Whats

Earlier this year, an Iran-linked actor used Anthropic’s Claude artificial intelligence model to scrape and analyze data with the aim of helping target U.S. naval forces in the Middle East. A group in Yemen – very likely Iranian-backed Houthi militants – also used Claude to assist with work on guidance systems for ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

These are just some of the revelations about how adversaries and other malign actors have been using one of the premier pieces of AI software being developed in the United States that were contained in a new report Anthropic released late yesterday. The 154-page document also details instances where Claude was used directly and indirectly to support intelligence gathering and surveillance, cyberattacks, influence operations, and even worrisome biological research over the past eight months. In addition to Iran and Yemen, the human actors behind these activities were based in Russia, China, and a host of other countries.

Anthropic has shared details about what it calls the “misuse” of its models in the past, but describes the new report as its “most detailed” to date. The company has clearly been cataloging these case studies, and has assigned each one a control number. Though the entire contents of the report are cause for concern, the explicit attempt to use Claude to target American forces, as well as to develop new higher-end missiles and other military technology, are particular standouts and signs of what’s to come, as we will highlight below.

GTG-30005: Military reconnaissance

GTG-30005 is the case study dealing with the targeting of U.S. naval forces, and the summary is as follows:

“In another investigation, we identified and disrupted an Iran-nexus threat actor that used Claude to collect and analyze publicly accessible data to develop targeting recommendations against US naval forces in the region. The threat actor used Claude to compile targeting handbooks, through a Python pipeline the threat actor built with Claude’s assistance, to identify and track naval positions based on open-source information. The compiled material included a roster of US personnel scraped from captions on public military photographs; publicly accessible ship and aircraft transponder identifiers; commercial satellite-imagery query scripts; and an inventory of public websites that exposed US naval movements. The threat actor also directed Claude to compile vulnerability research on shipboard systems, cataloging known CVEs in maritime VSAT terminals, Cisco communications equipment, and industrial control products.”

“We banned the actor’s account, developed detections to reduce the risk of future misuse, and shared threat intelligence with government authorities to disrupt the threat.”

How exactly Anthropic defines the term “nexus” here is not immediately clear, and other entries in its new report also use “state-nexus” in addition to country-based variations. However, in this specific case, an addendum is added to the entry that explicitly says that the same account was separately tied to “domestic mass surveillance” software development work “for Iranian state systems,” clearly pointing to an actor directly linked to the regime in Tehran.

Whether or not any of the data collected and analysed here was directly used to subsequently carry out attacks on U.S. forces is unknown. However, there have been media reports just in recent weeks that Iran has been increasingly trying to strike American warships. Those same reports have raised questions about how the country has been prosecuting those operations given its limited capabilities and capacity to track maritime targets far from its shores. The possibility that Russia or China could be supplying targeting data has been put forward.

The use of AI technology by nation-state armed forces to develop target sets and engage them is already known to be growing globally. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have been a pioneer in this regard, but the U.S. military, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and others are also known to be developing and fielding these capabilities.

U.S. military officials have also voiced increasing concern in recent years about the ability to track the movements and disposition of U.S. military assets and personnel using publicly available pictures and other data. There has been much talk, in turn, about how to balance transparency and operational security.

GTG-87001: Disrupting a Yemen-based guided weapons engineering cell using Claude to develop guidance software

Anthropic’s new report details an instance where an individual in Yemen used Claude as part of missile guidance work, which is given the control number GTG-87001.

“We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen running three weapons development programs: a guided rocket that used a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing guidance; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant missile (referred to as the “R2000” set) that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant.”

“The actors used Claude Code in place of human software engineers to develop the guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) software that steers and stabilizes a flying vehicle. For example, they used Claude to integrate an open-source autopilot onto a phone-class flight computer, writing the control and position estimation software, tuning the control settings, running a firmware build pipeline, and performing a flight simulation. The actors managed several Claude instances at once, assigning each one a role, much as a lead would delegate work on a small engineering team: the actors tasked one instance with writing the code, another with research, and a third with reviewing the code the first instance produced.”

“Our safeguards blocked many of their requests, but not all of them. The actors used a variety of tactics to evade our safeguards, including hiding their goals and the products the software was meant for, and they split their work across multiple sessions so no single session revealed their full intent.”

“These actors carried out a sustained effort to develop guided weapons, including using Claude to design guidance software. We do not have evidence the actors succeeded in fielding an operational device; but they did test-fire a guided rocket. This field test appears to have failed: within hours, the actors returned to Claude to work out why it failed.”

“We identified this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development. We banned accounts associated with the actors and shared threat information with public- and private-sector partners to mitigate risks posed by the actors. Nevertheless, we have evidence that the actors had already built an offline simulation toolkit that does not rely on Claude or other engineering computing environments such as MATLAB.”

As mentioned earlier, the report does not name the Houthis, but that group has historically been based primarily in the northern end of Yemen. It is also the only entity in the country known to have active missile development programs, which are conducted with critical support from Iran.

Whether this particular work directly resulted in any new capabilities is unknown. Anthropic notes that there looked to be at least one failed test launch before the accounts were banned, which would have occurred sometime after the beginning of this year, based on the stated cutoff dates for the report. By the end of 2025, the Houthis had already amassed a wide array of very real ballistic missiles, including types with at least claimed ranges of 2,000 kilometers (approximately 1,242 miles). The group also has a variety of cruise missiles and one-way attack drones that it has employed operationally.

Still, being able to leverage Claude could only have helped any domestic missile development efforts in Yemen, which might help reduce dependency on Iran, at least to a degree. Furthermore, developing functional hypersonic glide vehicles capable of prolonged stable flight has historically been notoriously difficult, even for entities with extensive relevant knowledge bases on an organizational level.

GTG-17001: Disrupting a China-based operation using Claude to draft a fire control specification and acquisition documents for undersea warfare

Use of Claude in foreign military endeavours goes beyond the Middle East, as evidenced by case study GTG-17001. This involved a Chinese actor conducting work related to a naval counter-torpedo defense system.

“We identified a China-based threat actor who used Claude to advance three parallel tracks of work on an anti-torpedo weapons system:”

• “First, the actor used Claude to draft a Chinese-language specification for an anti-torpedo fire control system (the core logic that aims and times an anti-torpedo weapon’s response). The document was written to win approval from a Chinese defense manufacturer, which would move the work on to technical certification and operational testing.”
• “Second, the actor used Claude to produce a Chinese-language technical proposal of more than 200 pages, accompanied by an executive briefing deck.”
• “Third, the actor used Claude to benchmark their own system against specific US anti-torpedo and anti-submarine programs based on publicly accessible information. They then generated a Chinese-language briefing on US Navy systems derived from open-source reporting.”

“The actor presented themselves as an original equipment manufacturer in the US defense sector. We assess the actor was associated with a Chinese defense industry manufacturer aiming to produce a weapons specification and acquisition proposal for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.”

“The actor used Claude to write the acquisition proposal, refining it over many drafts. After each draft, the actor instructed Claude to role-play a hostile expert reviewer to critique the proposal, then used that feedback to sharpen the next version. In parallel, the actor used Claude to build pieces of the anti-torpedo weapons system’s fire control software and a test matrix to validate them.”

“The operational lift the actor achieved was a function of using Claude to automate complex technical outputs. The actor leveraged the model to compress the development timelines for the certification registry, compliance documentation, and automated fire control logic. The actor also accelerated the traditional human review cycle by having Claude critique the acquisition proposal across multiple rounds of review while role-playing a persona.”

