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Australia is approaching a moment of strategic reckoning in Asia. For years, it has maintained a posture of alliance loyalty to the United States while professing regional engagement. This balancing act is losing credibility.

As Warwick Powell, adjunct professor at Queensland University of Technology and senior fellow at Taihe Institute in Beijing, observes, Australia is increasingly viewed by Southeast Asian nations not as a regional partner but as an actor pursuing extra-regional agendas. The habits of strategic ambiguity are no longer fit for purpose.

The region faces converging challenges: intensifying great power competition, accelerating climate disruption, and growing political fragmentation. Yet the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue revealed little recognition of this reality.

There was no serious discussion of climate as a security issue, and China chose not to attend. These silences at Shangri-La matter. As Admiral Chris Barrie has warned, climate change presents the most immediate threat to Australia’s security and stability. He has called for a new national climate intelligence capability and urgent reorientation of defense strategy.

Keating’s enduring observation remains relevant. Australia will not find its security from Asia, but in it. That vision has been sidelined by a bipartisan consensus around AUKUS, preserved more from inertia than necessity.

With a strong majority in the House and recent Greens defections in the Senate, the Albanese government no longer requires this alignment to govern. It now has the opportunity to reassess and reset.

This is Australia’s ASEAN moment. The choice is between continuing to defer to distant agendas or stepping forward as a credible, sovereign leader in the region. The time for inaction has passed.

Losing the Region—Powell’s Warning

Powell’s recent analysis delivers a pointed diagnosis of Australia’s standing in Southeast Asia. Regional governments increasingly view Canberra not as a constructive partner, but as a proxy advancing external interests.

As Australia strengthens its alignment through frameworks such as AUKUS and deepens its strategic dependence on the United States, it drifts further from the multipolar outlook now shaping the region.

This divergence was clearly visible during the Shangri-La talks in Singapore. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim reaffirmed ASEAN’s position of strategic non-alignment, stating, “We won’t choose sides.”

His remarks reflect a growing resolve among Southeast Asian nations to assert agency in the face of great power rivalry. The absence of China from the Dialogue was just as significant. Its decision not to attend signalled a breakdown in regional dialogue and rising mistrust of Western-led security platforms, even as the region confronts converging risks that demand cooperation.

This fragmentation leaves Australia exposed. While countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam are deliberately hedging, engaging the United States, China, and one another without locking into rigid blocs, Australia has placed itself firmly within a binary security framework. That decision undermines its relevance in a region that no longer sees power through Cold War lenses.

Powell’s warning is clear. Australia is at risk of losing the region not through neglect, but through strategic misalignment. Rebuilding trust will require more than reassurance. It will require a visible shift in posture, purpose, and the substance of Australia’s regional engagement.

The Keating Contrast—Abandoned Independence

At a time when Australia’s regional credibility is under strain, it is worth recalling the last prime minister to articulate a confident, independent vision for Asia: Paul Keating.

He recognized that Australia’s future would be shaped not by its proximity to traditional allies, but by its integration with the region. Keating argued that Australia must find its security in Asia, not from it, framing strategic independence as a prerequisite for regional respect.

Unfortunately, that vision has been sidelined. In its place, Australia has adopted a defense posture that prioritizes transoceanic alliance obligations over sovereign strategic design.

Despite ministerial rhetoric about listening to Southeast Asia, the Albanese government has largely maintained the security architecture of its predecessors. The bipartisan unity around AUKUS is being preserved not out of necessity, but out of habit.

The political landscape has shifted. With a firm parliamentary majority and shifting Senate dynamics, the Albanese government now governs from a position of confidence.

This presents an opportunity to chart a course independent of inherited defense orthodoxy, allowing for a recalibration of the nation’s strategic settings, and to realign its security posture to restore regional credibility.

Hugh White has argued that Australia must develop a self-reliant defense capacity. Keating reminds us that sovereignty is the foundation of regional trust. Both point toward the same conclusion. Australia must make choices grounded in its own interests, not inherited reactions, but sovereign priorities.

The Forbidden Threat—Climate Collapse as the Real Security Challenge

While Australia’s defense debate remains fixated on hypothetical conflicts and future weapons platforms, the most immediate and destabilizing threat in the region is already unfolding: climate disruption. Sea-level rise, collapsing food systems, water insecurity, and intensifying weather extremes are straining state capacity, regional cooperation, and economic stability. These risks are not abstract; they are accelerating.

Yet the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue failed to formally address climate security. No multilateral framework was proposed to tackle ecological disruption, and no regional initiative was announced to manage displacement or enhance food system resilience. That China chose not to attend the Dialogue only reinforced the lack of coordinated leadership in the face of shared risks.

This neglect of climate as a strategic issue reveals a deeper problem. Security planning remains anchored to twentieth-century concepts of threat, despite clear evidence that ecological systems now shape the landscape of conflict and cooperation. The regional security architecture is ill-equipped to meet these challenges.

Australia cannot lead in the region while ignoring the risks that matter most to its neighbors. Climate change is not peripheral; it is the context within which all other issues now unfold. Ecological security must be viewed not as an add-on to national strategy, but as its foundation.

Admiral Chris Barrie’s Climate Imperative

Admiral Chris Barrie has emerged as one of Australia’s leading voices on the intersection of climate change and national security. As a former Chief of the Defence Force, his warning is clear: the most immediate threats to Australia will not come from hostile navies but from disrupted ecosystems, broken supply chains, and mass displacement across the region.

Barrie has consistently argued for a broader conception of security. He calls for the establishment of a national climate threat intelligence capability and a strategic reassessment of defense investment allocation.

His emphasis is not on rejecting military preparedness but on adapting it to the realities of a climate-disrupted world. This entails reallocating resources toward civil resilience, logistics, infrastructure hardening, and anticipatory intelligence.

At the Shangri-La talks, United States Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called on Indo-Pacific allies to increase defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP.

Barrie would not dispute the need for greater investment. But he would challenge the logic behind it. More submarines or missile systems will not secure Australia against water insecurity, regional migration crises, or the collapse of vital infrastructure.

A modern defense strategy must be grounded in environmental foresight and regional interdependence. It must prepare for cascading, interconnected disruptions, not simply conventional threats. In this view, spending more is not enough. Australia must spend wisely and in ways that build adaptive, sovereign capacity to meet the challenges already unfolding.

A New Compact with Asia—Reimagining Leadership

In a previous article, I argued that the Coalition’s failure to engage meaningfully with regional climate diplomacy reflected a strategic blind spot that undermined Australia’s credibility. That failure created space for Labor to lead.

With a clear majority in the House and recent defections from the Greens in the Senate, the Albanese government is no longer dependent on inherited defense orthodoxy to govern. It has the mandate and the responsibility to chart a different course.

The unity ticket with the Coalition on AUKUS may have served a political purpose, but it is no longer essential. The region does not need alignment. It needs leadership—anchored in capability and trust. Australia must demonstrate that it understands the security needs of Southeast Asia and the Pacific and is willing to lead in response.

Meeting U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s call to lift spending to 3.5 percent of GDP is achievable. But that spending must serve Australia’s own strategic priorities. It should support Hugh White’s vision for a self-reliant force, and it must advance Admiral Chris Barrie’s call to prepare for the systemic consequences of climate change. Sovereignty now depends not only on defense capability but also on ecological readiness, civil resilience, and regional cooperation.

