warfare

U.S. Space Force’s top officer has shared new details about his service’s use of electronic warfare capabilities during Operation Epic Fury against Iran earlier this year. This underscores how space is steadily becoming an arena where conflict actually occurs, and the implications this has for forces operating inside and outside of the Earth’s atmosphere.

Chief of Space Operations Gen. Douglas Schiess highlighted the actions of a member of the 42nd Electromagnetic Warfare Combat Detachment (EWCD) in support of Epic Fury during a keynote speech earlier this morning. Schiess’ remarks came at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference, at which TWZ is in attendance. This is his first major engagement since taking over as head of Space Force less than two weeks ago.

“During Operation Epic Fury, our components, notably at U.S. Central Command and Space Command, with support from our components at European Command and Pacific Command, demonstrated that Guardians [the official term for uniformed Space Force personnel] are not supporting from the sidelines as a nice-to-have [sic], but we are delivering space power directly into the fight as a need-to-have,” Schiess said. “One of those impressive Guardians is Specialist Gray, who hails from Tampa, Florida. She joined the Space Force just two years ago, but listen to the impact she [has] made in her short term already.”

“She deployed to the CENTCOM AOR [Central Command area of responsibility] as a part of the 42nd Electronic Warfare Detachment [sic], and within hours of OEF kicking off, she received a top priority target package with one critical objective: reconfigure her weapon system and execute critical non-kinetic fires,” he continued. “She locked onto the target, optimized her weapon system, and waged electromagnetic warfare against a determined adversary. Even as ‘Alarm Red’ sirens were blaring, and incoming missiles targeted her site, she courageously held the line, protecting forces, denying adversary capability, and delivering space effects, until her commander had to literally pull her from the console to safety.”

“Specialist Gray is just one of the outstanding members of the entire enterprise of dedicated guardians, including the acquisition professionals that developed and fielded the weapon system that she operated, the intel Guardians that developed the targeting package that she used, and the cyber guardians who ensured communication, connectivity, and network defense for the command and control, the guardian instructors who trained her for combat, and the list goes on and on,” the Chief of Space Operations added.

Schiess did not name the system in question or elaborate further on how it was employed. However, previously released pictures of elements of the 42nd EWCD in the Middle East have shown personnel working with trailer-mounted multi-band antennas that have been associated in the past with variants of the Counter Communications System (CCS). CCS is a family of ground-based electronic warfare jammers primarily designed to disrupt enemy space-based communications capabilities. Prior to yesterday, CCS was the U.S. military’s only publicly acknowledged anti-satellite weapon. Space Force has now confirmed it also has weapons in orbit, which we will come back to later on.

The 42nd Electromagnetic Warfare Combat Detachment has been operating in the Middle East since at least 2024 under the umbrella of Space Force’s main headquarters in the region, U.S. Space Forces – Central (SPACECENT). President Donald Trump briefly called attention to the detachment’s “cutting-edge defense activities” during a Christmas Eve conference call with deployed service members last year.

“Sometimes we have to be within the footprint of the satellite, and so that’s why Guardians go into harm’s way,” Gen. Schiess did tell TWZ and other outlets at a roundtable after his speech this morning when asked for more details about the 42nd EWCD’s role in Operation Epic Fury, and what lessons Space Force has been learning from the conflict more broadly.

“Electromagnetic warfare was a big part of that, but also satellite communications,” he added. “The ability to keep communications, obviously GPS and PNT [positioning, navigation, and timing], were important there.”

“And then, really, missile warning and missile tracking was [sic] incredibly important. Both [Air Force Chief of Staff] Gen. Wilsbach and I talked about ‘Red Alarm’ situations,” the Chief of Space Operations continued. “Being able to tell our forces to be able to take cover was extremely important. And as we’ve seen from Ukraine to Iran, the amount of missiles and the amount of things, the folks that are doing that each and every day are incredible, and they are saving lives.”

