NEWS

Footage from the ground in Erbil, Iraq shows several drones over the city’s airspace and the wrecking of a drone falling through the sky onto the city.

In a surprising development, Serbia has emerged as an operator of the Chinese-made CM-400 air-launched supersonic standoff missile. The weapon has been integrated into Serbia’s Soviet-era MiG-29 Fulcrums, which have undergone various upgrades. As it stands, the Balkan state, which has had a turbulent recent history, likely fields a missile capability otherwise unmatched in Europe (outside of Russia, at least).

A photo recently emerged showing a Serbian Air Force and Air Defense MiG-29 carrying a pair of CM-400 missiles on its inboard underwing hardpoints.

There had also been previous clues that Serbia might be poised to introduce a powerful new weapon of some kind.

According to Belgrade-based defense journalist Petar Vojinović, the chief of the General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, Gen. Milan Mojsilović, stated last month that “in the air component, we have weapons of a similar maximum range and lethality [to the PULS rocket artillery system].”

Mojsilović was referencing the Israeli-made PULS (Precise and Universal Launching System) since this has been recently introduced by the Serbian Army. You can read more about this ground-launched artillery rocket here.

Furthermore, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić recently alluded to recently introduced military capabilities, stating: “…people couldn’t dream about everything we have, everything we are acquiring, they couldn’t dream.”

As for the CM-400, this weapon was developed and is manufactured by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), apparently primarily for export. So far, it is not known to be in Chinese military service.

Unveiled in 2012, the CM-400 has a length of around 17 feet, a diameter of 16 inches, and weighs roughly 2,000 pounds. This includes one of two types of warheads, either a high-explosive charge weighing 330 pounds or an armor-piercing warhead weighing 440 pounds.

The CM-400 is a supersonic weapon, and CASIC claims it can reach a speed of Mach 4.5 in the terminal phase of flight. It has often been described as a hypersonic missile, but this is likely not the case: Mach 5 is typically considered to be the boundary between high-supersonic and hypersonic speed.

Nevertheless, it is clearly a very fast missile.

The missile’s range remains unclear, with varying accounts of this aspect of its performance.

At the very least, it is reported to have a range of 155 miles, while some sources claim it can hit targets at a range of 186 miles or even 250 miles.

The CM-400 has also been described as a quasi-ballistic missile, though this is also probably not entirely accurate.

Generally speaking, a quasi-ballistic missile is capable of being used on a depressed trajectory. This makes the missile more capable of significant maneuvering in flight, presenting greater challenges even for opponents with more robust missile defense capabilities.

In the case of the CM-400, the missile reportedly flies on a relatively high ballistic trajectory, powered by its solid rocket motor. It then careens toward its target at a steep angle of descent. While it may also be able to maneuver dynamically during its terminal attack phase, to attack moving ships, it doesn’t fly on a depressed trajectory, as far as we know.

In terms of target sets, the missile has been widely described as an anti-ship missile, specifically even as a ‘carrier-killer’. In fact, the basic weapon can also be configured as an anti-radiation missile, and it is presumed to also have the capability to attack non-emitting ground targets.

Depending on the different targets, the CM-400 can have different seeker heads fitted. All of the versions have an inertial guidance system with Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) correction. For the terminal phase, it relies on an infrared/optoelectronic seeker for attacking naval targets, or a passive radar seeker to take out electromagnetic emitters. The circular error probable (CEP) for the anti-radiation version is claimed to be 16-33, reduced to 16 feet or less for the anti-ship version.

Previously, the only confirmed export operator of the CM-400 was Pakistan, which uses it on its JF-17 Thunder multirole fighters. Pakistani officials claimed that the missile saw successful combat use against Indian S-400 air defense systems during the conflict between the countries in May last year. However, this remains unconfirmed.

In Serbian service, the CM-400 is carried by the MiG-29 fighter. These aircraft were first acquired by the then Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Survivors of Operation Allied Force in 1999 were later supplemented by secondhand MiG-29s from Russian and Belarusian stocks. The aircraft have also been moderately upgraded and are now known as MiG-29SM+. Fourteen examples are currently in active Serbian service.

The long-term plan for the Serbian MiG-29s is somewhat unclear, since the country ordered 12 Dassault Rafale multirole fighters, in a deal that you can read more about here.

For the time being, however, in the CM-400, Serbia looks to have secured a capability that is very likely unique in the wider region.

With its combination of very high speed, long range, and ‘fire and forget’ guidance, the missile is ideal for deep standoff strikes. It is optimized for striking hardened strategic targets, day and night, and in all weather.

Thanks to CATIC’s Standalone Weapon Fire Control System (SWFCS), also designated as WZHK-1 by China, the CM-400 (and other Chinese missiles) areis designed to allow foreign models of aircraft to operate Chinese missiles and bombs.

Speaking to Janes during the exhibition, a CATIC official said that the system is designed to equip a range of Chinese air-launched weapons and can be installed on existing weapon hardpoints.

“The system gives air forces around the world the ability to easily integrate Chinese-made weapons with their aircraft without requiring them to make software or hardware changes to the host aircraft,” a CATIC official told Janes about the SWFCS back in 2024.

“The [SWFCS] uses a wireless data system that connects to a tablet in the cockpit that can be worn by the pilot. The tablet acts as a portable wireless controller that the pilot can use to launch the missiles,” the official added. Similar tablet-based soluiions have also been used by Ukraine to rapidly integrate Western weapons on Soviet-era jets, as you can read about here.

Ukrainian Air Force Su-27 Flanker Wild Weasel operations, seen here conducting multiple low level standoff strikes against Russian radars with US-supplied AGM-88 HARMs. pic.twitter.com/7CosjXFNkO

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) April 21, 2024

The same SWFCS interface is also being used to carry another Chinese air-to-ground weapon, the LS-6 precision-guided munition. This is a 1,100-pound-class weapon that combines a general-purpose bomb with a strap-on upgrade package to provide range extension and precision strike capabilities.

Meanwhile, weapons in the CM-400 class are a response to the growing threat posed by ground-based air defense systems, which are pushing combat aircraft ever further from the targets they are assigned to destroy.

With its very high maximum speed, the CM-400 is also well suited to attacking time-sensitive targets, which could also include mobile air defense systems or mobile ballistic missiles, provided their coordinates can be established in the required timeframe.

For Serbia, the new missile would appear to offer a relatively easy way to expand its air-launched, precision standoff strike capability. With a high degree of flexibility, fast reaction time, and the ability to penetrate most enemy air defenses, it is a notably hard-hitting weapon for what is otherwise a fairly modest air force.

It is also interesting that Serbia is looking to China to fulfil its missile needs, rather than Russia.

While Belgrade and Moscow have traditionally had good relations, acquiring Russian arms has become far harder since the West imposed sanctions in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Even before this, however, there were signs that Serbia was looking to move away from Russia as its main arms supplier. As such, it has increasingly moved into a more Western-oriented orbit, with acquisitions from Airbus, for example, but it is also buying weapons from China and Israel.

At the same time, the Serbian military is increasingly switching to more NATO-style doctrine, as well as equipment, including exercises alongside the U.S. Air Force, as you can read about here.

Bearing in mind the fact that it can be integrated on non-Chinese platforms, it will be interesting to see if other nations also adopt the CM-400.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Washington, DC – Several Democrats in the United States have emerged from a classified briefing about the war on Iran, saying they still have little clarity about President Donald Trump’s justifications and end goals, even 11 days into the conflict.

“I emerge from this briefing as dissatisfied and angry, frankly, as I have from any past briefing in my 15 years,” said Senator Richard Blumenthal, following Tuesday’s briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Their statements marked the latest wave of condemnation from congressional Democrats, who have a slim minority in the Senate and the US House of Representatives.

Party members in both chambers had recently voted in near unison on resolutions seeking to halt the war, which the US and Israel launched on February 28.

But their efforts to pass a “war powers resolution” to rein in Trump failed amid widespread Republican opposition.

More recently, Democrats have pledged to delay proceedings in the Senate unless top officials from the Department of State and the Pentagon testify under oath about the war.

Following Tuesday’s briefing, Democrats like Blumenthal argued that the Trump administration owes the US public more clarity about the war.

Blumenthal added that the meeting piqued concerns that US forces may be deployed to either Iraq or Iran.

“I am left with more questions than answers, especially about the cost of the war,” he said.

“I am most concerned about the threat to American lives of potentially deploying our sons and daughters on the ground in Iraq. We seem to be on a path towards deploying American troops on the ground in Iran to accomplish any of the potential objectives.”

