TODAY

Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab says satellite images appear to show mass killings in Sudan’s western city of el-Fasher.

The fall of the Sudanese city of el-Fasher to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has resulted in mass killings by the group, according to an analysis of satellite imagery viewed by Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL).

The RSF had laid siege to el-Fasher, the capital city of North Darfur in western Sudan, for more than a year and a half. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced the withdrawal of his forces from their last stronghold in the wider Darfur region late on Monday, a day after the paramilitary RSF seized control of the main Sudanese army base in el-Fasher and declared victory there.

The fall of el-Fasher has “resulted in the carpet-bombing of large swaths of the city by Sudan Armed Forces, an unknown number of civilian casualties caused by both sides, and almost 15 months of IPC-5 Famine conditions in areas caused by RSF’s siege of the city”, the HRL report said. The HRL determined this by reviewing satellite imagery and open source and remote sensing data from Monday.

“El-Fasher appears to be in a systematic and intentional process of ethnic cleansing of Fur, Zaghawa, and Berti indigenous non-Arab communities through forced displacement and summary execution,” the HRL said.

The RSF has long been accused of targeting non-Arab communities in Darfur, and the HRL, aid groups and experts have previously warned of mass violence and displacement if el-Fasher fell.

HRL’s report showed images containing clusters of objects and ground discolouration that it believes to be evidence of human bodies. The HRL appears to back up other accounts from aid groups that reported chaotic scenes on the ground, including killings, arrests and attacks on hospitals.

“The actions by RSF presented in this report may be consistent with war crimes and crimes against humanity (CAH) and may rise to the level of genocide,” the report said.

The war in Sudan between the RSF and the SAF began on April 15, 2023 and has become the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with tens of thousands killed and more than 12 million people displaced. There are also fears that Sudan could once again split, more than a decade after the creation of South Sudan.

Darfur is an RSF stronghold while the SAF controls the Sudanese capital Khartoum, as well as the north and east of the country. The RSF advance comes shortly after talks last week by the Quad – a bloc of nations comprised of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates – which laid out a roadmap aimed at ending the war in Sudan.

More air traffic controllers are calling in sick, often to work another job to pay for groceries and medicines.

United States air traffic controllers will miss their paycheques because of the ongoing government shutdown, raising concerns that mounting financial stress could take a toll on the already understaffed employees who guide thousands of flights each day.

Paycheques were due on Tuesday.

Flight delays are becoming more common across the country as more controllers call out sick because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was already so short on controllers before the shutdown.

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy and National Air Traffic Controllers Association President Nick Daniels have continued to emphasise the pressure that controllers are feeling. They say the problems are likely to only get worse the longer the shutdown continues.

Not only are controllers worrying about how to pay for their mortgages and groceries, but Daniels said some of them are also grappling with how to pay for the medicine needed to keep their children alive.

Duffy said he heard from one controller who had to tell his daughter she couldn’t join the travelling volleyball team she had earned a spot on because he couldn’t afford the cost during the shutdown.

“Air traffic controllers have to have 100 percent of focus 100 percent of the time,” Daniels said Tuesday at a news conference alongside Duffy at LaGuardia Airport in New York City. “And I’m watching air traffic controllers going to work. I’m getting the stories. They’re worried about paying for medicine for their daughter. I got a message from a controller that said, ‘I’m running out of money. And if she doesn’t get the medicine she needs, she dies. That’s the end.’”

The FAA restricts the number of flights landing and taking off at an airport anytime there is a shortage of controllers to ensure safety. Most of the time, that has meant delays — sometimes hours long — at airports like New Jersey’s Newark Liberty International Airport or Burbank Airport in California. But over the weekend, Los Angeles International Airport actually had to stop all flights for nearly two hours.

Controllers are planning to assemble outside at least 17 airports nationwide on Tuesday to hand out leaflets urging an end to the shutdown as soon as possible.

Money worries

The number of controllers calling in sick has increased during the shutdown – both because of their frustration with the situation and because controllers need the time off to work second jobs instead of continuing to work six days a week, as many of them routinely do. Duffy has said that controllers could be fired if they abuse their sick time, but the vast majority of them have continued to show up for work every day.

Air traffic controller Joe Segretto, who works at a regional radar facility that directs planes in and out of airports in the New York area, said morale is suffering as controllers worry more about money.

“The pressure is real,” Segretto said. “We have people trying to keep these planes safe. We have trainees — who are trying to learn a new job that is very fast-paced, very stressful, very complex — now having to worry about how they’re going to pay bills.”

Duffy said the shutdown is also making it harder for the government to reduce the longstanding shortage of about 3,000 controllers. He said that some students have dropped out of the air traffic controller academy in Oklahoma City, and younger controllers who are still training to do the job might abandon the career because they can’t afford to go without pay.

“This shutdown is making it harder for me to accomplish those goals,” Duffy said.

The longer the 27-day shutdown continues, the more pressure will continue to build on the US Congress to reach an agreement to reopen the government. During the 35-day shutdown in President Donald Trump’s first term, the disruptions to flights across the country contributed to the end of that disruption. But so far, Democrats and Republicans have shown little sign of reaching a deal to fund the government.

Israel is holding captive 95 Palestinian healthcare workers in its prisons. They include doctors, nurses and paramedics detained without charge. Healthcare Workers Watch recorded 80 medical workers taken from Gaza and 15 from the occupied West Bank.

