NEWS

With the U.S. Air Force now in the process of transitioning from the aging EC-130H Compass Call to the brand-new, bizjet-based EA-37B Compass Call, TWZ caught up with top executives from the two co-primes on the electronic attack aircraft program. In the process, we learnt more about its capabilities, related platforms, and other prospects for the future. We spoke with Jason Lambert, president of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sector (ISR) at L3Harris Technologies, and Dave Harrold, who leads the Countermeasure & Electromagnetic Attack (CEMA) Solutions business area at BAE Systems.

TWZ: Can you give us a better understanding of what the EA-37B Compass Call does conceptually? There are clearly a lot of different parts to its mission, so I am just interested to hear that in your words.

Dave Harrold: This aircraft is the Department of War’s only long-range, electromagnetic spectrum aircraft. Interestingly enough, it used to be called the EC-37B until it was formally changed to the EA-37B, signifying that it is a dedicated electronic attack platform.

When I say electronic attack, what we’re talking about is really degrading, denying, and disrupting adversary communications. It’s about causing havoc in their command-and-control system, so that adversary leaders are unable to make clear decisions. So that’s about integrated air defense systems [IADS] and disruptions there. It’s about [disrupting] different communication nodes. This really is a dedicated counter-C5ISRT [command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting] platform. We’ve been doing this mission set for over 40 years with the EC-130H workhorse starring in every conflict since it was put in the inventory, particularly in the Global War on Terror.

We saw the need to be able to do that at a higher altitude, longer range, higher speed, if we were going to turn this capability toward other regions. And so the challenge was really around: how do you take all of that stuff on an EC-130H and package it down to an EA-37B? That has been a challenge of innovation and technology, for us to reimagine: how do you take that size and weight and reduce it, but not reduce the power? Because we need that power to be able to execute the kinds of techniques that we’re doing on the system. So really, it’s about controlling the electromagnetic spectrum, making sure we can enable our side and disable the other side.

Electromagnetic warfare, evolved

Jason Lambert: The EA-37B does that really on a theater level. There are other capability sets that the Department of War has in their inventory that are more of a point solution, whereas this is really a theater-level, strategic solution, dominating the electromagnetic spectrum and being able to defeat what’s happening on our adversary’s side, while our forces continue to operate in full, with what they need to do for their communications, with what they need to do with their command and control systems. Other systems out in the world are broad jammers. This is not that; this enables our assets to be able to continue to do their job in a non-degraded manner.

Dave Harrold: Yeah, this is really important. One of the strengths of the EA-37B is the simultaneity. What that means is we’ve got the power and the capability. We’re not in a one-versus-world anymore, or using a point solution: here’s a threat, here’s a technique. The threat environment is getting more and more sophisticated and challenging, and so it’s really about how many different techniques can you run at one time to neutralize or disrupt or deny how many different threats that are out there? That’s what’s important about the power and what distinguishes this platform from point solutions.

Jason Lambert: And it is all software-defined, which is a very important thing. The threats are evolving, and we’ve got the capability, and our Department of War has the capability, for some of our other platforms, our ISR platforms, specifically, to go out and collect on what those potential threats might look like and how those threats evolve over time. That information is able to be configured within the mission system that BAE Systems produces to be able to go and defeat those threats. It’s not like a one-off solution that’s going to be made obsolete. It’s a solution today that’s built for tomorrow and beyond, because it can continue to evolve based on the threats.

TWZ: Can you kind of indulge us in terms of what could it do? What’s a tangible thing this could actually go and do? Could it go and shut down a big part of an integrated air defense system [IADS] for example?

Jason Lambert: I’m gonna go back to one of the things I’ve already said: sophisticated comms networks. Our enemy adversaries have more and more sophisticated comms networks. We have to affect those comms networks in order to affect their overall capability. And, you know, you mentioned IADS, that is an original mission of the Compass Call platform, to disrupt the IADS.

Dave Harrold: Exactly, this is designed to break the kill chain. If there’s no command and control system to process the information for the kill chain, it won’t work. And you can do that significant range. That’s what it does.

TWZ: Can you explain a bit more about what you have to do to port these systems and capabilities from the EC-130H into the EA-37B?

Jason Lambert: L3Harris is the integrator. We purchase the aircraft either directly from Gulfstream or from the VIP market. Then we work with Gulfstream to do the conversion of the aircraft. We essentially time it back to what the plane was when it initially left the production line. Then we go and do the outer mold line shape; Gulfstream provides that to us at our facility in Waco, Texas. Then we do the integration of the BAE Systems mission system that Dave and his team provide.

Dave Harrold: We’re the prime mission equipment provider, so that’s our co-prime split, and we build all of that up in Nashua, New Hampshire. We build that equipment, we test it, we lay it out. We have an integration lab up there, where we actually lay it out as if it were in the aircraft, and then we ship that off to Jason’s team, who then lay it out to make sure it all fits again before they put it on the actual aircraft. It’s a very choreographed way to make sure that we’re hand in hand about building the equipment, that the cabling is all appropriate, and all that kind of stuff, so that Jason’s team can integrate it on the aircraft.

Jason Lambert: The EC-130H is still in service today, but it is obviously a very different airplane in terms of the capability set. We think about it, we think about the SWAP — size, weight, and power are three constraints or criteria that we look at. Obviously, they are very different on a business jet platform, but we’ve successfully done that integration on the new system. Now we can, of course, put that all on an aircraft that’s got a much larger range, time on station, and altitude to be able to perform this mission.

The EC-130 Crew

TWZ: Returning to the EC-130H comparison. Can you compare the performance of the two platforms? How does that affect survivability?

Jason Lambert: From a speed perspective, the EA-37B flies at Mach 0.82… versus 300 miles an hour for the EC-130H. For altitude, the EC-130H flies at 20,000 feet. The EA-37B is going to be north of 40,000 feet. So we have double the altitude. And when we think about time on station, it’s not comparable. I mean, from a range perspective, we have more than double. We have around 2,300 nautical miles on the EC-130H and 4,400 nautical miles on the EA-37B. Couple that with additional content that can be put on from defensive perspective, and it’s far more survivable, no question about it. In terms of how it operates, the altitude it operates, the standoff range it can operate at, it’s a different plane

 TWZ: Does greater altitude improve your ability to do this missions with greater standoff?

Dave Harrold: It actually does. Just the geometry of being at that higher altitude, you can get a far greater view to the horizon, and and not just on the ground, but communication at large. So think what might be above you as well as below you.

Returning to survivability, I think the other thing to remember is that the mission here is to degrade, disrupt, and deny the adversary’s ability to communicate. And so by doing that, we’re contributing to the survivability of the whole campaign, and by itself, also the platform itself, right? If I’m out there disabling different comms networks that are integral to threats actually being successful, the platform is making itself much more survivable through its actual core mission.

TWZ: Could it go and operate as an escort jammer? I mean, could it go and follow a package to a certain point to protect it?

Jason Lambert: I mean, I guess. I guess we use the word jammer. But it’s not just a simple jammer. It’s a very different mission set, a very discrete set of techniques. But it is absolutely essential to the overall strike package to make sure that that the goals of that package are achieved.

TWZ: Can we just talk a little more about some of the improvements in the EA-37B version of Compass Call? I guess one of the big improvements is the ability to rapidly insert new capabilities in the form of upgrades. Is there anything you can say about that?

Dave Harrold: I think as we move forward, the original baseline was really about just cross-decking the capability from the EC-130H. Now we’re moving into a much more software-defined radio architecture, an open systems architecture. The whole point there is that we go from SABER [BAE Systems’ Small Adaptive Bank of Electronic Resources], which is sort of what I would call Baseline 3.5, interim, the bridge, to get to Baseline 4, which is the fully open software-defined radio architecture. The whole point there is that it used to take months or longer to find a threat, get a new technique, and figure out how to put it on the hardware. Hardware now is all about adaptability and speed, and, more importantly, it’s not just about BAE Systems’ techniques that this open architecture allows for. Anybody who has the right technique can come and plug into our system. We’ve got a development kit that people can get access to, and they can write new skills that we can rapidly insert into the open architecture. As the threat environment gets more sophisticated, we have to get more sophisticated with how rapidly we can come forward with something to counter those threats.

TWZ: Just in terms of the CONOPS, does this airplane follow a scripted battle plan? Or can it do real-time adjustments, performing more dynamically?

Dave Harrold: It’s a sophisticated system that is adaptable and flexible to the combatant commanders’ needs, so it can be tasked in that way, to be used optimally, for whatever the commander needs. I also think the exploitation that the system needs to do is flexible enough to be able to change depending on if we are pre-war or at war.

TWZ: How do the mission players actually see the data? Is it processed on board, or can it be worked offboard as well?

Jason Lambert: We’ve got a crew of up to nine people on the aircraft. Of course, the pilot and co-pilot are responsible for the flying, but there are an additional seven members in the back that operate and employ the electronic attack mission system and equipment that’s permanently integrated into the mission and cargo compartment. That crew can include a mission crew commander, which would be an electronic warfare officer, and a weapon system officer. There are experienced cryptologists, linguists, analyst operators, and airborne maintenance technicians. So it’s an entire team that’s up there. The aircraft can process that work onboard, or it can send signals and content to other aircraft in the network.

BAE Systems Compass Call Jammer

TWZ: Can a ground operating team manipulate the Compass Call system? Or does it have to be done airborne?

Jason Lambert: I’m a little cautious on how to answer that question, just in terms of the nature of the classification. I’ll just say it is set up to operate in theater and on a network and so also autonomously. As we continue to evolve our solution set, not just for Compass Call, but what we’re doing on our other ISR platforms, AI is becoming a big part of that in terms of operator workload and being able to do more of the mission set with fewer individuals on the plane. That is evolving as the threat goes up.

TWZ: I think that’s an obvious thing, isn’t it, to want to have fewer operators on board?

Jason Lambert: It helps with weight. If you take out a member of the personnel and a mission crew station, now you can do the same on either a smaller platform, or you can bring more gear onto the same aircraft. There’s always that tradeoff.

TWZ: Can we go back very briefly to the point about reducing the personnel on board. How will you harness AI to do that?

Jason Lambert: It’s really through AI decision content provided to the operator. So think about it in terms of an AEW&C [airborne early waring and control] equation, and a little bit different in terms of what would happen in Compass Call. But in the AEW&C equation, your operators are looking at the number of assets to track. Think of aircraft, airborne assets. They could be ballistic threats, anything that’s been launched and in the sky. There’s a certain number per operator and that number is typically classified. But if you think about it in terms of the things that the human in the system can actually manage at any one point in time, the AI will help that human be able to do a lot more of that by giving the information, compacting the information, and the decision tools to enable them to do more. That’s really what AI does. It’s not a supplement. It’ss an enhancement for the operators.

TWZ: In terms of expandability, the nose and the tail are currently empty. Are you looking at putting anything in there? Is there a need for that? Could you add additional cooling, for example, in the future?

Jason Lambert: We have expansion options for additional content. So we’re continuing to look at that in terms of what you mentioned on the nose. In terms of cooling, there’s both air cooling and liquid cooling on the platform, and so we typically operate in both environments. More broadly, though, about expandability, we talk a lot with our customer about what a roadmap to additional capabilities might look like. Whether that’s new techniques because of emerging threats, prime mission equipment itself, or other capabilities that might take advantage of real estate on the platform. So we’re executing an existing program and at the same time talking about what incremental upgrades might look like in the future.

TWZ: Could you expand the mission set by adding new sensors?

Jason Lambert: It’s actually not so much the hardware, it’s the software, right? And it’s all software defined. The expandability in the mission packages is really designed to evolve based on what the threat package looks like. And so the threat identification is more and more about the adversary, then we can involve the system through the software integration on the platform. It’s already like it’s designed to be self-expanded. Again, that’s why this simultaneity thing is really important, it’s because as new mission sets come on board, I don’t have to sacrifice one mission for another mission and I can simultaneously execute.

TWZ: The first export customer for the EA-37B is Italy, with two jets on order. Can you talk about those aircraft?

Jason Lambert: They will be the same. Italy may use a different nomenclature when the aircraft are delivered, but they will be EA-37B aircraft. We both co-prime this program for the U.S. Air Force. We also do that for Foreign Military Sales [FMS]. Italy is our first international customer, and there is some additional interest beyond that.

TWZ: So you are going to build additional sets of the Compass Call kit to go in that?

Jason Lambert: We are. That particular contract, and the way we execute these programs on an international basis, is we do a hybrid contract. We do a direct commercial sale, typically on the airplanes, and then the mission system and integration are done on an FMS case through the U.S. Air Force. Of course, this has to go through U.S. government approvals with the State Department in terms of policy release and whatnot, for the technology, which has been approved for Italy. There are additional customers that are also interested on the international front.

TWZ: Presumably the benefit there is that the Italians already have G550s and the associated infrastructure?

Jason Lambert: We have an ISR program known as JAMMS [Joint Airborne Multi-Mission Multi-Sensor System]. When you think about a country that wants to go take on an electronic attack capability, the precursor to that is, typically, an ISR capability. They’ve got an aircraft known as JAMMS. We have a legacy program called SPYDR that we’ve done with the Italians. Understanding the signals that you want to go and eventually exploit and get dominance over in terms of the electromagnetic spectrum, having that understanding of them first through the ISR path is typically the starting point. In recent news you might have seen we have also successfully delivered MC-55A Peregrine to the Australians. That’s their foray into this space as well. And they’ve got interest in potentially looking at the EA-37B Compass Call downrange. But to start right now, it’s the ISR capability that’s been delivered.

TWZ: And so do other export customers for the EA-37B get a U.S.-standard Compass Call, or is it going to be a slightly different standard? How will they work alongside the U.S. Air Force jets?

Jason Lambert: It’s all subject to releaseability in the U.S. Air Force. But they will be getting the same capability. It’s helpful for the United States, because you want to have your partners involved in this. In an unclassified realm, right now, the need from the U.S. Air Force is over 20 planes. We’re currently under contract, in terms of the mission system, for 10. There are congressional plus-ups that have been looked at for FY 26. The budget’s been increased, and it looks like there’s going to be another two aircraft placed on order for this fiscal year. We’re excited about that. As industry, we’re always looking at how we can expand capacity to go address that need. But you think about a need of 20-plus aircraft in an unclassified space with 10 under contract, soon to be 12. Partners are a big part of how we can go address that global challenge, for the global threat. Italy is the foray into doing that in the EUCOM theater, and what could be done in the eastern realm of NATO. Now, potentially, we’re working with partners from PACOM.

Dave Harrold: The RC-135 Rivet Joint is another aircraft in the U.S. Air Force asset base. That is our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset employed by the United States and United Kingdom. Again, that works hand in hand and collaboratively with the EA-37B feet. They will combine, and they can also provide information to each other.