Senator Elizabeth Warren, meanwhile, said that the Trump administration “cannot explain the reasons that we entered this war, the goals we’re trying to accomplish and the methods for doing that”.

She also pointed to the high cost of the military operations against Iran, which some have estimated to exceed $5.6bn in the first two days alone.

Warren pointed out that Republicans cut healthcare subsidies last year in an effort to reduce federal spending, but appear to have no problem approving military expenses.

“While there is no money for 15 million Americans who lost their healthcare”, she noted, “there’s a billion dollars a day to spend on bombing Iran”.

While approached by reporters, Senator Jacky Rosen indicated she was limited in her ability to comment on classified briefings. Still, she offered brief remarks to voice her frustration.

“I can tell you what I heard is not just concerning. It is disturbing,” she said. “And I’m not sure what the end game is or what their plans are. They certainly have not made their case.”

‘On our timeline and at our choosing’

The latest round of criticism came shortly after US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth pledged to conduct the “most intense day” of strikes since the war began.

As of Tuesday, the war had killed at least 1,255 people in Iran, 394 people in Lebanon, 13 in Israel, six in Iraq and 14 across the Gulf.

Trump has repeatedly said the war would not be prolonged, but his officials have offered shifting timelines. Hegseth, for instance, said the fighting would not stop “until the enemy is totally and decisively defeated”.

“We do so on our timeline and at our choosing,” he said.

The Trump administration has also offered an array of justifications for launching the war, which came amid indirect talks with Iran on the future of its nuclear programme.

Trump has blamed Iran’s nuclear ambitions for the conflict, though Tehran has denied seeking a nuclear weapon, and his administration has also said the war was necessary to end Iran’s ballistic missile programme.

Experts have said that available evidence does not support the Trump administration’s claims that either posed an immediate threat to the US.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters last week that the US attacked because its close ally Israel had planned to attack Iran, which would have led to retaliation against US assets.

Rubio and Trump subsequently backed away from the circular rationale, with Trump claiming last week that Iran was the one planning to strike first.

Another rationale the Trump administration offered is that the totality of Iran’s actions since the 1979 Islamic revolution represented a threat to the US, thereby necessitating an attack.

Trump and his top officials have not provided evidence for any of their claims.

Calls for hearings, investigation

Democrats have been largely sidelined since the war began. Only a handful of Republicans have joined the left-leaning party in its efforts to rein in Trump through legislative means.

Under the US Constitution, only Congress can declare war. But presidents can still use the military to respond to imminent threats in instances of self-defence.

Still, there are limits to how long such operations can proceed. Under the 1973 War Powers Resolution, presidents must withdraw forces within 60 to 90 days of an unauthorised military campaign, or else seek congressional approval.

Trump, however, has denied he needs congressional backing for the military campaigns he has conducted since returning to office.

The latest attacks in Iran have sparked widespread public opposition, with polls suggesting a majority of US citizens oppose the war effort.

Earlier this week, six Democratic senators called for an investigation into a strike on a girls’ school in Minab, in southern Iran. Several investigations have indicated that the US was responsible for the attack, which killed at least 170 people, mostly children.

Last week, nearly 30 members of Congress called for an investigation into reports that US military leaders had used biblical motivations to justify the war to subordinates.

Some reportedly invoked “religious prophecy and apocalyptic theology” in statements to other enlisted personnel.

On Monday, Senator Cory Booker said Democrats had “collectively agreed” to use an array of procedural mechanisms in the chamber to block legislative business until Trump officials agree to testify under oath.

“Each individual senator has a tremendous amount of power to disrupt the normal functioning of the Senate, as well as certain privileges that we can exercise,” Booker said.

“And what we have agreed right now is that we’re not going to let the Senate continue business as usual, which seems to be ignoring the urgent issues the American people are dealing with.”

G7 energy ministers will hold a call on Tuesday to discuss sharply rising energy prices triggered by the ongoing war in Iran, officials said. A separate call later in the day will see European Union leaders addressing similar concerns, reflecting heightened global anxiety over fuel supply and costs.

Oil prices surged to their highest levels since mid-2022 on Monday, driven by fears of reduced Gulf output and disruptions to tanker traffic through key shipping routes. Even before the Iran conflict, European energy prices were generally higher than those in the United States and China.

G7 Prepares Response, But Stops Short of Releases

G7 finance ministers signalled readiness to take “necessary measures” in response to the price surge but did not commit to coordinated emergency releases of strategic oil reserves.

The G7, which includes United States, Canada, Japan, Italy, Britain, Germany, and France, will hold the call at 1245 GMT. French Finance Minister Roland Lescure, whose country holds the G7 presidency this year, said that Europe and the U.S. currently do not face immediate supply shortages.

EU Leaders Target Competitiveness and Energy Costs

Later on Tuesday, EU leaders will discuss energy prices and competitiveness, joining German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Belgian Prime Minister De Wever, and others.

The EU is highly exposed to global energy volatility, importing more than 90% of its oil and roughly 80% of its gas. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has pledged proposals at next week’s EU summit to address rising prices.

Officials have already discussed measures including adjustments to energy taxes and potential amendments to the EU carbon price, which contributes around 11% to industrial power costs.

Coordinated Action Sought but Uncertain

The calls by the G7 and EU reflect a growing urgency to manage energy price shocks caused by the Iran war. While governments have the tools to intervene, officials are balancing the need to stabilize prices with broader fiscal and strategic considerations.

With oil and gas markets highly sensitive to geopolitical developments, both G7 and EU leaders face pressure to act quickly to prevent price spikes from translating into economic slowdowns or political unrest across their regions.

With information from Reuters.

Rescue workers carefully extracted an unexploded missile from a house in Kuhdasht City, following US-Israeli airstrikes on western Iran.

United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has said that today will be “the most intense day of strikes,” as the U.S. and Israeli militaries increase their attacks on Iran. Meanwhile, Hegseth said that, in the last 24 hours, Iran has launched its lowest number of weapons since the conflict began, suggesting that these strikes are starting to more significantly erode Tehran’s ability to hit back at Israel, U.S. interests in the Middle East, and the wider region.

Hegseth said that the aftermath of the conflict is “going to be in America’s interests” and says it “will not live under a nuclear blackmail” from Iran.

Among the U.S. assets involved in the recent strikes is the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr., seen firing a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile at Iran yesterday.

The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford is reportedly on the move. Based on open-source flight tracking data, the supercarrier is apparently now operating in the central Red Sea, off the coast of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. This suggests that the carrier strike group is heading closer to the theater of combat. Whether it will pass the Bab El Mandeb Strait, which the Iranian proxies in Yemen can put under threat, is yet to be seen.

According to The Washington Post, citing U.S. officials, the U.S. military expended munitions to the value of $5.6 billion in only the first two days of its attack on Iran. Statistics like these have raised questions about how fast some of the Pentagon’s most valuable stockpiles of weapons — including Tomahawk cruise missiles — have been eroded, and the capacity of the defense industry to make good the deficit.

Further U.S. long-range strike firepower has arrived at RAF Fairford in England, where another three B-1B bombers touched down today. These join three more B-1s that arrived on Friday and Saturday, as well as three B-52Hs that landed at the airbase yesterday, as you can read about here. As we have discussed repeatedly in recent weeks, having the bombers forward deployed to England and/or Diego Garcia will drastically increase sortie rates and decrease wear-and-tear on the bomber fleet compared to flying from U.S. airbases and back. This will become even more relevant if the bomber force shifts from making standoff strikes to direct attacks on Iranian targets, even if just over limited parts of the country where air supremacy is more guaranteed.

Ukrainian and Russian officials have claimed battlefield successes in the more than four-year war, as Russian air attacks on Ukraine continue.

At least four people were killed in Russian attacks on the Ukrainian town of Sloviansk, regional authorities said on Tuesday.

The governor of Sloviansk, Vadym Filashkin, confirmed the death toll on Tuesday and said 16 others were wounded, including a 14-year-old girl. He said Russian forces dropped three guided bombs on the city.

There was no immediate comment from Moscow on the attack.

Overnight drone strikes on three other Ukrainian cities wounded at least 17 people, including two children, emergency services said.

Ukraine’s air force said that it shot down 122 out of 137 drones that Russia launched during the night.

Warring parties claim advances

Ukrainian forces have recently retaken nearly all the territory of the southeastern Dnipropetrovsk industrial region during a counteroffensive, driving Russian troops out of more than 400 square kilometres (150sq miles), Major-General Oleksandr Komarenko said in an interview published Tuesday by local media outlet RBC-Ukraine.