Gen. Schiess’ anecdote about Specialist Gray and the 42nd EWCD did highlight how Iran, especially in the opening phases of the conflict earlier this year, was able to deal real blows to U.S. and allied facilities and forces across the Middle East. Iranian missiles, drones, and other capabilities were able to damage and/or destroy a variety of high-value assets, including aircraft and radars, and cause hundreds of casualties, as TWZ has drawn attention to on several occasions in the past. This has already been a sobering wake-up call with serious implications for potential future conflicts against larger and even more capability opponents, especially China.

“I think the whole joint force is learning a lot from Operation Epic Fury, the previous operation there, on exactly what needs to be in underground facilities, [and] what maybe can we do from remote locations,” the head of Space Force said at the roundtable today. “You could also look at what can we do from space to do some of those things? And so we’re looking at all those [lessons learned].”

Gen. Schiess mentioning subterranean facilities and remote operations is particularly notable. Even before Operation Epic Fury began, the U.S. Air Force had been working to expand options for directing operations in the Middle East from a command center in the United States. The service had also been looking to push certain command and control functions at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar underground. Al Udeid was among the many bases Iran subsequently targeted.

Operation Epic Fury has already added new fuel to a larger ongoing debate about balancing U.S. military base defense priorities globally, including the relative value of investing in new physically hardened infrastructure. TWZ has been following these discussions very closely in recent years. The conflict with Iran has raised serious questions about future operations of any kind at certain bases across the Middle East, and there have been reports that a larger reorientation of America’s force posture in the region could be coming.

For Space Force, operations against Iran have provided a broader opportunity for the service to demonstrate its active role in forward-deployed operations. That, in turn, has generated its own lessons learned beyond just steps needed to help better protect units in the field.

This extends to “reconstitution [of forces] in a combat environment, the logistics and the importance of that relationship with TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] and to be able to get supplies and replenishment into the theater,” Chief Master Sergeant of the Space Force John Bentivegna also said today, speaking alongside Gen. Schiess at the roundtable. That is “something we haven’t really worked on before. So definitely, it was a great lesson learned.”

Space-based capabilities including early warning, general intelligence gathering, weapons guidance, near-real-time communications, and more, are already absolutely central to U.S. military operations. America’s long-standing dominance in space is also steadily being eroded, with China, in particular, surging ahead in the deployment of new satellites to support a host of mission requirements, including intelligence-gathering and long-range targeting. The ability to leverage space is also proliferating to smaller adversaries, including Iran.

In addition, as mentioned, the space domain is no longer limited to just supporting operations within the atmosphere, but is a place where real engagements happen. The U.S. military is now capable of generating so-called counter-space effects using forces and assets within the atmosphere as well as in orbit, as was just disclosed yesterday.

Overall, Gen. Douglas Schiess’ comments today about the role played by Specialist Gray and the 42nd EWCD during Operation Epic Fury are indicative of not just what is to come in future operations, but how the Space Force is already engaged in combat missions now.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

On Sept. 26, 1983 the Soviet Union’s Oko early warning system reported that the US had launched five intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, the duty officer at the Serpukhov-15 bunker, broke protocol and refused to report the alert as a confirmed strike. He reasoned that a real US first strike would involve hundreds or thousands of missiles, not five. The system, it turned out, had mistaken sunlight reflecting off clouds for missile launches.

Petrov’s decision to defy protocol prevented an erroneous retaliatory nuclear strike and its incalculable consequences.

“I had all the data (to suggest there was an ongoing missile attack),” he told the BBC’s Russian Service 30 years later.

“If I had sent my report up the chain of command, nobody would have said a word against it. They were lucky it was me on shift that night.”

That Cold War lesson resonates loudly amid growing fear over how AI is being deployed in warfare. A recent appeal has put automation in war back in the spotlight, raising a question that leaves many uneasy: What would happen if a computer — an AI system — were the one calling the shots and it got the response to an attack wrong?

In an essay published over the weekend, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei called for AI model development to slow down and face closer scrutiny. The appeal was not unprecedented but this time it drew rare public agreement from two rivals: Sam Altman of OpenAI and Elon Musk of xAI.

“Over the last few months I have become convinced that fully addressing the risks requires even more prudence — not just investing in risk prevention but pacing the rate of capabilities advancement so that risk prevention has time to keep up,” Amodei said.

