Vehicles

Taking a break from fighting Russians in the Kostiantynivka sector of the eastern Donetsk region, the commander of a Ukrainian uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV) unit spoke with us about innovations in the use of these systems. One was the first deployment of a UGV specifically designed for amphibious operations to deliver supplies to frontline troops in areas impeded by water obstacles. Large areas of the front line are bisected by rivers and wetlands, and the country has many other small waterways and marsh areas. As we have frequently reported, the use of UGVs by both Ukraine and Russia has exploded as the ubiquity of aerial attack drones makes it far too dangerous for human battlefield movements.

In an exclusive interview with TWZ, the commander of the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade’s “Alter Ego” UGV unit, who goes by the call sign “Electric,” offered us unique insights into the challenges of developing amphibious UGVs and how they were deployed.

In the first of two parts, Electric talks about why Alter Ego developed amphibious UGVs – including modifying a Triton variant for this – and how the unit made them work. The second part features his insights into using heavy ‘bomber drones’ to drop UGVs behind enemy lines for kamikaze raids. In addition, a representative of Brave1, Ukraine’s weapons technology accelerator, spoke about developing these systems at scale.

Some of the questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity.

Q: How did the need for amphibious UGVs for logistics operations first come up?

A: We had this idea for a long time, but recently one of the departments of the Ministry of Defense asked for our help to solve this problem, so that the UGV could overcome water obstacles.

There was a crucial need for this kind of means at certain parts of the front, but the units that are located there didn’t have the capacity by themselves to solve this task. So our battalion was asked to solve this problem because we are one of the most experienced units in terms of UGVs.

Q: How long did it take to design and test the amphibious UGV, and what went into that process?

A: The whole process from development to battle deployment took less than three months.

Q: What did you have to do to make this work?

A: First of all, we looked at amphibious solutions that were on the market, not only in Ukraine, but in the world, and we took two separate approaches. One was taking one of the main UGVs that our unit is using on the ground, and we made it amphibious. And the other approach was that we took one of the solutions that was on the market that already had amphibious capabilities, and we solved several disadvantages that it had. And at the moment, we are using both.

Q: What did you have to do to make the UGV amphibious, and then what were some of the obstacles that had to be overcome to get this operational?

A: First of all, we have to explain that there are different solutions on the market that kind of work on the testing ground — like they can swim, they can drive on the ground, and in the vision of the manufacturer, they are working. But the fact is that these solutions are not ready for the reality on the front line, which is often very different from what is on the testing ground.

And the second point is that the unit has its own workshops where people work near the front line, and the experts, the engineers that work there, they have a very high level of competence to evaluate different solutions and select the one that has potential. And that’s what’s completely different between this unit and everyone else, like manufacturers and others who are working on these solutions, because they don’t understand what’s needed on the battlefield.

Q: So what did you have to change to make it work?

A: Regarding the amphibious one, basically the unit changed almost everything that that UGV had, starting from electronics, the software, the waterproofing, the communications – we basically changed everything. Regarding the one that we already used on the ground, we basically tried to retain what was allowing it to be an effective UGV on the ground, and we added waterproofing and specific mechanics, so that it can work in the water environment.

Q: You mentioned communications. What kind of communications did you add?

A: The communication means that was installed on the UGV by the manufacturer was not sufficient at all. Basically, it didn’t have enough quality for the battlefield situation. It was not working. But we already have our own communications that we were working on, and we have a lot of experience because we have been working for a long time in this UGV area. So we basically helped to install a sufficient level of communications on this UGV.

Q: So how does the amphibious UGV communicate with the controller? Does it use Starlink or some other satellite communications system for navigation?

A: This is satellite navigation, but not only. Satellite navigation is a part of this communication system.

Q: What are the other parts?

A: It’s better not to talk in detail about the other part of the communication system.

Q: There were probably a lot of different missions that could have been used for this first amphibious UGV logistics delivery. Why was this particular mission chosen?

