Afghanistan

Rescuers in eastern Afghanistan are searching through mud and rubble after flash floods and a landslide tore through Nuristan province. At least 23 people have been killed and dozens are still missing as officials warn of more heavy rain and a rising death toll.

In the United Arab Emirates, women hold half of all parliamentary seats, a threshold reached by only six national legislatures on Earth. In Afghanistan, a fellow member of the same fifty seven nation bloc, girls are barred by law from any education beyond primary school, the only country where that is true. On July 12 and 13, 2026, delegates from all fifty seven states gathered in Islamabad to adopt a single shared declaration on women’s empowerment. The distance between those two realities is the actual subject the declaration had to confront, whether its authors framed it that way or not.

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation represents fifty seven states and close to 1.9 billion people, a demographic scale matched by few multilateral bodies. What it conspicuously lacks is a shared starting point on gender equality, and the scale of that lack is easy to understate until the two ends of the distribution are placed side by side. The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2025 ranks the United Arab Emirates 69th of 146 economies overall, with full parliamentary parity and women occupying nearly two thirds of federal leadership roles. It ranks Bangladesh 24th of 148, the strongest performer in South Asia for a second consecutive year, having closed 73 percent of its overall gender gap after decades of expanding a legislative quota from 7 percent of seats to 30. At the opposite pole, three of the only five economies anywhere in the world governed by an entirely male cabinet, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, are OIC members, and Oman remains the sole national parliament on the planet with no women seated in it at all. Afghanistan sits outside even that range. It is the only country on Earth barring girls from secondary and higher education by law, a policy that currently excludes close to 2.2 million girls from formal schooling altogether.

This is the span the Islamabad Declaration was written into, and it is worth pausing on what that span actually implies. A framework broad enough to be endorsed by both Abu Dhabi and Kabul’s immediate neighbors within the same bloc can, almost by construction, say very little about what any single government is actually required to do. Language capacious enough to cover a country with full parliamentary parity and a country that bars girls from secondary school is language calibrated for consensus, not for consequence. The more useful question, then, is not whether the declaration reads as ambitious, most instruments of this kind do, but whether the bloc has built, or shows any sign of building, a mechanism capable of moving its weakest performers rather than simply narrating the achievements of its strongest.

Where the record earns genuine credit

Some of what the OIC claims for itself withstands scrutiny, and is worth crediting on its own terms rather than dissolved into a general skepticism about summit diplomacy. Female enrollment in tertiary education has expanded meaningfully across member states, and the bloc’s own reporting places women at just over 39 percent of researchers across OIC countries, ahead of the roughly 34 percent global average. Maternal and child health outcomes have improved alongside it. But the most persuasive evidence for what actually moves the needle sits not in the declaration’s language but in the legislative record beneath it. Global data from the Inter Parliamentary Union shows that countries employing electoral quotas elected women at a rate of 31.2 percent in 2024, against 16.8 percent in countries without them, a gap of nearly two to one that survives across regions and income levels. Bangladesh’s own trajectory, from a 7 percent quota to 30, tracks that pattern almost precisely, and the United Arab Emirates reached full parliamentary parity through a comparable top down legal commitment rather than the slow accretion of social change. Where OIC member states have adopted binding, specific instruments, quotas above all others, the results are visible and replicable in the data. That is a genuine and transferable finding, and it rests on firmer ground than most of the rhetoric surrounding it.

The economic weakness the whole bloc shares, to varying degrees

Set the political headlines aside and the bloc’s collective vulnerability comes into sharper focus around economic participation. The OIC’s own assessment puts female labor force participation across member states at roughly 41 percent against 76 percent for men, and estimates some 106 million young people across the bloc as neither employed, in education, nor in training, with young women disproportionately represented among them. Southern Asia, the region anchoring several of the OIC’s most populous members, registers the weakest economic participation score of any region tracked in the Global Gender Gap Report, a full thirty five points separating its best and worst performing economies from one another. Even the UAE and Bangladesh, the bloc’s clearest political success stories, have not resolved this dimension with anything like the completeness they have brought to representation, which suggests economic inclusion answers to different levers than legislative quotas do, and that the declaration’s language on finance, entrepreneurship, and employment access is, whether by design or accident, aimed at the harder of the bloc’s two structural problems.