“We uncovered this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development. We cannot attribute the activity to a specific entity or actor. But we have banned the account for violating our Supported Regions Policy and our Usage Policy, which prohibits weapons design and development, and incorporated our investigative findings into our safeguards to mitigate the risk of future misuse.”

Anthropic’s report does not name the U.S. programs leveraged here, but does note the information in question was publicly available. Anti-torpedo systems for surface warships and submarines have been an area of significant interest for the U.S. Navy for years now. Those developments have also produced compact torpedo designs for use in other applications.

The PLAN’s interest in these same kinds of capabilities is not at all surprising. Underwater threats and countermeasures to them, broadly speaking, would play a central and vital role in any future conflict between the United States and China across the broad expanses of the Pacific.

GTG-27005: Disrupting a Russia-based operation using Claude to engineer an autonomous military drone swarm

Another case study, GTG-27005, details the use of Claude by Russian actors working on drone swarming technology.

“We identified likely freelance Russia-based threat actors who set out to build a full-stack autonomous first-person-view (FPV) kamikaze drone swarm. The actors used Claude Code to write and test the code and save it directly into the actors’ own project files. In addition to Claude Code, the actors used a software-in-the-loop simulation stack and a rented graphics processing host for model training. They called the operation ‘DronDoc’ or ‘Serafim.’”

“The actors used Claude to build the core software system, including the drones’ shared swarm memory and fault-tolerant coordination logic (FTCL); an onboard small language model to govern attack, observe, and return-to-base behaviors; a terminal guidance software system to steer drones to their target (using the onboard camera) and issue the call to detonate; a control-link geolocation module to find opposing drone operators; a passive acoustic detection layer; and low-level logic for the drones’ programmable chips. The actors designed the platform for autonomous lethal engagement; the onboard model could select targets (including a ‘person’ target class) and issue detonation commands without a human in the loop. The actors’ activity—including flashing the low-level firmware to live development boards, provisioning single-board computers, and wiring up a simulation environment over a mesh network—confirmed that they were using real hardware-in-loop testing within their sessions.”

“The actors trained a computer vision classifier on scraped Ukrainian combat footage, splitting the target classes into “enemy” and “friendly,” and allow-listing Russian systems. They also repeatedly used a fixed coordinate in Donetsk Oblast as the demonstration strike point, with front-line cities and corridors in Ukraine as the mission geography.”

“The actors created their accounts between late 2025 and early 2026 and started the operation in mid-May 2026. The actors circumvented our geographic access controls by routing traffic through commercial virtual private servers.”

“We assess the actors were a small, specialized freelance team doing a mix of civilian and military work, not a Russian state entity. We identified nine accounts associated with this group; eight were used only for ordinary freelance work, not weapons-related software development. Based on our investigation, we assess the actors had ties to a regional university with a federal research center associated with the Russian Academy of Sciences. The actors claimed to have received funding from Russia’s Advanced Research Foundation, National Technology Initiative, and Ministry of Defence, though we cannot verify those claims. We identified this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development, we banned accounts associated with the actors, and have incorporated our investigative findings into safeguards to reduce the risk of future misuse.”

Anthropic’s report included a table, reproduced below, detailing different types of drones and other capabilities that were fed into the model as part of this work.

Also, while Anthropic said it could not confirm any direct ties in this instance to the Russian government, the work described here is fully in line with capabilities that have already been demonstrated to varying degrees in Ukraine in the past few years. TWZ has been very closely tracking developments on both sides of the conflict when it comes to new automated targeting and swarming capabilities for shorter- and longer-ranged kamikaze drones. In 2024, we also published a detailed feature outlining a coming revolution in drone warfare, signs of which were already emerging then, thanks to AI and the ever-lowering barrier to entry for leveraging that technology.

GTG-17002: Disrupting a China-based operation using Claude to build targeting software for electronic warfare and air defense suppression

The last case study in the Conventional Weapons section of Anthropic’s new report, GTG-17002, covers electronic warfare-related work by a Chinese actor, with a particular focus on potential air defense targets in Taiwan.

“We identified a China-based actor who used Claude’s chat, coding, and agentic work tools to design, build, and iterate on a Chinese-language suite of about 16 modules for electronic warfare, using the electromagnetic spectrum to detect, jam, or deceive an opponent’s radar and communications, and for suppressing an opponent’s air defenses.”

“The actor used Claude to build the software system, from the underlying logic to the user interface, and iterated through 12 versions. This included implementing and optimizing the system’s radar detection and jamming physics, generating a vulnerability analysis module, and drafting Chinese-language targeting instructions. The software suite the actor built analyzed an opponent’s radars, surface-to-air missile sites, command posts, and communications nodes, then computed their detection coverage, assessed the effectiveness of jamming, ranked targets by value and vulnerability, including which to suppress first, and determined how best to assign jammer sorties to targets across multi-day campaigns. The suite also ranked which of an opponent’s assets to suppress first, and modeled specific engagement envelopes, including those of Patriot and THAAD-class [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] systems.”

“Mid-project, we observed the actor change the simulation’s default scenario to 12 targets in Taiwan. The targets included a command bunker in Taiwan, an early warning radar site, Patriot and Tien Kung [surface-to-air missile] batteries, major air bases, and a regional combatant command headquarters.”

NCSIST – Tien Kung III Air Defense Missile & Hsiung Feng III Anti-Ship Missile Live Firing [480p]

“The actor also ran a self-hosted model on an internal network alongside Claude and connected the software suite to this model through a tool-use integration.”

“Based on our investigation, we assess the actor is a China-based defense and military-industrial researcher. Account-level metadata and content flagged by our safeguards indicated the actor was linked to PRC research institutions, including the PLA Academy of Military Sciences. We detected this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development, we banned accounts linked to the actor, and have incorporated our investigative findings into our safeguards to reduce the risk of future misuse.”

An accompanying table, seen below, mentions several specific types of U.S.-made air defense radars, as well as the Link-16 datalink network, as having come up in the course of this work. Electronic warfare variants of the Chinese Y-8 and Y-9 aircraft, as well as the J-16D electronic warfare jet, and what appears to be a reference to the Golden Eagle drone helicopter, are also mentioned.

China’s J-16D Shows Versatility Across Reconnaissance, Attack, Defense: Designers

The suppression of enemy air defenses is an essential part of any modern air campaign, whether conducted independently or as a part of a larger operation. This would be no less critical in any military intervention against Taiwan from the mainland, or any other larger-scale conflict the PLA might find itself in.

Guardrails and ethics

Beyond the details in any of the specific case studies, Anthropic’s new report underscores growing broader concerns about guardrails for the use of AI and general ethics surrounding the technology. As noted in the instances above, Anthropic has also implemented various safeguards to try to block access to Claude from certain regions and/or to prevent the model from conducting certain types of work. At the same time, what the company has now shared makes clear that those protections can still be circumvented to a significant degree, at least for now.

For its part, Anthropic has been publicly supportive of transparency laws and regulation, at least within the United States. The company also notably made tweaks to certain Claude models earlier this year to address U.S. government cybersecurity concerns.

Starting in December 2025, Anthropic has also been very publicly embroiled in a dispute with the Pentagon over the potential use of Claude to support mass surveillance and fully autonomous weapon systems. This subsequently led to the company being designated a supply chain risk, and limitations being imposed on the use of that model within the U.S. military and elsewhere across the U.S. government. Anthropic is continuing to fight that action in court. However, just yesterday, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Pentagon Chief Technology Officer Emil Michael said the U.S. military had scaled back the use of Anthropic’s products in support of classified work by 90 percent.