Ken Henry’s warning against short-termism remains relevant. His leadership of the 2012 Australia in the Asian Century White Paper reflected an understanding that long-term security must integrate economic, environmental, and strategic foresight. That insight is more urgent now than ever.

Australia could lead the development of a Climate Resilience Compact with ASEAN, focused on adaptation finance, early warning systems, and joint infrastructure investment. These initiatives would reinforce regional stability, build long-term credibility, and restore Australia’s standing as a partner rather than a proxy.

This approach would also align with French President Emmanuel Macron’s call in Singapore for a third way in regional affairs. His vision of a cooperative Eurasia, shaped by middle powers and not defined by major power rivalry, speaks directly to the moment of geopolitical recalibration Australia must now embrace. The tools are at hand. What is needed now is resolve.

Strategic Spending for a Different Century

Defense spending must increase—not to prepare for someone else’s war, but to build the strategic, ecological, and societal resilience necessary for the century we are already in. Australia needs more capability, but of a different kind.

That means investing in economic sovereignty, with secure supply chains and domestic capacity in critical industries. It means strengthening cyber and digital infrastructure to defend not only borders but also networks and information systems.

It also means preparing for climate-driven displacement and regional instability by building humanitarian logistics and planning for migration and crisis response. Civil defense and national infrastructure resilience must become core security priorities, capable of protecting communities from floods, fires, and system shocks.

Soft power matters too. Australia must rebuild regional trust through strategic communications, education, and long-term relationships, not just treaties and defense platforms.

And it must plan with the future in mind, embedding intergenerational thinking into every major investment, in line with what Henry has called for across national policy.

These are the foundations of a secure, sovereign Australia. More spending is needed, but it must serve the world we are entering, not the one we are leaving behind.

Conclusion—A Sovereign Future Begins in the Region

Australia stands at a point of strategic inflection. The architecture of the old order is fraying. The assumptions that underpinned decades of defense and foreign policy are no longer sufficient.

As Warwick Powell has warned, alignment without purpose risks diminishing Australia’s standing in the region it most depends on. The habits of subordination must give way to a posture of agency.

The region is evolving. Middle powers are asserting independence, ASEAN is upholding non-alignment, and the Indo-Pacific is emerging as a theater not just of competition but of ecological disruption and social upheaval.

The defining threats of this era—ecological disruption, infrastructure risk, and forced migration—are systemic, not hypothetical.

The Albanese government possesses electoral authority, parliamentary confidence, and regional goodwill. It no longer needs to defend inherited positions; it can lead. This leadership must start by redefining national security for the twenty-first century.

Barrie warns of ecological risk, while Henry emphasizes that serious nations plan for the long term. Hugh White reminds us that dependence is not strategy—self-reliance is. Paul Keating’s insight was not rhetorical; it was strategic: security is found in Asia, not from it.

Together, these voices advocate for a different kind of strength. One built on stewardship rather than subservience, cooperation rather than coercion, and the capacity to endure rather than merely to respond.

This is Australia’s ASEAN moment. To remain relevant in the Asian century, Australia must lead as a trusted regional partner, not as a tethered auxiliary. Drift is no longer an option; purpose must now prevail. Sovereignty begins not in reaction to threats, but in the purposeful shaping of what endures.

Welcome to Screen Gab, the newsletter for everyone who was pretending they didn’t care about the “Love Island USA” delay on Peacock so it would load faster.

This week’s Season 7 premiere of the reality TV dating show arrived over 40 minutes past its scheduled launch time, causing eager fans who planned their dinners accordingly to crash out on social media about the delay — but, hey, absence makes the heart grow fonder, right? (Speaking of absences, Yulissa Escobar is already gone.) “Vanderpump Rules” alum Ariana Madix, who returns as host, stopped by Guest Spot to talk about the series that brings together a group of single people (known as islanders) into one villa for a messy and drama-filled chance at love (and money).

Also in this week’s Screen Gab, our streaming recommendations include a PBS documentary about a Harvard dropout who, over half a century ago, revolutionized the way people instantly chronicle their lives with his invention of the Polaroid camera, and a British competition series that’s become a bit of a phenomenon by having comedians competing against each other in bizarre challenges.

ICYMI

Must-read stories you might have missed

Director Celine Song, left, and actor Dakota Johnson of the film “Materialists.”

(Christina House / Los Angeles Times)

Dakota Johnson and director Celine Song rethink the rom-com with ‘Materialists’: The duo explore contemporary, clear-eyed attitudes toward relationships in their new film, Song’s follow-up to “Past Lives.”

Mark Hamill starred in the ultimate battle of good and evil. Now he just wants to make America normal again: After nearly five decades as Luke Skywalker, the actor opens up about finding new purpose in Mike Flanagan’s “The Life of Chuck,” speaking out against Trump and rebuilding after the Malibu wildfires.

‘Phineas and Ferb’ returns after 10 years with a new season and more musical moments: The popular Disney animated series is back after a decade with its main voice cast, more musical numbers and guest stars including Alan Cumming, Michael Bublé and Megan Rapinoe.

‘The biggest mistake of my life’: 6 actors on typecasting, comedy idols and more: Nathan Lane recalls the Friars Club Roast from hell, Kate Hudson opens up about needing to fight for roles beyond the rom-com and more tales from The Envelope Comedy Roundtable.

Turn on

Recommendations from the film and TV experts at The Times

Edwin Land, left, holding a Polavision camera with Bill McCune in “Mr. Polaroid.”

(PBS / Library of Congress)

“Mr. Polaroid” (pbs.org)

The story of inventor Edwin Land — scrap metal dealer’s son, Harvard dropout — and the transformative social power of his famous instant camera is told in this “American Experience” documentary. You may remember the Swinger, a ’60s mass market youth accessory, or even the older models that needed a fixative rub, but certainly you have experienced the full-color perfection of the classic SX-70. “Mr. Polaroid” captures the magic of the analog image developing in your hand as opposed to the mundanity of digital pictures in thousands on your cell phone — a thing to gather around, put in an album, stick on a refrigerator — and the vision (and myopia) of an obsessive leader whose invention he hoped “you would use as often as your pencil or your eyeglasses,” and would somehow draw humanity closer together. (“Polaroid is on its way to lead the world,” he declared in a letter to his troops, “perhaps even to save it.”) Land hired women in important research positions when that was rarely done and, after the death of Martin Luther King Jr., resolved to bring more Black employees into Polaroid, but he would also work with the CIA and license (then retract) technology to apartheid South Africa — so, a complicated person. But using his cameras was simplicity itself. — Robert Lloyd

Stevie Martin and Jason Mantzoukas in Season 19 of “Taskmaster.”