The test the declaration cannot argue its way around

Afghanistan is where the claim that voluntary declarations carry real weight meets its sharpest and least forgiving test. At the same Islamabad conference, delegates stated plainly that the Taliban’s restrictions on women harm the image of Islam and are inconsistent with Islamic teaching, echoing an OIC position from previous years that described the restrictions as contrary to the faith the bloc exists to represent. The Muslim World League, the largest Islamic non governmental organization in the world, has separately and repeatedly urged the Taliban to reverse the bans. The response from Kabul has been unambiguous. Spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid has told international audiences that women’s rights are fully protected under the group’s interpretation of Sharia, and Taliban officials have characterized the education ban as an internal matter closed to outside comment, a position firm enough to have stalled unrelated talks over frozen central bank assets as recently as May 2026.

The stakes of this reach well beyond Afghanistan’s borders. If the bloc’s most unified and most theologically grounded criticism, the accusation that a member state’s policy is contrary to Islam itself, produces no observable change in that state’s conduct, it becomes a reasonable proxy for how much practical force softer, less unified language on labor force participation or quota adoption is likely to carry anywhere else in the bloc. The Islamabad Declaration has no enforcement mechanism for Afghanistan, and, tellingly, does not appear to need one in order to be adopted, since adoption requires only consensus on wording, not compliance with it.

Taking the structural counterargument seriously

There is a coherent case that expecting more than this from the OIC misreads what kind of institution it actually is. A consensus body spanning constitutional monarchies, parliamentary republics, and a Taliban administered emirate cannot plausibly issue binding standards on domestic labor law or family structure without member states either declining to sign or signing without any intention of compliance, an outcome arguably worse than the present voluntary model. Under this reading, the declaration’s proper function is to establish a shared reference point and let reputational pressure and peer example, the UAE and Bangladesh held up as internal proof of concept, do the work that binding law structurally cannot. The newly launched Islamabad Initiative on Women’s Digital Inclusion, a voluntary platform for digital literacy, entrepreneurship, and technology access, is built entirely on that theory of change: participation by choice rather than compliance by mandate. Judged against that more modest theory rather than against an enforcement standard it was never designed to meet, the declaration may be performing precisely as intended, and the fair critique is not that it fails at its stated purpose, but that its stated purpose may simply be too modest for the scale of the problem it describes.

Three paths from here

The most probable trajectory, roughly half of plausible outcomes by our estimate, is that the demonstration effect model continues largely undisturbed: the UAE and Bangladesh keep improving and are cited internally as proof the model works, the bloc’s lowest tier, Afghanistan most starkly, remains unmoved by rhetorical pressure however strongly it is worded, and the aggregate figures stay roughly flat because gains concentrated at the top fail to transmit downward through the distribution.

A second and less likely path, perhaps three in ten, sees middle tier member states, those possessing neither the UAE’s resources nor Afghanistan’s total exclusion, adopting elements of the proposed Gender Equality Dashboard or the digital inclusion platform in a genuine if partial way, narrowing the bloc’s middle even while its extremes remain fixed in place.

A third and least likely path, perhaps one in five, involves the range widening further still, driven by continuing instability among the bloc’s weakest performers, Afghanistan foremost among them but potentially compounded by conflict or governance stress elsewhere, at a pace that outstrips whatever gains the top and middle of the distribution manage to produce.

The indicator worth watching

The clearest available test is not whether the OIC issues further statements on Afghanistan, since it plainly will, but whether the Gender Equality Dashboard or the Digital Inclusion Initiative produces any actual, published, comparative country level data within the current reporting cycle. A voluntary framework that generates public comparison functions differently, in practice, from one that generates only communiques, since comparison is the mechanism from which reputational pressure, the model’s only real lever, actually derives. A second and narrower indicator is whether Afghanistan’s formal relationship with OIC gender programming registers any change whatsoever, even nominal engagement, as distinct from continued flat rejection, since that alone would be the first sign that unified religious framing carries weight the bloc’s other instruments do not.

What this means for institutional readers

For Western multilateral institutions and United Nations agencies, the OIC’s internal variance means that a single engagement strategy toward the bloc on gender issues is analytically weak on its face. The UAE and Bangladesh are credible technical partners on quota design and implementation, while engagement on Afghanistan specifically should continue to run primarily through humanitarian and human rights channels, given that the OIC’s own most unified criticism has already been tested there and found to carry no observable weight.

For investors and development finance institutions assessing exposure across OIC economies, a female labor force participation range running from roughly 22 percent to over 70 percent within a single fifty seven member bloc constitutes one of the more differentiated and independently checkable indicators available for human capital and productivity due diligence on any individual member state, and merits assessment country by country rather than reliance on the bloc’s aggregate language.

