yet received independent confirmation of his mother’s condition or wellbeing.

Critics say the visit was a government stunt as it tries to rehabilitate its image.

I recently travelled to Sorowako, South Sulawesi, for a corporate social responsibility programme supported by Vale Indonesia. I helped local journalists use artificial intelligence ethically and responsibly in investigative reporting: reading documents, identifying inconsistencies and preparing interviews while keeping verification and editorial judgement in human hands.

Yet Sorowako made it difficult to see AI merely as a newsroom tool. The town sits within the industrial landscape powering Indonesia’s nickel ambitions. Materials processed across Sulawesi are entering global battery supply chains, while AI is moving beyond screens into machines, factories, ports and mines. Here, both transformations occupy the same geography.

Indonesia produced roughly three-fifths of the world’s mined nickel in 2024. The boom has attracted smelters, battery-material plants and billions in foreign investment. Yet how much Indonesian technological capability is emerging around it—and how much is taking root in the regions carrying the industrial and ecological burden? US Geological Survey

Responsible AI skills expand local journalists’ agency. The same principle should reach the industrial value chain. Mining regions should participate as producers of knowledge, technology and services, beyond extraction and social compensation.

The Physical-AI Window

Autonomous equipment, machine vision and robots able to act in the real world are bringing AI into factories, warehouses and difficult industrial environments.

The International Federation of Robotics recorded 542,000 industrial robot installations in 2024. Asia absorbed 74 percent; China installed 295,000 units and now operates more than two million. Goldman Sachs estimates the more speculative humanoid segment could reach US$38 billion by 2035. The projection is uncertain, but the physical-AI market is already widening. International Federation of Robotics, Goldman Sachs

China treats this frontier as industrial policy. Indonesia’s credible entry point is more practical. Mines need robotic inspection and safer hauling; their environmental monitoring also needs improvement. These are difficult operating problems—and domestic companies already need them solved. State Council Information Office of China

Nickel is a launching pad, not a guarantee of robotics demand. Many robots use none. Indonesia’s advantage lies in combining its mineral and battery base with industrial sites where new systems can be tested.

Its downstreaming strategy, however, remains highly linear: ore becomes processed nickel, then battery material, batteries and eventually electric vehicles. Horizontal downstreaming would build capabilities that spread sideways from this chain. Industrial AI developed for nickel could later serve copper or geothermal operations. Low-carbon processing and environmental technology could travel even further.

The objective is to convert temporary geological power into capability that outlives the commodity. Progress can be read through a downstreaming capability ladder: enforcement, processing, supplier formation and technological ownership. Indonesia has climbed the first two stages more decisively than many peers. The last two remain unfinished.

Different Positions on the Ladder

Canada illustrates the mature destination. In July 2026, its government backed mining projects using AI, robotics and subsurface imaging, alongside work on ecological restoration. Its mines function as testing grounds for domestic technology and exportable expertise. Government of Canada

Chile offers a more achievable Global South pathway. CORFO and the National Piloting Center help suppliers test technology under real conditions. Expande translates operational problems into industry challenges; its network has involved more than 2,500 suppliers and generated over 180 contracts. Chile has not completed the journey into higher-value manufacturing, which makes its lessons more useful for Indonesia. Expande

The Philippines shows the cost of stopping earlier. The world’s second-largest nickel producer exported 44.97 million wet metric tonnes of ore in 2024 while operating only two processing plants. Its Senate approved a phased ban on unprocessed ore exports in February 2025, but the provision was removed four months later amid concerns over mine closures, financing and insufficient domestic capacity. Argus, Reuters

Thailand shows another route onto the ladder. Without Indonesia’s nickel leverage, it used subsidies and tax incentives tied to local-production obligations. Those policies have attracted more than US$4 billion in EV investment, while Chinese brands now account for over 70 percent of EV sales. Reuters BYD’s Rayong plant—its first in Southeast Asia, opened in July 2024—anchors the emerging production cluster. Reuters Thai suppliers are entering the chain, but the transfer of deeper engineering and intellectual property is less visible. Thailand has shown that scale and supplier participation can be built quickly; technological ownership remains the harder rung.

Indonesia enforced its ore-export ban and built processing scale, although much technology and capital came from abroad. Its next test is whether enforcement produces Indonesian suppliers—and whether those suppliers eventually own technology.