(Rob Parfitt / Channel 4)

“Taskmaster” (YouTube, Pluto TV)

Imagine “The Great British Bake Off” with fangs. That’s the appeal of “Taskmaster,” a truly singular British comedy competition series in which pompous tyrant Greg Davies and his fastidious minion Alex Horne (who is also the show’s creator) sit in gilded thrones and order five comedians to do the impossible, the ingenious and the hilariously annoying. The first episode of Season 1 kicked off with the challenges: paint a horse while riding a horse, empty a bathtub without pulling the plug or tipping it over, and eat as much watermelon as possible. Expect giggling and protestations as the frustrated comics have the best worst time of their lives. Now in Season 19, for the first time an American performer — Jason Mantzoukas — has flown across the Atlantic to be publicly roasted. Challenged to bring in his snootiest item, Mantzoukas admitted that “in America, snootiness is not really a thing.” So he hired a fake butler. He’s making us Yanks proud. — Amy Nicholson

Guest spot

A weekly chat with actors, writers, directors and more about what they’re working on — and what they’re watching

Ariana Madix returns to host “Love Island USA” for its seventh season.

(Ben Symons / Peacock)

“Love Island USA” kicked off its seventh season this week on Peacock, which can only mean one thing: A summer of diabolical choices sure to take over timelines six nights a week has officially begun. A spinoff of the U.K. reality dating series, the U.S. iteration is set on the island of Fiji and brings together 10 singles in a villa under constant video surveillance with a goal of coupling up. Over the course of the series, in between competing in kooky challenges and going on dates, new islanders are brought in and contestants may re-couple at their discretion — those not paired up are in danger of elimination. The last-standing couple leaves with a $100,000 cash prize. It’s not exactly the storybook backdrop for forming long-lasting relationships, but the realities of modern dating are hardly any better. After making her hosting debut last season, Ariana Madix, the “Vanderpump Rules” alum and Scandoval survivor who has spun her reality TV stardom into a booming career beyond the Bravo universe, is back to oversee the shenanigans. Madix stopped by Guest Spot to tell us which contestant she’s watching out for this season and which workplace comedies she finds comfort in. —Yvonne Villarreal

As someone who has had the highs and lows of a relationship documented on a reality show, what’s your best advice for someone looking for love on TV today?

I’ve never been on a television program to find love, [or] make a romantic connection, so I’m not sure I’m the best to give advice … but my advice for anyone entering the world of reality television regardless of the reason is to enter with authenticity and vulnerability. Let yourself be open to the opportunities that the circumstances bring.

Is hosting the level of involvement you want to have with reality TV at this point in your life and career or could you see yourself letting cameras document your life again?

I think for me to be on reality television in the sort of role where I am putting myself out there, I would want to be in charge. I would want to be executive producer and I would probably fight for that in any capacity to be back in that space.

Which islanders do you think will do well this year?

I have a great feeling about Olandria [Carthen]. She’s stunning, sexy, full of personality and knows exactly what she wants.

What have you watched recently that you’re recommending to everyone you know?

For a while I was telling everyone I knew about “Sweet Home” [Netflix]. It had me on the edge of my seat and I became so connected to the characters. I cried so hard at the end and I never would have expected to be crying over a show about monsters.

What’s your go-to comfort watch, the film or TV show you return to again and again?

“The Office” or “Parks and Rec” [both on Peacock]. I can put them on to fall asleep and whenever I wake up, I can jump back in and have a laugh with my favorite TV characters. There are no bad seasons.

On May 29th, Elon Musk officially stepped down from his role in the Trump administration’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), concluding a 130-day tenure marked by controversy and unmet fiscal goals. His departure follows public criticism of a Republican-backed spending bill that, contrary to DOGE’s mission, significantly increases the federal deficit. This development underscores the complex interplay between political affiliations, corporate responsibilities, and the influence of high-profile individuals on emerging financial markets.

His resignation marks a pivotal moment in the ongoing scrutiny of his leadership and its impact on Tesla. While Musk’s departure from DOGE was intended to refocus attention on Tesla, it has done little to ease growing concerns among investors and the public about his commitment to the company’s core goals of innovation and sustainability. Instead of restoring confidence, the move has highlighted deeper issues within Tesla, as the company continues to struggle with declining sales and mounting reputational challenges. These concerns are compounded by perceptions that Musk’s attention is divided, raising questions about whether he remains fully dedicated to steering Tesla through a critical period of transformation. As a result, his leadership is now under intensified scrutiny, with stakeholders demanding clearer direction and renewed focus on the values that once defined Tesla’s pioneering identity.

Tesla Takedown as a Global Backlash Against Musk

The hashtag #TeslaTakedown trended widely on X (formerly Twitter) and other social media platforms in early 2025, marking a global protest movement targeting Tesla and its founder, Elon Musk. Activists across the United States, Canada, Europe, and Australia called for divestment from Tesla by urging individuals and institutions to sell off their vehicles and shares. The movement was sparked by a series of controversial decisions by Musk, most notably his decision to join the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), which critics say undermined public trust in Tesla’s independence.

Even before the protest gained global momentum, Tesla was already grappling with unstable corporate performance, particularly in the stock market. In the first quarter of 2025, Tesla ranked among the worst-performing stocks in the S&P 500, with shares losing over a third of their value. This significant decline was largely fueled by public backlash against Musk’s aggressive efficiency policies under DOGE, which disrupted Tesla’s operations. Meanwhile, Tesla’s electric vehicles have struggled to maintain market share amid a surge of Chinese EVs dominating Asian and European markets. This fierce competition has led to weakened demand, production slowdowns, and mass layoffs. The company is currently laying off more than 10% of its global workforce—its largest reduction in four years—underscoring declining sales and the ongoing failure to deliver an affordable EV in the face of a price war with Chinese rivals. In addition, Tesla reported a gross profit margin of just 17.6% in Q4, the lowest in over four years.

Sustainability is a myth to Musk.  

The situation deteriorated further when the United States, under the Trump administration, withdrew from the Paris Agreement, casting fresh doubts on Musk’s environmental commitments, especially given his newly acquired role within the administration. Tesla has long branded itself as a green tech pioneer committed to zero-emission vehicles and the reduction of carbon emissions. The company’s stated goal is to operate fully carbon-neutral factories to help create a more sustainable future. However, this commitment was called into question in 2022 when Tesla was removed from the S&P 500 ESG Index. Established in 2019, the index evaluates companies based on their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards. Tesla’s removal prompted Musk to publicly denounce ESG as a scam, citing examples of tobacco companies receiving higher ESG ratings than Tesla, despite its focus on clean energy innovation. S&P justified the decision by pointing to allegations of racial discrimination and a failure to maintain a healthy workplace environment. In response, Tesla issued a statement reaffirming its commitment to equity and non-discrimination, after which it was eventually reinstated.

Tesla’s ESG Commitment and Consumer Trust

Musk’s dual role as both the head of multiple tech companies and a government bureaucrat places him in a difficult position, torn between saving his company and navigating political criticism. On one hand, Tesla’s poor ESG record with S&P has made Musk skeptical of ESG initiatives; on the other, public trust in Tesla’s electric vehicles, which are projected to play a key role in future sustainable innovation, is at risk. Without substantial reform, the divestment movement could continue to grow. The U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement signals a loosening of domestic environmental policies, including the blocking of EV subsidies, increased fossil fuel production, and a backlash against Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives. Following the U.S. withdrawal, many investors divested from their holdings, indicating a decline in ESG funds, with an estimated outflow of up to 6.1 billion US dollars in the first three months of 2025, after 4.3 billion US dollars had already been withdrawn in the last quarter of 2024.

