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There is another way to read the ongoing Middle East crisis, one that makes legible what standard analysis consistently struggles to explain. It begins not with capability but with the geometry of the system through which capability must travel to produce effects. The United States and its partners possess overwhelming military superiority over Iran, and that superiority is not in question, yet the conflict has produced a pattern that defies its logic. A superpower coalition has been unable to impose coherent strategic outcomes against an adversary operating through proxies, low-cost disruption, and the systematic exploitation of global commercial vulnerabilities.

Over the past two years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of disruption with consequential effects on the global system. Houthi drones force the rerouting of global shipping, with Red Sea cargo volumes falling by roughly 50% through early 2024 as major carriers diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks to transit times, driving freight costs sharply higher across European markets, and costing Egypt nearly $800 million per month at peak in lost Suez Canal revenue. A non-state network spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has absorbed sustained air campaigns, targeted eliminations of senior commanders, and repeated ground operations without losing its capacity to generate coordinated pressure across multiple theaters simultaneously. The asymmetry seems to follow a deliberate strategic logic that raw power analysis struggles to read, precisely because the conflict operates on a surface that capability assessments were never designed to map. What this suggests is that the decisive variable is not what actors possess but whether the relationships connecting them can transmit coordinated action when the system is under strain.

When that system cannot coordinate, something important breaks down. An alliance that formally exists but faces operational friction at every decision point ceases to be an alliance in any meaningful strategic sense. A security guarantee that cannot be transmitted rapidly to the partner it is meant to protect has, in effect, already failed its primary function. It follows that the gap between what a system formally is and what it can actually do under pressure is not a secondary consideration but the surface on which this conflict is being decided. Conventional analysis, calibrated to count warheads and assess intentions, consistently leaves this gap unmapped.

Analysts know that Saudi Arabia’s OPEC production decisions have repeatedly positioned Riyadh against Washington’s economic preferences, they know that European energy dependency complicates transatlantic alignment, and they know that Iran’s proxy network extends across five countries and absorbs military pressure without fracturing. Yet what the available frameworks cannot do is convert that knowledge into a structural reading of the system. They show that these conditions exist. What they cannot show is how those conditions interact, where they compound, and what the aggregate geometry of their interaction means for whether coordinated action is possible at all.

Power analysis was built to read capability differentials between states, and it does that well. Alliance theory was built to read the conditions under which formal commitments hold or fail, and it does that too. Neither, however, was built to read the operational weight of the ties through which capability and commitment must travel to produce effects.

The instruments available are calibrated to answer questions different from those the current situation poses. Deploying them on a problem they were not designed to read produces the consistent failure to explain what is actually happening that has marked analysis of this conflict from the start.

Adjacency mapping is an instrument designed to read that gap by mapping connectivity, by which I mean their operational weight, specifically their capacity to carry coordinated action under strain. What distinguishes it from standard approaches is its unit of analysis. Rather than the actors themselves, it treats the weight of the relationships as primary. The question it asks is not who holds power but whether the ties connecting power-holders can transmit that power when the system needs them to. Two states can be formally allied, operationally integrated in name, and structurally disconnected at the same time, and nothing in standard analysis will tell you which of those conditions is actually operative until the moment of crisis reveals it.

The instrument assigns each significant relationship in the system a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting how frequently the two actors interact operationally, how reliably information moves between them, how the tie has behaved under recent stress, and how quickly it transmits pressure when the system is under strain. At the higher end of the scale, a weight at or above 0.6 indicates that coordination approaches automaticity, and the tie carries load without constant investment to maintain it. Around 0.3, friction accumulates. In this setting, decisions require deliberate effort at every juncture, slowing the system and making it susceptible to gradual degradation that never triggers a visible rupture. At or below 0.2, the tie has effectively ceased to function as a transmission pathway, leaving the actors operationally disconnected regardless of what their formal relationship nominally says.

These weights are analytical judgements calibrated against observable evidence. In other words, their value lies in making visible what experienced analysts already carry as intuition and in giving that intuition a structure precise enough to argue about. The numbers are therefore analytical judgements, not measurements. A more rigorous application would derive them from quantifiable indicators across each dimension, including military interoperability, intelligence exchange depth, crisis responsiveness, economic interdependence, and signaling consistency, averaged and weighted systematically. That work lies beyond the scope of this piece, but the architecture is designed to accommodate it.

There is a risk management dimension to this reading that is worth making explicit. Standard geopolitical risk assessment focuses on actor-level variables such as regime stability, military capability, and leadership intentions. What adjacency mapping adds is a structural layer that those assessments typically miss. A coalition whose load-bearing relationships operate in the friction zone is exposed to a category of risk that capability assessments do not capture and that becomes visible only when the system is read structurally.

What the matrix adds is the ability to see how compound weakness across multiple relationships produces cascading effects that bilateral assessment alone would struggle to predict. A system whose dominant actor holds several weak partnerships faces more than friction. As a consequence, the geometry of those weaknesses determines whether any concerted response is structurally possible at all. Aggregate capability becomes, in that light, secondary to that question.

If we apply this to the Middle East security complex, the instrument produces one possible reading. This reading differs considerably from the picture conventional analysis generates. Its value is not in the precision of the numbers but in making the system’s geometry visible enough to argue about.

The matrix below maps operational connectivity across the system’s key actors. The numbers are analytical judgements, not measurements.

The geometry they make visible is what matters here.

The matrix is intentionally non-symmetric. Where operational influence flows asymmetrically between two actors, the weights reflect that directionality.

The matrix reveals, in this light, a system whose dominant actors are connected at fundamentally different weights. And more significantly, its most important bilateral relationship is operating in the friction zone. It’s formally excluded adversary has constructed the only alternative connectivity architecture in the system. What this implies is that the geometry of the conflict runs considerably deeper than standard alliance analysis tends to suggest.

On the coalition side, the US has high adjacency with Qatar, Bahrain, Israel, and Kuwait, ties that enable rapid coordination and require little maintenance, constituting the operational backbone of what Washington can actually activate quickly.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia, however, sits at 0.4. That number is analytically more significant than almost anything else in the matrix. Saudi Arabia remains, on most readings, the relationship on which Gulf order coherence formally depends, the anchor of the security architecture since the 1970s, and it is operating in the friction zone where every significant decision requires renegotiation from scratch rather than flowing through an established channel. Saudi Arabia’s invitation to join BRICS in August 2023, yuan-denominated oil transactions with China, and its participation in the Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023 all point in the same direction. Riyadh is hedging structurally toward China and the broader non-Western order, a posture that sits uneasily alongside its formal security alignment with Washington. Taken together, these are not isolated political episodes but evidence of a tie that has been operating below the coordination threshold for years and whose weakness is, on this reading, the system’s most consequential structural vulnerability.

Through the normalization architecture, the UAE has arguably become the system’s most structurally reliable node at 0.6 with both the US and Israel, its operational integration exceeding Saudi Arabia’s despite Saudi Arabia’s formal primacy. The Abraham Accords of September 2020 established the formal foundation for that integration. The operational depth it has since generated, across intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, and coordinated positioning on Iran, has made the UAE the coalition’s most functionally connected Gulf partner. Oman holds what is perhaps the system’s most anomalous position, meaningful adjacency with both the US coalition and Iran simultaneously, a profile no other state actor in the matrix replicates. That structural position gave Oman the back-channel role it played through the early phases of the conflict, with documented precedent in the secret US-Iran nuclear negotiations that began in Muscat in 2012 and ran through 2013. As the conflict has intensified, Pakistan has assumed the primary mediation function, but Oman’s position as a quiet facilitator has not disappeared; it has simply been supplemented by a node with more direct access to both capitals at this particular moment.