TWZ: In terms of the airframes, the G550 program has come to an end. Where will you source new aircraft from?

Jason Lambert: The G550 is currently out of production. Right now, on any given day, there are roughly a dozen aircraft that are available for sale. Think of it as high-net-worth individuals or corporations that want to trade up or trade in their business jet fleet. So we would go procure those aircraft as they were looking to go buy another asset from Gulfstream or another partner, and we would take those aircraft and work with Gulfstream to do that modification work and get ready to go host the BAE Systems mission kit. That’s how we grow the current G550 base with the used assets on the market.

Additionally, the U.S. Air Force has got 16 C-37 or G550 aircraft that they operate. There are discussions right now on a recap program. Not all those aircraft are a perfect fit for the mission system. They have to be above a certain serial number in terms of how they were produced. Five of the 16 are potential candidates that could be converted to Compass Call. That’s incremental, of course, on top of dozen or so the VIP market. But there are planes available for us to do the expansion. When Dave and I look out and we get the question from Air Force about how do we grow and expand, industry is ready to go do that. We know the need is for greater numbers and we have plans to be able to go execute that.

TWZ: So the extra two EA-37Bs for the Air Force will be existing airframes that you will harvest from somewhere else?

Jason Lambert: We will purchase those from the market. We’ve already identified owners and tail numbers. We’re ready to go.

We want to thank Jason Lambert and Dave Harrold for taking the time to answer our questions about the EA-37B and share their passion for the aircraft with our readers.

Contact the editor: thomas@thewarzone.com

After spending decades criticising China, a succession of leaders from Western countries have been lining up to engage with its leadership.

In recent months, many of them have visited Beijing, seeking business opportunities.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is the latest to land in China.

Merz says Beijing must not be overlooked when tackling the big global challenges.

United States President Donald Trump’s huge tariffs are said to have pushed Western countries closer to China.

But can China be an alternative?

And what does it have to offer?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Jost Wubbeke – Managing partner at Sinolytics and an expert on China’s industrial policy, rare earths and supply chain strategy

Harry Broadman – Former assistant to the US trade representative

Dan Wang – Economist and director on Eurasia Group’s China team

The 10th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was held on November 3 in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. The main theme of this year’s summit was ‘Turk Time’. The organization, which has set goals such as the long-term Vision of the Turkic World 2040 and the short-term Strategic Roadmap of the OTS 2022-2026, has added a new vision with ‘Turk Time’. So, is the Turk Age possible in the 21st century? Could Turks become an effective political center in the new era? Is Turk Time just a slogan? Or is it based on reality?

Turmoil in the Current Global System gave birth to the Organization of Turkic States

The 2008 economic crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the weakening of United States (US) hegemony that emerged with its military withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq left great chaos and a vacuum in international order.[1] Especially with the COVID-19 pandemic and the US debt ceiling crisis, the US hegemony tool, dollar hegemony, has suffered a major shake-up and has become controversial.[2] This vacuum and chaotic environment triggered an effort to build a new alternative order for countries that were uncomfortable with the existing international order, and to gain a position in the new order to be established. As the rise of Asian economies continued in the global economy, organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS accelerated the construction of an alternative multipolar order. The world was divided into two camps: defenders of the old unipolar world order and proponents of the new multipolar world order. The weakening of US hegemony and global chaos paved the way for the OTS. The transformation of the organization in 2021 coincided with the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Turkey, in particular, plays a decisive role in the OTS. In recent years, Turkey has experienced sharp ruptures in its relations with the US, EU, and NATO. The weakening of Turkey’s relations with the West is a reflection of the decline of US hegemony in the global order. At the same time, Turkey’s increasing cooperation and friendship with Russia and China played a positive role in the establishment of the OTS. The organization should be seen as an attempt to become part of a multipolar world order. For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statement that the world is bigger than five is an expression of the need to build a just multipolar world order. As the Turkic states increase cooperation, trade, and prosperity among themselves, they serve regional peace and the establishment of a just order. With the OTS, Turkey aims to increase prosperity in the region, improve infrastructure, maintain a common culture, and increase its defense and counter-terrorism cooperation capabilities. Turkey’s objectives in the OTS in Central Asia are an effort to take part in a multipolar world that will strengthen peace and prosperity. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan aims to continue the Turk Time with Turkey and for the Turkic world to become the world’s rising power.[3] Turkey wants to be a subject, not an object, in the multipolar order. In sum, Turkey is trying to play a stronger role in the new international system to be established by establishing good relations with the advocates of the multipolar world order.

Organization Strengthens by Institutionalizing

After the transformation of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States into the OTS with the Istanbul summit in 2021, the organization entered the process of building a stronger institutional infrastructure. Analyzing the outcomes of the Astana Summit, efforts to complete the institutionalization of the organization stand out. This year, the organization continued to increase institutionalization in areas such as the Civil Protection Mechanism, the Turkic Judicial Training Network, the Union of Notaries of the Turkic World, the Turkic Investment Fund, and the Organization of Trade Unions of Turkic States. The final declaration expresses satisfaction with the activities carried out within the framework of the organization in one year.[4] For example, the Alliance of Turkic News Agencies (ATNA) was established after the summit between Turkey’s news agency Anadolu Agency (AA), Azerbaijan State News Agency (AZERTAC), Kyrgyz National News Agency (Kabar), Uzbekistan National News Agency (UzA), and Kazakhstan’s news agency Qazcontent. After the establishment of ATNA, Binali Yıldırım, Chairman of the OTS Council of Elders, said: “We aim to bring the truth to the people in the fastest way and to prevent colonialist countries from covering the events. Serdar Karagöz, who was elected president of ATNA, emphasized the importance of combating disinformation.[5] In short, in the field of media, OTS has placed establishment of a media network that will challenge the media of the unipolar world and represent the oppressed at its center. During the next few years, it is possible to predict that the organization will institutionalize in various fields.

The organization Aims to Strengthen Trade

There are two important cooperation areas between the member states of the OTS. The first is the development of cooperation in the energy field. Turkic states are rich in valuable minerals such as energy, natural gas, oil, and uranium. Therefore, the member states of the organization tend to deepen their cooperation in the field of energy. The second meeting of the OTS Working Group on Energy Cooperation of the Ministers Responsible for Energy of the OTS was held on September 28, 2022, in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The parties adopted the OTS Energy Cooperation Program and the related action plan for 2023-2027, which includes the exchange of information and ideas on legislation and national programs in the energy sector, renewable and alternative energy sources, fossil fuel energy, nuclear energy, energy efficiency, dissemination of new technologies, capacity-building programs, and enhancing cooperation in the international arena. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized the importance of making efforts to make the Middle Corridor even more attractive for investment and to transport trans-Caspian resources, particularly Turkmen gas, to Turkey and Europe. Strategic energy infrastructure projects such as the Organization, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, Southern Gas Corridor, Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP), and Trans Adriatic Pipeline Project (TAP) contribute to the prosperity of Turkic states and European and global energy security. [6]

The second is to take steps to strengthen trade along the Silk Road belt. The member states of the OTS had a trade volume of $ 700 billion. However, only $ 18 billions of this trade volume is carried out among the member states themselves. This situation is the main driving factor in the establishment of the organization. Because Turkey and the member states are determined to develop trade among themselves. The member states of the organization focus on removing or facilitating trade barriers among themselves. Eliminating trade barriers and providing infrastructure investments on roads. In this respect, there is no other way but to work in harmony with the Belt and Road Initiative of the OTS. The implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the 2023-2027 OTS Transport Connectivity Program adopted at the Astana summit is expected to significantly increase the transit potential of the Middle Corridor and make Caspian transits smoother.

The establishment of the Turkish Investment Fund was on the agenda at the Istanbul Summit. During the two-year period of the organization, sub-commissions carried out infrastructure work to establish the Turkish Investment Fund. On March 16, 2023, the Agreement on the Establishment of the Turkish Investment Fund was signed at the Extraordinary Summit of the OTS held in Ankara. Before the Astana summit, Turkey voted the proposal for the establishment of the Turkish Investment Fund as a law in its parliament: “The capital participation commitment of the Republic of Turkey to the Turkish Investment Fund and the payments to be made within the framework of this commitment cannot exceed the equivalent of USD 100,000,000.[7] The President is authorized to increase the amount up to five times.  Thus, the OTS has gained an institutional structure to finance its investments among itself. All of these developments are efforts to increase the economic trade volume of the organization and strengthen economic cooperation.

Russia, Iran, and China should be part of the OTS

The fate of Turkic states depends on the revival of the Silk Road and the Belt and Road Initiative. Historically, trade flowing from China to Europe via the Silk Road played an important role in enriching Turks and building powerful states. Today, China, the world’s second-largest economy, has regained its historical position. The revival of the historical Silk Road plays an important role in the revival of the Turkic world. There must be an air of unity in Eurasia in order for the OTS to succeed. In this respect, the accession of Iran, Russia, and China, which have Turkic-speaking peoples, to the OTS will add significant strength to the organization. There is already such an expectation in the OTS. Chairman of the Council of Elders of the OTS Binali Yıldırım stated that China and Russia are natural members of the OTS.[8]

The sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of Russia’s operation in Ukraine have highlighted the strategic importance of the Middle Corridor.[9] Moreover, although 96 percent of the trade from China to Europe is by sea, the US continues to blockade the South China Sea. Currently, the Middle Corridor is the safest port for trade flow. The most important goal of the OTS is to make the Middle Corridor more active. “We should also pay special attention to the development of transport networks between our countries. With this understanding, we continue our efforts to activate the Caspian Trans-Caspian East-West Middle Corridor. We should strengthen our cooperation in removing obstacles to transportation and trade, enriching transportation networks, facilitating border crossings, and visa procedures”.[10]

Conclusion

The world is on the brink of a global rupture, and OTS is an organization that emerged on the brink of this global rupture. Shortly after the Republic of Turkey celebrated its 100^th anniversary on October 29, the OTS organized a summit with the theme of ‘Turk Time’, which reflects the expectation of Turks to become a global actor for the 200^th year. To achieve this goal, the Organization of Turkic States must unite in Eurasia. In this respect, it is vital for the OTS to strengthen its cooperation with China, Iran, and Russia. These states are the leading powers of Asia and home to Turkic-speaking peoples. Economically, the Middle Corridor is vital for the OTS. Trade between China and Europe passes through Central Asia via railroads, which indicates the revival of the historic Silk Road. Controlling the Silk Road, the OTS can regain its historical role, gain a geopolitical advantage, and become an important figure in world politics. Turks have always had their own special goals, called the ‘Red Apple’. The Ottoman Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror set the conquest of Istanbul and the establishment of a new Roman Empire as the Red Apple. In the 16-18^th centuries, the Ottoman Sultans identified the conquest of Vienna and Rome as the Red Apple. In the 20^th century, Turkist ideologues had the Red Apple of establishing a Turan State. In the 21^st century, it is clear that the Turks’ Red Apple is the greatest ideal to be a center in the multipolar world order under the slogan of ‘Turk Time’.

The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of Shanghai University.

[1] Francis Fukuyama, Francis Fukuyama on the end of American hegemony, 8 November 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2021/11/08/francis-fukuyama-on-the-end-of-american-hegemony

[2] CFR, The Future of Dollar Hegemony, 22 August 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/future-dollar-hegemony

[3] Türkiye Yüzyılı’nda ‘Türk Devri’ başlıyor, 3 November 2023, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/turkiye-yuzyilinda-turk-devri-basliyor-809286.html

[4] Organization of Turkic States, “Declaration of the Tenth Summit of the Organization of the Turkic States”, 3 November 2023, https://www.turkicstates.org/assets/pdf/haberler/astana-declaration-3113-215.pdf

[5] AA, “Türk Haber Ajansları Birliğinin ilk genel kurulu yapıldı”, 6 November 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/kurumsal-haberler/turk-haber-ajanslari-birliginin-ilk-genel-kurulu-yapildi/3045736#

[6] Türkiye İletişim Başkanlığı, 21. Yüzyılın Parlayan Yıldızı: Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı, İstanbul, Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı Yayınları: 2023

[7] Resmî Gazete, Türk Yatırım Fonu Kuruluş Anlaşmasının Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun, 11November 2023, https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2023/11/20231111-1.htm

[8] Sputnik, Aksakallılar Konseyi Başkanı Yıldırım: Rusya ve Çin Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı’nın doğal üyesidir, https://tr.sputniknews.com/20211126/aksakallilar-konseyi-baskani-yildirim-rusya-ve-cin-turk-devletleri-teskilatinin-dogal-uyesidir-1051186836.html

[9] Zeynep Çetinkaya, & Zeynep Canlı, “Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı Türkiye’den geçen ‘Orta Koridorun önemini daha da artırdı.” AA, 2022, 1 Mart 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/rusya-ukrayna-savasi-turkiyeden-gecen- orta-koridorun-onemini-daha-da-artirdi/2519232.

[10] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, “Türk dünyasının barışı, refahı ve güvenliği yönünde adımlar atmayı sürdüreceğiz”, 3 November 2023, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/150055/-turk-dunyasinin-barisi-refahi-ve-guvenligi-yonunde-adimlar-atmayi-surdurecegiz-

Tehran, Iran – Another round of indirect talks between Iranian and United States officials ended with a mediator claiming “significant progress” but still no clear evidence that either side was willing to concede enough on their positions to avoid war.

After the conclusion of the talks in Geneva on Thursday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said further technical talks would be held next week in Vienna and progress had been “good”.

“These were the most serious and longest talks,” Araghchi said.

Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, who mediated the talks, said Iranian and US diplomats would consult with their governments before the Vienna talks.

Few details have emerged about the discussions, but Araghchi was reported to have met US envoy Steve Witkoff – if only briefly, according to Iran’s Tasnim news agency.

The Iranian team, led by Araghchi, handed over on Wednesday night Tehran’s written proposals to Al Busaidi, who also mediated previous rounds of talks in Geneva and Muscat.

The Omani diplomat then met with the US delegation on Thursday, led by Witkoff and US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. Al Busaidi mediated between the two teams throughout the day, and the US delegation also held separate talks over Ukraine.

Also taking part in the talks was Rafael Grossi, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which will have to undertake nuclear monitoring and verification duties in Iran in case of any agreement.

The UN watchdog will hold several days of board meetings starting on March 6, which is around the 10- to 15-day deadline floated by Trump last week for Iran to reach a deal.

Western media outlets have suggested the board could once again consider a move to censure Iran depending on the results of the Geneva talks. Iran has accused Grossi of taking politicised action and criticised the IAEA after Israel attacked Iran in June, one day after the agency passed a resolution saying Tehran was not complying with its commitment to nuclear safeguards.