He described the overall situation on the front line as difficult but under control, with the heaviest fighting continuing near Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine and Oleksandrivka in the south, where he said Russian forces have concentrated their main effort.

There was no independent verification of his description of the military situation.

The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, said late Monday that recent Ukrainian counterattacks “are generating tactical, operational and strategic effects that may disrupt Russia’s spring-summer 2026 offensive campaign plan”.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russian forces have extended their gains in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, whose capture Moscow has made one of the goals of its invasion. Ukraine controlled about 25 percent of the Donbas six months ago, but it now holds just 15-17 percent, Putin said.

In Russia, the governor of the border region Bryansk, said a Ukrainian missile strike on Bryansk city had killed at least six people and wounded 37 others.

Alexander Bogomaz said those killed were civilians and that the wounded were admitted to the Bryansk Regional Hospital.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the attack hit a Russian missile plant.

At the same time, a United Nations investigation found that the deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 had amounted to “crimes against humanity”.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for President Vladimir Putin and five other Russian officials in 2023 over the alleged illegal deportation of children, which Moscow denies and said it has been evacuating people voluntarily from a warzone.

Trilateral talks ‘next week’

United States special envoy Steve Witkoff told the CNBC news outlet on Tuesday that the next round of trilateral talks between Ukraine, Russia and the US would likely be “sometime next week”.

Trilateral talks were first held in January in the United Arab Emirates; a second meeting was held in February in Geneva, Switzerland. Last year, Russia and Ukraine also held three rounds of talks in Turkiye, yet so far the two countries remain no closer to a deal as key issues, including Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory, are yet to be resolved.

Moscow has repeatedly said it would only agree to a deal that allows it to retain the territories it has seized, while Ukraine has said its territory must be returned in any deal.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Turkiye was prepared to host the next round of trilateral talks after speaking with his Turkish counterpart, President Tayyip Erdogan, on Tuesday.

As world institutions wobble, The Hague has unexpectedly become the stage for a reckoning long denied in the Philippines.

Proceedings at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in late February offered a rare glimpse of accountability at a moment when global norms feel increasingly fragile. The court held a hearing in the case against former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to confirm charges for crimes against humanity committed during the so‑called “war on drugs”.

For the families of those killed in the “drug war” watching tearfully from the public gallery, this hearing marked the first real step towards justice after years of violence, denial, and dehumanisation of their loved ones. As a Filipino lawyer and counsel for the victims, Joel Butuyan, told the court, “Truth is the antidote to the virus of impunity.”

A three-judge panel – women from Romania, Mexico and Benin – heard arguments from prosecutors, victims’ counsel, and Duterte’s defence lawyer. Their task was not to determine guilt, but to assess whether there is sufficient evidence for the case against Duterte to proceed to trial.

The case focuses on 49 incidents of alleged murder and attempted murder, involving 78 victims, including children, between November 2011 and March 2019, when the ICC still had jurisdiction over the Philippines. In March 2018, soon after the former ICC prosecutor announced a preliminary inquiry into the situation of the Philippines, Duterte withdrew the Philippines from the court’s membership, which became final one year later.

The case against Duterte covers his tenure as mayor of Davao City, in the southern Philippines, and the period after he was elected president in 2016. The prosecutors emphasised that the specific incidents they focused on represent only a fraction of the thousands of killings attributed to police and hired hitmen during Duterte’s anti-drug campaign.

I sat in the public gallery alongside victims’ families, activists, clergy, journalists, and lawyers who had traveled from the Philippines to witness a moment many never thought possible. Duterte’s supporters were there, too. But Duterte himself was absent as he waived his right to be present. His written statement declared that he did not recognize the court’s jurisdiction and claimed he had been “kidnapped”. His refusal to appear was obviously a disappointment for the victims’ families, hoping to see him in the dock.

Still, his voice echoed through the courtroom. Prosecutors played video after video of Duterte urging police to kill drug suspects and ignore legal restraints. In one chilling 2016 address, he warned: “If I become the president, I will order the military and the police to hunt down the drug lords, the big ones, and kill them.”  Duterte’s lawyer argued that the prosecutors were selective in their approach to the speeches and that they missed critical information that would exonerate Duterte, including references to using force in self-defence.

Human Rights Watch has been reporting on Duterte’s “drug wars” since 2009, when we detailed the operations of the “Davao Death Squad” that targeted street children, petty criminals and drug suspects when Duterte was mayor. A 2017 Human Rights Watch report showed how Duterte’s “drug war” escalated nationwide after he was elected president.

The panel now has 60 days to decide whether the case will proceed to trial. But while the ICC deliberates, drug-related killings in the Philippines continue, though reduced from their peak during the Duterte administration.

Domestic accountability remains woefully inadequate. Nearly 10 years after the nationwide “drug war” began, five cases have resulted in convictions of a total of nine police officers. The vast majority of those responsible, including senior officials, remain untouched.

The political context is also fraught. Sending Duterte to The Hague may have suited the current president, Ferdinand Marcos Jr,  allowing him to distance himself from the bloodiest excesses of his predecessor. But several of Duterte’s alleged co‑perpetrators – senior police officers and officials who helped transplant Davao City’s “neutralisation” strategies to the national stage – still wield influence or have gone into hiding.

The security architecture that enabled the killings within the national police force remains largely intact. With the wrong political signal, the violence could easily surge again.

Marcos now faces a defining choice. He can continue outsourcing justice to the ICC while tolerating a culture of impunity at home. Or he can demonstrate genuine commitment to accountability and the rule of law. Doing so would require a clear, public repudiation of the decade-long police operation underpinning the anti-drug campaign, and an explicit assurance that its methods are no longer acceptable state policy.

Marcos should also empower the Department of Justice to pursue investigations and prosecutions in earnest, and take steps to rejoin the ICC, which would, in turn, help strengthen domestic accountability efforts. Without credible domestic action, promises of reform will ring hollow.

This is a moment of reckoning for the Philippines. Families who have waited years for answers deserve more than political convenience; they deserve justice. Whatever the ICC decides in the coming months, the Philippine government need not – and should not – wait. Ending impunity and honouring the dignity of victims begins at home.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

International Energy Agency chief says talks aim to assess conditions as US-Israel war on Iran fuels global uncertainty.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) is set to hold an emergency meeting to assess the situation in the Middle East as the US-Israeli war on Iran continues to roil global energy markets.

Fatih Birol, the agency’s executive director, said representatives of IEA member states would meet on Tuesday to assess “the current security of supply and market conditions” amid the conflict.

“I have convened an extraordinary meeting of IEA member governments, which will take place later today to assess the current security of supply and market conditions to inform a subsequent decision on whether to make emergency stocks of IEA countries available to the market,” Birol said.

This week, oil prices hit their highest levels since mid‑2022 amid concerns of prolonged shipping disruptions linked to the war and reduced output from some key producers in countries that have been targeted by retaliatory Iranian strikes.

While the market reversed late in the day on Monday, with benchmarks falling below $90 a barrel, uncertainty persists around how long the United States-Israel war will drag on.

The Strait of Hormuz, a critical Gulf waterway through which about one-fifth of the world’s oil supplies passes, has effectively been shut down as a result of the war.

“If this drags on, it is not just going to be energy prices” that are affected, Al Jazeera’s Osama Bin Javaid explained. “It is going to have an impact on global economies.”

Bin Javaid noted that the extraordinary IEA meeting comes after Group of Seven (G7) countries met to discuss possible actions to help stabilise global energy markets.

European governments have been on edge about the prospect of a repeat of the energy crisis they faced in 2022, when prices surged to record peaks after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

“The IEA will ⁠be presenting an ⁠in-depth analysis of the pros and ⁠cons of releasing stocks ⁠now,” the European Union’s Energy Commissioner ‌Dan Jorgensen said before the agency’s meeting.

Earlier on Tuesday, G7 energy ministers stopped short of deciding on the release of strategic oil reserves in a call, instead asking the IEA to assess the situation before acting.

“Everyone is willing to take measures to stabilise the market, including the United States,” French Finance Minister Roland Lescure told reporters after the latest talks.

“We have asked the IEA to elaborate scenarios for a potential oil stock release; we need to be ready to act at any moment,” he added.

EU leaders also will discuss competitiveness, including energy prices, on a call later in the day with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever, and others.

An Israeli air strike has heavily damaged a building in southern Lebanon’s Tyre district as Israeli forces continue to attack across the area. The army says it is targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure and has warned residents south of the Litani river to leave.

