Afghanistan

Kabul, a city of over six million people, could become the first modern city to run out of water in the next five years, a new report has warned.

Groundwater levels in the Afghan capital have dropped drastically due to over-extraction and the effects of climate change, according to a report published by nonprofit Mercy Corps.

So, is Kabul’s water crisis at a tipping point and do Afghan authorities have the resources and expertise to address the issue?

The depth of the crisis

Kabul’s aquifer levels have plummeted 25-30 metres (82 – 98 feet) in the past decade, with extraction of water exceeding natural recharge by a staggering 44 million cubic metres (1,553cu feet) a year, the report, published in April this year, noted.

If the current trend continues, Kabul’s aquifers will become dry by 2030, posing an existential threat to the Afghan capital, according to the report. This could cause the displacement of some three million Afghan residents, it said.

The report said UNICEF projected that nearly half of Kabul’s underground bore wells, the primary source of drinking water for residents, are already dry.

It also highlights widespread water contamination: Up to 80 percent of groundwater is believed to be unsafe, with high levels of sewage, arsenic and salinity.

Conflict, climate change and government failures

Experts point to a combination of factors behind the crisis: climate change, governance failures and increasing pressures on existing resources as the city’s population has expanded from less than one million in 2001 to roughly six million people today.

Two decades of US-led military intervention in Afghanistan also played a role in the crisis, as it forced more people to move to Kabul while governance in the rest of the country suffered.

“The prediction is based on the growing gap between groundwater recharge and annual water extraction. These trends have been consistently observed over recent years, making the forecast credible,” said Assem Mayar, water resource management expert and former lecturer at Kabul Polytechnic University.

“It reflects a worst-case scenario that could materialise by 2030 if no effective interventions are made,” he added.

Najibullah Sadid, senior researcher and a member of the Afghanistan Water and Environment Professionals Network, said it was impossible to put a timeline on when the capital city would run dry. But he conceded that Kabul’s water problems are grave.

“Nobody can claim when the last well will run dry, but what we know is that as the groundwater levels further drop, the capacity of deep aquifers become less – imagine the groundwater as a bowl with depleting water,” he said.

“We know the end is near,” he said.

A vast portion of the Afghan capital relies on underground borewells, and as water levels drop, people dig deeper or in different locations looking for sources of water.

According to an August 2024 report by the National Statistics Directorate, there are approximately 310,000 drilled wells across the country. According to the Mercy Corps report, it is estimated that there are also nearly 120,000 unregulated bore wells across Kabul.

A 2023 UN report found that nearly 49 percent of borewells in Kabul are dry, while others are functioning at only 60 percent efficiency.

The water crisis, Mayar said, exposes the divide between the city’s rich and poor. “Wealthier residents can afford to drill deeper boreholes, further limiting access for the poorest,” he said. “The crisis affects the poorest first.”

The signs of this divide are evident in longer lines outside public water taps or private water takers, says Abdulhadi Achakzai, director at the Environmental Protection Trainings and Development Organization (EPTDO), a Kabul-based climate protection NGO.

Poorer residents, often children, are forced to continually search for sources of water.

“Every evening, even late at night, when I am returning home from work, I see young children with small cans in their hands looking for water … they look hopeless, navigating life collecting water for their homes rather than studying or learning,” he said.

Additionally, Sadid said, Kabul’s already depleted water resources were being exploited by the “over 500 beverage and mineral water companies” operating in the capital city,” all of which are using Kabul’s groundwater”. Alokozay, a popular Afghan soft drinks company, alone extracts nearly one billion litres (256 million gallons) of water over a year — 2.5 million litres (660,000 gallons) a day — according to Sadid’s calculations.

Al Jazeera sent Alokozay questions about its water extraction on June 21, but has yet to receive a response.

Kabul, Sadid said, also had more than 400 hectares (9,884 acres) of green houses to grow vegetables, which suck up 4 billion litres (1.05 billion gallons) of water every year, according to his calculations. “The list [of entities using Kabul water] is long,” he said.

‘Repeated droughts, early snowmelt and reduced snowfall’

The water shortage is further compounded by climate change. Recent years have seen a significant reduction in precipitation across the country.

“The three rivers — Kabul river, Paghman river and Logar river—that replenish Kabul’s groundwater rely heavily on snow and glacier meltwater from the Hindu Kush mountains,” the Mercy Corps report noted. “However, between October 2023 to January 2024, Afghanistan only received only 45 to 60 percent of the average precipitation during the peak winter season compared to previous years.”

Mayar, the former lecturer at Kabul Polytechnic University, said that while it was difficult to quantify exactly how much of the crisis was caused by climate change, extreme weather events had only added to Kabul’s woes.

“Climate-related events such as repeated droughts, early snowmelts, and reduced snowfall have clearly diminished groundwater recharge opportunities,” he said.

Additionally, increased air temperature has led to greater evaporation, raising agricultural water consumption, said Sadid from the Afghanistan Water and Environment Professionals Network.

While several provinces have experienced water scarcity, particularly within agrarian communities, Kabul remains the worst affected due to its growing population.

Decades of conflict

Sadid argued Kabul’s crisis runs deeper than the impact of climate change, compounded by years of war, weak governance, and sanctions on the aid-dependent country.

Much of the funds channelled into the country were diverted to security for the first two decades of the century. Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, funding has been used to tackle an escalating humanitarian crisis. Western sanctions have also significantly stymied development projects that could have helped Kabul better manage the current water crisis.

As a result, authorities have struggled with the maintenance of pipelines, canals and dams — including basic tasks like de-sedimentation.

“The crisis is already beyond the capacity of the current de facto authorities,” Mayar said, referring to the Taliban. “In well-managed cities, such impacts are mitigated through robust water governance and infrastructure. Kabul lacks such capacity, and the current authorities are unable to address the problem without external support,” he added.

As a result, environmental resilience projects have taken a backseat.

“Several planned initiatives, including projects for artificial groundwater recharge, were suspended following the Taliban takeover,” Mayar pointed out. “Sanctions continue to restrict organisations and donors from funding and implementing essential water-related projects in Afghanistan,” he said.

Sadid pointed out one example: An Awater supply project -funded by the German Development bank KfW, along with European agencies – could have supplied 44 billion litres (11 billion gallons) of water annually to parts of Kabul from Logar aquifers.

“But currently this project has been suspended,” he said, even though two-thirds of the initiative was already completed when the government of former President Ashraf Ghani collapsed in 2021.

Similarly, India and the Ghani government had signed an agreement in 2021 for the construction of the Shah-toot dam on the Kabul River. Once completed, the dam could supply water to large parts of Kabul, Sadid said, “but its fate is uncertain now.”

What can be done to address the water crisis?

Experts recommend the development of the city’s water infrastructure as the starting point to address the crisis.

“Artificial groundwater recharge and the development of basic water infrastructure around the city are urgently needed. Once these foundations are in place, a citywide water supply network can gradually be developed,” Mayar recommended.

Achakzai agreed that building infrastructure and its maintenance were key elements of any fix.

“Aside from introducing new pipelines to the city from nearby rivers, such as in Panjshir, there needs to be an effort to recharge underground aquifers with constructions of check dams and water reservoirs,” he said, adding that these structures will also facilitate rainwater harvesting and groundwater replenishment.

“[The] Afghan government needs to renew ageing water pipes and systems. Modernising infrastructure will improve efficiency and reduce water loss,” he added.

Yet all of that is made harder by Afghanistan’s global isolation and the sanctions regime it is under, Achakzai said.

“Sanctions restrict Afghanistan’s access to essential resources, technology, and funding needed for water infrastructure development and maintenance,” he said. This, in turn, reduces agricultural productivity, and increases hunger and economic hardship, forcing communities to migrate, he warned.

Russia has become the first country to formally recognise the Taliban government in Afghanistan since the group took power in 2021. The Kremlin said the move would ‘pave the way for bilateral cooperation’, while the Taliban hailed it as a ‘courageous step’.