Pakistan has emerged as the conflict’s primary mediation node, hosting the highest-level direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1979 and brokering the April 2026 ceasefire. That role reflects a structural position the matrix makes legible: high Saudi adjacency, a functioning Iran tie, and a rehabilitated relationship with Washington that no other regional actor currently combines. China’s influence over both Pakistani and Iranian decision-making operates as an exogenous pressure that the matrix only partially captures, and Pakistan’s own domestic constraints, including its difficulty developing direct channels with the IRGC, limit how far that mediation role can ultimately reach.

Iran’s position is where the matrix becomes most analytically revealing. Across the state actors in the system, Iran’s adjacency sits at or near fragmentation, built up through sanctions, absent operational channels, and decades of adversarial signalling that have left Tehran formally isolated from the coordination architecture the United States and its partners have constructed.

And yet the only high-weight tie Iran holds is with its proxy network at 0.7. That single number may go further toward explaining the architecture of the entire campaign than any other figure in the matrix.

It is an asymmetric relationship in which Tehran’s capacity to activate and direct exceeds the reverse influence those actors exert over Iranian strategic decisions. What that single structural condition implies goes further toward explaining the architecture of Iranian pressure operations than most analyses of Iranian intentions or capabilities tend to reach. Iran is geographically central and formally excluded. It is precisely that combination, positioned to apply pressure across every theatre while bearing none of the coordination costs that formal inclusion imposes. That, from this vantage point, is what makes legible a strategy that standard analysis, focused on actors and their capabilities, cannot see.

Seen through this lens, what Iran is doing across the region is something more structurally ambitious than a military campaign. It is attempting to restructure the matrix itself. The goal appears to be less about battlefield victory than about the gradual degradation of the ties connecting the United States to its regional partners, below the threshold at which coordinated response becomes automatic, eroding the will to keep paying the price of alignment while simultaneously building alternative adjacency in the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest.

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping is calibrated to stay below the threshold that would compel a unified military response. It introduces friction into the economic relationships connecting European states to the Gulf system, raising the cost of alignment with Washington’s regional posture without forcing the kind of direct confrontation that would unite the coalition. Strikes on Gulf infrastructure follow the same calibration, persistent enough to signal that the US security guarantee cannot insulate its partners from costs, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing the point at which coalition fragmentation becomes irrelevant because a unified response becomes compulsory. Across Iraq and Syria, simultaneous pressure from affiliated militias prevents the concentration of attention that sustained coalition coordination requires. In each case, the instrument targets a relationship rather than a capability, specifically the weight of the ties whose degradation would restructure the system’s geometry without requiring Iran to displace the existing order directly.

The US-Saudi tie at 0.4 is the primary focus of that degradation effort. Should that threshold be breached, Saudi Arabia hedges. As hedging reduces operational interactivity the tie weakens further. The process risks becoming self-reinforcing. Iranian military superiority over any individual partner is not required to sustain it.

The same logic extends across European actors, though not uniformly. Germany’s industrial exposure to energy price volatility, France’s residual strategic autonomy instinct, and the EU’s institutional preference for de-escalation all produce different thresholds for continued alignment with Washington. Their shared energy dependency gives them asymmetric stakes in the Gulf system’s stability, but their appetite for risk diverges from Washington’s in ways that are not identical across capitals, and each time Iran forces a decision about the cost of continued alignment, that divergence fragments the coalition’s coordination surface further.

By sustaining operational ties with non-state actors across the region, Iran is constructing alternative adjacency in precisely the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest. These are populations and factions that the existing regional order has excluded from the dominant coalition’s coordination architecture. Deliberately so — Iran is building in the structural gaps the system leaves open. Displacing the existing order appears unnecessary. Becoming the more reliable pole of alignment for the actors that order has failed to integrate may be sufficient. All that is required is that the order fragment sufficiently at its margins for that offer to appear credible, and the current trajectory of US-Saudi friction and European hedging is steadily moving in that direction.

The coalition’s instruments are calibrated to military threats. The system, however, is failing along a different surface entirely, or so this reading suggests. The formal architecture remains largely intact, security guarantees have not been withdrawn, Gulf states remain formally aligned, and normalisation agreements hold. And yet the operational adjacency that gives that architecture its functional weight is under sustained pressure from an actor that has correctly identified the gap between formal commitment and operational tie as the system’s primary vulnerability. That identification is outpacing the coalition’s capacity to respond.

On this reading, the surface on which the conflict appears to be decided is not the one the coalition is defending.

What adjacency mapping reveals is a story about geometry. The system’s dominant actor holds formal commitments at weights the system cannot sustain under the pressure being applied to it. Its adversary, in turn, has built the only alternative coordination architecture in the space that those weakening ties leave open. The conflict is likely to be determined by which ties the system can no longer afford to lose under sustained and calibrated pressure. The question is whether the actors currently holding those ties in the friction zone can rebuild them to the coordination threshold before the process of degradation becomes irreversible. That is a question that capability assessments are not well-positioned to answer, and one that a structural reading of the system’s connectivity at least helps to make visible.

Leo is the third pontiff to visit the fossil fuel-rich country after John Paul II in 1992 and Benedict XVI in 2009.

Pope Leo XIV is set to arrive in Angola on the third leg of a landmark African tour that has unfolded alongside an escalating war of words with United States President Donald Trump over the Middle East conflict.

Leo, the third pontiff to visit the fossil fuel-rich country after John Paul II in 1992 and Benedict XVI in 2009, is expected to arrive at 3pm local time (14:00 GMT) on Saturday in the capital, Luanda, where billboards bearing his image have been erected to welcome him.

The pope, who visited Cameroon for three days before flying to Luanda, is also slated to meet Angola’s President Joao Lourenco and deliver a speech in the country, where about 44 percent of the population identifies as Catholic.

Leo’s increasingly forceful calls for world peace are likely to resonate in Angola, which emerged in 2002 from a 27-year civil war that erupted after independence from Portugal in 1975.

Throughout his Africa visit, the first pope from the US has issued pointed warnings about corruption, the exploitation of the continent’s vast resources and the dangers of artificial intelligence.

‘Stick to matters of morality’

The pope’s Africa visit has also been marked by a clash with Trump, who has called the 70-year-old head of the Catholic Church “weak on crime” and “terrible for foreign policy”. Trump had also shared what appeared to be an AI-generated image of himself as Jesus, prompting a backlash from leaders across the religious spectrum.

The pope had responded by saying he was not afraid of Trump and that he would continue to speak out against war, marking a rare public clash between a pontiff and a sitting US president.

Speaking to reporters on Thursday, Trump said he had the right to disagree with the pontiff. “I have no disagreement with the fact the pope can say what he wants, and I want him to say what he wants, but I can disagree,” he said.