Vladimir Putin has presented multiple proposals to mediate the conflict in Iran, according to the Kremlin. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Tuesday that the proposals are “still on the table,” emphasizing Russia’s readiness to help reduce tensions.

Peskov noted that any diplomatic solution requires coordination across multiple parties and agreements, signaling that Moscow intends to play a careful, measured role rather than rushing into mediation. This framing underscores Russia’s attempt to position itself as a credible intermediary while retaining influence over the conflict’s trajectory.

Recent Putin-Trump Contact

The remarks came after a phone call between Putin and Donald Trump on Monday, in which Putin reportedly offered options to end the Iran war quickly. Trump publicly said that Putin “wants to be helpful,” but added that resolving the Ukraine conflict would be an even more useful contribution.

The exchange highlights how Russia’s involvement in Iran is intertwined with its broader geopolitical interests, particularly in Europe and the Middle East. Moscow’s dual focus on positioning as a mediator and protecting its strategic priorities in Ukraine illustrates its careful diplomatic balancing act.

Russia-Iran Relations and Strategic Calculations

Russia maintains a strategic partnership with Iran, which provides it leverage in regional energy and security affairs. While Moscow has condemned U.S. and Israel military actions against Iran, it has also economically benefited from the resulting surge in oil prices.

Reports that Russia may have shared targeting intelligence with Tehran have drawn scrutiny, although Peskov declined to confirm or deny them. By avoiding direct comment, Russia preserves operational flexibility and manages international perceptions, allowing it to maintain influence with Iran while publicly projecting a mediating stance.

Analytical Perspective: Mediation Amid Strategic Interests

Russia’s position reflects a calculated effort to balance diplomacy and national interest. Keeping mediation proposals publicly “on the table” serves several purposes:

1. Diplomatic Leverage: By signaling willingness to mediate, Russia positions itself as a necessary interlocutor for any resolution, increasing its bargaining power with both the U.S. and Iran.
2. Strategic Buffering: Moscow preserves its ties with Tehran, protecting a partner in the Middle East while benefiting from higher oil prices amid global supply shocks.
3. Geopolitical Messaging: The Kremlin is communicating to the West that Russia can influence outcomes in the Middle East, reinforcing its image as a global power capable of shaping crises beyond its immediate borders.

This approach highlights a broader Russian strategy: maintain engagement in multiple theaters simultaneously Ukraine, Iran, and energy markets while avoiding overt entanglement that could provoke direct confrontation with the U.S. or NATO.

Conclusion: Patient Diplomacy as a Strategic Tool

Moscow’s emphasis on patience and coordination indicates that Russia is playing the long game, using mediation as a tool to expand influence rather than as a purely humanitarian effort. Analysts suggest that this approach allows Russia to extract maximum strategic advantage, balancing its regional partnerships, energy interests, and global standing, while leaving room to maneuver depending on how the Iran conflict evolves.

Russia’s dual role as both potential mediator and strategic partner to Tehran exemplifies the complex interplay of diplomacy, energy politics, and military calculation in the Middle East.

With information from Reuters.

On our recent delegation to Venezuela, one quote echoed again and again — a warning written nearly two centuries ago by Simón Bolívar in 1829:

“The United States appears destined by Providence to plague America with misery in the name of liberty.”

For many Venezuelans, that line no longer feels like history. It feels like the present.

The January 3 U.S. military operation that seized President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores marked a dramatic escalation in a conflict that Venezuelans describe not as sudden but as cumulative — the culmination of decades of pressure, sanctions, and attempts at isolation. “We still haven’t totally processed what happened on January 3,” sanctions expert William Castillo told us. “But it was the culmination of over 25 years of aggression and 11 years of resisting devastating sanctions. A 20-year-old today has lived half his life in a blockaded country.”

Carlos Ron, former deputy foreign minister and now with the Tricontinental Institute for Social Research, described the buildup to the invasion as the result of a carefully constructed narrative. “First there was the dangerous rhetoric describing Venezuelans in the United States as criminals,” he said. “Then endless references to the Tren de Aragua gang. Then the boat strikes blowing up alleged smugglers. Then the oil tanker seizures and naval blockade. The pressure wasn’t working, so they escalated to the January 3 invasion and kidnapping of President Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and the deaths of over 100 people.”

While in the United States the events of January 3 have largely been forgotten, replaced by a devastating war with Iran, in Venezuela the reminders are everywhere. Huge banners draped from apartment buildings demand: “Bring them home.” Weekly protests call for their release.

In the Tiuna neighborhood of Caracas, we met Mileidy Chirinos, who lives in an apartment complex overlooking the site where Maduro was captured. From her rooftop, she told us about that dreadful night, when the sky lit up with explosions so loud her building shook and everyone ran outside screaming.

“Have your children ever woken up terrified to the sound of bombs?” she asked.

We shook our heads.

“Ours have,” she said. “And they are U.S. bombs. Now we understand what Palestinians in Gaza feel every day.”

She told us psychologists now visit weekly to help residents cope with the trauma.

Within days of the U.S. invasion, the National Assembly swore in Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as acting president. President Trump publicly praised Rodríguez for “doing a good job,” emphasizing his strong relationship with her. But from the beginning, she has been negotiating with the United States with a gun to her head. She was told that any refusal to compromise would result not in the kidnapping of her and her team, but death and the continued bombing of Venezuela.

The presence of U.S. power looms large. Nuclear submarines still patrol offshore. Thousands of troops remain positioned nearby. Every statement and decision made by the government is scrutinized. And on February 2, despite Trump’s praise for Delcy Rodríguez, he renewed the 2015 executive order declaring Venezuela an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security.

The visits from the heads of the CIA and Southern Command have undoubtedly been difficult for the government to swallow. Delcy’s revolutionary father was tortured to death in 1976 by a Venezuelan government that worked closely with the CIA. The U.S. Southern Command coordinated the January 3 attack.

But the government is not without leverage.

“The United States thought the state was weak, that it didn’t have popular support, that the military was divided,” said Tania Díaz of the ruling PSUV party. “January 3rd could have triggered looting, military defections, or widespread destabilization. None of that happened.”

The United States has overwhelming military dominance, but it was also aware that millions of Venezuelans signed up to be part of the people’s militia. This militia, along with the army that remained loyal to the government, gave Washington pause about launching a prolonged war and attempting to replace Delcy Rodríguez with opposition leader María Corina Machado. 

While Machado enjoys enthusiastic support among Venezuelan exiles in Miami and the Trump administration recognized her movement as the winner of the 2024 election, the picture inside Venezuela is very different.  The opposition remains deeply divided and Trump realized there was no viable faction ready to assume power.

Besides, as William Castillo put it bluntly: “Trump does not care about elections or human rights or political prisoners. He cares about three other things: oil, oil, and oil.” To that, we can add gold, where the U.S. just pushed Venezuela to provide direct access to gold exports and investment opportunities in the country’s gold and mineral sector, 

Certainly, under the circumstances, the Venezuelan leadership has had little choice but to grant the United States significant influence over its oil exports. But while Trump boasts that this is the fruit of his “spectacular assault,” Maduro had long been open to cooperation with U.S. oil companies.

“Maduro was well aware that Venezuela needed investment in its oil facilities,” Castillo told us, “but the lack of investment is because of U.S. sanctions, not because of Maduro. Venezuela never stopped selling to the U.S.; it is the U.S. that stopped buying. And it also stopped selling spare parts needed to repair the infrastructure. So the U.S. started the fire that decimated our oil industry and now acts as if it’s the firefighter coming to the rescue.”

In any case, the easing of oil sanctions — the only sanctions that have been partially lifted — is already bringing an infusion of much-needed dollars, and the government has been able to use these funds to support social programs.

But in Venezuela the conflict is not seen as simply about oil. Blanca Eekhout, head of the Simon Bolivar Institute, says U.S. actions represent a brazen return to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine originally warned European powers not to interfere in the Western Hemisphere, but over time it became a justification for repeated U.S. interventions across the region. 

“We have gone back 200 years,” she said. “All rules of sovereignty have been violated. But while the Trump administration thinks it can control the hemisphere by force, it can’t.”

The historical contradiction is stark. In 1823, the young United States declared Latin America its sphere of influence. A year earlier, Bolívar envisioned a powerful, sovereign Latin America capable of charting its own destiny. That tension still echoes through the present.

Bolívar’s dream is also being battered by the resurgence of the right across the region. The left in Latin America is far weaker than during the days of Hugo Chávez. Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Ecuador’s Rafael Correa have been replaced by conservative leaders. Cuba remains under a suffocating U.S. siege. Progressive regional institutions like CELAC and ALBA have faded, and the vision of Latin American unity that once seemed within reach now feels far more fragile.

