TODAY

SC Villa captain and Ugandan international David Owori was found unconscious by passers-by, but later pronounced dead.

Uganda international ‌David Owori, captain of one of the country’s ⁠biggest football clubs, ⁠has died after an assault in the capital Kampala, police said.

The 28-year-old, who was captain of Uganda’s record-breaking champions SC Villa, was ⁠critically injured by unidentified assailants in a suburb of Kampala on Tuesday, police spokesperson Racheal Kawala said.

His death comes only weeks after the killing of Rugby international Sydney Gongodyo in the Ugandan capital.

Owori was found unconscious ⁠by passers-by, who took him to a nearby hospital. He was transferred to another hospital where he was later pronounced dead, Kawala said.

“David was not just a footballer. He was both a leader ‌and an inspiration to a generation. As Captain of SC Villa, he led with courage, humility and passion. In the Uganda Cranes jersey, he carried the hopes of a nation,” the Federation of Uganda Football Associations said in a statement.

Crime is rampant in the capital of the East ⁠African country and many Ugandans expressed outrage ⁠at his death on X. They also condemned what some said was the inability of the authorities to tackle crime.

Owori’s death follows that of Gongodyo’s, who in June died after he was assaulted by a ⁠mob in Kampala after he was apparently ⁠mistaken for a thief, according to police.

“Sadly, Ugandan sport has been hit with many such tragedies lately, and we hope for justice and a lasting solution,” ‌the state-run National Council of Sports Uganda said.

Deputy Speaker Thomas Tayebwa asked authorities to address the wider security challenges in ‌the ‌country, according to a statement on parliament’s website.

SC Villa extended a 20-year wait for the Uganda league title last season, when Owori lifted the trophy as captain.

It was their record-extending 17th Uganda league crown.

Boeing and Northrop Grumman are laying the groundwork to take teaming between the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol plane and the MQ-4C Triton long-endurance maritime surveillance drone to a new level. A first-of-its-kind test has demonstrated common command and control architectures that will enable P-8A crews to issue orders to MQ-4Cs. The drones would then perform their assigned missions autonomously and report back. The Poseidon and Triton were designed to operate as a team from the start, but the ability to task the uncrewed aircraft directly in flight would offer new flexibility, especially to respond to sudden changes in the battlespace.

Press releases today from Boeing and Northrop Grumman shared details of the recent P-8/MQ-4 teaming test. The testing was conducted in a laboratory environment and no real aircraft were involved.

“A P-8A operator issued machine readable, machine actionable mission tasking to a simulated MQ-4C Triton using UCI [Universal Command & Control Interface] formatted messages,” according to Boeing’s release. “The P-8A cued the Triton transit to a specific area. After receiving the request, the Triton autonomously planned and executed a transit to the area, employed sensors per the tasking, processed findings onboard, and reported results back to the P-8A Poseidon.”

“In the exchange, Triton’s system used AI [artificial intelligence] algorithms to collect, process and share intelligence data with P-8A Poseidon in response to a request sent by the P-8A Poseidon system,” Northrop Grumman also said in its release.

“Data routes included satellite relay to reflect realistic operational communications. Mission management and autonomy layers communicated via OMS/UCI [Open Mission Systems/Universal Command & Control Interface] rather than custom point to point interfaces,” Boeing’s release adds. “Using UCI, the platforms can collaborate with any U.S. or allied asset sharing the same interface – reducing operator workload by distributing the mission tasks and accelerating commander decisions, making integration across platforms quicker and more cost effective.”

The P-8A was designed primarily as a maritime patrol platform, but has substantial additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities baked in. This includes a surface search radar that also has a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode, allowing it to capture still radar ‘images,’ even through cloud cover, smoke, and dust, and at night. It also has a sensor turret with electro-optical and infrared full-motion video cameras, as well as a robust signals intelligence suite, as you can read more about here. Its communications capabilities are also critical to making use of all the intelligence it gathers, as well as leveraging data gathered by other platforms. The U.S. Navy also operates more specialized versions of the Poseidon with very advanced add-on sensor systems.

The MQ-4C, which was derived from the RQ-4 Global Hawk drone, has a radar with a SAR mode, as well as electro-optical and infrared cameras, as well. In addition, the drones have electronic support measures systems that allow for the collection of electronic intelligence passively. Unlike Global Hawk, Triton also notably has the ability to descend to lower altitudes to more closely investigate targets of interest.

So far, the United States and Australia are the only countries to operate the MQ-4C, and both of them also have fleets of P-8s. Canada, Denmark, Germany, India, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, and the United Kingdom all fly P-8s or are in the process of acquiring them, as well. Last month, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Norway announced a new joint plan to acquire and operate a fleet of Triton drones under the umbrella of the NATO alliance.

As already noted, the intention has always been for the P-8A and MQ-4C to work closely together, and the U.S. Navy actively teams the two platforms up today.

“Currently, the MQ-4C is being used as a long endurance, maritime ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] asset, that often times feeds us updated posits [positions] on contacts of interest,” a P-8A pilot assigned to the Navy’s Patrol Squadron Five (VP-5), the “Mad Foxes,” explained to TWZ in an interview years ago. “They can fly significantly higher and longer than us and are able to provide a more constant feed of ISR.”

“The Triton will be flown and monitored out of NAS Jacksonville [Naval Air Station Jacksonville in Florida], and we have already seen some pilots and NFOs [naval flight officers] being selected to operate the aircraft,” the Navy P-8A pilot also noted at that time, and this is the crux of the matter.

What Boeing and Northrop Grumman have now demonstrated, at least in a test lab, is the ability of P-8A crews to dynamically task and retask MQ-4Cs without having to go through a command center on the ground that could be thousands of miles away. This, in turn, can only speed up the process of responding to sudden developments, which could include potential threats that pop up unexpectedly or targets of interest that appear to be fleeting.

As the pilot from VP-5 previously explained, the MQ-4C already offers a valuable broad-area maritime surveillance asset that can cover vastly more area, and do so more persistently, than a P-8A can by itself. This, in turn, can also help keep Poseidons further away from potential dangers.

Though treated as something of an aside in the press releases today, work to enable the MQ-4C to do at least some level of immediate autonomous processing of the data it collects using AI-driven systems is also an important development. The amount of data that drones like the Triton can collect can easily be overwhelming for sensor operators and intelligence analysts. A new electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) suite is in development now for the MQ-4C that will only expand the breadth and volume of data the drones can collect. The U.S. Navy is also in the process of upgrading its P-8As with the explicit aim of improving their already substantial ISR, targeting, and networking capabilities.

With all this in mind, the ability to detect and classify potential items of interest and then highlight them for human personnel offers immense benefits for shrinking down the time it takes to go from data collection to appropriate action. Having a collection platform, crewed or uncrewed, do at least some of that work in an automated fashion upfront can only help further speed up the process. Not having to send as much data can help reduce bandwidth demands and, by extension, latency in the transfer, too.

The OMS/UCI architecture used to support the new P-8/MQ-4C teaming testing could further open the door to pairing the Poseidon with other uncrewed teammates, as well. General Atomics has already been pitching the SeaGuardian version of its MQ-9B drone as a new partner for the P-8A. In its standard configuration, the SeaGuardian is also primarily intended for maritime surveillance and reconnaissance. However, there has also been work to give the drone new capabilities to support anti-submarine warfare missions, including with underwing dispensers for sonobuoys and the ability to pass data they collect along to other nodes.

We could see more teaming opportunities emerge for the P-8A in the future on the smaller tactical side if the aircraft gain the ability to launch drones of their own. TWZ has laid out a detailed case for adding this capability to the Poseidon in the past. More broadly speaking, the U.S. military is investing heavily in crewed-uncrewed teaming capabilities in the air and in other domains, and this is also a growing trend globally.

Especially with the P-8 user base already large and continuing to expand, a new level of interoperability between the Poseidon and the Triton, specifically, could be valuable for the U.S. military and its allies and partners during future coalition operations. This could also create new interest in the MQ-4C among existing and future P-8 operators.

“MQ-4C Triton and P-8A are the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s maritime patrol and reconnaissance force, delivering complementary capabilities unmatched by any other platforms,” Jane Bishop, Vice President and General Manager of the Global Surveillance Division at Northrop Grumman, said in a statement today. “This demonstration underscores the flexibility of our systems, our unwavering industry investment and the strength of our industry relationships. Our commitment to pushing the boundaries of advanced technology ensures that the U.S. and allied nations operators maintain an unparalleled edge against evolving maritime threats.”

“This Poseidon-Triton teaming demonstration unlocks real-world capability and interoperability for the U.S. and allies,” Tory Peterson, Vice President of the P-8 program at Boeing, also said in a statement. “We’re investing so that current and future global P-8A operators can expand the scope and effectiveness of their missions with low risk, evolutionary enhancements on the most advanced maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft already in service.”

It remains to be seen when Boeing and Northrop Grumman might demonstrate the new P-8/MQ-4C teaming capabilities in a real-world flight test.

“Next steps and timing will depend on customer requirements and would follow established acquisition, testing and fielding paths,” a Boeing spokesperson told TWZ when asked about any potential flight testing plans. “This was a jointly funded technology collaboration between Boeing and Northrop Grumman, demonstrating a practical, low-risk approach for integrating standards-based capabilities into existing platforms.”

The recent laboratory test is still an important step toward a future in which P-8A crews are able to issue direct commands to their uncrewed MQ-4C partners.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

US Japan Currency Intervention Signals Shift Away From G7 Coordination

Last week’s joint intervention by the United States and Japan to support the Japanese yen has raised fresh questions about the future of international currency coordination, as the operation proceeded without broader participation from other Group of Seven (G7) economies.

Although the intervention temporarily strengthened the yen, analysts argue that the absence of coordinated action from Europe and other major economies reflects a broader decline in multilateral economic cooperation and a growing preference for bilateral deals under the Trump administration.

The intervention was jointly carried out by Washington and Tokyo after the yen weakened to multi decade lows against the U.S. dollar. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Japanese Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama later confirmed the operation and defended its objectives.

