NEWS

As its defense against Russia grinds on and with the future of foreign military assistance never assured, Ukraine is ramping up procurement of its new, domestically produced “Equalizer” aerial glide bomb, according to the Ukrainian military. Brave1, the Ukrainian defense technology incubator, on Tuesday provided us with some new details about this weapon, which extends the range and accuracy of so-called dumb bombs by adding guidance kits and pop-out wings.

Also known by its Ukrainian name “Vyrivniuvach,” this bomb first broke cover in May, which you can read more about in our initial story on the topic here. It was developed by the Ukrainian company DG Industry with the Brave1’s support.

While glide bombs have been used to great effect by both sides, Kyiv has had to rely on donated weapons like the U.S.-made Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range munition (JDAM-ER) and the French-made AASM-250 Hammer bomb. The Ukrainian Air Force also makes extensive use of the U.S.-supplied Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), which is smaller and also has pop-out wings.

The Ukrainian Air Force began launching JDAM-ERs in March 2023 and SDBs that November, though the use of the latter wasn’t officially confirmed until May 2024. The weapons became critical for striking Russian targets over the front lines because they allowed Ukrainian jets to release them from standoff distances and better avoid Russian air defenses.

Russia, meanwhile, produced its own crude glide bomb earlier in the war and it has become a highly problematic and deadly threat for Ukraine to contend with since. Now Ukraine is building its own.

As we noted in our earlier piece, the weapon had cleared trials and is ready for combat, giving Ukraine a domestically produced standoff munition that could augment its current arsenal of donated ones and provide a more secure supply chain given the uncertain nature of foreign assistance. One of our outstanding questions at the time was whether the Equalizer would have independent propulsion, a modification that provides this class of munition with a significant boost in range beyond the “dozens of kilometers,” Brave1 claims it can reach. By comparison, the stated JDAM-ER range is more definitive, able to hit targets about 45 miles away.

Russia last year introduced a small turbojet engine to its glide bombs, with claims that this has boosted range to at least 60 miles. Ukraine says it is developing that capability as well, with the goal of reaching targets as far as 125 miles away.

It’s worth noting that Ukraine’s French-supplied Hammer precision-guided bombs also feature a rocket booster. This feature is of unique utility for Ukraine, which often slings its glide bombs via pop-up launch profiles from low level executed by its fighter and attack aircraft. This is due to the extremely heavy air defenses near the front lines.

You can see a Ukrainian MiG-29 launch two Hammers in the following video.

The Equalizer “has no motor,” Brave1 spokesman Yurii Voronkov told us.

“A major challenge was the lack of an engine, as navigation and control rely entirely on the bomb’s own inertia and aerodynamics,” he explained. “Naturally, this demands precise calculations, structural balancing, and extensive testing.”

“The main difficulty lay in combining several critical factors: speed, high g-forces, and aircraft integration,” the Brave1 spokesman added. “This is precisely the type of system where even millimeters are critical, and choosing the right components directly impacts the structure’s effectiveness and resilience.” 

“The weapon was designed with high-precision targeting and compatibility with current Ukrainian aircraft and systems,” Voronkov stated. While designed for Ukrainian Su-24, Su-27, and MiG-29 jets, it can also be used with donated F-16 and Mirage fighters, though it “has to receive additional certification for usage on F-16s and Mirages.”

“The bomb also has modern guidance algorithms that promote better targeting and accuracy,” he noted, without providing additional details.

“Structurally speaking, the product differs from both Russian and foreign counterparts,” Voronkov added. “During development, the developers researched existing systems, incorporating real combat experience and feedback from the military. As a result, the product integrates all the advantages of existing solutions while addressing their shortcomings.”

Voronkov declined to elaborate, but highlighted that “everything—from the wings to the flight controller software—was developed in Ukraine, with the exception of the chips and microcircuits. In terms of the component base, approximately 90% consists of Ukrainian, European, and American parts. Overall, the company managed to avoid critical dependence on foreign components.”

Ukraine began developing the Equalizer two years ago over concerns about the future flow of arms into the country, Voronkov said. Given that with the war dragging on, the U.S. has stopped donating weapons to Ukraine and other nations, like the Netherlands, have as well, it was not an academic exercise.

“In 2024, a team of developers asked themselves a practical question: what happens if foreign arms supplies stop?” Voronokov proffered. “Ukraine needed its own capabilities to help its military carry out combat missions independently. That marked the beginning of their mission to develop a domestic guided aerial bomb.”

“By May 2025, following a series of successful tests, the team proved the concept was viable and decided to move forward,” the Brave1 spokesman added. “They transitioned to producing the initial prototypes and scaling up manufacturing. Naturally, it was a gradual process—the team continued refining the product and fine-tuning specific technical solutions, work that remains ongoing to this day.” 

“Brave1 supported this project from its inception in 2024,” Voronkov stated. “We aim to back innovations right from the start because it gives teams a real shot at success. We recognized the chance that the project would reach completion and prove its capabilities quickly, but we were equally aware it might take much longer. In the end, going from concept to the first working prototype took 17 months.”

DG Industry is one of “at least eight manufacturers working on glide bombs altogether,” Voronkov noted.

“The guided aerial bomb itself isn’t just a single product—it represents a technology that has now emerged in our country,” Yaroslav Vinnytskyi, Head of Defense Technologies at Brave1, told us. “It will continue to evolve, and its application can be scaled across various types and sizes. Mastering this technology is a major milestone, providing additional capabilities for both manufacturers and the armed forces.”

Beyond seeking supply independence, by developing its own weapons like Equalizer, Ukraine won’t have to worry about preclusions placed on their use by foreign donors, something that happened with several weapons systems, though the limits ebbed and flowed.

As we noted earlier in this story, the Equalizer “is already being officially purchased for supply to the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn, head of the Central Department of Innovation Activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, told the Ukrainian Ukrinform media outlet.

Voloshyn noted that Russia has increased its daily use of glide bombs from about 180 last year to more than 300 this year. It remains unknown when the Equalizer will arrive on the battlefield for Ukraine at scale, or when the other options will either.

Given what these weapons can bring to the table if they truly work as advertised, for Kyiv they cannot come soon enough.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Iran denies launching missiles at the UAE, suggesting the incident was a ‘false flag operation’.

The United Arab Emirates has imposed an indefinite trade embargo on Iran after accusing Iranian forces of firing two ballistic missiles at the country, an allegation Tehran denies.

In a statement early on Wednesday, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the decision was made in “light of escalations that undermine peace and security in the region”.

“All trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice,” it added.

The statement came after the UAE’s Ministry of Defence said its air defences detected two ballistic missiles launched from Iran, with one falling outside the country’s territorial waters and the other landing within them.

In a follow-up statement, the ministry said the missiles had been “targeting maritime traffic” and promised to “resolutely confront any attempt to undermine the security of the nation or maritime navigation in the region”.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the accusation as “baseless”, with spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei suggesting it was a “false flag operation” amid the war launched by the United States and Israel against his country.

Baghaei warned the claim “contradicts the principle of good neighbourliness” and urged regional parties to steer clear of what he called unfounded claims against Tehran, and argued that any honest assessment of the situation must also weigh the “malicious actions” of the US and Israel.

US naval blockade

Tuesday’s attack came a day after a 60-day window for US-Iranian peace talks expired without a breakthrough in the more than five-month-old conflict.

In the war’s first six weeks, Iran targeted the UAE with retaliatory strikes more than any other Gulf country, launching more than 530 ballistic missiles, dozens of cruise missiles and over 2,200 drones at what it described as US assets. Tuesday’s strike is the first targeting the UAE since May, and comes days after Abu Dhabi accused Tehran of attacking two of its state-owned ADNOC (Abu Dhabi National Oil Company) vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran has not claimed responsibility for the ADNOC attacks.

The trade embargo comes as the US maintains a naval blockade on Iranian ports, with President Trump signalling a pivot towards economic pressure, rather than military pressure, to compel Tehran into accepting US demands.

Mark Kimmitt, a retired US general and former assistant secretary of state, told Al Jazeera the UAE’s trade embargo could hit Iran harder than anything Washington has imposed, with Dubai having quietly become Iran’s most important trading partner, edging out both China and Turkiye to supply roughly a third of everything Iran imports each year.

The UAE had suspended direct cargo shipping between the two countries in early March, just days after the war began, and resumed trade only in late June via Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port.

“I don’t think that you can overstate or understate the importance of the trade, both financial and goods trade, between Dubai and Iran,” Kimmitt said.

That reliance runs deeper than goods on ships, given Dubai’s standing as a global financial hub, which Kimmitt said has long given Iran a discreet way to move money around international sanctions, cutting off a route Tehran has long relied on for years. “In many ways, the embargo being put on by the UAE is even more significant than the embargo being put on by the United States,” he said.

The former general said he doesn’t expect other Gulf states to follow suit immediately, predicting a “wait-and-see” approach even if Iranian attacks continue.

But he said the UAE’s move is significant enough that Tehran could interpret it as bordering on an act of war, likening it to the near-total embargo the US imposed on Japan after World War II.

BREAKINGBREAKING,

Trump announces pause on 50 percent duty on Canadian exports shortly before midnight deadline.

The United States and Canada have reached a deal to avert steep tariffs on billions of dollars of Canadian goods, US President Donald Trump has announced.

Trump made the announcement shortly before the expiry of a midnight deadline for imposing a 50 percent duty on a wide range of Canadian exports, including electronics, industrial machinery, furniture, and dairy products.

“I have paused the 50% Tariffs against Canada, that were scheduled to kick in tomorrow morning for a three day period, based on the fact that Canada and the U.S.A., subject to the finalization of documents, have a DEAL!” Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social.

“The great Keystone XL Pipeline, long ago killed by Sleepy Joe Biden, may be awoken from the grave!”

More to follow…

The U.S. Army has chosen Hanwha Defense USA to advance to the next phase of its Mobile Tactical Cannon (MTC) program. The company will now provide prototypes of its wheeled 155mm K9 Mobile Howitzer for further testing. This, in turn, could lead to its adoption as a replacement for the Army’s existing towed 155mm M777 howitzers.

“The U.S. Army announced today an agreement with Hanwha Defense USA, Arlington, Virginia, for the development of prototypes for the Mobile Tactical Cannon program, a critical priority in the Army’s ongoing continuous transformation and long-range fires modernization efforts,” according to a press release the service put out this evening. “Awarded competitively under an Other Transaction Authority (10 U.S.C. Section 4022), the firm-fixed-price agreement will provide the Army with up to 18 wheeled Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems for rapid prototyping, testing, and Soldier experimentation over an estimated four-year period of performance. The amount of this action is $100,302,961 with a total cumulative face value of $262,903,274.”

OTAs are a contracting mechanism that U.S. government agencies regularly use to help accelerate advanced research and development and prototype efforts.

The Army’s release does not explicitly mention the K9 Mobile Howitzer (K9MH), also known as the K9A2. However, Hanwha Defense USA has confirmed that this is the design it will be supplying in its own press release. The company had also announced this would be its entry for the MTC competition back in March. American Rheinmetall, BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems, and Elbit Systems USA had also been in the running.