Supreme Court lifted group’s ‘terrorist’ designation in April, as Moscow seeks normalisation in bid for regional clout.

Russia has accepted the credentials of a new ambassador of Afghanistan as part of an ongoing drive to build friendly relations with the country’s Taliban authorities, which seized power as United States troops withdrew from the country four years ago.

“We believe that the act of official recognition of the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will give impetus to the development of productive bilateral cooperation between our countries in various fields,” said the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a statement on Thursday.

The move makes Russia the first country in the world to recognise the country’s Taliban government.

“This brave decision will be an example for others,” Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said in a video of a meeting on Thursday with Dmitry Zhirnov, the Russian ambassador to Kabul, posted on X.

“Now that the process of recognition has started, Russia was ahead of everyone.”

The move is likely to be closely watched by Washington, which has frozen billions in Afghanistan’s central bank assets and enforced sanctions on some senior leaders in the Taliban, which has contributed to Afghanistan’s banking sector being largely cut off from the international financial system.

The group seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021, when US forces supporting the country’s internationally recognised government pulled out.

Moscow, which called the US withdrawal a “failure”, has taken steps to normalise relations with the Taliban authorities since then, seeing them as a potential economic partner and ally in fighting terrorism.

A Taliban delegation attended Russia’s flagship economic forum in Saint Petersburg in 2022 and 2024, and the group’s top diplomat met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow last October.

In July 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the Taliban “allies in the fight against terrorism” – notably against Islamic State Khorasan Province, ISKP (ISIS-K), a group responsible for deadly attacks in both Afghanistan and Russia.

In April, Russia’s Supreme Court lifted the “terrorist” designation for the group.

Lavrov said that month that “the new authorities in Kabul are a reality”, urging Moscow to adopt a “pragmatic, not ideologised policy” towards the Taliban.

Competing for influence

Moscow’s attitude towards the Taliban has shifted drastically over the last two decades.

The group was formed in 1994 during the Afghan Civil War, largely by former US-supported Mujahideen fighters who battled the Soviet Union during the 1980s.

The Soviet-Afghan war resulted in a stinging defeat for Moscow that may have hastened the demise of the USSR.

Russia put the Taliban on its “terrorist” blacklist in 2003 over its support for separatists in the North Caucasus.

But the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 has forced Russia and other countries in the region to change tack as they compete for influence.

Russia was the first country to open a business representative office in Kabul after the Taliban takeover, and has announced plans to use Afghanistan as a transit hub for gas heading to Southeast Asia.

The Afghan government is not officially recognised by any world body, and the United Nations refers to the administration as the “Taliban de facto authorities”.

On Friday, June 13, when Israeli missiles began raining down on Tehran, Shamsi was reminded once again just how vulnerable she and her family are.

The 34-year-old Afghan mother of two was working at her sewing job in north Tehran. In a state of panic and fear, she rushed back home to find her daughters, aged five and seven, huddled beneath a table in horror.

Shamsi fled Taliban rule in Afghanistan just a year ago, hoping Iran would offer safety. Now, undocumented and terrified, she finds herself caught in yet another dangerous situation – this time with no shelter, no status, and no way out.

“I escaped the Taliban but bombs were raining over our heads here,” Shamsi told Al Jazeera from her home in northern Tehran, asking to be referred to by her first name only, for security reasons. “We came here for safety, but we didn’t know where to go.”

Shamsi, a former activist in Afghanistan, and her husband, a former soldier in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan before the Taliban returned to power in 2021, fled to Iran on a temporary visa, fearful of reprisals from the Taliban over their work. But they have been unable to renew their visas because of the cost and the requirement to exit Iran and re-enter through Taliban-controlled Afghanistan – a journey that would likely be too dangerous.

Life in Iran has not been easy. Without legal residency, Shamsi has no protection at work, no bank account, and no access to aid. “There was no help from Iranians, or from any international organisation,” she said.

Internet blackouts in Tehran have made it hard to find information or contact family.

“Without a driver’s licence, we can’t move around. Every crossroad in Tehran is heavily inspected by police,” she said, noting that they managed to get around restrictions to buy food before Israel began bombing, but once that started it became much harder.

Iran hosts an estimated 3.5 million refugees and people in refugee-like situations, including some 750,000 registered Afghans. But more than 2.6 million are undocumented individuals. Since the Taliban’s return to power and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, thousands of Afghans, including activists, journalists, former soldiers, and other vulnerable people, have crossed into Iran seeking refuge.

Tehran province alone reportedly hosts 1.5 million Afghan refugees – the majority of them undocumented – and as Israel targeted sites in and around the capital, attacking civilian and military locations during the 12-day conflict, many Afghans were starkly reminded of their extreme vulnerability – unprotected and unable to access emergency assistance, or even reliable information during air raids as the internet was shut down for large periods of time.

While many fled Tehran for the north of Iran, Afghan refugees like Shamsi and her family had nowhere to go.

On the night of June 22, an explosion shook her neighbourhood, breaking the windows of the family’s apartment. “I was awake until 3am, and just an hour after I fell asleep, another blast woke me up,” she said.

An entire residential apartment was levelled near her building. “I prepared a bag with my children’s main items to be ready if something happens to our building.”

The June 23 ceasefire brokered by Qatar and the US came as a huge relief, but now there are other problems: Shamsi’s family is almost out of money. Her employer, who used to pay her in cash, has left the city and won’t answer her calls. “He’s disappeared,” she said. “When I [previously] asked for my unpaid wages, he just said: ‘You’re an Afghan migrant, get out, out, out.’”

The human cost of conflict

For all Afghans trapped in Iran – both those forced to flee and those who stayed in their homes – the 12-day conflict with Israel has sharply reawakened feelings of trauma and displacement.

Furthermore, according to the Iranian health authorities, three Afghan migrants – identified as Hafiz Bostani, Abdulwali and Habibullah Jamshidi – were among the 610 people killed in the recent strikes.

On June 18, 18-year-old Afghan labourer Abdulwali was killed and several others were injured in an Israeli strike on their construction site in the Tehranpars area of Tehran. According to the victim’s father, Abdulwali left his studies in Afghanistan about six months ago to work in Iran to feed his family. In a video widely shared by Abdulwali’s friends, his colleagues at the construction site can be heard calling to him to leave the building as loud explosions echo in the background.

Other Afghans are still missing since the Israeli strikes. Hakimi, an elderly Afghan man from Takhar province in Afghanistan, told Al Jazeera that he hadn’t heard from three of his grandsons in Iran for four days. “They were stuck inside a construction site in central Tehran with no food,” he said.

All he knows is that they retreated to the basement of the unfinished apartment building they were working on when they heard the sound of bombs, he explained. The shops nearby were closed, and their Iranian employer has fled the city without paying wages.

Even if they have survived, he added, they are undocumented. “If they get out, they will get deported by police,” Hakimi said.

From one danger zone to another

During the conflict, UN Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett urged all parties to protect Afghan migrants in Iran, warning of serious risks to their safety and calling for immediate humanitarian safeguards.

Afghan activist Laila Forugh Mohammadi, who now lives outside the country, is using social media to raise awareness about the dire conditions Afghans are facing in Iran. “People can’t move, can’t speak,” she said. “Most have no legal documents, and that puts them in a dangerous position where they can’t even retrieve unpaid wages from fleeing employers.”

She also flagged that amid the Iran-Israel conflict, there is no government body supporting Afghans. “There’s no bureaucracy to process their situation. We dreaded an escalation in the violence between Iran and Israel for the safety of our people,” she said.

In the end, those who did manage to evacuate from the most dangerous areas in Iran mostly did so with the help of Afghan organisations.

The Afghan Women Activists’ Coordinating Body (AWACB), part of the European Organisation for Integration, helped hundreds of women – many of whom fled the Taliban because of their activist work – and their families to flee. They relocated from high-risk areas like Tehran, Isfahan and Qom – the sites of key nuclear facilities which Israel and the US both targeted – to safer cities such as Mashhad in the northeast of the country. The group also helped with communicating with families in Afghanistan during the ongoing internet blackouts in Iran.