The concerns about ‘misuse’ outlined in Anthropic’s new report apply, in general terms, to publicly accessible models being developed by other companies, too. There have already been publicly disclosed instances of AI agents themselves engaging in hacking and other malign behavior in order to complete assigned tasks, raising additional questions about security and public safety, not to mention ethics.

TWZ has noted in the past that America’s adversaries are likely to be less worried about ethics, in general, when it comes to AI. Anthropic’s new report also shows there are few bounds to what state-aligned or even non-state actors might seek to use this technology for, including the development of potential weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, AI models like Claude are not going away, and developments continue to advance at an ever-quickening pace, opening the door to further proliferation. Developments are rapidly intermingling globally, with companies in China notably leveraging models created in the U.S. to further their own work, which is then released publicly. The technology will increasingly become more integrated and critical to most aspects of military operations and weapons development, alongside its commercial and civilian applications. It is just as much a superweapon as anything else, and the country with the more capable models, and the willingness to deploy them, will have a major edge in future conflicts.

With all this in mind, it seems very plausible, if not probable, that the case studies described in Anthropic’s new report are just the tip of an approaching iceberg that will need a concerted effort to tackle.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Yemen’s Houthi group has carried out attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, with Riyadh saying that dozens of people have been wounded, as fighting between the Iran-aligned group and pro-Saudi forces in Yemen sharply escalates.

The Houthis on Tuesday said they targeted Saudi energy sites belonging to oil giant Aramco in southern areas, with the group’s military spokesperson calling it “a broad operation”.

Saudi authorities confirmed attacks on several facilities and installations related to the energy sector in the south of the country, vowing a firm response. Riyadh also accused the Houthis of wounding at least 73 people in the attacks.

The conflict between the Yemeni armed group and Saudi Arabia is unfolding as the Houthis are currently fighting Yemen’s Riyadh-backed internationally recognised government, which announced that it was launching counteroffensives against Houthi-held positions across several provinces on Monday.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a UN-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

The escalation also comes as the strategic importance of Yemen’s Bab al-Mandeb Strait grows amid Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key passageway for global oil and gas supplies.

The Houthis have sought to advance towards the vital Red Sea shipping route, while government forces say their campaign ultimately aims to retake the Houthi-held capital, Sanaa.

So what do we know about the latest fighting, and what comes next?

How did the fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis unfold?

The Houthis on Monday said Saudi Arabia launched multiple attacks on Houthi-held areas.

The group said Saudi attacks using aircraft and cruise missiles struck al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces.

Moreover, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out an air strike on a prison in al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf, killing seven people and injuring seven others. Riyadh did not immediately comment on the attacks.

At the same time, the Houthis claimed to have shot down Saudi reconnaissance drones over al-Jawf and al-Bayda.

Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Major-General Turki al-Malki, the Saudi spokesman for the Riyadh-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis carried out attacks on the Saudi cities of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran, injuring at least 73 people, among them women and children.

According to a statement from Saudi Arabia’s Energy Ministry, the strikes also triggered fires at multiple oil installations and utility sites across the kingdom’s southern provinces.

Southern Saudi Arabia is home to key oil infrastructure, including the Jazan refinery, one of the kingdom’s largest, with the capacity to process 400,000 barrels of crude per day.

Shortly after, the Houthis announced that they had targeted Saudi energy infrastructure operated by oil giant Aramco in the south using drones and ballistic missiles.

The group’s military spokesman, Yahya Saree, said the attacks were retaliation for recent Saudi attacks on Houthi-controlled areas across Yemen.

Why is this escalation taking place now?

A key focus of the fighting is the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi shipping in July. The Houthis have also pushed towards government-held areas near al-Makha (Mocha) and territory bordering the Bab al-Mandeb Strait amid reinforcements and counteroffensives from government forces.

The strait’s strategic importance has increased dramatically because Iran’s restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz have forced Saudi Arabia to rely more heavily on its Red Sea export route. Between March and mid-July, Saudi seaborne crude exports through Bab al-Mandeb were eight times higher than during the same period in 2025.

In 2024, about 4.1 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the strait daily on average – about 5 percent of the global total.

Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the strait holds importance “when we look at the Houthis’ broader strategy”.

“The move towards the western coast is not only about gaining territory on the ground. It also has a maritime dimension,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The Houthis have already linked their military campaign to the Red Sea and the shipping routes around Bab al-Mandeb. So gaining more control over the … western coast could give them greater depth and allow them to sustain pressure on maritime traffic in the Red Sea. In that sense, the ground offensive and their maritime campaign are closely connected.”

The latest escalation also follows fighting that resumed in July after an Iranian aircraft attempted to land in Sanaa without Saudi authorisation, followed by strikes on Sanaa airport and Houthi retaliation.

What is happening between government forces and the Houthis?

On Sunday, Yemen’s internationally recognised government said its warplanes had struck Houthi positions in Hodeidah, Marib and al-Jawf, as fighting spread across several fronts.

On Monday, government-aligned forces stepped up their counteroffensive. They announced a ground push towards the al-Labanat mountains in al-Jawf, while also reporting rocket attacks on Yatma and “intensive battles” with Houthi fighters in the province. Government forces also claimed advances towards Dhi Na’im district in al-Bayda.

The Houthis said they had repelled the advance towards al-Labanat and inflicted casualties on government-aligned forces. Houthi official Mohammed al-Farah also claimed the group fired ballistic missiles at reinforcements in al-Jawf.

By late Monday, government-aligned forces reported carrying out further air attacks against Houthi positions west of Taiz.

Al Jazeera could not independently verify the battlefield claims by the Houthis or the Yemeni government.

Rashad al-Alimi, who heads Yemen’s Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, meanwhile said on Monday that government forces had made significant gains against the Houthis, pointing to advances in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Taiz and Hodeidah.

“Our armed forces will continue to carry out their constitutional duty until state institutions are restored and their authority extends over the entire territory of Yemen,” al-Alimi said in a statement.

Yemen’s deputy defence minister, Major-General Samir al-Sabri, said in comments aired on state television that the government had resolved to “retake Sanaa”.

Majid al-Nuzaili, a spokesperson for government-aligned forces, said the goal of the offensive was to “liberate Yemen from the grip” of the Houthis “and restore Sanaa as a capital for all Yemenis”.

What is the humanitarian situation on the ground?

The World Health Organization said on Monday that at least 728 people have been killed or wounded in Yemen since August 23, with the majority in Taiz and along the western coast.

It said an estimated 21,000 people, roughly 3,000 families, have been displaced from Taiz alone since Thursday.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said the casualty count is expected to rise.

“These casualties are said to be in the hundreds from both sides, especially as we have reports of air strikes being conducted in the governorate of al-Jawf,” he said.

The Crisis Group’s Nagi said the world was witnessing “significant deterioration in what is already a catastrophic situation”.

“We saw in the past few days a lot of displacement from areas where there has been fighting between the two sides, especially in Taiz,” he noted.

“Those are the direct impacts, but there are also indirect ones. The economic situation is likely to get worse, which will put even more pressure on the humanitarian situation. Ultimately, I think it will depend on how long this round of fighting lasts. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the humanitarian impact will be.”

What’s next?