PA Media

Arrival

Initial accommodation

Flats and HMOs

Hotels

Large sites

What happens next?

Following its call for applications for a three-day intensive fellowship on reporting conflict and missing persons issues in Nigeria, HumAngle, in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), has selected 10 middle-career and senior journalists from across the country. 

The selected fellows were drawn from media organisations like Daily Trust, Reuters, Premium Times, DW, African Independent Television (AIT), and others. 

“We received over 200 strong applications during the two-week application window,” commented Hauwa Shaffii Nuhu, HumAngle’s Managing Editor. “After a rigorous shortlisting and interviewing process, the final 10 emerged.”

The selected participants are expected to arrive in Abuja on Nov. 3, ahead of the three-day fellowship program scheduled to be held from November 4 to 6, 2025. 

Over the years, the ICRC has continued to support missing persons in Nigeria by tracing and facilitating reunions while also providing psychological and economic support, especially to those affected by conflict. HumAngle has also carried out extensive work on the missing persons crisis in Nigeria, particularly in the northeastern region, documenting thousands of cases across various local governments in Borno state through its Missing Persons Dashboard. 

While focused on deepening the understanding and reporting of the missing persons crisis in Nigeria, the training also aims to equip middle-career and senior journalists with the skills to report on conflict issues thoroughly through a trauma-informed lens. 

During the 3-day fellowship, the fellows will participate in sessions on human-centred conflict reporting, ethical frameworks in journalism, psychological well-being for reporters, and more. These sessions will be facilitated by experts from HumAngle and the ICRC.  By the end of the training, fellows are expected to have gained deeper insights into the scope and dynamics of the conflict reporting landscape in Nigeria. 

A contract the U.S. Navy recently awarded to defense startup Castelion may point to its pursuit of a new, lower-cost, air-launched hypersonic strike weapon. The service has something of a gap to fill now after halting plans for an air-launched, air-breathing hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile roughly a year ago, due to cost and industrial base factors. A version of Castelion’s Blackbeard hypersonic missile could also find its way onto Navy ships and submarines, as well as ground-based launchers.

Last Friday, Castelion announced that it had received contracts from the Navy, as well as the U.S. Army, for “integration” of Blackbeard onto unspecified “operational platforms.” TWZ has reached out to the Navy for more information. The Army has already made clear it is interested in employing Blackbeard in a ground-launched mode, as you can read more about here.

“Under these agreements, Castelion will work with both services to integrate the hypersonic Blackbeard weapon system onto operational platforms and demonstrate its capabilities in live-fire tests – advancing the Department of War’s effort to evaluate and accelerate new, cost-effective strike capabilities for conventional deterrence,” according to a company press release. “Blackbeard is Castelion’s first long-range, hypersonic strike weapon, designed for mass production and rapid fielding once integration and testing are complete. The system leverages vertically integrated propulsion and guidance subsystems to achieve performance at a fraction of the cost of legacy weapons – supporting the Department’s objective of building credible, non-nuclear deterrent capacity at scale.”

Many questions remain about the expected final design and capabilities of the Blackbeard missile, including whether or not it will feature some form of air-breathing propulsion. The full “weapon system” could also incorporate multiple designs. Castelion has already conducted numerous live-fire launches using different test articles.

The designs seen in testing to date “are representative of the low-cost internally developed test vehicles we use to enable rapid subsystem design iteration and to ground our performance models in real-world test data,” Castelion told TWZ back in June. “Castelion’s approach to development focuses on getting into hardware-in-the-loop and flight testing early in development to support learning cycles across design, production, and test. As such, flight vehicles shown on social media are not representative nor intended to be representative of our final weapon systems.”

As TWZ has noted in the past, the term “hypersonic missile” typically refers to weapons designed for sustained hypersonic speed across a relatively shallow and even maneuvering trajectory. This can include designs that use a ballistic missile-like booster to loft an unpowered glide vehicle to a desired velocity and altitude before releasing it toward its target, as well as air-breathing cruise missiles capable of traveling at hypersonic speeds. Hypersonic speed is generally defined as anything above Mach 5, which larger ballistic missiles do reach in the course of their flights.

The testing that Castelion has disclosed so far has also been centered on the employment of Blackbeard in the ground-launched mode, which is fully in line with what is known about the Army’s plans for the weapon. The Navy could have a similar eye toward surface (or sub-surface) launch modes from ships, submarines, or even launchers on the ground.

At the same time, there are indications that the Navy is pursuing Blackbeard, at least in part, as an air-launched weapon. In February 2024, Castelion received a contract from the Office of Naval Research (ONR), valued at just under $3 million, to “perform an initial trade study to identify cost, schedule, and performance estimates of producing an air-launched anti-surface weapon and shipping system not to exceed 212″ in length with an on-aircraft weight limit of 2,750 lbs. and an air-to-air weapon with not-to-exceed dimensions of 7″ diameter x 144″ long with production quantity of >200 no later than 2027 for both weapons.”

Whether or not the air-to-air weapon design mentioned here is part of the larger work Castelion is doing on Blackbeard, or a separate project, is unknown. The company has previously said that it was aiming to have a more finalized Blackbeard design by 2027.

