USA

KEY POINT:

–        The contemporary importance of the aerospace sector stems from its complex technological structure, its diverse applications, and balanced public and private investment, which contribute to security in competitive environments.

–        The 2001 United Nations Convention on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space illustrates the conflict between space militarization and technological security. Modern competition increasingly intertwines military and economic aspects, as demonstrated by advances in electronic warfare and communication systems.

–        As space becomes a battleground for military dominance, it is essential to ensure peaceful development in this race. The challenges lie in managing military interests while promoting civilian innovations, revealing the complexities of international law and the prospects for disarmament in an evolving geopolitical landscape.

–        In contemplating treaties, there is a risk of being seen as naive, as demonstrated by the decline of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This highlights the need to avoid the militarization of space. Alternatives include maintaining secrecy over space defense technologies or promoting strategic alliances for technology sharing.

–        A coalition between the United States, the European Union, and Russia could counterbalance the military advances of China and India. Investment in aerospace technology is key to gaining a competitive advantage, while trade agreements could guide the distribution of dual-use technologies, ultimately influencing global power dynamics and social transformations.

Why write about investing in the space sector today? Because it is an area of intervention that has the following structural characteristics: a) it is a complex combination of technologies, as was the case with the cas and , in its early days, the laptop computer; b) it offers a wide range of multiple application to other mature non-space technologies, c) it optimizes the combination of public and private investment, as has been the case with all other investments in technology that have changed the entire production system, and finally d) it guarantees the security of technologies and, therefore, of investments, which are covered in the eyes of competitors for military or security reasons.

For “mature” technologies, this is not possible. [1]

The issue of the militarization of space is essential to understanding the applicability of new aerospace technologies to non-military production.

In 2001, the UN General Assembly approved a Convention on the prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, signe by all major countries interested in space technologies.

But here too there is a logical contradiction between the non-militarization of space and the security of technologies, which must be covered by international competition in order to produce sufficiently attractive economic returns in a timely manner. [2]

Furthermore, there is a concept that could also be described as economy, albeit in a broad sense: if a State or alliance acquires a competitive edge in a weapons system, it also acquires maximum deterrence at minimum cost.

Competition between weapons system reduces their effectiveness and increases their structural costs, while also limiting their application cycles to civilian production, where global competitors can enter the market.

This is an application of Michael Porter’s thesis on the “global competitive advantage” [3].

It is therefore not surprising that space is the scene of competition that, in addition to being economic and application-based, is increasingly military in nature.

Just think, for example, of laser countermeasures for enemy missile systems and advanced electronic jamming and message distortion techniques that can be directed from space to Earth or, more simply, between space weapons themselves. [4]

The Chinese have already affirmed, in their theoretical and strategic models, the absolute importance of electronic warfare from space and, therefore, of incapacitating the enemy by abolishing its strategic and tactical communication networks. [5]

This is a modern reinterpretation of Sun Tsu’s concept that, in the best tradition of Chinese Zen, victory is achieved by forcing the enemy to move.

The strategic application of the esoteric Buddhist concept of wu wei, “moving without moving.”

Therefore, the more the space economy becomes central to the definition of the next models of globalized development, a technological-productive development in which many non-European and non-Western people will participate for the first time in human history, the more we should expect a “space war” perhaps managed according to the criteria of the Cold War, i.e. a conflict that never reaches the final clash but still makes it credibile and probable.[6]

But let’s see how and what the scientific and technological market of space can become.

According to a British forecast, the return on investment in space is expected to increase in 2007 to USD 140 billion [7], with a differentiation of services as follows: international direct-to-home services, 32%; radio, 6%; fixed satellites, 18%; mobile satellites, 3%; and direct-to-home in the US, 32%.

Total investment is expected to be USD 60 billion. [8]

So, first of all, telecommunications, which is not coincidentally the backbone of current and, above all, future weapons systems.

The ESA, the European Space Agency of which Italy is naturally a member, has drawn up a development plan up to 2010 in which the following are optimized for the communication sector: the size of satellite payloads, the application of military-derived Ku Band technology to civilian networks, and the development of fixed networks for Earth observation for economic, agricultural, and land traffic management purposes [9].

In other words, the aim here is to make investment in aerospace sustainable in order to optimize communication networks, according to the classic model of the “service society” developed in the mid-1980s [10].

But are we sure that the “computerization” and materialization of society and production systems are still a model capable of explaining the world and, above all, of predicting and changing it, according to Karl Marx’s old idea of ideas that “transform” rather than reflect reality?