MIND ID and Vale as Ecosystem Builders

MIND ID, Indonesia’s state-owned mining holding and Vale Indonesia’s largest shareholder, could orchestrate the next stage by pooling operational problems across its portfolio and financing the pilots that address them. It could then route proven solutions into procurement, allowing technology tested in nickel to travel into copper or tin. Sorowako is the natural lighthouse site. Vale Indonesia could open bounded challenges in worker safety or land rehabilitation, provide controlled access for testing and give successful suppliers a path into procurement. Vale Indonesia

The investment network is already multi-aligned. The Pomalaa project brings together Vale Indonesia, China’s Huayou and Ford from the United States. Separately, the nearly US$6 billion CATL–Antam–Indonesia Battery Corporation project links North Maluku with battery manufacturing in West Java. Indonesia is hosting production relationships that cross geopolitical blocs. Vale Indonesia, CATL

These relationships can extend from batteries towards battery-powered industrial intelligence. Indonesia’s return should be measured by whether local engineers gain ownership and the ability to sell abroad.

Connecting Sorowako to Rebana—and the World

This transition needs a spatial architecture connecting Indonesia’s nickel-producing east with Java’s manufacturing and logistics base. Sorowako is not starting from zero. Politeknik Sorowako grew from a technical academy into a vocational institution oriented towards local industrial needs. It offers a base for building capability close to the mines. Vale Indonesia

The polytechnic could anchor field engineering and testing. ITB’s Cirebon campus, within West Java’s Rebana corridor, could add advanced research and systems integration. Joint laboratories and supplier incubation would allow knowledge to move in both directions. Institut Teknologi Bandung

Patimban International Port gives Rebana an external gateway. Its container terminal currently has annual capacity of 250,000 twenty-foot equivalent units and is being expanded to 1.65 million. The port’s long-term design targets 7.5 million TEU per year; this is planned capacity, not present throughput. A regular international service launched in July 2026 now connects West Java with Singapore, Thailand and major Chinese ports. ANTARA

The emerging chain is tangible. Field capability developed in Sorowako could be refined in Cirebon, manufactured across Rebana and exported through Patimban.

This is the spatial expression of a multiplex industrial-digital ecosystem. Yet it carries an internal risk. If ecological burdens remain in Sulawesi while intellectual property and high-value firms accumulate in Java, Indonesia will reproduce a double asymmetry within its own borders. Rebana should become a scaling node without monopolising knowledge. Contracts and technical capacity must circulate back towards producing regions.

Vale’s support for Politeknik Sorowako could therefore evolve from conventional CSR into a long-term capability strategy. Skilled work and local suppliers can give communities a stake in the industry’s future, reducing resistance rooted in exclusion. None of this substitutes for environmental performance, land rights or meaningful participation.

Geopolitical Localisation

ASEAN adds a wider market. Its Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026–2030 calls for sustainable investment across the minerals value chain and stronger capacity in mining technology, research and innovation. ASEAN Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026–2030

Equipment proven under Sulawesi’s heat, dust and uneven connectivity could find buyers across the Global South. Indonesia can occupy the critical-mineral and industrial-intelligence layer of ASEAN’s AI economy.

Manufacturing in Indonesia could also help Chinese-linked firms diversify production. Factory location alone does not dissolve geopolitical concerns. US connected-vehicle rules show that governments may scrutinise who owns the software and retains remote access. Europe’s foreign-subsidy regime adds another layer of exposure. US Bureau of Industry and Security, European Commission

The defensible strategy is geopolitical localisation. Foreign production in Indonesia must create substantial domestic value and withstand scrutiny over ownership, supply chains and cybersecurity. Indonesian participation in engineering and intellectual property is central. This would make the country a bridge production node with capabilities of its own, rather than a passport factory for technology routed through its territory.

When I left Sorowako, what stayed with me was the proximity between a community learning to adapt to AI and industrial operations capable of becoming laboratories for it. The same region supplying global industries could help create safer mines and more credible environmental monitoring.

Nickel’s geopolitical leverage will not last. The durable test is what Indonesia can build before that advantage fades.