Analyst Hisham al-Omeisy said the fighting in the war-torn country was no longer simply a domestic one.

“We are way beyond the concept [of it] being domestic. It all started with the Houthis pushing to control Bab al-Mandeb and the western coast, to control the chokehold on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, with the Iranians controlling the Strait of Hormuz,” al-Omeisy, a senior Yemen adviser at the European Institute of Peace, told Al Jazeera.

“This is definitely not domestic, especially when the Houthis have started attacking Saudi Arabia as well for the better part of the last month, and now escalating since today [Tuesday].”

Domestically, the Crisis Group’s Nagi said it was “unclear” what the outcome of this round of fighting will be, describing the situation on the ground as “very fluid”.

“But what we are seeing is that the government seems to be in a stronger position than at any time before, and it sees this round of fighting as an opportunity to consolidate its position and gain more territory from the Houthis,” he added, while warning that this did not mean the Houthis were weak.

“It’s true that the Houthis are fighting in Taiz, and they were the ones who launched the offensive against government forces there and made some gains. But on other fronts, in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and elsewhere, government forces have advanced and gained several key areas, while the Houthis have been on the defensive.”

On whether there will be a winner in this conflict, al-Omeisy said that in the long term, he expects a negotiated settlement.

“Look at the history of Yemen … we always inevitably reach some sort of a deal, so it’s not going to be a winner-takes-all,” he said.

“I don’t imagine there’s going to be a push to regain the capital [Sanaa], for instance. It’s going to be a bloodbath if they [government-aligned forces] do that.”

“There’s going to be a humbling of the Houthi forces. There’s going to be losses. But eventually, you will need a political deal,” al-Omeisy added.

According to Saudi political analyst Khaled Batarfi, the Houthi strikes will trigger a response but not a prolonged war.

“This is an escalation, of course,” Batarfi told Al Jazeera. In past attacks, Saudi Arabia tried “to not get engaged in a civil war, keep its distance and not to respond to attacks. But now this is too much [of an escalation],” he said.

“The coalition will have a say on that. This is a civil war inside Yemen, and it affects us as one of the parties. And so any response … in the same way [will be] an eye for an eye. But I don’t see a prolonged war – not with Iran and not with the Houthis.”

In two months as the Angels’ interim general manager, John Mozeliak has reoriented the team’s draft selection priority from “closest to the majors” to “best available,” traded one-third of the major league roster to seed a barren minor league system, fired three coaches and completed a restructuring of the front office.

On Monday, he has scheduled the first meeting of the new leadership group in baseball operations.

We’ll get to that restructuring, but none of the decisions so far resolve two of the most compelling questions in Anaheim: Who is going to be running the Angels next year? And, with this year’s Angels flirting with the first 100-loss season in franchise history, are the Angels going to be much better next year?

To the latter question: Probably not.

“With the starting pitching we have, if we have the ability to be more consistent with our offense, you can definitely squint and see a better club out there,” Mozeliak told me. “But it’s going to take a few pieces to do that.”

Uh oh. That sounds discouragingly like the Angels of the past decade: We’re undermanned, but we want to be competitive, so we’ll sign a few lower-tier free agents and hope we can sneak into the playoffs with an 83-win season. In the real world, the Angels clinched their 11th consecutive losing season before the calendar turned to September.

Mozeliak has said he did not believe that the Angels need to rebuild, that the resources available to a team in the second-largest market in the majors should preclude outright tanking. In theory, that should mean that Mozeliak could trade José Soriano for shortstop Arjun Nimmala, 20, now the Angels’ top prospect, comfortable that owner Arte Moreno could buy a quality free agent to replace Soriano in the starting rotation.

In reality, Mozeliak cannot rightly tell Moreno that the Angels are one or two free agents from winning. And, as Mozeliak said, “It’s not the most robust free-agent class of all time.”

The Angels rank 26th among the 30 major league teams in runs scored, so Mozeliak might well focus on offensive upgrades. Standout names among free agent hitters this fall: Luis Arraez, Gleyber Torres, Jake Bauers … Taylor Ward, anyone?

With the infusion of talent from the draft and the trade deadline, analyst ratings for the Angels’ minor league system have risen from among the worst in baseball to middle of the pack. It’s a start. If next season is about building, why not just play the kids?

The Angels’ Denzer Guzman hits an RBI single against the Athletics at Angel Stadium on June 27.

(John McCoy / Getty Images)

Rookie Denzer Guzman is batting .218, with a .263 on-base percentage and a .341 slugging percentage.

“We’re starting a 22-year-old at third base,” Mozeliak said. “Most 22-year-olds are finishing their senior year in college. He’s competing. There’s a lot of upside in him, but that requires a little patience.”

Of the 12 prospects Mozeliak acquired at the trade deadline, he said he anticipated two — designated hitter/catcher Moises Ballesteros and infielder Nacho Alvarez Jr. — would have a chance to make next year’s team. The Angels also would prefer not to replace Soriano from a blossoming corps of young arms.

“We don’t want to start reaching down to the minors to try to push someone that might not be ready,” Mozeliak said. “I think we’ve seen that here before.”

As Mozeliak restructures the roster, he is doing the same in the front office. He said he is elevating Matt Swanson — removed as scouting director by former general manager Perry Minasian — to oversee all of the Angels’ scouting operations: amateur, professional and international.

The rest of the leadership core, all from within the organization: Joey Prebynski to oversee player development, including a separate minor league director to be hired; Michael Lord to head research and development; and assistant general manager David Haynes, who will focus on major league personnel. Mozeliak said he will ask those leaders to evaluate their departments and make personnel recommendations.

“I think that exercise is going to happen over the next four weeks,” Mozeliak said.

That timeline could mean that the Angels do not hire a general manager by the end of the season, as the team originally outlined. Mozeliak said he has neither interviewed any candidates nor set up any interviews.

Within the industry, former major league pitcher and current St. Louis Cardinals assistant general manager Randy Flores is considered the favorite, with Mozeliak remaining either as a president of baseball operations or a senior adviser.

Mozeliak insists he has not decided what he wants to do beyond the season, and he said his long working relationship with Flores in St. Louis will not preclude a round of interviews.

“I certainly understand that Molly [Jolly, the Angels’ team president] and Arte would want a very exhausting search,” Mozeliak said, “and one that isn’t just two degrees connected to Mo.”

If the Angels get to the end of the season without a general manager, who would make the call on whether to retain manager Kurt Suzuki and the coaches?

“Based on the timeline today, it would feel like it would be our group now,” Mozeliak said, “but time will tell.”

If the Angels dismiss Suzuki, that would allow a new general manager to hire a new manager. If Mozeliak decides to retain Suzuki, that could set up the awkward prospect of a new general manager inheriting a manager he did not choose, as Minasian did with Joe Maddon. In Minasian’s six seasons as general manager, the Angels had five managers.

The Angels could use a little more time. In 2027, they just might get it, and perhaps no organization could benefit more from it.

If owners lock out major league players for all or part of the season, in a year Mozeliak suggests might be best remembered for the development of minor league players, that might be no great loss for the Angels. Better than 100 losses, certainly.

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), including Chinese President Xi Jinping, his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, are set to gather in Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek for an annual summit.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is also attending the summit, which marks 25 years of its existence.