The yen has largely maintained its gains since the intervention, although investors remain uncertain whether further support will follow or whether the Bank of Japan will reinforce the move through additional interest rate increases.

Treasury Market Concerns Shaped Washington’s Decision

One key factor behind U.S. involvement appears to have been concerns over the U.S. Treasury market.

Japan remains the largest foreign holder of U.S. government bonds. A large unilateral intervention by Tokyo would likely have required selling significant amounts of U.S. Treasuries to obtain dollars for prolonged currency operations, potentially disrupting already volatile bond markets.

By participating directly, the United States reportedly helped provide dollar liquidity while selling euros rather than dollars, reducing pressure on Treasury markets and limiting broader financial instability.

G7’s Absence Raises Questions

Despite the shared interest among G7 economies in preventing excessive currency volatility, other members of the group did not participate.

Historically, major currency interventions have often involved coordinated action across the G7. Following Japan’s 2011 earthquake and tsunami, G7 nations jointly intervened to weaken an excessively strong yen. Earlier coordinated efforts also included interventions supporting the euro in 2000 and global liquidity operations after the September 11 attacks.

In contrast, the latest operation remained strictly bilateral, even though the United States reportedly sold euros during the intervention without direct European participation.

The European Central Bank declined to comment publicly, while the International Monetary Fund has also remained largely silent.

Shift From Multilateralism to Bilateral Deals

The intervention reflects a broader shift in U.S. foreign economic policy under President Donald Trump, whose administration has increasingly favored bilateral negotiations over multilateral coordination.

Rather than pursuing comprehensive international agreements similar to the Plaza Accord or Louvre Accord, Washington has increasingly relied on country specific arrangements.

Japan has also deepened bilateral economic cooperation with the United States, including major investment commitments linked to previous tariff negotiations, reinforcing this new framework.

Regional Currency Pressures

U.S. officials also pointed to wider regional concerns.

Treasury Secretary Bessent argued that continued yen weakness risked placing downward pressure on other Asian currencies, particularly South Korea’s won, as exporters sought to remain competitive with Japanese manufacturers.

China’s yuan remains another major regional factor, although Beijing falls outside the G7 framework. Broader discussions involving China are expected only at future G20 meetings.

Historical Role of the G7

For decades, the G7 served as the primary forum for coordinated responses to major currency instability.

From stabilizing the euro during its early years to responding collectively after major financial crises, coordinated interventions carried significant market credibility because they demonstrated unified political and monetary commitment.

The latest U.S. Japan intervention marks a departure from that tradition, suggesting that future currency management may increasingly rely on bilateral arrangements rather than collective action.

Analysis

The U.S. Japan intervention highlights more than an attempt to stabilize the yen. It reflects a structural shift in global economic governance. The declining role of coordinated G7 action suggests that multilateral mechanisms are gradually giving way to transactional bilateral partnerships, particularly under the Trump administration.

While bilateral interventions may offer quicker and more flexible responses, they lack the collective market impact that historically made G7 operations highly effective. The absence of Europe and other major economies also raises questions about the future cohesion of the G7 as a forum for managing global financial stability.

For investors, this evolving landscape increases uncertainty. Without unified international coordination, currency markets may become more volatile as governments pursue national interests independently rather than through collective action. Whether future administrations restore broader multilateral cooperation or continue this bilateral approach will shape the next phase of global foreign exchange policy.

With information from Reuters.

Details are still limited, but a Kratos Valkyrie drone in a “test configuration” has crashed at the U.S. Army’s Dugway Proving Ground in Utah.

“A Kratos test configuration of Valkyrie experienced a mishap following takeoff from a test-range runway on Tuesday, August 4, 2026. This was a Kratos internally funded R&D event, part of continually adding configurations and capabilities,” according to a statement Kratos provided to TWZ. “No one was injured in the incident. As safety is our top priority, flight test operations for this system have been paused temporarily in an abundance of caution while we investigate the cause of the incident. Kratos has additional test systems ready once the investigation is complete.”

In response to our follow-up questions, Kratos declined to provide more information about the configuration of the drone. The statement’s mention of “takeoff from a test-range runway” would point to one of two versions of the Valkyrie the company has been developing capable of getting airborne from traditional runways, which we will come back to in a moment.

An installation spokesperson at Dugway separately confirmed to TWZ that an unspecified drone had crashed yesterday at around 8:00 AM local time. The uncrewed aircraft, which was not owned or operated by the U.S. military, went down shortly after takeoff for reasons that are still unknown. There were no casualties or damage to buildings as a result. When asked specifically, base officials had declined to say whether or not the drone was a Valkyrie.

Dugway’s Michael Army Airfield is a major hub for uncrewed aircraft testing, both by the U.S. military and private companies. Dugway also supports a wide range of other research and development and test and evaluation activities, with a heavy focus on defense against chemical and biological warfare threats.

Versions of the Valkyrie have been flying since 2019, with the U.S. Air Force being the first known operator of the type. The drone, also known as the XQ-58, was originally designed for rocket-assisted takeoffs via static launchers, and then recovery via parachute. Kratos subsequently developed a special launch trolley enabling takeoffs from traditional runways. In August 2024, the company announced plans for a new variant with built-in landing gear, also known as the Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) type, and said they hoped to see a first flight “soon.” The CTOL drones will still be capable of being launched via rocket.

Back in January, Kratos told TWZ that the target timeframe for a first flight of the CTOL Valkyrie had moved to early 2026. At that time, the company also confirmed that this version of Valkyrie, sometimes referred to as the MQ-58B, was being developed in part for the U.S. Marine Corps. The Marines are acquiring these drones under the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Uncrewed Expeditionary Tactical Aircraft (MUX TACAIR) Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. The service is hoping to take delivery of its first MQ-58s in 2029. The service has already been laying the groundwork for its future CCA fleets in with XQ-58 variants of the Valkyrie.

Kratos has seen growing interest in the Valkyrie family globally in recent years. This includes a partnership with Airbus on a version of the stealthy XQ-58 Valkyrie drone for the German Luftwaffe.

More remains to be learned about the crash at Dugway and how it might affect ongoing work on the Valkyrie family.

Update: 6:25 PM ET –

TWZ has now had a chance to talk to Steve Fendley, President of Kratos’ Unmanned Systems Division, in light of yesterday’s crash.

“I can’t go into detail on the exact configuration because, of course, that’s related to the investigation and what we will dig into,” Fendley told us. “So that basically would be potentially affecting the investigation. The investigation goes through everything that occurs leading up to doing any kind of a test.”

“We push the envelope across all of our system types,” he added. “The other thing I can say is we are constantly increasing the capability of the system, both for what we think it needs to be, and in other cases to satisfy what a particular customer may want to do to satisfy a certain mission.”

“So we’re doing all of those things, and the kind of Silicon Valley approach, the more modern test approach for things is you accelerate quickly, you reduce risk where you can you experience failures here and there, you learn from those failures and you move forward,” he continued. “Ideally, with that process, over time, what you do is – what you ultimately develop, achieve, and can move forward with is much faster than the I’m going to call it the legacy traditional approach, which has you know little or no tolerance for any missteps.”

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Eight of the world’s largest shipping associations have urged the United Nations to oppose tolls in the Strait of Hormuz amid reports that Iran and Oman are nearing a deal to manage the critical waterway.

In a letter to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and International Maritime Organization Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez, the group said that allowing authorities to charge vessels to transit the strait would violate international norms and harm the global economy.

“Introducing compulsory charges for transit, or service fees that are a toll in all but name, through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a significant departure from established international practice,” the groups representing shipowners and operators said in the letter, which was sent to the UN on Monday but made public on Wednesday.

“Beyond the immediate financial implications for global trade, it would establish a precedent that could undermine the internationally recognised legal framework governing straits used for international navigation and transit passage.”

Internationally recognised rights of navigation should not be “compromised or used as part of broader political negotiations,” the group said, warning that a permanent de facto “toll booth” would lead to higher energy prices, inflation and economic uncertainty.

“Ultimately, these impacts will carry a human cost, affecting livelihoods around the world. It is vital that we continue supporting the preservation of freedom of navigation as the foundation of international maritime governance,” the group said in the letter.

The letter’s eight signatories are the Asian Shipowners Association, the Baltic and International Maritime Council, the Cruise Lines International Association, the European Shipowners Association, the International Chamber of Shipping, the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners, the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners and the World Shipping Council.

Dominguez, the head of the UN’s maritime agency, previously told Al Jazeera that imposing fees in the strait would violate international law and set a “very detrimental” precedent for global shipping.

“Countries do not have the right to introduce tolls or payments or charges on these straits,” Dominguez said in April.

Deborah Elms, the head of trade policy at the Hinrich Foundation in Singapore, said the establishment of a permanent toll system would be felt acutely in Asia, which buys the bulk of the Gulf’s energy exports.

“The cost increases from Hormuz disruption can be seen in Asia, particularly in diesel fuel price increases and shortages, in the skyrocketing cost of fertilisers, and in rising costs and shortages of plastics,” Elms told Al Jazeera.

“Much of the oil currently shipped through Hormuz could be rerouted through pipelines, but natural gas remains a problem. This chokepoint is not a major problem for container shipping, but if tolls were applied to other waterways, containers and bulk carriers would be affected much more,” she said.

Iran established a de facto maritime “toll booth” in the strait shortly after the US and Israel launched their war against the country in late February.

Tehran formalised its fee regime with the establishment of the Persian Gulf Strait Authority in May.

Iran’s ability to launch attacks on commercial vessels in the region has granted Tehran effective control over the waterway, giving it powerful leverage in negotiations on ending the war.

Dozens of attacks have been carried out on vessels since the start of the conflict, most of which have been blamed on Iranian forces.

The IMO has confirmed 64 incidents and 17 deaths in the region since the war began.

Shipping across the Gulf continues to be severely disrupted more than five months into the conflict, with at least 6,000 seafarers still stranded in and around the strait as of late July, according to the IMO and UN Human Rights Chief Volker Turk.

In the latest incident on Wednesday, a tanker reported hearing two explosions while transiting the strait, according to the UK Maritime Trade Operations Centre (UKMTO).

Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said the IMO and other international agencies have limited ability to influence any deal involving Iran, Oman and the US despite their concerns.

“Despite clear interests in maintaining freedom of navigation in international straits, neither the UN, international organisations or shipowners have adequate leverage or ability to affect Iran’s calculus,” Thompson told Al Jazeera.

“President Trump has the means to continue to use violence to coerce a stubborn and resilient Iran, but he has thus far been ambivalent about international law and freedom of navigation, so it is uncertain if he would use his political capital or military force to prevent Iran from extracting tolls on shipping in the strait,” Thompson said.

Ukraine’s military intelligence says North Korea is preparing to deploy a missile unit to western Russia, which would mark another major expansion of military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang. The report comes as Kyiv warns its dwindling ballistic missile defenses are costing civilian lives.

Andrii Cherniak of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) told Reuters that the deployment will involve approximately 90 North Korean personnel stationed in Russia’s Voronezh region — which borders Ukraine — alongside the Russian military’s 112th Guards Missile Brigade. Ukrainian intelligence assesses the unit could ultimately field six launchers and as many as 120 KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), although the final composition is expected to be determined during senior-level talks next month.

The Ukrainian intelligence assessment has not been independently verified.

If confirmed, the deployment would represent a further deepening of North Korean support for Russia, after supplying Russia with ammunition, smaller numbers of ballistic missiles, and troops.

The Ukrainian Air Force today said Russia launched another major overnight strike combining drones with ballistic missiles. Preliminary figures showed Ukrainian air defenses shot down 98 of the 115 drones launched, but failed to intercept a single ballistic missile. As well as the inherent difficulty of intercepting these threats, this statistic also points to the exhaustion of its Patriot interceptor stockpiles.

The attack killed at least 17 people and injured dozens more after strikes hit multiple locations across Kyiv.

President Volodymyr Zelensky directly linked the casualties to continued shortages of advanced air-defense systems.

“Ballistic missile interceptors could have saved the lives of those killed today,” Zelensky wrote on social media. “It is very important that our partners understand that delays in supplying them, or an unwillingness to provide anti-ballistic systems, lead directly to such horrific casualties and destruction.”

Ukraine has spent months urging Western partners to provide additional Patriot batteries and interceptor missiles, which remain among the few systems capable of defeating ballistic missile threats such as Russia’s Iskander and North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24. While Ukrainian forces routinely claim to intercept the majority of incoming drones and many cruise missiles, ballistic missiles continue to present one of the most difficult threats to defend against.

Last month, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested Washington might grant Ukraine a license to manufacture Patriot interceptors domestically before later appearing to back away from the proposal, saying the technology was “a hard thing to give away.”

According to Ukraine’s military administration, seven sites across Kyiv were struck during the latest attack, which began shortly after midnight. Zelensky said the primary targets included civilian industrial facilities, among them a brewing company and warehouses storing construction materials.

“Partners who are not yet ready to play a more active role in supplying interceptors can help by implementing new sanctions. A significant share of Russia’s ballistic missile production is still not under sanctions,” Zelensky wrote on X. “Even now. New steps are needed — from the G7, the European Union, and everyone who supports the protection of life. Thank you to those who are willing to help in this way.”

Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said rescue operations continued throughout the day.

“There may still be people under the rubble,” he said.

Emergency crews rescued two survivors from a destroyed warehouse near the city center. Klitschko said 24 people were injured, including an ambulance driver, while four remained in critical condition. The strikes also ignited multiple fires at warehouses and industrial sites, while Ukrainian authorities reported an ammonia leak triggered by one of the impacts.

The latest attack coincides with what Ukrainian intelligence says was Russia’s first use of North Korean ballistic missiles since August 2025.

Cherniak told Reuters that Pyongyang recently delivered another batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia, along with additional personnel. He said Russia ultimately expects to receive 120 North Korean ballistic missiles and six launchers.

According to Ukrainian authorities, one of the newly delivered North Korean missiles struck the central Ukrainian village of Radushne last week, flattening a residential home and killing at least five members of the same family.

In the strike on Radushne, for the first time in a while, the Russians used a North Korean missile, according to preliminary data. Of course, more examinations will follow, and everything will be verified, but as of now – it is a North Korean ballistic missile. The alliance… pic.twitter.com/UtTTNGwBUb

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) July 30, 2026

Clearly, any increase in Russia’s ballistic missile inventory poses a serious challenge for Ukraine’s already strained air defenses. The situation is likely to become more difficult heading into the coming winter, when Russia normally steps up its strikes against Ukraine’s electrical grid.

The KN-23, known in North Korea as the Hwasong-11A, is a traditional SRBM that can reach out to around 800 kilometers (497 miles) and has a 500-kilogram (1,102-pound) class unitary high-explosive warhead. It offers greater range than Russia’s 9M723 Iskander SRBM, which carries a similarly sized warhead but has a range of 500 kilometers (311 miles). This weapon has also been fired from adapted railcars, a concept you can read more about here.

As for the KN-24, or Hwasong-11B, this has a range of approximately 410 kilometers (255 miles), making it more of a battlefield support SRBM, but still sufficient for Russia to strike many targets within Ukraine. It is often considered a North Korean analog of the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

However, the North Korean SRBMs are considered less accurate than their Russian-made counterparts and have been associated with strikes causing significant civilian casualties.

According to a report from Ukrainian state prosecutors, around half of the KN-23s that had been launched by Russia between late December 2023 and late February 2024 not only deviated from their trajectory but also exploded in midair.

An investigation by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) into the wreckage of a KN-23/KN-24 missile used by Russia in Ukraine found that the missile contained more than 290 foreign-made electronic components, with approximately 75 percent linked to U.S. companies, 16 percent to European firms, and the remainder to Asian manufacturers. This suggests that North Korea continues to obtain critical Western technology despite longstanding international sanctions and points to continued limitations in Pyongyang’s high-technology production capabilities.

🚨 🇺🇦🇷🇺🇰🇵 Analysis of the debris from one of the North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russia at Ukraine found it was constructed with more than 290 non-domestic electronic components. Many of them were produced by US companies in the last 3 years.

This analysis was conducted… pic.twitter.com/YHwwAZG0Wo

— Colby Badhwar (@ColbyBadhwar) February 20, 2024

North Korea first began supplying KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia in late 2023. Cherniak said Pyongyang delivered approximately 150 ballistic missiles between late 2023 and August 2025. Ukraine also says North Korea has supplied millions of much-needed artillery projectiles and deployed around 14,000 troops to Russia’s Kursk region under the countries’ 2024 mutual defense agreement.

Cherniak said roughly 9,500 North Korean troops remain in Kursk but are not currently engaged in combat operations against Ukraine. Zelensky said last month that Russia is seeking an additional 30,000 North Korean troops and is preparing facilities in the Voronezh region to receive them.

Overall, North Korean-supplied missiles make up only a very small fraction of the weapons used in Russian strikes on Ukraine, but there has long been concern about the direction the burgeoning military relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang could take. There have been particular concerns that Russian expertise in the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons — as well as other weapons and technologies — could be provided to North Korea.

North Korea: Kim Jong-un shows unseen nuclear weapons to Russia’s defence minister

The reported new deployment comes as Russia appears to be increasing its reliance on ballistic missiles to exploit one of Ukraine’s most significant military vulnerabilities. With few signs that Russia has been able to further ramp up production of its own Iskander missiles, an increased supply of North Korean ballistic missiles would take advantage of a gap in Ukrainian air defenses and further threaten its cities, energy infrastructure, and other targets. The bigger concern is not simply another shipment of missiles, but the prospect of Russia tapping into an expanding North Korean production base financed by Moscow, allowing it to sustain high-volume ballistic missile attacks for far longer than it otherwise could.

Ukraine’s ability to defeat ballistic missiles of any origin has become increasingly constrained by the availability of interceptor missiles. Patriot remains the primary system capable of reliably engaging Iskander, KN-23, and KN-24 ballistic missiles, but the U.S.-made interceptors are expensive, produced in relatively modest numbers, and are also needed to meet U.S. and allied needs around the world. European-supplied SAMP/T batteries also provide a limited anti-ballistic capability, but have been provided in only limited numbers so far.

Global demand for Patriot interceptors has surged amid conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, straining U.S. and allied inventories and production capacity. Those constraints have become significant enough that Congress has questioned whether the Pentagon can sustain higher transfer rates to Ukraine even as Kyiv presses for more interceptors. Meanwhile, although the United States continues discussing licensed Patriot production with Ukraine, any domestic manufacturing effort would take many months—if not years—to produce missiles in meaningful numbers, leaving Kyiv dependent on allied deliveries for the foreseeable future.

Whether or not the reported North Korean missile unit deployment materializes, the operational trend is becoming increasingly clear. Russia is continuing to expand the scale and complexity of its long-range strike campaigns, pairing mass drone attacks with growing numbers of ballistic missiles specifically intended to exploit one of Ukraine’s most difficult defensive challenges. As Kyiv’s leadership continues to press for additional Patriot batteries and interceptor missiles, the consequences of those shortages are becoming increasingly evident with every large-scale strike.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Two drone-related incidents at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany represent the most serious threats yet in the wave of small drone incursions that have plagued Europe for the past few years. German police say an explosive-laden drone was located on the ground near a Ukrainian cargo jet and that there was a midair collision between an object and another cargo aircraft. 

This marks the first time that a drone with explosives has been found in Europe far from the Ukrainian border, The Guardian noted. The incidents, which spurred the opening of a counter-terror investigation and temporary closure of the airport, have raised the level of concern about these incursions and the threats to parked aircraft, issues TWZ has frequently covered for years.

That the drone was carrying explosives “is a new quality of danger,” German Interior Minister Armin Schuster told reporters.

German officials have not said who was operating the drones, but Ukrainian officials are blaming Russia.

“During the night of August 4 to 5, 2026, an airport employee discovered a drone carrying an unknown explosive device in the security area of the cargo flight operations, near the ‘South Runway takeoff/landing strip,’” the Saxony State Criminal Police said in a release. “The object was examined with the support of the Federal Police and a bomb-disposal robot. The Federal Police’s IEDD (improvised explosive device disposal) unit removed the detonator from the explosive device.”