The U.S. policy towards environmental issues directly contradicts Musk’s goals for Tesla as a leader in sustainable technology and creates serious challenges for the company in fulfilling ESG commitments. Trump’s open support for Musk amid the #TeslaTakedown controversy, even going so far as to call the protests a form of domestic terrorism, has only damaged Tesla’s reputation further. Trump also praised Musk’s budget-cutting measures, especially the termination of DEI-related contracts. This endorsement has triggered a decline in Tesla’s stock and raised investor concerns about Musk’s political entanglements with the Trump administration. Additionally, Tesla’s long history of overpromising and underdelivering, such as missing production targets or releasing products that differ sharply from initial announcements, has damaged its credibility and fueled accusations of greenwashing. Societal skepticism toward Tesla’s commitment to sustainable innovation continues to grow.

Blurred Lines Between Politics and Business

Elon Musk’s resignation from DOGE marks a crucial step toward repairing Tesla’s reputation, which had noticeably declined in early 2025. This move signals a renewed focus on Tesla’s core mission, including the return of customers who had grown skeptical of the company’s commitment to sustainable innovation. It underscores the difficult reality that balancing dual roles as a politician and a business leader is inherently vulnerable to conflicts of interest and that one must be prioritized to meet customer expectations effectively. Musk’s involvement with DOGE indicated that he placed political ambitions, particularly those aligned with Trump, above Tesla’s fundamental goals. Trump’s strong influence shaped policy decisions that reflected his controversial and dismissive approach to criticism, which conflicted with Tesla’s values and threatened the company’s commitment to sustainability.

Sustainable leadership is essential for building authentic commitments that resonate with the public, and the #TeslaTakedown movement serves as a clear wake-up call for Musk. Ultimately, only by drawing a clear line between business and politics can Tesla rebuild public trust, regain its competitive edge, and chart a sustainable path forward.

ASEAN nations have been closely observing the trajectory of US-China relations and have expressed their apprehensions vis-à-vis the uncertainty arising out of Trump tariffs. Leaders of Singapore and Malaysia have been particularly vocal in expressing their apprehensions.

While speaking at the opening of the 46th ASEAN Summit held at Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian PM, Anwar Ibrahim, referred to the imposition of tariffs by US President Donald Trump. Said the Malaysian PM:

‘Indeed, a transition in the geopolitical order is underway, and the global trading system is under further strain with the recent imposition of US unilateral tariffs,’

How ASEAN countries have benefited from the China+1 strategy

Here it would be pertinent to point out that ASEAN nations have also benefitted from the China+1 strategy of Western companies. Through this strategy, Western companies have been keen to reduce their dependence upon China and have been shifting to several ASEAN countries. Companies have moved from China not just to Vietnam but to other ASEAN nations like Indonesia and Malaysia as well.

Impact of China-US thaw on ASEAN

While many would have thought that ASEAN countries would heave a sigh of relief after the China-US agreement signed in Geneva, via which the US reduced tariffs against China from 145 percent to 30 percent. There has been a mixed reaction to the same, given the possibility of companies redrawing their China+1 plans.

Malaysia’s interest in BRICS+

Another important impact of Trump’s policies has been ASEAN countries seeking entry into multilateral organizations. Indonesia entered BRICS as a member in January 2025.

Malaysia, which entered BRICS as a partner country in October 2024, has also applied for full membership. Two other ASEAN countries, Vietnam and Thailand, also entered BRICS.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan, while commenting on the ASEAN nation’s interest in joining BRICS:

‘Malaysia’s desire to join BRICS represents its effort to uphold policies and identity as an independent and neutral country, striking a balance with great powers and opening up new business and investment opportunities,’

Malaysia shares close economic ties with China as well as the US and the EU. Malaysia’s bilateral trade with China in 2024 exceeded $200 billion ($212.04 billion). The ASEAN nation’s trade with the US was estimated at $80.2 billion in 2024.

The Malaysian PM, Anwar Ibrahim, had earlier proposed an ‘Asian Monetary Fund’ as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In recent years, Malaysia has been pushing for “de-dollarization,” or trade in non-dollar currencies, with several countries.

Anwar Ibrahim’s Russia visit and discussion of BRICS+

Apart from several other bilateral issues, the role of Malaysia in BRICS+ was also discussed during the recent meeting between Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the former’s Russia visit. The Malaysian PM thanked Putin for his role in facilitating Malaysia’s entry into BRICS+. The Russian president, on his part, welcomed the entry of Malaysia and other ASEAN nations as partner countries into BRICS+ during Russia’s chairmanship of BRICS+ in 2024.

During the meeting of Australian PM Anthony Albanese and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto during the former’s Indonesia visit, one of the issues that was discussed was Indonesia’s entry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and OECD. The CPTPP—earlier the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—was initially conceived by former US President Barack Obama. During US President Donald Trump’s earlier presidency, the US had pulled out of TPP. While the organization did face a setback after the US exit from the CPTPP — members like Japan and Australia, which are wary of China’s growing clout in the Indo-Pacific, have been playing a key role in giving a push to economic linkages. Two other ASEAN countries—Malaysia and Vietnam—are already members of the CPTPP.

The Indonesian president thanked Australia for its support for Indonesian into the CPTPP.

The Australian PM, while commenting on his support for Indonesia’s entry into CPTPP:

‘I assure you, Mr. President, of Australia’s support for your joining the OECD as well as your accession to the CPTPP.’

The Australian PM also reiterated Indonesia’s strategic importance in the context of the Indo-Pacific.

Indonesia’s important role on the global stage

Indonesia has robust ties with both China and the US and seeks to use multilateral platforms for further enhancing its clout, as several middle powers have done in recent years. Indonesia has sought to present itself as an important voice of the Global South and as an important link between the G7 and G20.

ASEAN-China-GCC

On the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit, the first ASEAN-China-GCC Summit was held for the first time. The Malaysian PM dubbed this as extraordinary. Anwar Ibrahim also said:

‘I am confident that ASEAN, the GCC, and China can draw upon our unique attributes and shape a future that is more connected, more resilient, and more prosperous.’

Conclusion

In conclusion, the interest of countries like Malaysia and Indonesia in entering multilateral organizations is driven by the changing geopolitical situation in ASEAN and beyond. These nations need to be deft and nimble and can not afford to have a zero-sum approach towards the same. The recent ASEAN Summit is a strong illustration of how ASEAN member states are seeking to diversify their relationships by seeking entry into important multilateral blocs. Apart from this, one point that is evident from the recent ASEAN summit was that ASEAN as a grouping is also seeking to strengthen ties with groups like the GCC.

With the recent pivot in US foreign policy regarding Europe and NATO, it has become clear that NATO’s European members need to ramp up spending on defense, and the time of relying on the US for defense in Europe is over. Many would argue that it’s well overdue, with Trump saying that NATO members should boost their defense spending to 5% of their GDP versus the traditional 2% target set by NATO. This target for NATO members was first set at the 2006 Riga summit; however, that target was reaffirmed and made more concrete in the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge at their summit in Wales, with only four members hitting the target that year. In 2024, those numbers were up, with NATO estimating 22 out of 32 would hit the target that year, so it’s clear defense spending in Europe is on the up. The Secretary-General of NATO, Mark Rutte, said, “We will need more time to consult amongst Allies what exactly the new level should be. But it is considerably more than 2%,” when asked about higher spending targets.