The two-day summit, starting on Monday, comes at a time when the world is grappling with the aftermath of the US-Israel war on Iran, which has upended global energy and financial markets, and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

So, what will be the main agenda of the summit, and will the SCO leaders try to use the gathering to push for a multipolar world and Global South cooperation on trade and security issues, as United States President Donald Trump’s unilateral foreign policy has eroded the global rules-based order?

Here’s what we know:

Who is attending the SCO summit and where is it being held?

This year’s summit is taking place in Bishkek under the motto: Together for Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity.

Xi, Putin and Modi will be joined by the Iranian president and leaders of Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, among others.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn are also expected to attend the summit.

William Yang, senior analyst for Northeast Asia at the International Crisis Group, noted that the ongoing wars are putting more strain on the rules-based international order, and against this backdrop, the summit serves as an important occasion for several of the world’s rising great powers, including China and India, to elevate their global influence and deepen their engagement and cooperation with other countries in the Global South.

“For years, SCO has been viewed as one of the avenues for China to promote the multipolar world order and form its own bloc with other developing countries. Despite its narrow scope of cooperation at the beginning, SCO member states have sought to expand the scope of their mandate and the number of member states,” Yang told Al Jazeera.

Amid the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Europe, Yang said, “China could use this year’s summit to present itself as a great power that advocates for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts, thereby sharpening the contrast with the US.”

“However, these efforts are likely to be limited to rhetoric rather than any substantive proposal for conflict resolution,” he said.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero, chief economist for Asia Pacific at French investment bank Natixis, said the summit is particularly significant because it marks the grouping’s 25th anniversary and offers the first chance to turn last year’s Tianjin strategy, which called for a multipolar world order that fosters mutually beneficial international cooperation, into action. Last year’s summit took place in China’s Tianjin region.

“Putting Modi, Putin and Xi in the same room, with India-China border talks still live and a scheduled Modi-Putin bilateral, is a visible test of how far the recent thaw goes and how Eurasia wants to organise security, connectivity and trade without defaulting to Western institutions,” she told Al Jazeera, referring to the recent India-China talks amid the warming up of New Delhi-Beijing ties.

What is the SCO?

The SCO started in 1996 as a security bloc, dubbed the “Shanghai Five”. It was formed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to settle their border disputes following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But in June 2001, the grouping evolved into the SCO, and expanded to include Uzbekistan, with headquarters in Beijing. In 2017, the bloc expanded to include India and Pakistan. Iran and Belarus were also added as full members in 2023 and 2024, respectively.

In addition, the organisation has 14 key dialogue partners, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Turkiye, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Cambodia.

SCO member states account for 43 percent of the world’s population and 23 percent – or almost a quarter – of the global economy.

Analysts have pointed out that while the SCO emerged with a focus on regional security, the expansion of its mandate to include trade and other Global South concerns means it is difficult to understand what sets the grouping apart from other Global South organisations like the BRICS, which is an acronym derived from the initials of the founding member countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

Alejandro Reyes, adjunct professor in the department of politics and public administration at the University of Hong Kong, said the SCO has grown into a “counterbalance” to the US-led Asia Pacific alliance aimed at countering China’s rise. India is part of both groupings. “Interestingly, India is part of the SCO, and the US appears to have dropped the Indo-Pacific nomenclature,” he said.

Reyes emphasised that “the SCO is not a coherent anti-US, anti-Western alliance”. “It is better understood as a forum in which countries with very different interests can demonstrate that they have alternatives and strategic room for manoeuvre – agency in this more volatile geopolitical order, dominated by China and the US. It is less an anti-American alliance than a venue for countries hedging against and hinging away from American power,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The significance this year is that current US policies, especially with regard to Iran and continuing US tariff and sanctions action, may be making that hedging more attractive and necessary,” he added.

What is on this year’s agenda?

The US-Israel war on Iran, the Russia-Ukraine war and the economic and social situation in Afghanistan are key issues leaders are expected to discuss this year, according to the SCO Secretariat.

Relations between India and China – Asia’s two major economies – are also expected to be discussed. Last year, Beijing and New Delhi began a rapprochement after five years of tensions over a 2020 deadly border skirmish. Trump’s tariff war on Indian goods last year forced New Delhi to mend ties with Beijing. For the first time since 2018, Modi visited China last year for the SCO summit.

Border tensions between India and Pakistan also persist, and the issue is expected to be discussed at this summit.

Manoj Kewalramani, chairperson of Bengaluru-based think tank Takshashila Institution’s Geostrategy Programme, told Al Jazeera that apart from the traditional security agenda, this year’s summit might include any forward movement on issues of economic integration or financial cooperation architecture.

“In Tianjin, we had the agreement on establishing the SCO Development Bank,” Kewalramani said.

“The Kyrgyz leadership has said that its priority will be to move the needle on the bank, the SCO Development Fund and SCO Investment Fund,” he said, adding that while talks have reportedly been taking place in this direction, there is no clarity on whether any agreements will be announced at this year’s summit.

According to the SCO Secretariat, economic connectivity will be a key topic the group will discuss as the US and Israel’s war on Iran continues to paralyse key maritime routes like the Strait of Hormuz, which has upended global supply chains, the energy market and financial markets.

The group is expected to discuss new trade and transport corridors, such as the 7,200km (4,474-mile) International North-South Transport Corridor, which links the Russian port city of St Petersburg with India’s financial capital, Mumbai, through Iran and ports on the Gulf.

Herrero pointed out that with Modi and Putin scheduled to hold a bilateral meeting, discussions on the Northern Sea Route, which runs through the Arctic coast, are also expected. China last month announced a new shipping route through the Arctic Ocean, aimed at easing global trade amid the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks in the Bab al-Mandeb in the Red Sea, which will pass through the Northern Sea Route.

According to Indian media reports, Moscow and New Delhi could negotiate the use of the Northern Sea Route by India as the crisis in West Asia continues to affect trade routes.

The SCO will also seek to establish a network of Silk Road stations to support international freight traffic across Eurasia.

Can the SCO agree on all issues?

The Eurasian grouping has often been unable to agree on global geopolitical issues.

For instance, Russia has been able to get most SCO members to align with its interests when it comes to its war in Ukraine, but India has attempted to play a more balanced role – seeking peace and stronger ties with Ukraine, while also buying record levels of oil from Russia.

But this year, Ukraine is expected to feature in discussions, with Turkiye’s Erdogan and Russia’s Putin holding bilateral talks on the matter, according to a Kremlin aide. Europe’s deadliest war since World War II is in its fifth year.

Yury Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, said the meeting would take place on the sidelines of the SCO summit.

“There are many issues to discuss. Of course, these include the situation in the Black Sea and the Ukraine issue in general,” he told reporters, referring to the rise in attacks in the Black Sea.

The SCO has, however, taken a more collective position on the US-Israel war on Iran and Israel’s genocidal actions in Palestine.

In March, the SCO condemned the US-Israel war on Iran. “The SCO member states considered the use of force as unacceptable and advocate for the resolution of existing differences exclusively by peaceful means, based on dialogue, mutual respect, and taking into account the legitimate interests of all parties, in accordance with the norms of international law and the principles of the UN Charter,” it said in a statement.

India, which has strong ties with Israel, had refused to endorse an SCO joint statement condemning Israel for its attack on Iran in June 2025.

Iranian President Pezeshkian is also scheduled to meet Putin on the sidelines of the summit, according to Iran’s official IRNA news agency. Russia is a close ally of Iran and the two countries cooperate on defence issues. China has emerged as Iran’s biggest economic lifeline as it buys more than 80 percent of its crude oil. Moscow and Beijing have also lent diplomatic cover to Tehran at the UN.