Today’s aerospace technologies are not so clear-cut in their alignment with the “third wave” model.

Think, for example, of biology and pharmacological and therapeutic experiments or the production of new materials in the absence of gravity.

In the short term, the Great Transformation hypothesized by Karl Polanyi for old industrial capitalism is not only about communication or process innovation but also and above all about old traditional product innovation.

The US NASA has sent two flowers donated by International Flavors & Fragrances into space on the Shuttle Columbia to see whether the absence of gravity would change their scents to produce new essences.

The Russians have signed a contract with US television producer Burnett to organize a “reality show” in space.

In short, the amount of innovative non-communication technologies generated in space is increasing, according to the author’s calculations, by 36% per year for public investment and, as can be seen, private investment. [11]

Therefore, there is nothing to prevent these techologies and new materials from being used in a possible multilateral conflict for space management in the context of future space utilization, including for military purposes.

It is true that, to use a cliché and state the obvious, “space is immense,” but it is the orbits closest to Earth that are most useful both technologically and for telecommunications and, of course, for military purposes. Therefore, military and security control of these orbits will allow for the optimization of public and private investment in aerospace, both civil and military.

Here too, to paraphrase Von Clausewitz, we will be dealing with a cold war by other means.

Meanwhile, defense and security spending allows for the exclusivity of technologies, which cannot be copied or “cloned,” thus guaranteeing the predictability of expected economic returns.

Furthermore, security and defense produce maximum innovation because they are forced to find the competitive or strategic “gap” to exploit for as long as possible against potential enemies.

Finally, space investment in the security-defense area allows for the confidentiality of civilian applications when the time comes.

But when it comes to aerospace, there is more: the possibility of controlling wide areas of the Earth from above allows for an epoch-making strategic transformation: maximum deterrence combined with retaliatory power.

This is a far cry from the atomic strategy, when the aim, from Beaufre to Paul Nitze, was to inflict maximum damage to make it impossible for the enemy to respond and thus force them into classic unconditional surrender.

The development of military space allows for the immediate elimination of defenses and complete blindness to subsequent waves of attack, whether nuclear or conventional.

The new Global Space Strategic allows the fusion of direct and indirect strategy, because the communicative, political, cultural, social, and productive structures are annihilated by the same series of salvos from space that nullify the defenses and response potential of the target state [12].

So the question that arises is this: how can we avoid the strategies that fall out of the “space race” and use aerospace and its innovative technologies only in ways that guarantee peaceful, participatory, and optimal development?

The issue is more difficult than it seems. In fact, much of the public investor’s interest is military, given that the “weaponization” of space allows, with well-planned civilian spin-offs, weapon system such as the atomic weapon of the Cold war, i.e. a high potential for a winning strike, absolute brevity of military actions, and maximum success.

Furthermore, the techniques used in the 1970s to force most countries to abandon nuclear weapons through the Non-Proliferation Treaty have proved ineffective.

On the military front, the so-called “third world” countries now all have the real or short-term possibility of producing atomic weapons.

Weapons “cannot be uninvented,” as General Carlo Jean said years ago.

Furthermore, believing that signing a series of pieces of paper is enough to force a state to change its national strategy or, perhaps, to accept Manzonian proclamations against its neighbors who have instead switched to military nuclear power is a belief of absolute naivety.

There are no treaties that can prevent a state from achieving what it considers to be its national interest. Machiavelli’s saying that words do not govern states also applies to international law.

To believe in the power of treaties is to run the risk of being written, according to Guicciardini’s brutal formula in the Book of Fools.

Finally, the inglorious end of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should prevent us from repeating the path towards the militarization of space, as described by Manzoni.

Let us consider the other possibilities: a) absolute secrecy surrounding space defense technologies, leaving the competitors in this new Cold War in doubt as to what technology and doctrine are actually being used. Difficult, but it can be attempted.

Or, within the framework of a clear and strategic alliance, not simply an assembly of Hegelian “beautiful souls,” we could push for effective sharing of space technologies, including those with dual military-civilian use, within the framework of a shared defense doctrine.

Of course, this requires strategic thinking and, above all, serious identification of the enemy, without which there can be no strategy or tactics.

For example, one could think of an alliance between the Russian Federation, Europe, and the US against the strategy and military development of the China-India complex, which would quickly render many technologies obsolete and enjoy a very long “development window” before wages and prices are adjusted to Euro-American standards. [13].