“Our capacity is limited. We can only support official members of AWACB,” said Dr Patoni Teichmann, the group’s founder, speaking to Al Jazeera before the ceasefire. “We have evacuated 103 women out of our existing 450 members, most of whom are Afghan women’s rights activists and protesters who rallied against the women’s education ban and fled Afghanistan.”

‘I can’t go back to the Taliban’

Iran recently announced plans to deport up to two million undocumented Afghans, but during the 12-day conflict, some took the decision to move back anyway despite the dangers and hardships they may face there.

World Vision Afghanistan reported that, throughout the 12-day war, approximately 7,000 Afghans were crossing daily from Iran into Afghanistan via the Islam Qala border in Herat. “People are arriving with only the clothes on their backs,” said Mark Cal, a field representative. “They’re traumatised, confused, and returning to a homeland still in economic and social freefall.”

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has voiced grave concerns about the deteriorating humanitarian situation for Afghans in Iran, adding that it is monitoring reports that people are on the move within Iran and that some are leaving for neighbouring countries.

Even as Israeli strikes came to a halt, tensions remain high, and the number of Afghans fleeing Iran is expected to rise.

But for many, there is nowhere left to go.

Back in northern Tehran, Shamsi sits beside her daughter watching an Iranian news channel. “We came here for safety,” she says softly. Asked what she would do if the situation worsens, Shamsi doesn’t hesitate: “I will stay here with my family. I can’t go back to the Taliban.”

This piece was published in collaboration with Egab.

June 25 (UPI) — The United States is offering a reward of up to $5 million for information locating Mahmood Shah Habibi, an Afghan American businessman who was abducted in Afghanistan nearly three years ago.

The reward from the U.S. State Department’s Rewards for Justice Program was announced Tuesday by department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce, who said during a regular press briefing, “We have determined that he has been disappeared, and that he has not been heard from.”

According to a release from the FBI in August, Habibi, a contractor for Kabul-based telecommunications company Asia Consultancy Group, and his driver were kidnapped from their vehicle near his home in the Afghan capital on Aug. 10, 2022.

It is believed that he was taken by the Taliban along with 29 other employees of his company, all of whom, except for Habibi, have since been released.

“He has not been heard from since his initial arrest, and the Taliban has yet to provide any information regarding his whereabouts or condition,” the State Department said in a statement.

Bruce said they are hoping the $5 million reward will entice someone to come forward.

“It makes a difference in everyone’s lives that we might get some information about him,” she said.

The U.S. military withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. In its absence, the Taliban regained control of the Middle Eastern country.

After a short and successful war with Iraq, President George H.W. Bush claimed in 1991 that “the ghosts of Vietnam have been laid to rest beneath the sands of the Arabian desert.” Bush was referring to what was commonly called the “Vietnam syndrome.” The idea was that the Vietnam War had so scarred the American psyche that we forever lost confidence in American power.

The elder President Bush was partially right. The first Iraq war was certainly popular. And his successor, President Clinton, used American power — in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere — with the general approval of the media and the public.

But when the younger Bush, Clinton’s successor, launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Vietnam syndrome came back with a vengeance. Barely three weeks after the U.S. attacked Afghanistan on Oct. 7, 2002, famed New York Times correspondent R.W. Apple penned a piece headlined “A Military Quagmire Remembered: Afghanistan as Vietnam.”

“Like an unwelcome specter from an unhappy past,” Apple wrote, “the ominous word ‘quagmire’ has begun to haunt conversations among government officials and students of foreign policy, both here and abroad.”

“Could Afghanistan become another Vietnam?” he rhetorically asked. “Echoes of Vietnam are unavoidable,” he asserted.

Over the next 12 months, the newspaper ran nearly 300 articles with the words “Vietnam” and “Afghanistan” in them. The New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times ran articles mentioning Iraq and Vietnam at an average rate of more than twice a day (I looked it up 20 years ago).

The tragic irony is that President George W. Bush did what his father couldn’t: He exorcised the specter of “another Vietnam” — but he also replaced it with the specter of “another Iraq.”

That’s what’s echoing in the reaction to President Trump’s decision to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. We’re all familiar with cliches about generals fighting the last war, but journalists and politicians have the same habit of cramming the square peg of current events into the round hole of previous conflicts.

Trump’s decision to bomb Iran — which I broadly support, with caveats — is fair game for criticism and concern. But the Iraq syndrome cosplay misleads more than instructs. For starters, no one is proposing “boots on the ground,” never mind “occupation” or “nation-building.”

The debate over whether George W. Bush lied us into war over the issue of weapons of mass destruction is more tendentious than the conventional wisdom on the left and right would have you believe. But it’s also irrelevant. No serious observer disputes that Iran has been pursuing a nuclear weapon for decades. The only live question is, or was: How close is Iran to having one?

Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, told Congress in March — preposterously in my opinion — that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon.” On Sunday, “Meet the Press” host Kristen Welker asked Vice President JD Vance, “So, why launch this strike now? Has the intelligence changed, Mr. Vice President?”

It’s a good question. But it’s not a sound basis for insinuating that another Republican president is again using faulty intelligence to get us into a war — just like Iraq.

The squabbling over whether this was a “preemptive” rather than “preventative” attack misses the point. America would be justified in attacking Iran even if Gabbard was right. Why? Because Iran has been committing acts of war against America, and Israel, for decades, mostly through terrorist proxies it created, trained, funded and directed for that purpose. In 1983, Hezbollah militants blew up the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, killing 63. Later that year, it blew up the U.S. Marine barracks, also in Beirut, killing 241 Americans. In the decades since, Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies have orchestrated or attempted the murder of Americans repeatedly, including during the Iraq war. It even authorized the assassination of President Trump, according to Joe Biden’s Justice Department.

These are acts of war that would justify a response even if Iran had no interest in a nuclear weapon. But the fanatical regime — whose supporters routinely chant “Death to America!” — is pursuing a nuclear weapon.

For years, the argument for not taking out that program has rested largely on the fact that it would be too difficult. The facilities are too hardened, Iran’s proxies are too powerful.

That is the intelligence that has changed. Israel crushed Hezbollah and Hamas militants and eliminated much of Iran’s air defense system. What once seemed like a daunting assault on a Death Star turned into a layup by comparison.

None of this means that things cannot get worse or that Trump’s decision won’t end up being regrettable. But whatever that scenario looks like, it won’t look much like what happened in Iraq, except for those unwilling to see it any other way.

@JonahDispatch

MIAMI — President Trump’s new ban on travel to the U.S. by citizens from 12 mainly African and Middle Eastern countries took effect Monday amid rising tension over the president’s escalating campaign of immigration enforcement.

The new proclamation, which Trump signed last week, applies to citizens of Afghanistan, Myanmar, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. It also imposes heightened restrictions on people from Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan and Venezuela who are outside the U.S. and don’t hold a valid visa.

The new ban does not revoke visas previously issued to people from countries on the list, according to guidance issued Friday to all U.S. diplomatic missions. However, unless an applicant meets narrow criteria for an exemption to the ban, his or her application will be rejected starting Monday. Travelers with previously issued visas should still be able to enter the U.S. even after the ban takes effect.

During Trump’s first term, a hastily written executive order mandating the denial of entry to citizens of mainly Muslim countries created chaos at numerous airports and other ports of entry, prompting successful legal challenges and major revisions to the policy.

In the hours after the new ban took effect, no disruptions were immediately discernible at Los Angeles International Airport. And passengers appeared to move steadily through an international arrival area at Miami International Airport, where green card holder Luis Hernandez returned to Miami after a weekend visiting family in Cuba.

“They did not ask me anything,” said Hernandez, a Cuban citizen who has lived in the U.S. for three years. “I only showed my residency card.”

Magda Moreno and her husband also said things seemed normal when they arrived Monday in Miami after a trip to Cuba to see relatives. Asked about the travel restrictions for Cubans, Moreno, a U.S. citizen, said: “It is difficult not being able to bring the family and for them not being able to enter into the U.S.”