Frictions also exist on how the group views border tensions between India and Pakistan. New Delhi has repeatedly called on the organisation to condemn “cross-border terrorism”, for which it blames Islamabad, a close economic and defence ally of China.

Last July, India demanded that the grouping condemn the April 2025 attack by armed men in Indian-administered Kashmir, in which 26 people were killed. Pakistan has also blamed India for armed attacks inside its territory.

During the Tianjin summit, the bloc condemned “terror” attacks in both India and Pakistan, taking a more balanced position on the issue.

What are Russia, China and India going to gain at the summit?

Reyes from the University of Hong Kong pointed out that all eyes will also be on Russia, China and India.

“For China, the SCO is partly about institution-building. Beijing wants to demonstrate that it can convene a large part of Eurasia around an agenda of security, connectivity, trade and development, while promoting a more multipolar, agentic international order. It also reinforces China’s increasingly important economic position in Central Asia, a strategically key region of the Eurasia landmass,” he said.

“For Russia, the summit is an opportunity to show that it is not isolated internationally. Maintaining strong relationships with China, India, Iran and Central Asia is economically and diplomatically important, given the Ukraine war and Western and other sanctions. But Moscow also has an interest in preserving its own influence in Eurasia rather than simply becoming more and more dependent on China.

“India is in an intriguing position. Modi’s participation is not an indication that India is joining the China-Russia axis, such as it is. India itself describes its SCO priorities as ‘security, connectivity and opportunity’. That is much more consistent with India’s longstanding pursuit of strategic autonomy – its agency amid the great-power rivalry,” Reyes explained.

He added that New Delhi wants “access and influence in Central Asia, continued relations with Russia [from which it buys the bulk of its defence equipment], and a mechanism for managing its difficult but gradually stabilising relationship with China”.

“At the same time, New Delhi maintains important relations with Washington, including through the Quad security arrangement.

“So China and Russia may see the SCO partly as an instrument for building a less US-dominated international order. India, meanwhile, sees it more as one of several overlapping platforms through which it can maximise its own agency.”

What does all this mean to the US?

As part of his unilateral foreign policy vision, Trump has undermined the Western-led international order and lashed out at Global South blocs, such as BRICS, which he sees as a threat to the US’s economic dominance. He has called the grouping “anti-American”.

However, Kewalramani noted that the Trump administration has continued some of its predecessors’ approaches and deepened engagement with countries in the region where this year’s SCO is being hosted, especially with the C5 or Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

“Joe Biden had established a leader-level meeting mechanism with C5 countries in 2023. Trump also hosted them in DC in November 2025. [US Secretary of State] Marco Rubio and subsequently Trump are expected to visit the region later [this] year. Kazakhstan has announced accession to the Abraham Accords, becoming the first Central Asian state to join [the Trump-led diplomatic efforts to cajole Muslim countries to recognise Israel]. The US has been engaged with the region on critical minerals and other business deals,” he said.

“In other words, C5 members are also adopting a diversified diplomatic approach, seeking to balance China and Russia’s dominance,” he noted.

“But the fact that you are witnessing these countries meeting with far more purpose to think about alternative financial and energy architectures is a reflection of the limitations of the US’s disruptive foreign policy,” Kewalramani added.

Herrero said for the US, the SCO summit is a reminder that countries like India will keep practising strategic autonomy: it will sit in the Quad and buy US defence equipment while also talking to Moscow and Beijing in a China-heavy forum.

The Quad or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was established by India, Japan, Australia and the US in 2007 to counter China’s growing influence in the Asia Pacific region. Over the past quarter-century, India has grown closer to the US and its allies, amid shared concerns over Beijing’s rise.

Reyes warned that Washington should be careful not to read the SCO as a consolidated anti-US coalition, even though China, Russia and Iran are members.

“The differences among China, Russia and India are far too substantial to substantiate that label. The more important message is that American economic and geopolitical pressure can sometimes produce convergence among countries that otherwise might disagree with one another more,” he said.

“The SCO’s criticism of unilateral economic measures is significant in that respect. China and Russia explicitly want a less US-dominated international order. India does not necessarily share that objective, but it does want a world in which Washington cannot dictate its foreign-policy choices.”

For the last month, the Los Angeles Dodgers and Lakers have filled the headlines and airwaves, but not for the reasons either would like.

The Lakers were sold by Mark Walter in mid-August, just over a year after he bought the team.

The sale came about two weeks after the Wall Street Journal reported in late July that the U.S. attorney’s office and securities regulators were investigating Walter’s business and insurance empire regarding $16 billion to $21 billion in possibly fraudulent loans.

In June of last year, 66-year-old Walter and one of his holding companies, TWG Global, purchased a controlling interest in the Lakers for $10 billion, only to sell the franchise to Joshua Kushner and Bob Iger for $12.5 billion this month.

Bloomberg reported that Walter’s sale of the Lakers was done to eliminate some of the billions in outstanding loans that has drawn the ire of federal regulators.

Since then, questions have swirled about whether Walter will put other assets on the market in his fundraising bid, including the Dodgers, which he purchased as chief executive of Chicago investment firm Guggenheim Partners for $2.15 billion in 2012. Sources close to Walter say he’s not likely to sell.

To better understand this tangled story, we spoke with Times sports reporter Steve Henson about why he thinks Walter won’t put the Dodgers up for sale.

What are federal investigators examining

Business reporter Laurence Darmiento wrote Aug. 5 that the heart of the federal investigation swirls around related-party transactions.

These dealings are “between entities with business or personal ties, including loans, sales and other transactions that can have legitimate reasons but pose potential conflicts of interest and typically require extra scrutiny,” Darmiento wrote.

More than $1 billion in financing to buy the Dodgers in 2012 came from insurance companies managed by Guggenheim Partners. The purchase was later vetted by state insurance regulators.

More on the related-party transactions

Investigators are checking whether billions of dollars’ worth of similar loans made by Walter’s companies were properly disclosed and that insurance companies were not over-leveraged.

Approximately $21 billion in loans not disclosed to state insurance regulators were made by two Delaware insurers Walter owns, according to ratings agency Fitch. The loans reportedly were made to companies with ties to Walter or his TWG Global holdings company.

The issue with these loans is they raise suspicions, according to Bruce Dubinsky, a forensic accountant who spoke with Darmiento. Dubinsky worked on the Enron and Madoff cases.

Dubinsky said that from an audit standpoint, these types of transactions “are always more suspect to fraud” and manipulation since repayments can be delayed indefinitely.

The insurance industry’s tight regulations for money collected from premiums exists so that money is available for future claims. Regulators believe related-party transaction are a threat to that guarantee.

TWG Global has rejected any allegations of wrongdoing.

Why is Walter fighting to keep the Dodgers

Henson teamed with Times colleagues to write about Walter’s chances of hanging on to the Dodgers amid this federal probe and whether new owners Bob Iger and Josh Kushner overpaid for the Lakers.

Henson reported that Walter owns a broad series of sports interests: English soccer Premier League team Chelsea, the Los Angeles Sparks WNBA team, the Cadillac Formula 1 racing team; a premier women’s tennis competition, the Billie Jean King Cup, and the entire Professional Women’s Hockey League.

He already sold the Lakers and Henson noted that there have been reports he’s putting his shares of Chelsea on the market.

So, why keep the Dodgers?