In Caracas, the situation is tangled, contradictory, and volatile. But amid the uncertainty, one thing felt clear: the Venezuelan left is not collapsing. It is recalibrating.

As Blanca told us before we left:

“They thought we would fall apart. But we are still here.”

And in the background, Bolívar’s warning continues to drift through the air — like a storm that never quite passes.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Medea Benjamin is the cofounder of CODEPINK for Peace, and the author of several books, including Inside Iran: The Real History and Politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

Source: Code Pink

Human Rights Watch (HRW) said on Monday that the Israeli military illegally deployed white phosphorus munitions over the southern Lebanese town of Yohmor on March 3, posing severe risks to civilians.

Ramzi Kaiss, HRW’s Lebanon researcher, described the incendiary effects of white phosphorus as capable of causing death or “cruel injuries that result in lifelong suffering.” The group said it had verified eight images and reports from civil defense personnel responding to fires in residential areas.

Legal and Humanitarian Context

White phosphorus can legally be used in warfare to create smoke screens, illuminate battlefields, mark targets, or burn fortified positions. However, HRW emphasized that deploying airburst white phosphorus over populated areas is prohibited under international humanitarian law.

Protocol III of the Convention on the Prohibition of Certain Conventional Weapons classifies white phosphorus as an incendiary weapon and forbids its use against military targets located among civilians. While Israel has not signed the protocol and is not legally bound by it, HRW and other rights groups argue that its use in populated areas constitutes a violation of humanitarian principles.

Previous Patterns and Scale

The report comes amid an intensification of Israeli strikes in Lebanon over the past week. According to the Lebanese National Council for Scientific Research, between October 2023 and July 2024, Israel carried out 175 attacks using white phosphorus in southern Lebanon, sparking fires across more than 600 hectares (1,480 acres) of farmland.

HRW previously accused Israel of using white phosphorus in 2023, a charge the Israeli military denied. Civilian displacement and casualties have been severe: nearly 400 people killed and hundreds of thousands forced to leave their homes as strikes continue.

Israeli Response

The Israeli military told Reuters it was unaware of and could not confirm the use of white phosphorus shells in Yohmor. Officials said they had not reviewed the same videos cited by HRW and declined to comment on the allegations. Lebanese authorities have not issued a statement on the report.

On March 3, the Israeli military ordered residents of Yohmor and 50 other nearby towns to evacuate ahead of strikes, highlighting the heightened risks to civilians in affected areas.

Analysis

The allegations underscore the ongoing humanitarian and legal concerns in southern Lebanon amid Israel’s operations. Even without Israel being formally bound by Protocol III, the use of incendiary munitions in populated areas raises questions about compliance with customary international humanitarian law, which prohibits indiscriminate attacks on civilians.

The repeated accusations of white phosphorus use reflect both the intensity of Israel’s military campaign and the broader risk of civilian harm in the conflict. Beyond immediate casualties and destruction, agricultural damage and displacement threaten long-term social and economic stability in southern Lebanon, particularly for farming communities still recovering from previous conflicts.

The HRW report may intensify international scrutiny on Israel’s conduct in Lebanon, potentially influencing diplomatic and humanitarian responses in the region.

With information from Reuters.

Investors placed strong bets on Tuesday that Donald Trump could bring the war in Iran to a rapid conclusion, even as both sides escalated threats. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran declared that no oil would leave the Middle East until U.S. and Israeli attacks cease, prompting Trump to threaten that any attempt to block tanker traffic would be met with strikes “twenty times harder.”

Despite the rhetoric, markets quickly reversed the historic surge in crude prices seen on Monday. Brent crude briefly surged to nearly $120 a barrel, a level not seen since mid‑2022, but fell back to around $92 by Tuesday morning. Futures volumes were low, reflecting both caution and the fact that traders were recalibrating risk based on Trump’s comments that the U.S. was “very far ahead” of his initial four- to five-week timeframe for the conflict. Asian and European share prices staged a recovery from earlier steep falls, signaling that markets were treating Trump’s statements as a de-escalation signal, even if the on-the-ground situation remained dire.

Analysts noted that while the market’s reaction reflects optimism about a short conflict, underlying risks remain. Suvro Sarkar of DBS Bank observed that benchmark Middle Eastern grades like Murban and Dubai crude remain above $100 per barrel, meaning the fundamental pressures on supply have not dissipated.

On the Ground: Intensified Conflict

Meanwhile, the human and strategic realities on the ground remain stark. Tehran residents described the heaviest bombardment of the conflict yet, with strikes across the city leaving civilians fearful and homes damaged. One resident said, “It was like hell. They were bombing everywhere, every part of Tehran… my children are afraid to sleep now. We have nowhere to go.”

Israel is simultaneously operating under the assumption that Trump could end the war at any moment, sources familiar with its military plans told Reuters. This has encouraged Israeli forces to maximize damage on Iranian targets before any potential ceasefire, highlighting the tension between the short-term operational calculus and long-term strategic objectives.

Iran’s appointment of hardliner Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader signals defiance against U.S. pressure to influence Iranian leadership, underscoring Tehran’s unwillingness to yield to external demands despite the military pressure.

Strategic Implications: Oil, Leadership, and Geopolitics

The war has effectively halted shipments through the Strait of Hormuz policy measures such as easing sanctions on Russia and releasing strategic oil reserves, are interpreted by markets as mitigating factors that could prevent a prolonged energy crisis.

However, the underlying political and military dynamics suggest that a rapid resolution may not meet all stated U.S. objectives. Ending the conflict quickly to restore oil flows would likely leave Iran’s leadership intact, which contrasts with Trump’s previous maximalist demands for influence over Iran’s succession. Israel’s objectives diverge further, as it continues to seek regime change and to weaken Tehran’s ability to strike beyond its borders, while U.S. officials emphasize missile and nuclear containment.

Human and Regional Costs

The war has already inflicted significant human costs. Iran’s U.N. ambassador reported at least 1,332 civilian deaths and thousands wounded since the airstrikes began. Iranian missile and drone strikes targeting Gulf states have damaged infrastructure, closed airports, and disrupted hotels, while retaliatory Israeli strikes in Lebanon have killed scores amid ongoing efforts to neutralize Hezbollah.

Domestically, Iran has suppressed dissent and anti-government protests following the death of Ali Khamenei, further complicating the social dynamics that external military action interacts with. Large-scale rallies in support of Mojtaba Khamenei demonstrate public mobilization in favor of the hardline leadership, which may limit the U.S. and Israel’s capacity to influence internal political outcomes even after the war concludes.

Analysis: Financial, Strategic, and Geopolitical Interplay

Markets are betting on a short conflict because of political signaling, but the broader picture is far more complex. Oil prices remain sensitive to supply disruptions, and the potential for renewed escalations persists. The market response highlights how sentiment can temporarily override fundamental risks, yet volatility is likely to continue as long as strategic objectives, military operations, and leadership decisions remain unresolved.

From a geopolitical perspective, the conflict illustrates the tension between military objectives and economic consequences. A rapid end to the war would stabilize energy markets and global growth expectations but may leave U.S. and Israeli goals partially unmet. Conversely, prolonging the conflict to pursue maximalist aims risks a sustained oil shock, regional instability, and wider economic fallout, echoing lessons from past Middle East crises in the 1970s.

Analysts emphasize that energy markets, geopolitical strategy, and human costs are tightly intertwined: traders respond quickly to political statements, but the underlying realities strikes, leadership decisions, and supply chain vulnerabilities ensure that uncertainty will remain high. The delicate balance between military pressure, diplomacy, and market psychology will determine whether the Iran conflict resolves quickly or evolves into a more protracted crisis.

With information from Reuters.

Mérida, March 9, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Millions of Venezuelans participated on Sunday in the first National Popular Consultation of 2026, a direct democracy mechanism designed to transfer state resources directly to organized communities for the execution of self-managed projects. 

The process took place in 5,336 communal circuits nationwide. Residents over the age of 15 were eligible to vote for one of up to seven projects previously proposed and debated in local citizens’ assemblies. The initiatives mostly focus on urgent territorial priorities such as water distribution, electrical grid repairs, and infrastructure renovations.

Once a project is selected by the majority of voters in a communal circuit, the government transfers US $10,000, in local currency. The community then manages the resources and oversees the execution of the work. 

Communes Minister Ángel Prado visited several voting centers on Sunday, hailing the turnout and the efficiency of the communal model.