If firms and technical institutions take root in Sulawesi, then scale across Indonesia, Sorowako will have done more than supply the AI economy. It will have helped Indonesia learn how to compete within it.

The Philippines is hosting a meeting of foreign ministers from Southeast Asia.

They are expected to address regional security issues, including the civil war in Myanmar and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

But renewed fighting between the US and Iran has overshadowed the gathering.

Ministers have called for hostilities to end.

The conflict has hit Asia hard – disrupting its energy and food supplies, international commerce and raising fears of a global economic slowdown.

Will it also affect ASEAN’s efforts to tackle issues within the region?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Richard Heydarian – Political Scientist and Author of Indo-Pacific: Trump, China and the New Struggle for Global Mastery

Phar Kim Ben – Professor in ASEAN studies at International Islamic Univeristy of Malaysia and former Director of Political & Security Community at ASEAN Secretariat

Don McLain Gill – Lecturer at De La Salle University and Indo-Pacific Research fellow with Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio has met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi at a gathering of southeast Asian foreign ministers, to discuss how to manage bilateral tensions ahead of a planned summit between US President Donald Trump and China’s Xi Jinping.

The meeting on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathering of foreign ministers in Manila on Wednesday came amid tensions over China’s conduct in the disputed South China Sea and the US war against Iran. ASEAN countries have expressed concerns about both issues at the meeting.

Relations between Washington and Beijing have also been complicated by Trump’s accusations that China meddled in US elections, allegations Beijing has dismissed as “pure fabrication”.

Rubio said the US and China have “great differences” that are likely to persist “for the foreseeable future”, but that he and Wang discussed the need to manage those disagreements to ensure Xi has a “very positive visit” to the US. Xi is expected to visit in September.

Wang said the US must “respect China’s core interests … effectively manage differences and disagreements, and address China’s legitimate concerns”, according to an official Chinese summary of their meeting. It described the talks as “pragmatic, positive and constructive”.

The two sides agreed to “make sound preparations for the next stage of high-level exchanges,” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement.

‘Commerce as geopolitical weapon’

Wednesday’s meeting came two days after a confrontation between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea left a Philippine sailor injured, leading both countries to summon each other’s ambassador.

The incident this week took place on Monday at the disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippines ⁠said Chinese coastguard struck one of ⁠the Philippine navy staff on the head with a wooden baton, while China said the Philippine personnel were the first to attack and accused Philippine vessels ⁠of ramming a Chinese patrol boat.

Rubio said the altercation benefited nobody, adding that Washington had ⁠reiterated in all its meetings that it was bound by a defence treaty to stand up for Manila.

“We intend to live up to our treaty obligations, and I think we’ve done so, and will continue to do so,” he said.

Rubio’s remarks echo an opinion piece he published in Philippine media on Tuesday about Beijing’s conduct in the South China Sea. Rubio warned of “dire new threats” if those waters were to “fall under the control of a power willing to use commerce as a geopolitical weapon”.

Beijing claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea via a line on its maps that cuts into the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, and is at the centre of long-running disputes over a multitude of islands.

Disputes between the Philippines and China have increased in recent years as Manila takes a bolder stance while pursuing closer defence ties with the US, Australia and Japan.

The US has increased military financing for the Philippines to $100mn for the 2026 fiscal year and is providing an additional $9mn to expand a coastguard pier on the island of Palawan “to enhance Philippine maritime ⁠law enforcement presence and sustain operations in the South China Sea”, the State Department said in a fact sheet.

Discussing the US relationship with ASEAN member states, Rubio said the security and prosperity of the US and southeast Asia were closely interconnected.

“I believe very much that the future and the story of the 21st century will be written in this region and by how events unfold here,” he said.

Iran ‘not serious about talks’, says Rubio

Rubio also addressed the situation with Iran in a meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers, claiming that Tehran was responsible for the latest escalation.

“The problem we’re having right now is that they’re not serious about talks,” Rubio said. “If they’re serious, we’re serious. If they’re not, then we will do what’s necessary to protect our interests, and also the interests of our allies.”

The US has carried out strikes on Iran for eleven consecutive nights, including targeting roads, bridges and power plants in recent attacks, all but shattering an interim peace deal agreed by the two sides last month.