Inevitably, it will come down to the middle powers of NATO—France, Germany, Poland, and the UK—to step up to the plate and take over the leadership roles. Ultimately, this shift in responsibility will largely shape the alliance and Europe for years to come. But is this realistic, and what hurdles will the middle powers overcome to get there?

The US is the glue that holds NATO together.

Since NATO’s inception, the US has acted as the glue that keeps the alliance together, and it is evident from recent events just how crucial that role is. And it’s significantly more than just manpower/firepower, as you may expect.

The middle powers of NATO face a series of challenges ahead in their effort to step up and take over that role from the US. One of these challenges is the fact that the US plays a monumental role in the hierarchy of NATO’s various operational commands, with the US holding a lot of key roles within that structure that NATO, without the US, would not be able to operate certainly anywhere near as efficiently as it is currently run.

 The US also has an integral part to play in NATO’s capability for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), with most of the capability that NATO has being US-supplied and run. An example of this occurred during Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011): the US provided an estimated 75% of ISR assets, enabling NATO to carry out precision strikes and monitor Gaddafi regime movements.

All of this is said without even touching the subject of the US’s missile defense and general man/firepower capabilities, with the European nations currently not having an equivalent.

Defense spending and capabilities

The only way the middle powers will be able to step into the US’s shoes and fill the role Washington has traditionally played is through an increase in defense spending, resulting in a significant boost to their military capabilities. However, this necessity presents several challenges of its own, so what does the current situation look like, and how will it develop?

France has consistently maintained a capable military and spent a good amount of their GDP on defense. Fluctuations in their defense budget have meant they’ve fallen short of the 2% goal set by NATO in previous years.

President Macron announced plans in early 2023 to vastly increase military spending, pledging to spend 413 billion euros on defense in 2024-2030, an increase of 118 billion euros compared to the previous period.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, we have seen a vast increase in defense budgets across NATO, none perhaps more noticeable than in Germany, with Chancellor Olaf Scholz wanting to inject 100 billion euros into the German military (Bundeswehr) to increase military capability and readiness. With the German Federal Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius, pledging to make the German military “the backbone of deterrence and collective defense in Europe.”

It would seem this shift in defense policy is here to stay, with both German parliaments recently voting in favor of another boost to military spending.

Nevertheless, it’s not all plain sailing for Germany. With recent recruitment numbers falling short of their targets, the Bundeswehr still faces personnel shortages. It’s clear that the intention is there, but there are still many practical challenges for them to overcome.

Poland has quickly become a key player within NATO, from having a humble military at the time of the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russian forces to boasting the third-largest military within NATO, only behind that of the US and Turkey. Their armed forces have undergone a significant modernization program at this time, too.

This rapid modernization has meant Poland has fast become one of the leading defense powers within NATO, playing a crucial role in securing their eastern flank; they have also become one of NATO’s highest spenders on defense, spending an impressive 4.12% of their GDP.

The UK has consistently hit the 2% target set by NATO and, for the past four years, has even slightly exceeded this, with projects such as the Challenger 3 and the Boxer armored vehicle receiving around £5 billion in funding.

As with Germany, this isn’t without its challenges. The UK has faced significant setbacks in recruitment, with it being reported in November 2024 that the British armed forces had “consistently fallen short of recruitment targets over the past five years,” with some saying that the armed forces were losing 300 people a month more than they were recruiting.

It is also worth mentioning that France and the UK both possess nuclear capabilities, although the UK’s Trident missile system is US-supplied and maintained. Meanwhile, the French “Force de dissuasion” is fully independent.

Whilst it is undoubtable that the middle powers and Europe as a whole are taking defense spending a lot more seriously, and, for the first time since the Cold War, it is being seen as a priority, there is still a long way to go before NATO without the US taking a primary role could even be considered comparable to the NATO we have known up until now.

No natural leader

Other issues the middle powers face when trying to take over these roles are cooperation, coordination of efforts, and political and military leadership. To put it simply, NATO risks lacking unified leadership without the US. There is no obvious alternative to U.S. leadership within NATO. This means the alliance’s future leadership will depend entirely on the ability of European members to cooperate. Historically, however, that cooperation has been difficult. Europe is often divided by differing political ideologies, national interests, and unresolved disputes between member states. Countries frequently prioritize their own agendas, making it hard to reach collective decisions. A key example of this is the long-standing tension between Turkey and Greece—both NATO members, yet frequently at odds due to their history of conflict and territorial disputes. There is also the issue of the European Union and NATO often failing to cooperate, causing frequent internal strife on key issues such as the situation with Turkey and Cyprus.

Nevertheless, there are recent examples of political cohesion, such as the UK stating it would back the potential incoming German chancellor Friedrich Merz in sending Taurus missiles to Ukraine come across more as a patchwork than cohesive leadership. Most of the middle powers appear to focus on strengthening their own national capabilities rather than fostering cohesion and building multinational capacity. The result is a fragmented and disorganized approach—unsurprising, given that NATO is fundamentally an alliance of countries with a long history of rivalry and conflict. However, one should never underestimate the power of an external threat in uniting nations and giving them a common enemy, and Russia certainly seems to be doing just that.

NATO going forward

What does all this mean going forward? Across the board, especially amongst the middle powers of NATO, the intention to take a more active role in defense is there. Generally, NATO isn’t in a terrible position, and the desire for collective defense amongst member states has become paramount.

That said, the alliance still faces significant challenges ahead, especially when it comes to leadership; the US has long been the force that bridged the gap where the European members fell short. The US shifting its focus away from Europe has undoubtedly had a profound effect. It was perhaps not until this happened that it became clear just how much NATO relied on Washington for political direction, and whilst it is entirely possible for the middle powers to collectively take over that role, presently, that reality seems distant. Reaching that reality will be far from an overnight process. With Europe’s attention firmly focused on the war in Ukraine, many argue that the clock is already ticking, bringing the prospect of a conflict with Russia closer to reality.

The digital battleground has become an increasingly critical theatre for modern geopolitical conflicts, and the Taliban’s recent social media campaign targeting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia (KSA) underscores this shift. Following the UAE’s warm reception of former U.S. President Donald Trump, a surge of hostile online activity emerged, orchestrated by Taliban-linked accounts under the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). This campaign, executed through human-operated parody profiles, blends religious rhetoric, violent threats, and geopolitical grievances to undermine Gulf states’ legitimacy while reinforcing the Taliban’s ideological stance. The sophistication of this operation reveals not just a localized grievance but a broader strategy of asymmetric warfare, leveraging digital tools to exert influence beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

Central to the Taliban’s messaging is the accusation that the UAE has “disgraced Islam and the Ummah” by engaging with Trump, a figure historically criticized in the Muslim world for policies such as the travel ban on several Muslim-majority nations and his administration’s unwavering support for Israel. By framing the UAE’s diplomatic overtures as a betrayal of Islamic solidarity, the Taliban seeks to galvanize conservative Muslim audiences, casting Gulf states as Western collaborators. This narrative is not new, extremist groups have long employed religious rhetoric to isolate moderate Muslim nations, but the Taliban’s institutionalized use of social media amplifies its reach and potency.