Fundamental differences

The two sides have been at odds over key issues, including uranium enrichment and missiles.

Washington has repeatedly emphasised, in lockstep with Israel, that it will not accept any nuclear enrichment taking place on Iranian soil, even at civilian-use levels agreed during the 2015 nuclear deal that Iran agreed with world powers. Trump unilaterally abandoned that deal in 2018.

In the days leading up to the Geneva talks, US officials increasingly focused on Iran’s ballistic missile programme, saying the missiles threaten US military bases across the Middle East as well as Israel. Iran has refused to entertain any talks on its conventional weapons. Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, have repeatedly said they will never develop nuclear weapons.

Speaking to local officials during a provincial visit, Pezeshkian also shot back at Trump’s assertion during a lengthy State of the Union speech that Iran was “the world’s number one sponsor of terror”.

Pezeshkian said numerous Iranian officials and nuclear scientists have been assassinated over the decades, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the country’s 1979 Islamic revolution.

“If the realities are seen fairly, it will become clear that Iran is not only not a supporter of terrorism, but one of the main victims of terror in the region and across the world,” he said.

The Iranian government’s IRNA news agency said Tehran’s proposal was expected to gauge US “seriousness” in the talks because it contained “win-win” offers.

Iranian officials have not publicly discussed all the details of their proposals, but they are believed to include diluting part of the country’s 60-percent enriched uranium and keeping the uranium inside the country. Iranian authorities envisage that could be paired with economic opportunities for the US related to Iranian oil and gas and the purchase of airplanes.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has maintained his tough rhetoric against the US as well, casting doubt on the chances of any agreement. He also said Trump would be unable to overthrow Iran’s government after the US president said regime change would be “the best thing that could happen” in Iran.

Araghchi said during an interview on Wednesday that even if Khamenei is killed, the theocratic establishment in Iran would carry on because it has legal procedures in place to appoint a successor. Pezeshkian added on Thursday: “They can eliminate me, eliminate anyone. If they hit us, a hundred more like us will come up to run the country.”

Double-digit inflation as Iran braces for war

Iranian and US officials have been hailing supposed “progress” in the indirect talks this month, but many Iranians continue to prepare for war.

In Tehran and across the country, people are buying bottled water, biscuits, canned foods and other essentials in case of a war.

“A few days ago, I bought a power bank to keep the electronics charged. Now I’m looking for a short-wave radio so we can hear the news if the state shuts down the internet and electricity infrastructure is bombed,” said a 28-year-old resident of the capital who asked not to be named.

As bombs fell during the 12-day war with Israel in June, Iranian authorities cut off almost all internet access for several days, followed in January by an unprecedented 20-day total blackout imposed on about 92 million people as thousands of people were killed during nationwide protests.

The Iranian government, which blames “terrorists” armed and funded by the US and Israel for the protests, has rejected Trump’s claim that 32,000 Iranians were killed during the demonstrations. It said more than 3,000 people were killed, and rejects documentation by the United Nations and international human rights organisations that its security forces were behind the killings.

As the threat of war intensifies, not all Iranians are capable of stocking up on food and other necessities due to rising inflation that has gripped the country for more than a decade as a result of a mix of chronic local mismanagement and US and UN sanctions.

According to separate reports by the Statistical Centre of Iran and the Central Bank of Iran released on Thursday, inflation has now shot beyond 60 percent.

The Statistical Centre put annual inflation in the Iranian month of Bahman, which ended on February 19, at 68.1 percent, while the Central Bank said it was 62.2 percent.

Food inflation was by far the strongest driver at a whopping 105 percent. That included a 207-percent inflation rate for cooking oil, 117 percent for red meat, 108 percent for eggs and dairy products, 113 percent for fruit and 142 percent for bread and corn.

Iran’s national currency, the rial, stood at about 1.66 million rials to the US dollar on Thursday, near an all-time low.

Venezuelanalysis editor Ricardo Vaz joined Ileana Chan on the Global Majority for Peace podcast to take stock of Venezuela’s political reality following the January 3 US attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro.

The discussion focuses on the long history of imperialist attacks against the Bolivarian Revolution and the US’ efforts to take control of the Venezuelan oil industry.

Source: Empire Watch

Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel has drawn criticism at home amid tensions over Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi says India and Israel will collaborate more closely on defence technology while pursuing a free trade agreement, as he wrapped up a controversial two-day visit.

Modi and his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu said at a joint news conference in Jerusalem on Thursday that they would also foster collaboration on technologies, such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, as their countries concluded more than a dozen bilateral agreements.

“The future belongs to those who innovate and Israel and India are bent on innovation,” said Netanyahu. “We’re proud ancient civilisations, very proud of our past. But absolutely determined to seize the future, and we can do it better together.”

A joint statement highlighted cooperation in the field of “horizon scanning”, describing it as a mechanism that “helps identify emerging global trends in areas like technology, economy and society, by leveraging data”.

Israel also agreed to allow 50,000 more Indian nationals into the country, where tens of thousands of South Asians have filled construction and caregiving jobs since new restrictions were placed on Palestinian workers at the start of its war on Gaza.

Strategic embrace

Modi’s visit, his second since he took office in 2014, has drawn criticism at home, signalling an ongoing expansion of India’s strategic embrace of Israel amid ongoing tensions over Israel’s genocidal war against Palestinians in Gaza, which has killed more than 72,000 people.

Confirming their growing ties, the leaders’ joint statement referenced the Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and an April 2025 attack on tourists and civilians in Pahalgam, in Indian-controlled Kashmir.

“Terrorism cannot be accepted in any form or expression,” said Modi, who has historically supported the establishment of a Palestinian state yet has sometimes abstained from criticism of Israel in international forums, including the United Nations.

Earlier this month, India was among the countries that condemned Israeli measures to effectively deepen its control over the occupied West Bank.

Both countries also lauded United States President Donald Trump’s plan to advance the “ceasefire” in the Gaza Strip.

The continuous clashes between the M23 rebels and the security forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have caused massive displacements and unrest in various communities. Thousands have sought refuge in Ngungu, located in the Bahunde area of the Masisi Territory in North Kivu.

Displaced families arriving in central Ngungu are facing increasingly difficult situations and strained reception from local residents. Humanitarian workers in the area told HumAngle that the continued influx of displaced people is putting overwhelming pressure on host households in Ngungu. 

“Receiving families share the little they have with arriving families, but the situation is becoming untenable,” a humanitarian worker who asked for anonymity for security reasons said. “In several quarters of Ngungu, modest households are currently obliged to welcome three extra families, and promiscuity, lack of food, and insufficient potable water are complicating the daily lives of the displaced persons, who are composed mostly of women and children.”

Local sources said affected communities have received no government intervention, as individuals survive through communal solidarity in an already fragile economic situation.

Community leaders said they have reached out to humanitarian organisations for urgent assistance. Their immediate priorities include distributing food and essential supplies, ensuring access to clean drinking water, and providing healthcare for vulnerable individuals.

“Despite their own personal difficulties, the inhabitants of Ngungu continue to show proof of solidarity towards the displaced persons. The people are organising communal initiatives to share food and temporary shelter,” a local community leader revealed.

Local civic actors stress that while solidarity is commendable, it cannot sustain itself in the long term without structured external assistance. Given the profound needs and increasing vulnerability of displaced persons, the residents of Ngungu are hopeful for a swift response from humanitarian partners to prevent a worsening of the humanitarian crisis in North Kivu.

The 2026 Annual Sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), known as the “Lianghui,” are a pivotal event. They will witness the official launch and final adoption of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). This plan serves as a roadmap not only for China but also for countries of the Global South, focusing on the shift from quantitative growth to “new qualitative productive forces” based on innovation and technology. It is worth noting that formulating medium- and long-term plans to guide China’s economic and social development is a crucial method of governance employed by the Communist Party of China.

The “Two Sessions” meetings (National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) in China in 2026 represent a strategic focal point for the Global South, outlining the 15th Five-Year Plan, supporting high-quality development through new productive forces, and strengthening trade partnerships, particularly in the areas of energy, transportation, and the digital economy. Its importance to the Global South lies in China’s leadership of economic integration. China aims to promote openness and cooperation, providing an opportunity for the Global South to benefit from the growth of the world’s second-largest economy. Here, (The Global South’s benefit from China’s innovative development models): During the Two Sessions in March 2026, China will present a model of governance and technological innovation that developing countries and countries of the Global South can utilize to achieve sustainable development and digital transformation. Additionally, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan and the Two Sessions in March 2026 will strengthen the foundations for trade between China and the Global South in particular: These meetings will pave the way for China to enhance trade with countries of the Global South in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, supporting infrastructure and economic growth in the Global South under China’s leadership. Most importantly, the Two Sessions in March 2026 and China’s 15th Five-Year Plan will support the Asia-Pacific region and the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s Vision 2026 focuses on “building a community with a shared future,” promoting investment projects and economic exchanges with developing countries. Therefore, the upcoming two-day meeting in China in March 2026 is crucial in guiding the Chinese economy towards domestic consumption and innovation, opening new markets and opportunities for developing countries in the Global South.

This tenth five-year plan represents China’s economic and social roadmap for the second half of the current decade, emphasizing “high-quality development” and technological innovation that will benefit developing countries in the Global South. Thus, during the 2026 meetings, China will work to “promote the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative with high quality.” This “Chinese-style modernization” will contribute to creating more development opportunities for countries around the world, especially those in the Global South, in accordance with President Xi Jinping’s principles of a shared future for mankind, win-win cooperation, and mutual benefit for all, particularly developing countries. The developing world. It aims to achieve the goal of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping of doubling the size of China’s national economy by 2030. To this end, the State Council of China held a plenary meeting on February 6, 2026, to review the draft government work report and the draft 15th Five-Year Plan before submitting them to parliament during the joint sessions of the two councils in March 2026. The annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) to discuss the draft 15th Five-Year Plan is scheduled to begin on March 5, 2026, while the session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) will commence on March 4, 2026.

The meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2026 are of exceptional importance, as they mark the official launch of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). These meetings, known as the “Two Sessions,” will chart China’s economic and political course for the second half of the current decade, with a focus on transitioning to “new productive forces.” The strategic significance of the Two Sessions in China in 2026 stems from adopting the Decade Roadmap: The 15th Five-Year Plan serves as a crucial link in achieving China’s goal of socialist modernization by 2035. Furthermore, the meetings will address how China will respond to global challenges: These meetings come at a time when China is facing a slowdown in global growth, geopolitical tensions, and internal structural pressures. With a discussion of the (mechanisms and plans for transforming China’s economic model): The upcoming meetings of the Two Sessions in March 2026 aim to shift the Chinese economy from reliance on traditional manufacturing to an innovation- and technology-driven economy. Emphasis will also be placed on further modernizing the state’s governance system and capacity, raising the level of social civilization, enhancing cultural confidence, continuously improving the quality of life for the Chinese people, achieving new progress in providing sufficient and high-quality employment, making significant new strides in building a “beautiful China,” establishing a green lifestyle and production model, strengthening national security, and effectively promoting the construction of a “safe China” at a higher level.

The Chinese political leadership is currently laying the groundwork for the Two Sessions in March 2026, which will determine the contours of the country’s social and economic development over the next five years. Chinese President Xi Jinping held meetings with senior officials to discuss the key priorities of the new Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), while Chinese state media launched a nationwide campaign to gather public feedback. During a symposium held in April 2025 to discuss the 15th Five-Year Plan, President Xi Jinping, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, emphasized that “in planning economic and social development for this period, it is essential to proactively assess the impact of changes in the international landscape on China and adapt to them by adjusting and improving the country’s economic structure.” President Xi highlighted several key areas, including ensuring economic stability by stabilizing employment, supporting businesses, and continuing China’s broad-based economic opening-up. During his speech at the April 2025 symposium to discuss China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, Xi Jinping strongly emphasized scientific and technological development. He specifically called for new, high-quality productive forces to play a more prominent role in the country’s economic revitalization. He also called for strengthening the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, developing emerging industries, and accelerating the construction of a modern industrial system.

In a speech published in the Communist Party’s magazine “Qiushi” in July 2025, President Xi Jinping stated that “the world is undergoing changes unseen in a century, making the technological revolution and competition among major powers increasingly intertwined.” He urged the Chinese nation to consolidate its strategic advantage in the global technology race.

Herein lies the most important strategic dimension of the 15th Five-Year Plan and its impact on the Global South, through leading the technological transformation. The plan aims to achieve “self-reliance” in advanced technology fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and semiconductors. For countries in the Global South, this represents an opportunity to break the Western monopoly on technology and gain access to advanced Chinese technological alternatives. Furthermore, China offers a “high-quality development model” during the 15th Five-Year Plan period, transitioning from labor-intensive industries to smart and green manufacturing. This approach provides the Global South with an inspiring model for integrating environmental sustainability with economic growth, particularly in the areas of solar energy and electric vehicles. Finally, the plan promotes “dual-cycle development” by focusing on reducing dependence on foreign markets and boosting domestic consumption. This transformation could lead to a reshaping of global supply chains, opening new horizons for countries in the Global South to export their products to the massive Chinese market, which is expected to reach $20 trillion by 2026. Furthermore, the timing of the launch and discussion of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan presents an opportunity to enhance regional and multilateral cooperation, coinciding with China’s hosting of the APEC summit.

  In 2026, the 15th Five-Year Plan will focus on (strengthening economic integration with Asia-Pacific and Global South countries), emphasizing the digital economy, transportation, and energy. Beyond its strategic security and resource implications for the Global South, the 15th Five-Year Plan includes new strategies for marine resource exploitation and deep-sea innovation, a vital area for many coastal developing countries seeking to develop their “blue economy,” drawing on China’s experience in this field.

The 15th Five-Year Plan, covering the period from 2026 to 2030, is expected to focus on enhancing economic resilience and strengthening China’s technological and innovative capabilities. It will be adopted during a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Chinese Five-Year Plans are the country’s most important policy blueprints, outlining strategic goals for economic and social development over a five-year period. These plans began with the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. They define national priorities, particularly in the areas of economic growth, industrial development, education, and social development, and serve as binding guidelines for all local, regional, and national governments. China, a leading force and supporter of the Global South, draws upon its experience.

As for the main topics of discussion during the 15th Five-Year Plan, which will take place during the 2026 Two Sessions in China, legislative and political deliberations will focus on several key pillars, most importantly: how China can achieve technological independence and self-reliance. This will be accomplished by discussing mechanisms and plans for achieving “Chinese self-reliance” in critical technologies, such as advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. This will be achieved by studying and discussing ways to strengthen scientific and technological capabilities to achieve self-sufficiency in vital industries through advanced manufacturing and artificial intelligence, transforming the manufacturing sector towards smart technologies to enhance innovation. Emphasis will be placed on China’s firm commitment to the “Made in China policy,” aiming to propel China to the forefront of a range of high-tech industries, including aerospace, electric vehicles, robotics, and communications. The discussions will also explore ways to achieve common prosperity and well-being for the Chinese people by improving living standards and ensuring a more equitable distribution of the fruits of modernization.