A: The Alter Ego unit has so much experience in terms of UGVs, and not just experience of using UGVs, but the experience of being the first in the world. We had one of the first evacuation missions, we had one of the first strike missions using UGVs, the paratrooper UGV, and now the amphibious UGV. So basically, we have the systems to make it work for the first time when nobody knows how to conduct this mission.

Q: No, I mean why did this particular mission get chosen to be the first one?

A: There are certain places on the front line where we have water obstacles that prevent logistics from being done by UGV. At the moment, UGVs are carrying hundreds of tons of logistics, probably the most compared to any other means on the front line, but before this, these water obstacles would prevent UGVs from providing logistics for those parts of the front, and that need can’t be fully satisfied by UAVs or other means. That’s why we did this mission with the amphibious UGV, and now our task here is to scale this technology and provide this logistics system for other similar parts of the front where there are water obstacles.

Q: Tell me about where and when this mission took place and what it was like to watch it unfold.

A: So unfortunately, we can’t provide information about when and where this operation took place. But regarding how it went and what we felt, this was another big challenge, because this is something that wasn’t done before, and nobody thought this is real. So this was quite difficult, and to tell the truth, the mission didn’t succeed on the first try, actually, and it required a lot of effort in terms of planning, preparing, engineering, and basically it required 100% effort from everyone involved in that mission.

Q: How many times did it fail before, and what went wrong?

A: We had one failed attempt. The reason for failure was a certain technical problem. After that, we analyzed what went wrong, and we worked on solving those issues. Basically, it’s something that nobody had tried to do, it’s kind of hard to know what can go wrong before you actually try it. So the best way to find a solution like that is to try and then iterate on that attempt and make it better and better and better.

Also, I would like to add that although this was the first successful mission regarding an amphibious UGV, it’s not that there was no work on that before that. We were actively talking to and collecting the experience of everyone who was working on these kinds of missions before, and that was also a reason why this mission succeeded.

Q: How far did the amphibious UGV go for this mission?

A: So the UGV went 40 kilometers one way, and then it returned. So probably around 70 kilometers in total, and it carried food and other supplies.

Q: Did this UGV come under Russian fire on this mission?

A: Yes, and it survived.

Q: How does the UGV switch from water to land operations?

A: So the UGV has two separate control systems, one for water and one for land, and basically it switches to the one that is required at the moment. That’s how it can operate in both environments.

Q: Is that autonomous, or is that something that the controller at the base has to do as they watch the UGV on its mission?

A: At the moment, the operator fully controls the UGV manually. And basically, before, the operators of UGVs only knew how to move them on land, but now they also had to learn how to move them in the water. So not only was the technology itself developed, but we also had to prepare the operator and come up with tactics for this UGV.

Q: Did you use AI on this mission in any way, and if so, how?

A: We didn’t use AI.

Q: Have there been other missions using amphibious UGVs?

A: Yes.

Q: Can you say how many and what was delivered?

A: No.

Q: Is this designed only for logistics missions, or will it be used in the future for strike missions, either as a one-way attack system or as a platform for machine guns or other weapons?

A: We can use it in different ways in the future.

Q: Mud season is fast approaching, when much maneuvering becomes impossible or severely degraded because of how difficult it is to move in the thick, oozing slop. Will your amphibious UGVs work in the mud?

A: I think it can operate in the mud in the same way it operates in the water.

In the next segment of our interview, Electric talks about using bomber drones to deliver UGVs behind the lines, and a Brave1 representative talks about how the organization is working to develop these systems at scale for wider use.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The U.S. Marine Corps is buying Anduril Pulsar-L electronic warfare jammers to meet an urgent operational need to better protect its 8×8 wheeled Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV) from drones. This is part of broader efforts the service is pursuing to boost the ACV’s defenses against uncrewed aerial attackers, as well as incoming anti-tank guided missiles and other threats. Drone threats are real now and have notably sidelined even the most advanced heavy armor in Ukraine.

Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) announced it had awarded a sole-source deal to Anduril, valued at $15,711,445.50, for an unspecified number of Pulsar-Ls, yesterday. This follows a statement of intent the Command put out last month. Anduril first unveiled Pulsar-L, a lightweight addition to its larger Pulsar family of electronic warfare systems, in April 2025.

The Marine Corps had 150 baseline personnel carrier variants of the ACV (or ACV-Ps), as well as 21 command-and-control ACV-C versions, in inventory as of April 2026. The default armament for ACV-P currently is just a single .50 caliber M2 machine gun in a remote weapon station on top of the hull. The service’s goal is to eventually acquire 389 ACV-Ps and 33 ACV-Cs, as well as 152 ACV-30s with new 30mm cannon-armed turrets and 34 ACV-R armored recovery vehicle variants. The ACV family has already supplanted the Marine Corps’ previous fleet of tracked Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAV).

“The Anduril Pulsar-L system is a platform-integrated omni-directional SK C-UAS [soft-kill counter-uncrewed aerial systems] with a combined sensor/jammer package that detects, tracks, identifies, and defeats radio frequency-dependent Group 1 and Group 2 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs),” MARCORSYSCOM wrote in a justification for the sole-source contract, which was also released yesterday. “Additionally, the system provides counter positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities.”

Introducing: Pulsar-L

The U.S. military definition of a Group 1 drone is any design weighing up to 20 pounds, that is able to fly up to an altitude of 1,200 feet, and that can reach speeds of up to 100 knots. Group 2 is the next tier up, encompassing types with gross weights between 21 and 55 pounds, that can get up to an altitude of 3,500 feet, and hit top speeds of up to 250 knots. Kamikaze drones and other small weaponized types that fall into Groups 1 and 2 are used on a daily basis in Ukraine to attack armored vehicles, as well as unarmored vehicles and personnel. These are threats that have been steadily expanding to other hotspots globally, and that we will come back to later on.

Furthermore, “the Pulsar-L is the only solution capable of being mounted on the ACV to provide a mobile and organic means to effectively and simultaneously execute the entire kill-chain against hostile UASs in the deployed land and maritime/littoral environment while not exceeding the limited ACV space, weight, and power claim allotted to the SK C-UAS solution,” according to MARCORSYSCOM. “This will provide the ACV with an essential defensive capability, directly contributing to increased survivability and force protection while not sacrificing the mobility and operational tempo of the ACV.”

Pulsar-L is already “in use by the Special Operations Command due to the system’s low weight, proven performance in engaging multiple UASs, and simultaneous execution of the full kill-chain while static or on the move,” the justification document adds. “Additionally, it is the only known commercially available system that meets the minimum requirement to rapidly identify and respond to emerging UAS technologies and tactics without frequent updates to predefined threat data libraries. The Pulsar-L is the only solution that uses machine based learning to continually adapt to these ever-changing threats without requiring vendor updates, allowing the warfighters to continually be effective in the fight.”

The latter point here is a particularly important consideration for electronic warfare systems, in general, which need to be able to accurately detect, categorize, and respond to different waveforms to be most effective. The emergence of new waveforms, as well as changes to how existing ones are emitted, together with new tactics, techniques, and procedures, can all negatively impact a system’s performance. Historically, the process of responding to those developments with updates to built-in threat libraries has been lengthy and complex. The conflict in Ukraine has shown that the cycle of new developments in the electromagnetic spectrum and then the need for new countermeasures can be regularly measured in weeks.

The U.S. military has been heavily investing in so-called cognitive electronic warfare capabilities to help automate and otherwise accelerate various aspects of this process. The ability of a particular electronic warfare suite to adapt autonomously in real-time, even in the middle of operations, has been viewed as the absolute ‘holy grail’ of this concept, which you can read more about here. How exactly Pulsar-L leverages machine-learning and artificial intelligence to this end, and the speed with which it can adapt to changing threats, is still not entirely clear.

