Amy Madigan is now a first-time Actor Award winner.
The “Weapons” actor scored in the supporting actress category Sunday for her performance as the unhinged Aunt Gladys in the Zach Cregger-directed horror film. She beat out Teyana Taylor (“One Battle After Another”), Odessa A’Zion (“Marty Supreme”), Ariana Grande (“Wicked: For Good”) and Wunmi Mosaku (“Sinners”).
The win shakes up the Oscars race for supporting actress, which prior to Madigan’s Actor Award victory seemed to be in Taylor’s favor.
“It’s such an honor to be here. I’ve been doing this a long ass time,” Madigan said as she accepted the honor Sunday evening.
“Gladys has surprised me. She’s getting a lot of love back,” Madigan said. “I didn’t know y’all want to hang out with her.”
The actor also offered a message of camaraderie to her fellow SAG-AFTRA members, citing the Chicago upbringing that made her a “union person.”
“We’re all union people,” she continued, “and I don’t care what somebody says. They’re not going to bust us, ever.”
Madigan went on to give a shout-out to her fellow “Weapons” cast members Julia Garner, Josh Brolin and others.
Madigan was the sole “Weapons” star nominated at this year’s Actor Awards. She also received nominations from the Golden Globe Awards, Critics Choice Awards and Academy Awards. She earned her last Oscar nomination 40 years ago for her performance as the fiery Sunny in “Twice in a Lifetime” (1985).
“I haven’t done this in a while, so it feels like a new experience for me, but I know what it is very well,” Madigan told The Times in a November interview about the awards buzz.
“It’s a little daunting at times,” she added.
But like her “Weapons” character, Madigan is fearless, having used a stunt double for only the very last scene in a physically demanding movie.
As for everything before that, the actor said, “I did all that running and all that ridiculous stuff.”
“I think everybody was holding their breath a little bit going, ‘Oh, I hope she doesn’t slip and crash into something,’ which I didn’t,” she said. “I’m proud of that.”
You can read more about LOCUST and how it works in our story here.
An AeroVironment LOCUST laser directed energy weapon owned by the U.S. Army was reportedly at the center of a chain of events that led to the recent shutdown of airspace around El Paso, Texas. (AeroVironment)
The use of the LOCUST came as the FAA was working on “a safety assessment of the risks the new technology could pose to other aircraft,” The New York Times reported. “F.A.A. officials had warned the Pentagon that if they were not given sufficient time and information to conduct their review, they would have no choice but to shut down the nearby airspace.”
The tug of war between the Pentagon and FAA – which led to a shutdown of airspace over the nation’s 23rd largest city – is a glaring example of the convoluted and conflicting authorities the U.S. relies on to deal with the increasing threat posed by drones.
The FAA did not respond to our request for comment. We also reached out to U.S. Northern Command and AeroVironment for comment.
BREAKING: The Pentagon let Customs and Border Protection use an anti-drone laser before the FAA closed El Paso airspace, AP sources say. https://t.co/T3F2pDAiZk
However, safety concerns about using directed energy weapons, and especially kinetic ones, to take down drones in the U.S. have been a major factor in why they aren’t employed in this role.
A little less than a year and a half ago, officials at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which has coordinating authority for counter-drone efforts in the U.S., said the use of such weapons was not yet on the table. The reason is that they can create dangerous or otherwise serious collateral effects that are not a concern in a war zone.
Boeing’s Compact Laser Weapon System (CLWS) (Boeing)
“The biggest thing right now is the impact of the laser when it moves beyond its target,” NORTHCOM Deputy Test Director Jason Mayes said of laser directed energy weapons for counter-drone use. “You know, how far is it going? What’s that going to do? How long does the laser need to remain on target before it begins to inflict damage and so on, right?”
Mayes, speaking to a small group of reporters, including from The War Zone at Falcon Peak 2025, a counter-drone experiment at Peterson Space Force Base in October 2024, also raised questions about whether the laser beam could impact aircraft or even satellites passing by, as well as things on the ground like “hikers up on a hill.”
The military has been working to mitigate those concerns, Mayes proffered at the time.
“I think that we could get to a point where we have approval for that here in the homeland,” he posited.
It is unclear when the approval to use laser counter-drone weapons came or how extensive such permissions have been. We also don’t know if the LOCUST system, understood to have been stationed at nearby Fort Bliss, was sent there under a pilot program established under the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). It calls for at least four military installations to be used to speed up the development of counter-drone efforts at bases across the country. The measure includes systems “capable of destroying or disabling a small unmanned aircraft by means of high-powered microwave, laser, or other similar technology.”