Rubio stressed that Iran could not be allowed to control the Strait of ‌Hormuz, as it could set a dangerous precedent for other parts of the world.

The top US diplomat also confirmed he would meet on Thursday with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov to discuss the Ukraine war, saying that Washington remained open to playing a constructive role in ending the conflict.

Southeast Asian countries are highly affected by oil supply shortages caused by the Iran war and the Strait of Hormuz closure.

Southeast Asian nations are “deeply concerned” about the impact of blockades of key maritime trade routes in the Middle East, their top diplomats have said.

Foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their key ⁠partners met in the Philippines on Tuesday against a backdrop of instability due to the global impact on trade and energy supplies caused by the US-Israel war on Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea.

Southeast Asian countries have a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $3.8 trillion but are highly exposed to supply limitations caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, as they are heavily dependent on Gulf countries for their oil imports.

At the ongoing ASEAN summit in Manila, heads of state and top diplomats from the region are seeking to agree on an oil-sharing mechanism to mitigate the impact of the war on Iran.

Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis announced a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia on Monday, opening a potential new front in the war and risking aggravating the threat to global energy supplies and trade beyond the Gulf.

“We are deeply concerned that these ‌developments severely undermine the ongoing efforts of key mediators and diminish the prospects for a peaceful resolution through dialogue and diplomacy,” ASEAN ministers said in a statement.

Top diplomats from the United States, Russia and China are also attending the ASEAN summit, another reminder of how the war on Iran is reshaping international diplomacy and the global energy supply.

Reporting from Manila, Al Jazeera’s Barnaby Lo said the war has driven up oil and gas prices in Southeast Asia while also stalling manufacturing and exports, causing countries from the region to find new trade partners.

“Southeast Asia is thousands of kilometres away from the Middle East, but it has been one of the most impacted regions by the conflict because of how dependent many of its member nations are on oil from the Middle East,” Lo said.

“Take, for example, the Philippines: it’s the first country in the world to declare a state of national energy emergency, and it still is in this state, so it is fighting problems on two fronts. One on supply, the other on skyrocketing fuel prices,” Lo said. “On supply, it’s gotten oil from non-traditional partners, such as Russia and China, but on skyrocketing prices it has very little it can do because the prices here are driven by market forces.”

Other key issues to be discussed at the ASEAN summit include the civil war in Myanmar, as the bloc’s peace initiatives falter, five years after a military coup plunged the country into a conflict that has killed an estimated 100,000 people.

“Ahead of the summit, ASEAN foreign ministers held an in-person meeting – the first since 2021 – with the foreign minister of the military-backed government in Myanmar in Bangkok,” Lo reported. “This was criticised for legitimising the military junta in Myanmar.”

Top diplomats are also likely to discuss ⁠tensions in the South China Sea, with ASEAN countries and China still trying to conclude a code of conduct to ⁠prevent disputes after nearly 10 years. In advance of the summit, China and the Philippines were engaged in a feud after a confrontation between their vessels in disputed waters left a Filipino sailor injured.

The US Department of State condemned what it described as China’s “dangerous and aggressive” actions, and its “troubling pattern of provocation against lawful Philippine maritime operations”.

Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro said the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) must work together to shield external pressures, as the group holds a summit in Manila.

Authors: Dr Soumyodeep Deb & Aung Kyaw*

Myanmar’s president Min Aung Hlaing is currently on a 5-day state visit to India on the invitation of Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. This is his first foreign visit after the recent election where he was elected as the new president of Myanmar. However, the elections that brought him to power were not democratic in nature. Therefore, “Min Aung Hlaing is not Myanmar’s legitimate president,” as noted by Mercy Chriesty Barends, a member of the Indonesian Parliament and chairperson of the ASEAN Parliamentarian on Human Rights. He oversaw a campaign of widespread crimes against his own people after masterminding a bloody coup that toppled a democratically elected government. As a result, APHR has asked India to condemn Min Aung’s government as undemocratic and illegal. Thus, the question of why India, which claims to be the largest democracy in the world, is dealing with an undemocratic administration that is accused of violating its own citizens’ human rights emerges.