Beyond ideological condemnation, the campaign escalates into explicit threats, with multiple accounts referencing the “yellow keg”, a signature Taliban improvised explosive device (IED) used extensively against US forces during the 2001–2021 conflict. The deliberate invocation of this imagery serves a dual purpose: it signals the Taliban’s continued embrace of violent tactics while psychologically intimidating its targets. Such threats, even if symbolic, carry the risk of inspiring lone actors or affiliated militant cells to pursue physical attacks, particularly given the historical precedent of Taliban-linked violence extending beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

While the UAE remains the primary target, the campaign’s inclusion of Saudi Arabia suggests a broader ideological offensive against Gulf monarchies perceived as aligning too closely with Western powers. The use of Pashto and Dari, languages dominant in Afghanistan but also understood among diaspora and regional jihadist circles, ensures localized resonance while maintaining plausible deniability for the Taliban’s central leadership. This linguistic choice, combined with the recycling of accounts historically used to promote Taliban edicts, reinforces the campaign’s authenticity within its intended audience.

The campaign’s timing, thematic coherence, and operational signatures point to centralized coordination, likely emanating from the Taliban’s GDI. Unlike fragmented extremist online activity, this effort displays a clear command structure, mirroring the Taliban’s disciplined approach to information warfare. The reuse of accounts previously associated with official Taliban narratives further underscores institutional involvement, distinguishing it from grassroots anti-UAE sentiment. This digital offensive aligns with the Taliban’s long-standing reliance on psychological operations, extending their influence without direct military confrontation.

The ramifications of this campaign extend far beyond social media vitriol. First, it seeks to erode the UAE’s and KSA’s religious legitimacy, particularly among conservative Muslim populations and transnational jihadist groups still active in Afghanistan. By casting these nations as apostates, the Taliban aims to fracture intra-Islamic solidarity, potentially driving recruitment for anti-Gulf militancy.

Second, the campaign reaffirms the Taliban’s commitment to asymmetric warfare. Despite their formal control of Afghanistan, the group continues to employ hybrid tactics, blending insurgency, propaganda, and diplomacy, to challenge adversaries indirectly. The digital domain offers a low-cost, high-impact arena to sustain pressure without provoking immediate military retaliation.

Most alarmingly, the explicit references to past IED tactics suggest a latent threat of physical escalation. While the Taliban may not directly orchestrate attacks on Gulf soil, the rhetoric could incite sympathizers or affiliate groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to act. The UAE and KSA, both vocal opponents of Islamist extremism, remain high-value targets for such elements.

To counter this evolving threat, a multi-faceted approach is essential:

• Gulf states should collaborate with international cybersecurity firms to identify and dismantle Taliban-linked networks, focusing on parody accounts and coordinated disinformation campaigns.
• Governments and religious institutions in the UAE and KSA must amplify moderate Islamic voices to delegitimize the Taliban’s extremist framing.
• Strengthening intelligence cooperation among Gulf nations and allies can pre-empt potential offline threats inspired by online incitement.
• Social media companies must enforce stricter verification processes to curb the proliferation of fake accounts disseminating violent propaganda.
• The international community should hold the Taliban accountable for digital incitement, linking sanctions relief to the cessation of hostile online campaigns.

“The internet is the first battlefield of the 21st century.” Wang Huning

The Taliban’s latest campaign exemplifies this reality, proving that in an interconnected world, ideological and physical conflicts are increasingly waged through pixels and propaganda. For the UAE and KSA, the challenge lies not only in defending their digital frontiers but in ensuring that online hostilities do not manifest in tangible violence. As the Taliban refines its hybrid warfare playbook, the global community must adapt, recognizing that the next threat may emerge not from a battlefield, but from a smartphone.

The intricate and multifaceted matters of normative relations among the nations of the Northeast Asian countries, even though they are entangled in specific issues stemming from territorial disputes, challenge a well-established norm and order of diplomatic relations. One of the problems is the matter of Dokdo Island’s ownership, which was disputed by the authorities of South Korea and Japan. With its significant historical and geopolitical implications, this dispute is a key factor in the region’s diplomatic landscape. On the other hand, with another matter of dispute, China and South Korea still have an issue with the overlapping territory of the exclusive economic zone. The problem is currently exacerbated by China’s installation of aquaculture facilities in the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ), a move that has significantly heightened the tension in the region and underscores the need for resolution. This territory is located off the west coast of the Korean Peninsula, making it a complex challenge to maintain Korea-China’s diplomatic relations.

At the same time, China and Japan confronted another issue similar to the South Korean dispute. Both of them claim the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands. The controversy also concerns the island’s ownership and reflects each country’s historical and cultural perspectives. Japan’s government called the island the Senkaku Islands, while China’s authority named the islands the Diaoyu Islands.

Amid the tariff oppression, which refers to the imposition of high tariffs on Chinese goods by the Trump administration, China has to face two different challenges. In one position, China has to stand against the high-handed Donald Trump’s ruling, which is seen as aggressive and unfair, but in the other position, China also struggles to bring a solution with its nearest neighbor countries in Northeast Asia, where the territorial disputes add a layer of complexity to the already well-established relations.

China’s authority realizes the crucial role of Japan and South Korea, which act as part of the US’s allies in Asia. Their relationship is strategic for the US and makes sense for China, as their connections become part of the US’s long history. This is in stark contrast to China’s past, when it was the US’s opponent during the Korean War. However, China might be letting Japan and Korea connect to the US as allies because they were China’s nearest neighbors in Northeast Asia, which could share and maintain a partnership without causing overwhelming disruptions. The mutual respect and relationship between China, Japan, and South Korea is a beacon of hope, offering a promising and positive outlook for the region’s future.

China and the US, as two economic powerhouses, often find themselves at odds. However, it’s important to note that their relationship is not solely defined by geopolitical tensions. The two countries are deeply intertwined economically, with significant trade and investment ties. This economic interdependence, which is further underscored by their influence in the G20 forum and their status as major trading partners with Korea and Japan, is a complex web that cannot be easily untangled. Despite China’s efforts to diversify its economic relationships, it continues to value the US’ political, legal, and justice systems and its socio-economic structure. The significance of these financial ties cannot be overstated, as they play a crucial role in shaping the geopolitical landscape of Northeast Asia.

Despite the unfortunate geopolitical situation, the Chinese government’s steadfast commitment to resolving the interrelations crisis is unwavering. China’s Foreign Minister Spokesperson, Guo Jiakun, clarified that the construction of the aquaculture facilities, a point of contention, did not violate any previous agreements. The Chinese government’s decision to send its delegation, led by Hong Liang, Director-General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for in-person dialogue with a South Korean representative is a clear demonstration of this commitment. The recent meeting between Hong Liang and Kang Young-Shin, Director-General for Northeast and Central Asian Affairs at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 23 April 2025, is a promising step towards potential progress. This progress in the dialogue instills optimism for the future and underscores the potential for a peaceful resolution, providing a ray of hope in an otherwise complex situation.