Fort Bliss is also home to a significant portion of the Army’s air defense units, which are increasingly charged with the counter-drone mission. The base is also a major hub for border security operations, which the U.S. military often conducts in cooperation with law enforcement agencies, as well.
Using a counter-drone device, a Fort Bliss Law Enforcement Activity Military Police Company soldier participates in a counter-unmanned aircraft system drill as part of an integrated protection exercise at Fort Bliss, Texas, Aug. 20, 2025. (U.S. Army) David Poe
The future domestic use of laser counter-drone weapons remains an open question, but the NDAA pilot program gives the military additional authorities under existing statutes to at least test them. Still, as we have frequently noted, a confusing and often competing set of federal laws governing the use of counter-drone systems domestically impacted the ability to defend against these threats. The El Paso situation is a case in point of how challenging this can be.
NORTHCOM has authority over the troops and equipment, in this case a laser system, to take down the drones. However, federal laws limit where and when the military can use these systems, which is a large reason why CBP was involved.
In advance of the U.S. hosting the 2026 World Cup and 2028 Olympic Games, the Trump administration pushed to expand counter-drone authorities. Congress granted that when it passed the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
Under a federal law known as 124n, “the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ, including CBP, have limited authority to mitigate drone threats domestically to protect covered facilities or assets,” Scott Shtofman, Vice President & Counsel, Regulatory Affairs for the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), told us. “That authority has been extended and expanded, under the Safer Skies Act of the NDAA, to certain certified state, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies operating under federal training and oversight.”
Still, “it’s not a blanket nationwide shoot down power and only applies in defined threat situations,” he added.
A chart of DHS counter-drone authorities. (DHS)
Meanwhile, under another federal statute commonly referred to as 130(i), “DoW can mitigate drone threats to protect military installations and missions inside the U.S., but it does not have general domestic airspace policing authority,” Shtofman posited.
However, the Pentagon is working to expand its counter-drone capabilities.
In January, the recently created Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) 401 announced updated guidance for counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) operations. The move empowered installation commanders “to take decisive action to protect military facilities, assets, and personnel within the homeland,” according to a press release at the time.
“The guidance, signed by the Secretary of War on December 8, 2025, streamlines and consolidates existing policies for detecting and mitigating UAS under the authority of 10 U.S. Code § 130i,” the release added, referring to another one of the laws governing domestic counter-small drone efforts. “It addresses the direct and growing threat posed by the proliferation of inexpensive and capable UAS. This updated framework provides commanders with the expanded authority and flexibility needed to dominate the airspace above their installations.”
Fort Bliss, Texas. (US Army)
Among other things, the new rules eliminate restrictions on defense perimeters that reduced installation commanders’ abilities to protect against drones.
“The previous ‘fence-line’ limitation has been removed, giving commanders a larger defensive area and greater decision space to protect covered facilities and assets,” the new rules state.
In earlier reporting, we noted that not all installations were considered “covered” to take down drones. The new rules permit service secretaries to determine which installations should be covered, to increase the number.
Beyond that, the Pentagon is now allowed to share “UAS track and sensor data among interagency partners, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). It also allows for the use of trained and certified contractor personnel as C-sUAS operators.”
“Every commander has the inherent right to self-defense,” the Pentagon told us. “The Department of War will defend its personnel and assets from illicit UAS activity in accordance with our authority under title 10 Section 130i, and the standing rules for the use of force.”
A US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Border Patrol vehicle drives past recently installed concertina wire on a section of border wall fencing along the US-Mexico border between San Diego and Tijuana in San Diego, California on April 24, 2025. (Photo by Patrick T. Fallon / AFP) PATRICK T. FALLON
In addition to the numerous drone incursions over U.S. installations that we have frequently covered, cross-border cartel drone operations are a chronic issue, and we have been calling attention to the growing dangers they pose for many years now. Controversy over the El Paso incident was magnified after the White House insisted that the U.S. shot down a cartel drone flying over the border, which was later contradicted by the reporting that it was a mylar balloon.
Regardless of what it was, small drones remain a clear and present danger to the U.S. Whether new technology and additional authorities to use them will make a difference is an open question.
Update: 8:31 PM Eastern –
A U.S. official responded with answers to some of our questions.
The limit on the distance installation commanders can counter drones is the capability of their counter-UAS systems and the ability to coordinate with local authorities and communities.
No sites have been chosen yet for the counter-drone pilot program.
To his knowledge, the El Paso incident was the first time a directed energy weapon had been used against illicit drones in the homeland.
There are no statutory preclusions to using directed energy weapons against drones in the homeland.