A threat-intelligence report published by Anthropic found that a cell based in northern Yemen tried to use Claude (its AI tool) to build guided rockets and missiles, including a ballistic missile with a claimed 2,000 km range and a separate program incorporating a hypersonic glide vehicle.

Anthropic said that it banned the accounts after detecting the activity, although there was no evidence that the group successfully fielded an operational weapon.

War offers no shortage of similar examples, where AI streamlines battlefield decisions or powers surveillance. The Middle East, given its strategic weight and the range of actors involved, has become a testing ground for the technology.

Israel has long used AI in its military. Over three years of war in Gaza its forces have reportedly deployed several machine-learning systems — Habsora (“Gospel”), Lavender, Fire Factory and Where’s Daddy — to automate large parts of target generation and strike planning.

The systems mine surveillance feeds, communications data and existing databases to propose targets and recommend munitions and strike schedules. Analysts reportedly went from producing about 50 targets a year to as many as 100 a day.

Concerns over AI-supported targeting resurfaced during the Iran war, after a US strike hit the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls’ school in Minab, southern Iran, killing at least 168 people, most of them children.

The US has not disclosed whether AI was used in that strike but Adm. Brad Cooper, the US commander leading the campaign, has confirmed the use of “a variety of advanced AI tools” to process large volumes of data, without naming specific systems. He said that the tools let commanders make “smarter decisions faster than the enemy can react,” cutting processes that once took hours or days down to seconds.

“Humans will always make final decisions on what to shoot and what not to shoot, and when to shoot,” he said.

The US military has run AI-enabled war programs since at least 2017. Its Maven Smart System, built by Palantir, helps fuse battlefield data, identify targets and accelerate decisions. NATO acquired its own version in 2025. OpenAI and Anthropic are also competing for military contracts, reflecting the growing reliance of defense operations on commercial AI and the increasingly close ties between the two sectors.

In Ukraine, both sides use AI for data processing and target selection. Ukraine’s former Deputy Defense Minister Yuriy Myronenko told the BBC that AI analyzed more than 50,000 front-line video streams each month, helping “quickly process this massive data, identify targets and put them on a map.”

But as war spills beyond the traditional battlefield into a hybrid, multi-faceted front, AI adoption follows.

In April YouTube banned Explosive Media, a Gen Z Iranian channel that used AI-generated Lego-style animations mocking Western figures — including Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu — while pushing pro-Iranian, anti-US and anti-Israel narratives.

More recently separate media investigations found that Israel had funded multimillion-dollar PR campaigns to shape how AI chatbots, including ChatGPT, answer questions about Gaza and the Israeli military. By setting up fake think tanks and publishing AI-generated papers with no real authors, the investigators said, Israel built a sophisticated operation to manipulate search results and shape public understanding — a shift in propaganda tactics that is harder to detect because it disguises advocacy as neutral expertise.

Throughout history militaries have sought tools that offer an edge over adversaries. But deploying AI in high-stakes environments like armed conflict carries risks distinct from any previous technology.

Part of the concern lies in the technology itself. An AI model trained on faulty or unrepresentative data can generate inaccurate results or malfunction once deployed in conditions that differ from its training environment.

AI-supported targeting is a case in point. Where such tools generate targets at scale with minimal human oversight, errors are not difficult to imagine.

That risk grows more acute as AI development moves from decision support to agents that can pursue complex goals with little human supervision. The next step, recursive self-improvement, would involve systems upgrading themselves with decreasing human input in a potentially open-ended loop.

As Jean-Marc Rickli and Tobias Knappe of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy note in a recent paper, agentic AI “is shifting the AI landscape from being a passive, supportive tool towards an active executor that can increasingly define and take courses of action on behalf of a human user” — a shift that, they added, “also raises significant societal, security, legal and ethical risks.”

In this sense, the proliferation of AI, on and off the battlefield, has introduced unprecedented challenges, prompting scrutiny of its impact on moral agency and accountability.

In June the UN held its first Informal Exchange on Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain. Discussions centered on human rights and international humanitarian law, with nongovernmental organizations pushing for a moratorium on AI systems used in lethal decision-making — such as automated targeting — until robust global safeguards are in place.