After US Vice President JD Vance urged the Vatican to “stick to matters of morality”, Leo said on Thursday that the world was “being ravaged by a handful of tyrants” and intensified criticism of those using religion to justify war.

During his stop in Cameroon, Leo also urged the country’s leaders to tackle corruption and condemned “those who, in the name of profit, continue to seize the African continent to exploit and plunder it”.

Leo’s warnings against corruption and exploitation may resonate in Angola, where one-third of the population lives below the poverty line despite vast fossil fuel reserves.

On Sunday, he will celebrate an open-air Mass in Kilamba, outside Luanda, before travelling by helicopter to Muxima, home to a 16th-century church and major pilgrimage site.

On Monday, Leo is due to travel to Saurimo to visit a retirement home and hold another Mass. He will then fly to Equatorial Guinea, the final stop of his 18,000km (11,185-mile) African tour.

England’s Lionesses are no strangers to making history.

The past decade has been rich in landmark moments; a first tournament medal, a first major trophy, and a first title defence – on foreign soil to boot.

When Sarina Wiegman’s side play Iceland in Reykjavik on Saturday (17:30 BST) they will reach another milestone – the 500th fixture for England’s senior women’s team.

The game is important for securing qualification for next year’s World Cup in Brazil, with England keen to win more silverware in the famous white shirt.

But regardless of the result, the match will be etched in history as a reminder of how far the English women’s game has come.

In 1921, the Football Association (FA) banned women’s football, considering the game “most unsuitable for females”, external.

The decision consigned women’s football to park pitches and small venues for half a century before the decision was overturned in 1971.

To mark 500 not out, BBC Sport takes a look at 11 defining moments in the history of England’s women.

The U.S. Air Force has begun test flights on an extremely lavish 747-8i Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) that Qatar donated to the U.S. last year for use by President Donald Trump. The jet, now dubbed VC-25B Bridge Aircraft, is set to serve in the Air Force One role while the White House awaits the extremely delayed delivery from Boeing of two fully-outfitted VC-25B Air Force One aircraft 

“I can confirm that the VC-25B Bridge Aircraft has begun flight test,” an Air Force spokesperson told The War Zone Friday afternoon. “We expect the aircraft will be delivered to the Presidential Airlift Group no later than summer 2026.”

Aviation Week was the first to report the news of the test flight.

The Air Force declined to provide additional information about the testing program, including when it began or how many flights have taken place. It also remains unclear when the 747-8i will conduct real VIP missions or if it will receive a new official designation. With questions swirling about the legality and ethics of a president receiving a gift plane, the Pentagon last May took delivery of the aircraft and said it would rapidly undertake the required modifications.

The jet, using the call sign VADER01, was spotted by flight trackers over Texas yesterday. It took off from Majors Field in Greenville, Texas, flew over Tulsa, Oklahoma, Amarillo and Abilene, Texas, before landing back at Majors Field. The airport is home to L3 Technologies, which is modifying the jet. The facility at Greenville is a hub for this exact kind of modification work on the Pentagon’s larger aircraft.

Video and photos taken by aviation photographers show that the aircraft was in a white base livery, though it will reportedly get Trump’s red, dark blue and white paint scheme. The aircraft was delivered from Qatar in its maroon, white and gray striped scheme originally.

Aviation photographer TT-33 operator was kind enough to share some images with us. The photos were captured as the aircraft was landing at Majors Field yesterday. You can see more of his work here.

The photos show remarkably few modifications to the VC-25B Bridge Aircraft’s communications system, which already had an extensive broadband satellite communications suite when Qatar handed it over. These additions include a handfuls of new aerials and what appear to be two UHF satcom ‘platter’ antennas.

As TWZ has previously noted, converting any aircraft into one that is secure and safe enough to transport the president is a complex undertaking. The aircraft needs to provide constant, secure communications, including what is needed to order a nuclear strike. Historically, it also needs to be physically hardened both inside and out to withstand myriad threats, from the electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear weapon going off to incoming surface-to-air missiles to enemy intelligence-gathering efforts. To do this requires significant modifications right down to the aircraft’s outer structure.

In this case, it is likely impossible for the jet to receive EMP hardening and, at least based on the limited photos available, we cannot find any clear additions that would indicate the installation of an integrated self defense suite of any kind. The VC-25As are speckled with missile approach warning sensors and many laser countermeasures turrets (DIRCM). They also include the legacy Matador infrared countermeasure system above their jet engines and APU. This is in addition to other defensive features which are less visible and remain closely guarded secrets.

Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM)

At the very least, this aircraft will have to feature some kind of DIRCM setup to repel shoulder-fired heat-seeking missiles, and modular units are available that can be attached in a canoe to the bottom of the aircraft. These systems, such as Elbit’s C-MUSIC or Northrop Grumman’s Guardian, are in service with foreign VVIP 747s, as well as commercial aircraft, including those flying for Israeli airline El Al. You can read all about these systems here. Still, while they offer far less defensive capacity compared to what is seen under the belly of a VC-25A, they would offer a significant layer of protection.

It’s also possible a more elaborate and fully integrated defensive system could be installed in the coming weeks, but it’s hard to imagine this would allow the jet to enter service this summer.

Adding a further layer of complexity to the procurement and fielding process of any new presidential airlift aircraft, there are tight controls around sourcing spares for aircraft with this mission, and specific rules about vetting individual parts to protect against espionage and sabotage. Clearly many practices and requirements had to be relaxed in order to rush this ‘bridge’ aircraft into service.

There are also questions about where this jet could actually fly operationally. Without a fully specialized design meeting all the requirements for the traditional Air Force One mission, it will likely be limited to domestic use or other very low threat areas. Given all that, and its reported conversion price tag approaching $400 million, there are legitimate questions about why it is needed at all.

As we noted earlier in this story, the flight test of this aircraft came as Boeing is far behind in the process of converting two other 747-8is originally built as commercial airliners into new fully customized VC-25B Air Force One aircraft. This led to the emergence of Trump’s idea of procuring an ‘interim’ Air Force One.

On Friday, the Air Force told us that it “is collaborating with Boeing to implement acceleration initiatives and expect the first delivery of the VC-25B in mid-2028.” If this is the case, then this ‘bridge’ aircraft will have served at most around two years until the first full-up VC-25B is delivered.

We have reached out to Boeing for additional details.

While it is not yet known when the ‘bridge’ VC-25B will actually transport the president, we know there is great pressure to get it doing exactly that from the White House. Judging by its configuration so far, whatever possible appears to have been done to make that happen.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Al-Noor is a UNRWA centre in Gaza providing education and support for visually impaired children. Operating since 1962, it faces unprecedented pressure as Israel’s war on Gaza has left more than 1,500 people visually impaired since 2023.

Court filings have indicated that lawyers for President Donald Trump are seeking a resolution with the Department of Justice over a $10bn lawsuit he filed against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

But the trouble, critics say, is that such a settlement would leave Trump essentially negotiating with an executive branch under his control.

Friday’s court filing, however, emphasises the efficiency of seeking a settlement.

In the document, Trump’s lawyers call for the case to be paused for 90 days to allow a resolution to be hammered out.

“This limited pause will neither prejudice the parties nor delay ultimate resolution,” the filing says. “Rather, the extension will promote judicial economy and allow the Parties to explore avenues that could narrow or resolve the issues efficiently.”