For rights focused organizations and donors, the quota evidence, 31.2 percent representation where legal quotas exist against 16.8 percent where they do not, is the single most defensible, causally grounded policy argument available to press within OIC forums, considerably more persuasive than the broader declaratory commitments on empowerment that lack a comparably rigorous evidentiary foundation.

BEIRUT  — President Trump long railed against forever wars.

For years, whether as president or candidate, he flayed electoral opponents and previous presidents with his signature barbs, calling their entanglements a “complete waste of time” (Afghanistan), “the worst single mistake ever made in the history of our country” (Iraq) and “stupid” (Ukraine).

Yet he now appears to be stumbling into a forever war of his own.

From the first days of the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran, Trump and his officials insisted their adventure abroad would be the exception, that the conflict would end in a matter of weeks.

Now, 4½ months later, after a torturous, start-stop vacillation between truce and war, the U.S. is pressing on with a fight that has no end in sight — or even a clear definition of what an acceptable end would be.

In the last week, the ceasefire collapsed, with the U.S. and Iran trading daily waves of strikes, leading to the deaths of two American servicemen on Friday when Iranian ballistic missiles struck Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, where U.S. assets and personnel are stationed.

On Sunday, as the U.S. and Iran launched more air assaults, the U.S. announced that a service member was killed Saturday in Iraq during the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance from a downed Iranian one-way attack drone.

On March 9, the remains of U.S. Army Sgt. Benjamin N. Pennington, 26, of Glendale, Ky., then the seventh U.S. service member to die in combat during the Iran war, are transferred at Dover Air Force Base, Del.

(Julia Demaree Nikhinson / Associated Press)

The deaths in Jordan were the first combat fatalities since the U.S. and Iran agreed to a ceasefire. One soldier remains missing, according to a statement from U.S. Central Command.

Including the most recent casualties, 17 U.S. service members have been killed and more than 430 wounded since the war began, the Pentagon says.

In Iran, at least 57 people have been killed and more than 517 injured in U.S. attacks in the last three weeks, according to Iranian health authorities. The death toll since the beginning of the war has surpassed 3,500, and more than 27,000 have been wounded.

The U.S. and Israeli militaries have — in the telling of Trump and various officials — decimated Iran’s navy and air defenses, eviscerated multiple layers of its leadership and bombed tens of thousands of targets across the country.

Despite that military pressure, and Trump’s insistence that members of Iran’s leadership “want to make a deal” (he’s said that an accord was on hand no less than 46 times since the start of the war), Tehran has refused to surrender its nuclear and missile arsenals and continues to support its regional militia allies.

Iran has also created a new pressure point to use against adversaries by blockading the Strait of Hormuz, the vital waterway through which a fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas flowed before the war. And it has widened the war’s footprint by targeting countries hosting American military assets.

Trump has vowed to expand bombings to include civilian infrastructure such as power plants and bridges in what he says is a bid to force Iran into negotiations once more.

He has also brought additional forces to the Middle East. According to Centcom, there are now 50,000 troops in the region, along with 20 naval warships and hundreds of warplanes.

U.S. Central Command, which oversees operations in the region, declined to comment on the deployments, though on Sunday the New York Times reported that the U.S. was sending to the region F-16 fighter jets from Germany and stealthy F-35 jets from Britain.

For observers, those moves signal that Trump is falling into an escalation trap.

“From Trump’s perspective, the easiest way to demonstrate resolve and power is by just bombing Iran and seeing what that brings about,” said Andreas Boehm, a Middle East expert and lecturer on international law at University of St. Gallen in Switzerland. Although those strikes seem tactically impressive, they have not helped him strategically, he said.

“In reality, it doesn’t change the situation because the Iranians won’t budge. And if you confuse tactical and strategic success, then you’re not going anywhere in any kind of war,” Boehm said.

An escalation on Washington’s part is also certain to spark a similar reaction from Tehran, said Vali Nasr, professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

“Iran gets a vote here,” Nasr said, adding Iran could up the ante by closing Bab al Mandab, the vital strait connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. It could also widen attacks on infrastructure in Persian Gulf countries — moves that would trigger an even bigger ripple effect across global markets.

“Trump thought wars in the Middle East would be like Venezuela: a big in-and-out without a prolonged war,” Nasr said, referring to the Trump administration’s strike that saw U.S. forces abduct Venezuelan leader Nicholás Maduro and force the remaining members of his government to submit to U.S. control.