This is not the first time that work on an air-launched variation of Blackbeard has come up, either. In its 2026 Fiscal Year budget request, the Army said that the ground-launched version of the weapon that it expects to receive will leverage an “existing air-launched, extended-range Blackbeard design,” but did not elaborate. TWZ has reached out to the Army for more information in the past.

As noted, the Navy has had a stated requirement for an air-launched hypersonic anti-surface warfare capability for years now. Starting in 2021, the service had been pursuing an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile to meet that need through a program called Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (HALO). Raytheon and Lockheed Martin had been working on competing designs.

The Navy had hoped to begin fielding HALO before the end of the decade. However, in late 2024, the service scrapped plans to move the program to the next phase of development.

“The Navy cancelled the solicitation for the Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (HALO) Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) effort in fall 2024 due to budgetary constraints that prevent fielding new capability within the planned delivery schedule,” Navy Capt. Ron Flanders, a service spokesperson, told TWZ in April of this year. “The decision was made after the Navy conducted a careful analysis, looking at cost trends and program performance across the munitions industrial base compared to the Navy’s priorities and existing fiscal commitments.”

“We are working closely with our resource sponsors to revalidate the requirements, with an emphasis on affordability,” Flanders added at that time. “The Navy is committed to its investment in Long Range Fires to meet National Defense objectives, with priority emphasis on fielding continued capability improvements to the AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).”

Castelion’s focus on lower-cost and producibility for Blackbeard, coupled with the schedule it is targeting for development of the missile, all align with the Navy’s stated post-HALO plans. The service had previously described HALO as a critical capability, especially in the context of future high-end fighting, such as one in the Pacific against China.

The Navy could well be looking at multiple options to meet this ongoing requirement for a new, air-launched, high-speed, anti-ship weapon. The service is already fielding an air-launched version of the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), called the AIM-174B, ostensibly in the anti-air role. However, in its surface-launched form, the SM-6 also has an anti-ship capability, and the AIM-174B could be used in that role, as well.

As mentioned, the Navy could still pursue other versions of Blackbeard beyond an air-launched type. Previously stated plans for HALO also included the eventual development of variants that could be fired from ships and submarines.

Other services could be interested in air-launched variations of Blackbeard, as well. The U.S. Air Force has also awarded Castelion contracts in the past in relation to long-range strike weapon concepts, and TWZ has previously reached out to that service for more information.

All of this is also heavily contingent on Castelion meeting its schedule, cost, and other goals for Blackbeard. The Army’s budget documents show it is pursuing Blackbeard aggressively, but through a phased approach that offers multiple off-ramps.

Castelion has certainly received a new vote of confidence on Blackbeard, regardless of launch modes, with the new integration contracts from the Navy and the Army.

Contact the author: [email protected]

Lebanon’s military is urgently working to meet a year-end deadline to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon under a ceasefire deal with Israel. The operation marks a dramatic shift in Lebanon’s internal power dynamics, as the army takes on a role that would have been unthinkable during Hezbollah’s peak influence.

Two sources told Reuters that the army has blown up so many Hezbollah weapons caches that it has run out of explosives, forcing troops to seal off sites instead of destroying them until new U.S. supplies arrive.

Why It Matters

This campaign could redefine Lebanon’s sovereignty and reshape the balance between state and militia power. Hezbollah’s disarmament is a key demand from Washington and Israel, and its success could bring stability or trigger fresh unrest.
However, moving beyond the south risks sectarian tensions and could fracture the army, reviving memories of Lebanon’s civil war.

Lebanese Army: Leading disarmament under U.S. and international pressure, but facing shortages of explosives and political risks.

Hezbollah: Weakened by Israel’s war last year but still influential, especially in the north and Bekaa Valley, where disarmament remains uncertain.

United States: Providing millions in aid and demolition equipment to “degrade Hezbollah.”

Israel: Supplying intelligence through the truce mechanism but complicating operations with cross-border fire incidents.

UNIFIL: Supporting inspection and clearance operations in southern Lebanon.

Current Progress

Nine arms caches and dozens of tunnels have been uncovered in the south.

The army expects to complete southern operations by December.

Explosives depleted by June, with six soldiers killed during dismantling efforts.

$14 million in new U.S. demolition aid is expected, though delivery may take months.

Challenges Ahead

Hezbollah has agreed to ceasefire terms in the south but refuses to disarm elsewhere without a political deal.

Lebanese officials fear civil strife if the army expands disarmament north without consensus.

Israeli air strikes and occupation of five border hilltops threaten to delay progress.

What’s Next

The U.S. and allies are pressing Beirut to meet the year-end target and expand efforts beyond the south in 2026. But Hezbollah’s warning against confronting the Shi’ite community, and ongoing Israeli pressure, mean Lebanon’s army must walk a political and military tightrope.

As one Lebanese official put it: “The army if betting on time.”

With information from Reuters.

Iyer suffers injury while attempting a catch in third and final ODI of India’s tour of Australia.

India batsman Shreyas Iyer is in stable condition and recovering well from spleen injury, Twenty20 captain Suryakumar Yadav says.

Iyer suffered a lacerated spleen on Saturday during India’s victory over Australia in their third one-day international (ODI) when he fell awkwardly while making a catch.

The 30-year-old was admitted to hospital, and Indian media reported that his condition was life-threatening.