How did the case start?

The case stems from an incident that began in 2017, when a worker named Charles “Chaz” Littlejohn was re-hired as a contractor through the government consulting firm Booz Allen.

While working on IRS files, Littlejohn stole copies of Trump’s tax returns, which had been the source of prolonged public scrutiny.

Until Trump, every president since Richard Nixon had released their tax returns as a gesture of transparency. Trump, however, claimed he could not, citing ongoing audits.

The tax returns Littlejohn stole were ultimately released to the media, and in 2020, The New York Times released a series of articles that showed Trump paid no income taxes in 10 of the 15 preceding years.

Other years, he paid relatively small sums, like $750, because he reported more losses than gains. ProPublica also ran stories based on the leaked tax returns, highlighting inconsistencies and Trump’s low tax payments.

Privacy law protects taxpayer information from being released by the IRS without explicit permission. Littlejohn was sentenced to five years in prison in 2024.

But in late January of this year, Trump filed a lawsuit arguing that he, his businesses and his sons Eric and Donald Jr had suffered “significant and irreparable harm” from the leaks.

The defendants in the lawsuit were the IRS and its overseeing body, the Treasury Department, both of which are part of the executive branch.

“Defendants have caused Plaintiffs reputational and financial harm, public embarrassment, unfairly tarnished their business reputations, portrayed them in a false light, and negatively affected President Trump and the other Plaintiffs’ public standing,” the lawsuit reads.

Questions of ethics and legality

But experts have warned that the lawsuit contains flaws that would normally prompt the Justice Department, also under Trump’s control, to seek dismissal.

The lawsuit, for instance, arrives at its whopping $10bn sum by supposedly tallying up media references to Trump’s leaked tax returns.

However, experts say the formula for damages is calculated by the number of unauthorised disclosures by a government employee, not by media re-printings.

Then there is the question of Littlejohn’s employment status. He was an outside contractor, not a government employee.

Trump also has to contend with the two-year statute of limitations in the case. The lawsuit contends that “President Trump did not discover the numerous violations” of his tax returns until January 29, 2024.

But critics point out he had posted on social media about his tax information being “illegally obtained” as far back as 2020, when The New York Times published its series.

Opponents say the lawsuit should be dismissed or at least delayed until Trump is no longer president. Otherwise, they argue it represents a conflict of interest, with Trump fundamentally negotiating with his own administration for a payout.

Controlling ‘both sides of the litigation’

Trump himself has acknowledged that such a payment would “never look good”. But he has justified the sum by saying it would be donated to charity.

“Nobody would care because it’s going to go to numerous very good charities,” he said in February.

Even that, legal experts argue, could run afoul of the Emoluments Clause in the US Constitution, which prohibits the president from profiting off his position, apart from his salary.

Government watchdogs have attempted to stop a settlement from unfolding. On February 5, for instance, the group Democracy Forward filed an amicus brief arguing the court should act to prevent an abuse of power.

“This case is extraordinary because the President controls both sides of the litigation, which raises the prospect of collusive litigation tactics,” the brief explains.

“To treat this case like business as usual would threaten the integrity of the justice system and the important taxpayer and privacy protections at the heart of this case.”

But the $10bn IRS lawsuit is not the only case Trump is seeking to settle with his own government. In 2023 and 2024, Trump filed administrative complaints seeking compensation for federal investigations he considered to be unfair.

One complaint concerns an FBI investigation into alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election, and the other is about the FBI’s raid of Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate after he refused a subpoena to return classified documents.

For those complaints, Trump is reportedly seeking additional damages to the tune of $230m.

A Lebanese man who returned to his village in southern Lebanon after the temporary ceasefire was announced removes the Israeli flag from Beaufort Castle (Qalaat al-Shaqif). The castle which dates back to the 12th century is in the Nabatiyeh Governorate.

‘This will be a great and brilliant day for the world’ US President Donald Trump said at a Turning Point USA event as Iran fully opens the Strait of Hormuz. He also thanked Gulf states for their ‘tremendous’ support.

Welcome to Bunker Talk. This is a weekend open discussion post for the best commenting crew on the net, in which we can chat about all the stuff that went on this week that we didn’t cover. We can also talk about the stuff we did or whatever else grabs your interest. In other words, it’s an off-topic thread.

This week’s caption reads:

The Volcano Lair was the underground headquarters of the terrorist syndicate SPECTRE during the Bond film You Only Live Twice from 1967. 

Also, a reminder:

Prime Directives!

• If you want to talk politics, do so respectfully and know that there’s always somebody that isn’t going to agree with you. 
• If you have political differences, hash it out respectfully, stick to the facts, and no childish name-calling or personal attacks of any kind. If you can’t handle yourself in that manner, then please, discuss virtually anything else.
• No drive-by garbage political memes. No conspiracy theory rants. Links to crackpot sites will be axed, too. Trolling and shitposting will not be tolerated. No obsessive behavior about other users. Just don’t interact with folks you don’t like. 
• Do not be a sucker and feed trolls! That’s as much on you as on them. Use the mute button if you don’t like what you see.  
• So unless you have something of quality to say, know how to treat people with respect, understand that everyone isn’t going to subscribe to your exact same worldview, and have come to terms with the reality that there is no perfect solution when it comes to moderation of a community like this, it’s probably best to just move on. 
• Finally, as always, report offenders, please. This doesn’t mean reporting people who don’t share your political views, but we really need your help in this regard.

Keir Starmer is facing renewed calls for resignation after fresh revelations surrounding the appointment and vetting of former UK ambassador to the United States Peter Mandelson. The controversy has reignited scrutiny over governance standards inside the Labour government, coming at a politically sensitive time just months after Labour’s landslide election victory in 2024.

The Vetting Controversy:
The core of the scandal centres on reports that Mandelson did not properly pass security vetting before being appointed as ambassador. Despite this, official communications suggested that clearance had been confirmed. Downing Street has since dismissed a senior Foreign Office official, intensifying questions about how the appointment was handled and who within government was aware of the vetting status.

Political Fallout Inside Government:
The issue has exposed tensions within the Labour Party, with some lawmakers expressing concern over administrative failures while others defend the Prime Minister. Senior minister Darren Jones said Starmer was “furious” about not being informed of the vetting issues, while acknowledging serious breakdowns in communication between departments.

Opposition Pressure and Leadership Questions:
Opposition figures, including Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch, have accused Starmer of misleading Parliament and questioned his credibility. The central allegation is whether the Prime Minister knowingly misrepresented the status of Mandelson’s clearance when defending the appointment. These accusations have intensified calls for resignation from political rivals.

Wider Political Context:
The controversy comes at a politically sensitive moment for Starmer, as Labour prepares for key local elections across England, Scotland, and Wales. The government is also managing broader foreign policy challenges, including Britain’s positioning in global conflicts involving the United States and Middle East tensions, adding further pressure on leadership stability.

Institutional and Governance Concerns:
Beyond individual accountability, the scandal has raised broader concerns about administrative competence within the Foreign Office and Downing Street. The dismissal of senior officials has highlighted breakdowns in communication and vetting procedures, raising questions about how high-level diplomatic appointments are approved and overseen.