“And the reality is that it’s backfired,” he said.

Trump is not the first American president to think a foreign engagement wouldn’t last long. Whether in Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq, U.S. leaders dispatched troops on operations they thought would last weeks or months, dismissing warnings that they would be bogged down in years-long occupations.

Iran would be an especially sticky quagmire if Trump were to commit ground troops.

The country’s area — about 636,000 square miles — is more than double the size of Afghanistan, almost four times the size of Iraq, and five times the size of Vietnam — all nations where the U.S. struggled to prevail against adversaries not as well equipped and arguably less ideologically motivated than its adversaries in Iran.

Meanwhile, for a president whose central foreign policy campaign promise was no more wars, the growing number of casualties, along with the escalating damage inflicted by Iran on U.S. assets and allies, has exposed cracks in the support the Teflon-like Trump has enjoyed from his advocates.

Onetime MAGA acolytes, including flagship conservative figures such as Tucker Carlson, Megyn Kelly and Alex Jones, have already turned on the president over the war and other issues. And Republican figures who had tied their star to Trump fear a drubbing in the midterms so long as the war continues.

If negotiations were to resume, it’s unclear whether Trump and his coterie of negotiators have the stamina or the foreign service expertise to bring about an accord.

After all, the 2015 Obama-era deal aimed at reining in Tehran’s nuclear program took 600 days and hundreds of diplomats and technical experts to negotiate.

With Trump relying on unconventional fixers such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and real estate investor Steve Witkoff, not to mention his evisceration of the diplomatic corps, an agreement of that scale appears unlikely.

“Everything is dependent on the mood of one man,” Nasr said.

“It’s not the system that’s making the decision; it’s not the country making the decision,” he said. “It’s one man, and it depends how he feels like at one particular point in time.”

Tehran too may be less amenable to negotiations with Trump, given his history: During his first term, he pulled out of the nuclear deal and ordered the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, a leading Iranian general.

In his second term, he launched bombing campaigns on Iran during negotiations — twice. And Iran accused the U.S. of repeatedly violating the April ceasefire and the memorandum of understanding signed in June.

Asked on NewsNation on Sunday about Iran’s announcement that it would no longer abide by the memorandum, Trump said, “I couldn’t care less.”

Such factors, said Ali Vaez, the Iran project director for the International Crisis Group, lead to a formula for prolonged conflict.

“It’s a forever war in the making, and the reason why is that Trump has proven he’s impossible to negotiate with,” Vaez said.

If an agreement as superficial as the memorandum of understanding — which deferred thornier issues for late negotiations — was derailed, then there’s little option other than repeated cycles of violence.

“Once you’ve proven that diplomacy doesn’t work,” he said, “then there’s only war.”

With the passing of another government deadline for undocumented Afghans to leave, Pakistan has launched a new crackdown on thousands still living in the country.

In response to criticism, authorities say they are enforcing immigration laws and cite national security concerns.

Hundreds of thousands of Afghans have returned to a country they fled. The UN says they include undocumented migrants, refugees and Afghan citizen card holders.

The campaign has coincided with rising political tensions between Islamabad and Kabul.

But is politics involved in the rising tension between the neighbours? And how is Kabul dealing with the influx of returnees?

Presenter: Scott McLean

Guests:

Obaidullah Baheer – Adjunct lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan

Kamran Bokhari – Senior fellow with the Middle East Policy Council in Washington, DC

Zahid Mahmood – Pakistani defence analyst and former senior officer of the Pakistan Army

Belgium has issued five visas to a Taliban delegation to attend a European Union meeting on migration in Brussels and discuss the deportation of Afghan asylum seekers from European nations.

The meeting, expected to take place on Tuesday, will be the first time the EU has hosted the group since it returned to power in Afghanistan almost five years ago.

A spokesperson from the Belgian Foreign Ministry told reporters that the five visas were granted on Monday after a security assessment and that they are valid for Belgium for one day only.

The European Commission said it has invited the Taliban officials for discussions on irregular migration from Afghanistan to the 27-member bloc, and to also discuss the deportation of Afghan people in the EU who have had their asylum applications rejected.

The EU has not identified which Taliban representatives were invited to the meeting. Several senior Taliban leaders are also under EU sanctions.

