analysis

Champions League analyst Stephen Warnock and Guillem Balague believe Liverpool’s defensive weaknesses combined with the experimentation of playing Bradley Barcola up front, highlight Andoni Iraola’s team are still trying to find their identity following a 3-2 defeat to Fenerbahce in the Champions League.

READ MORE: Another ‘miracle’ in Istanbul – but this one hurt Liverpool

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Match of the Day pundits Danny Murphy and Stephan Warnock analyse Lisandro Martinez’s performance in Manchester United’s 2-0 defeat to Chelsea, where the Argentinian defender was sent off.

MATCH REPORT: Chelsea 2-0 Manchester United

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Match of the Day pundits Danny Murphy and Stephan Warnock analyse Brighton’s impressive 1-0 victory over Manchester City, with Warnock praising the balance of the Seagulls squad.

MATCH REPORT: Manchester City 0-1 Brighton

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Developments in the Gulf since the beginning of this year have raised fundamental questions about the security of the region in general and Qatar in particular. How can Qatar and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states become effective, independent military powers that do not rely on external security guarantees to ensure their safety?

The question for Qatar is how it can build, over the next five years, a national defence capability that would enable it to protect the state and its vital interests even in the absence of Gulf or regional support, or if the United States provides only limited assistance. The aim is to explore whether Qatar can achieve what might be described as defence autonomy, rather than isolation. In other words, Qatar should remain open to alliances and partnerships without making its security dependent on the decisions of another state.

Qatar is a small country in terms of geography and population, but it enjoys numerous advantages. It has highly valuable critical infrastructure, a sensitive geographical location and an economy that depends heavily on the uninterrupted flow of energy exports, trade and shipping to almost every part of the world. At the same time, it possesses substantial financial resources, extensive international relationships, a major military base hosting US forces, advanced air defence capabilities and a network of political relationships that give it influence beyond its physical size.

These advantages, however, do not amount to “strategic autonomy”. In a major crisis such as the one the region has been experiencing for several months, Qatar’s protection remains heavily dependent on the US. Nor does reliance on the collective capabilities of the GCC provide sufficient assurance that its member states would be able, or willing, to take risks in defence of another member.

Against this backdrop, Qatar’s policy objective over the next five years should be to design and build an independent national strategy based on the capacity to prevent threats, withstand attacks and maintain continuity. The goal should be to achieve defence autonomy, rather than to build an army capable of confronting a major regional power on its own.

Such a strategy would rest on six pillars:

• Air and missile defence
• Early warning capabilities and information sovereignty
• Protection of critical infrastructure
• Air and naval power
• Cybersecurity and electronic warfare
• Restructuring security and military policy around the principle of multiple security guarantees rather than dependence on a single guarantor

Defence autonomy

Qatar does not need to exhaust its resources building the capabilities required to fight an all-out war alone against a major regional power, regardless of which power that might be. Such an ambition would be unrealistic for a country with limited territory and population.

A more realistic objective is to achieve a degree of defence autonomy appropriate for a small state such as Qatar. This means being able to perform a number of essential tasks without waiting for assistance from others.

These include, but are not limited to:

• Detecting threats and identifying their nature before they reach Qatari territory
• Delaying or absorbing an initial strike
• Protecting the country’s leadership and strategic centres
• Maintaining energy and water supplies, electricity, communications, ports and airports
• Keeping political and economic activities functioning during a crisis
• Imposing sufficiently high costs on an aggressor to force it to reconsider its calculations
• Withstanding a prolonged crisis without making the state’s continued functioning conditional on the arrival of external forces

To carry out these tasks effectively, the strategy should focus on the following priorities:

First: Building an integrated Qatari air defence shield

This is the most important gap that needs to be addressed. Possessing advanced fighter aircraft and air defence systems is not enough to make Qatar militarily autonomous. What is needed is an integrated national air and missile defence system.

The objective by 2031 should not be to possess the best defence system, but one that continues to function even in the absence of US forces or any other external security guarantor.

Such a system should include:

• A multilayered Qatari radar network
• Integration of civilian and military radar systems
• A unified national command and control centre
• Integration of short, medium and long-range air defences
• Expanded counter-drone capabilities
• Stronger electronic warfare capabilities and equipment
• Low-cost interception systems for small targets
• Enhanced mobile protection for radar installations and command centres
• Large national stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts

Second: An air force designed for independence

Qatar currently possesses an advanced air fleet. But the independence of an air force cannot be measured by the number of aircraft it operates. The crucial question is whether the Qatari air force can sustain operations for several consecutive weeks if external supply lines are disrupted.