Many immigration experts say the new ban is more carefully crafted and appears designed to beat court challenges that hampered the first by focusing on the visa application process.

Trump said this time that some countries had “deficient” screening for passports and other public documents or have historically refused to take back their own citizens. He relied extensively on an annual Homeland Security report of people who remain in the U.S. after their visas expired.

Measuring overstay rates has challenged experts for decades, but the government has made a limited attempt annually since 2016. Trump’s proclamation cites overstay rates for eight of the 12 banned countries.

Trump also tied the new ban to a terrorist attack in Boulder, Colo., saying it underscored the dangers posed by some visitors who overstay visas. U.S. officials say the man charged in the attack overstayed a tourist visa. He is from Egypt, a country that is not on Trump’s restricted list.

The ban was quickly denounced by groups that provide aid and resettlement help to refugees.

“This policy is not about national security — it is about sowing division and vilifying communities that are seeking safety and opportunity in the United States,” said Abby Maxman, president of Oxfam America, a nonprofit international relief organization.

Haiti’s transitional presidential council said in a social media post Monday that the ban “is likely to indiscriminately affect all Haitians.” Acknowledging “fierce fighting” against gangs controlling most of the capital city of Port-au-Prince, the council said it is strengthening Haiti’s borders and would negotiate with the U.S. to drop Haiti from the list of banned countries.

Gang violence has prevented many Haitians from risking a visit to the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince. Sheena Jean-Pierre, a 27-year-old civil engineer, went recently to see whether long lines had formed because of the ban. She had previously requested a visa three times to study in the U.S. but was rejected.

Jean-Pierre is now looking to continue her studies in other countries such as Brazil and Argentina. She said she doesn’t oppose the travel ban, saying the U.S. “has law and order,” unlike Haiti.

The inclusion of Afghanistan angered some supporters who have worked to resettle its people. The ban does make exceptions for Afghans on Special Immigrant Visas, generally people who worked most closely with the U.S. government during the two-decade-long war there.

Afghanistan had been one of the largest sources of resettled refugees, with about 14,000 arrivals in a 12-month period through September 2024. Trump suspended refugee resettlement his first day in office.

Solomon writes for the Associated Press. AP journalists Dánica Coto in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Evens Sanon in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, contributed to this report.

ISLAMABAD — Afghans who worked for the U.S. during its war against the Taliban urged President Trump on Thursday to exempt them from a travel ban that could lead to them being deported to Afghanistan, where they say they will face persecution.

Their appeal came hours after Trump announced a U.S. entry ban on citizens from 12 countries, including Afghanistan.

It affects thousands of Afghans who fled Taliban rule and had been approved for resettlement through a U.S. program assisting people at risk due to their work with the American government, media organizations, and humanitarian groups. But Trump suspended that program in January, leaving Afghans stranded in several locations, including Pakistan and Qatar.

Pakistan, meanwhile, has been deporting foreigners it says are living in the country illegally, mostly Afghan, adding to the refugees’ sense of peril.

“This is heartbreaking and sad news,” said one Afghan, who worked closely with U.S. agencies before the Taliban returned to power in 2021. He spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the issue, fearing Taliban reprisals and potential arrest by Pakistani authorities.

He said the travel ban on an estimated 20,000 Afghans in Pakistan could encourage the government to begin deporting Afghans awaiting resettlement in the U.S. “President Trump has shattered hopes,” he told the Associated Press.

He said his life would be at risk if he returned to Afghanistan with his family because he previously worked for the U.S. Embassy in Kabul on public awareness campaigns promoting education.

“You know the Taliban are against the education of girls. America has the right to shape its immigration policy, but it should not abandon those who stood with it, risked their life, and who were promised a good future.”

Another Afghan, Khalid Khan, said the new restrictions could expose him and thousands of others to arrest in Pakistan.

He said police had previously left him and his family alone at the request of the U.S. Embassy. “I worked for the U.S. military for eight years, and I feel abandoned. Every month, Trump is making a new rule,” said Khan. He fled to Pakistan three years ago.

“I don’t know what to say. Returning to Afghanistan will jeopardize my daughter’s education. You know the Taliban have banned girls from attending school beyond sixth grade. My daughter will remain uneducated if we return.”

He said it no longer mattered whether people spoke out against Trump’s policies.

“So long as Trump is there, we are nowhere. I have left all of my matters to Allah.”

There was no immediate comment on the travel ban from the Taliban-run government.

Pakistan previously said it was working with host countries to resettle Afghans. Nobody was available to comment on Trump’s latest executive order.

Ahmed writes for the Associated Press.

Taliban government to follow Pakistan’s move to designate ambassador to Kabul as tensions between the two nations ease.

Afghanistan has welcomed an upgrade in its diplomatic ties with Pakistan, signalling an easing of tensions between the South Asian neighbours.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on Friday said the charge d’affaires stationed in the Afghan capital, Kabul, would be elevated to the rank of ambassador, with Afghanistan’s Taliban government later announcing its representative in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, would also be upgraded.

A charge d’affaires serves as an embassy’s chief of mission in the absence of the ambassador.

“This elevation in diplomatic representation between Afghanistan [and] Pakistan paves the way for enhanced bilateral cooperation in multiple domains,” the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted on X on Saturday.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan welcomes the decision of the Government of Pakistan to upgrade the level of its diplomatic mission in Kabul to that of an ambassador.

In reciprocity, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will elevate the… pic.twitter.com/ZY1S5TexAR

— Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Afghanistan (@MoFA_Afg) May 31, 2025

Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi is due to visit Pakistan “in the coming days”, the ministry spokesman, Zia Ahmad Takal, said.

Only a handful of countries – including China – have agreed to host Taliban government ambassadors since their return to power in 2021, with no country yet formally recognising the administration.

Pakistan is the fourth country to designate an ambassador to Kabul, after China, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan. Russia last month said it would also accredit a Taliban government ambassador, days after removing the group’s “terrorist” designation.

For the past few months, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been rocky over security concerns and a campaign by Islamabad to expel tens of thousands of Afghan refugees.

Islamabad says armed groups which launch attacks inside Pakistan use Afghan soil. Kabul denies the allegation, saying such violence is Pakistan’s domestic problem to handle.

However, Foreign Minister Dar on Friday said relations between the two nations have improved since he visited Kabul last month. Last week, he also met Muttaqi and their Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, during a trilateral meeting in Beijing.

Following that meeting, China said it will “continue to assist with improving Afghanistan-Pakistan ties”.

Pakistan has become the fourth country to appoint an ambassador to Kabul, after China, UAE and Uzbekistan.

Pakistan has announced it will designate an ambassador to Afghanistan, the first since the Taliban re-entered and captured Kabul in 2021, in a move aimed at improving previously strained relations between the neighbouring countries.

In a statement on Friday, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have improved since his visit to Kabul in April. “To maintain this momentum, I am pleased to announce the decision of the Government of Pakistan to upgrade the level of its charge d’affaires in Kabul to the level of ambassador,” he said.

Dar’s announcement comes a week after he met his Afghan counterpart, Amir Khan Muttaqi, alongside their Chinese counterpart Wang Yi during a trilateral meeting in Beijing.

Dar expressed hope that the decision would strengthen economic cooperation, boost bilateral trade and enhance joint efforts to combat terrorism.

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are on positive trajectory after my very productive visit to Kabul with Pakistan delegation on 19th April 2025. To maintain this momentum, I am pleased to announce the decision of the Government of Pakistan to upgrade the level of its Chargé…

— Ishaq Dar (@MIshaqDar50) May 30, 2025

Tensions between the two countries have long been strained over Pakistan’s accusations that Kabul provides a haven to the Pakistan Taliban, who are known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP and are allies of the Afghan Taliban.

TTP is a separate group and has been emboldened since the Afghan Taliban returned to power four years ago.

There was no immediate comment from Kabul on the latest development. However, Pakistan had earlier signalled that the two sides were considering an upgrade in diplomatic relations.