Analysis:
The Mandelson vetting scandal has evolved from a procedural controversy into a wider test of political authority and administrative control for Starmer. While there is no clear evidence yet that the Prime Minister deliberately misled Parliament, the perception of mismanagement and lack of oversight has created significant political vulnerability.

At its core, the issue reflects a deeper challenge of governance: maintaining institutional trust while managing complex bureaucratic systems. Even if the government survives immediate calls for resignation, the damage is likely to linger, particularly if further inconsistencies emerge. With elections approaching and internal party tensions rising, Starmer’s ability to project control and competence will be central to whether this episode becomes a temporary setback or a longer-term political liability.

China has taken a firm stance against the Israeli escalation in Lebanon, strongly warning against the region becoming a second Gaza and considering the events a blatant violation of Lebanese sovereignty and international law. The most prominent features of the Chinese response up to April 2026 to this Israeli military escalation in southern Lebanon included condemning the targeting of civilians and emphasizing the protection of Lebanese sovereignty while rejecting Israeli violations aimed at destroying the infrastructure of southern Lebanon. The Chinese Foreign Ministry condemned the extensive Israeli raids targeting towns in southern Lebanon, stressing that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security are a red line that must not be crossed. China also emphasized the protection of Lebanese civilians, with Beijing unequivocally affirming that the protection of civilians and civilian objects in armed conflicts is a legal obligation and expressing its shock at the scale of casualties and destruction inflicted on southern villages and towns.

China’s position is based on a comprehensive vision linking the stability of southern Lebanon to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Beijing believes that addressing the root causes of the conflict is the only way to prevent its spread throughout the Middle East. While condemning the destruction of Lebanese infrastructure and civilian areas, China’s Foreign Ministry denounced the Israeli airstrikes that killed hundreds of civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure and property. Beijing categorically rejects any actions that lead to the destruction of infrastructure, considering them a violation of international law. China has consistently emphasized that Lebanon’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity are a red line that must not be crossed. Beijing has also declared its opposition to the Israeli ground incursion into southern Lebanon, warning that such actions exacerbate regional tensions. China has called for diplomatic solutions, urging all parties, especially Israel, to exercise maximum restraint and return to the path of political and diplomatic settlement, asserting that continued violence will not bring security to any party. China condemned the attacks targeting UNIFIL peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon, stressing the need to ensure the safety of UN peacekeepers.

In this context, China deliberately directed veiled criticism at Washington regarding Israeli violations in southern Lebanon. China believes that the failure to contain the escalation in southern Lebanon is partly due to the military and political support provided to Israel by external powers, a clear reference to the United States, which hinders efforts to de-escalate the situation. Simultaneously, China warned of a second Gaza in southern Lebanon. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explicitly cautioned against a repeat of the Gaza tragedy in Lebanon, emphasizing that violence cannot replace right and justice. China is pressing in international forums, particularly the Security Council, for an immediate and permanent cessation of Israeli hostilities, warning against the region sliding into a full-scale war. This stance reflects China’s desire to bolster its role as a peacemaker in the Middle East and to rival American influence by adhering to political solutions and international law.

Here, China sharply criticized the American role in the Israeli war against southern Lebanon and its recent escalation in April 2026, arguing that Washington contributes to undermining regional stability through its military and political support for Israel. Beijing considered the military operations supported or participated in by the United States to be a flagrant violation of international law and the principles of national sovereignty. While warning against the militarization of the region, China criticized the expansion of the American military presence, describing it as irresponsible and warning that such steps exacerbate tensions rather than de-escalate them. Beijing believes that Washington’s approach to the international order reflects the values ​​of the law of the jungle and fuels chaos and instability in the Middle East. While criticizing the US for its double standards, China, through its Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, condemned the continued Israeli strikes on towns and villages in southern Lebanon despite ongoing efforts to de-escalate the situation. She emphasized that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security must not be violated.

China called on Israel to immediately withdraw from southern Lebanon, warning against a repeat of the Gaza scenario. Chinese President Xi Jinping issued direct warnings demanding the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, cautioning that continued military operations could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe similar to what occurred in the Gaza Strip. He also called for an end to the Israeli escalation in southern Lebanon. China maintains that violence does not solve problems but rather exacerbates crises, urging maximum restraint to de-escalate the volatile regional situation. Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, asserting that their current military presence violates Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Xi explicitly warned against allowing southern Lebanon to become another Gaza, pointing to the risk of a widespread humanitarian catastrophe and the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

To halt the cycle of violence and armed conflict in southern Lebanon, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed a four-point peace initiative to bolster stability in the Middle East. This initiative includes a call for a multilateral peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations, the re-establishment of the border along the Blue Line between southern Lebanon and Israel, and a reaffirmation of China’s rejection of any violation of Lebanese sovereignty. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly emphasized, most notably on April 9, 2026, that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security are a (red line) that must not be crossed. These Chinese moves position Beijing as an active diplomatic alternative in the region at a time of escalating international tensions between major powers and ongoing regional conflicts. China has begun diplomatic efforts by proposing several peace initiatives to halt the cycle of armed conflict in southern Lebanon. The most prominent of these is the call for a multilateral peace conference. Beijing proposed hosting an international peace conference aimed at stabilizing the region and reinforcing the border along the Blue Line separating Israel and Lebanon, under the auspices of the United Nations. China holds Israel fully responsible, considering the ongoing fighting in Gaza to be the root cause of the instability in the Middle East. Therefore, China called on the international community, particularly the major powers, to play a constructive role in achieving a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire in southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. China has also supported the UNIFIL peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, strongly condemning any attacks on UNIFIL forces as violations of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Here, China used its influence in the UN Security Council and international forums to emphasize that any military operations outside the framework of the United Nations violate its Charter. It described the Israeli strikes on towns and villages in southern Lebanon as unauthorized actions.

Based on the preceding analysis, we understand the accuracy of China’s linking of the tensions in southern Lebanon to the war in Gaza. China called for restraint to prevent the conflict from spreading regionally, based on its principles of supporting sovereign states like Lebanon and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. China also called for a return to the diplomatic track to halt the cycle of violent armed conflict in southern Lebanon perpetrated by Israel. China condemned the extensive Israeli strikes, stressing that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security must not be violated. It emphasized the need to protect Lebanese civilians and civilian infrastructure during Israeli military operations and called for de-escalation and immediate steps to calm the situation and prevent further escalation of the conflict in southern Lebanon.

The measure has long been criticised for allowing US intelligence agencies to collect citizen data without a warrant.

The United States Congress has temporarily extended a controversial surveillance law which allows federal intelligence agencies to collect the data of foreigners, including their contacts with US citizens.

The move allows a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to continue until April 30. The short-term extension was passed by the House of Representatives and approved by the Senate on Friday.

The patch comes after President Donald Trump’s efforts to secure a more lasting extension broke down.

Section 702 of FISA allows the National Security Agency (NSA) and other intelligence services to collect data from foreigners outside of the country.

That could include their interactions with US citizens, a prospect that has alarmed rights advocates.

Collecting such data, which can include correspondence on email and telecommunications platforms, typically requires a warrant approved by a court.

The process has been described by critics as a “backdoor search” that circumvents existing privacy laws.

Speaking after Friday’s vote, Senate Majority Leader John Thune said there was still some openness to reforming the law.