The 2026 meetings of the Joint Conference will also focus on structural reforms, implementing over 300 reform measures to enhance the efficiency of the Chinese national economy within a complex international environment. This year’s meetings in China will also address the “green transition,” continuing to support clean technologies such as solar power and electric vehicles, and promoting renewable energy (solar and wind) to achieve peak carbon emissions by 2030. Furthermore, they will discuss boosting domestic demand by exploring ways to encourage household consumption as a primary driver of growth, rather than relying excessively on foreign investment. The meetings will also address strengthening national security, exploring ways to bolster industrial supply chains, and ensuring water and food security for Chinese society, including the modernization of 700,000 kilometers of pipeline infrastructure. Finally, they will discuss achieving maritime development by utilizing marine resources and innovating in deep-sea technology as part of balanced regional growth.

From the preceding analysis, we understand that the two sessions of the Global Summit in China in March 2026 represent a strategic pivotal point for reshaping globalization and the developments of the Global South under China’s leadership. This will lead to a more inclusive and multipolar world, moving away from traditional economic dependence, thus strengthening China’s position as a leader and key driver of development in the Global South in the coming decade.

A Palestinian mother from Gaza says she recognised her missing son, Mohammed Sharab, when he was shown shackled, blindfolded and listed as ‘for sale’ in a post shared by Israeli soldiers.

Aiden Markram smacked 82 not out off 46 balls as South Africa beat West Indies by nine wickets to maintain their unbeaten record at the 2026 T20 World Cup.

South Africa’s captain struck seven fours and four sixes as South Africa chased 177 with 23 balls to spare to move two points clear at the top of Group 1 in the Super 8s and put one foot in the semi-finals.

The 31-year-old, who brought up his half-century off 27 balls, shared a 95-run opening stand with Quinton de Kock (47 off 24) before the wicketkeeper was removed by Roston Chase in the eighth over. Ryan Rickelton chipped in with a quickfire 45 not out off 28 at number three.

Markram sealed South Africa’s fifth win of the tournament in Ahmedabad with his 11th boundary.

The victory puts the Proteas on the verge of the semi-finals without making them mathematically sure. They will go through if India beat Zimbabwe in Thursday’s other game. West Indies play India in their final match of the group knowing a defeat will likely eliminate them.

South Africa, finalists in 2024, should have been chasing a significantly lower total after taking four wickets in the powerplay and later reducing West Indies to 83-7.

However, the two-time champions fought back through Romario Shepherd and Jason Holder, who put on 89 (57) for the eighth wicket to drag West Indies beyond 170.

After smacking spinner Keshav Maharaj’s opening over for 17, West Indies, who piled on 254-6 against Zimbabwe in their Super 8 opener on Monday, lost four wickets in 11 balls to slump from 29-0 to 43-4 inside four overs, with Kagiso Rabada and Lungi Ngidi collecting two wickets apiece.

Sherfane Rutherford, who couldn’t capitalise on being dropped on three, Rovman Powell, and Matthew Forde joined the procession back to the dressing room before Shepherd and Holder came together in the 11th over.

After rebuilding steadily, the pair burst into life from the 15-over mark, Shepherd accelerating from 21 (17) to finish unbeaten on 52 (37) and Holder reaching 49 (31) before being run-out off the penultimate ball of the innings.

They added 58 runs off the final five overs, including Holder taking the 18th, bowled by Marco Jansen, for 23.

Newly teamed-up Northrop Grumman and Embraer are hoping that a boom refueling system-equipped version of the latter’s KC-390 Millennium twin jet engine tanker-transport will catch the eye of the U.S. Air Force. The two companies say the KC-390’s size and other attributes make it ideally suited to kinds of ‘agile’ distributed operations the Air Force sees as essential for success in future conflict, especially one in the Pacific against China. This is exactly the case TWZ laid out in detail when the concept for a version of this aircraft fitted with a boom first emerged four years ago.

TWZ‘s Jamie Hunter spoke with representatives from Northrop Grumman and Embraer about current plans for the boom-equipped KC-390 on the show floor at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium. The two firms first announced their new partnership on this aircraft last week. Embraer had originally unveiled this version of the KC-390 together with L3Harris, but the latter was no longer involved in the project, at least at a high level, by October 2024.

“We are excited to announce the partnership to get started on the development of this capability, because we believe it’s a significant advantage to our U.S. Air Force, as well as our international allies,” Craig Woolston, Vice President and General Manager of Research and Advanced Design within Northrop Grumman’s Aeronautics Systems sector, said at the Warfare Symposium. “Partnering our advanced manufacturing and experience in the past in this domain with a proven design, modern capability, we think is a differentiator in this mobility space.”

“With the KC-390, the boom is adding a capability to the refueling capability that is already there with the probe-and-drogue system,” Frederico Lemos, Chief Commercial Officer for Defense and Security International Business at Embraer, also said. “So, adding that capability, and the target is to maintain the multi-mission capability, to bring the KC-390 even more … Agile Combat Employment type of capability, [and be] able to perform all of these missions in a distributed, dispersed operation type of employment.”

Lemos also said his company is committed to investing in a U.S. production facility for the KC-390, but said those plans, including the choice of location, are still to be finalized. Melbourne, Florida, has been raised as one possibility. Embraer and Northrop Grumman both have facilities already, and they held an event there last week to unveil their partnership.

Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is the term the U.S. Air Force currently uses to describe a set of concepts for distributed and disaggregated operations. ACE is focused heavily on short notice and otherwise irregular deployments, often to remote, austere, or otherwise non-traditional locales. We will come back to this later on.

Visualizing ACE

Development of the Millennium dates back to the early 2000s, originally just as a medium-sized jet-powered transport aircraft called the C-390 capable of operating from short and improvised runways. The ability to refuel receivers via the probe-and-drogue method was subsequently added to the design, resulting in its current “KC” designation. The aircraft can itself be refueled using this method via a probe that extends out from the front end of the fuselage above the cockpit. The KC-390 is loosely comparable in size and other respects to the turboprop-powered C-130 Hercules.

Further KC-390 versions configured for maritime patrol, electronic warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions are also now in development. Millennium variants are in service today in Brazil, Portugal, and Hungary, with a number of other countries set to begin operating the aircraft in the coming years.

Embraer | C-390 Millennium: Innovation, Performance and Reliability

The U.S. Air Force’s preferred aerial refueling method is the boom, and it is used by the vast majority of its aircraft. L3Harris had previously talked about several options for integrating a boom onto the KC-390, including ones involving remote operation, broadly akin to what is found on the KC-46, or more direct operator control, as is the case on the KC-135. On KC-390s currently configured for probe-and-drogue refueling, an operator manages those systems from a station in the cockpit.

“We’re starting that development. We’re exploring the trade space of what is the best solution,” Northrop Grumman’s Woolston said when asked for more details about the boom integration plan. “I’ll say those decisions haven’t been made. Like I said, it’s a trade space to explore.”

Woolston did highlight a particular focus on “autonomous boom” capabilities to help “rapidly integrate with whatever aircraft or system we’re refueling,” but didn’t elaborate further. This may refer to more automated boom capabilities, which Boeing and Airbus have also developed, which can help speed up the refueling process, increase safety margins, and reduce operator strain. The future development and fielding of new aerial refueling-capable air combat drones will also benefit from, if not require, these kinds of capabilities.

Boeing KC-46A Tanker Refuels Military Aircraft Using 3D

Airbus achieves world’s first fully automatic refuelling contacts

“You know the [KC-]390 is a full fly-by-wire airplane, low-workload for the crew,” Embraer’s Lemos noted. “We already have a third position in the cockpit that is there, has access to all the information that comes in and out of the airplane. Helps today with their refueling missions, monitoring the cameras … , good situational awareness of what’s happening.”

Overall, the boom integration depends “on what multi-mission capabilities we want to retain on the KC-390,” according to Woolston.

“We already have additional tanks on the [KC-]390. They are roll-on, roll-out. They are the same size as a pallet, standard 463 pallet,” Lemos added. “So you can combine additional tanks with cargo and with passengers. That’s a big advantage in terms of flexibility, in terms of employment. And you can use the fuel of [sic] those tanks to fly further or to offload the fuel for a receiver. So the moment you connect those tanks to the airplane, it’s an integral fuel system, you can use that fuel the best way you see fit.”

Lemos also stressed that retaining the KC-390’s existing capabilities in the boom-equipped version means the aircraft will still be able to operate from short and/or unimproved runways.

Embraer C-390 Millennium’s Unpaved Runway Tests Continues

All of this underscores how a version of the KC-390 with a boom could fit into an ACE scenario just like TWZ previously explored in-depth. As we wrote back in 2022:

“Overall, a KC-390 would provide a significantly smaller footprint than that of a traditional boom-equipped tanker, allowing it to work out of tighter airfields. L3Harris says that the boom-equipped KC-390 itself will still be capable of receiving fuel in flight. However, the model at the Air & Space Force Association Conference shows that it will have a boom receptacle above the cockpit instead the standard type’s refueling probe. Paired with its own refueling boom and the ability to carry out ground refueling operations for other aircraft, the KC-390 will be able to provide ACE deployments with a critical fuel lifeline, not just in the air, but also on the ground, and do so at significantly extended ranges.”

“With its own aerial refueling capability, an Air Force KC-390 could fly out to refuel from a larger tanker, such as a KC-46, and then return that fuel to austere airfields to be used by combat aircraft. Currently, only the service’s special operations-configured M/HC-130s can do that and they do not have a boom of their own so they cannot also provide fuel to Air Force receptacle-equipped aircraft, which accounts for nearly all of the force’s fleet. Basically, the KC-390 could allow for true ‘hub and spoke’ tanker operations, including from austere areas, during a major conflict. This could be especially attractive for refueling tactical aircraft, like fighters and eventually drones, from forward locales. Once again, currently, the Air Force doesn’t have a solution for this problem, which could make the KC-390 very attractive.”

“There are also the multi-role capabilities this aircraft provides, being able to move cargo and personnel to far-flung locations at jet speeds. Once again, this would support a hub-and-spoke concept of operations across a vast theater like the Pacific.”

…

“As noted earlier, the ACE concept will become especially prevalent as the United States continues to keep a pulse on China and any corresponding developments in the Pacific. Considering the sheer size of the region, maintaining the flexibility to disperse aircraft and other assets in less condensed groups will not only ensure widespread U.S. presence, but also prevent adversaries like China from targeting and taking out large amounts of aircraft and other capabilities by attacking just a handful of installations. It also greatly complicates the enemy’s own defensive strategy.”

As an additional point, in the scenarios described above, KC-390s could refuel fighters right after takeoff from austere airstrips. Those tactical jets could, in turn, launch with lower gross weights to help get safely airborne from shorter runways. Part of the initial fuel load could also be traded for more munitions while retaining sufficiently low weight. Topping off after takeoff, as well as being able to refuel closer to a forward operating location on the way back from a mission, would give those fighters greater overall operational reach.

The KC-390’s capabilities could be further expanded by the use of podded and/or roll-on/roll-off communications, electronic warfare, and other capabilities. The U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC) is already heavily investing in new networking and self-protection systems that can be added to tankers and airlifters, as necessary.

Beyond supporting the ACE construct, KC-390s could just help provide the Air Force with valuable added tanker capacity in general, including to help meet day-to-day training and other non-combat requirements. AMC has previously raised the possibility of acquiring a business jet-based tanker, which could also act as a similar gap-filler. U.S. military officials have been sounding the alarm for years now about the strain on existing tanker fleets and raising concerns about their capacity to meet even existing demands, let alone what would be required for a major sustained conflict.

This has been compounded by the growing age of the service’s Cold War-era KC-135 tanker fleet (and previously by that of the now-retired KC-10s), as well as persistent and often serious issues with newer KC-46s. The increasing vulnerability of traditional tankers based on airliner-type designs has also been a cause for concern.

For some time now, the Air Force has been working to refine requirements for what it is currently calling the Next-Generation Air Refueling System (NGAS). The NGAS plan could include new stealth tankers, as well as other types of aircraft and new capabilities for existing types. The service has said in the past that it hopes to see elements of NGAS begin to enter operational service by 2040, if not much sooner.

“I cannot have a 90-year-old tanker refueling a B-21 [Raider stealth bomber],” Lt. Gen. Rebecca Sonkiss, head of AMC, separately told TWZ and other outlets at a roundtable yesterday on the sidelines of the AFA Warfare Symposium. “If you do math, as we reach end of programs for things, that’s reality, right? I cannot have that. I must recap[italize] the tanker force.”

“There is also an element of that, that is the NGAS portion of it, which is a more specific problem set within the theater to be able to ensure that we deliver lethality, effectively and survivably,” she continued, noting that the Air Force is also looking to acquire additional KC-46s.

“They’ve put some money in to maintain that NGAS AOA [analysis of alternatives], and they’re working through [it] right now,” Sonkiss added. “I don’t think they’ve solidified the final pathway to NGAS, and I really don’t want to comment on the half work on that space.”

An analysis of alternatives is a process that the U.S. military uses to assess available options and further refine requirements for further weapon systems and other capabilities.

“Of course, we’re open to a family [of] systems,” Lt. Gen. Sonkiss also said. “It has to fit in with the greater Air Force scheme maneuver of what do those platforms need? And then we make the NGAS platform get after that portion.”

“How far do they need to get into the threat ring?” she added, noting that there could be various avenues to providing more protection for aircraft operating in more contested environments. “And that’s what that NGAS piece is going to work through.”

It should be made clear here that there is no expectation that a boom-equipped KC-390 would be a single ‘silver bullet’ solution to the NGAS question. Aviation Week reported last week that Northrop Grumman is presenting it as just one part of a three-tiered proposal for NGAS that also includes a larger blended wing body design and a smaller tanker drone. Northrop Grumman has so far declined to confirm or deny that it is making this multi-part pitch. The company is already partnered with JetZero on a project to build a blended wing body demonstrator for the Air Force that could be configured as a tanker and/or a cargo aircraft, which you can read more about here.

“The reaction we’ve gotten here at AFA has been very positive,” Northrop Grumman’s Woolston told us when asked about current Air Force interest in the boom-equipped KC-390, specifically.

“We are now starting to have that dialog,” he also said when asked about whether there had been any formal meetings with representatives from AMC or other Air Force officials.