“We spoke to him,” Suryakumar told reporters on Tuesday before India’s five-match Twenty20 series against Australia beginning in Canberra on Wednesday.

“When we got to know about his injury, I called him. Then I realised Shreyas doesn’t have his phone on him, and I called our physio, Kamlesh Jain, who told us he’s stable.

“He’s looking good 1761653559. We’ve been in touch for two days, he’s replying. If he’s able to reply on the phone, then he’s stable.”

How did Iyer sustain freak injury?

The 30-year-old sustained an impact injury in his left lower rib cage region as he pulled off a sensational backpedalling catch to remove Alex Carey, a key moment in the third ODI of the series, which India won by nine wickets.

Iyer, who is also the vice captain of the ODI team, was forced off the field after the injury and did not return for the rest of Australia’s innings.

“He was taken to the hospital for further evaluation,” the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) said in a statement.

“Scans revealed a laceration injury to the spleen. He is under treatment, medically stable, and recovering well.”

He remained hospitalised in Sydney, where the BCCI medical team closely monitored him in consultation with specialists from Australia and India.

It was not clear when Iyer could return to action.

Despite the victory on Saturday, India lost the series 1-2 after suffering defeats in the first two games in Perth and Adelaide.

India’s next one-day outing is a home series against South Africa, starting on November 30.

Iyer has scored 2,917 runs from 73 ODIs at an average of 47.81.

A five-match T20 series between the two cricketing powerhouses begins on Wednesday, but Iyer is not a part of that squad.

A US Air Force plane flew inside Hurricane Melissa on Monday over the Caribbean, revealing a rare weather phenomenon known as the ‘stadium effect’. Forecasters say the Category 5 storm is set to be Jamaica’s most destructive on record and is expected to make landfall early on Tuesday.

As trial opens, Tetsuya Yamagami admits murdering Japan’s longest serving leader three years ago.

The man accused of killing former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2022 has pleaded guilty to murder.

Forty-five-year-old Tetsuya Yamagami admitted all charges read out by prosecutors as his trial opened on Tuesday, according to the Japanese broadcaster NHK.

Yamagami was charged with murder and violations of arms control laws for allegedly using a handmade weapon to shoot Japan’s longest serving leader.

“Everything is true,” the suspect told the court, according to the AFP news agency.

Abe was shot as he gave a speech during an election campaign in the western city of Nara on July 8, 2022. Yamagami was arrested at the scene.

The assassination was reportedly triggered by the suspect’s anger over links between Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to the Unification Church.

Yamagami held a grudge against the South Korean religious group due to his mother’s donation of 100 million yen ($663,218). The gift ruined his family’s financial health, Japanese media reported.

Long the subject of controversy and criticism, the Unification Church, whose followers are referred to disparagingly as “Moonies”, has since faced increased pressure from authorities over accusations of bribery.

The church’s Japanese followers are viewed as a key source of income.

The shooting was followed by revelations that more than 100 LDP lawmakers had ties to the Unification Church, driving down public support for the ruling party.

After Tuesday’s initial court session, 17 more hearings are scheduled this year before a verdict is scheduled for January 21.

The trial opened the same day as two of Abe’s former allies, LDP leader and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and visiting United States President Donald Trump, held a summit in Tokyo.

Abe, who served as Japan’s prime minister for almost nine years, is regularly mentioned by both during public events.

On Tuesday, Takaichi gave Trump a golf putter owned by Abe and other golf memorabilia during their meeting at the Akasaka Palace.

Hundreds of asylum seekers could be housed in two military sites in Inverness and East Sussex as the government aims to end the use of hotels.

Discussions are under way over the use of the sites to accommodate 900 men, as first reported in the Times.

Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has instructed Home Office and Ministry of Defence officials to accelerate work to locate appropriate military sites, the BBC understands.

The government has pledged to end the use of asylum hotels, which have cost billions of pounds and become a focal point for anti-migrant protests, by the next election.

Migrants are due to be housed in the Cameron Barracks in Inverness and Crowborough army training camp in East Sussex by the end of next month, under plans being drawn up by ministers.

Defence Minister Luke Pollard told BBC Breakfast that the sites were not “luxury accommodation by any means,” but “adequate for what is required”.

“That will enable us to take the pressure off the asylum hotel estate and enable those to be closed at a faster rate,” he said.

Pressed on whether military sites would be cheaper for the government than hotels, Pollard said the cost was currently being assessed and that “it depends on the base”.

He said: “But I think there’s something that is of greater significance that we’ve seen over the past few months, and that is the absolute public appetite to see every asylum hotel closed.”

Pollard would not be drawn on how many asylum seekers were to be moved or when that would happen.

He said there would have to be sufficient engagement with local authorities and adequate security arrangements in place. “Those conversations have been going on for some time now,” he added.

Inverness’s Liberal Democrat MP Angus MacDonald told the BBC he supported the use of military sites to house asylum seekers, but that the chosen base seemed “a bit odd” given it is in the town centre.

“It’s effectively the same,” he told BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, adding that to his knowledge it was an open barracks without security.

“I very much thought the idea of putting them in army camps was to have them out of town, and make them less of an issue for the local population.”

He said he had first been given a “tip-off” about the use of Cameron Barracks about a month ago by someone in the army, when its occupants had been given notice to leave, and recently learned the plan was to house 300 asylum seekers there.