“The agreement provides for the accelerated delivery of six prototype MTC systems, with an option for an additional 12. Soldiers will use these platforms in a series of operational experiments to assess performance, reliability, and supportability in realistic combat conditions,” the release adds. “This Soldier-centric, experiment-driven approach reflects the Army’s continuous transformation initiative to rapidly deliver lethal capabilities, incorporate immediate Soldier feedback, and adapt the force to pace emerging threats in multi-domain operations.”

The K9MH was developed from Hanwha’s earlier tracked K9 design, variants and derivatives of which are already in service in South Korea, as well as Australia, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, India, Norway, Poland, and Turkey. Both the tracked and wheeled designs share the same 52-caliber 155mm cannon. Caliber here is a measurement of length in relation to the diameter of the barrel. A 52-caliber 155mm barrel is just under 26 and a half feet long. The M777’s barrel is 39 calibers long, or just around 16.7 feet.

K9 and K10 prove compatibility with US munitions during a live-fire demonstration at YPG

In general, longer barrels on howitzers translate to greater range. Hanwha says the maximum range of the K9MH is just over 37 miles (60 kilometers), though it is unclear if this is only when using rocket-assisted or other specialized ammunition. The stated maximum range of the M777, even when using specialized rounds, is just under 20 miles.

As a self-propelled howitzer, the 8×8 K9MH also offers the benefit of integrated mobility over the towed M777, which requires a separate vehicle to move it from point A to point B. “Its emplacement/displacement times of under 30 seconds enables ‘shoot and scoot’ tactics,” according to Hanwha’s website.

The K9MH can also carry 40 rounds of ammunition onboard, as well as be rapidly reloaded in the field via a companion K10 resupply vehicle.

“We’re focused on creating a U.S.-anchored K9 Mobile Howitzer manufacturing network – with Opelika, Alabama, as the current phase I launch point – that can deliver advanced Mobile Tactical Cannons at the speed and scale the U.S. Army needs,” Jason Pak, Hanwha Defense USA Head of Land Systems-Artillery, also said in a statement.

“Hanwha’s global supply chain and local production experience in Australia, Egypt, Poland and Romania demonstrate a proven commitment to local execution we’re excited to bring to the U.S.,” Michael Coulter, Hanwha Defense USA CEO, said in his own statement. “Localization is central to Hanwha’s global business model, leveraging our global leading industrial technology and process in Korea to create sovereign industrial strength in the U.S., whether it be in shipbuilding, munitions or combat vehicles.”

The Army has been actively exploring the idea of replacing the M777 with a new wheeled self-propelled howitzer since at least 2019, and has even conducted shoot-offs of various designs in the past. The service has also made clear that its selection of Hanwha Defense USA to advance in the MTC effort does not guarantee that it will field the K9MH.

“Data and insights gained from these experiments will directly inform senior leaders’ decisions on future fielding. If approved for fielding, MTC will replace M777 towed artillery systems in select formations, significantly increasing their lethality, mobility, reliability, and survivability on the modern, highly transparent battlefield,” per the Army’s release today. “By rapidly prototyping these systems, the Army is advancing a more mobile and adaptable fires formation aligned with the rigorous demands of large-scale combat operations.”

The release does not elaborate on what “select formations” might be in line to eventually receive K9MHs. However, a past MTC contracting notice says the initial focus is on replacing M777s within Brigade Combat Teams equipped with Stryker wheeled light armored vehicles. Airborne, airmobile, and ‘leg’ infantry brigades also have M777s that could be supplanted by new wheeled self-propelled howitzers.

The possibility of the Army replacing at least a portion of its existing M109-series tracked self-propelled 155mm howitzers has also been raised in the past. However, the service’s press release today makes clear that the focus of the MTC program right now is still on replacing towed M777s. There is a long-standing debate about the relative pros and cons of wheeled versus tracked self-propelled howitzers, with the U.S. Army long having favored the latter. Tracked designs typically offer greater off-road mobility and are often more heavily armored. They are also generally heavier overall, which can negatively impact mobility and transportability more broadly, and can be more costly to acquire and operate.

“If you look at the [fight] in Ukraine on either side, it’s really hard to move out and get fires ready to go. … The Paladin [the name applied to the latest A6 and A7 variants of the M109] is just incapable of it at speed,” Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll told members of the House Appropriations Committee at a hearing earlier this year. “And so while we think the Paladin will be in our lives for a while, because we want to be good custodians of the assets the American taxpayer has given us, we think that new purchases to balance that platform out should be something different.”

At that time, Driscoll was defending his service’s omission of funding for any more M109A7s in its Fiscal Year 2027 budget proposal.

It is worth noting here that both sides in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine have and continue to employ tracked and wheeled self-propelled howitzers, as well as towed types. The war has underscored the continued importance of artillery, in general. At the same time, mobility, and greater speed while on the move, are ever more important considerations in an era of drone warfare and expanded kill chains that put anything that stays in one place too long at higher risk

MTC is part of a larger Self-Propelled Howitzer-Modernization (SPH-M) effort that could also include the separate acquisition of a new tracked self-propelled howitzer. There have been several abortive Army attempts to replace the venerable M109 family since the 1990s. This includes the advanced XM2001 Crusader, which was canceled in 2002 ostensibly due to growing costs. The service axed the more recent XM1299, developed under its Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ECRA) program in 2024. The XM1299 featured a 58-caliber cannon and had a demonstrated range of 40 miles (just over 60 kilometers). The Army has previously said that the length of the barrel presented technical challenges that contributed to the program’s cancellation.

XM2001 Crusader Howitzer Prototype

Since the XM1299’s cancellation, the Army has also been investing heavily in new long-range artillery shells, including ramjet-powered types.

Today’s announcement is also another important win for South Korea’s defense industry, which has made major export gains globally in recent years. Poland, in particular, has become a huge customer for South Korean arms exports, including versions of the K9. Further progress in the U.S. Army’s MTC program could offer a major inroad into the American market for Hanwha.

With today’s announcement, the Army has taken an important new step toward adding a new wheeled 155mm self-propelled howitzer to its arsenal.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Lawmakers in the United States have renewed calls for answers about conditions on board the USS Abraham Lincoln, suggesting that reports emerging from the aircraft carrier may belie a troubling pattern.

In at least three separate appeals, Democrats called for more information about how the Navy prepared for the vessel’s record-breaking deployment.

The aircraft carrier has been involved in military operations against Venezuela as well as the US-Israel war on Iran since it departed from San Diego, California, in November.

The ship has yet to dock for a port call in the time since. Having spent more than 260 days at sea, it has broken the US Navy’s record for the longest deployment without a stop.

Reports have emerged in recent weeks about crew members attempting to jump overboard amid shortages of food and other supplies.

On Tuesday, US Representative Pat Ryan published a letter sent to acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao and signed by 22 members of Congress.

It noted that the lengthy deployments “have become a pattern in the Administration’s handling of its war against Iran”.

The war, which began on February 28, shows no sign of ending. Ryan pointed out that the USS Gerald Ford had also broken records for the length of its deployment as part of the Iran war, and it, too, was the subject of worrying reports about strain on sailors’ health. The ship returned to the US in April.

“The reported conditions on the Lincoln, following so soon after the reported conditions on the Ford, leave Congress and the public concerned that the Department is not adapting quickly enough to the conditions,” Ryan wrote in his letter, dated August 14.

He also questioned whether US Central Command (CENTCOM), which oversees military operations in the Middle East, was “taking the appropriate steps to mitigate the continued challenges in our fleet”.

A delegation of California lawmakers, including Senators Adam Schiff and Alex Padilla, has also sent a letter to the Pentagon calling for an inquiry.

Separately, a group of Democratic senators addressed another letter, dated August 15, to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, demanding answers and calling for accountability.

“This is a symptom of poor planning by both you and the President and exacerbated by the deeply unsound decision to start a war with Iran,” that letter said.

“Open-ended deployments driven by an open-ended war have real consequences for our servicemembers, and we are seeing those consequences now.”

The appeals for more information come as the USS Lincoln prepares to navigate home.

Cao revealed last week that the USS Lincoln would soon return to the US. The announcement coincided with reports that the USS George Washington has been rerouted from the Pacific Ocean to replace its fellow aircraft carrier.

But the USS Washington’s departure leaves no aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific, long portrayed as a region of strategic interest for the US as it seeks to check China’s territorial ambitions.

President Donald Trump and his defence officials, meanwhile, have argued that reports about the USS Lincoln’s conditions have been overblown.

Hegseth, for instance, has called the reports of conditions “completely misrepresented”. Trump last week also said the vessel had not been deployed “nearly long enough”.

On Monday, the president brushed aside questions about the USS Lincoln’s conditions as part of a “CNN fake report”.

Admiral Brad Cooper, the head of US Central Command, has also released a statement on social media this week, saying he has visited the USS Lincoln in recent days and found the crew “awe-inspiring”.

“This doesn’t mean that all is perfect,” he wrote. “Find any of the nearly 4 million Navy veterans in America today and they will likely tell you that service at sea for long periods isn’t for everyone.”

But he applauded the USS Lincoln’s leadership for having made “mental health and crew resilience” a priority.

Unlike Democrats, members of Trump’s Republican Party have largely not responded to the reports of mental health strain and supply shortages on the USS Lincoln.

However, Representative Don Bacon voiced concern during an interview on CBS News’s Face the Nation programme on Sunday.

“We should have oversight,” he said.

The arrest comes after an attack on activist Nadia Beller, who says she was targeted for her opposition to conservative reforms and corruption.

Bolivia has arrested a prominent adviser to several right-wing political leaders in Latin America on suspicion of plotting a murder.

Fernando Cerimedo was arrested on Tuesday following an attack on lawyer and political activist Nadia Beller. The consultant has worked on political campaigns for Argentina’s President Javier Milei, former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, and Bolivia’s President Rodrigo Paz.

The Argentinian national was arrested in Bolivia at an airport, trying to travel to his home country.

Security videos captured Beller standing in front of a hotel in Santa Cruz when two men dressed as delivery drivers walked up the stairs, shot her from close range, took some of her belongings, and left her behind as she lay on the ground.

Beller, who was four weeks pregnant, believes she was targeted for her opposition to a pack of unconstitutional laws under Decree 5503, which were being prepared by Cerimedo and the government, and for witnessing high-level corruption.

Decree 5503 introduces radical economic reforms, such as eliminating state fuel subsidies, that target policies put in place under Bolivia’s former socialist government.

Beller is also understood to have had a romantic relationship with Cerimedo. She admitted to her relationship with him in a video appearance from her hospital bed, and highlighted Cerimedo’s significant political influence.

She said she decided to speak out as she believes that “until I speak directly to the Bolivian people, they are going to finish what they attempted to do. They are going to end up taking my life”.

Bolivian Vice President Edmand Lara said the attack “threatens life, democracy, and freedom of expression” in a news conference where he called for an impartial investigation “without any kind of favoritism”.

Yes. The US South Korea relationship has not broken down under Donald Trump, but it has become more transactional, cost focused and strategically uncertain. The latest decision to scale back joint military exercises highlights a broader evolution in which Washington increasingly expects Seoul to shoulder more of the alliance burden while seeking greater flexibility for US forces across the region.

From deterrence to deal making

Trump’s approach to South Korea has been shaped heavily by his personal diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. His first term moved rapidly from threats of “fire and fury” to unprecedented summits with Kim, followed by the suspension or redesign of major US South Korean military exercises.