For the answer to be yes, Qatar must develop the capacity to continue air operations even without direct US or other foreign support, albeit at a reduced level.

This requires policymakers and those responsible for developing the national defence strategy to focus on the following priorities over the next five years:

• Increasing ammunition stockpiles, whether through domestic production or imports
• Expanding domestic defence manufacturing capabilities and strengthening maintenance capacity
• Training more Qatari personnel to carry out a range of functions, including maintenance
• Building up dispersed ammunition stockpiles rather than concentrating them in a single location
• Increasing stocks of drones and other unmanned aircraft
• Developing ground and aerial refuelling capabilities and strengthening logistical support

Third: The sea as a second line of defence

For Qatar, a peninsula surrounded by water on three sides, protecting its maritime domain is not merely a military concern. It is also an economic necessity of the highest importance.

Liquefied natural gas, oil exports and imports all depend on the security of the surrounding waters. Qatar should therefore develop a naval force suited to its needs, equipped with advanced technology and capabilities.

The objective is not to build a large fleet, but to make attacks on Qatar’s maritime infrastructure both difficult and costly.

This requires a focus on several important priorities:

• Continuously improving and expanding maritime surveillance capabilities to protect Qatar’s waters and offshore installations
• Strengthening and developing capabilities to counter maritime drones
• Enhancing the protection of ports and securing shipping routes

Fourth: A national resilience programme

The most serious vulnerability of a country with limited territory and population lies in its infrastructure. A successful attack on a small number of critical facilities could have severe and far-reaching consequences for the entire country.

Given the importance of this threat, the national defence strategy should include the establishment of what might be called a “national resilience and protection programme”.

Such a programme would aim to protect critical infrastructure, including gas and energy facilities, water desalination plants, power stations, telecommunications centres and towers, civilian and military airports, ports and fuel networks, hospitals, government institutions and data centres.

One aspect of this protection is ensuring that every sector has adequate backup capacity. If a major desalination plant were to stop operating for any reason, for example, an alternative source of supply should be available to prevent a water supply problem from escalating into a national crisis. The same principle should apply to every other sector.

Fifth: Qatar must know what is happening around it before the US does

Military independence begins with information. Qatar therefore needs to develop its own national capabilities in the following areas:

• Space-based reconnaissance
• Unmanned aerial vehicles
• Radar systems
• Electronic intelligence
• Artificial intelligence-driven data analysis

This does not mean that Qatar needs to launch large satellites for every mission. Instead, it should work towards building an integrated system combining commercial and military satellites, international partnerships and national capabilities for collecting and analysing data.

The underlying principle is that Qatar should not depend on an external party to inform it of a threat approaching its territory.

Qatar will undoubtedly continue to need intelligence from the US, France, the United Kingdom and other countries. Nevertheless, it must possess the independent capacity to produce its own national intelligence picture, assess the nature of threats and determine how to prepare for them at an early stage, before requesting assistance from allies or partners.

Sixth: Diversifying security guarantees

The events of this year have demonstrated to all GCC states the importance of diversifying their alliances and security guarantees rather than relying on a single external power, particularly the US.

That power could become involved in future international crises, decide for one reason or another to limit its direct involvement in regional crises, or even reduce its military presence.

This makes it necessary to adopt a forward-looking approach based on diversifying alliances and making the security of the Gulf a matter of global interest requiring international cooperation.

In this context, GCC states could benefit from partnerships with South Korea, Turkiye and certain European powers, as well as regional powers such as Pakistan and China in specific fields, without hastily abandoning cooperation with the US.

The objective is to reduce the risks associated with dependence on a single supplier or ally. Such diversification does not mean building an alliance against the US.

Achieving defence and political autonomy for Qatar by 2031 does not mean isolating the country from its partners or dispensing with existing alliances. Rather, it means developing national capabilities that can ensure the protection of the state and its vital interests under all circumstances.

This strategic objective requires the development of an integrated air defence system, stronger intelligence and cyber capabilities, and better protection of critical infrastructure. It also requires improving the effectiveness of Qatar’s air and naval forces to ensure resilience and allow state institutions to continue functioning during a crisis.