“This is an extraordinary result and a demonstration of the great participation registered in this 2026 Popular Consultation,” Prado stated to national media. “The organized people are showing that they have the capacity to manage their own resources and solve their problems with transparency and commitment.”

The winning proposal in the Lanceros Atures Commune in Lara state was the purchase of equipment for the local healthcare center. In rural Cojedes state, residents of the Zamora Vive Communal Circuit chose to fund the production of cereals and legumes.

In 5 de Marzo Comandante Eterno Commune in southwest Caracas the community selected a project to replace 10 kg liquefied gas (LPG) cylinders used mostly for cooking. For many families, this was a critical priority as existing cylinders were in poor condition or insufficient for daily needs.

Anaís Márquez, a spokesperson for the commune, explained to Venezuelanalysis the transformative impact of the winning project.

“The winning project is the replacement of the cooking gas cylinders, which will transform our realities,” Márquez said. Six of the seven community councils here rely on these cylinders. Many were in poor condition, or people only had one. Selecting this project means guaranteeing a better quality of life and safety for our families.”

Márquez highlighted that the consultation’s timing on March 8, International Working Women’s Day, added a layer of historical significance to the process.

“I believe this consultation is one of those demands we have fought for. What better way to commemorate International Working Women’s Day than through participation, since 80% of communal spokespeople in Venezuela are women,” she noted.

The local activist added that the projects chosen in the consultations “create a sense of belonging and joint responsibility for the transformation of our territory.”

The concept of the commune was central to former President Hugo Chávez’s vision of the path toward socialism. Chávez envisioned communes as the “unit cells” of a new state, where social property and self-governance would eventually replace the old “bourgeois” structures.

Starting in 2024, the Nicolás Maduro government implemented the consultations as the main mechanism to support grassroots organizations. By empowering local communities to execute projects identified through their own “concrete agenda of action,” the state bypassed the local governorships and mayoralties to deliver funds directly.

Sunday’s vote was the first of several planned for 2026.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

The United States and Israel’s war on Iran has caused the largest energy supply shock in decades.

The Strait of Hormuz is in effect closed, and attacks are being carried out on energy facilities in the Middle East, rattling oil markets.

From Americans filling their tanks at the pump to European factories and Asian economies, the impact is already being felt.

US President Donald Trump says the rise in oil prices is a “very small price to pay” for “safety and peace”. But investors warn that if the conflict drags on, there’s danger of stagflation.

A suspected Iranian attack on a high-rise residential building in Bahrain’s capital of Manama has killed a 29-year-old Bahraini woman and injured several others.

Surging energy prices caused by the US-Israel war on Iran could ripple across the United States economy, heaping further strain on consumers at a time when cost-of-living issues are already a primary concern.

The price of crude oil increased from about $67 per barrel before the war began on February 28 to nearly $97 on Monday, as the conflict snarls production and transport in one of the most energy-rich regions on earth. Oil temporarily passed $100 per barrel on Sunday before slightly easing back.

The price tracker GasBuddy reported on Monday that the average price of gas in the US has risen by 51 cents per gallon over the last week.

“Yes, yes, definitely,” said 52-year-old Alma Newell when asked if she was worried about price increases at a gas station in the coastal city of Goleta, California.

Newell said she is out of work with a shoulder injury and worried that rising costs could stretch her already limited budget.

“The prices have a big impact because I’m not working right now,” she said. “Food and rent are already very expensive.”

“It’s crazy,” she added. “Because the war is so unnecessary.”

Cost of living issues

Rising prices could deepen frustration with the administration of US President Donald Trump and put greater political pressure on the White House, already struggling to address cost-of-living issues with the crucial midterm elections set to take place later this year.

“I think the current price increase in oil suggests the US will see $3.50 to $4 gasoline by next week, and $5 diesel this week,” said Gregory Brew, a senior analyst on Iran and oil at the Eurasia Group.

The highest recorded average for gas prices at the pump was in June 2022, when prices soared to $5.034, months after the Russian war on Ukraine started, according to Gas Buddy, which tracks fuel prices going back to 2008.

“The impact 1773123967 is more political than economic, as high gasoline prices generate negative press and can add to the perception that the government is not properly handling the economy. That means Trump will feel more political pressure to end this war quickly.”

A Pew Research Center poll in early February suggested widespread anxiety about the rising cost-of-living before the US and Israel launched attacks on Iran, with 68 percent of respondents saying they were very or somewhat concerned about gas prices.

“I’m not too worried myself because I have a hybrid car and ride my bike,” said 72-year-old Bjorn Birmir at the gas station in Goleta, California. “But for people in general, it will make life more expensive. Prices are already high, and it will make them even higher.”

Ongoing disruptions

The disruptions caused by the war include the shuttering of the Strait of Hormuz, a key node in global transit and shipping. Iran has long said that it could close down the strait in the event of a showdown with the US and Israel.

About 20 percent of global oil and a significant portion of natural gas pass through the strait, predominantly to Asia, supplies that are now stranded as traffic through the narrow waterway has ground to a halt. Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure in countries across the region have also led some countries to scale back production.

Other economic sectors are also feeling the squeeze.

Goods such as fertiliser, vital for agricultural production, are seeing price increases just ahead of the spring planting season in the Northern Hemisphere. About one-third of the global fertiliser trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz.

Effects of the war could ripple throughout the global economy, with poor countries especially hard-hit. Pakistan announced a series of austerity measures and cuts to fuel subsidies on Monday, while Bangladesh shuttered universities and announced restrictions on fuel use as a result of the war.

US officials and countries around the world have already discussed measures to help ease the shock of rising energy prices, including the potential release of strategic oil reserves in a bid to temporarily boost global supply.

The G7 said on Monday that it would take “necessary measures” to support energy supplies, but held off on announcing the release of strategic reserves, with energy ministers set to meet on Tuesday to discuss the matter further.

The US has a strategic oil reserve of more than 415 million barrels, one of the largest in the world, that it could release in coordination with allied countries.

But it is unclear when these measures would kick in and how long such steps could help fill the gaps created by the war.

Rachel Ziemba, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, says that much depends on whether the war is brought to a speedy conclusion or continues on for weeks or even months, with the possibility of further escalation.

Thus far, neither the US and Israel nor Iran has suggested it are willing to stop the war anytime soon, although Trump told CBS News on Monday that “the war is very complete, pretty much”, comments that helped ease some of the price swings in oil and stocks.

“If the war continues, we would see oil prices not only remain elevated, but perhaps rally further as markets price in a more protracted outage,” said Ziemba. “There’s also the question of, when it does end, how much damage will be done to infrastructure and just how quickly supplies could come back online.”

Initial polling has suggested that the war is unpopular in the US, with a Quinnipiac University poll released on Monday finding that 53 percent of voters who responded oppose Trump’s military action in Iran, including 60 percent of political independents.

That lack of popular support could present a political headache for Trump and his Republican Party if voters connect the war to increasing prices. Thus far, Trump has largely dismissed concerns about the war’s possible impact on the rising cost of living.

“Short term oil prices, which will drop rapidly when the destruction of the Iran nuclear threat is over, is a very small price to pay for USA, and World, Safety and Peace,” Trump said in a Truth Social post on Sunday. “ONLY FOOLS WOULD THINK DIFFERENTLY!”

When a state’s political leadership announces a ceasefire and its military keeps firing, the instinct is to reach for deception as the explanation. In Iran’s case, the more unsettling answer may be structural. The gap between what Iranian presidents say and what Iranian forces do reflects not a coordinated lie but a command architecture deliberately engineered to operate without central direction. In a serious conflict, the consequences of that architecture would be felt well beyond Iran’s borders.

A Command Architecture Designed to Survive Decapitation

In September 2008, IRGC Commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari oversaw a sweeping restructuring that divided the force into thirty-one provincial corps, each empowered to conduct military operations within its zone without requiring authorization from the center. As Michael Connell of the Center for Naval Analyses noted in his analysis for the United States Institute of Peace, the intent was to strengthen unit cohesion and ensure operational continuity under degraded command conditions. He flagged explicitly that the decentralization could produce unintended escalation dynamics, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

That warning deserves serious attention. The IRGC’s Mosaic Defense doctrine was not designed to make Iran more responsive to political leadership in a crisis. It was designed to ensure that military operations could continue regardless of what happened to that leadership. A force structured that way does not stop firing because a president gives a speech.

The Apology That Wasn’t

The internal contradiction becomes clearest when traced through a hypothetical cascade. A president announces a ceasefire and attributes the directive to an Interim Leadership Council. A fellow council member publicly declares that heavy strikes will continue. A hardline cleric addresses the president directly, calling his position untenable. By the time the president’s original statement is reposted, the ceasefire language has been quietly removed.