Another critical dynamic is the presence of Afghan refugees and migrants in Pakistan. Islamabad has ramped up forced mass deportation, with some tens of thousands having crossed the border, in April, back to an uncertain future in Afghanistan, the United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported.

Nearly three million Afghans in Pakistan, many who have been there for decades as wars plagued their nation, face deportation after Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced in October a three-phase plan to send them back to their home country.

Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban currently have embassies in each other’s capitals, but they are led by charges d’affaires, a lower level than an ambassador.

Pakistan has become the fourth country to designate an ambassador to Kabul, after China, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan.

No country has formally recognised the Taliban administration, with foreign powers saying they will not do so until it changes course on women’s rights.

Diplomats and experts say, however, that having an ambassador officially present their credentials represents a step towards recognition of the Taliban’s government.

In 2017, the US dropped the “mother of all bombs” in a remote village in Afghanistan’s Achin district. Al Jazeera made the journey to see what’s left: homes destroyed, health problems mounting, and no accountability in sight.

Islamabad, Pakistan – As Pakistan remained embroiled in a war of words with its archrival India – following a dramatic exchange of missiles and drones nearly two weeks ago – it this week advanced diplomatic efforts with two other neighbors: China and Afghanistan, which could lead to the formal resumption of diplomatic ties between Islamabad and Kabul after nearly four years.

In an “informal” trilateral meeting held in Beijing on May 21, the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan convened under a forum first launched in 2017, and which last met in May 2023.

This time, a key outcome from the meeting, according to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, was a renewed willingness by both Pakistan and Afghanistan to restore diplomatic relations after heightened tensions in recent years.

“Afghanistan and Pakistan expressed clear willingness to elevate diplomatic relations and agreed in principle to exchange ambassadors as soon as possible. China welcomed this and will continue to provideassistance for the improvement of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations,” Wang said.

He added that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – a $62bn mega project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – will now be extended into Afghanistan.

A Pakistani diplomat with direct knowledge of the talks told Al Jazeera that the next round of the trilateral meetings will be held “very soon”, within a few weeks, to build on the momentum from the Beijing conclave.

“I am reasonably optimistic about the outcomes. It was a great confidence- and trust-building exercise between the three countries,” said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity about the Beijing meeting.

Trilateral diplomacy amid Indo-Pakistan tensions

The meeting came after a four-day standoff between Pakistan and India, with both countries claiming “victory” and launching diplomatic offensives to assert dominance.

The conflict, from May 7 to May 10, followed Indian strikes on what it called “terrorist infrastructure” in Pakistan, in retaliation for the Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir last month that left 26 civilians dead. India blamed the attack on Pakistan-based armed groups, an allegation Islamabad denies.

While China urged restraint on both sides, its support for Pakistan was evident on the front lines of the conflict, with the Pakistani military using Chinese fighter jets, missiles, and air defence systems.

On the other hand, Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar said on May 15 that he appreciated Afghan acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s “condemnation” of the Pahalgam attack, in a conversation between the two. Indian media also reported a visit to New Delhi by senior Taliban figure and deputy interior minister, Ibrahim Sadr, in early May.

Mustafa Hyder Sayed, executive director of the Islamabad-based Pakistan-China Institute, called the Beijing meeting “very significant”, given Afghanistan’s geopolitical sensitivity.

For Pakistan and China, the “conflict with India has reinforced strategic clarity” on the need to work closely with Afghanistan,  Sayed said.

Kabul-based political analyst Tameem Bahiss agreed.

“This [the call between Muttaqi and Jaishankar] signals a major shift in India-Afghanistan relations, one that could raise concerns in Islamabad amid an already volatile regional climate,” he said. “The timing of this trilateral meeting, not just its content, reflects an urgent need for coordination among these three countries as new geopolitical dynamics take shape in South and Central Asia.”

Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister, Senator Mohammad Ishaq Dar @MIshaqDar50, Member of the CPC Political Bureau & Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China, Wang Yi, and Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Amir Khan Muttaqi, held an informal trilateral meeting in… pic.twitter.com/xbVcmUDijD

— Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Pakistan (@ForeignOfficePk) May 21, 2025

A rocky relationship

When the Afghan Taliban returned to power in August 2021, many saw it as a win for Pakistan, given its historical ties to the group. From 1996 through 2021, Pakistan was one of the Taliban’s key allies. India, meanwhile, viewed the Taliban as a proxy of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and refused to engage with it.

However, relations between Pakistan and the Taliban have deteriorated.

Pakistan has accused the Afghan Taliban of allowing groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to launch attacks across the border, an allegation the Taliban vehemently deny. The TTP, formed in 2007, shares ideological roots with the Afghan Taliban but operates independently.

According to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan suffered 521 attacks in 2024 – a 70 percent increase from the previous year – resulting in nearly 1,000 civilian and security personnel deaths.

But in a trip that was seen as a potential breakthrough in strained ties, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Kabul on April 19, just days before the Pahalgam attack.

Ihsanullah Tipu, an Islamabad-based security analyst, says Pakistan’s renewed diplomatic outreach to Afghanistan prioritises key concerns, with security taking precedence over trade, border disputes, and border closures, a sentiment he said China also shares.

“To foster meaningful trade ties, Pakistan’s security concerns must be addressed first,” Tipu told Al Jazeera, warning that failure to do so could escalate tensions to armed conflict.

“But given China’s global influence and close ties with both Pakistan and Afghanistan, Beijing can play a pivotal role as a guarantor of any commitments made,” added Tipu, who co-founded the security research portal The Khorasan Diary.

Common security threats

While Pakistan continues to accuse the Afghan Taliban of harbouring fighters who attack targets in Pakistan, many of these assaults have been directed at Chinese nationals working on CPEC projects.

Pakistani government figures estimate that about 20,000 Chinese nationals live in the country. At least 20 have been killed in attacks since 2021 in provinces like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Groups including the TTP have claimed responsibility.

China has also expressed concern over the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), alleging that its fighters use Afghan territory to stage attacks against China.

Sayed of PCI stressed that both Pakistan and China see security as their “core interest” in Afghanistan.

“This is a shared threat, and in the past the ETIM has also had a significance presence in Afghanistan. And these militant networks are connected with each other as well. So that is a pre-requisite for any cooperation to move forward, to first neutralise these terrorist outfits, which seem to be operating freely and comfortably in Afghanistan,” he said.

However, Bahiss noted that since the Taliban’s return to power, most regional countries, including China, have found the security situation inside Afghanistan acceptable, enabling ongoing economic engagement.

“The key exception is Pakistan, which continues to face serious threats from Afghan soil. While Pakistan prioritises eliminating or containing the TTP, Kabul is focused on trade, transit, and regional integration,” he said.

This is where China’s pivotal role could come into the picture, the Kabul-based analyst said, adding that the country is uniquely positioned to mediate by encouraging security cooperation while also advancing trade and transit initiatives that benefit all three countries.

India-Afghanistan ties and Pakistan’s concerns

During the civilian governments in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, India and Afghanistan developed close ties, despite several attacks on Indian diplomatic missions by the Taliban and its allies.

In recent months, there has been increased interaction between officials from New Delhi and Kabul, including the recent Jaishankar-Muttaqi conversation.

Does this warming of ties raise alarm in Islamabad? Sayed doesn’t think so.

“Pakistan doesn’t mistrust Kabul. But Pakistan has asked for action. The rulers there need to walk the talk regarding TTP and other terrorist outfits. I don’t think either Beijing or Islamabad opposes Kabul having positive relations with India, as long as it doesn’t compromise the interests of Pakistan and China,” he said.

However, Bahis said New Delhi’s rapprochement with the Taliban could lead to worries in Pakistan and China, both of which have historically had tense ties with India.

“While recent India-Afghanistan contacts are still in early stages, their timing may raise concerns in Islamabad,” he said.

“Afghanistan has the sovereign right to engage with any country, including India. But it must tread carefully. Clear messaging is essential to ensure that its growing ties with New Delhi aren’t misinterpreted as threats by other regional players,” Bahiss said. “Balancing these complex relationships will require diplomacy, transparency, and mutual respect.”