Defence autonomy also requires diversifying international partnerships and establishing multiple security guarantees to reduce dependence on any single external power.

The foundation of this strategy is a transition from dependence on external protection towards the ability to deter threats, withstand crises and make independent national decisions at the appropriate time, while remaining open to international cooperation and partnerships.

A version of this piece in Arabic was originally published by Al Jazeera Arabic here.

WASHINGTON — At first glance, President Trump’s decision to relax U.S. sanctions on Russia despite its continuing invasion of Ukraine was a dramatic break from principles that guided American foreign policy for most of a century.

Since the end of World War II, U.S.-Russian relations have oscillated between hostility and friendship, but one element was consistent: When Russia tried to take over one if its neighbors, the United States pushed back.

This time, though, the United States appeared to favor the aggressor, not the victim.

“The Trump administration has abandoned any pretense of being an honest broker,” Richard N. Haass, a former senior State Department official under then-President George W. Bush, wrote last week. “It has gone all in on Russia’s side.”

The break from long-standing tradition was real, but it should not have been entirely surprising.

Trump has long expressed admiration for Russia’s autocratic leader, Vladimir Putin — part of a syndrome one of his former aides, Fiona Hill, has called “autocrat envy.”

“He wants to rule like them,” she said, referring to the president’s bromances with Putin, China’s Xi Jinping and other strongmen.

Meanwhile, Trump often expresses disdain for democratically elected leaders of smaller countries, and he reserves a special loathing for the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky.

He has repeatedly said Zelensky was foolish to resist Russia’s 2022 invasion because, in his view, the larger country is almost certain to win the war.

“Russia is a massive country,” he said this month. “Even if it loses a million soldiers, it still has a million more. Ukraine doesn’t have that kind of manpower.”

Moreover, Trump has long believed U.S. companies could reap an economic bonanza from Russia’s resource-rich economy. As a real estate magnate, he spent 30 years seeking deals in Moscow; in 2008, his son Donald Jr. said Russians had provided the Trump Organization “a lot of our assets.”

In the short run, the president hopes to boost Republican prospects in next week’s midterm elections by buying diesel fuel from Russia — a move aimed at lowering prices at the cost of bolstering Putin’s war economy. (It hasn’t worked; the price of diesel has risen slightly since Trump’s decision.)

But he has a longer-term goals as well. He has long believed better relations between the United States and Russia would be good for both countries, no matter who’s in power in Moscow. And he has long yearned openly for a Nobel Peace Prize — and one way might be to arrange a durable ceasefire in Ukraine.

All those factors have led Trump to overturn two major elements of traditional U.S. foreign policy.

Instead of supporting Ukraine, the victim of a foreign military invasion, he’s been pressing the Zelensky to accept Putin’s demands for territory.

“President Trump still wants a personal relationship with Putin, and he wants to change the nature of the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship. Ukraine is in the way. So what President Trump is trying to do is get Ukraine out of the way. … President Trump wants Zelensky to capitulate,” Hill said.

“Zelensky has to want to settle this war, and if he doesn’t, I think it’s going to be a very bad thing,” Trump said last week.

As he issued that advice, Ukraine’s army was experiencing interruptions with three forms of U.S. military help: Starlink, the communications system it uses to guide its anti-drone missiles; U.S.-provided early radar warnings of Russian missile attacks; and supplies of Patriot anti-missile weapons. U.S. officials claimed the three incidents were not deliberate — but to Ukrainians, they felt like a warning.

Meanwhile, instead of putting pressure on Putin through the traditional means of economic sanctions, Trump said he was trying to entice the Russian leader to negotiate by giving him preemptive rewards.

“I am in the process of negotiating Peace in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and don’t want to do anything that will drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table,” he explained on Truth Social. “Great progress is being made.”

But signs of that progress were hard to find. In St. Petersburg last week, Trump’s personal envoy, Steve Witkoff, presented Putin with a ceasefire proposal that the Americans negotiated with Ukraine and European countries. A top Putin aide dismissed the document, saying it “contained little of real value.”

Instead, the Russian president offered to increase Russian fertilizer exports to U.S. farmers. And he said he hoped Trump would join him at a summit meeting in China with Xi.