The IRGC’s own posture in this scenario resolves the ambiguity on structural grounds. It endorses the president’s language, then appends a caveat that renders it inoperative: all US and Israeli military bases and interests across the region remain primary targets. Since every GCC state hosts American forces, that framing preserves full operational freedom while allowing the presidency to project restraint. The contradiction is not incidental. It is the doctrine functioning as designed.

The Theological Dimension

Iran is not simply a military organization. It is a theocratic state whose constitutional legitimacy flows from velayat-e faqih, the guardianship of the Islamic jurist, which vests supreme authority in a single clerical figure whose religious and political mandates are inseparable. Remove that figure, and the system’s legitimating architecture is suspended rather than transferred. The Assembly of Experts is constitutionally mandated to elect a successor, but wartime conditions would disrupt that process at precisely the moment its resolution matters most.

A RAND Corporation analysis prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense identified the IRGC as the institution best positioned to shape any post-Khamenei transition, with the organizational reach and economic weight to determine outcomes that civilian institutions cannot contest. The result, in a decapitation scenario, is a theocratic state operating without its theological anchor and a military operating under pre-delegated authority with no one capable of recalling it.

Durability Without Effect

The Mosaic Defense doctrine would prove, above all, durable. A decentralized force can survive catastrophic leadership losses and sustain operations. But durability is not the same as capability, and sustained fire is not the same as strategic effect.

Iran’s theory of regional attrition, the calculation that sustained strikes against Gulf infrastructure and American basing would fracture GCC cohesion and coerce Arab neighbors toward neutrality, has produced no evidence of working. The GCC bloc has held. Individual member states have coordinated their responses rather than fractured under pressure. The country absorbing the sharpest volume of Iranian strike activity, the UAE, has demonstrated air defense performance that has exceeded even optimistic prewar assessments. Publicly available figures suggest UAE systems have defeated upward of ninety percent of inbound threats, a result that reflects years of sustained investment, deep integration with American and Israeli platforms, and an operational tempo that has stress-tested those systems at genuine scale.

The picture that emerges is not one of Iran winning a war of attrition. It is one of an Iran burning through accessible inventory, losing launch infrastructure faster than it can regenerate, and discovering that the regional architecture it spent years attempting to destabilize has proven considerably more resilient than it calculated.

That resilience carries its own strategic meaning. A weakened force operating under pre-delegated authority, without a supreme leader to set limits, remains dangerous in a narrow tactical sense. But it is operating without a coherent end state, and the environment it faces is not the one it anticipated. The GCC’s collective posture and the demonstrated effectiveness of layered air defense across the Gulf have closed off the strategic outcomes Iran’s doctrine was written to achieve.

The scenario is instructive for what it reveals about the limits of decentralized military design. A force built to keep firing regardless of political direction is also a force that cannot be steered toward an exit. But the Gulf states have demonstrated something of equal importance in response: that resilience, properly built and consistently resourced, can outlast a doctrine designed for chaos, and that the regional order Iran sought to unravel has shown itself capable of absorbing the blow.

Modern wars are fought not only with weapons but with assumptions—and the most dangerous assumptions are often invisible to those making them. Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between known unknowns (questions we recognize but cannot answer) and unknown unknowns (risks we have not even framed as questions) captures something essential about the current confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran.

The Nuclear Material Problem

The June 2025 12-day war struck several of Iran’s nuclear facilities but left the most consequential question unanswered: where is the material? The March 2026 campaign has struck deeper, targeting hardened and dispersed sites that June’s operations left intact. Yet the fundamental uncertainty has not resolved—it has compounded. Iran reportedly retains roughly 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, approaching weapons-grade, and the precise location of that stockpile is now more opaque than before. On March 2, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported the entrance buildings of Iran’s underground Natanz enrichment plant had been bombed, but without inspection access, the agency cannot reconstruct a monitoring baseline.

The strategic paradox is acute. Any Iranian government—this one or a successor—must now confront a nuclear-armed Israel and a United States willing to strike Iranian territory twice in nine months. Under those conditions, nuclear capability looks less like a provocation and more like a rational insurance policy. The war may have permanently entrenched the very incentive it was designed to dismantle. A further risk of escaping conventional arms-control frameworks is if Iranian institutions fragment, specialized nuclear expertise disperses internationally, potentially becoming available to states or non-state actors.

Regime Change and What Follows

The war’s stated objective rests on uncertain ground. Intelligence assessments before the conflict reportedly concluded that even a large-scale assault was unlikely to produce regime collapse—yet the campaign proceeded anyway. The Iranian state has shown remarkable institutional resilience, with no visible defections among senior leadership, a government operating under its constitutional framework, and a regime that has absorbed the Iran-Iraq War, the Green Movement, and decades of sanctions.

War has accelerated the succession question around Ali Khamenei. One trajectory involves Mojtaba Khamenei, whose rise would mean dynastic continuity rather than transformation; another sees the IRGC consolidating power—equally misaligned with Western hopes. The question of what comes after was not answered before the bombs fell.

Retaliation, Major-Power Shadows, and Strategic Incoherence

Iran’s retaliation has demonstrated its asymmetric reach. The IRGC claims attacks on at least 27 bases hosting American troops across the region, alongside Israeli military facilities. Tehran appears to be pacing its response, sustaining an attrition campaign designed to exhaust interceptor stocks rather than overwhelm them in a single strike.

The major power dimensions compound this. Russia has reportedly been providing intelligence on American naval deployments; Chinese-linked entities have allegedly tracked US forces via satellite. Meanwhile, strategic incoherence in Washington compounds every other risk. Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have framed this as a limited campaign against nuclear infrastructure; Trump has simultaneously floated regime change on social media.

The Munitions Race

The deepest structural vulnerability may not lie on the battlefield but in the arithmetic of an industrial system never designed to fight this kind of war. The first 36 hours consumed more than 3,000 precision-guided munitions and interceptors. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Dan Caine had warned that stockpiles were already significantly depleted before the first strike. Secretary Marco Rubio subsequently acknowledged that Iran produces an estimated 100 missiles a month versus roughly six or seven high-end interceptors that American industry can manufacture in the same period.

That deficit has a history. The US likely expended 100 to 150 THAAD interceptors and 80 SM-3s supporting Israel during June’s Twelve-Day War. Those stocks were never fully replenished. The bottlenecks are physical as well as financial. Lockheed Martin’s plan to raise PAC-3 MSE production to 2,000 units per year addresses a six-to-seven-year horizon, not the current emergency.

The drone dimension adds a layer officials have been slow to acknowledge. Hegseth and Caine admitted in a closed-door briefing that Iran’s Shahed drones present a challenge US air defenses cannot fully meet. The Shahed flies low and slow—hard to detect and poorly matched to the high-end interceptors THAAD and SM-3 are optimized to defeat. Intercepting a drone can cost roughly five times what it costs to manufacture one.

This crystallizes the war’s most consequential known unknown: how much of Iran’s arsenal reflects genuine capability, and how much reflects deliberate restraint? The IDF assessed Iran possessed roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles on February 11.

The search for emergency solutions has produced one remarkable geopolitical inversion. The Pentagon has approached Ukraine about purchasing drone interceptors. They are low-cost systems Ukrainian manufacturers developed specifically to hunt Shaheds, built from years of adapting to exactly the threat now confounding American air defenses in the Gulf. The US is buying drone killers from a country it recently all but abandoned! The implications extend to the Indo-Pacific. Every interceptor fired over the Gulf of Bahrain is one fewer available in the Taiwan Strait.

The Energy Shock

The Strait of Hormuz has moved from a textbook chokepoint to a live emergency. Tanker traffic has come to a near standstill. War-risk insurance premiums have made commercial passage unviable even where it remains physically possible. At least five tankers have been struck across the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and nearby waters. Approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day—a fifth of global consumption—normally transit the strait, alongside roughly 20% of global LNG trade. Traders are warning that oil prices could surge past $100 a barrel if the conflict in Iran continues to escalate. Goldman Sachs Research estimates that a full one-month closure would add $15 per barrel, assuming no compensating measures like spare pipeline utilization or releases from strategic petroleum reserves. Bank of America sees tail risk far higher, estimating a prolonged shutdown could add $40–$80 per barrel above current prices.