For a country whose government is not recognised by any nation, Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has had an unusually busy calendar in recent weeks.

He has hosted his counterpart from Pakistan, spoken on the phone with India’s foreign minister, and jetted to Iran and China. In Beijing, he also met the Pakistani foreign minister again. On Wednesday, he joined trilateral talks with delegations from Pakistan and China.

This, even though the ruling Taliban have historically had tense relations with most of these countries, and currently have taut ties with Pakistan, a one-time ally with whom trust is at an all-time low.

While neither the United Nations nor any of its member states formally recognise the Taliban, analysts say that this diplomatic overdrive suggests that the movement is far from a pariah on the global stage.

So why are multiple countries in Afghanistan’s neighbourhood queueing up to engage diplomatically with the Taliban, while avoiding formal recognition?

We unpack the Taliban’s latest high-level regional engagements and look at why India, Pakistan and Iran are all trying to befriend Afghanistan’s rulers, four years after they marched on Kabul and grabbed power.

Who did Muttaqi meet or speak to in recent weeks?

A timeline of Afghanistan’s recent diplomatic engagements:

• April 19: Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar travels with a high-level delegation to Kabul to meet Muttaqi and other Afghan officials. The two sides discussed an ongoing spat over Pakistan’s repatriation of Afghan refugees, bilateral trade and economic cooperation, the Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement.
• May 6: Dar and Muttaqi spoke again on what turned out to be the eve of India’s attack on Pakistan, leading to four days of missile and drone attacks between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. The exchange of fire took place after India accused Pakistan of being involved in the April 22 Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, which left 26 people dead.
• May 15: India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar holds a phone conversation with Muttaqi to express his gratitude for the Taliban’s condemnation of the Pahalgam attacks.
• May 17: Muttaqi arrives in the Iranian capital Tehran to attend the Tehran Dialogue Forum, where he also holds meetings with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Massoud Pazeshkian.
• May 21: Muttaqi visits Beijing. Trilateral talks between Afghanistan, Pakistan and China take place aimed at boosting trade and security between the three countries.

Head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha, Qatar, Suhail Shaheen said the group is a “reality of today’s Afghanistan” as it “controls all territory and borders of the country”.

“The regional countries know this fact and, as such, they engage with the Islamic Emirate at various levels, which is a pragmatic and rational approach in my view,” he told Al Jazeera, referring to the name by which the Taliban refers to the current Afghan state.

“We believe it is through engagement that we can find solutions to issues,” he added, arguing that formal recognition of the Taliban government “not be delayed furthermore”.

“Our region has its own interests and goals that we should adhere to.”

Why is India warming up to the Taliban?

It’s an unlikely partnership. During the Taliban’s initial rule between 1996 and  2001, the Indian government refused to engage with the Afghan group and did not recognise their rule, which at the time was only recognised by Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

India, which had supported the earlier Soviet-backed government of Mohammad Najibullah, shut down its embassy in Kabul once the Taliban came to power: It viewed the Taliban as a proxy of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, which had supported the mujahideen against Moscow.

Instead, New Delhi supported the anti-Taliban opposition group, the Northern Alliance.

Following the United States-led ousting of the Taliban in 2001, India reopened its Kabul embassy and became a significant development partner for Afghanistan, investing more than $3bn in infrastructure, health, education and water projects, according to its Ministry of External Affairs.

But its embassy and consulates came under repeated, deadly attacks from the Taliban and its allies, including the Haqqani group.

After the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, New Delhi evacuated its embassy and once again refused to recognise the group. However, unlike during the Taliban’s first stint in power, India built diplomatic contacts with the group – first behind closed doors, then, increasingly, publicly.

The logic was simple, say analysts: India realised that by refusing to engage with the Taliban earlier, it had ceded influence in Afghanistan to Pakistan, its regional rival.

In June 2022, less than a year after the Taliban’s return to power, India reopened its embassy in Kabul by deploying a team of “technical experts” to run it. In November 2024, the Taliban appointed an acting consul at the Afghan consulate in Mumbai.

Then, last January, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Muttaqi both flew to Dubai for a meeting – the highest-level face-to-face interaction between New Delhi and the Taliban to date.

Kabir Taneja, a deputy director at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation, says not dealing with “whatever political reality sets in in Kabul was never an option” for India.

“No one is pleased per se that the reality is the Taliban,” Taneja told Al Jazeera. However, while India’s “decades-long” efforts to foster goodwill with the Afghan people have faced challenges since the Taliban takeover, they have not been entirely undone.

“Even the Taliban’s ideological stronghold, the Darul Uloom Deoband seminary, is in India,” he added. “These are ties with the country and its actors that cannot be vanquished, and have to be dealt with realistically and practically,” he added.

What is Pakistan’s calculus?

One of the Taliban’s foremost backers between 1996 and 2021, Pakistan has seen its relationship with the group plummet in recent years.

Since the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, Pakistan has seen a surge in violent attacks, which Islamabad attributes to armed groups, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan insists that the TTP operates from Afghan territory and blames the ruling Taliban for allowing them sanctuary – a claim the Taliban government denies.

Emerging in 2007 amid the US-led so-called “war on terror”, the Pakistan Taliban has long challenged Islamabad’s authority through a violent rebellion. Though distinct from the Afghan Taliban, the two are seen as ideologically aligned.

Dar’s visit to Kabul and subsequent communication with Muttaqi represent a “tactical, ad hoc thaw” rather than a substantial shift in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, says Rabia Akhtar, director at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore.

During the recent India-Pakistan crisis, Islamabad grew increasingly concerned about the possibility of Afghanistan allowing its territory to be used by New Delhi against Pakistan, she suggested. “This has increased Islamabad’s urgency to secure its western border,” Akhtar told Al Jazeera.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s decision earlier this year to expel Afghan refugees – including many who have spent most of their lives in Pakistan – and frequent border closures disrupting trade are also sources of tension in the relationship.

The refugees question, in particular, could prove to be a key factor that will shape future relations between the two countries, Akhtar said.

“While Pakistan has pushed for repatriation of undocumented Afghans, Kabul views such deportations as punitive,” she said. “If this dialogue is an indication of a recognition on both sides that confrontation is unsustainable, especially amidst shifting regional alignments and economic pressures, then that’s a good sign.”

The Taliban’s Shaheen said while Kabul wanted good relations with Islamabad, they should be “reciprocated” and that a “blame game” is not in anyone’s interest.

“We have taken practical steps as far as it concerns us,” he said, noting that Afghanistan had started building checkpoints “along the line adjacent to Pakistan in order to prevent any one from crossing”.

“However, their internal security is the responsibility of their security forces not ours.”

China, at the trilateral talks in Beijing on Wednesday, said Kabul and Islamabad had agreed in principle to upgrade diplomatic ties and would send their respective ambassadors at the earliest.

Nevertheless, Akhtar does not expect the “core mistrust” between the two neighbours, particularly over alleged TTP sanctuaries, to “go away any time soon”.

“We should look at this shift as part of Pakistan’s broader crisis management post-India-Pak crisis rather than structural reconciliation,” Akhtar asserted.

What does Iran want from its ties with the Taliban?

Like India, Tehran refused to recognise the Taliban when it was first in power, while backing the Northern Alliance, especially after the 1998 killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif by Taliban fighters.

Iran amassed thousands of troops on its eastern border, nearly going to war with the Taliban over the incident.

Concerned about the extensive US military footprint in the region post-9/11, Iran was said to be quietly engaging with the Taliban, offering limited support in an effort to counter American influence and protect its own strategic interests.

Since the Taliban took back reins of the country nearly four years ago, Iran again showed willingness to build ties with rulers in Kabul on a number of security, humanitarian and trade-related matters, analysts say.

Shaheen, head of the Taliban’s office in Doha, said that both Iran and India previously thought the group was “under the influence of Pakistan”.