The explosive-laden drone was found near a massive An-124-100 Ruslan (NATO reporting name Condor) cargo jet. As we have previously reported, Antonov, which operates the aircraft, is now using Leipzig as its headquarters after its facilities at Hostomel Airport in Ukraine were destroyed in the opening days of the Russian all-out invasion. The airport is also used by NATO and the German military for transport.

In the context of a Russian threat, the Condor, in particular, represents an unsurprising target. Ukraine’s An-124s are a source of national pride and a big flying symbol of the country’s defiance and survival. They also provide much-needed revenue to Ukraine and strategic airlift to support the conflict. Ukraine’s An-124s have long provided charter cargo services for western militaries, companies and NGOs. Since the war began, Antonov Airlines An-124s have been used to deliver war materiel bound for Ukraine. So, these giant aircraft really check a lot of boxes if Russia was looking to drastically escalate to executing such brazen attacks in European countries. While they are clearly the logical suspect in this case, we still have no proof who was behind these incidents.

In addition to the drone on the ground, “a presumed second, unknown flying object collided with a cargo aircraft after it aborted its landing and went around again due to the previously imposed runway closure,” the Saxony State Criminal Police added. “After landing in Hanover, the aircraft was found to have sustained minor damage.”

The cargo jet in the midair incident reportedly belonged to DHL. It should be noted that in 2024, Western security officials said they believed “that two incendiary devices, shipped via DHL, were part of a covert Russian operation that ultimately aimed to start fires aboard cargo or passenger aircraft flying to the U.S. and Canada, as Moscow steps up a sabotage campaign against Washington and its allies,” according to The Wall Street Journal at the time. However, there is no clear connection between these situations at this time.

“Leipzig Airport is part of our critical infrastructure,” stated State Minister of Justice Prof. Constanze Geiert. “Attacks on these structures must be pursued by the law enforcement authorities with full force and severity. It is therefore welcome that the investigation has been taken over by the Central Office for Extremism Saxony (ZESA), the Dresden General Prosecutor’s Office, and the Saxony State Criminal Police Office, and is now being conducted under high pressure and in close coordination with the federal security authorities.”

As noted earlier in this story, German officials have yet to point the finger at anyone, but Ukraine’s officials say Moscow is behind it.

Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, Oleksii Makeiev, blamed Moscow. “Who else could it be but Russia?” he told German media, without offering any proof. Ukraine’s strategic communications center took a similar stance.

“New footage of yet another act of Russian terrorism on EU soil, showing the drone loaded with explosives on the tarmac at Leipzig/Halle Airport, just meters from a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft,” Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications posited on X. “According to German authorities, the drone was carrying an improvised explosive device. Bomb disposal specialists rendered it safe after determining the detonator had malfunctioned, preventing the device from exploding. In a separate incident the same night, a DHL cargo aircraft reportedly struck an unidentified object shortly after departure—possibly another drone—before diverting safely. The aircraft landed without injuries, though inspectors found minor damage.”

While it is unknown how the UAS came to be found near the Condor, or what countermeasures are in place at the airport, if any, when taken at face value, it has all the hallmarks of an attempted near-field attack via short-range drone. This is the same kind of strike Ukraine famously pulled off last year during its Operation Spiderweb campaign against Russian strategic aviation. In that operation, Ukraine remotely launched drones, hidden in trucks parked near airfields across Russia, to hit parked bombers and other critical aircraft. Spiderweb hammered home a threat TWZ had raised for years — even the most important aircraft on earth largely sit vulnerable on the ground to large scale attacks by low-end drones launched nearby.

You can see a video of one of the Operation Spiderweb attacks below:

Footage shows the moment a lightning strike hit a football player in southern Thailand, during a semi-final match, killing him instantly. The strike injured 12 others as a monsoon storm swept through the area. Warning: video shows graphic footage.

Presidents of Argentina, Paraguay, Chile and Ecuador, along with Spain’s King Felipe VI, are expected to attend Friday’s ceremony.

Colombia’s outgoing defence minister has warned of a heightened risk of “terrorism” ahead of Friday’s inauguration of President-elect Abelardo de la Espriella.

Minister of Defence Pedro Sanchez told radio station La FM on Wednesday that authorities were tracking a “threat” against Friday’s proceedings. “Most likely, these criminals would attempt to disrupt this democratic event with acts of terrorism,” he said.

The handover of the presidency will take place in the region of Cali in Colombia’s southwest, which has recently seen a series of militia attacks.

De la Espriella, 48, who narrowly won the June presidential run-off, had asked Congress to move the event from the capital, Bogota, to the country’s third-largest city despite its proximity to areas under the control of rebel groups.

Several foreign leaders, including the presidents of Argentina, Paraguay, Chile and Ecuador, along with Spain’s King Felipe VI, are expected to attend the inauguration ceremony.

To secure the event, Colombia’s military is deploying roughly 11,000 troops and has imposed a no-fly zone on drones over Cali and its surroundings. Rebel fighters have previously used drones to drop explosives.

In the department of Cauca, near Cali, a dissident faction of the FARC armed group operates under the command of Ivan Mordisco, the alias of Colombia’s most wanted rebel leader.

The hard-right de la Espriella campaigned on dismantling outgoing President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” negotiation strategy with armed groups.

Petro has disputed the election result and said he will not attend Friday’s ceremony.

Caracas, August 5, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan grassroots movements have taken to the streets to oppose US control over the country’s resources and political affairs.

On Tuesday, around 150 people gathered in Caracas’ Plaza El Venezolano in a demonstration organized by a coalition of leftist political groups, including Comunes, the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), and the League of Socialist Workers (LTS).

“This is a protest against the imperialist plundering of our resources,” LTS’ Ángel Arias declared. “Anti-imperialism is not merely a discourse, it is a necessity for the Venezuelan working class.”

He decried that “the resources are far away from the Venezuelan people, with the decisions in Trump’s hands.”

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, Washington has seized control over the Venezuelan energy sector. Trump officials have been closely involved in an overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law and have brokered negotiations with Western corporations under the revised pro-business framework. Furthermore, Venezuelan export revenues, especially from crude sales, are deposited in a US Treasury account before an undisclosed portion is returned to Caracas at US officials’ discretion.

Arias criticized Venezuelan authorities for their “complicity,” including in reforming laws to favor Western capital. He also lambasted the Venezuelan far-right opposition for being “totally servile to Washington’s interests.”

Pedro Eusse, secretary-general of the CUTV trade union confederation, urged political unity against “colonial domination.”

“Beyond our political differences, we need to unite all those who oppose the imposition of a colonial protectorate,” he affirmed. “We need to have a common flag, which is to drive imperialism out of Venezuela.”

Speakers also condemned the US’ January 3 attacks and the continuing unilateral sanctions against the Caribbean nation.

A “Twitter storm” on Monday night placed #FueraTrumpdeVenezuela (“Trump out of Venezuela”) as the top X/Twitter trending hashtag in the country.

Tuesday’s protest followed a Saturday rally organized by the Popular Anti-Imperialist Front, a coalition of Caracas grassroots movements that called for “the defense of the Constitution and Hugo Chávez’s legacy.”

“We are on the streets to vehemently reject the presence of the US empire in our country,“ veteran organizer Juan Contreras from the Coordinadora Simón Bolívar told local media as over 100 protesters marched through the popular barrio of La Vega. “We are going to continue to mobilize and call on people to join our efforts.“

Contreras likewise criticized US-arbitrated negotiations between the acting Delcy Rodríguez government and an opposition faction. “If there is dialogue, it must be with the Venezuelan people and their organized movements.”

The Coordinadora Simón Bolívar, a historic collective from the combative 23 de Enero barrio, had previously denounced an alleged plot, orchestrated by the DEA, to assassinate grassroots leaders in working-class neighborhoods.

Both recent demonstrations also fiercely rejected the acting government’s recent rapprochement with Israel. Protesters held Palestinian flags and condemned the US ally’s genocide in Gaza and Lebanon.

An Israeli diplomatic and military mission, alongside several state-aligned NGOs, arrived in the Caribbean nation in the wake of the June 24 double earthquake. Rodríguez thanked the delegation and praised it as “highly trained and professional.” Former President Hugo Chávez severed ties with Tel Aviv in 2009. Both he and Maduro were stalwart supporters of the Palestinian cause, repeatedly excoriating Israel for its colonial occupation, war crimes, and genocide.

Venezuelan popular movements had previously mobilized on July 24 in a protest “against imperialism and Zionism” in Caracas’ Plaza Bolívar.

In addition to the public demonstrations, a group of Chavista political activists and intellectuals published the “Maracay Declaration” on July 28, defending the urgent need for national unity in “the struggle to recover independence.”

“In this hour, the homeland calls for unity and a national project that responds to the interests of the Venezuelan people, and we will work permanently to achieve these goals,” the statement read. Signees included former Vice President Elías Jaua and ex-congressman Tony Boza.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Kidnapping for ransom by armed groups and bandits has become a major crisis in Nigeria.

More than 300 people who had been kidnapped across Nigeria have been freed in an intelligence and security operation, the government has announced.

“President Bola Ahmed Tinubu warmly welcomes the successful rescue of 308 Nigerian citizens who were abducted in different attacks in Niger and Kwara states,” Bayo Onanuga, a special adviser to Nigeria’s president, said in a statement.

The statement said that 163 of those rescued were abducted from the Woro Community in Kaiama Local Government Area in Kwara State, and 145 were taken from Niger State.

“The victims were rescued from the Kainji Lake National Park Forest in New Bussa Local Government Area of Niger State”, according to the statement, as a result of a “coordinated, intelligence-driven operation”. The operation was carried out by the country’s National Counter Terrorism Centre, involving members of the armed forces, the police force and the Department of State Services.

“It was the largest rescue operation ever carried out on the same day by Nigeria’s joint security team,” the statement added.

The government in Kwara State, near the border with Benin, welcomed the rescue in a social media post, local channel Arise News reported.