“Member States are looking into ways to return persons who have committed serious crimes and who are possibly a security threat. So this is the initiative that the Commission is now following up on,” Commission spokesman Markus Lammert told the EU’s daily news briefing on Monday.

According to a letter seen by the Reuters news agency and addressed to Abdul Qahar Balkhi, a Taliban Foreign Ministry spokesman, the meeting will focus on “the return and readmission of Afghan nationals without a right to stay in the European Union”.

The Commission, however, emphasised that this meeting does not mean Brussels is formally recognising the Taliban.

Since returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban have steadily curtailed rights, restricting women’s freedom of movement, banning girls from education beyond primary school, and enforcing morality laws that limit free expression and access to employment. European governments also shut their embassies in Kabul when the Taliban authorities returned to power.

Rights organisations have asked the Commission to abandon its plans to talk with the Taliban.

“Any engagement with the Taliban needs to prioritise protecting human rights and accountability – not deporting people to danger there,” Fereshta Abbasi, Afghanistan researcher at Human Rights Watch, said.

Earlier this month, the EU’s migration chief Magnus Brunner defended the outreach, saying Brussels had no other option than to talk to the Taliban government about returning Afghan asylum seekers who had entered the 27-member bloc irregularly.

European governments have sought a tougher stance on migration as public opinion has hardened, spurring far-right electoral gains across the continent.

EU countries have received about a million asylum applications filed by Afghans between 2013 and 2024, according to the bloc’s migration agency.

Although Afghans are among the nationalities with the highest asylum recognition rates in the EU, overall acceptance has tightened as migration ⁠policies become more restrictive.

About 20 of the EU’s 27 member states expressed interest in returning numbers of migrants without a right to stay, particularly those with criminal convictions, to Afghanistan in a letter last year.

EU law allows for deportations of people convicted of serious crimes or ⁠deemed security threats in certain cases, but returns to Afghanistan have been limited due to the lack of diplomatic relations.

“The focus for member states is very much on persons who have committed serious crimes or who pose a security threat,” Commission spokesman Lammert told journalists Monday.

Afghanistan is, however, currently mired in a deep humanitarian crisis. According to the United Nations World Food Programme, more than 17 million Afghans – or one-third of the population – are “food insecure”, while the country is absorbing tens of thousands of people returning from Iran and Pakistan.

“The desperate scenes of people – including EU staff – fleeing Afghanistan are a recent memory,” Eve Geddie, director of Amnesty International’s European Institutions Office, said in a statement.

“It is unconscionable that the EU would now try and deport people to Afghanistan, which has only become more dangerous in the meantime,” she added.

No group has yet claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Two roadside bomb blasts in northwestern Pakistan have killed at least seven people.

The first explosion on Saturday hit a vehicle, and the second was detonated as rescuers responded, police said.

“A private pick-up truck carrying passengers was targeted with a remote-controlled IED,” said Yasir Afridi, a police officer in Bannu district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan, using a common acronym for a homemade bomb.

“The injured were being transported to hospital in a car for emergency treatment when a second IED exploded,” he said, adding that three people were wounded.

Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif condemned the attack and said the government would bring those responsible to justice.

There has been no claim of responsibility for the blast, but the Pakistan Taliban, known by the acronym TTP, and other armed groups operate in the area.

Pakistan has blamed Afghanistan for a surge in attacks near the border, although the Taliban government in Kabul has repeatedly denied Pakistani accusations that Afghan territory is used as a sanctuary for armed groups.

Frosty relations have escalated into clashes in recent months, including Pakistani air strikes on Afghan cities.

Pakistani air strikes near the border this month killed at least 26 Taliban fighters, the Pakistani government said, while the Afghan government said 12 civilians were killed.

The border has remained largely closed since violence escalated in October, freezing bilateral trade and disrupting the movement of people and goods.

In April, I accompanied a friend on a visit to villages in Daikundi province, central Afghanistan. The purpose of the trip was to speak to farmer beneficiaries of a project that an NGO operating in the agriculture sector had carried out and to follow up on its impact. The week I spent travelling with him was quite eye-opening regarding the state of the non-profit sector in the country.

The project in question provided zero-energy storage houses to preserve harvests, such as fruit and vegetables, in rural areas. On the surface, the idea was promising: provide farmers with storage space so they could sell their produce over a few months.

However, the farmers we spoke to in several villages showed us heaps of apples decaying beneath the trees. They complained that the storage houses had space for the apples of only two to three families in the entire village.