The meeting followed a December 2025 UN General Assembly resolution on “Artificial intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security.” Experts welcomed it as a step forward, despite notable absences — including the US, which voted against the resolution.

Momentum is now shifting to New York, where a factual summary of the Geneva talks is due to reach the UN First Committee during its October session.

Despite these efforts, battlefield AI remains governed largely by existing legal frameworks.

Existing international humanitarian law applies to AI-enabled weapons through the principles of distinction, proportionality, military necessity and precaution. Responsibility remains with states and human actors, while Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions also requires states party to the protocol to review new weapons, means and methods of warfare for legal compliance. US Directive 3000.09 similarly requires “appropriate levels of human judgment” but stops short of mandating real-time human control or creating binding international accountability.

In early September a UN disarmament forum in Geneva concluded three years of work on autonomous weapons, colloquially known as “killer robots.” A total of 128 states reached a non-binding consensus text after last-minute objections from the US and Russia, backing a proposed two-tier framework: prohibiting autonomous weapons whose effects are unpredictable or designed to target humans directly and restricting all others through mandatory human supervision rules.

Human Rights Watch said that the final text was considerably watered down and the US and Russia remain opposed to binding negotiations. But with 76 states now backing a legally binding instrument, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons’ November Review Conference looms as the decisive test of whether formal talks begin.

“AI systems will not change that the human is responsible for mistakes but it will obscure that humans feel responsible for mistakes and that can lead to a greater willingness to use force,” Elke Schwarz, professor of political theory at London’s Queen Mary University and author of “Death Machines: The Ethics of Violent Technologies,” told Arab News.

“There is a plausible deniability implicit in the use of AI enabled systems because they are essentially operating in a zone of invisibility.”

Israel offers the clearest example to date. When Israeli outlet +972 reported on the Lavender system it caused uproar by showing AI used not merely to assist analysts but to generate vast target lists — reportedly with only cursory human checks. The system’s scale, its claimed 90 percent accuracy and its use against people in their homes raised fears that human control was slipping and that AI could make large-scale violence faster, more impersonal and harder to attribute.

This marks a paradigm shift unseen in the history of conflict, which, as Schwarz argued, reshapes humanity’s relationship with violence and challenges conventional notions of ethical conduct in war.

She maintains that AI-enabled weapons systems facilitate the objectification of human targets, raising tolerance for collateral damage, while automation bias and technological mediation weaken operators’ moral agency and diminish their capacity for ethical judgment.

“Machines cannot be better at war than humans because machines don’t understand what war is, what it entails and what suffering it produces,” she said.

“They can only contribute to the actions humans decide on in better or worse ways. In my view AI-enabled systems make humans less restraint in using force, not more.

“Humans decide on the parameters. If they want to design a system that is less restraint, they will, if it is perceived to be more effective. A system cannot be a ‘better’ moral actor than the human because it has no concept of meaning for moral decisions. So, humans will not disappear from war with AI systems, but AI systems will change the relationship we humans have to violence. And that will make war worse.”

As a growing number of whistleblowers and experts warn, the risk is that an unchecked race toward superintelligent AI carries real risks to the very humans who built it.

For Schwarz, an AI “doomsday” is no longer far-fetched science fiction.

“I think we have already witnessed a horrendous human cost on account of AI enabled weapon systems,” she said.

“The introduction of AI systems into war has, at the very least, not lead to more restraint, more global stability, less conflict, fewer civilians killed or harmed. Quite the contrary. Children are dying due to war at a staggering rate. This is quite doomsday-ish in my books.”

As comparisons between the AI and nuclear arms races grow sharper by the day, the argument circles back to Petrov and to an ominous question: Would an algorithm have shown the same restraint?

“We can of course conjure up all kinds of awful scenarios, for example if someone decides to put an AI agent in charge of nuclear decision making (which would be ludicrous but you never know) and a data glitch leads to a nuclear threat spiral. But I think things are already quite awful because the technology and dehumanization seem to go hand in hand.”