“We’ve got to pivot and figure out what can pass, and we’re in the process ⁠of figuring out how to do that here,” he told reporters.

Supporters of reform, who stretch across party lines, have long sought to repeal or amend Section 702.

While FISA was initially passed in 1978, Section 702 was added as an amendment in 2008.

The addition came amid the US’s “global war on terror”. But during its approval, revelations emerged that the administration of former US President George W Bush had already used the tactics Section 702 legalised.

Supporters, including Trump, maintain that reforming the provision would lead to a lapse in national security.

“I have spoken with many in our Military who say FISA is necessary in order to protect our Troops overseas, as well as our people here at home, from the threat of Foreign Terror Attacks,” Trump wrote in a Truth Social post on Wednesday.

He has pushed for the law to be extended for 18 months without changes. That effort initially appeared on track in the House but was ultimately scuttled by pushback from within Trump’s own Republican Party.

Among the detractors was Republican Congressman Thomas Massie, who has been a regular critic of Trump.

“I will be voting NO on final passage of the FISA 702 Reauthorization Bill if it does not include a warrant provision and other reforms to protect US citizens’ right to privacy,” he wrote ahead of the House vote.

Caracas, April 17, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela has reestablished ties with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after a seven-year hiatus.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez confirmed the news on Thursday night, calling it a “great achievement of Venezuelan diplomacy” and a “very important step” for the Venezuelan economy.

“This is the result of months-long negotiations that the Venezuelan far-right unsuccessfully tried to sabotage,” she stated in a televised broadcast. “Good has triumphed.”

The IMF announced the “resumption of dealings” with Venezuela in a statement on Thursday, stating that the decision was “guided by the views of IMF members representing a majority of the total voting power.”

Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva stated earlier this week that the IMF had been approached by Venezuelan authorities at a technical level and that the Caribbean nation “desperately needs help.”

The World Bank likewise issued a statement disclosing the resumption of dealings with the acting Rodríguez government. Venezuela’s last loan with the institution concluded in 2005.

Venezuela had its relationship with the IMF suspended in 2019 after the first Trump administration and allies recognized the self-proclaimed “interim government” led by Juan Guaidó as the Caribbean nation’s legitimate authority.

In March, the White House recognized Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole leader” and later withdrew sanctions against her, while US officials spoke of efforts to reincorporate Caracas into the IMF fold.

Though relations were officially frozen in 2019, Venezuela had sought to distance itself from the Washington-based institution more than a decade prior. In 2007, former President Hugo Chávez formally withdrew Venezuela from the IMF and the World Bank, calling them “weapons of US imperialism.”

Chávez repeatedly denounced the US-controlled multilateral institutions’ role in promoting debt and underdevelopment in Global South countries and pushed for the creation of lending institutions as part of Latin American integration efforts. Under Chávez’s predecessors, Venezuela implemented draconian IMF-conditioned structural adjustment policies that saw over half of Venezuelans living in poverty by 1998.

Last year, President Nicolás Maduro stated that Venezuela had “broken the shackles” of the World Bank and the IMF and was instead building its own “self-sustainable model and relations with a new world.”

Venezuela’s priority will be accessing US $5.1 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) that it is entitled to as an IMF member. In 2021, the lending institution issued $650 billion amid the Covid-19 pandemic as an effort to help countries boost reserves and address fiscal needs. 

However, Venezuela was blocked from accessing the funds as the IMF refused to rule on the country’s legitimate authorities.

Caracas’ reengagement with the IMF and the World Bank also comes amid growing speculation about the fate of Venezuela’s sizable foreign debt. The Caribbean nation owes as much as $170 billion from a combination of defaulted bonds, unpaid loans, and international arbitration awards that have accrued interest for years as US sanctions battered Venezuela’s economy and cut it off from credit markets.  

Venezuelan bonds have been rallying in recent weeks following Washington’s rapprochement with Caracas as creditors bet on a debt restructuring deal that can bring significant windfalls.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Rodríguez administration has fast-tracked a number of pro-business reforms, including in the hydrocarbons and mining sectors. Upon enacting the Mining Law on Thursday, the acting president thanked Trump, Rubio, and other administration officials for their “good disposition” in establishing “cooperation.”

Rodríguez recently announced further plans to overhaul the South American country’s labor, pension, and tax legislation, while also identifying state assets that are “not strategic.” The Cisneros Group, one of Venezuela’s largest business conglomerates, recently announced the raising of funds ahead of expectations of a “wave of privatizations.”

Since January, the Trump administration has imposed control over Venezuelan oil revenues, mandating that royalties, taxes, and dividends be deposited in US Treasury accounts. In a congressional hearing on Thursday, Assistant State Secretary Michael Kozak stated that “around $3 billion” have moved through the dedicated accounts. 

He did not specify what portion of the revenues has been returned to Caracas, only that the funds had been used to pay public sector incomes and import oil industry inputs, while blocking any transactions with China, Cuba, and Iran.

Earlier this week, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued new restricted licenses allowing transactions with the Venezuelan Central Bank and public banks that are expected to facilitate the partial return of seized Venezuelan export revenues.

On Thursday, Venezuelan authorities additionally announced a change in the Central Bank leadership, with Luis Pérez replacing Laura Guerra as president of the institution. Guerra had been appointed to the post in April 2025 by Maduro.

Pérez is an economist who had served on the BCV board of directors since 2018. In his social media profile, he describes himself as a cryptocurrency enthusiast.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

French President Emmanuel Macron said he welcomed the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the Lebanon ceasefire, as the US and Iran declared the key waterway open. His comments came as European leaders discuss a post-war Hormuz maritime force.

Pope Leo XIV has stepped into a more assertive global role, adopting a sharper and more direct tone on international issues during his recent Africa tour. After maintaining a relatively cautious profile in the early months of his papacy, Leo has begun openly criticising war, inequality, and global power imbalances. His remarks have drawn repeated criticism from Donald Trump, particularly over his condemnation of the U.S.-Israeli war involving Iran.

Shift in Tone and Leadership Style:
Leo’s recent speeches mark a clear departure from traditional Vatican restraint. Speaking in African देशों such as Cameroon and Algeria, he has issued strong warnings about global injustice, accusing powerful actors of undermining peace and violating international norms. This more confrontational approach reflects a deliberate effort to position the papacy as an active moral voice in global affairs.

Clash with Political Power:
The pope’s remarks have brought him into direct conflict with Trump, who has publicly criticised Leo’s views on foreign policy. This exchange underscores a broader tension between moral authority and political leadership, particularly as the pope challenges the conduct of powerful nations in ongoing conflicts.

Moral Authority on the Global Stage:
Observers suggest Leo is consciously embracing a more visible and influential role, using his platform to highlight the human cost of war and inequality. His decision to deliver strong messages while visiting regions affected by poverty and conflict adds weight and immediacy to his statements, reinforcing his image as a global moral leader.

Breaking with Vatican Convention:
Traditionally, the Vatican has balanced moral advocacy with diplomatic neutrality to preserve its role as a mediator. Leo’s more direct criticism signals a shift in that balance, prioritising clarity and urgency over cautious diplomacy. This approach echoes, but may exceed, the tone of predecessors such as Pope Francis, who also spoke out on global injustices but often with more measured language.