In another village, we saw frustration with another project from a different NGO. That organisation had bought imported seeds for various vegetables and distributed them among farmers. Staff members provided training, conducted weeks of workshops on cultivation methods and techniques, and regularly monitored the crops.

The local participants invested significant time, energy, land, and water in the project. But the harvest they got from these imported seeds was very little and of poor quality. Despite the enormous amount of money spent by the NGO on surveying, training, logistics, transportation, and staff salaries, the vegetables for each family amounted to about 450 Afghans (roughly $7). There was no accountability for the farmers’ losses.

Such stories are common across rural communities in Afghanistan. While aid organisations publish reports of their achievements, many beneficiaries gain little from poorly designed projects that fail to address the real challenges they face. The cost of these projects is extremely high, but the output is often too little.

Since the Taliban took over Kabul and the US-led coalition withdrew from the country, humanitarian aid and funding in Afghanistan have dramatically collapsed. The struggle to secure funds, however, has not led to better efficiency, accountability, and transparency among the NGOs still operating in Afghanistan.

This is not a recent phenomenon. Between 2001 and 2021, Afghanistan became the poster child for corruption, embezzlement, and waste of foreign aid. One US journalist described it as “the $148 bn failure”.

According to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), set up by the United States to investigate fraud with US funds, between $26bn and $29bn was lost due to embezzlement or wasteful spending. This was just funding provided by the US government; there is no estimate for how much was wasted from other donors.

While much of the foreign funds went to the security sector, a significant amount went to the non-profit sphere, where waste was also widespread. Millions, if not billions, worth of projects became a missed opportunity to improve the lives of Afghans, especially in rural areas. This is a legacy that persists to this day.

This situation is not unique to Afghanistan. The development sector across the world is known for waste and inefficiency. In the Afghan context, that is exacerbated by the lack of control and difficulty of ground work.

Many foreign NGOs do not directly implement their projects; instead, they work through implementing partners (IPs), which themselves outsource implementation to subcontractors. This extended chain of actors means that often there is a lack of proper quality control and supervision, and there is motivation to carry out lower-quality work in order to increase profit.

Furthermore, the primary concern of IPs is securing funding. So they often present project proposals that look great on paper but do not necessarily have a substantial impact on the circumstances of the local population or address their most urgent needs.

Finally, there is a lot of waste in remuneration, especially when it comes to international staff. Foreign employees often have salaries as high as $10,000–20,000 for doing work that a local hire can do for much less.

It is clear that amid global cuts to donor funding, the development sector is struggling. This should be a moment of change. In Afghanistan, where the need of the local population is enormous while available financing is shrinking, NGOs can take this change into their own hands.

The simplest first step NGOs can take is to employ qualified locals to plan and lead projects. They would know the local culture, realities, and actual needs of communities, as well as market prices and field conditions. They can help not only optimise project costs but also ensure that they actually have a real, measurable impact.

In addition, NGOs should avoid having an extended chain of IPs and subcontractors. They should also regularly collect feedback from local communities and field workers directly in order to evaluate project effectiveness during implementation in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes.

Projects are more likely to produce sustainable results if NGOs invest in addressing pressing nationwide challenges, such as unemployment, infrastructure, and market access.

Improving efficiency and effectiveness would not only ensure Afghan beneficiaries get better services and help, but it would also make organisations more competitive for the dwindling pool of funding. This is the only way to salvage the NGO sector not only in Afghanistan but in the rest of the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

At least 22 people have been killed and 36 others injured when a truck carrying recently returned Afghan refugees overturned in eastern Afghanistan’s Laghman Province.

Officials say the driver lost control of the vehicle and authorities have launched an investigation.

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been tense since the Taliban took power in 2021.

On Monday, Pakistan summoned a senior Afghan diplomat after an attack claimed by the Pakistan Taliban, known by the acronym TPP. The group said it carried out two more attacks since, mostly against security forces.

Islamabad accuses Kabul of backing the fighters, which it denies.

The latest violence started with a major border skirmish in February. Mediation efforts by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkiye and China led to a pause in the fighting.

But the two sides have continued to target each other. This includes a Pakistani strike on a drug rehabilitation centre that killed more than 250 people.

Will these breaches lead to a resumption of hostilities? And is lasting peace possible between the neighbours?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Masood Khan – Former permanent representative of Pakistan, United Nations

Michael Kugelman – Senior fellow, Atlantic Council

Obaidullah Baheer – Adjunct lecturer, American University of Afghanistan