Although the Hanoi summit collapsed without a denuclearisation agreement, Trump has continued to emphasise his relationship with Kim. His latest instruction to reduce joint exercises therefore carries significance beyond cost savings. It signals that Washington may once again be willing to modify elements of its alliance posture in pursuit of diplomatic space with Pyongyang.

The strategic environment, however, is very different from 2018. North Korea has expanded its nuclear and missile capabilities and strengthened military cooperation with Russia. Reducing exercises therefore creates a more complicated calculation for Seoul: diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang may reduce tensions temporarily, but weaker military preparedness could also increase the risks associated with North Korea’s growing capabilities.

The alliance is becoming more transactional

The clearest transformation under Trump is arguably the growing emphasis on burden sharing.

Trump has repeatedly questioned the cost of maintaining roughly 28,500 US troops in South Korea and has pushed Seoul to contribute more to its own defence. The existing cost sharing agreement requires South Korea to contribute about 1.52 trillion won this year toward the upkeep of US forces.

For Washington, the argument is straightforward: South Korea is wealthy enough to assume a greater share of the financial and military burden. For Seoul, however, the US military presence remains central to deterring North Korea.

This creates a fundamental tension. The alliance is still strategically valuable to both sides, but Trump increasingly approaches it through a cost benefit framework rather than solely through traditional alliance commitments.

Defence cooperation is expanding even as exercises face pressure

The apparent contradiction is important. Trump is seeking to reduce certain military exercises while South Korea itself is increasing defence spending.

President Lee Jae Myung has pledged a larger security role and increased defence spending, while continuing to insist that Washington’s security commitment remains firm. Seoul has also sought greater strategic autonomy, including greater latitude over nuclear fuel technology and faster progress toward transferring wartime operational control.

This suggests that the alliance may be evolving rather than simply weakening.

South Korea appears to be preparing to assume greater responsibility for its own defence, while Washington wants the alliance to become more flexible and potentially address security challenges beyond the Korean Peninsula.

That latter objective is particularly sensitive for Seoul. The United States increasingly views its Asian alliances through the broader strategic competition with China, while South Korea remains primarily focused on the immediate threat from North Korea.

Trade has become inseparable from security

Under Trump, economic relations have also become an increasingly important component of the alliance.

Washington’s tariff pressure has pushed Seoul toward major investment commitments in the United States, including the $350 billion investment pledge associated with tariff relief. South Korean companies have already invested heavily in US semiconductors, batteries, electric vehicles and shipbuilding.

But disagreements over how the investment should be structured have exposed the limits of Trump’s transactional approach. Seoul has warned that demands for large upfront cash commitments could place pressure on its economy.

The detention of hundreds of South Korean workers during an immigration raid at a Hyundai LG battery project in Georgia further demonstrated how economic and political tensions can spill directly into the strategic relationship.

The result is an alliance in which security guarantees, trade concessions, investment and troop costs increasingly form one interconnected negotiation.

The deeper problem is strategic uncertainty

The central challenge for Seoul is not simply whether Trump wants fewer exercises. It is whether Washington’s definition of the alliance is changing.

For decades, the US South Korea alliance rested on a relatively clear bargain: Washington provided extended deterrence and military forces, while Seoul contributed financially and militarily to maintaining the security architecture.

Trump’s approach introduces more conditionality into that bargain.

If military exercises can be reduced because they are considered too expensive or diplomatically inconvenient, Seoul has to consider how predictable the US commitment remains. At the same time, Washington expects South Korea to spend more, invest more and potentially assume greater responsibility.

This could ultimately produce a stronger South Korean military, but it could also create greater uncertainty about the role of the United States.

What this means for China and the Indo Pacific

The evolution of the alliance also has implications far beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Washington wants greater flexibility for US forces stationed in South Korea to respond to regional contingencies, particularly those involving China. Seoul, however, has historically been reluctant to become directly involved in a confrontation over Taiwan.

That creates a structural divergence in strategic priorities.

For Washington, South Korea is increasingly part of a broader Indo Pacific security network. For Seoul, the primary purpose of the alliance remains deterrence against North Korea.

Trump’s transactional approach therefore forces South Korea to navigate between two competing imperatives: maintaining the American security umbrella while avoiding excessive strategic dependence on Washington’s wider confrontation with Beijing.

The alliance has changed, but it has not collapsed

Trump has not dismantled the US South Korea alliance. Instead, he is redefining its terms.

Military exercises are being reconsidered, defence burden sharing remains contentious, trade and investment have become bargaining instruments, and Washington increasingly expects Seoul to assume greater responsibility for regional security.

For South Korea, this creates both a risk and an opportunity. Greater defence spending and military autonomy could make Seoul less dependent on American forces. But if Washington simultaneously reduces visible commitments while demanding greater financial and strategic contributions, Seoul could find itself paying more for an alliance that feels less predictable.

The most important question, therefore, is not whether Trump is weakening the alliance. It is whether he is transforming it from a traditional security partnership into a transactional strategic bargain.

If that transformation continues, the US South Korea alliance could survive Trump, but it may emerge fundamentally different from the alliance Washington and Seoul built over the past seven decades.

With information from Reuters.

Concern over the security of Europe’s largest nuclear plant has been rife since Russia launched its full-scale war on Ukraine nearly five years ago.

A drone strike close to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in occupied southeastern Ukraine has killed one nuclear specialist and wounded 17, according to Russian reports.

Moscow asserted on Tuesday that the drone was launched by Ukraine. The security of Europe’s biggest nuclear plant has provoked significant global concern amid the full-scale war on Ukraine that Russia launched in February 2022.

Most of those injured by the strike were employees of the plant, according to a Telegram update by the Russian management of the nuclear facility. It asserted that the attack constituted one of the most serious incidents in the plant’s history.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) earlier confirmed reports that the strike hit staff members at a bus stop.

“No nuclear safety or security damage was reported,” the IAEA, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, said on social media.

However, it called “on military commanders responsible for these actions as well as all others aiming on nuclear power plants and/or their staff to put an immediate stop to these unacceptable actions”, citing the “great risks to nuclear safety”.

The Zaporizhzhia plant was seized by Russian forces a month after Moscow launched its invasion. The facility has been under Russian management since.

The safety of the plant – and the potential consequences of a hit amid the hostilities – have been a concern since the start of the war.

Zaporizhzhia’s six reactors can produce nearly six gigawatts of electricity, and the plant was crucial to supplying power to Ukraine’s national grid. All of the reactors have been shut down since Russia captured the plant, but a strike could cause damage and potentially cause serious leaks of radioactive material.

Tuesday’s strike came ahead of a scheduled visit by IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi to assess nuclear safety. It’s not clear if that visit will still take place.

A Russian strike on a thermal power plant was reported in central Ukraine a few hours later, forcing a halt to operations, according to DTEK, Ukraine’s largest energy provider and the company that operates the plant.

No casualties were reported, but DTEK stated on social media that the attack caused “significant damage to equipment”.

Russia has attacked the company’s thermal plants 230 times since the start of the war, according to DTEK’s Telegram channel, as it wages a campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) is repositioning one of its AH-64 Apache squadrons from Ramon Air Base in the Negev to Ramat David Air Base in northern Israel, bringing a portion of the service’s attack helicopter force significantly closer to the Lebanese and Syrian fronts. The AH-64 has been of central importance in recent IAF operations, and the shift makes the relatively small Apache fleet better positioned for rapid-response missions, including greater persistence over the northern battlefield.

The IAF announced today that 190 “Magic Touch” Squadron would be transferring its aircraft from Ramon to Ramat David, the northernmost IAF base. This would involve increased aircraft activity in the country’s skies, but that there was no security concern. The unit currently operates the older AH-64A, known locally as Peten (python), which the IAF began to receive in 1990.

The IAF began to establish an attack helicopter force in response to the lessons of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, particularly the need to counter large-scale enemy armored formations. Over the following decades, its role evolved from that of a dedicated tank-hunting force into a precision-strike capability able to engage a much broader range of threats, including irregular and guerrilla forces operating among civilian populations.

In the past, the IAF attack helicopter force comprised three frontline squadrons: 160 “First Attack Helicopter” Squadron, operating the AH-1, was at Palmachim, near Tel Aviv, while Ramon hosted the “Magic Touch” Squadron and 113 “Hornet” Squadron operating the newer AH-64D Saraf (serpent), which arrived in 2005.

When it arrived in Israel, the AH-64D (sometimes designated AH-64D-I) was one of the most advanced attack helicopters in the world. It combined the mission system of the U.S. Army AH-64D Apache Longbow, including its mast-mounted AN/APG-78 Longbow radar, with Israeli avionics. Among these are a Rafael voice communications and data suite (RAVNET 300) and Elta 1891 satellite communications (with prominent bulbous antennas carried on the outer parts of the stub wings). The locally developed mission management system is the Elbit HELICOM suite which provides a real-time overview of the battlefield. Finally, the Elisra Seraph self-protection suite includes an SPS-65 missile warning receiver and an SPJ-40 radar jammer as well as Elbit Rokar countermeasures dispensers.

After the Saraf entered IAF service, the fleet was subsequently expanded through the conversion of older AH-64A airframes to a similar standard.

The AH-64A upgrade also added an optional under-fuselage avionics pod, something that you can read about in more detail here.

Located near Haifa, Ramat David Air Base is one of the most historic in Israel. It was formerly operated by the U.K. Royal Air Force and was involved in combat from the very beginning of Israeli independence. Flying a succession of different fighters and fighter-bombers, units operating from the base were active in every major conflict that followed, including the Sinai campaign, the June 1967 Six-Day War, and the October 1973 War, when its squadrons fought over the Syrian and Lebanese fronts. Due to its proximity to Lebanon, Ramat David has played a major role in different campaigns fought in that country, starting in 1982.

Before the arrival of the “Magic Touch” Squadron, Ramat David was primarily an F-16 hub, with three squadrons flying the F-16C/D. These units have played a central role in Israeli air operations on the northern front, including operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.

As for Ramon Air Base in the south, its history dates back to the early 1980s, when it was established in the Negev as part of the reorganization of IAF infrastructure following the withdrawal from Sinai under the peace treaty with Egypt. Ramon has been home to fighters and attack jets, including F-16s and A-4s.

Since the 2000s, Ramon has been a principal base for some of the most advanced IAF combat aircraft. As well as the AH-64D, it is home to three of the four F-16I Sufa squadrons. It is also understood to be the home of the secretive Israeli drone, referred to as RA-01 and used for covert missions. You can read more about that here.

Moving an AH-64 squadron from Ramon to Ramat David reflects a shift in the IAF’s priorities toward the northern front. Ramat David places the helicopters significantly closer to Lebanon and Syria, reducing transit times and allowing more of their limited endurance to be spent over the battlefield. This is particularly valuable for rapid-response missions and close air support, where the Apache’s sensors and precision weapons can provide immediate support to ground forces.

As detailed in our deep dive on the IDF’s air defenses, Israeli AH-64s have also been extensively used in counter-drone operations. Their flexibility and ability to operate at low speeds make them well suited to engaging certain types of unmanned aircraft, while their Hellfire missiles can be employed in an unconventional air-to-air role for this mission. Bearing in mind the threat posed by drones launched from Lebanon and Syria, this factor may also have played into the relocation.

