This article will discuss the political context and strategic implications of the dissolution of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) as a development that reconstructs the domestic political dynamics of Turkey and the Middle East region. For more than four decades, the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey initiated by the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) has represented the rise of non-state actors as a new force in the international system while challenging the dominance of the state as the sole actor in the modern political configuration. The struggle for recognition of identity and official governmental autonomy ended with an official statement from its main pillar, Abdullah Öcalan, who was still in prison in February 2025. This call was then conveyed by a member of parliament from the pro-Kurdish party, containing orders to lay down arms, disband and end the armed conflict with Turkey. The dissolution of the PKK reinforced Ankara’s consolidation of power and strengthened the legitimacy of Turkey’s foreign policy under the Neo-Ottoman ideology. At the same time, the decision to dissolve the PKK reduced the space for Kurdish political articulation, which had opposed the government’s nationalist-Islamist and centralised narrative within the framework of the state.
PKK: Evolution of the Struggle, Regional Factors and Influences
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), also known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, is a militant organisation with Kurdish nationalist leanings, founded by Abdullah Öcalan in the late 1970s. The PKK rebellion was motivated by the Turkish government’s lack of sympathy towards Kurdish culture and its human rights violations against the population. This then encouraged the PKK group’s aspirations to gain political autonomy and territory through an independent Kurdish state. From the outset, this group has placed armed action as the main pillar of its struggle and has not hesitated to use violence against Kurds who are considered pro-Turkish government. Since 1984, this group has waged an armed rebellion against Turkey, which by 2024 had claimed the lives of more than 40,000 people, with thousands of other Kurds forced to flee the violence in southeastern Turkey to cities in the north.
As the decades of rebellion progressed, various internal and external factors began to shape new boundaries for the sustainability of the PKK’s armed movement. This was then supported by the involvement of several cross-border actors, including the PKK’s internal structure and militant wing, which included pro-Kurdish political parties and regional Kurdish networks, particularly the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) or Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria and the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) in Iraq. At the regional level, the dynamics of the PKK rebellion are influenced by the role of three major countries, namely Iran, Iraq and Syria, each of which has strategic and political interests in domestic Kurdish affairs that indirectly shape the PKK’s room for manoeuvre. Although it temporarily ceased its activities in the 2000s, the group is indicated to have resumed guerrilla attacks in south-eastern Turkey, resulting in a domino effect of various violent incidents.
Military Pressure, Regional Dynamics and the End of the PKK Rebellion
In the 1990s, Turkey targeted PKK bases operating in the Kurdish safe zone in northern Iraq through air strikes, which were then followed by ground operations. Ultimately, 2007 marked the peak of the Turkish government’s response to this conflict with the passing of a mandate for cross-border military operations against the PKK in Iraq, followed by a series of air strikes and ground operations in February 2008. Although attempts were made to pursue a peace process, this did not prove to be a solution due to the presence of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which played a significant role in the Syrian Civil War and ultimately triggered the peak of the fighting in 2015 and 2016. Since 2015, the insurgency has resulted in nearly 6,000 casualties, including 600 civilians, 1,300 soldiers, and 4,000 PKK and TAK members (CSIS, 2023).
Subsequently, these developments ultimately crystallised in a political decision in 2025, when the PKK declared an official end to its armed struggle. The author argues that this was influenced by several key factors, including a lack of significant political achievements coupled with a continuing weakening of military capacity, a narrowing operational area, and instability in external support, meaning that the costs of armed struggle were not commensurate with the results obtained. In addition, the PKK has been under constant military pressure from Turkey since Erdoğan came to power, resulting in the loss of safe havens for the PKK to train, hide and mobilise its forces. Öcalan’s ideological shift, which began to question the effectiveness of armed action, also led to the end of the rebellion, as he stated last February that the democratic path was the only way to realise a political system. Based on this statement, Öcalan has emphasised that armed struggle is no longer relevant and that the PKK must abandon its military strategy and choose the political path.
The PKK and the Consolidation of Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey
Neo-Ottomanism is a political and cultural orientation that developed in Turkey after the reform from a secular government to an approach more based on Islamic values, which grew stronger under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This doctrine is manifested in Turkey’s expansive foreign policy, which encompasses geopolitical strategies, overt military intervention, strategic alliances and cultural expansion, with the aim of restoring Turkey’s role as a major regional power and repeating the glory days of the Ottoman EmpireOne of the main ideas of this doctrine emphasises the importance of uniting all ethnic groups, regardless of ethnic background or religious affiliation, with the aim of maintaining the sustainability of the Ottoman Empire and ensuring the welfare of its people (Ivaylo, 2019). Based on this framework, the existence of Kurdish groups such as the PKK, whose main ambition is to gain autonomy and political identity, is considered a serious challenge to the narrative of statehood and Turkey’s dominant role in the region. Therefore, this shows intense tension between local identity aspirations and Turkey’s vision to assert its influence both domestically and regionally.
The Neo-Ottomanism doctrine aims to emphasise Turkey’s image as a strong, stable and leading country in the region. Meanwhile, the PKK rebellion has hindered the positive narrative that the government, particularly the Justice and Development Party (AKP), wants to build. The Erdoğan administration combines Ottoman rhetoric with modern nationalism and the narrative of national security, so that military operations against the PKK become part of Turkey’s duty to maintain unity and buffer zones in areas that were historically under Ottoman rule. In this case, consistent military pressure through Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018) and Claw Operations (2019-2013), accompanied by regional diplomacy and gradual political-economic integration efforts, has reduced the operational capacity and limited the movement of rebel groups such as the PKK. Ultimately, these factors, which were also supported by internal strategic transformations, including Öcalan’s ideological influence leading to the decision to “surrender”, reflect the implementation of the Neo-Ottomanism doctrine strategy and mark a new phase in both the Turkish government’s relationship with Kurdish groups and the opportunity to reshape the domestic and regional security landscape.
A New Phase and Paradigm Shift
Overall, the end of the PKK rebellion in 2025 not only marks the end of an armed conflict that has lasted more than four decades, but also manifests Turkey’s success in enforcing its Neo-Ottoman ideology at the domestic and regional levels to maintain its sovereignty and territory. The dissolution of the PKK was the result of consistent military pressure, structured diplomatic strategies and political-economic integration to limit the movement of non-state actors, in this case the rebels, while strengthening Ankara’s dominance. However, the author argues that it is not impossible that the rebellion will return with new patterns and strategies, although this will take a long time. Thus, this phenomenon is a tangible manifestation of the implementation of Neo-Ottomanism principles, which emphasise strengthening Turkey’s security, political legitimacy and regional influence, supported by a combination of military instruments, diplomacy and ideological pressure on local identities.