Personal Experience and Perspective:
Before becoming pope, Leo formerly Robert Prevost spent decades in Peru, where he witnessed conflict, poverty, and political instability firsthand. These experiences appear to inform his willingness to speak bluntly about violence, corruption, and the failures of global leadership.

Analysis:
Pope Leo’s emergence as a more forceful voice reflects a strategic and moral recalibration of the papacy’s role in global politics. By speaking more directly, he aims to assert the Church’s relevance in an increasingly volatile world, particularly at a time when traditional diplomatic mechanisms appear strained.

However, this approach carries risks. Greater outspokenness may enhance moral clarity but could also limit the Vatican’s ability to act as a neutral mediator in conflicts. The public clash with Trump highlights how easily moral interventions can become entangled in political disputes.

Ultimately, Leo’s leadership signals a shift toward a more activist papacy, one that prioritises direct engagement with global crises over cautious neutrality. Whether this strengthens the Church’s influence or complicates its diplomatic role will depend on how effectively he balances moral authority with geopolitical realities.

With information from Reuters.

The Army is accelerating procurement of 30x113mm XM1225 Aviation Proximity Explosive (APEX) rounds for its fleet of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. The move comes as the service is looking to enhance the aircraft’s burgeoning role as a counter-drone platform, something The War Zone has covered frequently. These shells, fired by the Apache’s chin-mounted M230 cannon, will add to its drone-killing arsenal, giving it a cheaper and more plentiful engagement option than some of the alternatives. You can read all about the XM1225 APEX round in our previous coverage here.

Seeing a growing need for these rounds, the Army went to Northrop Grumman, which makes them, and asked them to boost production, said Maj. Gen. Clair A. Gill, commander of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, Alabama. He was speaking during the Army Aviation Association of America’s Army Aviation Warfighting Summit in Nashville, Tennessee, which TWZ was in attendance.

“We had had 600 rounds total,” Gill explained. “They produced 1,000 already this month and can produce another 1,000 and will ramp their rate up to probably five times that.”

The company could not immediately comment about this effort.

The specialized APEX ammunition works by detonating only when it is close to an object, then it explodes in a spray of shrapnel. This is critical to shooting down drones, which are small, independently moving targets. These rounds could also be used against surface targets like personnel, soft-skinned vehicles, and small boats, where they would provide unique area effects compared to the Apache’s standard impact-detonating, high-explosive ammunition.

Earlier this year, we reported that Apaches live-fire tested the ammo last December at the service’s sprawling Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) in southern Arizona. 

“The Apache Attack Helicopter AH-64 has reached a new milestone in battlefield capability with the successful live fire test” of the APEX ammunition, the Army said in a February news release. “In December 2025, the Apache demonstrated its first-ever air-to-air engagement using 30mm proximity ammunition against unmanned aircraft systems targets at various ranges, showcasing the precision, versatility, and lethality of this advanced ammunition.”

The Army added that the Apex cartridge “is designed to counter modern threats, including UAS, exposed personnel and small boats, without requiring modifications to the Apache’s M230 Area Weapon System or fire control system.”

The M230LF Bushmaster Chain Gun | XM914

As we have pointed out in the past, these rounds require little additional training for Apache crews, because their ballistic properties are nearly identical to the M789 high-explosive dual-purpose (HEDP) rounds already fielded, which use an impact/grazing fuze to command detonation.

An additional benefit is that self-destructing proximity fuzed rounds mitigate some of the dangers of attacking drones with ammunition that will keep traveling for long distances if it doesn’t hit a target. This is a frequent occurrence with standard high-explosive or incendiary cannon rounds.

While the Israeli Air Force pioneered the counter-drone role for the AH-64 for years, the U.S. Army has formally codified it and added new capabilities in the process. A five-fold boost in procurement is a strong indication that the Army sees the value of the APEX rounds for these missions.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com.

⁠Manchester City boss Pep Guardiola ⁠has called Sunday’s Premier League clash with leaders Arsenal a final, saying defeat would end his side’s title hopes before the much-anticipated showdown at the Etihad Stadium.

City trail Arsenal by six points but have a game in hand, ⁠and victory would cut the gap while ramping up the pressure as the race enters its decisive phase.

Guardiola, however, said there was little room for error, acknowledging that anything less than three points would leave his team facing too steep a climb.

“Yes, obviously,” the Spaniard added on whether he sees ⁠the game as a final. “If we lose, it is over.”

Despite the fine margins, Guardiola said City are confident, stressing that belief is crucial at this stage of the season.

“If you could buy confidence in a supermarket, we would buy it immediately. It is one of the most important aspects,” he told a news conference. (Our confidence) is good. We are ready,” he added.

“A month ago, because we dropped points in moments, I thought we would not be here. (But) we ‌saw the calendar and said, ‘OK, we play Arsenal at home for a chance. It is six points. It is not a short distance, but we have a chance to do it.’

“That is the situation we are in. It depends on our behaviour, and everything will be said on Sunday. Our fans have sold out. Everything is perfect to play a game.”

Guardiola said Nico O’Reilly, who scored twice in City’s 2-0 League Cup final win over Arsenal, is fit after he left last weekend’s game at Chelsea clutching his left hamstring.

Solid Man City form sows unease among Arsenal fans

That thrilling victory was part of a solid City run of form, including a 4-0 throttling of Liverpool in the FA Cup ⁠quarterfinals. They have not lost a league game since mid-January.

City’s results have begun to sow unease among Arsenal ⁠fans.

“If we play like the second half (of the League Cup final) during 95 minutes and they play like the second half, we are going to win. Well, maybe not, because football is unpredictable,” Guardiola said.

“I know (Arsenal manager) Mikel (Arteta). They are going to adjust something, and we have to prepare to do it. In the end, it is more simple. It ⁠is how your players individually win the me-against-you.”

Guardiola insisted City must still raise their level if they are to sustain a title push through the final weeks.

“We need to get even better,” he said. “The first half against ⁠Chelsea (a 3-0 win on Sunday) was not bad but not great. The first 30 minutes ⁠against Liverpool was not good either. The first 30 minutes against Arsenal in the final, they were better.

“You cannot pretend that these kind of teams will be 90 or 95 minutes perfect, but this one aspect is not about the future, present or past, it’s about confidence, which is an incredible aspect.”

Asked if City are underdogs, Guardiola played down the label. “I understand ‌your message, but maybe we’re not,” he said. “They have been the best so far, but we want to challenge them.

“I said today to the players, it is just a football game, and we have to approach it like a football game. If you get distracted by emotions, that is ‌how ‌you lose focus.”

Guardiola said City remain proud to still be challenging on multiple fronts, even if Sunday’s result could prove decisive.

“We will see what happens,” he said. “But it is never over until it’s over, and we are still here. I am proud to be there, still challenging them.”

The U.S. Army is considering configuring at least a portion of its new MV-75A Cheyenne II tiltrotors to be able to refuel in flight using the probe-and-drogue method. This, in turn, has raised the question of how the service will ensure there is adequate tanker capacity to support that capability. Army officials and the MV-75A’s prime contractor, Bell, have both now pointed to a future where tanker drones like the U.S. Navy’s forthcoming MQ-25 Stingray could help extend the Cheyenne II’s reach.

