Finance Desk

Forty-eight EU lawmakers added a passage in support of the digital euro in an annual report on the European Central Bank (ECB) that will be voted on Tuesday.

Although the document has no legislative effect, the vote on the amendment will publicly show where support for the digital euro stands.

The digital euro would be an electronic form of cash issued by the ECB, and would serve as an additional form of payment supplementing the cash and cards issued by commercial banks.

Unlike everyday card payments, where payments are “private”, the digital euro would allow citizens a direct use of digital “public” money, now mainly available in the form of cash.

Under the European Commission’s proposal, the digital euro would include a digital wallet that could be used both online and offline, with payments not trackable.

The digital euro proposal has surged in importance thanks to economic tensions between the EU and the US, offering as it does an alternative to Visa and Mastercard, the two US-based payment systems used in everyday life by most Europeans.

EU’s legislative politics

The proposal has already been backed by EU countries in the Council, leaving the Parliament as the last co-legislator to take a position on the file.

However, the Parliament is experiencing a political deadlock, with the MEPs working on the proposal having difficulty agreeing on a common vision for the digital euro’s design.

In particular, the leading rapporteur on the file, centre-right Spanish MEP Fernando Navarrete, is proposing to reduce the digital euro’s scope, for instance by designing it solely for offline use. In that scenario, the digital euro would not be an alternative means of payment to Visa and Mastercard.

While the centre-right European People’s Party will likely be divided over the proposal in the vote, many far-right parties have expressed sharp disagreement to the proposal. Last week, the Spanish far-right party Vox asked the European Commission to withdraw it altogether.

In the passage that will be voted on Tuesday seen by Euronews, signatories ask for support for “an online and offline digital euro” that “should contribute to safeguarding universal access to payments” and not rely on solely private and non-European providers.

The signatories describes the design and the scope of the digital euro as in the European Commission proposal: “a complement to cash and private banking services […] to strengthen European monetary sovereignty, reduce fragmentation in retail payments and support the integrity and resilience of the single market”.

Supporters of the amendment

The passage in the report, which supports the original proposal of the European Commission with a larger scope for the digital euro, was proposed by Italian MEP Pasquale Tridico of the Five Stars Movement, which currently sits in The Left group at the European Parliament.

“Today we are totally dependent on the big American players – Visa and Mastercard – and this makes the EU weak and dependent on Trump’s decisions,” Tridico told Euronews, adding that delays and boycotts by minorities at the European Parliament are “counterproductive”.

“If the American president woke up one day and decide to cut Europeans off from digital payment circuits, European citizens would no longer be able to make purchases using credit cards, which are by far the most widely used means of payment today.”

The amendment in support of the digital euro has attracted the support of MEPs from several political groups, including the centre-right European People’s Party, the Socialists and Democrats, Renew Europe, the Greens and The Left.

Brothers of Italy, the party of the Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in the European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR), will vote in favour of the amendment, according to a Parliament official who spoke to Euronews in condition of anonymity.

At the time of publication, no other MEPs from ECR, Patriots for Europe or Europe of Sovereign Nations have expressed support.

Published on
09/02/2026 – 16:48 GMT+1

The French central bank governor handed in his resignation on Monday, which will take effect in June 2026.

This unexpected departure occurs roughly 18 months before his second term was scheduled to conclude in October 2027.

The move strategically shifts the responsibility of selecting his successor to the current President of France, Emmanuel Macron.

If Villeroy de Galhau had completed his full tenure, the appointment of the next head of the Bank of France would have fallen to the winner of the April 2027 presidential election, which current polling suggests could favour a far-right candidate.

While the French central bank governor cited personal reasons for his departure, specifically to lead the Fondation Apprentis d’Auteuil, a charity for vulnerable youth, the timing is perceived as a calculated effort to safeguard the institution’s future leadership.

In a press release, Villeroy de Galhau reassured that “a bit more than a year before the conclusion of my second term, it seems to me that I would have accomplished the core of my mission”.

In a separate letter to Bank of France employees, the governor also acknowledged that “this decision may come as a surprise”.

Resignation after stabilisation

Villeroy de Galhau may also have carefully chosen the right moment of stability in the present.

After a long and intense legislative deadlock in France, that saw the collapse of multiple governments, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu successfully navigated the approval of the 2026 budget which was announced at the start of the month.

Throughout late 2025, France’s inability to pass a budget had rattled investors, pushing the risk premium on French debt to its highest levels in years.

By waiting until this budget was finalised, Villeroy de Galhau ensured his departure did not trigger fresh market panic or exacerbate the existing political crisis.

President Emmanuel Macron can now focus on appointing a successor who will likely align with his pro-European and centrist economic vision.

Asian markets edged higher on Monday as Sanae Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) convincingly won the elections in Japan, providing greater clarity to investors worldwide.

The Japanese stock index, Nikkei 225, rose around 4%. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng jumped 1.76%, Korea’s Kospi rose 4.10%, while China’s SSE Composite Index saw a 1.41% gain.

In Europe, markets were mixed, with the STOXX Europe 600 trading less than 0.1% higher by around midday CET. France’s CAC 40 and the UK’s FTSE 100 fell, while Germany’s DAX was 0.18% higher and Spain’s IBEX 35 saw a 0.44% lift.

All eyes are now on the New York session open, with US futures trending downwards.

As for precious metals, gold is also up around 0.72% — back above $5,000 — while silver is more than 2% higher, at just under $80 per ounce.

The yen strengthened on Monday after Takaichi’s election victory, reversing six consecutive days of losses.

The PM assured the “continuation of responsible and proactive fiscal policies” after the election, although it’s unclear whether she is pursuing a weaker yen policy, highlighting that there are both advantages and disadvantages to a slide in the currency’s value.

Japan’s perceived stability

The first female Prime Minister of Japan, Sanae Takaichi, has regained a substantial amount of support for the LDP, which it had lost in recent elections due to inflation and corruption.

Following her electoral victory, Takaichi announced plans to accelerate the implementation of her campaign pledge to suspend the sales tax on food for two years.

The consequent loss of government revenue from this initiative, paired with high debt, is partially what caused a rout in Japanese bonds last month.

Nevertheless, Japan’s Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama talked down concerns over the country’s debt and the recent currency weakness, which many investors believe could prompt a rise in interest rates.

Katayama suggested utilising foreign exchange reserves to fund national expenditures. Although possible, this approach can be challenging as those reserves are usually only used for currency interventions.

The Japanese Finance Minister also underlined the ongoing collaboration and strong communication between the government and the Bank of Japan.

This assurance, together with the political stability provided by the robust mandate given to Prime Minister Takaichi, seems to have mitigated the markets’ distress — at least for the time being.

US economic reports

This week, investors worldwide are also bracing for major economic data releases in the United States, including reports delayed by the recent partial government shutdown.