An IDF video purportedly showing an Israeli AH-64 intercepting an Iranian UAV that crossed into Israeli territory:

Iranian UAV Intercepted by an Israeli Helicopter

In fact, there is a historical precedent for the move. Ahead of the June 1982 Lebanon War, the “Magic Touch” Squadron was transferred from Ramon to Ramat David to reduce the distance to its principal operational theater along the Lebanese border. Once again, between 1990 and 1995, the same squadron again flew its MD500 Defenders from Ramat David.

The new relocation also disperses the IAF’s relatively small Apache fleet between its northern and southern fronts, improving readiness at the cost of concentrating fewer helicopters at Ramon. It is worth noting that, at the time of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, only four Israeli AH-64s were actually on standby across the entire country. Two of these were on so-called short standby for potential deployment to the northern border within minutes, with the other two on long standby for the same area, meaning they would take longer to get into action. In total, the IAF has a fleet of around 48 AH-64s of both versions.

As of now, Israeli forces are no longer involved in a full-scale ground offensive on the northern front. However, they maintain a very active forward-defense posture, still hold positions in southern Lebanon, and limited ground operations continue. So, too, do airtrikes against Hezbollah infrastructure.

Separately, Israel maintains positions in Syria, in the former UN buffer zone and parts of Quneitra and western Daraa, while continuing raids and airstrikes in southern Syria. Only today, Israel reportedly struck Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase in the northwest, reportedly damaging the runway and storage facilities.

Time will tell how the long-term IAF Apache force looks. In January of this year, the U.S. State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to Israel of 30 of the latest AH-64E Apaches and related equipment for an estimated cost of $3.8 billion. Israel might not take up all of those aircraft, but the Apache is currently central to its future plans.

Even before October 7, the IAF had been pushing to acquire another 40 of the AH-64E versions, after apparently concluding that an earlier plan to bolster its attack fleet by replacing the older AH-64As with armed drones was not feasible. This is a notably interesting development at a time in which other AH-64 customers are rethinking the value of the attack helicopter in general, due to questions about their survivability on the modern battlefield.

The transfer of an AH-64 squadron to Ramat David underscores the IAF’s growing emphasis on the northern front and the Apache’s expanding role beyond traditional anti-armor missions. By positioning the helicopters closer to Lebanon and Syria, the move should improve their responsiveness and endurance over the battlefield while giving the IAF greater flexibility in addressing a wider range of emerging threats.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Opening statements in a landmark US case brought by a bipartisan coalition of 29 states against Meta – the parent company of Facebook and Instagram – began on Tuesday, with Colorado, California, New Jersey and Kentucky arguing that the company’s popular social media apps were designed in ways that harmed the mental health of young users.

The trial, which is expected to last several weeks, began in a US federal court in California before District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers. While there is an eight-person jury, the group is serving in an advisory role as Judge Rogers will ultimately decide the case.

Megan O’Neill, a deputy California attorney general, in her opening statement said that the company designed its products to “hook the users, hold them for as long as they can, harvest their data, and then hide the truth from the public”.

She added that it worked “especially well for kids”.

The lawsuit, which was first filed in 2023, alleges that Meta made decisions to design its apps to hook users and facilitate excessive use among the platforms’ youngest users. The coalition also alleges that the company collected data on children under the age of 13 in violation of federal law.

“Meta needed kids, and it needed to reassure the people who cared about those kids that the kids are safe,” O’Neill said.

‘Limited claims’

Meta has long pushed back on allegations against the Silicon Valley social media behemoth.

In a statement before the trial, a Meta spokesperson said the states’ claims are unsubstantiated, and the company stands by its record of creating strong protections for teenagers, including launching Instagram Teen Accounts in 2024, which limit who can contact underage users, as well as a feature that allows parents to set time limits on usage.

“The State AGs may call this a landmark case, but their limited claims are unsubstantiated and their financial demands are vastly disproportionate,” Stephanie Otway, a Meta spokesperson, told Al Jazeera in a statement.

“The AGs offer no proof anyone in their states was misled, claim benign features like having an additional Instagram account somehow harmed their residents, and attempt to penalize Meta for industry-wide challenges like age verification. Rather than sticking to the facts or the law, the states have instead decided to chase an outlandish payout.”

The potential impact on Meta’s bottom line is existential. The company could face fines as high as $1.4 trillion, which is just shy of its $1.5 trillion market cap. However, the coalition is seeking fines of roughly $200bn.

Meta has already been ordered to pay $942m in fines in a separate New Mexico lawsuit – $375m in civil penalties in a March jury verdict and $567m ordered by a judge earlier this month.

Meta has acknowledged that the lawsuits it faces, including those related to youth social media addiction, could lead to “substantial monetary damages or fines” in a Securities and Exchange Commission filing in January.

A long time coming

Meta, along with other social media giants, has faced a growing slate of cases across the United States, including from cities, states, school districts and even individuals.

The coalition of states is asking Meta to make changes to its platforms, including introducing new age restrictions and cutting the infinite scroll.

The case’s impetus came from a US Senate committee hearing in 2021, when whistleblower Frances Haugen, a former data scientist at Facebook, claimed that the company knowingly pushed products that could impact the health of young users as the Mark Zuckerberg-led company pursued higher profits.

Meta has repeatedly tried to end the coalition lawsuit, including in 2024 and as recently as June, when it sought summary judgement – a decision that a court might make without going to trial – which would have ended the lawsuit.

The case is impacting the company’s stock. On Wall Street, the social media giant is down more than 3 percent in midday trading.

The U.S. Navy is reportedly evaluating a major change to the Ford class aircraft carrier design that would move the island superstructure further forward on the flight deck. President Donald Trump is said to be pushing the service to reposition the island on aesthetic grounds, to make the ships look more like World War II-era carriers. Just last Thursday, Trump publicly ordered the Navy and the Pentagon to come up with a plan for abandoning the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) catapults and Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE) on the Ford class, starting with the future USS Doris Miller, as you can read more about in our reporting here.

Perhaps even more so than replacing EMALS and the AWEs, shifting the island would be an extremely costly and complex proposition. The Navy also chose the island’s location for very specific reasons to provide a host of operational benefits.

The Washington Post was the first to report Trump’s push to relocate the island on the Ford class on Sunday, citing anonymous current and former U.S. officials. Another story followed from The Hill, which also cited a former senior U.S. official.

“The timing and extent of the Navy’s evaluation is unclear, with current and former officials cautioning that the service was concerned that such a change would require significant time and money,” according to the Post. “Trump’s preference, current and former officials said, is for the new aircraft carriers to look more like those that were in service during World War II.”

“The review, which was kick-started in part because of Trump’s concerns about the aesthetics of the Ford class aircraft carriers, is due in ‘several’ weeks,” per The Hill‘s story. “A Navy official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Trump ordered the Navy to ‘implement design changes to our future aircraft carriers’ and that the service branch ‘has begun moving out on options to meet the President’s intent.’”

Currently, the USS Gerald R. Ford is the only carrier in this class in operational service. The Navy has three more on order: the future USS John F. Kennedy, USS Enterprise, and USS Doris Miller. The service hopes to take delivery of John F. Kennedy this year. The stated plan is to eventually acquire at least 10 Ford class carriers in total. Two more ships in the class have already been formally assigned names: the future USS William J. Clinton and USS George W. Bush.

John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) Successfully Completes Builder’s Sea Trials

To be clear, this is hardly the first time Trump has pushed for major U.S. naval ship design and force planning changes, especially when it comes to the aesthetics of those vessels. “I’m a very aesthetic person,” the President declared in December 2025 at the public rollout of plans for the Trump class battleship.

For the Navy, the placement of the island on the Ford class, as well as its overall design, was not an aesthetic decision. It was also not a decision that was made quickly. During a presentation at the U.S. Naval Academy Museum back in 2015, retired Navy Capt. Tal Manvel, who served for a time as Program Manager for Future Carriers, said the service examined 75 different conceptual configurations between 1996 and 2000. In addition to a host of different hullforms and flight deck layouts, these designs had islands placed at a wide variety of different points.

You can watch Tal Manvel’s full 2015 presentation below.

Shifley Lecture: USS Ford-class carrier design

Ultimately, the Navy settled on the design as it exists today. The total length of the Ford class is very similar to that of the Nimitz class it is in the process of replacing: 337 meters (1,106 feet) versus 332.8 meters (1,092 feet). However, the island on the Ford is 140 feet further aft compared to that of the Nimitz.

The Ford‘s island is also smaller and more angular overall. This was enabled in part by the decision to use a completely different main radar arrangement on the Ford compared to the Nimitz, paring down the total number of distinct radars required as a result. However, the Dual Band Radar (DBR) proved to be extremely complex and troublesome. As a result, the future USS John F. Kennedy and every future carrier in the class is now set to have the AN/SPY-6(V)3, also known as the fixed-face version of Raytheon’s Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR), in place of the DBR. The broad dimensions of the island remain unchanged. The DBR was also set to be a feature on the Navy’s trio of Zumwalt class stealthy destroyers, but the decision was subsequently made to eliminate the S-band arrays on those ships as a cost-cutting measure. Those three destroyers may eventually see the remaining X-band arrays replaced with a variant of the AN/SPY-6 radar coupled with a version of the Aegis Combat System in the future.

The matter of the radar aside, the island is sized to minimize its total footprint and maximize available open deck space, and has a very visible impact on the flight deck layout. The Ford has three aircraft elevators, two on the starboard side, both forward of the island, and another on the port side. Nimitz class carriers have three aircraft elevators on the starboard side, one of which is aft of the island, as well as one on the port side. These changes and other design choices mean the Ford has more total flight deck space than the Nimitz – five acres (217,800 square feet) compared to 4.5 acres (196,020 square feet), according to the Navy.

In an exclusive interview with TWZ back in 2022, then-Navy Capt. Paul “Paulie” Lanzilotta, captain of the USS Gerald R. Ford’s at the time, talked at length about the benefits of the island’s position.

The Navy uses “cyclic flight operations to continue to generate sorties over many hours a day,” Lanzilotta told us following a panel on the history of aircraft carriers at the annual Sea Air Space symposium that year. “And we do that by launching the cycle and then recovering that cycle.”

“If you’re a little bit late, you need to troubleshoot, maybe it’s just reset a system that’s built into the aircraft, you reset the system and off you go, you can taxi to the catapult,” he explained. “If you’re parked after the island on the older ships, you need a break in the recovery in order to do that because everything we do happens very, very quickly, very efficiently.”

“So on my ship? Less likely that you’re going to need that break and a lot more likely that I can refuel you and rearm you more efficiently,” he continued. “It’s based on the design of where the island is plus the weapons elevators and the way we fuel aircraft.”

What this all means in more layman’s terms is that the configuration of the flight deck, including the placement of the island, creates additional flexibility for launch and recovery operations and helps contribute to a better sortie generation rate. The way the space is configured would offer benefits for other activities, including hot-deck refueling and maintenance, as well. The Washington Post‘s story says the configuration also offers an added margin of safety for aircraft coming in to land by helping reduce the chance of turbulence generated at the stern.