“I haven’t really looked at that,” Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink had told TWZ and other outlets in response to a direct question about whether the KC-390 might have a future in his service’s tanker plans at another roundtable yesterday at the AFA Warfare Symposium.

A boom-equipped KC-390 could also be of interest to non-U.S. air arms that operate aircraft with the ability to refuel via this method. Aircraft built, at least in part, in the United States by an American firm could also open doors to acquiring them through a U.S. government foreign assistance mechanism.

Overall, it remains to be seen how the new partnership between Northrop Grumman and Embraer proceeds now, as well as how the Air Force’s vision for NGAS evolves. Still, as TWZ explored in detail four years ago, a new ‘agile tanker’ like boom-equipped KC-390 would seem to slot right into the operational scenarios the Air Force is now planning around, especially when it comes to a future conflict in the Pacific.

Jamie Hunter contributed to this story.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Japan is one of those spots on the map of the planet Earth where infrastructure and digital innovation are closely connected.

The country considers technology as an instrument of national competitiveness. For the last few years, this approach has extended, bringing revolution to Japan digital infrastructure, and exceeding expectations not only of citizens but also of international travellers.

5G Expansion and Digital Urban Infrastructure

Smart Tourism and Data Consumption Trends

Remote Work, International Mobility and Data Demands

In this context, as demand grows, many international visitors search for Japan eSIM unlimited data solutions that match their usage patterns. One example is available at Mobal Japan eSIM unlimited data, which provides an unlimited eSIM designed specifically for short-term stays, typically ranging from 3 to about 31 days, with unrestricted data usage suited to tourists and business travelers.

eSIM technology supports Japan’s tendency for digital transformation. eSIMs are the easiest way for travelers to stay connected, which can be arranged beforehand.

Policy, Regulation and Mobile Accessibility for Foreign Visitors

Japan’s telecom system is a perfect balance of competition and strict oversight. The market is tightly controlled by the rules around SIM registration, protection of consumers, and network licensing. As a result, foreign visitors may face a problem while getting a local SIM card.

At the same time, it’s clear that easy mobile access is needed for the positive experience of Japan for both business and travel spheres. Mobal provides a stable connection within the regulated system. All the services are perfectly adapted to correspond to legal requirements and the needs of travellers. The focus is not on promotion but on smooth service and security compliance.

Japan expands 5G networks, developing smart city technologies. As a result, regulations are constantly changing, covering such aspects as cybersecurity and digital identity. Such updates are needed for easily foreign visitors access and reliable mobile networks.

The Future of Digital Access in Japan

Arrest in town near the Ethiopian border follows Kenyan intelligence report revealing more than 1,000 citizens were trafficked for war.

Police in Kenya have arrested a man accused of being a member of a human trafficking scheme that lured Kenyans to Russia with false promises of work, only for them to end up fighting on the front lines of Ukrainian battlefields.

In a statement released late on Wednesday, Kenyan officials said Festus Arasa Omwamba was being detained in Moyale, a town in the country’s north bordering Ethiopia.

The 33-year-old “is believed to be a key player in a more extensive human trafficking syndicate that exploits vulnerable individuals by promising them legitimate employment opportunities in European countries”, read a statement from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations on X. “However, upon arrival, these unsuspecting victims find themselves trapped in illegal and perilous jobs, stripping them of their dignity and safety.”

The suspect was in police custody, undergoing preparation for his “impending” court appearance, it added.

Quoting police spokesperson Michael Muchiri, NTV Kenya reported that Omwamba was arrested after arriving from Russia. He was detained for allegedly recruiting Kenyans into the Russian military, Muchiri said.

The arrest comes after Kenya’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) last week unveiled a report which said more than 1,000 Kenyans have been recruited “to fight in the Russia-Ukraine war”, with 89 currently on the front line, 39 hospitalised, and 28 missing in action.

A day after the NIS released its report, dozens of families protested in Nairobi, demanding the government take action against the network of officials and syndicates tricking locals into joining the war. Many are still awaiting news about their loved ones’ whereabouts and when they might return.

Meanwhile, other families are grieving the deaths of their sons and brothers.

The Russian embassy in Nairobi denies the allegations, calling them in a statement last week “misleading propaganda”. It added that it never issued visas to Kenyan citizens who sought to travel to Russia with the aim to fight in Ukraine. However, the embassy added that Moscow does not preclude citizens of foreign countries from voluntarily enlisting in its armed forces.

Kenya’s Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi said he would travel to Russia in March to engage directly with the authorities and secure a safe return of Kenyans believed to be stranded there.

Fraudulent ‘schemes’ to lure foreign fighters

Reports of African men being fraudulently recruited and wilfully duped for work abroad to end up on the front lines in Ukraine have also surfaced from South Africa, Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Africa.

Ukraine on Wednesday accused Russia of using deception to recruit more than 1,700 Africans to join its war effort as the conflict drags into a fifth year.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha made the allegation during a news conference in Kyiv with his visiting Ghanaian counterpart, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa. He accused Moscow of using fraudulent “schemes” to lure the foreign fighters.

A day earlier, South Africa’s presidency announced it had secured the return home of 11 of its nationals who were “lured” into fighting for Russia in Ukraine. The presidency had already repatriated four others.

In the high-stakes world of private aviation, the acquisition of an aircraft is often celebrated as the ultimate achievement of corporate efficiency or personal success. It is the beginning of a journey defined by freedom and speed. However, the eventual divestment of that same asset is a process that is frequently underestimated, often to the financial detriment of the owner. Selling a complex machine that operates in a globally regulated environment is not merely a transaction; it is a multi-disciplinary project requiring legal, technical, and financial precision.

Unlike real estate or luxury automobiles, where value is relatively transparent and liquidity is somewhat predictable, the pre-owned jet market is opaque, fragmented, and notoriously unforgiving of unprepared sellers. A Gulfstream G650 or a Bombardier Challenger 350 does not have a “sticker price.” Its value is a floating target determined by its pedigree, its maintenance status, the geopolitical climate, and the specific micro-economics of its fleet type at the exact moment it hits the market. Navigating this exit requires a shift in mindset from “owner” to “vendor,” a transition that demands emotional detachment and rigorous attention to detail.

The Pre-Market Audit

Before a single photograph is taken or a listing is created, the aircraft must undergo a forensic internal audit. The most critical asset in a jet sale is not the leather seats or the paint job; it is the paperwork.

The Pedigree of Paper

In aviation, if a maintenance task is not documented, it effectively never happened. The value of an aircraft is inextricably tied to its logbooks. A missing logbook from ten years ago can devalue an airframe by millions of dollars. It raises the specter of “unknown damage history.” Sophisticated buyers will employ technical researchers to scan every page of the records. If they find gaps – missing 8130 forms for parts, undocumented engine cycles, or vague entries regarding repairs – they will either walk away or demand a price reduction that far exceeds the cost of the potential issue.

Therefore, the first step is digitizing and organizing the records. A seller must present a “clean bill of health” that traces the life of the aircraft from its birth on the assembly line to the present day. This includes organizing the “back-to-birth” trace for life-limited parts (LLPs). If you cannot prove the lineage of a landing gear strut, the buyer is forced to assume it is scrap metal, and the sale price will reflect that brutal reality.

Cosmetic Staging and the “Ramp Presence”

While the logs provide the technical value, the physical condition drives the emotional desire. A private jet is an emotional purchase. When a potential buyer walks up the airstairs, the sensory experience – the smell of the leather, the gleam of the woodwork, the clarity of the galley surfaces – sets the tone for the entire negotiation.

Sellers often neglect “ramp presence.” Faded paint on the wing leading edges, clouded cockpit windows, or worn carpet runners suggest a lack of care. If the owner skimped on the carpet, the buyer subconsciously wonders if they also skimped on the engine maintenance. Investing in professional detailing, wood veneer touch-ups, and even new carpet before listing can yield a return on investment of 3:1 or better. It removes the “low hanging fruit” that buyers use to justify lowball offers.

Valuation in a Fluid Market

Determining the asking price is an exercise in data analysis, not wishful thinking. Owners often fall into the trap of “book value” – what their accountant says the asset is worth – or “acquisition value” – what they paid for it plus the cost of upgrades. The market cares about neither.

The Influence of Engine Programs

One of the single largest determinants of value is the status of the engine maintenance programs. In the turbine world, these are often referred to as “Power by the Hour” programs (such as Rolls-Royce CorporateCare, JSSI, or Pratt & Whitney ESP). These programs act as a prepaid insurance policy for major engine overhauls.

An aircraft with engines “fully enrolled” on a program is a liquid asset. It transfers the liability of the next major overhaul (which can cost $2 million to $4 million per engine) from the buyer to the program provider. An aircraft that is “naked” (not on a program) is significantly harder to move. The seller must realize that if their engines are not covered, they will likely have to deduct the cost of the buy-in from the sale price, dollar for dollar.

Market Sentiment and Fleet Availability

Valuation also requires analyzing the “days on market” for comparable aircraft. If there are twenty Citation X jets for sale and only three have sold in the last six months, it is a buyer’s market. Pricing an aircraft at the top of the curve in such an environment ensures it will sit stagnant while incurring monthly hangar and insurance costs. A sharp, data-driven broker will provide a “Vref” or “Bluebook” value but will then adjust it based on real-time market intelligence, such as knowing that a competitor’s aircraft is about to drop its price by $500,000.

The Marketing Strategy

Once the aircraft is prepped and priced, the question becomes how to find a buyer. This is a small world. The strategy generally falls into two categories: On-Market and Off-Market.

The Broad Broadcast

Listing the aircraft on public-facing sites like Controller, AvBuyer, or JetNet is the standard approach. It maximizes exposure. However, it also signals to the world that the asset is available, which can sometimes be perceived as distress if it sits for too long. High-quality photography is non-negotiable here. Drone shots of the exterior, 3D walkthroughs of the cabin, and detailed shots of the galley amenities are standard expectations.

The Whisper Campaign

For ultra-high-net-worth individuals or corporations concerned with privacy, an “off-market” approach is preferred. The broker utilizes their personal network, calling other brokers and flight departments directly. “I have a turnkey Falcon 7X coming available next month, are you looking?” This creates an aura of exclusivity. It can drive a higher price because the buyer feels they are getting special access to an unlisted gem. However, it severely limits the buyer pool.

The Letter of Intent and the Deposit

When a buyer is found, the dance of documentation begins. The first major milestone is the Letter of Intent (LOI). This is a non-binding offer that outlines the price, the deposit amount (usually a refundable percentage held in escrow), and the timeline for the inspection.

The negotiation of the LOI is critical. It sets the “scope” of the Pre-Purchase Inspection (PPI). A seller wants a limited scope – “kick the tires and light the fires.” A buyer wants a deep scope – “take the plane apart and look for corrosion.” The agreed-upon scope determines how much risk the seller is exposed to. If the seller agrees to a “corrosion inspection” on an older aircraft, they might be opening a Pandora’s box of repair bills.

The Pre-Purchase Inspection (PPI): Where Deals Die

This is the most volatile phase of the transaction to sell a private jet successfully. The aircraft is flown to a neutral maintenance facility chosen by the buyer. For two to four weeks, technicians will open panels, borescope engines, and test avionics.

The Discrepancy List

The facility will produce a list of “discrepancies.” These are things that are broken or out of limits. The contract (Aircraft Purchase Agreement or APA) usually dictates that the seller is responsible for fixing “airworthy” items – things that make the plane illegal to fly. However, buyers will often try to include cosmetic items or “recommended” service bulletins in this list.

The “technical acceptance” phase is a second negotiation. The seller must decide whether to pay for the repairs, offer a credit, or refuse. If the repair bill is $50,000, it’s usually absorbed. If a major structural issue is found costing $500,000, the deal often hangs in the balance. This is where a strong technical manager on the seller’s side is vital to argue that “wear and tear” is not an airworthiness discrepancy.

The Mechanics of Closing

Once the aircraft is technically accepted, the focus shifts to the legal and financial closing. This is rarely a handshake and a check. It is a choreographed movement of funds and title transfers, often across international borders.

The International Registry

Most modern transactions fall under the purview of the “Cape Town Convention,” an international treaty intended to standardize the registration of mobile assets like aircraft. Closing requires registering the sale on the International Registry (IR). This protects the buyer’s title and the lender’s lien. If the seller has existing liens on the aircraft – perhaps a loan from a bank or unpaid maintenance bills – these must be cleared precisely at the moment of funding.

Escrow Agents

An aviation-specific escrow agent (like IATS or Insured Aircraft Title Service) acts as the traffic controller. They hold the buyer’s money and the seller’s bill of sale. They only release the money to the seller once they have confirmed that the title is clear and the registration has been filed with the FAA (or relevant civil aviation authority).

Tax Implications and Depreciation Recapture

For corporate sellers, the sale is a taxable event. If the aircraft has been fully depreciated for tax purposes (written off to zero value over five years, for example), the proceeds from the sale are considered “depreciation recapture” and are taxed as ordinary income. This can be a massive tax bill.

Sellers often utilize a “1031 Exchange” (in the US context) to defer this tax by rolling the proceeds immediately into the purchase of a replacement aircraft. However, the timing rules for a 1031 Exchange are rigid. The replacement asset must be identified within 45 days and closed within 180 days. Failing to meet these windows triggers the tax liability.

Sales and Use Tax

Furthermore, the physical location of the aircraft at the moment of closing matters. Closing in a state or country with high sales tax can trigger a liability for the buyer, which they may try to pass on or negotiate. Delivery locations are often chosen specifically for their tax-neutral status (e.g., closing while the aircraft is flying over international waters or in a state with a specific “fly-away” exemption).

The Post-Closing Detachment

Once the wire hits the account, the seller’s responsibility is largely over, but not entirely. There is the matter of insurance cancellation, hangar lease termination, and crew severance or reassignment.

If the crew is being retained by the buyer, a smooth transition of employment contracts is needed. If the aircraft is leaving the country, it must be deregistered from the national registry (e.g., the N-number removed) so it can be re-registered in its new home.

The Strategic Imperative of Patience

The timeline for a transaction of this magnitude typically runs from three to nine months. Sellers who enter the market with unrealistic expectations regarding price or timeline are often punished by the market. The “stigma of the stale listing” is real. If a jet sits on the market for 300 days, buyers assume there is something wrong with it, and the offers get progressively lower.

The most successful sellers are those who treat the divestment with the same rigor as the initial acquisition. They maintain the asset perfectly until the day it leaves, they assemble a team of specialized brokers and lawyers, and they remove emotion from the negotiation. In the end, the goal is not just to sell a plane; it is to exit a liability cleanly, maximizing capital retrieval to fuel the next mission, whether that is another acquisition or a reinvestment into the core business. The art of the exit is, ultimately, the art of preparation.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio updated U.S. legislators on Iran just hours before President Donald Trump issued warnings over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions in his State of the Union address. In the past days, U.S. military forces in the region have grown to the highest levels seen since the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. New assets that have arrived include U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors, reportedly in Israel, while F-16s have been deployed to Diego Garcia to protect the Indian Ocean outpost against potential Iranian attacks.