MacDonald added that Scotland did not have a “great track record” of migrants staying put there – and that the Home Office would need to consider whether they would “just up sticks and leave”.

Ministers are also considering industrial sites, temporary accommodation and otherwise disused accommodation to house asylum seekers.

Government sources told the BBC that all sites would comply with health and safety standards.

A Home Office spokesperson said: ”We are furious at the level of illegal migrants and asylum hotels.

“This government will close every asylum hotel. Work is well under way, with more suitable sites being brought forward to ease pressure on communities and cut asylum costs.”

Around 32,000 asylum seekers are currently being accommodated in hotels, a drop from a peak of more than 56,000 in 2023 but 2,500 more than last year.

A report on Monday found billions of taxpayers’ money had been “squandered” on asylum accommodation.

The Home Affairs Committee said “flawed contracts” and “incompetent delivery” had resulted in the Home Office relying on hotels as “go-to solutions” rather than temporary stop-gaps, with expected costs tripling to more than £15bn.

Commenting on the report’s findings, Sir Keir said he was “determined” to close all asylum hotels, adding: “I can’t tell you how frustrated and angry I am that we’ve been left with a mess as big as this by the last government.”

Two former military sites – MDP Wethersfield, a former RAF base in Essex, and Napier Barracks, a former military base in Kent – are already being used to house asylum seekers after being opened under the previous Tory government.

On a hot October morning, fuel pumps at a dozen service stations in Bamako, the capital of Mali, sputtered to a stop. Drivers who had spent hours waiting in line left empty-handed. Motorbikes, taxis, and vans idled where they stood. Market stalls that depended on refrigeration closed early. Hospitals began counting fuel reserves. 

What appeared to Mali residents as an everyday shortage was, in fact, the result of a deliberate, sustained campaign by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, known as JNIM, an Al-Qaeda affiliate operating in the Sahel, to choke the flow of fuel into the country. The group has moved beyond hit-and-run attacks to economic warfare, burning tankers, ambushing convoys, and enforcing a de facto embargo on fuel imports.

Videos shared online after the Oct. 21 attack showed dozens of burning tankers in Zégoua, near the border with Côte d’Ivoire. JNIM later released a propaganda message claiming responsibility for ambushing 37 vehicles that day.

The first publicly reported attacks began in early September, when the group blocked routes to Kayes and Nioro du Sahel in western Mali, bordering Mauritania and Senegal. That same day, Sept. 3, JNIM reportedly abducted six fuel tanker drivers from Senegal.

Despite an increased military presence, the jihadists struck again on Sept. 13 and 14, torching over 40 tankers under military escort while transporting from Senegal to Mali along the Diédiéni–Kolokani corridor. 

The consequences have rippled far beyond queues at fuel stations. There is currently a sharp inflation that has affected commercial activities. Mines operations have also slowed, and there is a steady erosion of the state’s control over basic life. Across the country, schools have also been closed, further disrupting daily life and cutting several young people off from education.

The residents of Mali expressed their grievances, urging the military junta led by Assimi Goita to step up the fight and counter the group’s atrocities.

JNIM has also sought to control the narrative. In a video released in early September, a spokesperson justified the blockade as retaliation against what he called “the bandit government’s persecution of the population” and “the closure of gas stations”.

This rhetoric points to a deeper cause. Mali’s government recently banned the sale of fuel outside official stations, a measure meant to disrupt the jihadists’ supply chains. 

Blockades and ambushes 

Mali is a landlocked country in West Africa, and it imports most of its fuel by road from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. Convoys, sometimes more than 100 tankers, travel through routes to Bamako, and that includes passing through jihadist-controlled areas. 

JNIM have staged checkpoints on key routes where they conduct their attacks by igniting the lead vehicles to create conflagrations. They have destroyed dozens of tankers, with a single ambush in mid-September affecting at least 40 tankers. Videos circulated online showed burning wrecks and stranded drivers. 

The attacks are designed to make transport by road both physically dangerous and economically untenable. As a result, many private companies have stopped sending fuel tankers; others now insist on military escorts, which often become targets in themselves, and neighbouring countries hesitate to transit fuel through overtly dangerous routes. 

Analysts note that by choking off fuel transport, JNIM aims to undermine public confidence in the junta’s competence, stir unrest, and increase its leverage in negotiating local control, taxation, or governance arrangements in contested areas. The approach aligns with Al-Qaeda’s long-standing strategy of exploiting social grievances and state fragility to entrench influence.

The group’s broader objective is to pressure Mali’s military government, which seized power in a coup five years ago, while expanding its own authority through informal taxation and control of smuggling routes. JNIM now holds sway over vast areas of Mali, particularly across the tri-border zone with Burkina Faso and Niger.

The economic shock 

Since the start of the attacks, Bamako and other urban centres have seen fuel queues stretch for hours and a surge in black-market operations, the very activity the government intended to stamp out in its recent ban.

One video posted on X on Oct. 23 captured the desperation: a long procession of cars trailing a fuel tanker to a station, hoping to secure a few litres.

The shortages have cascaded through every layer of the economy. Power supply has been hit as electricity utilities begin implementing emergency plans amid dwindling diesel reserves. For households dependent on private generators, costs have spiked overnight.

The price of goods transported by road has risen sharply in markets across Mali. Small traders who buy fresh produce daily for resale in Bamako say profits have evaporated. For ordinary families, higher transport costs translate directly into more expensive food.