“No MLB team has ever been run as boldly as this team,” Henson said. “And the revenue from the Dodgers is relentless, from ticket sales, to international merchandise and including friendly [player] salary deferments that help keep money in-house.”

Since Walter and Co.’s takeover, the Dodgers have won three of the last six World Series and 12 division titles after he and partners rescued the franchise from bankruptcy.

Walter noted that a sale of the Lakers, a franchise he’d barely owned for more than a year, was easier than one he’s already helmed for nearly 15 years.

“His identity is totally wrapped up with the Dodgers and this success saga,” Henson said. “It’s dear to his heart and having them to sell them would just tear him up.”

Amid all of this speculation, the boys in blue are attempting to become the first National League team (and third overall) to win three consecutive World Series titles this year.

The week’s biggest stories

(Carolyn Cole/Carolyn Cole/Los Angeles Times)

Trump administration policies and pushback

Artist and concert news

A final tribute

Television, advertising entertainment news

More news

Editor’s pick

More picks

Things to do

(Melody Xu/Los Angeles Times)

Today’s recipe

The San Juan Islands off Washington state has a much-loved clam chowder served at La Conner Brewing Co. in the tiny picturesque town of La Conner, Wash. The dish is spicy enough and not so thick with cream or flour and is a standout in the clam chowder world, according to Times reader Mary Ann Mollenkamp.

Have a great day, from the Essential California team

Jack Dolan, investigative reporter
Hugo Martín, assistant editor, fast break desk
Kevinisha Walker, multiplatform editor
Andrew J. Campa, weekend writer
Karim Doumar, head of newsletters

How can we make this newsletter more useful? Send comments to essentialcalifornia@latimes.com. Check our top stories, topics and the latest articles on latimes.com.

Voters in Guinea-Bissau will decide on August 30 whether to approve a new constitution that would significantly strengthen the presidency and reshape the country’s electoral system.

The vote comes nine months after the military seized power and installed General Horta Inta-A Na Man as transitional president, and just more than three months before presidential and legislative elections scheduled for December 6.

Supporters of the reform say it would provide clearer lines of authority and help address years of political instability and disputes between state institutions. Critics argue that it would concentrate too much power in the presidency and have questioned the process through which the draft was produced.

The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), one of Guinea-Bissau’s main opposition parties, has rejected the referendum and called for a boycott.

The referendum will determine whether the constitution approved by the National Transitional Council (CNT) enters into force and provides the framework for the country’s return to elected government.

Why is Guinea-Bissau changing its constitution?

The process began after the November 26, 2025, military coup.

Presidential and legislative elections had been held three days earlier. The military seized power while the electoral process was still under way, one day before the electoral commission was due to announce the presidential results.

Horta, then army chief of staff, became transitional president.

The transition charter established a National Transitional Council (CNT), which was given legislative powers during the transition. The council approved the proposed constitutional text on January 13, 2026.

Guinea-Bissau is a small Portuguese-speaking country on the West African coast, bordered by Senegal to the north and Guinea to the east and south. It gained independence from Portugal in 1974 and has experienced repeated coups and political crises since independence.

Under the existing constitution, Guinea-Bissau operates a semi-presidential system in which executive authority is shared between the president and prime minister.

The proposed constitution would substantially alter Guinea-Bissau’s existing semi-presidential system, giving the president significantly greater executive authority and reducing the prime minister’s role in government.

What would change?

Under the proposed constitution, the president would have greater control over the government, including the appointment and dismissal of the prime minister and members of the government.

The president would also chair the Council of Ministers and have the power to create or abolish ministries.

The proposed constitution would reduce parliament from 102 seats to 65 and cut the number of electoral constituencies from 29 to 12.

It would also introduce new requirements for presidential candidates.

Candidates would have to have lived permanently in Guinea-Bissau for the five years preceding an election. They would also have to pay a 50 million West African CFA franc deposit, or approximately $90,000.

Political parties sponsoring presidential candidates would need at least 5,000 members, including at least 300 in each region.

The proposed constitution would also establish a Constitutional Court.

Why is a stronger presidency controversial?

Guinea-Bissau’s political system has repeatedly been marked by disputes between presidents, prime ministers and parliament.

Supporters of the reform argue that giving the president clearer authority over the government could reduce institutional conflicts and make decision-making more effective.

Critics fear that concentrating executive authority in the presidency would weaken parliament and other checks on government, significantly altering the balance between the executive and legislature.

Critics have also raised concerns about the proposed reduction in the number of electoral constituencies, arguing that it could affect political representation and weaken parties that rely on strong local support.

The new financial and membership requirements have likewise drawn criticism from those who argue that they could make it harder for smaller political movements to contest presidential elections.

There is a separate dispute over how the constitution was produced.

The draft was prepared during a military-led transition rather than by a restored elected parliament. Opposition parties and civil society groups have criticised the process and questioned whether the drafting process was sufficiently inclusive.

Is the referendum about Horta Inta-A Na Man?

Horta has led the transition since the coup, but the referendum is not simply a vote on his political future.

The transition framework bars the transitional president and prime minister from running in the elections at the end of the transition.

The immediate issue is therefore what powers the next elected president will have.

If the constitution passes, the president elected in December would have considerably greater authority over the government than under the existing constitutional system.

Why does the timing matter?

The referendum comes before the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for December 6.

Voters will therefore decide the proposed constitutional framework before choosing the leaders who are expected to govern under it.

That means the next president and parliament could take office under rules drawn up during the military-led transition.

For the transitional authorities, the referendum is part of the process leading to a return to elected government.

For opponents, the timing raises the question of whether a military-led authority should determine fundamental political rules before elected institutions are restored.

What would a yes or no vote mean?

A yes vote would bring the proposed constitution into force, including stronger presidential powers, a smaller parliament, fewer electoral constituencies and new requirements for presidential candidates.

A no vote would reject the proposed constitution, leaving the question of constitutional reform unresolved.

At stake is not simply whether Guinea-Bissau adopts a new constitution, but how much power the presidency should hold when the country returns to elected government.

The words “Anaheim Angels” are now enshrined in California law.

Whether the baseball team that calls Angel Stadium home reverts to its hometown name remains to be seen. On Thursday, however, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law the “Home Run for Anaheim Act,” a step that elected officials in Orange County consider a significant step in that direction.

The new law, introduced by Assemblyman Avelino Valencia (D-Anaheim), cleared the state legislature without a single vote against it.

The law does not mandate the Angels — playing under a Los Angeles name in Anaheim’s city-owned stadium — revert to the Anaheim Angels name.

For now, in fact, the law does absolutely nothing. On Friday, the Los Angeles Angels play at Angel Stadium.

Instead, the law provides the city with an incentive to dangle before the team. If the Angels — whether under current owner Arte Moreno or a future owner — wish to develop the 150-acre Angel Stadium property, state law would prioritize affordable housing within the site.

In an era where team owners covet the profits from development around stadiums and arenas — including places for fans to eat, drink and shop 365 days a year, not just on game days — the city of Anaheim could seek an exemption from the affordable housing law. That wouldn’t rule out housing on the site, but it would give a team more flexibility to build whatever project might be considered most profitable.

If the city obtains the exemption, the new law says, “then any materials, including, but not limited to, a lease, deed of sale, and promotional or marketing materials, shall refer to that team as the Anaheim Angels.”

Moreno has twice reached deals with the city to develop the land, only to see the city walk away both times. In the last deal, he rejected the city’s request to rename the team the Anaheim Angels.