“Kudos to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu GCFR, security forces, and everyone who played a role in this huge feat. We are grateful!”, said the Kwara government statement, announcing the release of those abducted during the February 3 attack on local communities in Kaiama.

At least 200 people were killed in the attack, when suspected Boko Haram-linked fighters launched a coordinated assault that lasted several hours, according to the Nigeria-based Punch website.

Kidnapping for ransom by criminal groups, Boko Haram-linked fighters and gangs known as bandits has become a major crisis in Nigeria, especially in areas with little state presence.

Soft targets, including schools, churches and mosques, particularly in vulnerable rural communities with limited state security, have been particularly at risk.

On January 18, 177 people were abducted from three churches in the village of Kurmin Wali in Kaduna State.

Last month, security services freed at least 40 students and teachers kidnapped in May from the southern state of Oyo.

In June, the president announced that the military had “neutralised” more than 13,000 “terrorists” in the past year. The army also said it had rescued 360 people abducted by Boko Haram, which has spread across parts of the country from Borno State, once considered the centre of its operations.

“The successful execution of this intelligence-led operation demonstrates the growing efficiency and collaboration among our security services. I commend our gallant men and women in uniform for their bravery and unwavering commitment to safeguarding Nigerian lives,” the president said in his latest statement.

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has suffered a major electoral defeat after Dr Abdul El-Sayed won Michigan’s Democratic Senate primary, crushing pro-Israel congresswoman Haley Stevens despite an unprecedented spending campaign on her behalf.

AIPAC’s super political action committee, the United Democracy Project, spent more than $30 million promoting Stevens and attacking El-Sayed, according to Federal Election Commission filings analysed by the New York Times. NBC News projected El-Sayed as the winner on Wednesday, dealing a major blow to the pro-Israel lobby’s efforts to determine the outcome of one of the most closely watched Democratic contests in the country.

El-Sayed campaigned against US military assistance to Israel and repeatedly highlighted AIPAC’s intervention in the race. Stevens, by contrast, received the backing of AIPAC and the Democratic Party establishment.

The result is seen as providing some of the clearest evidence yet that association with Israel and its powerful lobby groups is becoming a political liability among Democratic voters as opposition grows to Israel’s genocide in Gaza and the unconditional support it receives from Washington.

A New York Times investigation published before the primary result was announced revealed the scale of AIPAC’s transformation from a traditional lobbying organisation into one of the largest spenders in US elections.

Spending by AIPAC-affiliated political action committees on campaign advertising and voter outreach has more than doubled in less than five years, rising from $29.3 million to $67.2 million. Much of the money has been directed towards Democratic primaries, where the lobby has sought to defeat candidates who criticise Israel or question US military assistance to the occupation state.

However, the investigation uncovered a striking feature of AIPAC’s campaign strategy: it rarely reveals its connection to Israel.

Between April 2022 and the end of July, AIPAC-funded groups produced 109 television and digital adverts. Only six mentioned Israel. Instead, the adverts focused on issues such as abortion rights, the economy and the cost of living, despite being financed specifically to elect politicians who support Israel.

AIPAC’s reluctance to mention Israel is seen as a reflection of a deeper political problem: open association with the Israeli government has become increasingly toxic following the mass killing, displacement and starvation of Palestinians in Gaza.

The lobby is effectively asking voters to support Israel’s preferred candidates without making Israel itself part of the public argument.

AIPAC has also channelled approximately $22 million into five smaller super PACs with innocuous names that make no reference to Israel. These include Elect Chicago Women, Affordable Chicago Now!, Voters for Responsive Government and Blue Wave Action.

Read: Pro-Israel cash goes undercover as US voters turn against Israel

The Michigan contest became the lobby’s largest gamble. United Democracy Project spent more than $10 million promoting Stevens and over $20 million attacking El-Sayed through advertising and voter outreach.

Nevertheless, El-Sayed prevailed.

El-Sayed’s victory is thought to be particularly significant because Michigan is home to one of the largest Arab-American populations in the US and became the centre of the “Uncommitted” movement, which challenged former President Joe Biden’s support for Israel’s assault on Gaza.

Signs of the political backlash were already visible in April when Stevens and another AIPAC-backed politician were booed during the Michigan Democratic Party Convention. El-Sayed and his former primary rival, Mallory McMorrow, had both pledged to reject AIPAC funding.

AIPAC has previously succeeded in removing several prominent critics of Israel, spending millions of dollars to defeat former Democratic representatives Jamaal Bowman and Cori Bush. It has also targeted Republicans who questioned US military support for Israel.

However, the lobby has faced a growing number of defeats. Summer Lee survived repeated AIPAC-funded attempts to remove her, while candidates in Illinois and New Jersey successfully used their opponents’ links to the lobby against them.

Polls have also documented a rapid decline in support for Israel. A majority of Americans now oppose providing economic and military assistance to Israel, while Democratic voters have become increasingly critical of both Israel’s conduct in Gaza and the influence of pro-Israel lobbying organisations.

Gianni Infantino will remain as Fifa president after he received the backing of senior executives in a meeting in Morocco on Wednesday.

Infantino summoned members of the management board to Fifa’s Africa office in Rabat following mounting criticism of his aborted attempt to sell off commercial and event operations to private investors.

European football’s governing body Uefa said at the weekend that it has lost confidence in Infantino, calling the Fifa Forward Enterprise proposal a “shabby, back room, opaque deal”.

Much criticism has come from within Fifa, including secretary general Mattias Grofstrom, who was at Wednesday’s meeting. In an internal memo sent to Fifa staff on Tuesday, he wrote that the situation is “a sad and reproachable series of events”.

However, in a statement following the meeting, Grofstrom and the managament board “reaffirmed their full support” for Infantino as president.

More to follow.

Deposed Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina says she will return in December despite facing a death sentence in absentia, as Dhaka seeks her extradition and India and Bangladesh work to repair strained ties.

The Houthi rebels of Yemen say they are widening the scope of their attacks on Saudi shipping to the northern Red Sea to prevent transits through the Suez Canal. The expansion of Houthi kinetic activities there comes amid mixed messages about efforts to open up the Strait of Hormuz, largely closed by Iran after it was hit by the U.S. and Israel on Feb. 28.

The Iranian-backed Houthis already struck Saudi ships in the southern part of that body of water and refineries along the northern portion after imposing a blockade on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, leading several oil tankers in the Red Sea to avoid that route in favor of the Suez Canal. The expansion of the Houthi campaign against Saudi shipping began with an attack off the port of Yanbu on the NCC Wafa, a Saudi oil tanker, the rebel group claimed today.

“By God’s grace, the Yemeni Armed Forces succeeded in striking the Saudi oil vessel Wafa in the northern Red Sea off the area of Yanbu, using a number of ballistic missiles — and the hit was precise, by God’s grace,” Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree claimed on X. “In tightening the naval blockade on the Saudi enemy at Bab al-Mandeb in the southern Red Sea, the Saudi enemy has moved to reroute its oil vessels toward the northern Red Sea. The Yemeni Armed Forces therefore affirm that their operations will continue and escalate in targeting Saudi oil vessels in the northern Red Sea, to close off every route and prevent passage, in order to cement the ‘blockade for blockade’ equation.”

There was no immediate statement issued by the Saudis and TWZ cannot independently verify the Houthis’ claims.

As we have frequently detailed, a Houthi blockade of the BAM threatens to add far greater pressure on oil exports from the Middle East, already drastically affected by the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the resumption of the U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. The kingdom has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to the hostilities in the Persian Gulf. As we have noted, the Suez Canal is an important artery in addition to the BAM for ships carrying Saudi energy supplies, though this route drastically increases the cost of exports to Asia given the need to travel around Africa. While tankers carrying Saudi oil through the BAM have been greatly reduced, they are still making their way through the Suez Canal. But that could change if the Houthis start making that route perilous too, which would put a tighter energy squeeze on the west, including Europe, as well as the rest of the globe. They could also continue to attack Saudi oil terminals on the Red Sea, making shipping a moot point if the transfer stations are not operational.

The closing of the BAM to Saudi oil traffic, and now threats to the transit route north to the canal, also raise the specter of the U.S. having to get as involved as it did during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September, which could pull resources away from Iranian-focused operations. It’s possible Egypt would have a major problem with such actions too, as it would impact the Canal’s revenue and freedom of movement. This could widen the conflict.

Meanwhile, there are mixed signals about whether the Strait of Hormuz will be fully reopened to traffic and under what conditions.

“The U.S., Iran and Oman are closing in on an interim agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, with the U.S. aiming for a Wednesday announcement,” Axios reported on Wednesday, citing two regional sources and a U.S. official. “According to two regional sources, the deal under discussion sets up a 60-day temporary arrangement between Oman and Iran in the Hormuz strait, which could be extended.”

All inbound traffic of ships through the strait and into the Gulf would go in a northern lane through Iranian waters, the publication noted. All outbound traffic through the strait and into the Arabian Sea would go in a southern lane through Omani waters, in coordination with Iran. In addition, there would be no tolls or fees charged during this interim two-month period and the parties would work to clear the median lane of the Strait of mines within 30 days.

“After the median lane is cleared, it would be used for inbound and outbound traffic under the terms of a permanent arrangement to be negotiated between Oman and Iran,” the outlet added.

The deal described by Axios largely mirrors the Iran-Oman negotiations we reported on yesterday, with the main differences being the involvement of the U.S. and no imposition of fees. As we noted, both Iran and the U.S. are currently following a bifurcated traffic pattern, with the U.S. Navy recommending transits close to the Omani coastline and Iran pushing shipping toward its shores. The middle of the Strait has been deemed too hazardous because of the threat primarily from mines.

Speaking to Fox News Tuesday night, President Donald Trump said negotiations with Iran have been ongoing but that Tehran faces severe consequences if it fails to open up the Strait.

“If they back out again, they are going to get hit really hard,” Trump proclaimed.

The president has insisted that Iran must fully open the vital chokepoint or face new and more intense attacks that would include power plants, other civilian infrastructure and even strikes on leadership.