The idea of democracy and human right violation had been India’s central position during the 1988 military coup in Myanmar. The Indian government had cut ties with the then military junta. India’s idealistic position had sidetracked India-Myanmar relations and led China to occupy the strategic sphere in India’s immediate neighborhood. Chinese investment and trade with Myanmar grew exponentially with the junta purchasing military hardware worth $1 billion from Beijing in 1989 one of the largest weapons deals in Myanmar’s history. This had led China to exert its influence on Myanmar. For Beijing the geo-strategic location of Myanmar having access to the Indian Ocean was of strategic interest. Enhancement of Chinese influence in Myanmar had a security implication for India as China used Myanmar to train major northeastern Indian insurgent groups like NSCN, ULFA etc. Thus, India’s rupturing of relationship with Myanmar after 1989 on idealistic grounds led China to exploit major gain at India’s immediate neighborhood.

This had led India to recalibrate its strategy towards Myanmar post the 2021 coup when India took a more pragmatic stand. The Indian ministry of external affairs had categorically pointed that any development in Myanmar has implications for India so India’s policy must serve its strategic interest. Therefore, we have seen India engaging both the military junta and the ethnic armed groups trying to balance its ties with both the parties. Since the coup India has been providing steady military assistant to the junta in form of military hardware and spares. It has also engaged the various ethnic armed groups by sending officials across the border and by inviting some of the groups to New Delhi for a conference. This makes it very evident that rather than maintaining the moral superiority of democracy, India is striving to further its strategic interests. The support to the rebel groups like the Arakan Army (AA) which controls a major part of strategic Rakhine state. After seizing control of majority of the state the Arakan Army pushed the initiative to have dialogue with the military junta. The AA had always held the ambition of having greater strategic autonomy in the Rakhine state. Thus, India’s engagement with the AA by sending government officials over to Myanmar signals that it wants to have strategic relation with the AA as that would enhance its influence and uphold India’s economic and trade ambitions. 

For India, the geographical location of Myanmar holds a great strategic significance. It shares a 1,693 kms of border and is seen as India’s gateway to the ASEAN. This had led India to invest heavily on major infrastructure projects in Myanmar. The Kaladan Multimodal Transit Corridor and Sittwe Port are two of India’s largest projects in Rakhine and Chin state of Myanmar. This project is seen to give India’s landlocked northeastern states access to Myanmar’s Sittwe port. This project is also seen as a counter to China’s Kyaukphyu Port at the Rakhine state. This has made the relation with Arakan Army of geo-strategic importance. The other major project that India is working on is to physically connect itself ASEAN via the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway. This project would give India land access to the two ASEAN states which can further be expanded to other nations like Vietnam. Although the projects are currently stalled due to the civil war, India is working with both the ethnic armed groups and the government to safeguard and fast-track the projects.

Thus, the recent visit of Min Aung Hlaing to India shows that India has chosen pragmatism over idealism. New Delhi has kept itself away from the nature of democracy in Myanmar and is trying to engage based on strategic interest. During the press briefing the Indian foreign sectary had pointed that India’s engagement with Myanmar is not based on Myanmar’s internal political arrangement. India does not want to disengage based on internal political dynamics as history has shown that other powers which has no interest in democracy would eventually take the advantage. This statement although has not mentioned China but was directed towards it. Therefore, the visit led to the signing of various agreements and MOUs between both the states. Myanmar has also reiterated that it won’t allow its territory to be used against anti-India activities. The recent advancement by the Myanmar Army is further leading it to consolidate its power and capture grounds. With the new conscript law, it can funnel additional troops to keep its advancement. Further being supported by Russia, China and India the firepower of the junta is superior to the rebel forces. This has also led India to recalibrate its Myanmar policy by engaging the current powerful junta and strategic rebel forces like the AA in Rakhine state.

Therefore, it can be argued that the growing India-China competition has made India move its Myanmar strategy towards pragmatism from idealism. Unlike in 1988 when India lost its strategic foothold to China in Myanmar due to its idealistic stand, the situation has now altered as the competition grows. But as a democracy, India must tread carefully on this fine line and bring up important issues of human rights and democracy in Myanmar.

Bio: Aung Kyaw is a recent graduate from Lingnan University majoring in Global Development and Sustainability and minor in Sociology. His research interests are politics of southeast asia, peace and conflict studies, social development, social issues in southeast asia. kyawkyawaung@ln.hk