In his interview with us in 2022, Lanzilotta, who has since been promoted to rear admiral and is now commander of Carrier Strike Group 12 (CSG-12), acknowledged that Ford had fewer aircraft elevators and less deck space in the back of the island. However, he said the elevators were designed to be more efficient and downplayed any negative impacts from the reconfiguration of the flight deck.

“I still have room back there to park aircraft. Fly helicopters back aft of the island when we want to work and park airplanes back there,” Lanzilotta said. Together with the smaller overall size of the island, “if anything, I probably gained overall area on the flight deck.”

“From a ship handling perspective, being further away from the bow kind of increases the shadow zone forward,” he did note, referring to something of a blind spot toward the bow that is only exacerbated by moving the island aft.

However, “we just manage [that challenge] organically,” he explained, “whether it’s a sensor forward, to watchstanders that are forward, and additional assets that we naturally have with us all the time, like our helicopters, and our security boats and stuff like that.”

“I’m amazed by how well we’re able to move in the narrow channel in San Diego Bay,” he added. “It’s a great bay, but a busy one.”

It is worth noting here that the Ford uses a distributed aperture remote video system to help the ship’s crew keep tabs on flight deck operations and to just provide valuable general situational awareness. This system supplants the Island Camera Room found on Nimitz class carriers. This also eliminates the need for individual camera operators at various points around the island, as is the case with the Integrated Launch and Recovery Television Surveillance (ILARTS) system on the older carriers. There are additional camera systems around the ship, as well. You can read more about this here.

The placement of the island on the Ford class reflects a broader trend, too. The design of France’s future “porte-avions de nouvelle génération,” or PA-Ng, (which translates to New Generation Aircraft Carrier), as it has been shown to date, has a very similarly shaped island that is also positioned well toward the stern. In 2023, renderings emerged of notional next-generation Chinese aircraft carriers with this same kind of island and flight deck configuration.

It is possible there are non-aesthetic reasons, as well as aesthetic ones, behind Trump’s report push to relocate the island on the Ford class. However, if that is the case, this has yet to be publicly articulated.

Very broadly speaking, since the end of World War II, the islands on U.S. aircraft carrier designs have been progressively moving further and further aft, in general. It is also worth noting that the island placement on World War II-era carrier designs was not universally further toward the bow, either. Some U.S. and foreign classes of the time, particularly lighter designs, lacked a traditional island on top of the flight deck at all.

Regardless of any pros and cons about where the island is placed on the Ford class design, moving it now would be exceedingly costly and complex. It has been pointed out that relocating the island would involve far more than just moving the superstructure. It is deeply integrated into the ship’s overall configuration, and shifting it would have much broader impacts that would need to be addressed just in terms of seakeeping, structural stability, and basic balance. A host of other accompanying changes would also be required. Since the island is where the ship’s main radars and many other key systems are positioned, a substantial amount of additional testing would have to be done to ensure everything works as intended in the new location.

“The Navy also examined the issue during his [Trump’s] first term as president,” according to The Washington Post. “A study found that moving the island could cost billions of dollars in redesign costs and significantly delay the program.”

More delays with the Ford class is something the Navy can ill afford. The program is already running years behind schedule due in no small part to issues with the aforementioned EMALS catapults and AWEs, as well as a host of other long-troubled aspects of the ship’s design. The Navy had originally planned to take delivery of the John F. Kennedy in 2022.

The potential pitfalls of a major reworking of the Ford design could have cascading effects that go well beyond this class of ships. As TWZ wrote last week after the announcement regarding plans for the catapults and weapons elevators on the future Doris Miller and other following ships in the class:

Trump’s memo yesterday also focused heavily on further steps to address now long-standing concerns about U.S. naval shipbuilding capacity across the board. America’s specific ability to produce new nuclear-powered surface warships and submarines has now become even more of a focal point in these discussions with the addition of the plans for the Trump class battleships. In May, the Navy confirmed the Trump class warships will have nuclear propulsion using the same type of reactors developed for the Ford class.

The Navy has not acquired a new nuclear-powered surface combatant in decades. Newport News is currently the only U.S. shipyard producing nuclear-powered surface vessels of any kind, and is already heavily strained by current demands, which also include production of new non-nuclear warships. There is only one other yard in the country that produces nuclear-powered vessels of any kind, and is focused on submarine production.

Pushing the schedule for the delivery of Ford class carriers even further to the right, along with adding billions to the program’s cost, would only add to the strains on the Navy’s existing Nimitz class carriers, which have been building into a low-level crisis. As we also wrote:

In a time of peace, without all the threats and operational demands the United States is currently facing, or if there was any kind of surplus carrier capacity, making fundamental changes to the Ford class carrier program might very well have been a logical decision. However, all of this also comes at a time when the Navy’s operational carriers are experiencing exceptional pressure. The Nimitz class carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, which has been on a marathon deployment in the Middle East, has become something of a poster child for growing readiness concerns amid reports of severely flagging morale and mental health among the crew. The Navy is now moving to relieve Lincoln.

Still, this is a worrisome situation that has already been building for many years, due in large part to a succession of global crises, and has now been further exacerbated by the ongoing conflict with Iran. Even so, the Navy is trying to keep to its existing schedule for inactivating aging Nimitz class carriers, though the date for when the USS Nimitz is set to leave service has now been pushed back until next year. Retiring existing carriers will only create further strains if the arrival of new members of the Ford class continues to be pushed back.

As we also previously mentioned, it very much remains to be seen if any plans for major changes to the Ford‘s core design actually become a reality. Trump’s second term in office ends in January 2029, and any such work could easily bleed over into the next presidential administration, which could then reverse course. Congress could well step in to take action even sooner.

Whatever happens, it would be a huge undertaking in terms of both time and resources to relocate the island on the Ford class carrier, and would upend a decision that was made years ago with clear operational benefits in mind.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Amid trade embargoes, asset freezes and attacks on ships as part of a naval blockade, Washington has announced a plan to enact a new wave of restrictions on Iran, targeting its economy.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last Thursday that the United States was planning to inflict more economic damage on Tehran as early as this week. The US would apply measures that have “never been seen in the history of economic isolation on a country”, Bessent said.

A day later on Friday, President Donald Trump echoed Bessent and said that Iran would be hit hard economically.

As the memorandum of understanding (MoU) expired on Monday, Trump called on Tehran to hold up the “white flag of surrender” but insisted that he was in no rush to end the war.

Since February 2025, following the start of Trump’s second term in office, Washington has sanctioned “more than 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft”, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) said in May.

Remaining defiant, Iran’s authorities have said they could shift to offensive operations, and are simultaneously prepared to counter a potential ground invasion.

According to Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, professor of economics of the Middle East at Philipps-Universitat Marburg in Germany, the naval blockade creates a new situation in which traditional sanctions packages are combined with the use of military force to generate a physical shortage of goods in the Iranian economy.

“This is an additional burden that raises new questions for policymakers in Tehran: Should they choose a deal whose terms are dictated by the Trump administration, or should they continue the armed conflict to break the blockade of the ports? It currently seems that Iran is leaning toward the second option,” he told Al Jazeera.

Farzanegan said that for the US to achieve its goals, namely changing the behaviour of the Iranian government, it should also “open a diplomatic exit and offer it as an option”.

If armed conflict does fully resume, he said “the costs will not be confined to the target of sanctions; the global economy will also pay a price” through continued disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and attacks across the region.

Iran emphasises MoU commitments

Meanwhile, talks have stalled in finding a way out of the war, although Iran’s negotiations have been ongoing with Oman and other mediators over a potential temporary arrangement in the Strait of Hormuz, where one-fifth of the global oil and natural gas used to flow before the war.

Iran’s parliament speaker and top negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, told state media on Tuesday that the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed until the US meets the conditions of the now-expired MoU.

“Let me state clearly: Until the commitments made by the United States in the memorandum of understanding, including the lifting of the blockade, the release of frozen assets, the lifting of oil sanctions, the end of threats and military operations on all fronts, and other conditions to which America agreed in the memorandum, are implemented, the strait will not be opened,” Ghalibaf said.

With tensions soaring before the war, Iran’s government delegated some authorities to border provinces to import essential goods and build up inventories.

To survive the blockade over recent months, Iran has also focused more on rerouting imports of food, consumer goods and industrial inputs through land borders with Pakistan, Turkiye and others, as well as through the Caspian Sea with Russia and Central Asia.

During the brief ceasefire period established under the MoU, the blockade was lifted for several weeks in late June and early July, enabling the rapid export of oil stored on board supertankers and giving the military time to regroup.

But Iran’s oil exports have stopped once again since the breakdown of the deal, and US and Israeli authorities have discussed disrupting Iran’s inland imports to ramp up the pressure.

The mounting pressure has only exacerbated Iran’s structural economic issues, rooted in decades of domestic corruption and mismanagement, as well as sanctions and international isolation.

For the country’s roughly 90 million people, the consequences include persistent inflation, insecure and poorly paid work, declining purchasing power and growing uncertainty about the future.

Against this backdrop, President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration this week named stabilising markets, protecting livelihoods and strengthening national resilience as its priorities for the next two years.

However, Mahdi Ghodsi, a senior economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, said Iran’s prolonged stagnation over most of the past 15 years suggested that government policy had not been aligned with those objectives.

He told Al Jazeera that to guarantee sustainable economic growth, the Islamic Republic would have to reduce confrontation with the US, the West and Israel while pursuing meaningful domestic reforms that would involve moving away from coercive social controls to restore some public trust.

“Without both external de-escalation and domestic political reform, the government may be able to slow the deterioration in living standards and market conditions, but it is unlikely to deliver durable stability, stronger livelihoods or genuine national resilience,” Ghodsi said.

Energy in the crosshairs

US media outlets have reported that Washington’s forthcoming measures against Iran could include sanctioning additional independent Chinese refineries – known as “teapots” – that buy or process Iranian crude.

OFAC has already imposed secondary sanctions on smaller China- and Hong Kong-based entities processing Iranian oil money, but it could go a major step further by following through on its threat of designating larger Chinese banks if they touch Iran-linked funds.

That move risks prompting a response from China, at a time when Washington is concerned about curtailed exports of critical minerals.

Economist Ghodsi said energy remained the most powerful source of US leverage over Iran, particularly after US and Israeli attacks damaged the country’s infrastructure.

“If the blockade persists into autumn and winter, the country risks severe supply shortages. Iran was already struggling with electricity, gas and water imbalances before this shock; further constraints would mean deeper rationing and temporary shutdowns in industry to preserve household supply,” he said.

The government has also reduced some subsidised petrol quotas for personal vehicles and has been considering raising fuel costs – after an earlier increase last December. Necessary but costly fuel imports amounting to several billion dollars per year have stopped as a result of the war and blockade.

Ghodsi said that is why the US would likely target Iran’s external energy trade, involving maritime transport, shipping services, insurance, payments and the foreign buyers and intermediaries that keep those flows operating.

“In practice, that means tighter enforcement against entities in China and elsewhere that facilitate sanctioned energy transactions, together with closer scrutiny of trans-shipment and payment routes through neighbouring countries and other trade partners,” he said.

A potentially very strong El Niño is emerging as a major risk for global agricultural markets, threatening to disrupt rainfall, raise temperatures and expose some of the world’s most important tropical crops to severe weather stress.