Anthropic’s Claude offers a similar note of caution.

“What’s not really disputed is that today’s actual military AI risks are the boring-sounding ones: bad targeting data, automation bias, escalation happening faster than diplomacy can respond, systems proliferating to actors with no safety culture at all. The ‘robots decide to turn on us’ framing, if anything, can be a distraction from those.”

Quite wise. Humans should take note.

Tetiana Bubynets collapsed on the asphalt after a Russian drone exploded at a gas station in the southern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia.

Despite the violent shockwave and blast of drone shrapnel produced by the attack on July 6, the 18-year-old accounting student had no visible wounds except for a nosebleed.

She was rushed to hospital and pronounced dead shortly after, alongside two other civilians, aged 41 and 48.

One of her lecturers, Tetiana Melikhova of Zaporizhzhia National University, said Bubynets was an only child and that her mother “lost the meaning of life” after she died.

“She couldn’t speak. At the funeral, she just lay on the coffin; she couldn’t let her child go,” Melikhova told Al Jazeera.

The strike that killed Bubynets was the first recorded case of Russia’s use of a fully autonomous attack drone powered by artificial intelligence (AI), according to a New York Times analysis.

While drone strikes have hammered Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian officials who examined the wreckage found the unmanned vehicle to be unlike others.

In place of an antenna, it featured an AI-powered minicomputer sold commercially by US technology company Nvidia, which rendered it capable of directing itself to the type of target it was programmed to spot – likely propane tanks in this case – lock on to it and proceed to strike.

AI-powered drones are the tip of the iceberg as Russia and Ukraine race towards boosting tech infrastructure aimed at coordinating reconnaissance and attack, according to analysts.

“It’s not about a drone having AI in it, and then seeing something and striking,” Marina Miron, researcher at the defence studies department at King’s College London, said. “Rather, it’s the drone seeing something, communicating to a software complex which knows how to map the GPS coordinates on a live battlefield map, and notifying the closest artillery unit.”

Referred to as reconnaissance-strike architecture, these unified battlefield management systems act like a central command. They track the location of friendly forces and identify enemy positions.

AI acts as the accelerator, instantly processing massive amounts of data collected through sensors in drones or any other military products, including interceptor missiles or artillery units.

The tactical advantage on the battlefield is given by the system’s ability to compress the kill chain – meaning coordinating and distributing the intelligence to military assets on the ground to find, track and destroy targets in a matter of minutes.

In such an ecosystem, AI-powered automated drones are just pieces of a broader puzzle.

Ukraine is known to be developing its system, which it named DELTA. Following operational trials in late 2025, Russia has been rolling out its version, the Svod Tactical Situational Awareness Complex, to front-line units.

Both sides claim that once the battlefield data is processed, a decision support system (DSS) presents a military commander with options to choose from, keeping a human in the decision-making loop, said Miron.

“In how far that is true is, of course, impossible to find out,” she added.

Acknowledging full AI autonomy would provoke ethical and legal questions.

Even if humans were to retain final decision-making authority, research has shown AI systems subtly shape choices, predetermining outcomes.

“Under time and pressure, commanders often do as AI suggests,” said Miron, whose research focuses on military AI and remotely piloted and autonomous systems.

Towards full automation

Coordinated AI-powered military systems are the next frontier of modern warfare, said Serhiy Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian Ministry of Defence adviser on loitering munitions, known by his callsign Flash.

“That’s what it will all come to,” he posted on his Telegram channel on July 1. “Navigation, search for a target, and attacks will be fully autonomous.”

Drones with some autonomous capabilities are already being deployed at scale.

Heorhii Volkov, commander of Ukraine’s Yasni Ochi drone strike unit, said this is currently mostly used in the final phase of long-distance strikes, where first-person view (FPV) drones are likely to lose radio connection due to electronic warfare or the curvature of the Earth.

The use of AI in so-called last-mile operations solves this battlefield hitch. If the signal is lost, an integrated AI-enabled onboard module takes full control of the unmanned vehicle, autonomously locks on the target and carries the strike to completion.