The focus will be on the January jobs report on Wednesday and the January consumer price index (CPI) which comes out on Friday.

The delayed payrolls report is expected to show modest gains of roughly 60,000 jobs while the CPI is estimated to show inflation cooling to 2.5%.

Together with the release of these reports, multiple Federal Reserve governors, including Christopher Waller and Stephen Miran, are scheduled to speak throughout the week.

Investors are paying particular attention to the language used by members of the Fed to gauge the new policy line, following the announcement of Jerome Powell’s successor, Kevin Warsh, as the next Federal Reserve Chair.

Warsh is set to take over in May 2026, pending Senate confirmation.

President Donald Trump picked Kevin Warsh as a figure whose public and private track record is likely to reassure the financial markets. Warsh has advocated lower rates and a reduction in the central bank’s balance sheet.

As the upcoming Winter Olympic Games Milano Cortina 2026 approaches, attention naturally shifts to records, rivalries, and the prestige of making it to the podium. But after the celebrations end, a practical question always resurfaces: What are those medals actually worth?

The answer depends on how you define “worth.” There’s the literal value of the metal, the tax implications that follow, and then the much bigger value that comes from status, visibility, and opportunity.

Are Olympic Gold Medals Actually Solid Gold?

Despite the name, Olympic gold medals are not solid gold. Even though the tradition of a solid gold medal was established in 1904, forging the medals 100% out of gold didn’t last long, as it became too costly after World War I. As a result, the top medal hasn’t been made of solid gold since the 1912 Olympic games.

Today, gold medals are primarily made of silver, with a relatively thin coating of pure gold on the surface. The exact specifications vary slightly, but the general formula has remained consistent. A modern Olympic gold medal typically contains 523 grams of sterling silver, with approximately six grams of gold plated on top. This allows it to look like gold and feel substantial, while also carrying enormous symbolic weight.

Silver medals are indeed solid, made of 525 grams of sterling silver. Bronze medals meanwhile contain no precious metals at all, typically containing 90 percent copper and other alloys, such as tin and zinc.

As a result, the true value of each medal comes more from the prestige of being a medalist and the opportunities it may offer than from the raw materials that comprise each medal.

What Gold, Silver, and Bronze Medals Are Worth at Today’s Metal Prices

Metal prices fluctuate constantly, so any estimate is a snapshot in time. Using current pricing, gold is trading around $4,900 per troy ounce, and silver around $85 per troy ounce. Six grams of gold works out to be worth about $945 at current prices, while the silver portion of a gold medal, about 523 grams, is worth about $1,430. Added together, the raw metal value of a gold medal currently lands around $2,375.

Silver medals, made of 525 grams of sterling silver, would be worth around $1,435, while bronze medals are worth far less from a materials standpoint. With copper currently priced at about $0.38 per ounce and a bronze medal comprising 495 grams of copper, the third-place medal would be worth less than $7 at today’s prices.

Do Olympic Athletes Have To Pay Taxes on Their Medals?

Fortunately for U.S. athletes, the tax picture has changed over time. In the past, medals and associated prize money were treated as taxable income, meaning athletes could owe federal taxes on both the cash bonuses and the fair market value of the medal itself.

That shifted in 2016, when Congress passed the United States Appreciation for Olympians and Paralympians Act of 2016. The legislation allows most U.S. Olympic and Paralympic athletes to exclude medal-related prize money from federal income taxes if their overall income falls below a certain threshold. The intent was to prevent athletes, many of whom train for years with limited financial support, from being hit with tax bills simply for winning.

Why Medals Are Worth Far More Than the Metal

If medals were only worth their metal content, they’d be impressive keepsakes, but not life-changing ones. The real value comes from what the medal represents and what it unlocks.

An Olympic medal can raise an athlete’s profile overnight, leading to endorsements, sponsorships, and paid appearances that weren’t on the table before. The impact often lasts well beyond competition, opening doors to coaching, leadership roles, and media opportunities long after the Games are over.

Those opportunities don’t look the same for every medalist—or arrive all at once. For some athletes, especially gold medalists, the exposure of winning on the sport’s biggest stage can translate quickly into major endorsement deals. For others, the payoff is more gradual, showing up as smaller sponsorships, speaking fees, or a clearer path into post-competition careers built on recognition and trust.

Winning multiple medals can also amplify the effect, creating a sustained spotlight that brands and audiences tend to value more than a single podium finish.

While the metal in an Olympic medal may only be worth a modest sum, the visibility it brings can reshape an athlete’s earning potential in ways that far outlast the Games themselves—making its true value less about what it’s made of, and more about what it makes possible.

The impact the Rodríguez administration could have on the Venezuelan oil industry, even under the new Hydrocarbons Law, would be unsustainable and limited in scope. Structural weakness surrounding the Delcy government and the National Assembly’s lack of legitimacy, commitment to the rule of law, and popular support will restrain the reach of her reforms. Nevertheless, the law will test the willingness of the private sector to run both upstream and downstream operations. These measures could deliver a limited economic boost, that despite American supervision, will be weaponized politically by window-dressing the regime’s legitimacy and stalling further political and economic reforms. It’s precisely this flawed political and legal foundation that undermines the sustainability of the economic gains that the new law could provide.

For Venezuela and PDVSA to reclaim relevance in the international oil market what is required are not incremental improvements but a comprehensive overhaul of the industry, the company, and the constitutional framework that ties them together. The reforms must prioritize transparency, accountability, and insulating the industry and PDVSA from political pressures under strong political coverage that provides long term stability. These measures are something an interim administration, independent of who is in charge, will be unable to provide. Only then would international companies and capitals commit to the long term projects needed.

Once the country finds its political footing under a popularly elected and legitimate government can longlasting and durable reform take place. At this point multiple options may surface. There could be a scenario where we see PDVSA take a back seat while the country creates a competitive fiscal system prioritizing royalty collections while up and downstream operations are run by private enterprises. Remaining PDVSA assets and JV operations would be divested gradually as production capacity is recovered in the hands of private enterprises. However, revitalizing PDVSA as a competitive oil company should remain as a national strategic objective. Venezuelans would greatly benefit from building a company able to compete in and outside of the Venezuelan market.

However, the only way to relaunch PDVSA as a relevant actor in the international market is by allowing it to enter the 21st century oil dynamics and embracing a partial privatization via a minority share offering in international equity markets. Beyond the much needed capital that would be raised in the initial and consequent secondary offerings, plus the potential to tap debt markets along the way, going public will create an additional moat and isolate the company some steps from further political interference. A publicly traded PDVSA would not only need to answer to the government but to energy analysts, independent shareholders, and international compliance and regulatory frameworks alike. It will be the pressure generated by the external scrutiny that will enable PDVSA to be scaled up back into international relevance. Given the precarious financial and operational standing of the holding, a partial privatization is not feasible on day one or two of a political transition and economic recovery phase. But it is a question that will become relevant once the objective becomes long sustainable growth.

PDVSA would need to cut all non-essential personnel and assets, streamlining its operations. Every dollar spent should be evaluated under a return-on-capital framework, making financial discipline central to strategic planning.

The privatization of PDVSA has been a taboo for Venezuelan society despite serious attempts in late 1990s to execute such an operation. However, the devastation that the industry suffered under chavista mismanagement provides a clean slate opportunity to relaunch PDVSA and the oil industry under a modern governance framework. For too long the Venezuelan oil industry has been treated as the cash cow of whoever seats in Miraflores. Historically, this led to the centralization of political and economic power which hindered the development of democratic institutions and left the nation at the will of the administration’s oil revenue distribution policy. Taking control of PDVSA not only meant controlling the oil industry but the state itself. Reforms should aim to break the petro-state monopoly over oil revenue and to make PDVSA part of a dynamic national industry where other participants are allowed to play.

There are multiple precedents to back this move. Lessons from the partial privatizations of Chinese SINOPEC and Norwegian Statoil from the early 2000s could be drawn to prove that these operations are possible under different political systems. A PDVSA offering would be exceptionally complex, but in order to even start considering it there are three basic fundamentals that need to align.

First, the move would need overwhelming support from civil society to sustain the necessary political will. While that looks like a concrete goal in María Corina Machado’s energy proposals, the possibility seems remote under an interim Delcy government that still needs to appease other factions within the ruling coalition. In addition, chavismo’s current leader has not adhered to international transparency standards following her 2020 appointment as acting Minister of Economy and Finance—a role that earned her the title of Venezuela’s economic vice president before taking control of the national oil industry. Her tenure overlapped with the loss of an estimated $21 billion in oil payments, a scandal that ultimately led to the arrest and scapegoating of former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami.

Second, Petróleos de Venezuela needs a robust rule-of-law framework that can deliver credible guarantees to investors The current interim president is unlikely to provide such assurances, given the deep mistrust surrounding Venezuela’s public institutions—many of which she does not fully control. As Juan Guillermo Blanco points out, her posture may swing from alignment with Washington on this occasion to an anti-imperialist rupture if the circumstances allow it.

Shifting to global best practices

PDVSA cannot move forward without the goodwill of the market. Francisco Monaldi has repeatedly stated that the main risks of Venezuelan oil are above ground. Beyond the politics, sanctions, and the legal framework, PDVSA needs to get its house in order to regain market credibility. For starters, the holding needs to address its debt issue—estimated at $34.5b—through an agreement where debtholders walk away feeling it was a fair deal. Without serious debt restructuring, a share offering roadshow would be impossible.

The company must also cut all non-essential ventures, subsidies, and social project funding from the nucleus. From PDVAL supermarkets to F1 teams, PDVSA bankrolled it all during chavismo. Despite how bizarre the outflows party got, these types of splurges and subsidies have been ingrained in the Venezuelan mindset and will be hard to get rid of. Such measures would represent a comprehensive detachment from century-old beliefs in the magical powers of the Venezuelan petro-state.

Furthermore, PDVSA would need to cut all non-essential personnel and assets, streamlining its operations. Every dollar spent should be evaluated under a return-on-capital framework, making financial discipline central to strategic planning. In addition, investors and banking partners must be able to track every dollar. Auditable records are not only essential for building reliable financial projections but also necessary for protecting stakeholders from anticorruption liability. This underscores the need for a new framework of transparent, efficient contract allocation and fully auditable accounting trails, ensuring that financial statements can withstand market scrutiny and compliance verification.

Making an example out of Petróleos de Venezuela would help generate a spillover effect that could contribute to more transparency, financial discipline, and compliance across the domestic market.

Figures such as the “productive participation contracts” (CPPs) or joint ventures that currently dominate private investments in the industry are compatible with this model as PDVSA should seek alliances in cases where it makes financial sense to do so. However, the secrecy under which these ventures have been working on needs to end.

Finally, PDVSA will need to bring in an independent leadership team and board with enough protection to isolate operational and financial decision-making from politics. Venezuela would be represented in the board as the majority shareholder, but would be restrained from running the day-to-day business operations and resource allocation. Studies that examine initial offerings of National Oil Companies (NOC) suggest that a substantial amount of the efficiency gains are delivered before an IPO is launched, as the company restructures itself to be introduced into the public market. PDVSA has a long way to go before we can consider this scenario. Nevertheless, aiming toward partial privatization would provide a blueprint for rebuilding PDVSA as an operationally, financially, and commercially viable company.

A share offering should consider a dual listing that includes the Caracas Stock Exchange, which is also in need of an extreme makeover (that’s part of a different discussion, however). The overhaul needed is not only about getting barrels out of the ground, but about including the company in the wider economy and making it subject to the highest managerial and corporate governance standards. Making an example out of Petróleos de Venezuela would help generate a spillover effect that could contribute to more transparency, financial discipline, and compliance across the domestic market. Ultimately, this would constrain the government’s ability to overreach into the private sector.

Whichever path is chosen for the future of PDVSA and the Venezuelan oil industry, it should be preceded by an inclusive debate that considers implications beyond the industry itself and sets the country on a sustainable growth path. This debate must happen in public, in conditions of full political and economic freedom, free from coercion by either internal or external powers. It should be the opposite of what occurred prior to the swift approval of the new Hydrocarbons Law, when secrecy prevailed and the legislative body responsible for drafting the statute showed no significant deliberation.

The one-sided vote in the illegitimate 2025 National Assembly should not overshadow the legislature’s failure to comply with its own parliamentary rules during the bill’s passage, as purported opposition lawmakers reportedly received a copy of the draft only hours before the first debate. That episode underscores why the legal and constitutional reforms needed to break the petro-state and refound PDVSA can only follow the renewal of all institutions, including a truly multiparty, independent congress.

The end goal is simple, yet history-changing: to dismantle Miraflores’ total control and discretion over oil-industry revenues.

Photograph by unknown author. “Trabajadores petroleros,” Fernando Irazábal Collection. Compiled by Archivo Fotografía Urbana.

On January 29, Venezuela experienced a legislative tectonic shift regarding the future of its hydrocarbon sector. The National Assembly approved a new petroleum law that effectively breaks with the post-1976 tradition of rigid state control, opening participation across the full value chain to private oil companies. 

This is not the first experiment with private participation since nationalization, but it is the clearest attempt since the 1990s Apertura to normalize it as the governing framework of the sector. The legislation, approved with striking speed and opacity, has elicited mixed reactions, ranging from denunciations of lost sovereignty and surrender to foreign interests to support for a first step that still requires major fixes. Despite these divergences, one thing is clear: the return of private companies to Venezuela’s oil sector inevitably revives parallels with the concessionary system under which the industry was born and flourished between 1914 and 1976, a mirror of what Venezuela’s energy sector could become in the twenty-first century.

The 1943 and 2026 hydrocarbons laws

The iconic 1943 bill enacted by President Isaías Medina Angarita (1941–1945) regulated Venezuela’s privately run oil industry until the 1976 nationalization. It became the institutional template of the concessionary era: a rules-and-taxes state overseeing a privately operated industry. Together with related legislation, it established the famous 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement with the state, later tightened by reforms. Yet within the 1943 framework, the rentier state largely confined itself to setting the rules and collecting taxes and rents, while private companies assumed the capital risks. There was no government monopoly over day-to-day operations.

In spirit, the 2026 law reintroduces comparable conditions for private capital. Petroleum companies can now either hold operational control in joint ventures with the state or carry out activities independently through government contracts. The 1943 and 2026 frameworks also embrace flexible royalty schemes that prioritize business viability over rigid tax burdens. Differences, of course, abound. To mention a few, the 2026 version concentrates discretionary power in the executive branch regarding royalties, opens the possibility of international arbitration outside the country, simplifies the tax burden into a 15% integrated hydrocarbons tax, and diminishes the National Assembly’s authority over oil business.

The Venezolanization pioneered by firms like the Creole Petroleum Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Mene Grande Oil Company, and many others also became an exercise in social integration.

Divergences aside, both pieces of legislation share the same underlying imperative: attracting capital and technology. The 1976 and 2001 hydrocarbons laws, by contrast, were designed precisely to limit private initiative. But investment alone will not do all the work. Human capital is also desperately needed to lead a reborn hydrocarbon sector, and here the concessions model offers valuable lessons.

The Venezolanization of the industry

An underappreciated dimension of that era was human capital development. Over decades, foreign firms trained Venezuelans across the corporate hierarchy—in technical, managerial, and executive roles—so that by the mid-1970s expatriates were a small fraction of the workforce and Venezuelans increasingly ran the day-to-day business. This created a pipeline of local talent able to inherit operational responsibility and manage the 1976 transition to state control with unusual continuity.

This history is not nostalgia for a bygone era, but a lesson worth highlighting. Venezuela’s oil collapse in this century is inseparable from the degradation of corporate culture and human capital, deepened by the politicization of the industry. It triggered a professional brain drain and the hollowing out of operational efficiency. Multinationals like Chevron, and others that may follow, should explicitly lean on a “Venezolanization 2.0” that engages local talent still in the country and encourages the return of a diaspora of Venezuelan managers and engineers now abroad. Insulating the sector from partisan hiring and purging is essential if these cadres are to operate with full competence.

The Venezolanization pioneered by firms like the Creole Petroleum Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Mene Grande Oil Company, and many others also became an exercise in social integration. Many American expatriates, like Creole’s CEO Arthur T. Proudfit, embraced the social milieu of the country that welcomed them, often learning the language and speaking it fluently; his daughter even married a local businessman. In exchange, Venezuelans trained abroad and working for these firms absorbed US professional values and traditions. This cultural exchange helped forge durable bonds between both countries and contributed to the successful presence of foreign capital in Venezuela. And these corporations did not stop at their payrolls. They understood that long-term success in the hydrocarbon sector extended beyond employees to the surrounding communities of the oil fields, and beyond.

Social license

Creole, Shell, and Mene Grande undertook significant investments in the country. In the oilfields, they negotiated lucrative labor contracts with unions. They also financed hospitals, university campuses, and other infrastructure projects. These firms even joined the state in ventures like the Venezuelan Basic Economy Corporation to fund agro-industrial projects aimed at diversifying the economy, while supporting rural communities through initiatives such as the American International Association. They left an indelible imprint on everyday life, from how Venezuelans shopped through market chains like CADA, to culture through documentaries, corporate magazines, and even TV news programs like Observador Creole.

More importantly, they built alliances with domestic capitalists like Eugenio Mendoza to address social problems. Creole and Venezuelan business leaders, for instance, institutionalized private-sector social action through organizations like the Dividendo Voluntario para la Comunidad (DVC), founded in 1964 to mobilize corporate contributions toward community projects. This nonprofit continues to exist today, fulfilling the original goal of social action bequeathed by American and Venezuelan businessmen more than sixty years ago. Creole also created the Creole Development Corporation, a financial arm designed to provide seed capital for local entrepreneurial activity. This was hardly a frictionless era, but it shows how legitimacy was treated as a condition of stability.

Contributions to health, schools, and infrastructure would also ease the state’s burden and allow it to focus on critical nation-building emergencies.

This largesse reached widely, but it was not mere corporate charity. To avoid jeopardizing their operations and invite nationalist backlash, companies engaged with surrounding communities and invested in their future. That is a lesson new capital arriving in Venezuela should pursue. There is even generational memory favorable to the presence of these firms in oil communities. 

Leveraging that legacy could open renewed opportunities for local professional growth while strengthening bonds between communities and multinationals. Contributions to health, schools, and infrastructure would also ease the state’s burden and allow it to focus on critical nation-building emergencies: democratizing institutions, reconstructing the economy, and addressing the public services and humanitarian needs the population faces.

A spiritual return to the concessions system?

The new hydrocarbons law pushes Venezuela’s oil industry in a new direction, and it functions as a first step in the right path. However, there is room for significant improvement. 

Moreover, key questions remain unanswered. For instance, what will be the fate of PDVSA? Any plan that fails to address the resurrection of its operational capabilities undermines the development of an efficient sector. Only the re-democratization of the country can properly confront the deeper failings reflected in the current legislation. Many industry experts have already proposed an alternative framework that would solve several of the bill’s core problems by establishing clear rules, transparency mechanisms, and a dedicated government agency entrusted with regulating the hydrocarbon sector.

The spirit of the concessionary model walks once more around Venezuela’s refineries, port terminals, and petroleum wells. It is too soon to tell whether foreign capital will return with the same excitement it brought more than a century ago, or whether the scale of investments and engagement with surrounding communities will match that of its predecessors. The sector can either become a platform for institutional rebuilding and professionalization, or another discretionary channel for rents and corruption. 

Democracy, check and balances, and clear rules can turn the 2026 hydrocarbons law (and its potential future modifications) into enduring principles for the remainder of the century. If so, the oil industry might unlock a new period of prosperity. Much remains to be done to materialize that future, but what is undeniable is that a new era begins.

Published on
04/02/2026 – 12:42 GMT+1

Novo Nordisk shares fell sharply on Wednesday after the company warned that sales and profits will drop in 2026.

The Danish drugmaker’s stock slid about 17% in early trading in Copenhagen, erasing gains made earlier in the year. The fall followed an unexpected pre-release of the company’s outlook for 2026.

Sales and operating profit are both expected to decline by between 5% and 13% this year, far below what analysts had anticipated.

The company had already cut its 2025 guidance in July, citing a difficult US market, triggering a one-day share price drop of more than 20%.

Pressure in the US

Novo Nordisk says it is reducing prices to make its GLP-1 drugs more affordable, even though the move is likely to hurt short-term performance.

The company faces growing competition in the United States from cheaper compounded versions of semaglutide — the active ingredient in Wegovy and diabetes drug Ozempic — as well as from rival Eli Lilly.

There have been some brighter signs. The new oral version of Wegovy has seen strong early demand in the US.

Novo Nordisk endured its worst year on record in 2025, with shares falling nearly 50%.

The company also underwent major leadership changes, appointing its first non-Danish chief executive and bringing former CEO Lars Rebien Sørensen back as chair.

At the same time, it struck a deal with US President Donald Trump for a programme tied to TrumpRx and direct-to-consumer discounts.

The starting price for the new Wegovy pill has been set at $149 (€126), far below the price of the injectable version a year earlier.

Patent expiries in several markets outside the United States are also expected to weigh on sales in 2026.

Meanwhile, the head of Novo’s US business, David Moore, who oversaw the launch of the pill, is leaving the company for personal reasons. He will be replaced by Jamie Miller, formerly of UnitedHealth.

Published on
04/02/2026 – 10:19 GMT+1

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will fly to Australia later this month in a bid to seal a long-delayed trade agreement, sources familiar with the matter told Euronews.

Concluding the deal would mark another trade win for the Commission, following recent deals with Latin America’s Mercosur bloc and India, as geopolitical tensions intensify with the US and China.

One source said von der Leyen could head to Canberra shortly after the Munich Security Conference concludes on 15 February.

Whether the trip goes ahead will depend on progress in negotiations led by EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, who is due to meet Australian Trade Minister Don Farrell in Brussels next week.

“As always, progress in the sensitive phase of negotiations will depend on substance,” Commission deputy chief spokesperson Olof Gill told Euronews.

Talks on an EU-Australia free-trade agreement collapsed in 2023 after Canberra accused Brussels of failing to offer sufficient market access for beef, sheep, dairy and sugar.

Agriculture remains a perennial flashpoint in EU trade negotiations. The Mercosur agreement has already met furious opposition from European farmers, who fear unfair competition from increased imports coming from Latin America.

Australia, however, is viewed in Brussels as a strategic and like-minded partner as the EU seeks to diversify its trade relationships, expand access to global markets and reduce exposure to a closing US market and China’s increasingly aggressive trade policy.

The free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur countries should be implemented without delay, Paraguay’s President Santiago Peña told Euronews. He warned that stalling the agreement would be a “mistake” amid rising geopolitical tensions.

The free trade pact was signed last month by the EU and Mercosur members Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. However, its full ratification by the EU has been frozen after MEPs referred the agreement to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.

“We already presented the agreement to the Congress of the Paraguayan Nation last week, and we understand that the European Union has the legal tools to implement it temporarily,” Peña said on Euronews’s flagship interview programme The Europe Conversation.

“We are working to make this happen, and we want Paraguay to be the first country to implement it.” The country currently holds the rotating pro tempore presidency of Mercosur.

Despite the judicial review, the European Commission has the prerogative to provisionally apply the deal once one or more Mercosur countries complete national ratification. While Germany, Spain, Portugal and the Nordics are pushing for the next phase, the Commission currently says no decision has yet been made.

‘Opposition rooted in ignorance’

The agreement would create a vast EU–Latin America free-trade zone, slashing tariffs on goods and services. But resistance in Europe remains fierce, with farmers and several capitals, led by Paris, warning of unfair competition from Mercosur imports.

Peña said that European opposition to the deal was rooted in “ignorance” and an outdated and stereotypical view of Latin America.

“Our countries have changed tremendously. They have developed. Human capital has grown,” Peña said. “Europe has to rediscover Latin America.”

In the interview, Peña warned that rejecting the deal would amount to a strategic blunder, as Europe can no longer rely on the United States as its default trade partner due to President Donald Trump’s unpredictable policies.

“If (MEPs) ultimately prefer not to integrate themselves into (new) markets and instead choose to retain their old alliances that today no longer work, it would certainly be a mistake,” he said.

Still, Peña credited Trump with giving the deal “the final push” after 25 years of talks.

“The world was in a state of drowsiness,” he said. “We weren’t moving, and he came along to move us all. He came to challenge what we thought was stable, and that pushed us to leave our comfort zone.”

According to Peña, one of the EU-Mercosur deal’s key advantages is its potential to counter China’s growing presence in the region and dominance of rare earth supplies.

“Europe is losing an enormous opportunity there, because if there is a region that can compete globally, it is Latin America. We have young talent, a predominantly young population, a population (of people who are) already digital natives,” he said.

“We have that tremendous abundance of natural resources, not only food that grows above the ground, but also minerals that are below the earth, which are so critical to this new technological wave. Our region has absolutely everything that Europe and the world need.”

Published on
02/02/2026 – 12:02 GMT+1

Gold and silver prices extended last week’s dramatic sell-off on Monday, as investors continued to digest the implications of President Donald Trump’s announcement of Kevin Warsh as the next chair of the US Federal Reserve.

The move has fuelled expectations of a more government pressure on the Fed and prompted a sharp reassessment of positions across precious metals.

Spot gold fell as much as 10% in early trading, while silver plunged up to 16%, following Friday’s rout that marked the largest intraday decline on record for the white metal.

The scale and speed of the move underscored how vulnerable the market had become after months of aggressive buying driven by geopolitical tension and bets on looser US monetary policy.

“The sharp selloff on Friday followed news that US President Donald Trump intends to nominate Kevin Warsh as the next Federal Reserve chair – a development that boosted the US dollar and reinforced expectations of a more hawkish policy stance,” said Ewa Manthey, commodities strategist at ING, and Warren Patterson, head of commodities strategy.

“While a correction was overdue after the intense rally, the scale of Friday’s decline far exceeded most expectations.”

Why the Fed matters for gold

Gold and silver are particularly sensitive to US interest-rate expectations.

Higher rates increase the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding assets such as precious metals, while a stronger dollar makes them more expensive for overseas buyers.

Warsh, a former Fed governor, has voice sentiments supportive of Trump’s vision for the Fed, including regular rate cuts.

That reassessment has been swift. Investor caution has been evident in exchange-traded funds, with silver holdings falling for a seventh consecutive session to their lowest level since November 2025.

Futures data also show speculators cutting back sharply on bullish bets, signalling a broader retreat from the sector.

“CFTC positioning shows a cooling in speculative interest across precious metals,” the ING report continued.

“Managed money net longs in COMEX gold fell by 17,741 lots last week… Speculators also cut net longs in silver… taking positioning to its lowest since February 2024.”

Margins rise, volatility bites

Market stress has been amplified by mechanical factors.

CME Group is set to raise margin requirements on COMEX gold and silver futures after last week’s historic swings, forcing traders to post more collateral or reduce exposure.

Such moves tend to accelerate sell-offs, particularly in heavily leveraged markets.

Attention is now turning to Asia, where Chinese investors have historically provided support during price dips. However, with volatility elevated and the Lunar New Year approaching, participation may be more cautious than usual.

“With volatility spiking and the Lunar New Year approaching, traders are likely to pare back positions and reduce risk,” the ING analysts said.

“Price direction in the near term will hinge on the extent of dip-buying from Chinese investors following Friday’s retreat.”

Outlook remains fragile

For now, the precious metals market remains at the mercy of macro forces, with little clarity on how quickly sentiment will stabilise.

Investors are watching US data closely for clues on real interest rates and the dollar’s next move, both of which will be shaped by expectations around the Fed’s future direction.

“Overall, volatility across precious metals is likely to remain elevated in the near term,” Manthey and Patterson said.

“For gold and silver, macro uncertainty, real rate expectations, and USD direction will continue to dominate sentiment,” the report concluded.

As the Trump administration ploughs forward with its incendiary policies, European trust in the US government is fading.

Amid tariff threats and pledges to conquer Greenland, citizens and politicians in Europe are unsettled — questioning a long-standing alliance.

Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (FDP), chair of the Defence Committee in the EU Parliament, claims to have an answer that is “worth its weight in gold”. In this case, the expression is more literal than figurative.

Around 1,236 tonnes of German gold, worth more than €100bn, are sitting in vaults in the US. Strack-Zimmermann has now announced that, in view of Trump’s recent political manoeuvres, it’s no longer justifiable to leave them be. This has reignited a fierce debate: to retrieve or not to retrieve?

The demand to bring gold back to Germany has been around for a long time, with some surveys suggesting that many citizens are in favour of the move. Similar debates are happening in Italy, which has the third-largest gold reserves in the world after the US and Germany.

Why does Germany hold gold in the US?

Germany’s gold reserves amount to around 3,350 tonnes. About 36.6% of this is in the US, a legacy of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates after World War II.

“At the time, all exchange rates were tied to the dollar, and the dollar was tied to gold,” Dr. Demary, senior economist for Monetary Policy and Financial Markets at the German Economic Institute (IW), told Euronews.

“Germany had large export surpluses with the US, so we accumulated a lot of dollars. To keep exchange rates stable, we exchanged those dollars for gold. That’s how these reserves were built up.”

During the Cold War, it was also practical to store gold abroad, as the US was considered a safe place in case of conflict with the Soviet Union. Over the years, some gold has been repatriated. By 2017, 300 tonnes were brought back from New York, 380 tonnes from Paris, and 900 tonnes from London.

This was part of a Bundesbank plan, unveiled in 2013, to store half of Germany’s gold reserves in Germany from 2020 onwards.

Bringing in the gold treasure: What are the risks?

Strack-Zimmermann and other politicians and economists cite Trump’s unpredictable trade and foreign policy as the reason for moving the gold out of the US.

“Of course, there is always some risk when you keep assets abroad,” said Demary. For example, there is a storage risk if a break-in occurs. But this risk exists whether the gold is stored abroad or in Germany.

“Another possible scenario is that the US government, due to tight currency reserves, could prevent the gold from being transferred,” he explained.

To ensure the safety of gold holdings, the Bundesbank has had to make frequent trips to New York in the past to take an inventory.

“It makes sense to leave this gold in the US in case we have a banking crisis here and need to obtain dollars,” said Demary.

Retrieving the gold could not only be logistically complex, but also risky.

“The gold would have to be transported in armoured vehicles onto a ship, which would also need to be guarded, and then brought back to Frankfurt under security,” added Demary. “There could be robberies, the ship could sink, or the cargo could be seized.”

Is Strack-Zimmermann’s demand pure populism?

Is Strack-Zimmermann’s demand pure symbolic politics? “I think so,” said the economist. “Perhaps it was a political move in response to the tariff threats, saying, ‘We’re bringing our gold back now.’”

According to the economist, it is also possible that Strack-Zimmermann estimated the magnitude of this gold value to be somewhat greater than it really is. In any case, the gold is currently safe in New York, even if Trump wanted to use it to exert pressure on Germany.

“The Federal Reserve is actually independent in its monetary policy. The US government cannot simply intervene. They would have to change laws first,” explained Dr Demary.

Even in the absolute worst case, if the US refused to release the gold, there would still be the option to go to court and enforce its return or receive compensation in dollars, said Demary.

“You have to weigh up the pros and cons and I would say the advantages of leaving the gold in the US outweigh the disadvantages,” he told Euronews.

The Trump administration has provided around $300 million to the Rodriguez government after seizing tankers and selling oil stockpiled in the country. The funds are being managed through accounts in Qatar and will be subject to audits by US agencies, Rubio told the Senate on Wednesday.

The idea that the US can somehow remote-control its way into a coherent audit of Venezuelan public spending defies imagination. Venezuela has never been an easy place to follow money. Road construction in Venezuela was for much of the 20th century a famous form of campaign finance that bankrolled politicians through well-greased kickback systems. Even in the country’s more prosperous days, public hospitals were notorious rat’s nests of corruption that allowed suppliers of everything from aspirin to X-ray machines to mark up prices for illicit gain and political financing.

Chavismo put this on steroids. Because there has been no alternation of power since Chávez’s 1998 election, no one in a position to audit government books has ever had an incentive to. The government comptroller’s office, once an institutional check on the ruling party, has for decades been used primarily to disqualify opposition politicians from holding office on the basis of fabricated accounting discrepancies.

The Chávez era saw the wholesale unraveling of basic parliamentary oversight of spending. State oil company PDVSA went from being an internationally respected company to a piggy bank used for everything from food imports to housing development. Multibillion-dollar slush funds with no rules about spending and no reporting requirements to the general public came to manage more than parliament. Bilateral financing agreements with China, Russia, and Iran led to secretive and inscrutable financing arrangements that made the country’s borrowing a black box.

Rampant corruption and damaged financial accountability do not mean that outsiders cannot be involved there. When the war in Ukraine broke out, international agencies famously relaxed what had been stringent standards around Ukrainian corruption. Aid agencies and nonprofits working in Haiti have had to quietly make concessions to the realities of operating there. As did the organizations that worked to reduce hunger in Venezuela during the crisis years. Expecting to maintain Swiss-level accounting standards in these types of environments is a recipe for making sure nothing gets done.

Which is a bit of what Rubio is promising by putting the US Export-Import Bank in charge of following every last dollar that Venezuela receives from US-brokered oil sales. Nobody was able to fully follow the money in Venezuela even when they were trying. After almost 30 years of systematically undermining public transparency, a remote-controlled, third-party audit conducted by foreigners from thousands of miles away doesn’t stand a ghost of a chance.

The inevitable conclusion is that the United States will simply have to start turning a blind eye to what actually happens with the money. With clear marching orders to get the economy up and running and oil production moving as fast as possible, there simply won’t be time to stand on accounting formalities. Ask too many questions and the progress will start to slow down. It seems like an unexpected consequence of a transition under tutelage: the Trump administration will quietly become part of the chavista machine.

Gold has risen more than 20% since the start of the year, surpassing the significant $5,500 milestone this week.

The precious metal’s rally, seen alongside a lift in commodities such as silver and platinum, is driven by a number of interlinking factors — including geopolitical tensions, rising government debt, and an uncertain outlook for interest rates and inflation.

Gold’s appeal is linked to the narrative that it is a safe haven asset, acting as a “hedge against inflation”. It typically increases in value when the dollar declines, it’s easily sold, and it’s also a tangible, finite commodity.

These factors are significant at a time when questions are being raised about the dollar, as well as fiat currencies like the Japanese yen. As government debt rises, so do fears around inflation and fiscal stability.

In the US, incendiary policies from the Trump administration are increasing market jitters around the health of the economy, prompting what some analysts view as a “sell America” trade. In recent weeks, the president has threatened to conquer Greenland, hinted at US intervention in Iran, sought to influence policy at the Federal Reserve, and launched an attack on Venezuela. To top that off, he’s also threatened more tariffs on trading partners, bringing back a well-worn tactic from 2025.

Although analysts argue that the dollar will not be unseated as the world’s reserve currency anytime soon, it seems investors are diversifying away from the greenback. The US’ next moves remain uncertain, and no one wants to be caught in the crosshairs. As an alternative to fiat currencies, gold may seem like a strong portfolio option.

“Investors previously bought US Treasuries as they were viewed as being quite risk-free. But especially because of the way that some wealth has been weaponised, certain countries are becoming more careful about how they allocate their capital,” said Simon Popple, managing director at Brookville Capital. “The dollar debasement helps the gold price,” he told Euronews.

Even so, Popple and other analysts stress that a major factor lifting the bullion price is far less complicated. As gold continues to make headlines, investors are caught up in the momentum, sparking a buying frenzy.

“People are naturally drawn to things they see moving and they’ve seen gold have an astonishing rally,” said Chris Beauchamp, chief market analyst at IG. “It’s bound to lead to an ignition of interest.”

He added that while gold has beneficial investment properties, the metal’s ability to hold its value is overstated, particularly in the short term. Gold’s position in the market notably shifted after former US president Richard Nixon decided to end direct dollar convertibility to gold in 1971. Put simply, countries no longer fixed their currencies to a specified amount of the precious metal.

“The gold standard is still invoked to suggest the metal is some kind of totemic asset we should have because it’s a fixed store of value. It’s not,” concluded Beauchamp.

Kenneth Lamont, a principal in Morningstar’s Manager Research Department, reiterated this message, also drawing comparisons between gold and crypto. While both are limited in supply, they are both “incredibly volatile”, he stressed.

“If you’re using either crypto or gold to buy something, it might be 30% less from one day to the next. It’s not actually a good store of value in the short term.”

While gold is much more established than bitcoin, and it has historically performed well over the long term, analysts stress that the unpredictability of both assets means the death knell is not yet ringing for fiat currencies.

Whether bullion’s price will continue to climb in the immediate future is a guessing game. Even so, given the precarious nature of global politics, it seems the metal may still have further to run.

The national debt passed the $36 trillion threshold in November for the first time ever, as the combined debt held by the U.S. public and the federal government grows.

At that sum, the U.S. national debt is approximately equal to the value of the economies of China, Germany, Japan, India, and the U.K. combined, the Peter G. Peterson Foundation found. 

National debt is the total amount of money the U.S. federal government owes its creditors. The American public primarily holds the largest share of federal debt, followed by foreign governments and U.S. banks and investors. The government gathers funds by collecting taxes on personal and corporate income, payroll earnings, and borrowing. The government then spends the money on programs such as Social Security, education, health care, national defense, and more, and takes on debt by borrowing to cover the expenses that accumulate over time. 

But which political party has historically added more to the national debt—Democrats or Republicans? The answer depends on how you slice the data.

Republican Presidents Have Added More to the National Debt Per Term—But Democratic Presidents Added More Debt Overall

Inflation-adjusted data from the U.S. Treasury Department and the Bureau of Labor Statistics would suggest that per term, Republican presidents have added slightly more debt to the U.S. national debt than Democratic presidents. Looking at U.S. presidents from 1913 through the end of the federal fiscal year 2024, Republican presidents added about $1.4 trillion per four-year term, compared to $1.2 trillion added by Democrats. 

However, Democratic presidents added more inflation-adjusted debt overall. That could be because Democratic presidents were in power for nine more years than Republican presidents in the period since 1913. Overall, Democratic presidents have added a total of $18 trillion to the national debt since 1913 (adjusted for inflation), while Republicans have added $17.3 trillion.

How Does a President and Their Administration Affect Debt?

Historically, the way a president has responded to major events has added significantly to the national debt. For example, funding wars and spending on government relief during recessions are some reasons presidents have added to the national debt.

While national debt isn’t entirely in a president’s control, a president and their administration’s fiscal policies do affect it. Federal spending can be out of a president’s control in times of war, natural disasters, or a public health crisis.

During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, then-President Trump signed the $2.2 trillion CARES Act stimulus bill into law in response to the sharp rise in unemployment during the pandemic. Later, President Biden signed the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act to provide more relief to Americans and businesses as they continued to recover from the pandemic.

President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 2009 when the economy was experiencing the worst recession since the Great Depression. Former President George W. Bush added significantly to the national debt during his term after launching the invasion of Afghanistan and the War on Terror following the Sept. 11 terror attacks. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars cost an estimated $8 trillion over 20 years, ending in 2021. 

How Would the 2024 Election Candidates’ Economic Plans Affect U.S. National Debt?

The national debt was also a leading issue for 2024 presidential election voters. October data from a poll by the Peterson Foundation found that more than nine in 10 voters across seven key swing states said it was important for candidates to have a plan for national debt. 

However, a report by the nonpartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) found that both candidates were likely to significantly increase the national debt under their current spending plans. High levels of national debt can slow down the economy, increase interest rates, and generally increase the risk of a fiscal crisis. 

Tallying what economic proposals the candidates had made, Harris’ spending plan would increase the national debt by about $3.95 trillion through 2035, while President-elect Trump’s plan would increase the debt by $7.75 trillion, according to an estimate by the CRFB.

Which President Added the Most National Debt Per Term? 

Former President Trump added the most national debt per term, adding an estimated $7.1 trillion to the national debt during his term from 2016 to 2020.

The Bottom Line

Looking at U.S. presidential terms since 1913, Republican presidents have added slightly more debt to the U.S. national debt than Democratic presidents per four-year term. However, Democratic presidents added more inflation-adjusted debt overall, though there have also been nine more years of Democratic presidents since 1913 compared to Republican presidents.

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell pushed back against political pressure on the US central bank on Wednesday and defended its independence, urging the next chair to “stay out of elected politics”. Markets, however, appeared unconvinced, accelerating a sell-off in the dollar as gold and silver hit fresh record highs.

“Don’t get pulled into elected politics. Don’t do it,” Powell told reporters.

The reaction followed the Federal Reserve’s latest decision to leave interest rates unchanged in a range between 3.5% and 3.75%.

Asked whether the Fed was drawing any macroeconomic signal from the explosive rally in precious metals, Powell played down its significance.

“We don’t take much message macroeconomically,” Powell said. “The argument that we are losing credibility is simply not the case. If you look at where inflation expectations are, our credibility is right where it needs to be.”

He highlighted that the Fed does not “get spun up over particular asset price changes”, although it continues to monitor markets closely.

Markets react

The market reaction sharply contradicted Powell’s message.

Gold jumped to $5,500 per ounce, setting a new all-time high, while silver climbed above $117 per ounce.

Gold is now up over 20% this month, on track for its strongest monthly performance since January 1980.

Silver’s gains have been even more dramatic, with prices already up around 55% this month — the strongest monthly rise on record.

Meanwhile, the US dollar index, which tracks the greenback against a basket of major currencies, fell to levels last seen four years ago.

“The next couple of days will show whether investors have concluded that the dollar needs to go lower and that today’s bounce is a selling opportunity,” said James Knightley, chief economist at ING.

The dollar is now more than 10% below its 2025 highs, weighed down by persistent macro headwinds, including global central bank diversification away from US assets, widening fiscal deficits, recurring questions over Fed independence, and expectations of further policy easing.

‘Is gold the new bitcoin?’

Veteran Wall Street economist Ed Yardeni linked the rally to politics, suggesting its sustained popularity could make “gold the new bitcoin”.

Yardeni argued that US President Donald Trump, a vocal supporter of cryptocurrencies, appears to be inadvertently fuelling the rise in gold prices.

On Tuesday, Trump said “the dollar is doing great” when asked whether the currency had fallen too much, signalling he is comfortable with a weaker greenback.

“A weaker dollar may put upward pressure on US inflation, which would also boost the price of gold,” Yardeni said.

Commodities surge beyond gold and silver

The rally has spread across the broader commodities market.

Platinum climbed above $2,900 per ounce for the first time on record this week and is already up 33% this month. Palladium, which benefits from stronger industrial demand, rose to a four-year high and is up more than 22% year to date.

Copper also surged, hitting a record $6.30 per pound on Thursday.

Across commodity markets, investors are increasingly positioning for prolonged dollar weakness, amid perceptions that US institutions are willing to tolerate — or quietly accept — the shift.

Euro stronger, equities mixed

In Europe, the euro traded near $1.1950, edging lower after briefly breaking above $1.20 earlier in the week following Trump’s comments.

The single currency has now risen for three consecutive months against the dollar and is up around 15% year on year.

European equities were mixed. France’s CAC 40 and Italy’s FTSE MIB gained around 0.5%, while Germany’s DAX fell over 1%.

Frankfurt’s losses were led by SAP, which slid 16% — its biggest one-day drop since October 2020 — after weaker-than-expected cloud sales and a cut to 2026 revenue guidance outweighed in-line fourth-quarter results.

Published on
29/01/2026 – 12:38 GMT+1

Oil prices rose on Thursday after US President Donald Trump warned Iran that “time is running out” and said a “massive armada” was heading towards the region if Tehran failed to agree to a nuclear non-proliferation deal.

In a Truth Social post, Trump said a fleet larger than the one sent to Venezuela was ready to “rapidly fulfil its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary” if Iran refused to negotiate a deal guaranteeing “no nuclear weapons”.

Global benchmark Brent rose by about 2.02%, trading at around $68.73 per barrel, while US crude (WTI) hovered around 2.15% higher, at $64.57 per barrel.

Trump previously threatened to attack Iran if it killed protesters during the ongoing protest movement across the country. Estimates of those killed range from around 6,000 to as many as 30,000, according to various reports.

Oil delivery disruptions

If the US were to escalate militarily, it could disrupt oil flows to countries that still trade with Iran.

Iran’s economy is already under heavy pressure from US secondary financial sanctions on its banking and energy sectors, compounded by the reimposition of JCPOA snapback sanctions.

These measures have severely limited Iran’s access to the Western financial system and constrained its ability to trade openly.

As a result, Iranian exports rely heavily on so-called “dark fleets,” ship-to-ship transfers and intermediary routes designed to obscure cargo origins along major maritime corridors.

Yet despite years of sanctions, Iran has retained access to oil markets, underlining the difficulty of fully enforcing restrictions on a high-value global commodity.

“Iran has a number of markets for its oil, despite the Western sanctions regime,” said Dmitry Grozubinski, a senior advisor on international trade policy at Aurora Macro Strategies.

China at centre of enforcement risk

China remains the largest buyer, with reports suggesting Iranian crude is often rebranded as Malaysian or Gulf-origin oil before entering the country.

“Independent refineries are purchasing it using dark fleet vessels, with transactions conducted through small private banks and in renminbi,” Grozubinski said.

Other destinations for Iranian oil and derivatives include Iraq, the UAE and Turkey, further complicating enforcement.

“It’s extremely difficult to maintain comprehensive sanctions on oil,” Grozubinski said, “especially when it requires policing transactions between Iran and states that don’t fully share Western priorities.”

China currently imports an estimated 1.2 to 1.4 million barrels of Iranian oil per day — around 80 to 90% of Iran’s crude exports.

US escalation could provoke Beijing

That dependence makes Beijing the central variable in any escalation. Analysts say China would be the most likely major economy to resist compliance and retaliate.

“Beijing has already signalled it would respond if Trump follows through,” said Dan Alamariu, chief geopolitical strategist at Alpine Macro, warning of renewed US–China trade friction.

One risk raised by analysts is the potential for China to again restrict exports of rare earths — a tool it has previously used during periods of trade tension — although such a move is considered unlikely in the short term.

“It’s not the base case,” Alamariu said, “but it’s not impossible.”