Rubio provided a rare intelligence briefing for congressional leaders — the so-called “gang of eight” — which includes the senior lawmakers from both parties in the House and Senate, as well as the chairs and ranking members of the House and Senate intelligence committees. The contents of the briefing are classified, but it underscores the wider preparations for potential significant military action against Iran.

The “gang of eight” receives classified intelligence from the White House in the form of briefings, and their content can include preparations for military operations. It is notable that the last time Rubio publicly briefed the group was on January 5, one day after the U.S. military launched its successful operation to capture Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro.

As he left yesterday’s briefing, Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer said: “This is serious, and the administration has to make its case to the American people.”

“I’m very concerned,” added Jim Himes, the ranking democrat on the House intelligence committee. “Wars in the Middle East don’t go well for presidents, for the country, and we have not heard articulated a single good reason for why now is the moment to launch yet another war in the Middle East.”

Rubio’s intel update preceded Trump’s State of the Union address last night, during which the U.S. president reaffirmed that Iran would never be permitted to acquire nuclear weapons.

In his address, Trump stated that he would rather handle rising tensions with Iran through diplomatic means. However, he also claimed that Tehran was developing ballistic missile technology that could potentially reach the United States, without providing further details.

“They’ve already developed missiles that can threaten Europe and our bases overseas,” Trump said. “And they’re working to build missiles that will soon reach the United States of America.”

Whether or not the U.S. Air Force’s new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) will carry multiple warheads remains to be seen now that a key arms control treaty has expired. The service is otherwise hopeful that the Sentinel program is now on the right track after years of major delays and ballooning costs, driven heavily by costs and complexities associated with building new infrastructure. A particularly key issue has been the matter of silos, with the original plan to repurpose the ones that currently house Minuteman III ICBMs having been abandoned in favor of all-new construction.

Air Force and other U.S. military officials, as well as a representative from the Sentinel’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman, shared new updates about the program with TWZ and other outlets at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium today. Sentinel has been undergoing a complete restructuring since delays and cost overruns triggered a legal requirement for a full review back in 2024. The original plan had called for the new Sentinel ICBMs, also designated LGM-35As, to begin entering operational service in 2029. Minuteman III, of which there are 400 currently sitting in silos across five states, was to be phased out by 2036.

The setbacks also mean that ongoing work on Sentinel is now occurring free from the limits on America’s nuclear arsenal that were imposed by the New START treaty with Russia. That agreement sunset, as scheduled, earlier this month without a follow-on deal in place.

A Sentinel Program official declined to say how many warheads could be loaded onto a single Sentinel missile when asked at a press briefing earlier today. The publicly stated plan previously has been to load each missile with a single W87-1 warhead.

Each of the Minuteman III ICBMs in service today, which are also designated LGM-30Gs, is topped with either a single W78 or W87 warhead, the result of a succession of arms control agreements culminating in New START. The LGM-30G, which entered service in 1970, was originally designed to carry up to three warheads, and retains this so-called multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability.

“We have the ability to do that. That’s obviously a national-level decision that would go up to the President,” Navy Adm. Rich Correll, head of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), told TWZ and others at a separate roundtable today, speaking generally about the prospect of the U.S. fielding ICBMs in a MIRV configuration again. “Those policy levers, if needed, provide additional resiliency within the capabilities that we have.”

“Nothing’s changed since [the] expiration of the New START treaty. The threat environment that existed before [the] expiration of the New START Treaty exists today,” Correll added. “So that decision space is open, and discussions will occur at a senior policy-making level to make decisions with respect to that. I would reserve any recommendations I have for that discussion within the Department.”

Earlier this month, Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), under which the currently Minuteman III force falls, also told TWZ that it “maintains the capability and training to MIRV the Minuteman III ICBM force” and that it would be prepared to do so “if directed by the President.”

We do know that the Sentinel missile is a new design with a three-stage solid fuel rocket booster that has been described as slightly larger than the Minuteman III. Under the shroud on top is a payload bus with a liquid fuel propulsion system.

Enabling Peace Through Deterrence

“Our liquid propulsion system, this is what gives us the fine point that allows us to place the re-entry vehicle precisely on target, that greater accuracy that comes with the Sentinel system,” the Northrop Grumman official explained at today’s press briefing.

Beyond improved accuracy, the Air Force and Northrop Grumman have said that Sentinel will also offer greater range, as well as reliability and sustainability benefits, compared to the Cold War-era Minuteman III. Though more specific details about Sentinel’s capabilities are classified, developing a new ICBM does provide the opportunity to incorporate various new features and functionality, including when it comes to survivability.

“At this point, we have completed testing on all of the major elements of the missile system. … We met all of our primary objectives and are [on] a good course to first flight, which is why we have confidence that we’re going to hit that pad launch in 2027,” the Northrop Grumman official added. “What we’re working on now are additional tests just to give us confidence” when it comes to “reliability and integrating that system.”

The Air Force first announced it was targeting a Sentinel first flight in 2027, from a launch pad above ground, last week. The service has yet to share when it expects to conduct the first test launch from a silo. Northrop Grumman is now building a full-scale prototype silo facility in Promontory, Utah, but it is unclear whether that will be constructed in a way that would allow it to be used for test launches in the future. As an aside, the New START treaty had also imposed limits on deployed and non-deployed “launchers,” which included silos for ICBMs.

As mentioned, the topic of silos has been absolutely central to the Sentinel program and its troubles over the years. Originally, the Air Force expected to be able to reuse Minuteman III silos, but subsequently determined that this was not the optimal course of action. The plan now is to construct 450 entirely new silos. The Air Force hopes this will actually save time and money now, in part because of the ability to leverage modern modular construction methods from the start rather than trying to repurpose decades-old structures.

“The original acquisition strategy for Sentinel was to use and reuse the Minuteman III silos for the housing of the Sentinel missile, with some upgraded communication rooms and things next to it. Over the past year, we’ve gone through multiple assessments to figure out what the right strategy is as we look forward, and we’ve changed our acquisition strategy to go after building and constructing new silos for Sentinel,” the Sentinel Program official explained today. “That came out of really kind of two primary things. The first reason we looked at this is just the variability of refurbishing Minuteman III silos. The Minuteman III silos are amazing, and they are incredibly efficient at executing the mission today. But as we were going down the path of trying to plan, just like trying to renovate a house built in the [19]60s, there was variability in understanding how you would attack refurbishment, how you would understand the conditions, and the timing, and the cost associated with that.”

The Air Force also sees new silos as helping ease the transition process from Minuteman III to Sentinel. Both missiles will be in service simultaneously for a time to ensure the land-based leg of America’s nuclear deterrent triad remains credible throughout the process.

“As we were looking at opportunity space, we found a squadron at Malmstrom [Air Force Base in Montana], which was the first one, that was still owned Air Force land, but allowed us what I would call swing space,” the Sentinel Program official noted. “If we constructed there, how we sequence and how we choreograph, taking down Minuteman and bringing Sentinel up on alert, it allowed us the opportunity to do that without impacting operations today. And going after that swing space, it actually drove us to designing and constructing new silos, as there were not Minuteman III silos available to be reused on those sites.”

New silos “also captured a few things that we were working through on risk, primarily around human factors and some other things that were existing in the reuse of Minuteman, it allowed us to get those and reduce those as we went forward,” they added.

“We knew and had some assumptions at the beginning. We had to test out those assumptions,” they also said when asked about why these issues were not recognized earlier on. “As we’ve tested out those assumptions, some of them proved false, which is why we’ve been going down the path of laying in, prototyping, experimentation, and showing progress on how do we say, ‘Hey, this is a different way of approaching it.’”

“To suggest they weren’t thought about, I think that would be probably short-sighted. They were very much thought about. I think that we often forget that these are very challenging programs. This is something we have not done in over six decades,” Air Force Gen. Dale White, Director of Critical Major Weapon Systems and direct reporting portfolio manager to the Deputy Secretary of War, also said at the roundtable. “Some of the assumptions that did come to fruition have actually provided more operational advantages. We’ve made changes along the way.”

“With the decision to recapitalize the intersite communications and build new launch silos, it’s opened up a lot of additional possibilities,” AFGSC commander Air Force Gen. Stephen Davis also said at the roundtable. “And I would tell you, I don’t think we have the answer exactly how we’re doing that yet, but we have more flexibility.”

The aforementioned prototype silo in Utah is being built to help further burn down risk.

“There are many things that we’re looking to prove out through this risk reduction activity, excavation techniques, how we integrate the modular elements of the silo, too. How we protect from weather conditions and how we do transportation to and from the site – critically important,” the Northrop Grumman official said. “And we will ultimately use this as we start to integrate and perform operations around missile emplacement, those kinds of things.”

Despite the “swing space” found to exist on Air Force-owned land, the Sentinel program is still expected to require the use of other U.S. government-owned land and the acquisition of additional land from private entities. The full extent of those additional land requirements is still being assessed. What will happen to the decommissioned Minuteman III silos is still to be determined, as well.

Though they are the most important aspect, silos are only one part of the massive infrastructure development plans baked into the Sentinel program. A total of 24 new launch centers and three new missile wing command centers are also set to be built. The new ICBM force will be spread across 32,000 square miles in five states and linked together by more than 5,000 miles of new fiber optic lines.

“The wing command center is actually a new capability being provided by Sentinel that doesn’t exist today for Minuteman,” the Sentinel Program official said. “Today at Minuteman, the information is more siloed. The structure of Minuteman is built around the [missile] squadron, and there isn’t a sole place where the information is pulled together, to give you the battlespace awareness of the entire wing at one time.”

“So the wing command center is where that fiber backbone is incredibly important,” they continued. “The quantity of data that can be pushed on fiber, from my physical security monitoring for health and status of the missiles and of the launch facilities, all can be integrated here into a common picture that allows the operational commander the ability to see what is going on in the missile field and take the appropriate action and prioritize where they are using their resources, their Airmen, to tackle the problems and the solutions.”

The first of these facilities is now being built at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. That base is also set to host initial prototyping efforts related to the fiber optic cable laying, which is set to be a huge undertaking led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

The Air Force is now aiming to start fielding Sentinel sometime in the early 2030s. How long it will take to complete the transition from Minuteman III to the ICBMs is unclear. The service has said it is at least “feasible” to keep some number of Minuteman IIIs on alert until 2050, according to a past report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a congressional watchdog.

The U.S. military continues to stress that the new Sentinel ICBMs and modernized infrastructure that will come with them are top national security priorities. Despite debates in the past about the utility of the land-based leg of the triad, it does remain the fastest nuclear response option in the Pentagon’s strategic portfolio. It also has a continued purpose to act as a ‘warhead sponge’ that would force any opponent to expend substantial resources on trying to neutralize it in a future nuclear exchange.

US Air Force launches Minuteman III ICBM from Vandenberg in unarmed test

The global geostrategic environment has also evolved in ways that further bolster the case for Sentinel, particularly when it comes to China drastically expanding its nuclear arsenal. Other global crises, including Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine, together with other proliferation and strategic weapons development concerns, are factors, as well.

“The fact of the matter is that both the offense and defensive threats … have evolved significantly” since Minuteman III was fielded, Gen. Davis said today. “We’ve gotten all the capability that we can out of the Minuteman, but Sentinel will bring Air Force Global Strike Command and USSTRATCOM important new capabilities that we need to keep up with the threat and to stay ahead of it.”

There are many questions the Sentinel program clearly still has to answer, including how many warheads each missile should carry, as it moves toward finally reaching an operational capability in the next decade.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

As the Muslim holy month of Ramadan began last week, the Iraqi city of Mosul regained its spiritual and cultural vibrancy, with religious rituals blending with cultural activities that reflect the city’s heritage, identity and collective memory after years of war and devastation.

On the first night of Ramadan, immediately after the Maghrib call to prayer, the chant “Majina ya Majina”, a traditional Ramadan song, echoes through the old neighbourhoods. Children in traditional clothing roam the streets singing Ramadan songs, in a scene that revives longstanding customs.

“This gathering of children revives Mosuli and Iraqi heritage and teaches them the values of sharing and celebrating the holy month,” said Yasser Goyani, 31, a member of the Bytna Foundation for Culture, Arts and Heritage

Tarawih prayers, performed at night during Ramadan, have also returned to the Grand al-Nuri Mosque and its iconic leaning minaret, al-Hadba, for the first time in nearly nine years, just before the bombing of the mosque in 2017 by ISIL (ISIS) fighters at the peak of an Iraqi government campaign against the group that had taken control of the city.

“I feel great joy performing prayers again in the mosque after its restoration and reopening, which reflects its spiritual and historical importance,” adds Goyani.

The traditional storyteller, or hakawati, has also re-emerged during Ramadan evenings, recounting stories from Mosul’s past.

“The hakawati represents a link between the past and the present. We narrate stories about how life in Mosul used to be, especially during the holy month of Ramadan. Despite technological development, people still love returning to their old memories,” explained Abeer al-Ghanem, 52, who plays the storyteller.

Meanwhile, the musaharati – the traditional predawn caller who wakes people up for a small meal to help them cope with the daylong fast – still walks through neighbourhoods in the Old City of Mosul before dawn.

Ghufran Thamer, 34, who performs the role, says, “The musaharati reminds people of authentic Ramadan rituals and keeps the nights of Ramadan alive, despite the changes in modern life.”

Traditional games remain a key part of the Ramadan atmosphere.

“We have been playing the siniya game since the 1980s. It is closely associated with Ramadan and creates a warm and joyful atmosphere among participants during the nights,” said Fahad Mohammed Kashmoula, 55.

Mosul’s markets, particularly the historic Bab al-Saray, come alive during Ramadan as residents flock to buy seasonal staples. Dates are especially in demand, providing a quick source of energy for those fasting. Khalil Mahmoud, 65, who has been selling dates in Bab al-Saray for nearly 40 years, says date sales increase significantly during Ramadan, especially in this market.

“Dates are highly sought after by those fasting, because they help compensate for the sugar lost during the day,” he said

Raisin juice, another Ramadan drink, is also popular across the city.

“The juice is prepared from high-quality raisins and fresh mint from the mountains of Kurdistan. The raisins are soaked, strained, crushed and strained again before being poured into bags for sale. Shops become crowded as people seek to replenish their energy after fasting,” said Hussein Muwaffaq, a raisin juice maker.