The U.S. Climate Prediction Center now sees a greater than 90% chance of a very strong El Niño during the northern hemisphere autumn and winter of 2026 to 2027. For commodity markets, the concern is not simply that El Niño causes drought. Its effects vary sharply by region, meaning excessive rainfall in one major producing country can occur alongside extreme dryness in another.

That makes the phenomenon particularly important for soft commodities such as cocoa, coffee and sugar, whose production is concentrated in climate sensitive tropical regions.

Why El Niño matters for commodity markets

El Niño occurs when sea surface temperatures in the eastern Pacific become unusually warm as trade winds weaken. The pattern generally lasts between nine and 12 months and can alter global temperature and rainfall patterns.

For farmers, the problem is timing. Crops can be damaged not only by drought but also by excessive rainfall, heat, fungal disease and disrupted flowering or harvesting cycles.

This year’s potential El Niño also arrives at an unusually difficult moment for agricultural producers. Farmers are already dealing with higher fertiliser and diesel costs linked to the U.S. Israeli war on Iran. Another major weather shock could therefore amplify existing production pressures.

Historically, strong El Niño episodes have been associated with substantial increases in soft commodity prices. But the effects differ considerably between crops.

Cocoa faces one of the clearest risks

Cocoa appears particularly vulnerable because production is heavily concentrated in a relatively small number of countries.

Ivory Coast and Ghana together account for roughly half of global cocoa production, while Ecuador is the third largest producer. All three can experience significant El Niño related weather disruptions.

Every strong El Niño over the past 55 years has reduced cocoa output, according to WisdomTree.

The previous El Niño illustrates why the relationship is more complicated than simply associating the phenomenon with drought. During the initial phase of the 2023 to 2024 event, West Africa experienced unusually heavy rainfall. Excess moisture contributed to fungal disease affecting cocoa trees.

Conditions subsequently shifted toward intense heat and unusually dry Harmattan winds. Trees weakened by disease struggled to flower, further damaging production.

That sequence demonstrates the real danger for cocoa: El Niño can produce multiple weather shocks during the same crop cycle.

The consequences can quickly reach global consumers. Cocoa prices nearly tripled in 2024 after the West African harvest failed, eventually exceeding $12,000 per metric ton.

A very strong El Niño could therefore revive fears of another supply deficit if weather conditions deteriorate across major growing regions.

Coffee faces a divided outlook

Coffee presents a more complicated picture because the world’s two major varieties are concentrated in different regions.

Robusta coffee is particularly exposed to El Niño because Vietnam and Indonesia, which together account for about half of global robusta production, typically experience higher temperatures and reduced rainfall under the weather pattern.

The timing is especially important. Dry conditions can hit these countries during crop development, with the consequences becoming visible during harvesting later in the year.

Citi analysts warned that dryness in Vietnam and Indonesia could significantly reduce robusta yields.

Arabica coffee presents a different picture.

Brazil, responsible for nearly half of global arabica production, can initially benefit from warmer conditions because they reduce the risk of damaging winter frosts.

But that advantage could prove temporary. El Niño typically brings hotter and drier conditions to Brazilian coffee growing regions later in the year, when the next crop is developing.

That creates the possibility of a delayed supply shock in 2027.

Sugar could be the exception

Sugar demonstrates why El Niño does not automatically translate into a bullish commodity market.

Brazil, the world’s largest sugar exporter, can experience heavier rainfall during the second half of the year. Excessive rain can disrupt harvesting and affect sugar quality.

India and Thailand face the opposite problem. El Niño generally reduces rainfall during the summer monsoon, creating additional pressure on production.

India is already expecting its lowest monsoon rainfall in 11 years, at around 90% of the long-term average. Hedgepoint estimates that even a moderate El Niño could reduce Indian sugar production by around 1 million metric tons.

Yet there is an important counterweight.

El Niño’s wetter conditions in Brazil could ultimately support the country’s following sugar crop. Since Brazil accounts for roughly half of global sugar exports, stronger Brazilian production could offset losses elsewhere.

That means sugar may not experience the same sustained price pressure as cocoa or robusta coffee.

The bigger problem is climate uncertainty

The most important market implication is not simply whether El Niño becomes “very strong.” It is where its effects materialise and when.

Agricultural markets operate on highly specific growing cycles. Rain arriving at the wrong stage can be just as damaging as drought. Excessive rainfall can create disease, while heat can interfere with flowering and crop development.

Climate change further complicates the picture.

The relationship between El Niño and agricultural weather is becoming harder to interpret because rising global temperatures can intensify the consequences of existing climate patterns. A weather event that might previously have produced manageable stress can now occur against a much hotter baseline.

This means commodity traders increasingly have to price not just the probability of El Niño, but the interaction between El Niño, climate change and already strained agricultural supply chains.

What could happen to prices?

The clearest risk is concentrated in cocoa and robusta coffee, where production is particularly exposed to adverse conditions in major growing countries.

Cocoa has perhaps the greatest vulnerability because West Africa dominates global supply and has already experienced serious weather related production problems. Another major disruption could quickly tighten inventories and push prices higher.

Robusta coffee faces a similar risk if drought develops across Vietnam and Indonesia.

Sugar is more balanced. Production losses in India and Thailand could be partly or potentially substantially offset by improved Brazilian conditions for the following crop.

The broader lesson is that El Niño is not a uniform commodity shock. It redistributes weather risks across producing regions, creating winners and losers within the same market.

Why consumers should care

The effects will ultimately extend beyond commodity exchanges.

Higher cocoa prices can increase chocolate production costs. Coffee shortages can raise prices for roasters and consumers, while sugar disruptions can affect everything from beverages to processed foods.

And because agricultural markets are interconnected, a weather shock in one producing region can encourage buyers to compete more aggressively for supplies elsewhere.

The potential super El Niño therefore arrives at a particularly sensitive moment for global food markets.

If forecasts prove correct, the next several months could test whether commodity markets have adequately priced the risks of increasingly volatile weather.

The real threat is not El Niño alone. It is El Niño hitting an agricultural system already under pressure from rising costs, concentrated production and a changing climate.

With information from Reuters.

By chaining bilateral naval exercises across a widening circle of partners — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and now Indonesia — Beijing is not assembling an alliance. It is manufacturing the impression that a Chinese warship’s presence near every regional flashpoint, including the waters off Taiwan, is unremarkable.

On July 29th, the Indonesian frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai wrapped up a two-day naval drill with the Russian navy in Vladivostok, part of Exercise Orruda 2026. Two weeks later, on August 12th, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that the same ship, on its way home, would run a “passing exercise” with a Chinese frigate, the Honghe — not in Indonesian waters, not in the South China Sea, but east of Taiwan. Jakarta’s navy described it in the blandest terms available: communications drills, a resupply run, “a universal naval tradition.” Taipei was not reassured. Taiwan’s foreign ministry said it “sternly condemns” the move and complained that Beijing had “unilaterally claimed” Indonesian participation before Jakarta had said a word about where, or why, this was happening.

That gap — between Jakarta’s shrug and Taipei’s alarm — is the story. It is also a useful corrective to how most coverage of Chinese naval activity is currently framed. The default lens is bilateral and confrontational: China versus the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal, China versus Japan around the Senkakus, China versus Taiwan in the Strait. That lens catches real events, but it misses the connective tissue between them — a growing schedule of joint drills with third parties, each one small and individually deniable as “routine,” that collectively do something the confrontational track cannot: they make China’s presence in the surrounding water look normal to everyone except the state it is actually disputing with.

Indonesia and China have their own maritime dispute: Beijing’s nine-dash line overlaps Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands, and Chinese fishing incursions there froze bilateral naval drills between 2015 and 2021. Those “Sharp Knife” exercises resumed in 2021 and have picked up pace since 2024. That history matters, but it is not what explains this month’s drill, because this drill did not happen anywhere near Natuna. It happened off Taiwan — waters Indonesia has no claim to and, until now, no naval presence in alongside China. Indonesia is simply the newest and most sensitive addition to a list that already includes Russia (the mature anchor partnership, most recently “Joint Sea-2026” in July), Malaysia (“Peace and Friendship 2025” in the Strait of Malacca last October), Cambodia (“Golden Dragon” at the newly built Ream Naval Base logistics center last spring), Thailand (“Blue Strike” and “Falcon Strike,” the latter launched again this month), and Vietnam (a Beibu Gulf coast guard and navy patrol series now past its fortieth iteration). All of this sits alongside a separate, unilateral track — a 100-plus-vessel show of force spanning the Yellow Sea to the western Pacific last December, and routine coast guard patrols around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.

The claim of this piece is that these two tracks are not separate stories about Chinese assertiveness. They are one story, working in tandem: the unilateral patrols draw the lines, and the bilateral drills erase them, by training a widening circle of regional navies — and the publics who read about them — to treat a Chinese warship’s presence near contested space as routine bilateral traffic rather than a signal.

The Indonesia case is the clearest evidence yet, because the location was Beijing’s choice, not Jakarta’s. Indonesia had no dispute-driven reason to be operating near Taiwan; its dispute with China sits in the Natuna Sea, hundreds of miles away. What Jakarta had was a frigate already at sea, returning from Russia, and a willingness to let Beijing choose the itinerary’s final leg. Global Times, writing for a domestic Chinese audience, called the drill’s timing “of great significance” — language China’s defense ministry does not use for routine port calls. The exercise also landed in the same week that Elbridge Colby, the U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy, was in Jakarta courting Indonesia’s alignment. Chaining a Chinese passing exercise onto the tail of an Indonesian-Russian one, in waters adjacent to the most dangerous flashpoint in the region, at the exact moment Washington was making its own pitch, is not the profile of a routine bilateral courtesy call.

The strongest objection to this argument comes from analysts of Malaysia’s drills with China, who point out that Kuala Lumpur treats “Peace and Friendship” as a hedging tool it controls, not a concession Beijing extracted — the exercises are deliberately unsophisticated (humanitarian assistance, counter-piracy, no live fire), and Malaysia’s own defense establishment remains wary of Chinese assertiveness even as it participates. That is a fair description of Malaysia’s intent, and it likely holds for Cambodia and Thailand too: these governments are managing great-power competition on their own terms, not capitulating to it. But intent on the partner’s side does not determine the effect on Beijing’s side. Whatever Kuala Lumpur or Phnom Penh tell their own publics, every additional bilateral drill lowers the diplomatic and psychological cost, for Beijing, of being seen operating a warship near water someone else disputes. Indonesia’s case shows why that distinction matters: Jakarta’s intent was almost certainly routine — a frigate coming home. Beijing’s was not. It picked the coordinates.

None of this means China is close to fielding a formal coalition in the NATO sense; nothing here involves interoperability, shared command, or mutual defense. What it means is narrower and, in some ways, more useful to Beijing: a maintenance routine that makes normalization cumulative rather than a single dramatic claim to defend. Each additional partner adds one more government that has, at least once, treated a joint Chinese naval presence near contested water as unremarkable — and one more precedent for the next invitation.