There are indications from Iran, however, that any deal to open the Strait is between Iran and Oman and that it might not result in a quick resolution.

The official Iranian Press TV stated on X “that any potential bilateral agreement between Tehran and Muscat regarding maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz will not automatically lead to the immediate re-opening of the strategic waterway.”

Reuters on Wednesday concurred that any deal to open the Strait may not be as imminent as Trump has claimed.

“A proposed deal between Iran and Oman would give Tehran control over ships entering the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz,” the outlet wrote, citing a senior Iranian source and two regional officials. “Despite the apparent step towards yielding to Iranian demands, the sources pushed back against assertions by U.S. President Donald Trump that ‌a deal reopening the strait was imminent, saying important details still had to be agreed.”

Regardless of negotiations, U.S. Central Command stated on X that the Strait of Hormuz southern route along the coast of Oman remains open and that over the past three months, “U.S. forces have assisted more than 1,000 vessels in successfully transiting the strait despite unwarranted Iranian aggression, and these transits continue today.”

Between Houthi actions in the Red Sea region and the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz, commercial traffic in both areas continues to be greatly reduced, though transits through the BAM are spiking upwards, according to MarineTraffic.

The latest “data highlights how headline volumes can obscure underlying maritime risk. Strait of Hormuz crossings fell from 10 to eight on 4 August, with seven vessels exiting the Middle East Gulf and only one entering,” MarineTraffic stated on X. “Five of the eight movements used the Iranian Unilateral Scheme, while no Hormuz Traffic Separation Scheme crossings were recorded.”

Meanwhile, “Bab el-Mandeb traffic rose from 25 to 34, including 18 vessels entering the Red Sea and 16 exiting,” MarineTraffic added. “Yet four dark transits, two sanctioned crossings and six shadow fleet movements indicate that visibility, routing concentration and compliance exposure remain central concerns.”

Amid all this, oil prices have actually fallen, with Brent Crude now trading at slightly over $79 a barrel, down from nearly $85 per barrel yesterday. Still, there are many reasons Trump is pushing a rekindled effort to find a diplomatic off-ramp to a conflict that has killed 18 American troops, wounded hundreds more, drained U.S. weapons stocks and roiled international relations and global financial markets. In addition to the global economic pressures this conflict has created, it is unpopular among the American electorate and crucial mid-term elections will take place in November. Even Fox News, generally supportive of Trump, has released polling data that shows a “majority of voters oppose U.S. military action, and nearly two thirds think the conflict will last at least a year.”

The latest Fox News survey “finds 56% oppose U.S. military action against Iran, including 40% who “strongly” oppose.”

How much these factors will play a role in Trump’s decision-making should become clearer over the next hours and days.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Britain’s new Prime Minister Andy Burnham is using social media to reshape Labour’s public image and challenge the growing online influence of populist parties, particularly Reform UK. By combining informal, relatable content with government messaging, Burnham is seeking to connect with younger voters while projecting a more approachable leadership style.

A New Digital Approach

Since taking office, Burnham has rapidly expanded his presence on TikTok, X, and Instagram through light-hearted videos, behind-the-scenes content, and policy announcements packaged in an accessible format.

Unlike traditional political messaging, Burnham’s posts often feature humor and everyday topics, ranging from debating popular pub snacks to joking about his own appearance. Communications experts say this approach presents him as relatable without undermining the seriousness of his office.

Labour Seeks to Close the Digital Gap

Burnham’s strategy reflects Labour’s effort to compete in an online space where Reform UK and its leader Nigel Farage have built significant audiences over several years.

Political analysts argue that while former Prime Minister Keir Starmer struggled to connect through digital platforms, Burnham’s communication style is more natural and engaging. Early polling suggests Labour has narrowed Reform UK’s lead since Burnham became prime minister, although the next general election remains years away.

Positive Messaging Over Polarisation

Communications specialists describe Burnham’s strategy as one focused on inclusion rather than confrontation. Instead of relying on divisive rhetoric, Labour is attempting to broaden its appeal through optimistic messaging and accessible political communication.

Videos highlighting government policies such as tax relief for hospitality businesses have attracted millions of views, demonstrating how policy announcements can gain wider attention when presented through social media trends.

Building a Professional Digital Operation

The government has expanded its investment in digital communications, recruiting specialists in content production, strategy, and social media engagement.

Burnham’s online campaign is being coordinated by experienced digital strategists, reflecting a broader recognition that political influence increasingly depends on platforms where younger audiences consume information.

Analysis: Social Media Is Becoming a Core Political Battleground

Burnham‘s early success illustrates how political communication is evolving beyond traditional speeches and television appearances. Social media has become a central arena where leaders compete not only on policy but also on personality, authenticity, and accessibility. While Burnham’s informal style may help Labour regain ground against populist rivals such as Reform UK, digital popularity alone is unlikely to determine long-term political success. As analysts note, sustained public support will ultimately depend on whether the government delivers tangible improvements on the economy, living standards, and public services. If policy outcomes fail to match the positive online narrative, social media momentum could prove difficult to maintain.

With information from Reuters.

Israeli forces have entered homes and shops in the occupied West Bank’s Qalandiya refugee camp, near Ramallah, issuing demolition threats against businesses.

The Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) said on Wednesday that eight Palestinian people were taken to hospital after suffering injuries.

Mohammad Aslan, spokesman for the committee that runs the affairs of the camp, told the AFP news agency that the Israeli army had arrested at least 20 people and took up positions on residents’ roofs.

In 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government advanced plans for the construction of an illegal 9,000-unit settlement on the grounds of Jerusalem’s former Atarot airport, adjacent to Qalandiya.

Palestinian residents have since voiced fear that raids and home demolitions could be tied to a strategy of eviction before illegal settlement construction, without any official word from Israeli authorities.

China’s ballistic missile arsenal has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past two decades. Once centered on a relatively small force of nuclear missiles designed primarily for deterrence, which we discussed in the first part of this series, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) now fields the world’s largest — and one of the most diverse — conventional and nuclear-armed ballistic missile forces. Among its increasingly advanced regional ballistic missiles are several types that are capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, further complicating crisis stability.

Ranging from short-range systems optimized for a Taiwan contingency to intermediate-range weapons capable of striking Guam and threatening U.S. naval forces deep into the Western Pacific, these regional missiles have become the backbone of Beijing’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. The land-based examples are road-mobile, solid-fueled, and increasingly precise. Some are fitted with hypersonic or maneuvering warheads to further complicate the work of an adversary’s air defenses. As of last year, the Pentagon assessed that China fielded 600 missiles in the ‘boosted hypersonic’ category, which includes systems carrying hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) as well as air-launched ballistic missiles, also covered in this article.

This guide examines China’s principal short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile systems, how they evolved, and the roles they are expected to play in any future conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

In this context, a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) refers to a ballistic missile with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), typically intended for battlefield or nearby regional targets; a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) covers ranges of 1,000-3,000 kilometers (621-1,864 miles) and is designed to strike targets across a broader region; and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) has a range of 3,000-5,500 kilometers (1,864-3,418 miles), enabling it to reach distant regional targets.

This article also discusses multiple missiles that carry either a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) or a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV). These weapon types can potentially be adapted to hit moving vessels. A MaRV follows a roughly ballistic path to its impact point, maneuvering to improve terminal accuracy and defeat missile defenses. If paired with a seeker, among other alterations, they can potentially be used to strike ships. Meanwhile, unlike a traditional ballistic reentry vehicle, an HGV is designed to be boosted to high speed and released before proceeding along a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path to its target. It remains maneuverable throughout much of its flight, allowing it to change course and vary its altitude. That combination of sustained hypersonic speed and unpredictable flight profile makes it far more difficult to successfully engage, while also reducing the time air defenses have to defend against it — provided they even have weapons that can successfully do so.

Short-range ballistic missiles

The PLARF fields multiple variants of the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-16 SRBM families. Among their most important roles is to hold Taiwan and the southern reaches of the Japanese archipelago at risk. Ongoing modernization efforts to improve accuracy, survivability, and operational flexibility underscore the continued importance of these systems, particularly for a cross-Strait campaign. Just as significant is their sheer quantity, which would enable sustained strikes against the many military and infrastructure targets that would need to be engaged in a major conflict.

DF-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2)

The origins of the DF-11 can be traced back to 1985, and work on a new single-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile. The initial requirement called for a 300-kilometer (186-mile) range, matching that of the widely used Soviet Scud-B, using a similar road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). However, development trailed the DF-15, culminating in a successful flight test in mid-1990.

The DF-11 entered PLARF service in 1992, but work on an improved version reportedly began almost immediately. Development of the DF-11A started as early as 1993 and focused primarily on extending the missile’s reach to approximately 600 kilometers (373 miles), effectively doubling the range of the original design. Following its maiden flight in 1997, the program was publicly acknowledged the following year, and the DF-11A formally entered Chinese service in 1999.

China also developed a specialized bunker-busting variant known as the DF-11AZT, reportedly entering service in 2013. Believed to use the DF-11A airframe, the missile replaces the standard high-explosive payload with a penetrator warhead optimized for attacking hardened and fortified targets. Images of the system surfaced in Chinese media in 2016, followed by the release of footage showing a 2013 test launch the following year.

Although rumors have periodically claimed the DF-11 family can carry a nuclear warhead, the available evidence does not support that assessment. Today, it appears that only one brigade still operates the system.

DF-15 (CSS-6)

China began developing a new generation of conventionally armed, mobile SRBMs during the 1980s, mainly with export customers in mind. The DF-15 has evolved through several iterations, although publicly available information on the missile family remains fragmented and, in some cases, contradictory. The first major upgrade, the DF-15A, reportedly entered service in 1996 and has occasionally been described as being capable of carrying a nuclear payload. However, the only PLARF brigade still believed to operate the variant is consistently identified in open-source assessments as a conventional missile unit. Estimates of its maximum range are equally inconsistent, with figures ranging from the original 600 kilometers (373 miles) to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles).

A more substantial redesign followed with the DF-15B (CSS-6 Mod 3), which reportedly entered operational service around 2006 before making its public debut during China’s military parade in 2009. The most obvious external change is its triconic reentry vehicle fitted with control fins, a configuration widely interpreted as incorporating a MaRV warhead.