Reports from the weeks following the convoy attacks documented widespread closures of petrol stations and soaring costs of travel and delivery. The military halted certain deliveries to mines over security concerns, and some tankers destined for large gold operations were stopped to avoid creating easy targets. 

For a country already weakened by years of conflict, coups, and economic instability, the fuel blockade has become a multiplier of hardship, a crisis that compounds every existing vulnerability.

Losing the grip 

At first glance, the scarcity hurts everyone, and JNIM gains leverage. 

By controlling or denying access to commodities, the group converts scarcity into political capital. In areas under its influence, it already collects taxes, fines, and “security levies” from traders. Smugglers who can move fuel through alternative routes find new profit, often paying bribes or cutting deals with armed groups to secure passage. 

Meanwhile, formal businesses tied to regulated supply chains and formal employment lose trust and capacity. Local elites who depend on state contracts feel the pinch. The junta, unable to guarantee basic services, faces a mounting legitimacy crisis. Analysts warn that such conditions hollow out institutions and entrench shadow economies, allowing parallel systems of governance to take root.

The government’s response has been uneven; part denial, part damage control. Initially, officials blamed the shortages on heavy rains delaying tanker arrivals. But when JNIM released its propaganda videos claiming responsibility, public outrage forced an acknowledgement of the crisis.

“The sellers should make things easy for the population; the hydrocarbon sellers should not raise the prices at this time of crisis,” said one resident in Bamako, interviewed by DW Africa, voicing his frustration over the difficulties of getting the fuel. 

The armed forces have since launched airstrikes, escorted convoys, and convened emergency committees to protect fuel shipments. Yet these measures have proven costly and largely ineffective.

Transitional Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga, who convened an interministerial crisis management committee, announced further steps, including price controls, new regional depots, and increased convoy protection, but they have done little to stem the attacks. Some local reports suggest negotiations or attempts at local truces in areas where the terrorists have influence, but negotiations are politically sensitive for a government that prizes a posture of strength.  

Complicating the situation further is the evolving role of foreign paramilitaries. The Wagner Group’s replacement by the so-called Africa Corps has yet to yield stability, and persistent accusations of human rights abuses risk undermining their counterterrorism efforts.

The longer the blockade continues, the sharper the choices before Mali’s leaders: concede territory and influence to armed groups, or escalate military operations that risk civilian casualties and further infrastructure damage. Either way, the cost of control grows heavier with each passing week.

U.S. President Donald Trump has suggested that contaminated fuel may have been a factor in the U.S. Navy’s loss of an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and an F/A-18F Super Hornet in the South China Sea on Sunday. In a very strange chain of events, the two aircraft, both assigned to the supercarrier USS Nimitz, went down within 30 minutes of each other while on separate missions. The crews of the Seahawk and the Super Hornet were both safely retrieved.

“They’re gonna let me know pretty soon,” Trump told reporters while flying aboard Air Force One on Monday. “I think they should be able to find out. It could be bad fuel. I mean, it’s possible it’s bad fuel. Very unusual that that would happen.”

Asked whether he thought “foul play” led to the crashes, Trump said “I don’t think so,” and reiterated his contaminated fuel theory. 

“We don’t believe it was anything nefarious,” a U.S. Navy official told The War Zone.

U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLEET), which oversees naval operations in the South China Sea region, declined to comment on Trump’s statements about the crashes and referred us to the White House. We have yet to receive a response and will update this story with any pertinent information provided.

The first of the two mishaps occurred about 2:45 PM local time, according to PACFLEET.

That’s when the Seahawk, assigned to the “Battle Cats” of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 73 (HSM-73), “went down in the waters of the South China Sea while conducting routine operations from” the Nimitz, a PACFLEET release stated. “Search and rescue assets assigned to Carrier Strike Group 11 safely recovered all three crew members.”

A half hour later, an F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter assigned to the “Fighting Redcocks” of Strike Fighter Squadron 22 (VFA-22) “also went down in the waters of the South China Sea while conducting routine operations from Nimitz,” PACFLEET announced. “Both crew members successfully ejected and were also safely recovered by search and rescue assets assigned to Carrier Strike Group 11. All personnel involved are safe and in stable condition. The cause of both incidents is currently under investigation.”

While the particular circumstances of the recent mishaps in the South China Sea remain under investigation, fuel contaminated with water and/or other foreign substances, or that otherwise falls below specifications, can present serious problems for aircraft, including causing engines to fail in flight. Checking fuel quality is a common part of an investigation following any aviation mishap, military or civilian.

In addition, carrier-based aviation operations present unique conditions when it comes to the transfer of fuel, both into storage tanks on the ship to begin with, which can occur while the carrier is underway at sea, as well as in port, and then into aircraft. Personnel aboard all Navy carriers perform regular fuel quality checks at multiple steps in the fuel distribution process.

Trump’s comments about the mishaps came as the President is traveling throughout Asia. He is scheduled to have a meeting on Thursday with Chinese leader Xi Jinping to discuss trade issues.

Nimitz, the Navy’s oldest carrier, is on its final cruise before its planned decommissioning next year. The flattop is currently in the process of returning to its home port in Naval Base Kitsap in Washington State after having been deployed to the Middle East for most of the summer, primarily as part of the U.S. response to attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels on commercial shipping.