Ukraine has not been invited to that meeting, which prompted Haass to resurrect an old diplomatic aphorism: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”

Haass and other veterans of U.S. negotiations with Russia fear that Putin is merely stalling for time and pocketing Trump’s concessions while he tries to grind Ukraine down with missile attacks on Kyiv and other cities.

“If Trump and Witkoff were serious, they would give Putin 15 days to say yes to their ceasefire proposal — and if he doesn’t, they would impose new and tougher sanctions,” said Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. “There are still a lot of things they can do that would put Russia in a corner.”

But that has not been Trump’s inclination so far.

The irony, Hill said, is that even if Trump gets his way, that may not produce the victory he appears to expect.

“Putin and Trump are not the only actors in this,” she said. “Ukraine is not anybody’s to give. Its not Putin’s to have, and it’s not Zelensky’s. … This whole war is about Ukrainians wanting the right to determine their own future. It’s not Putin’s right or anyone else’s. It’s not Donald Trump’s to give away.”

Match of the Day pundits Toby Alderweireld and Ashley Williams analyse Manchester United’s 3-0 defeat by Bournemouth, with Alderweireld suggesting there is no “togetherness” among the United squad.

MATCH REPORT: Manchester United 0-3 Bournemouth

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WASHINGTON — President Trump’s administration is on track to deport about 660,000 people over the past year, a new report released Thursday shows, as arrests ramp up across the country fueled by billions of dollars meant to supercharge his immigration agenda.

The report by the Migration Policy Institute shows deportations increased from 620,000 during the first year of Trump’s second administration. The numbers fall short of previous highs in the early 2000s and fail to meet the Trump administration’s promise, made when it received the billions from Congress, that the money would allow for 1 million deportations annually.

The report, based on publicly available data obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, comes after the Trump administration in January 2025 stopped publicly releasing similar figures compiled by the Department of Homeland Security.

Trump, a Republican, returned to power last year promising to stanch crossings at the southern border and crack down on immigration. His administration has pushed through restrictions on both legal and illegal immigration and launched high-profile arrest operations in its bid to force migrants out.

More people being deported, but not at all-time highs

The analysis found that the Department of Homeland Security carried out 980,000 deportations during the first 18 months of the second Trump administration.

During the last fiscal year — when the Trump administration’s immigration enforcement mechanisms were shifting into high gear — an estimated 660,000 people were deported.

According to MPI’s analysis, that’s a 26% increase from the yearly average from 2021 to 2024 during the administration of President Biden, a Democrat, but well below the 1.86 million deportations recorded in 2000, under President Clinton, another Democrat.

Despite the surging arrests, the report details some of the challenges to the Trump administration reaching its deportation targets.

Historically, many immigrants living in the U.S. without authorization were from Mexico and didn’t often seek asylum. But in recent years, migrants have come to the U.S. from a wide range of countries, which can make it more complicated to deport them. And immigration courts, which ultimately decide whether someone can be removed from the country, face more significant case backlogs.

Voluntary departures are increasing as are interior arrests

The report said voluntary departures — when people give up their cases in immigration court and agree to leave the country — were at an “all-time high,” with 170,000 choosing to do so since Trump returned to office in January 2025. People who choose voluntary departure could one day return to the U.S. But some immigrant advocates and lawyers say that people give up their court fight and agree to leave simply to get out of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, detention.

The Trump administration was also increasingly deporting people it arrested in the country’s interior, the report said, reflecting how it was stepping up enforcement against migrants who have been in the country for a long time. In 2025, about 28% of the people deported were arrested inside the country, but by July of this year that had risen to 39%.

Migrants arrested at the southern border still make up a large number of deportations, the report said — 69% of all deportations between Jan. 20, 2025, and July 31, 2026, were of people initially intercepted at the border.

People in the country longer may have more opportunities to contest their removal while the government typically has greater authority to fast-track deportations for people arrested at the border.

The analysis said most people deported have never been convicted of a crime, despite the Trump administration claiming to be targeting the “worst of the worst.” Previous data has showed the same.

In response to the MPI report, White House spokesperson Lauren Bis said: “President Trump has delivered the largest reduction in illegal immigration in modern history.”

Trump administration no longer regularly releases immigration data

Homeland Security stopped releasing similar data when Trump took office, making it difficult to track one of his key campaign promises. Figures the Trump administration has released are inconsistent and unverifiable.