Yaroslav Azhnyuk, founder of Ukrainian technology company The Fourth Law, which develops AI-powered autonomy software for unmanned vehicles, said Russia and Ukraine were working to deploy a wider range of autonomous systems.

“This is not simply a race to demonstrate a fully autonomous drone. It is a race to make autonomy reliable, affordable and deployable at scale,” Azhnyuk told Al Jazeera. “Electronic warfare, increasingly long engagement distances and the growing number of drones are making human-controlled systems less sufficient. Autonomy solves exactly these constraints.”

Azhnyuk believes autonomy will become a game-changer over the next six to 12 months.

“The decisive advantage will belong to the side that can deploy reliable autonomy across tens or hundreds of thousands of systems, not just demonstrate it in prototypes,” he said.

Kateryna Bondar, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), noted the dangers of AI’s reliance on algorithms.

“The system doesn’t understand what it’s doing; it’s just following the algorithm and the rules which people created,” said Bondar, who works at the CSIS’s Wadhwani AI Center. “AI has to be trained to recognise targets and engage these targets,” but writing code that distinguishes between a bus and a tank is easier than between a Russian and a Ukrainian soldier.

Additionally, cost-effective FPV drones have low-quality cameras and their resolution can be lowered further by adverse atmospheric conditions.

Military units using autonomous systems therefore “delegate the decision to a very imperfect technology that cannot distinguish between a civilian and a military person, combatant or non-combatant”, Bondar said.

“This is why there is a conversation around who makes a decision and who has responsibility for mistakes and errors.”

WASHINGTON — A bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers is pressing the Army to explain why it told a unit based in Europe to stop specializing in drone warfare, an order that comes as the world’s battlefields rapidly evolve and military tactics increasingly rely on uncrewed systems to fight.

The 173rd Airborne Brigade was building its own drones and practicing the kind of warfare that Ukraine has pioneered against Russia and that Iran has fought against the U.S. — warfare that has killed and wounded American troops. The brigade of 600 soldiers was set up in November to be deployed anywhere that drones were needed.

“We have deep concerns that eliminating this specialized drone unit will limit our ability to learn from allies, particularly the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and hinder our efforts to modernize drone warfare at the speed necessary to compete on the modern battlefield,” the lawmakers said in a letter shared with The Associated Press.

It requests a briefing from the Army to explain its decision and was sent Tuesday to departing Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and Gen. Christopher LaNeve, the Army’s acting chief of staff. It was signed by Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire, Republican Sen. Thom Tillis of North Carolina, independent Sen. Angus King of Maine and Republican Rep. Mike Turner of Ohio.

“This specialized unit was a prudent response in a moment when the character of warfare is changing faster than a conventional formation’s ability to adapt,” the lawmakers say.

They said they were particularly keen to understand the data, analysis and process behind the change after less than a year of the drone unit being active. They also want to know if the decision was based on guidance from Pentagon leadership or made internally by the Army.

LaNeve, who is filling in as the Army’s top uniformed officer, recently ordered the battalion to refocus on its core mission of being an airborne infantry unit. The move followed Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s sudden ousting of the Army’s prior chief of staff, Gen. Randy George.

Integrating drones into the Army’s tactics was a major focus for George. Last year, he and Driscoll had rolled out what they called the Army Transformation Initiative, which pushed to add “modernized (unmanned aircraft systems) into formations.”

George, who became Army chief of staff under President Joe Biden, regularly spoke about the need to accelerate development of new drone systems and get them in the hands of regular soldiers, not just specialized units. Driscoll supported such efforts and focused on cutting the red tape for military contractors to quickly develop more drones.

After George was ousted by Hegseth without explanation in April, he was replaced by LaNeve. This week, Driscoll submitted his own resignation and later said on social media that Wednesday would be his final full day on the job. A reason for his departure was not publicly revealed, but he was an ally of George, and his tensions with Hegseth have been widely reported.

“We are supportive of the transformative initiatives the Army has taken under Secretary Driscoll’s leadership in this area and would like to see that momentum maintained even as uniformed leadership changes,” the lawmakers wrote.

Toropin and Finley write for the Associated Press. Toropin reported from Nuremberg, Germany.