“Now they know it is not the reality. In view of this ground reality, they have adopted a new realistic and pragmatic approach, which is good for everyone,” he said.

Ibraheem Bahiss, analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the meeting between Muttaqi and Iranian President Pezeshkian doesn’t signal an “impending official recognition”. However, he said, “pragmatic considerations” have driven Iran to engage the Taliban, given its “key interests” in Afghanistan.

“Security-wise, Tehran wants allies in containing the ISIS [ISIL] local chapter. Tehran has also been seeking to expand its trade relations with Afghanistan, now being one of its major trading partners,” he told Al Jazeera.

In January 2024, twin suicide bombings in Kerman marked one of Iran’s deadliest attacks in decades, killing at least 94 people. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), an Afghanistan-based offshoot of ISIL, claimed responsibility.

In recent years, ISKP has also emerged as a significant challenge to the Taliban’s rule, having carried out multiple high-profile attacks across Afghanistan.

Bahiss added that Tehran also needed a “willing partner” in addressing the issue of some 780,000 Afghan refugees in Iran, as well as the “transboundary water flowing from Helmand River “.

In May 2023, tensions between the two neighbours flared, leading to border clashes in which two Iranian border guards and one Taliban fighter were killed.

The violence came after former and now deceased Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi warned the Taliban not to violate a 1973 treaty by restricting the flow of water from the Helmand River to Iran’s eastern regions. Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers denied the accusation.

A ‘comprehensive review’ of the US’s chaotic military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 has also been ordered.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that the United States is reviewing whether to designate Afghanistan’s rulers, the Taliban, as a “foreign terrorist organization”.

Rubio told the House Foreign Affairs Committee during a hearing on Capitol Hill in Washington on Wednesday, “I believe that classification is now, once again, under review.”

The response came a day after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered a “comprehensive review” of the United States’s chaotic military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, an evacuation operation in which 13 US service members and 150 Afghans were killed at Kabul’s airport in an ISIL (ISIS) bombing.

Hegseth said in a memo on Tuesday that after three months of assessing the withdrawal, a comprehensive review was needed to ensure accountability for this event.

“This remains an important step toward regaining faith and trust with the American people and all those who wear the uniform, and is prudent based on the number of casualties and equipment lost during the execution of this withdrawal operation,” Hegseth wrote.

Former President Joe Biden’s administration, which oversaw the pull-out, mostly blamed the resulting chaos on a lack of planning and reductions in troops by the first Donald Trump administration, following its deal with the Taliban to accelerate the withdrawal of US forces.

Trump had signed the deal with the Taliban in Doha in February 2020 aimed at ending its 18-year war in Afghanistan, beginning with the withdrawal of about 4,000 troops “within months”.

The then-Trump administration had agreed it would withdraw from the country by May 2021 if the Taliban negotiated a peace agreement with the Afghan government and promised to prevent internationally designated terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, from gaining a foothold in the country.

After assuming office in January 2021, Biden said he had to respect the agreement or risk new conflicts with the Taliban, which could have required additional troops in Afghanistan.

On the 2024 campaign trail, Trump frequently criticised Biden and his administration for the withdrawal, saying that the manner in which it was done “was the most embarrassing day in the history of our country’s life.” Trump said that the withdrawal should have been done with “dignity, with strength, with power.”

Senior US military officials, including then-Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and the then-top US general, Mark Milley, have already appeared before lawmakers to give their testimonies regarding the withdrawal.

The war in Afghanistan from 2001-2021 was the US’s longest war, surpassing Vietnam.

It remains unclear how Hegseth’s review would differ from the many previous reviews carried out by the US military, Department of State and Trump’s fellow Republicans in the House of Representatives.

US Central Command, which oversees operations in the Middle East, has also carried out an investigation into the ISIL attack on Kabul during the last few days of the withdrawal.

The digital battleground has become an increasingly critical theatre for modern geopolitical conflicts, and the Taliban’s recent social media campaign targeting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia (KSA) underscores this shift. Following the UAE’s warm reception of former U.S. President Donald Trump, a surge of hostile online activity emerged, orchestrated by Taliban-linked accounts under the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). This campaign, executed through human-operated parody profiles, blends religious rhetoric, violent threats, and geopolitical grievances to undermine Gulf states’ legitimacy while reinforcing the Taliban’s ideological stance. The sophistication of this operation reveals not just a localized grievance but a broader strategy of asymmetric warfare, leveraging digital tools to exert influence beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

Central to the Taliban’s messaging is the accusation that the UAE has “disgraced Islam and the Ummah” by engaging with Trump, a figure historically criticized in the Muslim world for policies such as the travel ban on several Muslim-majority nations and his administration’s unwavering support for Israel. By framing the UAE’s diplomatic overtures as a betrayal of Islamic solidarity, the Taliban seeks to galvanize conservative Muslim audiences, casting Gulf states as Western collaborators. This narrative is not new, extremist groups have long employed religious rhetoric to isolate moderate Muslim nations, but the Taliban’s institutionalized use of social media amplifies its reach and potency.

Beyond ideological condemnation, the campaign escalates into explicit threats, with multiple accounts referencing the “yellow keg”, a signature Taliban improvised explosive device (IED) used extensively against US forces during the 2001–2021 conflict. The deliberate invocation of this imagery serves a dual purpose: it signals the Taliban’s continued embrace of violent tactics while psychologically intimidating its targets. Such threats, even if symbolic, carry the risk of inspiring lone actors or affiliated militant cells to pursue physical attacks, particularly given the historical precedent of Taliban-linked violence extending beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

While the UAE remains the primary target, the campaign’s inclusion of Saudi Arabia suggests a broader ideological offensive against Gulf monarchies perceived as aligning too closely with Western powers. The use of Pashto and Dari, languages dominant in Afghanistan but also understood among diaspora and regional jihadist circles, ensures localized resonance while maintaining plausible deniability for the Taliban’s central leadership. This linguistic choice, combined with the recycling of accounts historically used to promote Taliban edicts, reinforces the campaign’s authenticity within its intended audience.

The campaign’s timing, thematic coherence, and operational signatures point to centralized coordination, likely emanating from the Taliban’s GDI. Unlike fragmented extremist online activity, this effort displays a clear command structure, mirroring the Taliban’s disciplined approach to information warfare. The reuse of accounts previously associated with official Taliban narratives further underscores institutional involvement, distinguishing it from grassroots anti-UAE sentiment. This digital offensive aligns with the Taliban’s long-standing reliance on psychological operations, extending their influence without direct military confrontation.

The ramifications of this campaign extend far beyond social media vitriol. First, it seeks to erode the UAE’s and KSA’s religious legitimacy, particularly among conservative Muslim populations and transnational jihadist groups still active in Afghanistan. By casting these nations as apostates, the Taliban aims to fracture intra-Islamic solidarity, potentially driving recruitment for anti-Gulf militancy.

Second, the campaign reaffirms the Taliban’s commitment to asymmetric warfare. Despite their formal control of Afghanistan, the group continues to employ hybrid tactics, blending insurgency, propaganda, and diplomacy, to challenge adversaries indirectly. The digital domain offers a low-cost, high-impact arena to sustain pressure without provoking immediate military retaliation.

Most alarmingly, the explicit references to past IED tactics suggest a latent threat of physical escalation. While the Taliban may not directly orchestrate attacks on Gulf soil, the rhetoric could incite sympathizers or affiliate groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to act. The UAE and KSA, both vocal opponents of Islamist extremism, remain high-value targets for such elements.

To counter this evolving threat, a multi-faceted approach is essential:

• Gulf states should collaborate with international cybersecurity firms to identify and dismantle Taliban-linked networks, focusing on parody accounts and coordinated disinformation campaigns.
• Governments and religious institutions in the UAE and KSA must amplify moderate Islamic voices to delegitimize the Taliban’s extremist framing.
• Strengthening intelligence cooperation among Gulf nations and allies can pre-empt potential offline threats inspired by online incitement.
• Social media companies must enforce stricter verification processes to curb the proliferation of fake accounts disseminating violent propaganda.
• The international community should hold the Taliban accountable for digital incitement, linking sanctions relief to the cessation of hostile online campaigns.