Alongside religious and cultural activities, the city also sees growing humanitarian initiatives during Ramadan, including paying off the debts of people in need, distributing food baskets, setting up free iftar meals, and promoting the values of social solidarity.

Caracas, February 25, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan rice producers have staged demonstrations in recent days, demanding responses from authorities to secure fair prices for their harvests.

Campesino organizations from Barinas, Cojedes, Guárico, and Portuguesa states have held meetings with their respective governors and local representatives of the Agriculture Ministry to denounce pressure from agribusiness conglomerates imposing lower prices for their crops.

Victor Martínez, a rice producer and representative from a rural association in Portuguesa state, told Venezuelanalysis that there is an urgent need to establish appropriate crop prices with harvesting set to begin in the coming days.

“We are calling on the Venezuelan government, from Acting President Delcy Rodríguez to Agriculture Minister Julio León Heredia, to intervene and help set fair prices for rice that take into account our production costs,” he explained. “We cannot have the agroindustrial conglomerates imposing prices unilaterally.”

According to Martínez, rural producers sold rice crops at $0.50-0.55 per kilogram last year, and presently the Iancarina group, the biggest agribusiness firm in Portuguesa state, is offering $0.32-0.38 per kilo. Iancarina holds significant market shares nationwide in corn flour and rice distribution with its “Mary” brand and has ties to the US-based transnational commodities marketer GSI Food.

“These prices would mean the extinction of rice production, jeopardizing thousands of jobs in the countryside,” Martínez continued. “We urge authorities to establish dialogue mechanisms that take our production costs into account.”

The rice growers additionally denounced that corporations have recently imported rice to drive down crop prices and that Venezuelan producers cannot compete with international prices due to “exorbitant production costs.” AgroPatria, a state-owned company that supplied agricultural inputs to campesinos, was turned over to private group AgroLlano in 2020.

Martínez stated that $0.70 per kilo of rice is the price Portuguesa producers have set as a target in negotiations.

“There are too many hurdles to produce right now, from very expensive inputs to a lack of access to credit,” he went on to add. “The same agroindustry corporations offer financing but with draconian conditions and our profit margins vanish.”

According to Martínez, current financing agreements see companies supply inputs and then collect as much as 60 percent of the crop as payment. 

“Agribusiness oligopolies say that they are better off just importing rice, which carries no risk for them. But no country can survive without agriculture.” He concluded with a call for halting imports and extending state support to campesino producers.

In recent days, rural collectives in different states have shared their production costs and come up with different proposals for Venezuelan authorities. They are likewise weighing the possibility of staging a rally in Caracas to demand the intervention of the Agriculture Ministry. Venezuelan government officials have yet to comment on the controversy.

In recent years, with the economy heavily constrained by US sanctions, the Nicolás Maduro government moved to liberalize agricultural policies, transferring former state competencies to the private sector, including provisioning of seed and fertilizer inputs and access to tractors. Fuel subsidies have likewise been phased out, with small-scale producers denouncing it as a major factor driving up production costs.

Campesino collectives have repeatedly drawn attention to a growing agribusiness influence both in the supply of inputs and the commercialization of harvests. Food conglomerates have used their control of silos and retail channels as well as imports during harvest season, to drive up profit margins by imposing lower prices on producers.

Apart from rice, farmers have condemned similar coercive practices with sugar and coffee. Standoffs have traditionally led to mediation from state authorities and a temporary agreement on prices. However, campesinos have repeatedly alerted that agribusiness firms stop honoring established prices or delay payments to take advantage of the Venezuelan currency devaluation.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

US eases oil embargo on Cuba as Caribbean neighbours warn worsening humanitarian crisis could destabilise region.

The United States has said it will allow the resale of some Venezuelan oil to Cuba in a move that could ease the island’s acute fuel shortages, as neighbouring countries raised the alarm over a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation caused by Washington’s oil blockade.

In a statement on Wednesday, the US Department of the Treasury said it would authorise companies seeking licences to resell Venezuelan oil for “commercial and humanitarian use in Cuba”.

It said the new “favorable licensing policy” would not cover “persons or entities associated with the Cuban military, intelligence services, or other government institutions”.

Venezuela had been the main supplier of crude and fuel ⁠to Cuba for the past 25 years through a bilateral pact mostly based on the barter of products and services. But since the US abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro last month and took control of the country’s oil exports, Caracas’s supply to Cuba has ceased.

Mexico, which had emerged as an alternate supplier, also halted shipments to the Caribbean island after the US threatened tariffs on countries that send oil to Cuba. The US blockade has worsened an energy crisis in Cuba that is hitting power generation and fuel for vehicles, houses and aviation.

The shift in US policy came as Caribbean leaders gathering in Saint Kitts and Nevis expressed alarm at the impacts of the blockade on the island nation of some 10.9 million people. Speaking to Caribbean leaders during a meeting of the regional political group CARICOM on Tuesday, Jamaican Prime Minister Andrew Holness affirmed solidarity with Cuba.

“Humanitarian suffering serves no one,” Holness said at the meeting. “A prolonged crisis in Cuba will not remain confined to Cuba.”

The Caribbean summit’s host, Saint Kitts and Nevis Prime Minister Terrance Drew, who studied in Cuba to be a doctor, said friends have told him of food scarcity and rubbish strewn in the streets.

“A destabilised Cuba will destabilise all of us,” Drew said.

But addressing the meeting in Saint Kitts and Nevis on Wednesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed that the humanitarian crisis had been caused by the Cuban government’s policies, not Washington’s blockade.

Rubio, whose parents migrated to the US from Cuba in 1956, warned that the sanctions would be snapped back if the oil winds up going to the government or military.

“Cuba needs to change. It needs to change dramatically because it is the only chance that it has to improve the quality of life for its people,” Rubio told reporters.

It is “a system that’s in collapse, and they need to make dramatic reforms”, he said.

Rubio went on to blame economic mismanagement and the lack of a vibrant private sector for the dire situation in Cuba, which has been under communist rule since Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution.

“This is the worst economic climate Cuba has faced. And it is the authorities there, and that government, who are responsible for that,” Rubio said.

The US pressure on Venezuela and Cuba ⁠has left several fuel cargoes undelivered since December, according to the Reuters news agency, contributing to the island’s inability to keep the lights on and cars circulating. A Cuba-related vessel that loaded Venezuelan gasoline in early February at a port operated by state-run company PDVSA remained this week anchored in Venezuelan waters waiting for authorisation to set sail.

Mexico and Canada have meanwhile announced they would be sending aid to Cuba, and Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also said his government was discussing the possibility of providing fuel to the island.

Separately on Wednesday, Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior announced killing four people and wounding six others on board a Florida-registered speedboat that it said entered Cuban waters.

Rubio told reporters it was not a US operation and that no US government personnel were involved.

“Suffice it to say, it is highly unusual to see shootouts in open sea like that,” he said. “ It’s not something that happens every day. It’s something frankly that hasn’t happened with Cuba in a very long time.”

So, here we are, once again. The United States has flooded the Middle East with combat capabilities. A massive investment has already been made in airframe hours, manpower, and naval resources in preparation for what could be the biggest initial military action America has taken in more than 20 years. Such an operation is not without absolutely massive risks. Iran has prepared for this day for many decades, and so many questions remain outstanding. Glaring ones. Ones that impact the globe and especially those tasked with fighting what could very well be a bloody war that has, at least at this time, highly opaque goals.

Let’s talk about those questions.

What is the goal?

This is the biggest unknown. What are we getting into here? Aside from the possibility that this is a giant feint — a hammer and anvil tactic to force a diplomatic outcome — there have to be clear military goals. Would an air campaign be focused on destroying Iran’s nuclear program alone? There are limitations to achieving that goal with airpower. Israel, too, is well aware of this. Is this goal to be paired with absolutely neutering Iran’s military-industrial base, along with its existing combat capabilities? That would seem more likely, but doing so would require a much larger, sustained operation.

There have also been reports that the White House is eyeing a limited operation in order to force Iran to make a deal. This seems wildly reckless both on a military and diplomatic level, and I doubt these reports are true. The Pentagon would never recommend this. It would ruin any element of surprise and the cumulative impact of using everything at its disposal to shock, blind, and deafen Iran’s command and control. It would also likely result in Iran counter-attacking, which sets off a chain of events that will be hard to pull back from.

Then there is regime change. That term comes with immense baggage for obvious and totally relevant reasons. Even if this goal is achieved — the collapse of the current regime — mainly through strikes, what comes next? Is there a plan in place for who will succeed Khamenei, and what would that group’s own goals be? How would they seize power when the power vacuum appears? Or will decapitating the regime throw Iran into civil war or even worse, a country controlled by the fanatical IRGC, which, on paper, would seem to be a prime candidate with the might and infrastructure to assume control.

In other words, could lopping off the head of the snake just see another, even more gruesome serpent take its place?

We don’t know the intelligence or what is going on clandestinely to see that such a risky operation has any chance of long-term success. Without a solid plan, such a move would seem to only invite more risk.

And once again, obtaining this level of transformation largely via airpower is a highly questionable proposition, at best. There is absolutely no appetite domestically to engage in another ground war in the Middle East, so that option is a non-starter, which is a good thing, as America’s track record in this regard is terrible.

Finally, as we have mentioned before, the U.S. military has a lot of combat capability now in the region, and more that can strike from afar, but there doesn’t appear to be enough to sustain a long campaign with a wider set of objectives. So this may limit what can be achieved.

That brings us to the next question.

What will Israel’s role be?

I think it’s safe to assume that Israel will be involved deeply in any major military operation the United States executes against Iran. Frankly, for any sustained campaign, based on the airpower capabilities in the region, America will need Israel’s help, and for that to be en masse.

Israel brings hundreds of fighter aircraft, unique munitions, and more to the fight. Supported fully by America’s tanker force, Israel’s tactical airpower will be far more effective than it was during the 12 Day War less than a year ago. Combining forces fully to achieve a common outcome is more powerful than the sum of its parts in this case.

Beyond traditional airpower, leveraging Israel’s intelligence would be critical. Traditional intelligence products from Israel will be key in achieving any outcome faster in an air war. The same can be said for the flow of U.S. information in Israel’s direction. Still, operating seamlessly is very tough in such a complex, long-range combat scenario. While Israel and the United States have repeatedly trained on smaller scales for this type of operation, doing it on a massive scale is a different story. How the tasking orders would be assigned and deconflicted would be very interesting to watch.

But even above the traditional combat power and intelligence Israel can offer such a mission, Israel’s deep presence on the ground in Iran will be arguably of the greatest value. Nobody is anywhere as deeply embedded inside Iran as Israel. And this will impact the full gamut of potential operational scenarios.

Case in point is the Mossad’s novel operation to take out Iran’s air defenses in key areas using operatives on the ground equipped with one-way attack drones and loitering anti-tank guided missiles. While suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses is largely thought to be relegated to the role of airpower, it is anything but limited to just this domain. And Israel proved this on an unprecedented level in the opening stages of the air war in June. Those near-field attacks on Iranian air defense sites allowed standoff munitions, drones, and eventually manned aircraft to make it to their targets, firmly setting the momentum in Israel’s favor during the opening parts of the campaign. It wouldn’t be that surprising if this is repeated, at least in some altered fashion, during whatever could happen in the coming days.

Mossad operatives on the ground also worked to assassinate the cream of Iran’s nuclear scientist corps during the operation, mainly using drones launched from near their targets. We would likely see a similar operation take place against military and regime leadership in the opening stages of the looming conflict, if it comes to pass. There are no indications that the United States has anywhere near this capability working inside Iran.

As we have discussed for years, Israel would likely be willing to put special operations units on the ground to seize and destroy absolutely critical hardened targets, such as nuclear sites or possibly individuals hidden within regime bunkers, that are not capable of being destroyed from the air. The United States could as well, but the political risks would be far higher if such an operation went awry.

Finally, it is worth noting that going to war alongside Israel against Iran brings additional diplomatic risks in the region, although these have waned in recent years as Arab countries have become far less hostile to the Jewish State. These Arab states also could see a massive benefit from a successful campaign that rejiggers the status quo in the region and ends Iran’s troublesome influence throughout it. Still, the economic disruption alone could be large, especially if the war carries and if Iran actively works to deny access to the Persian Gulf.

Real dangers

We have not seen modern Iran fight for its very life against the United States or even Israel. On paper, Iran can do immense damage to the region. Yes, it can close and mine the Strait of Hormuz, causing massive repercussions that could last long after the war ends, a possibility which you can read about here. This is a well-understood danger. But above even that, Iran has an absolutely huge inventory of standoff weapons — specifically cruise missiles, long-range one-way attack drones, and most importantly, ballistic missiles. On the latter, there is a broad misconception that Israel wiped out Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities. This couldn’t be further from the truth.

During the 12 Day War, Israel was concerned with Iran’s long-range ballistic missiles — MRBMs and IRBMs. These are also the easiest to find, fix, and destroy. They are large and their launchers are vulnerable because of it, especially during the pre-launch fueling stage. The location of the storage areas for these missiles is well known, including the missile cave complexes, some of which have the ability to launch the missiles through apertures in launch room ceilings. By hitting the entry and exit points of these facilities, these weapons are not destroyed but they are trapped inside.

In addition, Israel focused their interdiction ‘missile hunting’ efforts on these long-range weapons that threaten its homeland. They were also the weapons that had to be exposed as they were employed in retaliatory strikes during the war. The shorter-range stuff didn’t need to be as it was largely not used.

To make this clear, Iran’s far more plentiful short-range ballistic missiles that threaten American bases in Gulf Arab allied states were not heavily targeted. The same can be said for the shorter-range drones and cruise missiles.

So no, these capabilities were not knocked out by any means, and they are also by far the easiest for Iran to disperse and hide. This makes hunting for them from the air extremely problematic. This is especially true when Iran enters into a combat state, where it distributes these missiles, which are largely loaded onto common truck platforms, into population centers and hidden under pretty much anything. They can also shoot and scoot much faster than their long-range counterparts.

The IRGC-N took a massive delivery of anti ship missiles for coastal defense

Note the dual tube launcher in the pics, which we’ve never seen before. Seems to be a new anti ship new cruise missile. Sadly no information was given besides pics

My guess is possible supersonic AShM pic.twitter.com/i7i0z8uFc0

— Iran Defense commentary (unofficial) (@IranDefense) August 9, 2024

With all of America’s intelligence capabilities, finding and destroying these weapons from the air will be extremely challenging. Even the relatively meager arsenal belonging to Yemen’s Houthis proved vexing for the U.S. military after many months of sustained ‘hunting.’ The Houthis continued to get off successful coastal launches throughout these operations. The scale of the Iranian threat is exponentially larger, and the country has more complex terrain to hide these weapons.