The guest list is also instructive. The one claimant conspicuously absent from it is the Philippines — the country with the loudest ongoing disputes with Beijing, at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, and the one treaty ally the United States has directly on the South China Sea’s rim. Manila gets unilateral coercion, not invitations: coast guard patrols, water-cannon incidents, and jamming, rather than passing exercises. Every partner on the actual list — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia — either has no U.S. mutual defense treaty or, like Thailand, treats its treaty commitments as dormant rather than active. That is not a coincidence; it is a selection criterion. Beijing is not inviting the states most capable of resisting the normalization effect. It is inviting the states most likely to accept it, and saving coercion for the one state structurally immune to the charm offensive.

What happens next

Base case (roughly 55 percent).  The Indonesia relationship deepens but recalibrates location. A higher-tempo revival of the Sharp Knife series continues, concentrated in Indonesian or South China Sea-adjacent waters near Natuna rather than repeated performances off Taiwan. Jakarta absorbs the diplomatic cost of this month’s episode privately — quiet reassurances to Taipei and Washington — while keeping the relationship with Beijing intact. The key assumption: the backlash from Taiwan and the attention from Washington made a second Taiwan-adjacent rerun more costly to Jakarta than its benefit to Beijing.

Downside case.  Beijing repeats the chaining tactic with a second partner within the next twelve months, most plausibly Brunei — the quietest South China Sea claimant, which in February 2025 already agreed to joint oil-and-gas development with Beijing in disputed waters it claims. A first-ever Brunei-China passing exercise, timed to overlap with a Brunei exercise involving another power and staged near a genuinely contested reef rather than international water, would confirm this is a repeatable playbook rather than an Indonesia-specific improvisation — and would be far harder for the U.S. and Japan to counter, since Brunei has never been a vocal claimant to rally around.

Upside case.  Taiwan’s public condemnation, paired with Washington’s trilateral drills with Australia and the Philippines, hardens into an explicit regional habit of naming the chaining tactic itself — not just the individual exercise — making it reputationally costly for the next candidate partner to accept the choreography. The coalition-of-drills strategy stalls not because China stops asking, but because fewer navies say yes.

The takeaway

Beijing did not build a coalition off Taiwan this month; it borrowed one, for two days, from a country with no stake in the fight. That is a cheaper and more durable tool than a formal alliance would be, and it will not show up as a single dramatic escalation — it will show up as a pattern, one passing exercise at a time.

Watch for:  whether Indonesia’s navy does it again, and where. A repeat performance near another sensitive location within the next two quarters would confirm the pattern; a retreat to home waters would suggest Jakarta drew its own line. Watch, too, whether Brunei’s navy — quiet for decades — puts to sea with a Chinese frigate for the first time following its 2025 oil-and-gas pledge in disputed waters.

Root, England’s greatest batter and a veteran of 166 Tests, said he hoped his “natural persona” is suited to bringing a sense of calm to the men’s national team.

Off-field issues dominated last winter’s tours, including an incident involving Harry Brook being punched by a nightclub bouncer in Wellington and the team’s drinking during a mid-Ashes trip to Noosa, culminating in a heavy 4-1 defeat by Australia.

The issues continued into the summer when Stokes broke a team curfew, setting in motion a chaotic six weeks that resulted in a 2-1 series defeat by New Zealand, Stokes’ retirement and the sacking of McCullum.

Fellow New Zealander Stephen Fleming has been appointed as McCullum’s replacement, but batting coach Marcus Trescothick will take interim charge of the Test side for the three-match series against Pakistan.

Root, who has already led England in 65 Tests having held the role between 2017 and 2022, said one of his “big challenges” is “trying not to be Ben Stokes”.

“He is a very unique player with unbelievable qualities that I don’t think are easy to replicate,” Root said. “I don’t think there is any point trying to.

“It is going to have a slightly different look to it but that is OK.

“There has been a lot of good stuff that has happened in the past four years that will serve us really well.

“It is about not ripping it up, just fine tuning and evolving that and taking that to the next level. We have got to find a way of evolving the team without him.”

More to follow

The Rohingya of Myanmar have faced decades of discrimination and forced displacement, and a case alleging genocide now sits before the International Court of Justice.

This film describes how military regimes rewrote citizenship laws to exclude Rohingya from registers and used identity documents, checkpoints and travel permits to control movement. It also highlights how segregation, incitement and continuing waves of violence normalised their erasure from the community.

Focusing on the 2016-2017 “clearance operations”, the film documents village burnings, mass killings and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to Bangladesh. Through survivor testimony and interviews with officials and legal experts, Myanmar: The Architecture of Statelessness examines whether these crimes meet the legal threshold for genocide, how Myanmar defends itself against the allegation and what is ultimately at stake when the court delivers its verdict.

The U.S. Army is on track to stand up a new battalion equipped with the Patriot surface-to-air missile system on Guam in October. The unit will also have Enduring Shield, a lower-tier air defense system that currently uses the AIM-9X Sidewinder as its interceptor. This is a major step forward in the U.S. military’s years-long effort to bolster air and missile defenses on the extremely strategic U.S. island territory in the Western Pacific. It is also a significant development for the Army’s Patriot force, which continues to be worryingly overstretched due to heavy operational demands, something TWZ calls attention to regularly.

The new Army air defense unit on Guam will be designated 3rd Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment (3-43rd ADA). It will be under the purview, at least in part, of the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command (94th AAMDC) headquartered at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii.

“So, over the past couple of years, we’ve been working to increase the level of protection on Guam. In the past, we’ve had the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] battery there, and of course, Aegis BMD [ballistic missile defense capable] ship[s],” Army Col. Matt Dalton, Deputy Commander of the 94th AAMDC, said last week. “We’ve been working the past few years to increase that to provide a 360-degree defense, cruise missile defense, of the homeland [on Guam].”

Dalton was speaking during a panel discussion at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, at which TWZ was in attendance. An Army unit, known as Task Force Talon, has operated the THAAD battery on Guam since 2013.

“What does that entail? Construction, planning, barracks, housing, defense design, coordinating with the local authorities in the joint community, the governor’s office, FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] – so many, many things over the last couple of years,” he continued. “I think right now what we’re seeing is we’re starting to see the fruits of all that labor. This summer, the battalion commander arrived. This fall, 3-43rd ADA will stand up in October. Currently, there are about 120 or so soldiers specifically for that battalion on [the] island, on top of the the soldiers already there for the THAAD battery. And then over the next few months, we’re going to see the delivery of the weapon system.”

“The battalion will have both the Patriot Missile System and IFPC, or mobile ground-based launchers, which they will integrate to provide 360-degree, layered air and missile defense for Guam as part of our expansion to the defensive architecture to better protect everyone living there,” an Army spokesperson told TWZ when asked for more information about the “weapon system” Col. Dalton had referred to.

IFPC stands for Indirect Fire Protection Capability. IFPC dates back to the early 2000s, but the Army transitioned to the second phase, or Increment 2, of the program in 2021. That, in turn, led to the acquisition of the Enduring Shield system, which is primarily intended to help defend against cruise missiles and drones. We will come back to this in a moment.

Whether the Patriot systems headed for 3-43rd ADA are new-production assets or available with the Army’s existing inventory as part of a reorganization of other units is unclear, and TWZ has reached back out for more details. At the time of writing, the service is known to have 15 operational Patriot battalions, as well as two more that are non-deployable dedicated training units. A typical one of these battalions consists of a headquarters element and between three and five firing batteries. A single Patriot firing battery can have up to eight trailer-mounted launchers, along with a fire control radar and other supporting equipment.

“We know we have to grow that [Patriot force]. We have plans on the table to build a 16th, 17th, and 18th [battalions],” now-retired Army Gen. James Mingus, then the service’s Vice Chief of Staff, said last year. “And that’s not to include the Patriot battalion that we’re going to put in Guam as part of the Guam defense system.”

At that time, the Army general also talked about the possibility of future composite battalions with Patriot and IFPC/Enduring Shield systems. The Army also has plans to establish nine dedicated IFPC/Enduring Shield battalions.

“The IFPC battalions that are coming online will help offset that [demand for Patriot] as well, even though it’s not quite the same capability,” Mingus said. “In some environments, that [IFPC] actually is more appropriate to apply than a full-up Patriot battalion.”

Recent fighting with Iran has underscored the challenges posed by barrages that include a high-low threat mix. Furthermore, lower-tier IFPC/Enduring Shield systems can also provide critical defense for high-tier air defense assets like Patriot and THAAD, which are themselves high-priority targets for adversaries.

How many IFPC/Enduring Shield systems will be assigned to 3-43rd ADA is also unclear. The Army has said in the past that a typical IFPC/Enduring Shield platoon, multiple of which would be contained with a single battery, consists of four launchers linked to at least one AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel-series radar via the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) network. In their current form, each palletized launcher can be loaded with up to 18 AIM-9Xs. The Army is working to fielding at least one new interceptor for IFPC/Enduring Shield, primarily to help improve the system’s ability to defeat ever-more capable supersonic cruise missiles, though it would also boost its capabilities more broadly.

As an aside, the Army moved to acquire IFPC/Enduring Shield after deciding not to adopt a service-specific version of the Israeli Iron Dome system. An Iron Dome system was briefly deployed to Guam in 2021 as a test.

3-43rd ADA is still just one part of the larger plan to bolster air and missile defenses on the island as part of what is currently called the Guam Defense System (GDS). A prototype of a ground-based launch system based on the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) used on various U.S. and foreign warships has already been emplaced on the island. There have been plans, at least in the past, for a Guam-specific version of the Aegis Ashore system that use Mk 41-based launchers to fire Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors.

Guam is also getting an entirely new sensor architecture as part of the GDS. Work to date has included the establishment of a radar site with a prototype AN/TPY-6, a design derived from Lockheed Martin’s AN/SPY-7 Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in Alaska. Questions about the future of the AN/TPY-6 have been raised in the past, but it was still in place as of July.

The Army has also previously deployed a Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) to Guam. LTAMDS can be used as a standalone sensor, but also intended as next-generation radar for Patriot, and it could easily be tied with 3-43rd’s other assets when the battalion stands up later this year.

“So instead of what we have today, with our Q-series [AN/MPQ-65] radars that have about a 270-view look, which grows – or, kind of negates how much coverage that you can have, the new LTAMDS is 360 [degrees],” Gen. Mingus said last year. “It also goes from about 85 kilometers [close to 53 miles] up and 85 kilometers out to 300 by 300 [kilometers; around 186 miles]. So [it] greatly expands the range, the altitude, and it’s a 360.”

In works since 2021, the overall GDS plan reflects the extremely strategic position Guam occupies in the Western Pacific and the growing threats the island faces. As we previously wrote:

“Since 2021, expanding air and missile defenses on Guam has been a centerpiece of larger U.S. military efforts to reorient itself to preparing for future large-scale conflicts, especially a potential high-end fight with China in the Pacific. Guam is a vital hub for U.S. air and naval operations in the Western Pacific. It is also an important location for staging ground forces for onward movement across the region. In turn, being able to adequately protect key facilities on the island, including Andersen Air Force Base, Naval Base Guam, and Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz, especially from a growing array of Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic threats, is seen as critical. Various tiers of drones are also a real and still evolving threat. Guam could be a target for other adversaries, as well. Concerns about increasingly longer-range North Korean ballistic missiles prompted Task Force Talon’s initial deployment more than a decade ago.”