Also known by its hull number CVN-68, the Nimitz, which was first commissioned into service in 1975, is the lead ship in its class. The vessel’s design built on the Navy’s prior experience with its pioneering nuclear-powered supercarrier, the one-of-a-kind USS Enterprise (CVN-65), which served from 1961 to 2012.

The Navy began preparing for the Nimitz’s demise in 2023, which you can read more about here. The Newport News Shipbuilding division of Huntington Ingalls Industries has received multiple contracts already to begin laying the groundwork for removing the nuclear fuel from the carrier’s reactors and other aspects of the disposal process.

Whether contaminated fuel turns out to be a factor in, or even the root cause of the Seahawk and Super Hornet going down in the South China Sea, remains to be seen. U.S. military aviation accidents typically take weeks if not months to complete.

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The world is closely watching the potential meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping, which could take place at the APEC summit at the end of October, as well as the formal state visit in January of next year. Undoubtedly, the top priority for both the U.S. and China is to ease tensions, with Washington even more eager than Beijing to achieve a “truce.” This is because Beijing imposed large-scale countermeasures against Washington in October, in retaliation for the various sanctions the U.S. has levied on China since August. China’s countermeasures caught the U.S. off guard and left it struggling to respond.

China’s strict restrictions on rare earth exports have shocked the West, particularly the automotive and semiconductor industries. On the other hand, China’s halt to soybean purchases from the U.S. has frustrated Trump’s most loyal supporters. Washington’s initial reaction was one of anger, with threats of retaliation, but within days, its tone softened. This signals that Beijing has struck at the opponent’s sore spot, while Washington lacks effective tools to fight back.

“You have no cards to play.” Trump’s famous rebuke to Zelenskyy has gone global and will undoubtedly go down in history. Embarrassingly, Trump now finds himself in a similar predicament with Beijing: nearly “out of cards.” To demonstrate that he still has some in hand, Trump has finally pulled Taiwan out of his pocket.

On October 20, in an interview with Bloomberg, Trump listed Taiwan as one of the four top priorities in U.S.-China negotiations—alongside rare earths, soybeans, and fentanyl—and stated, “We’ll get along very well with China.”

According to a report in The Guardian, Trump explicitly said that China “doesn’t want” to invade Taiwan and predicted that “nothing will happen.” He described Taiwan as “an apple in China’s eyes,” emphasizing that “America is the strongest military power in the world by far” and “no one dares to mess with us.” In a buddying tone, he added, “I love my relationship with President Xi. We have a great relationship, and that on the Taiwan issue, “we’ll get along very well.”

In the following days, Trump repeatedly made similar statements in the media. However, on October 26, during an interview aboard his plane en route to Asia, he refused to discuss the Taiwan issue and warned that if China invades Taiwan, “it would be very dangerous for China.”

Trump’s rhetoric follows a very simple logic, as is well known: he fabricates bargaining chips out of thin air, uses soft language to lure the opponent to the negotiating table, then employs tough rhetoric to hint at his confidence in making the opponent yield, while refusing to reveal his hand in advance.

In mid-October, the RAND Corporation—a think tank closely tied to the U.S. military—released a report titled Stabilizing the U.S.-China Rivalry, urging Washington to abandon zero-sum thinking and instead adopt a “step-back” approach to stabilize U.S.-China relations and avoid military conflict. On the Taiwan front, the report suggests that the U.S. should encourage Taiwan and China to create shared interests and emotional bonds that gradually lay the groundwork for reunification. This proposal has been interpreted in Taiwan as “gradual unification,” drawing widespread attention and viewed as a signal of the U.S. abandoning Taiwan.

However, rather than “the U.S. abandoning Taiwan,” the RAND report is more accurately a “delaying tactic,” aiming to prolong the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through a “step-back” strategy, thereby securing U.S. strategic interests in the First Island Chain for the next 5-10 years.

The realist tone of the RAND report is becoming the mainstream view in the U.S. For instance, Time magazine recently published an article that enraged Taiwan’s ruling party: The U.S. Must Beware of Taiwan’s Reckless Leader. The piece argues that Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s reckless emphasis on Taiwan’s sovereignty is dragging the U.S. into the risk of military conflict with China. Furthermore, it stresses that Taiwan is a core interest for China but merely a non-treaty ally for the U.S.— America has no reason to get embroiled in war for Taiwan’s sake and should instead invest resources in treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

In other words, the restraint-oriented thinking in the U.S. that advocates “focusing on the big picture” is gradually gaining the upper hand. Such arguments often come from individuals and organizations familiar with U.S. military capabilities. Simply put, this rhetoric merely underscores a fact: the U.S. military has low odds of winning a war against China, and it’s not worth risking for a non-treaty ally.

Of course, hawkish thinking in the U.S. remains resilient. In contrast to the restrainers, hawks believe that losing Taiwan would severely damage U.S. credibility in East Asia, and from a long-term perspective, the U.S. would suffer more harm than good, thus stressing that “Taiwan is not for sale” and advocating continuing arms sales to Taiwan, even shifting from “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic clarity” policy.

But we know Trump doesn’t think that far ahead. Before he leaves office, Taiwan must be “cashed in” to feed this narcissist’s ego. In other words, the one inevitably waving the “Taiwan is for sale” sign is Trump.