The LNG dimension may prove more immediately damaging than oil. QatarEnergy has halted production at Ras Laffan, the world’s largest LNG facility, after Iranian drone attacks. This has already caused European natural gas futures to spike. If global LNG tightens, Europe must compete with Asian buyers on price. That competition may, in turn, force Europe back toward Russian gas, quietly reversing one of the most consequential geopolitical achievements of the post-Ukraine sanctions era.

The exposure is global and unevenly distributed. China, India, Japan, and South Korea account for roughly 75% of Hormuz crude exports and 59% of its LNG flows. South Korea has warned it could exhaust LNG reserves within nine days and has announced a 100 trillion won stabilization fund. India is pivoting toward Russian crude. These developments structurally benefit Moscow regardless of the war’s outcome.

The fertilizer dimension compounds the energy shock with a slower fuse. Nitrogen fertilizers are manufactured from natural gas; roughly a third of globally traded urea transits Hormuz. QatarEnergy’s halt removes fertilizer output simultaneously with LNG. Urea prices have already surged $60 to $80 per ton at New Orleans, with the spring planting window closing. The food-price consequences will not appear in grocery stores for months. But they are already locked in.

The Gulf Security Paradox

For decades the Gulf states managed their rivalry with Iran below the threshold of open confrontation, relying on the American security umbrella while avoiding direct entanglement. The war has collapsed that strategy. The Gulf states did not arrive at this crisis as Iran’s adversaries but rather as reluctant bystanders who had invested enormous diplomatic capital in preventing it. They gave ironclad assurances to Tehran, both before the war and up to its eve, that their territories would not serve as launchpads. That Iran responded by striking these same neighbors is a strategic miscalculation of historic proportions and a moral failure that may poison relations for a generation.

This has opened a structural debate now conducted in public. Is American military presence a protective shield or a magnet for retaliation? Citizens and analysts are asking why Gulf states should bear the risk of hosting US forces when Washington appears unable to protect them. Undoubtedly, Tehran understands this dynamic. Drone strikes on UAE-based data centers targeted Gulf publics’ confidence in the connectivity model as much as American commercial interests. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have staked their post-oil futures on projecting stability and attracting mobile capital. Intercepting most of the incoming fire is not sufficient when global firms are deciding where to invest next decade.

The crisis confronts the Gulf Cooperation Council with a strategic fork. One path leads toward deeper collective security, featuring integrated missile defense, expanded intelligence sharing, and coordinated maritime protection that could reduce dependence on any single external patron. The other leads toward renewed fragmentation as internal rivalries re-emerge.

Former Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani warned that the Gulf “must not be dragged into a direct confrontation with Iran,” arguing that such a clash would “deplete the resources of both sides and provide an opportunity for outside forces to control us under the pretext of helping us escape the crisis.” Yet the same crisis that could finally catalyze genuine Gulf collective security could just as easily deepen the divisions that have historically prevented it.

The Mediator’s Dilemma and the Meta-Unknown

The conflict has also damaged the diplomatic architecture that previously helped manage US-Iran tensions. Oman and Qatar built genuine credibility as intermediaries through years of patient back-channel work. Effective mediation requires neutrality. When conflict spreads into the territory of potential mediators, that credibility erodes. Iran’s decision to strike the very states whose neutrality made diplomacy possible may have burned the bridges needed to end the war—which is perhaps the most consequential unknown unknown in the entire conflict, second only to the US twice striking Iran in the span of nine months while negotiations were still ongoing.

At the deepest level lies a question no intelligence assessment can answer: whether the strategic logic of the war is coherent at all. Negotiations failed because each side demanded outcomes the other could not accept. The same incompatibility that made diplomacy impossible may make military victory equally elusive. Iran cannot surrender unconditionally without ceasing to be the Islamic Republic. And the conditions that make nuclear deterrence attractive to any Iranian government—this one or a successor—have not been removed by the strikes; they have been reinforced.

Conclusion

In sum, the US-Israeli campaign against Iran has illuminated the limits of military certainty. Known unknowns—munition shortages, asymmetric retaliation, and energy vulnerabilities—interact with unknown unknowns—nuclear dispersal, regime succession, and Gulf fragmentation—to create a conflict whose trajectory is inherently unpredictable. Rather than eliminating threats, the strikes may have entrenched incentives for nuclear retention, incentivized strategic caution, and stressed regional and global systems. The coherence of the war itself is in question, as military action and diplomacy pull in contradictory directions. Ultimately, the conflict underscores that modern warfare is as much about managing uncertainties as it is about destroying targets.

The reported idea of a special operation to seize Iran’s uranium should alarm anyone who still thinks there is a line between pressure and recklessness. Sending foreign forces into Iranian territory to capture nuclear material would be far beyond coercion. It would be war in plain sight. That risk looks even sharper when it is paired with talk of unconditional surrender and a revived maximum pressure campaign. Officials call that flexibility. In practice, it often creates confusion and a dangerous illusion of control.

Strategic Ambiguity Has Limits

Trump has long preferred threat inflation as a negotiating tool, and his administration’s National Security Presidential Memorandum on Iran makes clear that Washington wants to deny Tehran every path to a bomb. But there is a difference between pressure meant to shape diplomacy and rhetoric that drifts toward occupation logic. A raid assumes the United States can enter a sovereign state, take possession of fissile material, and leave without igniting a larger conflict. That is not strategy. It is a gamble.

A Raid Would Not Stay Small

Iran is not an isolated militia camp. It is a large state with layered security organs, missile capacity, regional partners, and a long memory of external intervention. Any attempt to seize uranium by force would expose American troops, bases, shipping lanes, diplomats, and partners to retaliation across several fronts. Even before talk of a raid, Washington and Tehran had been engaged in indirect nuclear talks in Oman. Replacing diplomacy with a ground mission would not create leverage. It would destroy what remains of a controlled bargaining space.

The Nuclear Picture Is Already Murky

The hardest fact in this debate is that the nuclear picture is already uncertain. In its February 2026 safeguards report, the IAEA said it could not verify the current status of facilities hit in June 2025. Reuters later highlighted that same report’s estimate that Iran had 440.9 kilograms enriched up to 60 percent before the strikes, while the Associated Press noted the wider stockpile had reached 9,874.9 kilograms of enriched uranium in total. Reuters also reported a cat-and-mouse hunt for missing material and confirmed that tunnel entrances at Isfahan were hit. Those facts do not make a commando operation look cleaner. They make it look less knowable.

Force Has Already Damaged Oversight

This is the contradiction hawks avoid. Military action may damage buildings, but it can also damage the inspection system needed to track what survives. The IAEA chief said that returning to Iranian sites was the top priority after the attacks because the agency had lost visibility. Reuters warned even before the war that any new Iran deal would have to address serious watchdog blind spots. Rafael Grossi had already reminded the Security Council that nuclear facilities must never be attacked and later stressed that inspectors must be allowed to do their job. Once oversight is broken, claims about perfect control become less credible.

Pressure Without Diplomacy Can Harden Iran

Advocates of seizure argue that urgency changes the rules. Their point is easy to grasp. If material has been moved, hidden, or split across sites, then delay is dangerous. But urgency cuts both ways. The less certainty there is, the more any raid grows in scope. A supposedly limited mission can quickly expand into repeated searches, broader strikes, and pressure for a longer presence. That trajectory sits uneasily with both the basic ban on the use of force in the UN Charter and the logic of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which depends on verification and compliance, not theatrical confiscation. Reuters has also shown that the damage from earlier strikes was difficult to measure and that U.S. officials later said there was no known intelligence that Iran had moved the uranium. That uncertainty is exactly why fantasies of a clean raid should be treated with suspicion.

Containment Is Less Dramatic, but Safer

There is another reason to reject this path. Public overstatement can create policy traps. Trump has already brushed aside internal caution, including when Reuters reported that he said his own intelligence chief was wrong about Iran’s program. Tehran, for its part, has insisted through officials speaking to Reuters that it will not give up enrichment under pressure. That is not a recipe for surrender. It is a recipe for concealment and hardening. Serious policy should focus on intelligence work, restored IAEA access, sustained diplomatic pressure backed by credible penalties, and a clear effort to prevent a regional war that would leave the uranium question even murkier.

The appeal of seizure is obvious. It sounds decisive and final. But nuclear crises rarely yield to cinematic solutions. They are managed through verification, containment, bargaining, and steady pressure, not through fantasies of absolute control. If this idea is truly being weighed in Washington, it should be rejected before rhetoric turns into mission planning. A ground effort to capture uranium inside Iran would not settle the problem. It could widen the war, shatter what diplomacy still exists, and leave the world with the same material, less oversight, and far more bloodshed.