Regardless, “there is an unusual and compelling need for the rapid deployment of SK C-UASs to forward-deployed ground units as Marines currently lack the ability to conduct self-defense against emerging UAS threats,” the justification document stresses. “Failure to deliver this capability places Marines at unnecessary risk, potentially leading to mission failure and loss of life, and hampers the Government’s ability to keep them safe during forward deployments.”

MARCORSYSCOM’s justification for the sole-source deal to Anduril does not otherwise elaborate on the urgent requirements that drove the deal, which it says were only formalized on April 7. That is notably roughly a week after the United States and Israel first launched major combat operations against Iran, which is a prolific developer and user of various tiers of weaponized drones. There is no explicit confirmation of any link, but Iranian drones, as well as missiles and other capabilities, have been a real threat to U.S. forces in the region. We have also just gained more insights recently into how forward-deployed Marine Corps elements contributed to those operations. Counter-drone capabilities would also be especially critical in any future amphibious landing operation, wherever it might occur.

All that being said, threats posed by armed Group 1 and 2 drones are not at all limited to Iran and the Middle East, nor are they new. They are only likely to become a more ubiquitous feature in the hands of nation-state armed forces and non-state actors in conflict zones globally as time goes on. The nature of these threats is also expanding significantly in scale and scope, especially when it comes to more automated targeting capabilities, thanks heavily to the increasing democratization of AI-driven technologies, something TWZ has explored in depth in the past.

A number of other significant developments in this arena have emerged from the conflict in Ukraine, where electronic warfare systems are heavily employed against drones. This includes the introduction of physical fiber-optic control links that cannot be jammed, as well as the use of mesh-like and often ad-hoc networks to increase resiliency.

The fighting in Ukraine has also underscored the threat that even small kamikaze drones pose to armored vehicles, including types that are far more heavily protected to start with than the Marine Corps’ ACVs. As mentioned, Ukrainian forces have been sidelining their M1 Abrams and other main battle tanks in the face of constant drone attacks.

MARCORSYSCOM’s justification for the Pulsar-L order makes clear that this is just one part of a larger plan to boost the ACV’s defenses.

“Marine Corps program of record for SK C-UAS is planned to initiate in FY27,” the document mentions toward the very end. “The components of this future program will be procured through full and open competition as it is expected that advanced non-kinetic and SK defeat technologies should be mature by this time.”

Marine Corps officials have also talked in the past about integrating active protection systems (APS), which could be blended together with C-UAS capabilities, and other defensive features to the service’s ACV fleet.

“We’re constantly looking at what the next generation of APS is and how we can get that onto the [ACV] platform in a lightweight form factor,” Chris Melkonian, the Marine Corps’ Program Manager for Advanced Amphibious Assault (PM AAA), told TWZ and other attendees at the annual Modern Day Marine exposition in April.

Improved “situational awareness, that’s kind of a gateway to counter-UAS, in terms of the ability to sense your environment,” Melkonian also highlighted at that time. “Take all that video on board and then be able to feed that into [a] counter-UAS system.”

Additional “overhead protection right now is a critical thing that we’re working on right now for this platform,” he added. The practice of adding on anti-drone armor screens on armored vehicles (and now other platforms), especially to protect against top-down attacks, first emerged in Russia in the lead-up to the all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, the installation of this kind of so-called ‘cope cage’ type armor has now become a global trend, including in the U.S. military.

The U.S. Marine Corps is also pressing ahead with a larger vision to field several tiers of counter-drone capabilities at all levels of its forces, to better protect everything from static installations at home and abroad right down to individual squads.

When it comes to the Marine Corps ACV fleet, the rush order for Pulsar-Ls is an important new step in boosting those vehicles’ defenses against threats that exist now. At the same time, drones are increasingly calling the role of armored vehicles in future conflicts into question.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com