In fact, for the West, Taiwan is rapidly depreciating because its most valuable asset—the semiconductor industry—is being hollowed out by the U.S. Taiwan’s vice president recently admitted that not only TSMC but also the ruling party has decided to replicate an identical semiconductor supply chain cluster in the U.S.

Taiwan’s authorities explain this investment plan as “avoiding over-reliance on the single Chinese market,” but those familiar with the semiconductor industry know that Taiwan has always relied on the U.S. market, not China—especially for high-end chips. Relocating the industry to the U.S. will only increase corporate costs, raise chip prices, and introduce even more unpredictable risks.

Rare earths are one such unpredictable risk. Semiconductor manufacturing requires rare earths, albeit in small proportions, but without them, chips cannot be produced. If Beijing wants to keep the semiconductor industry in Taiwan, it could completely ban rare earth exports to the U.S. while continuing normal supplies to Taiwan. Even if the U.S. tries to use Taiwan as a rare earth transshipment hub, that’s impossible, as China’s export controls can precisely calculate buyers’ demand volumes, eliminating any transshipment possibilities.

A more fundamental approach would be to ban rare earth exports to both Taiwan and the U.S., driving Taiwan’s value to rock bottom and preventing Trump from demanding too high a price.

In line with Trump’s style, consolidating proxies across the First Island Chain to form a military deterrence against China is undoubtedly another chip in his hand, but this card no longer works on China. Throughout this year, Beijing has repeatedly flexed its military muscles to signal to the U.S. that China cannot be contained. The U.S. military’s front line has effectively retreated to Guam, and Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea all know that the U.S. is pulling back. Without their backer, they dare not confront China.

The key point is that China understands the U.S.’s strategic goal is to stabilize U.S.-China relations, not to break ties. Therefore, only by doubling down on countermeasures against the U.S. can China achieve a stable state of “competition without rupture,” and facts have proven that a hardline strategy leads to a “TACO” outcome. Beijing has no reason or room to concede, especially on the Taiwan issue.

China is testing various tools to offset Western sanctions, leaving the entire West shrouded in fear and anger over rare earth cutoffs, yet powerless to retaliate. This proves that countermeasures to fully offset Western sanctions are nearly complete. If there’s any vulnerability, it’s the financial defense line, which is not yet fully prepared. This explains why China is actively promoting the internationalization of the renminbi and continuing to reduce its holdings of U.S. debt.

On the other hand, Taiwan’s largest opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), replaced its party chairman in October with someone determined to change its U.S. policy. Due to the ruling party’s declining popularity, the KMT is poised to win majority voter support in next year’s elections and those in 2028. The new chairman opposes U.S. directives—demanding that Taiwan raise defense spending to 5% of GDP—and extends a peace olive branch to Beijing, potentially leading to dramatic changes in Taiwan-U.S. relations, a development unfavorable to Washington.

Admittedly, the KMT’s new chairman may neither be able nor willing to convince the Taiwanese people to unify with mainland China, but she could reverse the status quo where Taiwan’s major parties are all pro-U.S. Her support from over half the party members stems from two public opinion bases: first, acknowledging oneself as Chinese; second, opposing the U.S. hollowing out Taiwan. According to polls, 4 million KMT supporters accept Chinese identity, and over half (more than 9 million) of all voters, regardless of party, oppose the U.S. hollowing out Taiwan.

While Taiwanese public opinion is divided, most Taiwanese people oppose the Trump administration’s plundering of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and also oppose war across the strait—this is the main reason for the ruling party’s sagging approval ratings.

A “distrust of America” sentiment pervades Taiwanese society, along with dissatisfaction toward the anti-China president, prompting Beijing to establish “Taiwan Restoration Day” (October 25) to evoke Taiwanese people’s historical memory of China’s recovery of Taiwan after World War II. This aims to maximize nationalism to offset separatism and reduce Taiwanese resistance to unification. At the same time, Beijing uses this move to send a clear signal to the U.S. and neighboring countries: China is determined to resolve the Taiwan issue and is working to remove all obstacles.

Beijing now holds a strong hand; even the U.S.’s “Taiwan card” has become a card China can counter with. In line with Xi Jinping’s decision-making style, he will concede when unprepared, but once fully ready, he will strike suddenly, catching the opponent off guard.

Trump should be very aware that his current position is precarious, making it hard to reverse Beijing’s advantageous stance. Even the “chip card” is no longer effective. Thus, aside from selling Taiwan, he has no other good options—and this is the situation most feared by Taiwan’s elites: the window for “maintaining the status quo” is closing.

However, the sentiments of Taiwan’s elites are also shifting with the situation. Due to the KMT’s policy pivot, more and more Taiwanese elites may pragmatically reassess Taiwan’s future in the coming years, as KMT supporters lead the way, turning back to demand that elites devise countermeasures to change cross-strait relations and foster peace.

When U.S. hawks emphasize “Taiwan is not for sale,” it ironically highlights America’s intent to sell Taiwan. Yet, if this can lead to a peaceful resolution, the trend should be welcomed rather than doubted. After all, there are no winners in war, and those sacrificed are often innocent civilians.

Taiwan is for sale—the buyer is only one. The fear is that Trump might overprice it, backfiring and once again squandering his chance at a Nobel Peace Prize.