The dialogue of top government officials presents a pivotal platform for resolving the prolonged standoff initiated by both countries in 2019. The potential for a mutually accepted agreement in the Yellow Sea dispute dialogue is not just a beacon of hope but a realistic possibility that should inspire optimism. However, it’s essential to acknowledge that the outcome of this dialogue may not necessarily mirror the outcome of the Dokdo or Takeshima Island dispute. The Yellow Sea dispute dialogue, which encompasses territorial claims and maritime rights, remains crucial in Northeast Asian geopolitics.

Nevertheless, the Yellow Sea dialogue’s resolution couldn’t significantly affect how the Japan-South Korean government resolves the entire Dokdo or Takeshima Island dispute. Beyond territorial claims, this dispute symbolizes the intricate historical and cultural relations between Japan and South Korea. Diplomatically, South Korea and Japan have made substantial progress in finding a solution, presenting various evidence and approaches to ensure a fair judgment for both. However, as of the end of 2024, the problem remains in a stalemate without a final resolution. This situation underscores the critical need for a nuanced approach in international relations, where tact and understanding can pave the way for resolution, highlighting the importance of understanding the complexities.

The past geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia is deeply entrenched in a long and complex history, notably Japan’s occupation of Chinese territory, South Korea, and some Southeast Asian countries. This historical context, with its layers of complexity and depth, is an undeniable part of the current geopolitical landscape. The Chinese can never forget this dark period, even though Japan and China have officially tightened diplomatic relations to construct a prospective and reliable Asia. Similarly, South Korea may never forget what Japan did in the past. Indeed, Koreans have not entirely forgiven what Japan did. This historical backdrop underscores the depth of the issues and the need for a nuanced approach to diplomatic relations in Northeast Asia. It’s not a matter of simple solutions but of understanding the intricate web of history, culture, and politics that shapes these relations. This complexity and depth of the problems in the region necessitate a nuanced approach, making the audience feel the weight of the issues at hand and the importance of understanding the historical and cultural context. Only by understanding this context can we hope to navigate the complexities of Northeast Asian geopolitics.

South Korea is also determined not to be left behind in economic and diplomatic relations with others. Therefore, today, Korea actively seeks intense cooperation with China and Japan regarding global security, trade, and cultural exchange, and fosters candid cultural and financial enhancement. This intense cooperation includes regular high-level diplomatic dialogues, joint security exercises, and collaborative economic initiatives. South Korea recognizes it cannot stand alone without China and Japan, as they are pivotal neighbors in Northeast Asia.

The governments of Northeast Asian countries are acutely aware that the US-China trade war significantly impacts the global economic landscape. This trade war, which has led to economic uncertainties and geopolitical tensions, has also influenced the diplomatic relations and security strategies of countries in the region. Despite the region’s bleak history, it is becoming increasingly clear that the countries in Northeast Asia are not isolated entities but deeply interconnected and interdependent. South Korea’s sustainable diplomatic relations with China and Japan are crucial for its global standing and security. By collaborating with these countries, South Korea can strengthen its position in the international community and ensure its protection in the face of global challenges, including those arising from the US-China trade war. The trade war has forced countries in the region to reassess their economic and security strategies, leading to a more interconnected and interdependent Northeast Asia. This reassessment includes a shift towards diversifying trade partners and strengthening regional security alliances, highlighting the region’s adaptability and resilience in the face of global challenges.

Northeast Asian interdependence underscores the need for peaceful and constructive relations among these countries and their collective influence on the worldwide community. The economic and diplomatic ties between South Korea, China, and Japan are not just about mutual benefits and shared security and prosperity in the region but also about the potential for increased economic growth and enhanced security. This collaboration offers reassurance about the potential benefits of these ties and the collective strength they can bring, reassuring the audience about the future and the positive outcomes that can be achieved through such cooperation.

Disclaimer: The Author wishes to reiterate that this article reflects his views and does not represent any institution. He also wants to emphasize that he takes personal responsibility for the content and accuracy of the information in this article, and any decision made based on this information is the reader’s responsibility.

The Middle East—a cradle of history, culture, and geopolitical contradictions—has repeatedly witnessed alluring promises of peace that ultimately sank into the whirlpool of its complex realities. The doctrine of “peace through strength,” which became a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy in the region during Donald Trump’s second presidential term, relies on displays of military might, economic sanctions, and aggressive diplomacy. It claims to tame rogue actors and bring stability to a turbulent region. However, the history of the Middle East, from the failure of “maximum pressure” policies to the inability of the Abraham Accords to resolve the Palestinian conflict, demonstrates that such an approach not only fails to deliver lasting peace but often fuels instability and heightens tensions.

The strategy of “peace through strength” is based on the assumption that military posturing and economic pressure can alter the behavior of regional players or compel them to cooperate. This approach was tested during Trump’s first term through the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, beginning with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. The goal was to force Iran into negotiations by imposing crippling sanctions, but the outcome was quite the opposite. A 2024 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that Iran has enriched uranium to 60%, just a step away from weapons-grade. This advancement not only signals the failure of the pressure campaign to contain Iran’s nuclear program but also escalated regional tensions. Moreover, the 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani—intended as a show of strength—did not weaken Iran but rather empowered its proxy forces, including Hezbollah and Iraqi militias. A 2024 UN Security Council report confirms that these groups expanded their operations following Soleimani’s death.

The Abraham Accords, hailed in 2020 as a major achievement of power-driven diplomacy, are another illustration of the limitations of this approach. These agreements, which normalized relations between Israel and countries like the UAE and Bahrain, were largely facilitated through U.S. economic and military incentives. However, they ignored the core issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, leading to increased violence in the West Bank and Gaza. UN reports from 2025 indicate that violence surged in these areas post-Accords, as Palestinians felt sidelined. This underscores that peace achieved by privileging some parties while excluding others is neither durable nor just—it fosters mistrust and unrest. An analysis by the Middle East Institute (March 2025) likewise emphasizes that the marginalization of the Palestinian issue has rendered the Abraham Accords fragile and incapable of withstanding regional shocks.

The Middle East is a region where history, identity, and national interests are so deeply intertwined that power-centric solutions often prove ineffective. Regional rivalries—such as the Iran-Saudi conflict or the Israeli-Palestinian struggle—are rooted in complex historical and identity-based issues that cannot be resolved through military or economic coercion. Unconditional U.S. support for Israel, a hallmark of Trump 2.0’s power-based approach, has eroded public trust across the Arab world. Pew Research Center polls in 2024 show that 72% of respondents in Arab countries perceive U.S. policies as biased and destabilizing. This distrust has only deepened with recent developments, such as Trump’s controversial proposal to relocate Gaza’s population to Egypt and Jordan and transform Gaza into the “Middle East Riviera.” The plan, strongly opposed by Egypt, Jordan, and Palestinian officials, has been condemned not only as impractical and illegal but also as an attempt to redefine the Palestinian issue as a humanitarian crisis rather than a political one.