“The internet is the first battlefield of the 21st century.” Wang Huning

The Taliban’s latest campaign exemplifies this reality, proving that in an interconnected world, ideological and physical conflicts are increasingly waged through pixels and propaganda. For the UAE and KSA, the challenge lies not only in defending their digital frontiers but in ensuring that online hostilities do not manifest in tangible violence. As the Taliban refines its hybrid warfare playbook, the global community must adapt, recognizing that the next threat may emerge not from a battlefield, but from a smartphone.

FREDERICKSBURG, Va. — Kat Renfroe was at Mass when she saw a volunteer opportunity in the bulletin. Her Catholic parish was looking for tutors for Afghan youth, newly arrived in the United States.

There was a personal connection for Renfroe. Her husband, now retired from the Marine Corps, had deployed to Afghanistan four times. “He just never talked about any other region the way he did about the people there,” she said.

She signed up to volunteer. “It changed my life,” she said.

That was seven years ago. She and her husband are still close to the young man she tutored, along with his family. And Renfroe has made a career of working with refugees. She now supervises the Fredericksburg migration and refugee services office, part of Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Arlington.

That faith-based work is now in peril. As part of President Trump’s immigration crackdown, his administration banned most incoming refugees in January and froze federal funds for the programs. Across the country, local resettlement agencies like hers have been forced to lay off staff or close their doors. Refugees and other legal migrants have been left in limbo, including Afghans who supported the U.S. in their native country.

The upheaval is particularly poignant in this part of Virginia, which boasts both strong ties to the military and to resettled Afghans, along with faith communities that support both groups.

Situated south of Washington and wedged among military bases, Fredericksburg and its surrounding counties are home to tens of thousands of veterans and active-duty personnel.

Virginia has resettled more Afghan refugees per capita than any other state. The Fredericksburg area now has halal markets, Afghan restaurants and school outreach programs for families who speak Dari and Pashto.

Many of these U.S.-based Afghans are still waiting for family members to join them — hopes that appear on indefinite hold. Families fear a new travel ban will emerge with Afghanistan on the list. A subset of Afghans already in the U.S. may soon face deportation as the Trump administration ends their temporary protected status.

“I think it’s tough for military families, especially those who have served, to look back on 20 years and not feel as though there’s some confusion and maybe even some anger about the situation,” Renfroe said.

The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops announced in April that it was ending its decades-old partnership with the federal government to resettle refugees. The move came after the Trump administration halted the program’s federal funding, which the bishops’ conference channels to local Catholic Charities.

The Fredericksburg Catholic Charities office has continued aiding current clients and operating with minimal layoffs thanks to its diocese’s support and state funds. But it’s unclear what the local agency’s future will be without federal funding or arriving refugees.

“I’ll just keep praying,” Renfroe said. “It’s all I can do from my end.”

A legacy of faith-based service

Religious groups have long been at the heart of U.S. refugee resettlement work. Until the recent policy changes, seven out of the 10 national organizations that partnered with the U.S. government to resettle refugees were faith-based. They were aided by hundreds of local affiliates and religious congregations.

Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Arlington has been working with refugees for 50 years, starting with Vietnamese people after the fall of Saigon. For the last 10 years, most of its clients have been Afghans, with an influx arriving in 2021 after the Taliban returned to power.

Area faith groups like Renfroe’s large church — St. Mary’s in Fredericksburg — have been key to helping Afghan newcomers get on their feet. Volunteers from local congregations furnish homes, provide meals and drive families to appointments.

“As a church, we care deeply. As Christians, we care deeply,” said Joi Rogers, who led the Afghan ministry at her Southern Baptist church. “As military, we also just have an obligation to them as people that committed to helping the U.S. in our mission over there.”

Rogers’ husband, Jake, a former Marine, is one of the pastors at Pillar, a network of 16 Southern Baptist churches that minister to military members. Their flagship location is near Quantico, the Marine base in northern Virginia, where nearly 5,000 Afghans were evacuated to after the fall of Kabul.

With Southern Baptist relief funds, Pillar Church hired Joi Rogers to work part time as a volunteer coordinator in the base’s makeshift refugee camp in 2021. She helped organize programming, including children’s activities. Her position was under the auspices of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, which the government contracted to help run the camp.

For Pillar’s founding pastor, Colby Garman, the effort was an easy decision. “It was affecting so many of the lives of our families here who had served in Afghanistan.”

“We’ve been told to love God and love our neighbor,” Garman said. “I said to our people, this is an opportunity, a unique opportunity, for us to demonstrate love for our neighbor.”

Christians called to care for refugees, politics aside

Within five months, as the Afghans left the base for locations around the country, the support at the camp transitioned to the broader community. Pillar started hosting an English class. Church members visited locally resettled families and tried to keep track of their needs.

For one Pillar Church couple in nearby Stafford, Va., that meant opening their home to a teenager who had arrived alone in the U.S. after being separated from her family at the Kabul airport — a situation they heard about through the church.

Katlyn Williams and her husband Phil Williams, then an active-duty Marine, served as foster parents for Mahsa Zarabi, now 20, during her junior and senior years of high school. They introduced her to many American firsts: the beach, homecoming, learning to drive.

“The community was great,” Zarabi said. “They welcomed me very well.”

She attends college nearby; the Williamses visit her monthly. During the Muslim holy month of Ramadan this spring, they broke fast with her and her family, now safely in Virginia.

“She has and will always be part of our family,” Katlyn Williams said.

Her friend Joi Rogers, while careful not to speak for Pillar, said watching the recent dismantling of the federal refugee program has “been very hard for me personally.”

Veterans and members of the military tend to vote Republican. Most Southern Baptists are among Trump’s staunch white evangelical supporters. For those reasons, Pillar pastor Garman knows it may be surprising to some that his church network has been steadfast in supporting refugees.

“I totally understand that is the case, but I think that is a bias of just not knowing who we are and what we do,” Garman said after a recent Sunday service.

Later, sitting in the church office with his wife, Jake Rogers said, “We recognize that there are really faithful Christians that could lie on either side of the issue of refugee policy.”

“Regardless of your view on what our national stance should be on this,” he said, “we as Christ followers should have a heart for these people that reflects God’s heart for these people.”

Unity through faith and refugee work

Later that week, nearly two dozen Afghan women gathered around a table at the Fredericksburg refugee office, while children played with toys in the corner. The class topic was self-care, led by an Afghan staff member. Along the back wall waited dishes of rice and chicken, part of a celebratory potluck to mark the end of Ramadan.

Sitting at the front was Suraya Qaderi, the last client to arrive at the resettlement agency before the U.S. government suspended new arrivals.

She was in Qatar waiting to be cleared for a flight to the United States when the Trump administration started canceling approved travel plans for refugees. “I was one of the lucky last few,” said Qaderi, who was allowed to proceed.

She arrived in Virginia on Jan. 24, the day the administration sent stop-work orders to resettlement agencies.

Qaderi worked for the election commission in Afghanistan, and she received a special immigrant visa for her close ties to the U.S. government. She was a child when her father disappeared under the previous Taliban regime.

The return of the Taliban government was like “the end of the world,” she said. As a woman, she lost many of her rights, including her ability to work and leave home unaccompanied.

She studied Islamic law during her university years. She believes the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam is wrong on the rights of women. “Islam is not only for them,” she said.

The resettlement office includes not only Catholic staffers, but many Muslim employees and clients. “We find so much commonality between our faiths,” Renfroe said.

Her Catholic faith guides her work, and it’s sustaining her through the uncertainty of what the funding and policy changes will mean for her organization, which remains committed to helping refugees.

“I’m happy to go back to being a volunteer again if that’s what it takes,” Renfroe said.

Regardless of government contracts, she wants local refugee families to know “that we’re still here, that we care about them and that we want to make sure that they have what they need.”

Stanley writes for the Associated Press.