The administration says it is transparent. On Tuesday, it released some of its own figures as part of a document boasting of its achievements on immigration, including that 1.2 million migrants have been deported or removed during Trump’s second term. The discrepancy could not immediately be reconciled.

In the absence of regular data, analysts and activists interested in immigration trends have relied on information obtained through lawsuits or limited and sporadic information released by federal agencies to track deportation data.

Santana writes for the Associated Press.

The top 1 percent in Peru captured 42 percent of all new wealth generated between 2019 and 2025, an analysis by the nonprofit group Oxfam has found.

The report, released on Tuesday, highlights growing inequality in the South American country and raises questions about how the government is addressing deepening social divisions.

“Economic inequality in Peru has remained stubbornly high for decades. And when people feel that the same people always win, that nothing changes and nothing can change, inequality starts to look less like an injustice and more like the natural order of things,” said Alejandra Alayza, the executive director of Oxfam in Peru.

“That is a dangerous kind of fatalism, and we must tear it down.”

The nonprofit told Al Jazeera in an email that the 42 percent figure represents an increase from the 2000 to 2019 period, when the top 1 percent captured about 39 percent of all new wealth.

Just 1.4 percent of new wealth from 2019 to 2025 went to the poorest 50 percent of the country’s population, according to the group.

Experts warn the trend bodes poorly for public faith in government and democratic institutions.

Oxfam worked with the Institute for Peruvian Studies, a think tank in Lima, to publish a report this month on Peruvians’ perceptions of inequality in their country.

The groups found that 84 percent of Peruvians believed their country is governed by powerful interests that shape politics to their benefit. More than 75 percent also said that wealthy corporations and individuals avoid paying their fair share of taxes.

The survey also suggested that public opinion was in favour of action to address the issue.

About 70 percent of respondents said they want the government to do more to reduce inequality, which a majority felt had limited access to services such as healthcare, employment, education and justice.

“The undeniable scale of public support for action to reduce inequality leaves no room for complacency,” Alayza said.

“Inequality is not a force of nature; it is made by political choices. And different choices can build a different Peru.”

Political instability

Peru’s rising inequality has been accompanied by a period of political turmoil, particularly in the presidential palace.

A stream of probes, scandals and impeachments has led to Peru being governed by nine presidents in the last 10 years.

The latest, right-wing President Keiko Fujimori, was sworn into office in July after a narrow race that saw voting delays and heated recriminations among the leading candidates.

Experts believe powerful interests have found opportunity amid the political tumult.

“It’s sort of a paradox. How can you have such a rotation among elites but still have a relatively narrow political-criminal-business elite that holds a lot of power? I think both things are true in Peru,” Will Freeman, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a US-based think tank, told Al Jazeera.

Part of the political upheaval has come from clashes between the presidency and Peru’s powerful Congress, which has the power to impeach executive leaders on the basis of “moral incapacity”, an ambiguous term.

The repeated leadership shakeups have weakened Peru’s democracy, according to analysts.

In December 2022, for instance, then-President Pedro Castillo announced that he would illegally dissolve Congress in response to repeated attempts to impeach him.

His subsequent removal and arrest prompted widespread protests. The government of Castillo’s successor, Dina Boluarte, implemented a months-long crackdown on the demonstrations that rights groups say included widespread abuses for which there has been little accountability.

In the years since, the Peruvian government has also taken steps to weaken judicial oversight and hollow out anticorruption watchdogs.

The nonprofit Freedom House, which measures political freedom in countries around the world, ranked Peru as “free” in 2022. But its ranking dropped the following year to “partly free”, in light of the deadly clashes between security forces and protesters.

In its 2026 report, Freedom House maintained that Peru was only “partly free”, citing in part the denial of full political rights to certain groups, including Indigenous peoples.

“High-profile corruption scandals have eroded public trust in government, and the weakening of judicial independence has impacted the country’s governing bodies,” the nonprofit said.

Powerful interests, both licit and illicit, have taken advantage of those changes.

“The groups themselves are unstable and fluid,” said Freeman. “And yet, I think Peruvians are right to conclude that, generally, they are wielding outsized influence in defence of their own commercial interests or political power rather [than] in service of some kind of general welfare.”