As mentioned, the Army establishing a new Patriot battalion, even one also equipped in part with IFPC/Enduring Shield is a significant development in of itself. The service’s existing Patriot force has been heavily in demand, and under significant strain as a result, for years, most recently due to the ongoing conflict with Iran. TWZ routinely highlights the worryingly inadequate capacity of the Army’s existing Patriot battalions to meet operational requirements now, let alone should a high-end fight, such as one against China in the Pacific, break out.

The PATRIOT Missile in Action

At the same time, work to establish the 3-43rd ADA highlights continued challenges the Army faces in bolstering its Patriot force, as well as its air and missile defense capabilities and capacity more broadly. As noted, it will have taken more than a year just to stand up this composite battalion on Guam, which will also be dedicated to defense of the island. The Army’s timeline for establishing the three other planned Patriot battalions is unclear. Prime contractor Raytheon is itself under immense strain to meet existing global orders for new Patriot systems due to competing priorities, and not just ones emanating from the United States. Last year, Switzerland saw its orders for new Patriot batteries deferred to meet urgent requests from Ukraine, and authorities in Geneva subsequently raised the prospect of canceling the deal altogether as a result of the delays.

Patriot systems also need stocks of interceptors to go along with them, and this has also become its own area of serious concern, especially in light of heavy expenditures in fighting with Iran. Transfers to Ukraine have also had significant impacts on U.S. stockpiles, as well as those of other countries. Questions have been raised about the ability of Raytheon and Lockheed Martin to meet still-growing demand for PAC-2 and PAC-3-series Patriot interceptors, respectively. These are long-lead items that take years to deliver. Both companies have been working to bolster their production capacity, but it will take time for this to translate into increased deliveries. Lockheed Martin is now also developing a lower-cost PAC-3 variant, called the Adapted Capability Effector (ACE), which it sees as another way to help boost total production. Just this year, the Army put in its first order for a new-production batch of older PAC-2 interceptors in more than three decades, further underscoring the current level of demand.

The establishment of 3-43rd ADA on Guam in October will still be an important development. At the same time, there is still much work to be done before the Army meets its larger goals for a sorely needed expansion of its Patriot force.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

New Delhi, India — On August 13, Abdul Hafeez returned to the primary school he once went to, in Karisunda, a village in Bankura district in the eastern Indian state of West Bengal.

The 26-year-old was visiting his alma mater as part of a campaign by the Cockroach Janata Party, a popular Indian pressure group, to audit conditions of the country’s under-funded, often dilapidated government-run schools.

The CJP had just succeeded in forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s education minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, in July, after a 37-day sit-in in the national capital that prompted antigovernment Gen Z protests across the country.

But in Bankura, things would turn deadly. Hours after Hafeez’s visit to his school, he alleged that local workers of Modi’s Hindu majoritarian Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) arrived at his home and assaulted him and his father, Mohammad Mafik. Two days later, Hafeez’s 51-year-old father died from his injuries.

On Sunday, Suvendu Adhikari, the chief minister of BJP-ruled West Bengal, said the attackers were “criminals with no BJP connection” and assured action.

But a day after burying his father, Hafeez told Al Jazeera that he stands firm in calling for accountability and reforms in government-run schools. “We will fight for justice for my father, but these attacks will not stop us from demanding better education,” he said.

That demand marks a new line in the sand for the CJP. Fresh from successfully forcing Modi and his government onto the defensive — the Indian PM has only rarely sacked ministers even in the face of credible accusations of wrongdoing or public pressure — the group has now announced its next battleground: India’s public-funded schools.

CJP leaders have asked their supporters, who thronged the protests in New Delhi from different parts of the country, to visit their nearby schools and audit their conditions.

They are working around a basic four-point checklist for what the CJP is calling its Fix the Schools campaign: drinking water and functional toilets; electricity and usable classrooms; boundary walls and campus safety; and midday meals and teacher attendance.

And the murder of Hafeez’s father has raised the already high stakes in a battle between the well-oiled machinery of Modi’s BJP and the fledgling, thin-on-organisation CJP.

“Abdul went to inspect the [government] school in Bengal where he once studied,” said Abhijeet Dipke, founder of the CJP. “It makes my blood boil that people are being murdered simply for demanding better schools.”

‘A disruptive change’

Ashutosh Ranka, a co-convenor of the Cockroach group, appeared emotional after meeting Hafeez’s family on Monday. He told reporters that the group proposed to press the government for compensation; however, Hafeez requested that a school be named after his father.

In Rajasthan, Ranka’s home state in western India, the group has faced other challenges.

Ranka joined a sit-in with primary school students in Alwar district on August 14 to demand additional rooms, clean toilets and drinking water. Local publications reported that the officials accepted the demands.

On Sunday, the Rajasthan government, also led by Modi’s BJP, imposed restrictions on so-called outsiders entering government schools and on taking photos and videos, citing students’ privacy.

The government notice, which ordered the school management to pursue criminal action against such surveys, came after Ranka had announced visits by CJP volunteers across the state.

Samina Bano, an education-policy expert who has advised several Indian states on reforms, told Al Jazeera that “it is essentially the system itself that is not working anymore for the people”.

In the last 10 years, Bano said, she had found “drunk teachers on duty during spot checks”, fake appointments in rural areas that many teachers do not want to go to, and other systemic failures that she insisted are common in the Indian public school system.

“Education in government-run schools a sorry state of affairs.
 It requires a disruptive change,” Bano said.

“The real problem is the quality of teaching, learning outcomes and the food,” Bano added, crediting the Cockroach pressure group for bringing the demands for reform into mainstream politics.

“They are bringing it into the discourse, but once people start demanding, there needs to be actual institution building, and that’s different work altogether,” Bano said. “There has to be an appetite to reimagine public education in India.”

‘Playing to strength’

After Gen Z protesters returned from the streets in New Delhi, the internet was instead flooded with videos of school-going children asking for better facilities across several states. They were blocking roads, circling local administration offices and fighting with bureaucrats.

The Cockroach party tapped into the momentum and announced its next phase in a smart mobilisation strategy, said Asim Ali, a political analyst in New Delhi.

“It plays to their strength of leveraging social media. Without many volunteers [like a traditional political party], they can outsource the grassroots work to followers on social media itself,” he said.

“By leveraging the power of social media, which is now felt in the remotest of corners in India, the Cockroach party has dramatically driven down organisational resource costs of a movement,” Ali added.

But Ali cautioned that this approach of relying on volunteers without political or organisational skills, protest experience or institutional support also exposes them to violence, as happened with the Hafeez family in West Bengal.

Yet the blood spilled in the eastern state hasn’t dimmed the drive from the CJP to demand accountability from authorities.

On Tuesday, Ranka announced on X that multiple venues in West Bengal’s capital Kolkata had cancelled or refused permission to the CJP to hold meet-ups with students.

“This only reinforces the fact that the BJP is scared from the cockroaches,” he wrote. “Cockroaches of Bengal will continue to visit govt schools and push the Bengal govt to get them fixed.

“The more you stop us, the bigger we become.”

Supreme Court grants jailed ex-PM Imran Khan transfer to hospital for nearly a month after concerns were raised over his blood pressure.

Islamabad, Pakistan — Pakistan’s Supreme Court on Tuesday ordered the transfer of Imran Khan, former prime minister and founder of the opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, from Rawalpindi’s Adiala prison to Islamabad’s Shifa International Hospital within two days, accepting a demand his party had been making for months.

Uzair Bhandari, one of Khan’s lawyers, told Al Jazeera the three-member bench also ordered a medical board be formed to oversee Khan’s treatment, including the ex-prime minister’s sister, Dr Uzma Khan, and his personal physician, Dr Faisal Sultan.

“The court also directed that Khan’s family be allowed to meet him at the hospital and that he be permitted to speak with his sons, who live abroad,” Bhandari said.

The next hearing has been fixed for September 16, and Khan should remain hospitalised until at least then as per the order, according to the lawyer. This will be the longest period that Khan will be physically outside jail premises since he was imprisoned in August 2023, convicted in several corruption-related cases that he and his party insist are politically motivated.

The order followed a report Adiala jail’s superintendent submitted to the court on Monday, detailing a cardiac board’s August 10 review of Khan, 73, which recorded fluctuating blood pressure and anxiety linked to restricted contact with his family.

During Tuesday’s hearing, the court pressed Pakistan’s advocate general over gaps in the report, saying Khan’s “pulse and heart condition were not normal” and that his vital organs “had started being affected”.

Courts had twice declined similar transfer requests since February, including an Islamabad High Court ruling that ordered a medical board’s assessment instead.

Zulfi Bukhari, a senior PTI leader, told Al Jazeera the ruling reinforced the party’s longstanding position that Khan needed independent, specialised treatment outside Adiala jail.

“Medical care provided within the prison system is no substitute for a thorough evaluation by independent specialists of his choosing,” he said, adding that PTI had consistently called for Khan’s transfer to Shifa International and access to his own doctors.

Government officials have insisted any transfer required judicial authorisation rather than executive discretion.

Rana Sanaullah, adviser to the prime minister, told the Senate on Monday that Khan was receiving “the best available medical treatment” and that his condition did not support PTI’s concerns.

The order lands amid a wider standoff over access to Khan, which PTI has increasingly framed as the precondition for reviving talks with the government. The government, for its part, has renewed efforts to engage in dialogue but to no avail as yet, while PTI leadership has announced a countrywide protest on September 27.

The attacks injured at least three people, including a girl, and damaged a Wildberries warehouse, Russian officials say.

Russian officials have reported more than 620 overnight drones targeting Moscow, in what appears to be one of Ukraine’s largest attacks on the Russian capital in years.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said Russian defences shot down 180 drones over the capital region between Monday evening and ‌5am (02:00 GMT) on Tuesday. He said 17 more drones were shot down en route to the capital later.

Russia’s state-run news agency TASS described the barrage as the largest drone attack on Moscow in the past two years.

The drone attack wounded three people, including a 10-year-old girl, Moscow region’s Governor Andrey Vorobyov said on Telegram. He said the “most serious consequences” were reported in the Pavlovsky Posad district, where a house burned down. Several more homes and a guesthouse were damaged in Bogorodsky district, he added.

A warehouse east of Moscow belonging to e-commerce giant Wildberries was damaged in Tuesday’s drone assault. In a statement, the company said its logistics complex sustained “minor damage” after “debris hit the wall of the building”.

Ukraine has struck multiple Wildberries warehouses in recent weeks, saying the company supplies components for Russian drones.

Five injured in Ukraine’s Kharkiv

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian air force reported shooting down or suppressing 111 of 147 “enemy” drone attacks overnight.

Kharkiv’s regional Governor Oleh Syniehubov said five people, including a nine-year-old boy, were injured in an overnight Russian attack on the city of Izyum.

Russian drones also sparked fires and damaged buildings in Kyiv region’s Brovary city, including an office building and warehouses, said Mayor Ihor Sapozhko.

With front-line fighting at a near standstill and talks frozen, Ukraine and Russia have significantly stepped up long-distance attacks, pushing the civilian death toll to its highest levels since the war’s first months in 2022.

In July alone, 437 civilians were killed in Ukraine, the highest monthly toll since May 2022, according to a United Nations tally.

Russian authorities reported 79 civilians killed in Ukrainian attacks in July, up from the previous month.