Iran’s shorter-range standoff weapons number in the thousands. They have the ability to saturate the best defenses on earth and lay waste to prized targets across the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, and deeper into allied Arab nations. This not only makes nearby basing of U.S. aircraft and personnel problematic, but it greatly increases the cost of any war the United States could execute against Iran.

We have seen what it took to defend against just one volley of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles. It resulted in the largest volley of Patriot interceptors in history. Even that defensive action wasn’t entirely successful at rebuffing the attack, let alone repeated ones that would include layers of drones, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles.

Footage of a US/Qatari PATRIOT surface to air missile system conducting a large ballistic missile engagement over Al-Udeid this evening, salvoing out dozens of PAC-3 interceptors at incoming Iranian ballistic missiles. pic.twitter.com/a7OHrs9svr

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 23, 2025

There is also a risk to American warships, even those that are operating far out to sea. Iran has shown it has the ability to launch long-range anti-ship weaponry not just from its coasts and warships, but from unassuming seaborne platforms, including using containerized missiles and drones. The farther U.S. Navy vessels have to operate from Iranian territory also means their missiles won’t be able to penetrate as far into the country. A carrier’s air wing will need additional tanking support to get to its targets, and sortie rates will be lowered.

These capabilities, along with the possibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz, drastically increase the chances of expanding the conflict by pulling Arab countries into it, as well, which would complicate, not help the cause, at least in many respects.

Iran knows full well where American aircraft are currently based, and they will throw everything they have at these sites. This includes America’s sprawling airbase in Jordan that is packed with tactical airpower. They know what defenses are there and have an understanding of what it will take to overwhelm them if they get the chance to do so. So the idea that we could not see mass losses of aircraft and other materiel, and even lives, on the ground, even when striking from afar, is not reality.

The same can be said about an air war. The U.S. has the most advanced air combat capabilities on earth, but ‘shit happens,’ especially during war. Even the Houthis nearly downed U.S. fighter aircraft optimized to destroy enemy air defenses. But regardless of defenses and the state of Iran’s air defense overlay, putting Americans over Iran, and repeatedly over days and weeks, is a risk. Aircraft can malfunction and mistakes can be made. When that happens, it will require even more risk to push combat search and rescue assets into the area to try and recover the crew. In other words, regardless of America’s outstanding air warfare capabilities, there is still a real risk involved in any operation over Iran.

Finally, if Iran is really backed into a corner, and especially if its most extremist elements remain in play, it could resort to weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, chemical weapons and rudimentary radiological ones (dirty bombs) could be used in a dying gasp of the regime. If they did this, it would mean a certain end for the sitting power structure in the country, but if that is going to happen anyway, they could lash out in horrible ways. There is debate as to whether Iran would, or even could, actually do this, but historically, the regime in Tehran is no stranger to the use of chemical weapons.

Defending Israel again

Iran did not run out of long-range ballistic missiles during the 12 Day War, either. They ran out of ones available for launch, and they likely saw real degradation in their ability to launch those accessible due to Israel’s interdiction efforts and disarray in Iranian command and control after nearly two weeks of being bombarded. Since that war, Iran has been pumping out more of these missiles at a high rate, despite Israel’s attacks on missile production-related targets. Some of these weapons are quite advanced, proving their ability to penetrate the IDF’s multi-tier integrated air defense system, the most advanced one on Earth, an air defense capability you can read all about here.

At the same time, the 12 Day War saw the United States and Israel burn through stocks of advanced interceptors, especially the mid-course or near mid-course intercept-capable ones. These weapons take years to produce and cost many millions of dollars each. Israel’s coveted Arrow system was reported to be running low on interceptors towards the end of the war, although how accurate those reports were is in question. The U.S. military burned through a large portion of its THAAD interceptors and many of the U.S. Navy’s prized SM-3 interceptors. This is on top of Israel ripping through countless Stunners fired by David’s Sling. The U.S. also fired a considerable number of PAC-3 Patriots and air-to-air missiles during the conflict while defending in areas outside of Israel from missile and drone attacks. But it’s the stockpile of the upper tier of missile defense interceptors that is most concerning.

If Iran was truly fighting for its life and knowing the end could be near, how many missiles will it send at Israel, and how many interceptors are available to defend against those barrages? Iran also has become increasingly savvy on what tactics to employ and where in order to overwhelm Israel’s defenses. While targeting has focused, at least to a degree, on military and governmental targets, if this was an all-out conflict, it’s likely Iran would just concentrate on population centers with whatever it has to throw at the cause.

The U.S. stockpile of advanced munitions is already a real concern after multiple campaigns to defend Israel, the long and violent standoff in the Red Sea, and the war in Ukraine. This is especially true for its more advanced interceptors, which are also in extreme demand among allies globally. This is all happening as the threat from China is growing more concerning by the day. A war in the Pacific will consume stocks of these weapons at a vastly higher rate than anything we have seen before. If those magazines run dry, it could mean the difference between winning and losing in that critical theater. And remember, these weapons take years to produce and cost many millions of dollars each. So it’s not like you can just say, ‘we’ll buy more.’ Of course, we will, but we won’t get those weapons for years, even as expansion of production is now underway across the DoW’s munitions portfolio.

So the cost of taking on Iran is not just in money and assets, and especially blood, it’s the opportunity cost of expending precious weapons in a war of choice that would be essential in a war of necessity that could erupt at any time.

Wild cards

There are capabilities and war plans we know nothing about. It may be possible that the United States thinks it can break Iran’s command and control capabilities so quickly that it can preempt many of its most dangerous weapons from being used in large quantities. This could come in the form of cyber attacks, other forms of espionage, electronic warfare, and exotic weaponry — and more likely a combination of the above. It could also be the orchestration of an insider coup-like scenario.

There is also the possibility that the United States thinks Iran’s military apparatus would simply collapse under a full combined aerial assault by the U.S. and Israel. A possible decapitation of the regime is another factor here.

If this is the case, and Iran’s warfighting capabilities can be left largely unused, then the risk equation changes. But this is a massive bet to make, and just how certain whatever measures are used will have the exact crippling effects intended could mean the difference between go and no-go for a major campaign.

In other words, we really don’t know what the United States and Israel still have up their sleeves. And maybe they have nothing that would cause such a dramatic effect at all. Instead, hitting them traditionally fast and hard, along with cyber, espionage, electronic warfare, and everything else, will be needed to erode Iran’s ability to fight back over time.

Regardless, the United States and Israel have prepared for exactly this eventuality for decades, so there certainly are bound to be some surprises. Of what magnitude is the question.

What if a deal is made, but Israel doesn’t think it’s good enough?

It’s possible that the game tree could expand in such a way that the United States makes a nuclear deal with Iran, but it does not address the long-range missile threat, or even the nuclear program, to a sufficient degree in Israel’s eyes. If this occurs, there is still the chance that Israel goes it alone and tries to do as much damage as possible to both of these elements. In some ways, this could be played to America’s advantage as it could deny being involved in the conflict and work to see if the deal sticks even after Israel’s kinetic action. In this case, American resources would be used to defend Israel, but not participate in the attack.

This may sound far-fetched, but it really isn’t an impossibility. Especially if Trump realizes how much of a commitment achieving something meaningful via an air campaign could become, as well as the risks of what comes after on the ground in Iran.

Whether a nuclear deal would even survive such a situation is unclear, but it’s possible.

Why now?

In the end, these are the fundamental questions Trump has to be asking himself and his aides: Is going to war with Iran really worth the risks, both the known ones and unknown ones, and what is the goal in doing so? Is that goal readily attainable and at what cost?

These questions also bleed directly into the political arena. Trump claimed to be the President that would get America out of wars, not start them, and especially ones that seem like they could spiral out of control relatively easily, resulting in much longer-term commitments. While he has had some stunningly successful military victories as of late, and there is a danger for politicians to think it will always turn out a similar way, that can change very quickly. If America wakes up to seeing a U.S. pilot being dragged through the streets of Tehran, any support for this conflict could quickly evaporate.

Above all else, the question has to be asked, why now? What has prompted the idea of declaring war on Iran at this moment? Yes, the protests and the brutal deaths of thousands at the hands of the regime seemed to have moved Trump, but that was subsequently used as a pretext for nuclear negotiations, not to correct human rights abuses.

In addition, Trump has declared repeatedly that he destroyed Iran’s nuclear program after the B-2 strikes in June. So why, just eight months after that action took place, is the United States about to go all-in against Iran over its nuclear program? We have heard anecdotes about possible threats of Iran starting the nuclear program back up, the threat posed by the enriched uranium they already have, and the possibility that they could develop new, longer-range missiles that could hit the U.S. one day, maybe. Yet nothing has been presented in a concrete manner as to why doing this right now is essential. It doesn’t match Trump’s long-standing political rhetoric at all.

There is obviously much the public doesn’t know, but the risk-reward equation seems like a uniquely puzzling one with this crisis, at least at this time.

If Iran doesn’t make a deal, it seems clear that Trump has put himself in a position where he will either have his bluff called or he will need to commit to an air war against Iran.

What happens from that historic split in the road is really anyone’s guess.

Including the Pentagon’s.

Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com

China officially announced in late January 2026 its refusal to join the Board of Peace at the “International Peace Council for the Administration of the Gaza Strip.” This council, proposed by the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump, is a new international entity launched by the US president as an alternative to traditional UN mechanisms. China confirmed in January 2026 that it had received a formal invitation from the United States to join the “International Peace Council” for Gaza, launched by President “Trump” as a global initiative to resolve the conflict. China’s stance toward this council is characterized by caution and a demand for further details while adhering to its established principles.

The reasons for China’s rejection of the US-sponsored peace council for the Gaza Strip are based on several strategic and legal justifications, the most important of which is the marginalization of the UN’s role by the International Peace Council, sponsored by Washington. Beijing believes that the council seeks to replace the role of the United Nations and the Security Council, and it affirms its commitment to an international system centered on the United Nations and based on international law. Regarding China’s criticism of the lack of Palestinian representation within the International Peace Council, China criticized the Council’s charter for failing to mention the Palestinians or respect their will, asserting that any arrangements for the future of Gaza must be based on the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine.” Furthermore, (China’s concerns about “American dominance” over the International Peace Council): Beijing warned that the Council could be a tool for Washington to impose “control” or establish military bases in the Gaza envelope area under the guise of reconstruction. Also, (China’s rejection of the financial membership criteria within the International Peace Council): The Council requires substantial financial contributions (up to one billion dollars for permanent membership), which China views as transforming peace into a “deal” driven by financial power rather than the legal rights of the Palestinians.

At the same time, China is demanding structural clarity regarding the resolution establishing the International Peace Council and its actual feasibility. China, through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, “Fu Cong,” expressed concern that the resolution establishing the council lacks essential details, particularly concerning its structure, composition, and terms of reference, as well as the nature of the proposed “international stabilization force” in Gaza. Therefore, Beijing insisted on the UN’s authority in this matter, maintaining that any future arrangements for Gaza must be made under the auspices of UN Security Council resolutions and with broad participation including Palestinian parties and Arab states. China rejected any “closed” or “unilateral” mechanisms that could marginalize the UN’s role. Furthermore, China categorically emphasized the principle of “Palestinian governance of Gaza,” considering the Gaza Strip an integral part of Palestinian territory. China rejects any plans aimed at imposing external trusteeship or control over its administration, affirming that the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine” is the foundation for any post-conflict governance. China has supported Arab initiatives on post-war management of the Gaza Strip, explicitly endorsing reconstruction and peace plans proposed by Egypt and other Arab states, deeming them consistent with the aspirations of the Palestinian people. China firmly adheres to the two-state solution, maintaining that any peace efforts must ultimately lead to a two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Therefore, the motives behind China’s rejection of the American request to join the International Peace Council on Gaza can be summarized as follows: China’s insistence on upholding the international legitimacy of the United Nations and its deep suspicions regarding the security and political objectives behind the council’s formation and Washington’s enthusiasm for it. The main reasons for China’s rejection of the International Peace Council on Gaza are China’s desire to protect the UN system. Beijing believes the proposed council seeks to replace or marginalize the role of the United Nations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry affirmed its commitment to an international system centered on the United Nations and based on its Charter and international law, rejecting any “alternative frameworks” outside of this scope. (Ambiguity in structure and tasks): The Chinese representative to the United Nations, “Fu Cong,” criticized the draft resolution concerning the council (Resolution 2803) for its lack of clear details regarding its structure, composition, and criteria for participation, describing it as “worrying.” In addition to China’s security concerns regarding the Gaza issue: Chinese intelligence reports indicate that one of the hidden objectives of the Washington-sponsored International Peace Council in Gaza is to destroy Hamas tunnels under the guise of “reconstruction,” which Beijing considers a “provocative and extremely dangerous” foreign military intervention. Furthermore, (China rejects American unilateralism in dealing with regional and global issues): China views the American International Peace Council initiative in Gaza as part of Washington’s attempts to impose “unilateralism” and exacerbate confrontation between blocs, which contradicts the “Global Governance Initiative” championed by Chinese President “Xi Jinping. ”.

Herein lies China’s alternative vision to the American initiative to form the International Peace Council: China, in its alternative to joining the Council, calls for the activation of the two-state solution as the only way to guarantee lasting peace in the Middle East and the implementation of the Beijing Declaration to support Palestinian national unity and strengthen the legitimacy of the Palestinian state. (UN Reform): Instead of creating parallel initiatives, Beijing calls for making the Security Council more responsive to the expectations of the world’s people on its 80th anniversary.

China proposes a different vision for managing the Gaza and Middle East issues, based on the following pillars: (Security Council Authority): This involves full adherence to UN Security Council resolutions as the sole basis for international legitimacy in Gaza. The Chinese call for (the principle of self-governance in the Gaza Strip): This involves China’s insistence that post-war administration of Gaza must be in the hands of the Palestinians themselves, rejecting any plans for forced displacement or external trusteeship. The Chinese call for a broad international peace conference on Gaza: Beijing calls for a more inclusive and credible international peace conference under UN auspices, with the aim of concretely implementing the two-state solution within a defined timeframe. With China prioritizing land routes over sea routes or temporary docks, as proposed by the US, China rejects maritime alternatives or “temporary docks” as substitutes for land corridors, viewing them as attempts to circumvent international obligations regarding humanitarian relief in the Gaza Strip.

From the preceding analysis, we understand that China considers itself a “positive stabilizing force” seeking to end the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip through comprehensive dialogue, in contrast to what it describes as the “unilateral” US approach, which it believes could deepen regional divisions. In short, while China does not reject participation in international dialogue on Gaza, it stipulates that the international peace council, sponsored by Washington, should be an instrument for strengthening international legitimacy, not a replacement for it, while preserving full Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza.