Yemens

For years, Aidarous al-Zubaidi has been the undisputed strongman of southern Yemen, a former air force officer who transitioned from a rebel leader to a statesman courted by Western diplomats.

But on Wednesday, his political trajectory took a drastic turn.

In a decree that has shaken the country’s fragile power-sharing arrangement, the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Rashad al-Alimi, removed al-Zubaidi from his post as council member, stripping him of his immunity and referring him to the public prosecutor on charges of “high treason”.

The decree accuses al-Zubaidi of “forming armed gangs”, “harming the Republic’s political and military standing”, and leading a military rebellion.

Simultaneously, the Saudi-led coalition announced that al-Zubaidi had “fled to an unknown destination” after failing to answer a summons to Riyadh—a claim the Southern Transitional Council (STC) vehemently denies, insisting their leader remains in Aden.

So, who is the man at the centre of these rapid developments in Yemen?

The ‘rebel’ officer

Born in 1967 in the Zubayd village of the mountainous Al-Dale governorate, al-Zubaidi’s life has mirrored the turbulent history of southern Yemen.

He graduated from the air force academy in Aden as a second lieutenant in 1988. However, his military career was upended by the 1994 civil war, in which northern forces under then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh crushed the southern separatist movement.

Al-Zubaidi fought on the losing side and was forced into exile in Djibouti.

He returned to Yemen in 1996 to found Haq Taqreer al-Maseer (HTM), which means the Movement of Right to Self-Determination, an armed group that carried out assassinations against northern military officials. A military court sentenced him to death in absentia, a ruling that stood until Saleh pardoned him in 2000.

After years of a low-level rebellion, al-Zubaidi re-emerged during the Arab Spring in 2011, when his movement claimed responsibility for attacks on Yemeni army vehicles in Al-Dale.

From governor to secessionist chief

The Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014 and their subsequent push south in 2015 provided al-Zubaidi with his biggest opening.

Leading southern resistance fighters, he played a pivotal role in repelling Houthi forces from Al-Dale and Aden. In recognition of his influence on the ground, President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed him governor of Aden in December 2015.

However, the alliance was short-lived. Tensions between Hadi’s government and southern separatists boiled over, leading to al-Zubaidi’s dismissal in April 2017.

Less than a month later, al-Zubaidi formed the Southern Transitional Council (STC), declaring it the legitimate representative of the southern people. Backed by the United Arab Emirates, the STC built a formidable paramilitary force that frequently clashed with government troops, eventually seizing control of Aden.

In April 2022, in a bid to unify the anti-Houthi front, al-Zubaidi was appointed to the eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).

A vision of ‘South Arabia’

Despite joining the unity government, al-Zubaidi never abandoned his ultimate goal: the restoration of the pre-1990 southern state.

In interviews with international media, including United Arab Emirates state-run newspaper The National and Al Hurra, al-Zubaidi outlined a vision for a federal “State of South Arabia”. He argued that the “peace process is frozen” and that a two-state solution was the only viable path forward.

He also courted controversy by expressing openness to the Abraham Accords.

“If Palestine regains its rights … when we have our southern state, we will make our own decisions and I believe we will be part of these accords,” he told The National in September 2025.

Most recently, on January 2, 2026, al-Zubaidi issued a “constitutional declaration” announcing a two-year transition period leading to a referendum on independence – a move that appears to have triggered his dismissal.

The final rupture

The events of January 7 mark the collapse of the fragile alliance between the internationally recognised government and the STC.

Brigadier General Turki al-Maliki, spokesperson for the coalition, stated that al-Zubaidi had been distributing weapons in Aden to “cause chaos” and had fled the country after being given a 48-hour ultimatum to report to Riyadh.

Al-Maliki also confirmed “limited preemptive strikes” against STC forces mobilising near the Zind camp in Al-Dale.

The STC has rejected these accounts. In a statement issued on Wednesday morning, the council claimed al-Zubaidi is “continuing his duties from the capital, Aden”.

Instead, the STC raised the alarm about its own delegation in Riyadh, led by Secretary-General Abdulrahman Shaher al-Subaihi, claiming they have lost all contact with them.

“We demand the Saudi authorities … guarantee the safety of our delegation,” the statement read, condemning the air strikes on Al-Dale as “unjustified escalation”.

With “high treason” charges on the table and air strikes reported in the south, al-Zubaidi’s long game for independence appears to have pushed Yemen into a dangerous new phase of conflict.

Leader of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council removed from government with the Saudi-led coalition saying he ‘fled to unknown location’.

Saudi-backed Hadramout governor says move under way to ‘peacefully’ take over military sites from STC.

Fighting broke out on Friday in Yemen’s Hadramout province that borders Saudi Arabia, between forces loyal to the region’s Saudi-backed governor and the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC).

The STC accused Saudi Arabia of bombing its forces near the border on Friday.

Seven people were killed and than 20 people were also wounded as seven air strikes hit a camp in Al-Khasah, said Mohammed Abdulmalik, head of the STC in Wadi Hadramaut and Hadramaut Desert.

But Hadramout’s governor Salem al-Khanbashi said on Friday that the efforts to take back bases from the STC were meant to “peacefully and systematically” reclaim military sites in Yemen’s southern province.

“The operation is not a declaration of war or an escalation, but rather a precautionary measure to protect security and prevent chaos,” he said in a statement.

Al Jazeera’s Mohammed Al Attab, reporting from Sanaa, said fighting was reported to be taking place on Friday in positions where STC forces are located along the Saudi border.

But, he added, “we are still waiting for confirmation about what is going on there,” saying that the latest information available from the area suggested the STC had maintained control of its positions.

The outbreak in fighting comes after Yemen’s Saudi-backed government said it ‍had appointed al-Khanbashi to take overall command of the National Shield forces in the eastern province, granting him full military, security and administrative authority in what it said was a move to restore security and order.

Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognised Yemeni government that it backs have accused the United Arab Emirates of arming the STC and pushing it to seize parts of the Hadramout and al-Mahra provinces in southern Yemen last month. Riyadh has warned that it views the STC’s growing presence in these provinces — which border Saudi Arabia — as a threat to its national security. The UAE has rejected these allegations and said that it is committed to Saudi Arabia’s security.

Last week, the UAE said it was pulling its remaining forces out of Yemen after Saudi Arabia backed a call for its forces to leave within 24 hours.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the STC are all part of a military coalition that Riyadh pulled together a decade ago to confront the Houthis. But the STC’s increasingly aggressive secessionist acts, and allegations that the UAE is assisting the group, have fostered tensions within the coalition.

The head of the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, warned against any attempt to oppose the government’s decisions to prevent the country from sliding into a new cycle of violence.

“The decision to end the Emirati military presence came within the framework of correcting the course of the [coalition] and in coordination with its joint leadership, and in a way that ensures the cessation of any support for elements outside the state,” al-Alimi said in a statement.

Tensions escalate

The STC has insisted its fighters will remain in place in the southern provinces that Saudi Arabia and the official Yemeni government want them to withdraw from.

On Friday, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Yemen blamed STC leader Aidarus al-Zubaidi for refusing to grant landing permission the previous day for a plane carrying a Saudi delegation to Aden.

“For several weeks and until yesterday, ‌the Kingdom sought to make all efforts with the Southern Transitional ⁠Council to end the escalation … but it faced continuous rejection and stubbornness from Aidarus Al-Zubaidi,” the Saudi ambassador, Mohammed Al-Jaber, said on X.

A halt in flights at Aden International Airport ‌on Thursday continued into Friday as both sides traded blame for the air traffic shutdown.

In a statement on Thursday, the STC-controlled Transport Ministry accused Saudi Arabia of imposing an air blockade, saying Riyadh required ‍all flights to go via Saudi Arabia for extra checks. A Saudi Arabian source, however, denied the allegation, saying Yemen’s internationally recognised government, led by the Presidential Leadership Council, was behind the requirement for UAE-bound flights to land for inspection in Jeddah.

Yemeni presidential adviser Thabet al-Ahmadi confirmed to Al Jazeera that it had imposed a requirement that applied to one flight route departing from Aden airport. He said the move was meant to prevent STC money smuggling.

Saudi Arabia’s strike on Mukalla port has triggered tensions with its partner in the Arab coalition in Yemen and its Gulf Arab neighbour, the United Arab Emirates.

The coalition spokesman, Major-General Turki al-Maliki, said two ships entered the port of Mukalla, carrying more than 80 vehicles and containers of weapons and ammunition destined for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), without informing Saudi Arabia or the internationally recognised Yemeni government.

There are serious differences between the two allies in Yemen, and now it is at its peak and perhaps a turning point that would impact Yemen.

The Yemeni government has lost control of events following a military escalation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Hadramout governorate, where Mukalla lies, in December.

The Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) is divided into two factions, each loyal to one party in this conflict. The difference had been simmering for years away from the spotlight until it exploded publicly over the past few days.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are key members of the Arab military coalition in Yemen, formed to confront the Houthis, who took full control of the capital, Sanaa, by force in 2015 and later imposed their own government.

This conflict of interest between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has been escalating gradually since the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) formed in 2017 as a separatist political and military force seeking an independent state in the south – South Yemen – an independent state between 1967 and 1990.

Earlier in December, the STC forces crossed red lines by controlling all southern governorates, including Hadramout and al-Mahra governorates. That did not go down well in Saudi Arabia, which considered the move a threat to its national security.

Hadramout also represents economic depth for Yemen with its oil and gas resources and related infrastructure, and also has a vital border crossing with Saudi Arabia, making it part of the equation for border security and trade.

The latest public fallout between Saudi Arabia and the UAE will cast a dark shadow over the situation in Yemen politically, economically, and militarily. The Yemeni political circles were divided into two camps, with the government members each following one of the external parties to the conflict – Saudi and Emirati.

The clearest outcome of the differences would be seen in the eight-member PLC, an internationally recognised body, which is already divided into camps loyal to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

One camp is headed by Rashad al-Alimi, the PLC president, and includes Sultan al-Arada, Abdullah al-Alimi Bawazir, and Othman Hussein Mujalli. The second is led by the head of the STC force, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, and includes Abdul Rahman al-Mahrami (also known as Abu Zaraa), Tariq Mohammed Saleh, and Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani.

The leaders of both camps issued two different statements regarding the calls made by al-Alimi for the UAE to withdraw from Yemen following the Saudi strike on the ships carrying weapons to the STC. One was in favour of the UAE’s exit from Yemen, and the other was against — showing they are representing the interests of regional players and at the same time confirming that Yemen is a venue for a proxy war.

Within the Yemeni political landscape, the quick developments and successive events are pushing Yemen into a new phase of an internal war among political and military components that make up the legitimate government, with new internal fighting among many armed factions.

It is also taking the focus away from the Houthi rebellion in the north, which controlled Sanaa and the most populous provinces in Yemen.

The main goal for the legitimate Yemeni government and the Saudi-led Arab coalition was to confront the Houthis’ takeover. Now, the country is on the brink of collapse and a new phase of turmoil after more than a decade of armed conflict, which could help the Houthis to expand their influence beyond their current areas of control.

The latest event will weaken the Saudi-led coalition further and cast doubt over its cohesion and ability to achieve its declared joint goals for Yemen.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

All UAE forces must leave Yemen within 24 hours, the presidential council says.

Yemen’s separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) is trying to create facts on the ground with its recent advances in the country’s eastern governorates of Hadramout and al-Mahra.

Its military push this month highlights that Yemen’s conflict – ongoing for more than a decade – cannot be reduced to one simply between the internationally recognised government and the Houthis. Instead, an overlapping map of influence is evident on the ground with de facto authorities competing over security, resources and representation.

At the heart of these changes is the STC, backed by a regional power, which now stands as the most powerful actor in Yemen’s south and parts of its east at a time when the government’s ability to impose unified administration over the whole country is distant and the economy is suffering.

In this context comes what the Yemeni government has said is the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) decision to suspend activities in the country. While the IMF has not publicly commented on the topic, President Rashad al-Alimi, the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, warned on Sunday that the decision was a “wake-up call” and an early signal of the cost of the STC’s security and military escalation in Hadramout and al-Mahra.

Al-Alimi stressed that Yemen’s economic circumstances – the country is the poorest in the region and has suffered immensely during the war – cannot withstand any new tensions. He added that the security instability in eastern Yemen would immediately affect the distribution of salaries, fuel and services and international donor confidence.

The solution, according to al-Alimi, is for the withdrawal of forces who have arrived in Hadramout and al-Mahra from outside the two governorates, calling it a necessary step to contain tensions and restore a path of trust with the international community.

But that economic warning cannot be understood in isolation from the shift in power in eastern Yemen, where competition for influence has become a direct factor in generating tension that leaves donors wary.

A new balance of power

The STC is clear that its goal is ultimately the secession of the territories in Yemen – its south and east – that formerly made up the country of South Yemen before unification in 1990.

It is opposed to the Houthis, who control Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and much of Yemen’s populous northwest, and the STC’s leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, has a seat on the government’s Presidential Leadership Council, officially as one of its vice chairmen.

The STC and government forces have previously fought, most notably in 2018 and 2019, in Aden and its surrounding governorates.

Its current expansion eastwards, focused on government forces and those affiliated with them, is part of that ongoing division in the anti-Houthi camp but one that redraws the balance of power within it, turning resource-rich Hadramout and al-Mahra into a multiparty arena of competition.

There are three concurrent trends that are emerging as a result: the expansion of STC forces with regional support, a desire by local and tribal forces – independent of the STC – to solidify their presence and the clearly limited tools the government has to confront its rivals.

The result is the further fragmentation of the state on three interconnected levels.

Politically, there is fragmentation within the same anti-Houthi camp with multiple decision-making centres. The government and regional actors are finding it more difficult to unify security and administrative policies, and the idea of a single “chain of command” controlling territory under anti-Houthi control has been eroded.

Geographically, new lines of contact have now been formed. Whereas lines of control were previously between the Houthis and government forces, they are now between Houthi and STC forces as well as grey areas contested by local and tribal forces and multiple military groups.

And then there is fragmentation on the representative level with mounting disputes over who actually speaks for the south and Hadramout and the practical decline of the concept of a single state as a sovereign framework for managing resources and institutions.

In Hadramout and al-Mahra, the fragmentation is particularly sensitive as both governorates include important border crossings with Saudi Arabia and Oman and also have a long coastline with routes tied to trade, smuggling and irregular migration.

Any imbalance here does not remain local; it quickly spills over into the region.

Economy hostage to security

The IMF’s suspension of activities carries not only financial implications but also a political reading that the security and institutional environments no longer provide sufficient conditions for sustaining support programmes.

The Yemeni state relies heavily on its own limited resources and fragile external support, so any disruption in resource areas, ports or supply routes translates into immediate pressure on livelihoods.

The latest military developments increase pressure on the exchange rate and the government’s ability to meet its financial obligations and widen the trust gap between society and the state, prompting non-institutional alternatives based on levies and loyalties.

And it will shrink the room for the government to manoeuvre, meaning the government has to take into account the cost of any escalation because any military move increases an economic bill that it cannot pay and drains what remains of the government’s ability to manage services.

Now that the impression has taken root that Yemen has turned into “islands of influence”, some external actors may be inclined to deal directly with de facto local authorities at the expense of the government, weakening the political centre rather than helping it to strengthen.

That is why the latest developments are so important if not existential to the government and al-Alimi. His call for the withdrawal of outside forces from Hadramout and al-Mahra is part of an attempt to stop the deterioration of trust in Yemen and to present the government once again as capable of controlling the other parties in the anti-Houthi camp if reasonable political and economic conditions are provided.

Houthis gain while rivals stay divided

The Houthis, who overthrew the government in Sanaa in a coup in 2014, have benefitted from the developments in Hadramout and al-Mahra even without being directly involved.

Every struggle for influence in areas outside the group’s control gives it clear gains, including the disintegration of the front opposing it and its rivals being preoccupied by internal conflicts rather than by the Houthis themselves.

In the anti-Houthi camp, the notion of a united front recedes every time a military confrontation between its components takes place, and the discussion shifts from confronting the Houthis to disputes over power and resources within the same camp.

The divisions within the anti-Houthi camp and the regional dimension to them also allow the Houthis to reinforce their narrative that their rivals are working within competing foreign agendas, as opposed to the Houthis, who portray themselves as independent actors able to carry out their own decisions.

Moreover, the recent conflict and its consequences ultimately improve the Houthis’ negotiating position now that the other side is even more fragmented and weak. The Houthis will enter any upcoming settlement from a more cohesive organisational and administrative position, raising the ceiling of their conditions.

The Houthis may have their own economic and social tensions, but divisions among their enemies give them extra time to sustain the war economy and their instruments of control over it and over the people they rule.

Rising risks, domestic and regional

The current course of events in Yemen elevates a number of overlapping risks.

Domestically, there is the possibility of front lines turning into actual borders between adjacent entities, the expansion of security vacuums and declining prospects for producing a unifying social contract.

Regionally, there could be an expansion of the areas considered lawless along the borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman, increasing the risks of smuggling and leading to higher costs for managing border security.

Internationally, the growing need for global powers to communicate with multiple parties in Yemen prolongs the crisis and increases the chances that the conflict is internationalised through competition over ports, resources and shipping routes.

However, the picture painted does not mean there will be a decisive victory for any side and instead makes a mosaic of authorities, all needing external sponsorship, more likely. Inevitably, that will weaken the prospect of establishing a stable state.

A way out?

Lowering tensions by making partial deals on redeployments of forces is not enough. Instead, the path forward needs a broader approach based on three interlinked pillars.

First, the national project needs to be redefined by drafting a vision of the state that guarantees fair partnership for all the regions of Yemen within a viable federal framework and redefines the political centre as a guarantor of rights and services.

Second, security must be based on a model of local forces under a national umbrella. In Hadramout and al-Mahra, this should be done by building professional local forces within a clear national and legal framework with practical arrangements for withdrawing outside forces and ensuring that security decision-making in state institutions is uniform.

Third, an economic deal is necessary to restore trust by concluding a transparent agreement on managing resources in the governorates that produce them, the fair distribution of revenues and the linking of international support to an implementable reform plan with a clear commitment to protecting sovereign facilities under central management.

In the absence of these steps, Yemen will continue towards a gradual model of disintegration from the peripheries in which the most cohesive armed entities advance and contested margins expand.

If that continues, the economy will be the first victim of fragmentation, making conditions even more difficult for millions of Yemenis.

And the governance crisis will eventually turn into a prolonged stability crisis, the repercussions of which will be difficult to contain locally and perhaps even regionally.

Saeed Thabit is the Al Jazeera Media Network’s bureau chief for Yemen