Around 2013, another variant, the DF-15C (CSS-6 Mod 2), reportedly entered service. Based on the shape of its warhead, the missile is widely believed to be optimized for attacks against hardened and deeply buried targets, much like the previous DF-11AZT.

The DF-15 remains in service with only a small number of PLARF brigades and appears to be steadily giving way to the newer, longer-ranged, and more capable DF-16.

In 2022, the PLARF fired multiple DF-15s into the waters around Taiwan during live-fire drills following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This reflects the fact that missiles in this category remain central to any contingency involving the island.

DF-16 (CSS-11)

Another conventionally armed mobile SRBM, the DF-16 has steadily replaced the DF-15. Although it made its public debut during China’s 2015 military parade, the missile is widely believed to have entered PLARF service several years earlier, around 2011 or 2012. Nevertheless, Much about the DF-16 remains unclear.

The DF-16 closely resembles the older DF-15, but lacks the prominent aerodynamic fins found on its predecessor. This suggests the missile relies on a more advanced guidance and flight-control system capable of maintaining stability without the need for large external control surfaces. There is also some uncertainty about its range: this could potentially surpass 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), a threshold that would place it in the MRBM category.

Stills from a video showing a test of a DF-16 with a submunitions warhead:

DF-16 from mid 2010s, with a submunition warhead.

Employment of submunition warheads against land based targets is well established, but for the PLA, their use for large and medium naval targets from AShBMs are more interesting especially from a mission kill pov. pic.twitter.com/m6S4QFAgDS

— Rick Joe (@RickJoe_PLA) March 8, 2026

A version equipped with what appears to be a MaRV, commonly identified as the DF-16A (CSS-11 Mod 2), was spotted in footage of a Chinese military exercise released in early 2017, indicating it was already operational by that point. Chinese state media later revealed another DF-16 warhead configuration in 2018, widely interpreted as evidence of a further variant, the DF-16B (CSS-11 Mod 3?). Despite the emergence of multiple versions, open-source reporting consistently indicates that the DF-16 family is intended exclusively for conventional strike missions.

Medium-range ballistic missiles

Over the past decade, Beijing has invested heavily in modernizing both the quality and quantity of its medium-range ballistic missile forces. Today, it fields a diverse mix of MRBMs, backed up by long-range land-attack cruise missiles, capable of executing both conventional and nuclear missions across the Indo-Pacific. All of these MRBMs are road-mobile, carried on wheeled TELs, and powered by solid-fuel rocket motors, allowing them to disperse rapidly, launch with minimal preparation, and complicate efforts to destroy them either before or after firing.

DF-17 (CSS-22)

One of the PLARF’s most significant recent additions is the DF-17, the world’s first operational ballistic missile designed from the outset to deliver an HGV. Publicly unveiled during China’s 70th anniversary military parade in 2019, the system is estimated to have entered service shortly beforehand.

With an estimated range of 1,800-2,200 kilometers (1,118-1,367 miles), the DF-17 can reach targets across Taiwan, South Korea, and most of Japan, as well as U.S. military facilities throughout the First Island Chain. Traveling at speeds reportedly approaching Mach 10, the DF-17 could cover its maximum range in roughly a dozen minutes, representing a far more difficult target for existing air and missile defense systems.

The PLARF would likely employ the DF-17 during the opening stages of a conflict to neutralize high-value assets, including integrated air and missile defense sites, long-range radars, command-and-control nodes, and other time-sensitive targets, thereby improving the effectiveness of follow-on strikes by less advanced missile systems.

Although Beijing maintains that the DF-17 is conventionally armed, Chinese media and senior U.S. military officials have suggested the missile may also possess a nuclear capability. If confirmed, it would join several other PLARF missile systems believed to be dual-capable, further complicating an adversary’s ability to distinguish between conventional and nuclear strikes during a crisis, and potentially increasing the risk of miscalculation.

Reports have also periodically pointed to the development of an anti-ship variant, which would further expand the DF-17’s role within China’s growing long-range precision strike arsenal.

DF-21

The origins of the DF-21 can be traced back to the late 1970s, when China began working in earnest on solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Following successful tests of a large-diameter solid rocket motor in 1978, development of the road-mobile DF-21 accelerated (as did work on a larger solid-fueled missile that would eventually evolve into the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile and its submarine-launched counterpart, the JL-2, both described in the first part of this feature).

The DF-21 completed its maiden successful test in 1985 and rapidly entered operational service with the PLA. The original DF-21 carried a single nuclear warhead and formed the backbone of China’s first generation of solid-fuel strategic missile forces. Its range is estimated at more than 1,750 kilometers (1,087 miles).

Even before the original DF-21 entered widespread service, work had begun on an improved version. Approved in 1986, the DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2) focused on reducing structural weight while increasing propellant capacity, extending the missile’s range and improving overall performance. Flight testing began in 1991, and by the mid-1990s the PLA had begun replacing the original DF-21 with the upgraded variant.

The DF-21 subsequently evolved from a purely nuclear deterrent into a remarkably versatile missile family. Around 2004, the PLA fielded the DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 4), widely believed to be the first conventionally armed member of the series. Designed for precision land attack, the missile introduced an entirely new mission for the DF-21 but also highlighted a growing escalation risk. The DF-21C appears to have been retired, with surviving units reportedly having transitioned to newer missile systems.

Public information on a supposed DF-21B remains sparse. The designation may have referred to an intermediate development fitted with a MaRV before that technology matured into the much better-known DF-21D.

China’s Dong-Feng 21 “carrier killer” Salvo Launch

It was the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) that really brought the missile family into the spotlight, as one of China’s most closely watched strategic weapons. Public attention surged in 2010 after a senior U.S. Navy officer stated that the missile had reached initial operational capability. Equipped with a MaRV and designed specifically to attack moving warships, the conventionally armed DF-21D became the world’s first operational anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and quickly earned the nickname “carrier killer” (since applied to several other weapon systems). Western sources attribute the DF-21D with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers (932 miles).

The concept reflected Beijing’s broader A2/AD strategy, which seeks to hold U.S. carrier strike groups at risk and complicate U.S. military intervention inside the First Island Chain. U.S. defense reports had been tracking the program since the mid-2000s, and subsequent reports indicate the DF-21D has been tested against both land-based carrier mockups and actual targets at sea, underscoring China’s continued investment in long-range precision strike capabilities.

While both the DF-21C and DF-21D are conventionally armed, there is also a more modern nuclear-armed addition to the family. First reported in 2016, information about this missile is scarce. Some sources refer to this variant as the DF-21E, though this designation has not been seen in an authoritative context in China, and the Western reporting name CSS-5 Mod 6 has meanwhile been applied.

For years, the medium-range DF-21 formed the backbone of China’s regional ballistic missile force, with different variants providing conventional land-attack, anti-ship, and nuclear strike capabilities. That role is increasingly being assumed by the longer-ranged DF-26 IRBM, which significantly expands the PLARF’s reach by bringing Guam, and its concentration of critical U.S. military facilities, within range. The in-development DF-27 looks set to push that range even further, blurring the boundary between an IRBM and an ICBM.

DF-26 (CSS-18)

Increasingly the centerpiece of the PLARF’s regional strike force is the DF-26, which appears to be a substantially enlarged and more capable evolution of the DF-21. Development is believed to have begun before 2010, with the first images emerging from Chinese sources around 2012 before U.S. intelligence publicly acknowledged the missile’s existence in 2014. Mounted on a highly mobile six-axle TEL, the two-stage, solid-fueled DF-26 made its public debut during China’s 2015 military parade and entered operational service the following year.

The DF-26 combines significantly greater range with exceptional mission flexibility. Unlike many earlier PLARF missiles, it is believed to be genuinely dual-capable, able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads that can reportedly be exchanged relatively quickly depending on operational requirements.

In addition to land-attack missions, China has also fielded an anti-ship variant, equipped with a MaRV, and effectively extending the DF-21D’s “carrier killer” concept many hundreds of miles farther out to sea.

The DF-26 is thought to have a range of more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles).

Just as significant as the DF-26’s capabilities is the pace at which it has been fielded. The missile has become one of the fastest-growing elements of the PLARF’s inventory, reflecting Beijing’s increasing emphasis on longer-range conventional strike options. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated that China possessed more than 200 DF-26 launchers by 2020, a figure that had grown to around 250 just two years later. Combined with its ability to strike targets as far away as Guam while performing both conventional and nuclear missions, the DF-26 is poised to remain one of the PLARF’s most important regional strike weapons for the foreseeable future.

DF-27 (CSS-X-24)

A next-generation system, the DF-27, represents the PLARF’s continued modernization. The Pentagon’s 2023 assessment described the DF-27 as still being under development, but a tranche of leaked U.S. intelligence documents earlier that year suggested at least a limited number had already entered service. If accurate, the DF-27 would represent another significant leap in China’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The Pentagon has stated that the missile could have a range of 5,000-8,000 kilometers (3,107-4,971 miles), pushing into the intercontinental-range category. Even at the lower end of this assessment, it could strike targets far beyond the Second Island Chain, including parts of Alaska and Australia, depending on launch location. At the higher end, it would be sufficient to reach Hawaii and potentially parts of the U.S. West Coast from some launch locations.

One missile I was hoping to see in yesterday’s PLA parade was the DF-27—a new long-range hypersonic missile that’s been discussed in the annual DoD China Military Power Report for the last few years.

However, it was missing from the parade…or was it??? pic.twitter.com/GPIGwkMgUG

— Tom Shugart (@tshugart3) September 3, 2025

Available reports indicate the missile is designed to carry an HGV and will likely be fielded in both land-attack and anti-ship variants. That combination could substantially expand the PLARF’s ability to threaten high-value targets across the Western Pacific, extending the reach of China’s A2/AD network farther into areas where U.S. carrier strike groups have traditionally operated under reduced threat.

The missile’s payload remains undisclosed, but given the PLARF’s growing inventory of dual-capable ballistic missiles, it would not be surprising if the DF-27 were ultimately able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.