“We are proud to call Angel Stadium of Anaheim our home,” Angels spokeswoman Marie Garvey said, “and any other comment about the future would be premature.”

Moreno, 80, has shown no public interest in a third negotiation with the city. The Angels’ current stadium lease extends through 2032, and the team has options to extend the lease through 2038.

By year’s end, the city has said it anticipates the release of a long-awaited property assessment, which is expected to show Angel Stadium needs hundreds of millions of dollars in upgrades to remain viable for the long-term. The city and team may not agree on who should pay for them, and real estate development around the stadium could be part of the solution for funding a new or renovated stadium.

The city could use the exemption as leverage in discussions with Moreno or a new owner, although leverage could work both ways.

When Anaheim sued the Angels over the 2005 name change, city-commissioned experts testified in court that the Anaheim name was worth hundreds of millions of dollars to the city over the life of the lease. That could compel an owner to ask the city to contribute to the cost of building a new stadium in exchange for the return of the Anaheim name.

An almost vacant large urban site — an aging stadium surrounded by 130 acres of parking lots, sitting between three freeways and a train station — is rare in Southern California and surely would attract development interest among potential bidders for the Angels.

But any new owner would have one more bit of leverage: Once the Angel Stadium lease expires, the owner would be free to move out of Anaheim.

U.S. Army soldiers used a Bradley Fighting Vehicle as a carrier for FireAnt uncrewed ground vehicles (UGV) during a recent test exercise. The small 4×4 UGVs can be configured as one-way attack munitions, as well as for electronic warfare, surveillance and reconnaissance, and other missions. Bradleys acting as transports and controllers for swarms of UGVs like the FireAnt could open up important new operational possibilities.

Swarmbotics AI, the developer of the FireAnt, shared a video on its LinkedIn page yesterday showing the Bradley with five of the UGVs attached to its side. The post says the footage was taken during Pegasus Charge 3, the third iteration of a 1st Cavalry Division-led test exercise series. The division is one of the operational formations supporting the Army’s larger Transformation In Contact (TIC) modernization initiative. Units assigned to the 1st Cavalry have been testing and evaluating various new weapon systems and other capabilities through Pegasus Charge events and other exercises.

“The US Army has picked Swarmbotics AI (SBAI) to build swarming, attritable, small unmanned ground vehicles (sUGVs) to advance Transformation in Contact (TiC) with the 1st Cavalry Division,” the company announced in a press release back in February. “The award results from successful participation at last year’s xTech Overwatch competition.”

xTech is an in-house Army technology accelerator that regularly hosts “innovation challenges” to support new developments that could be of interest to the service.

“During xTech Overwatch evaluations, soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Division assessed several contractor’s autonomous capabilities that spanned from ground, airborne, payload, and mission planning,” Swarmbotics AI’s release added. “This competitive assessment, facilitated by T2COM [the Army’s Transformation and Training Command] and key stakeholders, aimed to accelerate the adoption of autonomous systems in line with the Chief of Staff of the Army’s directive.”

From what is seen in the video from Swarmbotics AI, it is not immediately clear whether or not the FireAnts can be released remotely from within the Bradley, or if personnel have to unload them manually. Where the UGVs are seen stowed on the side is space that is often taken up by explosive reactive armor (ERA) blocks. A Bradley could carry additional FireAnts internally and deploy them via the rear ramp.

How the roughly 70-pound FireAnts were controlled and otherwise employed during Pegasus Charge 3 is also unclear. Swarmbotics AI has said in the past that human operators are responsible for directing groups of the UGVs. In its press release in February, the company said a squad-sized Army unit had operated 10 FireAnts during the xTech Overwatch competition.

Swarmbotics AI has also said that FireAnt has a significant degree of artificial intelligence (AI) driven autonomy to carry out assigned tasks. When networked together in a swarm, the UGVs are capable of “coordinated behavior across mixed teams and missions,” the company said previously, according to a story from Interesting Engineering.

TWZ has reached out for more information.

As already mentioned, FireAnt is designed to be readily reconfigurable for different missions using modular payloads. The anti-armor configuration, which arms the UGV with an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) warhead, has received the most attention to date. In this role, FireAnt has to get close to its target to be effective. Swarming capability would be very beneficial here for overwhelming defenders, as well as just launching attacks on large groups of tanks and other armored vehicles across a broader area.

With sensor and electronic warfare payloads, FireAnts could also help scout ahead, provide added general situational awareness, and even launch non-kinetic attacks. Swarmbotics AI has also raised the possibility of a counter-drone role for its UGVs. FireAnts could also conceivably act as signal relay nodes, which would also be especially useful when employing the UGVs in semi-autonomous swarms and/or for pushing them further forward of the main body of a friendly force.

“Mass is our objective, by employing swarms of heterogeneous small sUGVs [small UGVs] we create multiple dilemmas for our adversaries at fractions of the cost of exquisite platforms,” Stephen Houghton, Swarmbotics AI’s CEO, said in a statement accompanying the company’s February release.

It is worth noting here that the Army has previously demonstrated the ability of the Bradley to serve as a forward control node for UGVs. Bradleys could also bring groups of FireAnts or similarly-sized designs to the front lines and hand off control to other nodes.

Previous Army-sponsored testing has also involved FireAnts deployed from larger UGVs, as seen in the video below. This demonstrates an additional layer of crewed-uncrewed teaming capability that could push the entire chain further forward on the battlefield. This, in turn, would help keep human personnel even further removed from potential threats.

U.S. Army Tests New Robotic ‘Tank Killer’ Swarm Vehicles

UGVs have already become a notable fixture in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This includes types in the same general size category as FireAnt configured for kamikaze attacks, as well as large ones armed with various anti-tank guided missiles, automatic grenade launchers, and machine guns. Various UGVs and other uncrewed capabilities were the centerpieces of the annual Independence Day parade in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv just on Monday, as seen in the video below.

On the battlefields of Ukraine, UGVs are generally being employed via links with an operator, either in first-person direct or a third-person semi-autonomous mode, with the help of cameras on the vehicle. In that conflict, uncrewed ground systems face the same electronic warfare threats as their aerial counterparts, and designs with hard-wired fiber-optic control links have been developed in response. TWZ has also previously highlighted the impacts, in general, that the continued development and proliferation of AI-enabled automated target recognition capabilities and new autonomous technologies are already having on aerial one-way-attack drones. This applies, in broad terms, to uncrewed platforms on the ground, as well.

“The key takeaway is that robot swarms are here to stay,” Drew Watson, Swarmbotics AI’s CTO, said in a statement in the February press release. “Working with 1st Cav in 2026 we’ll baseline concepts for hundreds of robots deployed on the X and at the breach.”

It is still to be seen how FireAnt, specifically, may slot into the Army’s future force structure, overall. That being said, the image of the Bradley at Pegasus Charge 3 carrying a load of the UGVs does look to be a sign of things to come.

Special thanks to user @lfx160219 on X for bringing Swarmbotics AI‘s video from Pegasus Charge 3 to our attention.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

An Israeli attack on a Syrian airbase has been widely condemned.

The United States envoy warns the incident could have caused a direct confrontation with Turkish forces.

So why did Israel attack the base? And what are the implications?

Presenter: Anna Burns-Francis

Guests:

Murat Yesiltas – Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) think tank

Haid Haid – Consulting fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House

Michael Mulroy – Former US deputy assistant secretary of defence for the Middle East