Trump 2.0’s aggressive policies—including increased U.S. military presence in the region and threats of strikes against Iran—have exacerbated rather than reduced tensions. An April 2025 analysis by the Middle East Institute notes that Trump’s abrupt announcement of “direct” talks with Iran, while simultaneously threatening military action, sowed confusion and distrust among regional allies, including Israel. This oscillation between threats and diplomacy reflects the absence of a coherent strategic framework in Trump’s foreign policy. Additionally, U.S. military strikes against the Houthis in Yemen and support for Israeli operations in Gaza—disregarding their human and political consequences—have further fueled instability. A February 2025 Newsweek analysis warns that such actions have increased the risk of direct conflict between Israel and Iran.

One of the most significant flaws of the “peace through strength” doctrine is its failure to build trust among regional actors. Lasting peace requires frameworks that account for the concerns of all parties involved, but a power-based approach often strengthens one side at the expense of another. The Abraham Accords, by excluding Palestinians, contributed to growing distrust among Arab societies. In contrast, more successful examples—such as the 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel—demonstrate the importance of inclusive diplomacy. That agreement, reached through U.S. mediation and extensive negotiations, resulted in a durable peace because it addressed the concerns of both parties. Similarly, the 2015 JCPOA negotiations, which involved global powers and Iran, effectively curbed Iran’s nuclear program until the U.S. withdrawal in 2018. IAEA reports confirm that Iran complied with the deal until that point. This success highlights the superiority of multilateral diplomacy over unilateral pressure.

The “peace through strength” doctrine has not only failed to resolve Middle Eastern conflicts but has also contributed to economic and political instability. While broad sanctions against Iran pressured its economy, they also strengthened nationalist narratives in Tehran. A 2024 World Bank report shows that Iran has mitigated some of the sanctions’ impact by expanding trade with China and Russia. Furthermore, Trump’s aggressive economic policies—including broad tariffs on regional countries, such as a 17% tariff on Israeli goods—have created economic volatility and eroded allies’ trust. A 2025 Brookings Institution analysis notes that Chinese investments in regional infrastructure have grown significantly since 2018, signaling a decline in U.S. influence in favor of rivals like China and Russia.

The continuation of power-based policies risks further escalation. Statements by U.S. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce—that “Iran’s threat to expel IAEA inspectors contradicts its claim of a peaceful nuclear program”—and the response by Iran’s atomic agency spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi—that “no limitations exist on enrichment under the safeguards framework”—highlight the current stalemate. These disagreements underscore the need for diplomatic dialogue, not threats and pressure.

The doctrine of “peace through strength,” by ignoring the complexities of the Middle East, has repeatedly failed. Experiences such as maximum pressure on Iran, the Abraham Accords, and unrealistic proposals like relocating Gaza’s population reveal that military and economic might without inclusive diplomacy leads to instability. The Middle East needs frameworks that consider all sides and focus on building trust. Successful cases like Camp David and the JCPOA show that while multilateral diplomacy is difficult, it can yield lasting results. For the United States, shifting from imposing power to facilitating dialogue would not only reduce tensions but also restore its role as a credible mediator.

In the context of emerging new world, key global powers are thumbing up their strategic agendas, seriously evaluating their approaches in taking positions on diverse issues including security, trade and economics with implications for and impact on developing countries. Notwithstanding, Africa has seemingly become the center of the geopolitics, and the United States tariffs China’s trade while Russia attempts to assert its control over Ukraine’s ambitions to join North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO].

In early May 2025, MD Africa editor Kester Kenn Klomegah had the chance to talk with Professor Arnold Boateng over a number questions connecting evolutionary geopolitical process and its implications and likely impact on shaping world’s landscape. Professor Arnold Boateng is an Entrepreneur, Consultant, Speaker and Author. [Books: Dreams of Our Youth: The African Youth Question: Ananse Verses: Foundations for Life…Available from Amazon & Kindle Store].  Here are the interview excerpts:

Which global power is emerging and could, in the near future, be recognized as the super power?

Professor Arnold Boateng: In terms of Security Russia is already a superpower. It has a much [official records] ICBMs and nuclear weapons as the United States. On the economic front, China is more likely to take over. It has the ambition and intent. By purchasing power parity, it surpassed the United States a year ago or two ago.

Russia on the other seems to be more interested in dethroning the United States to put an end to America’s unilateralism, exceptionalism and the chaos in Eastern Europe, the Pacific and Latin America. Recently, Robert Gates was quoted as saying; “The United States is  the most destabilizing force on earth.”

China has a long way though. The final chip for a really superpower is to have your currency as “reserve currency.” China is a long way from that but within reach in a couple of years.

Would China want to be a superpower having seen what unchecked power has altered American foreign policy and excesses?

AB: Global majority is seriously betting on China. And my bet is on China too. But this does not rule out Russia if it could have the ambition. China should learn from the errors of the United States. It should acknowledge that one leader may sit on the throne but he does not rule alone. If Beijing is willing to have a multipolar world, then as they say;” China would have the Mandate of Heaven to lead and NOT rule.

Does it mean power is steadily moving from the northern hemisphere to South-South coalition?

AB: Power has already shifted. It did when Russia and China won Eurasia. We are merely waiting to see the reality play out in the open. Europe is deindustrialising. Their manufacturing sector has slowed due to high energy cost among other factors.

On security front, its benefactor has been the United States through NATO. With Trump’s policy of America first Europe has seen the writing on the wall. Resources for Europe’s industrial drive have largely come from the south. Nigerien uranium power 70% of France’s energy needs. Cobalt, gold, and other minerals driving their tech and general industrial push have come from the south.

The South-South coalition is on the rose. First, they have the raw materials and energy resources. They have a Highly educated and skill workforce in STEM. They have a youthful population and fast moving economies.

Apparently is it rather West vs. East?

AB: It should be the East. The world, especially Africa, has seen the enough to choose the East over the West. The West’s colonial project set Africa back for more than a century. We have endured their economic hitmen, wars and falsification of African history. Everywhere they have been, had been destabilized. In India, during the colonial project, opium wars in China; Libya, Iraq and regime change in Latin America and all over the world.

In a context of this inevitable evolutionary process, how can describe Africa’s position in the shifting power dynamics?

AB: For now Africa is divided. Africa looks either confuse or has failed to read the shifting power centres.

Africa is central to China’s rise and maintaining their position. Without DRC cobalt, the electronic industry and new tech economies could  not be sustained.

Africa is the King who does not know who he is. 

Can we conclude that China is the leading economic power? What makes Africa’s economic position uncertain in sharing global power?

AB: China controls more 85% of global supply chain. It is in the lead but it cannot get to the top alone. It lacked historical prestige. Much of its 5,000 year history it has been a closed system especially after the Ming took over from the Yuan Dynasty. It opened up under British Imperial project and closed again until President Nixon opened it up. Then Tiananmen happened.

The world is not seeking for another Superpower again considering the excesses of the United States around the globe when the Soviet Union declined in the 1990s. We are looking for a round table leadership. Africa is divided. We lack a coherent continent wide vision. Clearly, without sounding disrespectful, it looks like Africa does not know what is going on. We are oblivious to the shifting centres of power. African must stand together. We must have a common BRICS policy. A common China policy and assert good governance; regional industrial policy; common resource extraction and contracts policy. Common intelligence and security infrastructure among other critical systems necessary for being part of the shapers of the emerging global order.