Air-launched ballistic missiles

Falling into an interesting category is the air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). The ALBM concept is far from new, with designs dating back to the Cold War, although they are currently seeing something of a comeback, with multiple nations around the globe now pursuing their capabilities. China is among them, and the best-known of these weapons, the JL-1, is today considered to constitute the airborne arm of the Chinese nuclear triad.

JL-1

The JL-1 ALBM can be launched by the modernized H-6N missile carrier aircraft of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). These aircraft feature a modified fuselage that allows for the external carriage of these large weapons, as well as an in-flight refueling probe, extending their range.

The JL-1 ALBM is assumed to be the same missile that has been referred to in the past in the West as the CH-AS-X-13, and which is understood to have been in development since at least the mid-2010s. This missile is reported to be an adapted, air-launched version of the DF-21 MRBM and similarly equipped with a MaRV. The possible relationship with the DF-21, and the DF-21D specifically, has prompted previous speculation about the H-6N having an anti-ship role, particularly against U.S. carrier strike groups, as well as being able to hit land targets.

China released first in-flight footage of an H-6N bomber carrying the JL-1 nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile, escorted by two J-20 stealth fighters.

JL-1: Nuclear-capable ALBM, ~8,000 km range, hypersonic reentry, also usable for anti-ship/land-attack. pic.twitter.com/e9uokWFnvz

— Clash Report (@clashreport) August 4, 2026

China has said the JL-1 (presumably coupled with the H-6N) has a range of approximately 8,000 kilometers (4,971 miles), although this is very much unconfirmed.

The latest Pentagon report on Chinese military capabilities refers to the H-6N as a “nuclear weapons-capable bomber,” and that its JL-1 ALBM is a “highly precise theater weapon that would be well suited for delivering a low-yield nuclear weapon.” However, it may also have the option of a conventional warhead.

Imagery has also emerged in the past, as seen below, which has contributed to discussions about the possibility of a second variation on the Chinese ALBM concept, with what may be a wedge-shaped unpowered HGV on top. As with the JL-1, this weapon could also be anti-ship capable.

KD-21

Finally, the H-6K variant can carry the smaller KD-21 ALBM on its center-wing pylons. This designation indicates an anti-ship missile, but it may well have the capability to strike ground targets, too.

In terms of its appearance, the weapon is very similar to the Russian Kinzhal (known in the West as the AS-24 Killjoy), a missile that is launched from adapted MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors and which has been employed in the war in Ukraine, apparently with only mixed success. Like the Kinzhal, which is an air-launched development of the Iskander SRBM, the KD-21 may be derived from a land-based weapon. In particular, the Chinese missile bears a close resemblance to the CM-401 land-based anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), a weapon offered for export. The truck- or ship-launched CM-401 is also capable of hitting static land targets and is said to have a terminal speed of between Mach 4 and 6 and a range of up to 290 kilometers (180 miles).

Missile numbers

Estimating the size of the PLARF’s missile arsenal remains challenging, and, understandably, publicly available figures differ depending on whether they refer to launchers or missiles.

Recent Pentagon assessments estimate the PLARF operates roughly 200 SRBM launchers backed by around 1,000 missiles, approximately 300 MRBM launchers with some 1,300 missiles, and another 300 IRBM launchers fielding roughly 550 DF-26-class missiles.

While the number of Chinese SRBM launchers used for the DF-15 and DF-16 missiles, both of which are conventionally armed, has remained static in recent years according to Western estimates, Beijing has prioritized the development and deployment of land-based MRBMs and IRBMs, such as the dual-capable DF-21 and DF-26. From 2018 to 2019, for example, the Pentagon noted that the number of Chinese IRBM launchers and missiles had at least roughly tripled from roughly 30 to 80. In its 2020 report, the Pentagon noted that the PLARF had further increased this number to approximately 200 launchers.

These figures are informed estimates, and they vary noticeably across successive Pentagon reports as intelligence assessments evolve. Even so, they underscore the extraordinary scale of China’s regional strike force and, perhaps more importantly, its substantial magazine depth. This would allow the PLARF to conduct repeated waves of missile strikes in a high-intensity campaign. Current conflicts, especially between Iran and the United States/Israel, as well as in Ukraine, have shown just how critical these weapons are, and underscore that they can be a deterrent just by existing in huge numbers. The cost of air defense is also very high for the one being targeted. These lessons learned will likely accelerate China’s acquisition of more missiles and improved designs.

Taken together, the missile families detailed here illustrate how dramatically the PLARF has evolved from a relatively small strategic force into one of the world’s most capable missile services. Older systems such as the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-21 continue to provide valuable magazine depth, while newer designs including the DF-16, DF-17, DF-26, and emerging DF-27 emphasize greater range, improved accuracy, enhanced survivability, and increased operational flexibility.

Just as importantly, Beijing has increasingly blurred the line between conventional and nuclear deterrence by fielding a growing number of dual-capable missile systems, complicating an adversary’s ability to determine China’s intentions during a crisis.

Coupled with expanding production, continued technological refinement, and the proliferation of hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, the PLARF’s regional missile arsenal has become a central pillar of China’s military modernization and one of the most consequential strike forces in the Indo-Pacific. Any future conflict involving Taiwan, the First Island Chain, or U.S. forces in the Western Pacific is certain to feature these missiles prominently from its opening hours.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Europe’s established technology companies are emerging as unexpected beneficiaries of the artificial intelligence boom, as businesses shift from AI experimentation to large-scale deployment. Rather than model developers capturing all the value, companies specializing in enterprise software, consulting, and cloud infrastructure are seeing stronger demand by helping organizations integrate AI into existing operations.

Enterprise AI Shifts Toward Implementation

Recent earnings from SAP, Capgemini, Sopra Steria, and OVHcloud indicate that corporate AI spending is increasingly focused on implementation rather than simply acquiring AI models.

Large organizations require AI systems that integrate with legacy software, fragmented databases, compliance frameworks, and existing business processes. This complexity has created growing demand for firms with deep experience in enterprise technology integration.

Integration Becomes the Next AI Battleground

Industry analysts argue that the next phase of AI competition lies in applications rather than foundation models.

As businesses adopt multiple AI models for different functions, the challenge is no longer selecting the best model but ensuring those systems work securely across finance, supply chains, human resources, and customer operations.

This transition is benefiting European firms that have spent decades building enterprise software ecosystems and managing digital transformation projects.

Strong Corporate Results Reflect Growing Demand

SAP reported a 26% increase in its cloud backlog, reflecting continued migration of enterprise systems onto cloud platforms that increasingly support AI deployment.

Meanwhile, Capgemini and Sopra Steria upgraded their business outlooks after stronger-than-expected growth in bookings and consulting demand, particularly for AI integration, governance, and data management services.

These results suggest implementation services are becoming a major source of value creation within the AI economy.

European Digital Sovereignty Gains Importance

Demand is also growing for AI infrastructure that provides greater control over corporate and government data.

Sectors such as defense, aerospace, healthcare, and critical infrastructure increasingly prioritize security, regulatory compliance, and data sovereignty when deploying AI.

This trend has supported European cloud providers such as OVHcloud, while companies including Airbus have chosen European AI infrastructure and cloud services for sensitive applications.

Challenges Remain

Despite improving demand, Europe’s technology incumbents must demonstrate that AI-driven growth is sustainable over the long term.

Automation could pressure consulting margins, while increasing competition among AI providers may compress pricing. Companies will also need to continue investing heavily in infrastructure and software development to maintain their competitive position.

Analysis: Europe’s Competitive Advantage Lies Beyond AI Models

The latest earnings reinforce a broader shift in the AI value chain. While much investor attention has focused on companies developing large language models, the commercialization of AI increasingly depends on firms capable of integrating those models into complex enterprise environments. Europe’s established technology companies possess decades of expertise in enterprise software, systems integration, cybersecurity, and regulatory compliance areas becoming increasingly critical as organizations deploy AI at scale. If businesses continue prioritizing implementation, governance, and digital sovereignty over standalone AI models, Europe’s incumbents could become some of the most durable long-term beneficiaries of the global AI transformation, despite not leading the race to build frontier AI models.

With information from Reuters.

An airport employee spotted the drone carrying what authorities described as ‘an unknown explosive device’.

German authorities have launched an investigation after police removed the detonator from an explosive device attached to a drone found at Leipzig/Halle airport.

The airport’s north runway reopened on Wednesday after being closed for about two hours, while the south runway remained out of use due to scheduled maintenance.

Several flights, including a passenger aircraft, were diverted to other airports after a flying object was reported near the airport shortly before midnight. Police deployed an explosives-disposal robot to examine the object.

Authorities later said an airport employee discovered the drone near the runway carrying what they described as “an unknown explosive device”. Police examined it and removed its detonator, but did not provide further details about the nature of the device.

The probe is being led by prosecutors in the eastern state of Saxony who are responsible for politically motivated and “extremist” crimes, although authorities have not identified any suspects or attributed responsibility.

Meanwhile, an apparent second flying object collided with a freight aircraft after it aborted its landing because the runway was closed.

The aircraft diverted to Hannover airport, where officials found slight damage during an inspection. Authorities have not said whether the second object was connected to the drone found near the runway.

Authorities said there was no danger to travellers or airport employees, and flights were operating normally on Wednesday.

Photos from the scene showed police technicians working with an explosives-disposal robot near a Ukrainian Antonov cargo aircraft parked at the airport, although authorities have not indicated the aircraft was the intended target.

A 47-year-old woman has been arrested after four men were stabbed in Covent Garden in central London, the Metropolitan Police said.

The men, aged 34, 39, 42 and 52, were taken to hospital after emergency services were called to reports of a stabbing in Endell Street at about 12:30 BST.

In a statement, London Ambulance Service said: “We treated four patients at the scene and took them all to a major trauma centre as a priority by road.”

The woman has been arrested on suspicion of possession of an offensive weapon and assault.

Listen to the best of BBC Radio London on Sounds and follow BBC London on Facebook, external, X, external and Instagram, external. Send your story ideas to hello.bbclondon@bbc.co.uk, external