Army Maj. Gen. Clair Gill discussed aerial refueling capability for the MV-75A, as well as other aspects of the Cheyenne II, during a talk yesterday at the Army Aviation Association of America’s (AAAA) 2026 Warfighting Summit, at which TWZ is in attendance. Gill is currently the service’s Program Acquisition Executive for Maneuver Air. The Army plans to replace a substantial portion of its H-60 Black Hawk helicopters with the MV-75A in the coming years.

“Our last chief used to talk to me all the time about aerial refueling. We think that’s something. Maybe we don’t get all of them [the MV-75As] configured for that, but they’ll have the capability,” the Army’s top aviation acquisition officer added. “For industry, I want you to think about how are we going to refuel ourselves, right? One of the challenges, even the Regiment will tell you, and make it top priority – their challenge isn’t you know how good they are on par, their challenge is getting somebody to give them the gas.”

The “Regiment” that Gill refers to here is the Army’s elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), also commonly known as the Night Stalkers. The 160th is expecting to eventually receive a special operations-specific configuration of the MV-75, which will include in-flight refueling capability by default, as you can read more about here. Existing Night Stalker MH-60M Black Hawk and MH-47G Chinook special operations helicopters also have the ability to refuel in flight via probe-and-drogue. However, Army Black Hawks and Chinooks assigned to conventional units do not have this capability.

“The Navy’s got some pretty good unmanned ideas there if you want to kind of follow where we’re going,” Gill noted yesterday.

Gill did not specifically name Boeing’s MQ-25, but this is the only uncrewed tanker the Navy is currently pursuing, at least that we know about. Furthermore, Bell released a new computer-generated MV-75 promotional video yesterday around the AAAA conference, seen below, wherein a Cheyenne II is clearly depicted linking up with a Stingray, or an extremely similar-looking variant or derivative thereof.

Meet the Cheyenne II

The MQ-25 is in development now primarily as a carrier-based platform, but there is no reason why it could not also operate from bases on land. Boeing has itself previously presented a concept for an enlarged, land-based derivative of the design that could help meet future U.S. Air Force tanking needs.

The MQ-25 by itself promised to offer very long endurance and extreme range, which could make it attractive in the land-based role, as well as when operating from carriers. TWZ has previously explored how those capabilities open the door to the Stingray being utilized as much more than a tanker, as well.

Currently, the U.S. Air Force provides probe-and-drogue aerial refueling capacity using KC-135 and KC-46 tankers, as well as HC-130J Combat King II combat search and rescue aircraft and MC-130J Commando II special operations tanker/transports. The U.S. Marine Corps and Navy also have C-130 variants that can be employed as tankers, as well as transports. Navy carrier air wings currently rely on F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters carrying buddy refueling stores and drop tanks to provide organic aerial refueling support.

Shortfalls in aerial refueling capacity, even to meet peacetime demands, have been an increasingly concerning issue for years now. The Air Force just recently developed a system that allows A-10 Warthog attack jets to refuel via probe-and-drogue to create new operational flexibility for those aircraft, as you can read more about here. The A-10 was originally designed to refuel in flight using the boom method, which the Air Force prefers for fixed-wing aircraft.

On top of all this, the Army has no organic tanker capacity at present, at all. Furthermore, the formal division of roles and missions with the Air Force means that the service does not operate fleets of larger fixed-wing aircraft like the C-130 that could be readily adapted to this role. All of this would point to an uncrewed platform like MQ-25 as the most viable path to establishing an Army tanker force, which could also align better with its expeditionary air assault concepts of operations.

Army MV-75As could still make use of other tankers during joint operations, as well. There could be other organic air refueling options available to the service, too, including the possibility of adapting MV-75 itself to act as a buddy tanker.

The Army is separately advancing plans to acquire fleets of uncrewed aircraft capable of performing a variety of missions in close collaboration with the MV-75A and its existing fleets of crewed helicopters.

For the Army, demands for greater range and ability that cover those distances faster were key factors in the decision to acquire the MV-75A in the first place. The service sees these capabilities as particularly critical in the context of any future fight against China across the sprawling expanses of the Pacific.

“MV-75, as I mentioned, that’s our signature system,” Gen. Gill said yesterday. “Unmatched range, unmatched speed, unmatched mission flexibility.”

During a separate talk at the AAAA conference yesterday, Army Maj. Gen. David Gardner, head of the 101st Airborne Division, the service’s premier air assault formation, also highlighted a recent training exercise that included Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey tiltrotors. He said that was done specifically “to help our Division understand the operational reach that it will possess with the MV-75 Cheyenne.”

Units within the 101st are set to be the first to receive operational MV-75As, with or without aerial refueling capability. The Army had previously said that fielding would begin next year as part of a major acceleration of the program. However, it has now stepped back from any fixed timeline for the first flight of the Cheyenne, let alone when Bell will begin delivering production examples.

“It’s going to happen when it’s going to happen. So we are moving as fast as we can,” Gen. Gill told TWZ and other outlets ahead of the AAAA conference this week. “If I was king, and I had all the money in the world and all the engineers, and there were no limits, we probably would be able to do it in a matter of months.”

As an aside, integrating aerial refueling capability onto the MV-75A, and working to pair it with tanker drones like MQ-25, could make the Cheyenne II, or variants thereof, attractive to other potential operators. The Marine Corps is now early in the process of refining requirements for a successor to the MV-22. The Navy has also said it is leveraging work the Army has done on the MV-75A to inform its plans for a Future Vertical Lift-Maritime Strike (FVL-MS) family of systems to succeed its MH-60R and MH-60S Seahawks, as well as the MQ-8C Fire Scout drone helicopter. Bell has presented concepts for variations of its V-280 Valor tiltrotor, on which the MV-75A is based, optimized for supporting amphibious assault and other naval missions in the past.

As it stands now, the Army does not appear to have made a final decision on the extent to which it expects to integrate in-flight refueling capability in its future MV-75A fleet. That will have a direct impact on any pursuit of an organic tanker capability.

Still, the Army and Bell are already pointing to the MQ-25 as an example of what could be on the horizon to help further extend the reach of the Cheyenne II.

UPDATE: 5:08 PM EDT –

Maj. Gen. Clair Gill has now offered some additional comments on aerial refueling support for the MV-75A to TWZ and other outlets at a roundtable today on the sidelines of the AAAA conference.

“We’re also thinking creatively about if we put aerial refueling – which you’re gonna see on the SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] variants – if we put that on a conventional variant, then how do we refuel it?” he explained. “So we’re thinking through, do we need to develop a requirement for aerial refueling for ourselves now that we have really enhanced our capability?”

“One of the things that our special operations aviators – one of their most challenging tasks is helicopter aerial refueling. A lot of times people say, you’re telling me the challenge is the training of that, because it’s a pretty hard task,” he added later on in response to a direct follow-up question on this topic from our Jamie Hunter, who also called attention to what was seen in Bell’s video. “And I would say yes, but it’s actually the asset, the availability [of the] asset, to do the training. And we don’t have those organic to the Army. So I think we need to solve our own problems, and think about how do we do our own, let’s call it logistical resupply in the air, of an MV-75. So that’s where that concept photo or video was pointing.”

“We don’t have a requirement written right now, but I’ve talked with Army leaders,” Gill also noted.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com