Or a mixture of results that are effective in terms of cost-efficiency (in the sense that it would cost more for any state to wage space war to obtain them on its own) that could stabilize China itself, which could develop its dual-use space technologies also in accordance with a global agreement with Europe and the US to secure Western commercial expansion in Central and South Asia.

At this point, it would be a matter of finding a balance between Western and Eastern Technologies, but above all it would be necessary to verify whether our long term development programs envisage an expansion of European trade routes towards Asia, which would make this global strategy entirely reasonable.

If, on the other hand, China and India wanted to manage their “near abroad” on their own, strategy number one, that of an alliance on the militarization of space between the US, the EU, and the Russian Federation, would be more useful.

In short, we need to know and decide where we want to go and then shape our security and space warfare strategies accordingly, without hoping that other areas of the planet will do us the favor of standing still.

On the contrary, as far as we can predict, I suppose that a set of commercial and financial rules, rather than legal ones, could be defined for dual-use space technologies, based on the excellent experience of NATO’s COCOM throughout the Cold War.

From there, we can establish a division of labor in global space technology: there is no point in investing where others have done so before and better; it is better to define sharing rules (with competitive prices) to buy what is unnecessary to develop internally and perhaps resell on the global market those technologies in which a country or technological alliance has proven unbeatable.

Consider, in this case, the technologies for propellant chemistry, which Italy has developed with a high rate of innovation in recent years.

If this global market becomes optimal, then the force of circumstances will prevent the establishment of complete national technologies for the militarization of space. The global economy could become the Machiavellian reality of the situation.

In the meantime, it is absolutely necessary to invest in aerospace in order to acquire that “competitive edge” in cutting-edge technologies, which often have military and space origins, and which will allow us to continue to have: a) a highly differentiated production system, b) a high productivity margin that is competitive with our global competitors.

Reducing labor costs is a limited strategy, and, in any case, it clashes with the cost of living and therefore with a wage bill that is ultimately inelastic. The lower the wage, the worse the productivity per unit of output.

So, we need to invest immediately in advanced aerospace technologies, which will be the source of the next technological clusters that will determine who wins and who loses in the global division of labor.

In conclusion, albeit briefly, I have attempted to outline that we are closely linked to a highly complex set of developments in the technological, military, and economic sectors.

But above all, in that sector where scientific achievements produce deep transformations in the lives of individuals, which in turn change societies. This is the duty of those in science, politics, and business who have the task of questioning the future as a challenge for development and an opportunity for future progress.

Giancarlo Elia Valori

[1] V. Arms Control, Militarization of Outer Space, in www.globalissues.org, accessed on June 12, 2006

[2] V. NBER, Business Cycles Indicators, NBER, University of Chicago, Chicago 2001

[3] V. Michael Porter, Harvard University, Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, On Competition, Harvard University Press, 2002

[4] Lt. Col. Bruce M. Deblois, USAF, Space Sanctuary, a Viable National Strategy, Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1998.

[5] See defenselink.org, Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., January 2005.

[6] See The National Security Archive, The Master of the Game, Paul Nitze and US Cold War Strategy, from Truman to Reagan, Washington, D.C., October 2004.

[7] UK STRATEGY 2003-2006 AND BEYOND, British Government, 2004

[8] State of the Space Industry, 2004, International Space Business Council, March 2004

[9] BR-256, October 2005, ESA, the Telecommunications Long-Term Plan 2006-2010, Noordwijk, Holland, 2005

[10] Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, Bantam Books, 1984

[11] Commercial Alert, NASA shifts strategy for selling outer space, Washington Post, Ariana Eunjung Cha, March 2005

[12] Stephen M. Younger, Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 27 Giugno 2000

[13] See  HEARTHLAND review, Number entitled The atomic Rush, n. 1 2006

We won! Or, at least those of us who were rooting for Amaya Espinal and Bryan Arenales to take home the prize on Season 7 of “Love Island USA.”

After a blockbuster season with its fair share of controversy, the 25-year-old nurse from New York City and the 28-year-old accountant, bartender and real estate agent from Boston, respectively, walked out of the villa $100,000 richer and became the first Latino couple to win “Love Island.” In a time when many Latinos in the U.S. are being inundated with threats to our safety and freedom, this example of a mutual, fun and respectful Latino love is an indulgent little triumph for us all.

The dating show became appointment viewing for millions of fans, including myself, with new episodes dropping almost nightly as the show airs in near real time. “Love Island” — which launched in the U.K. in 2015 and has since spawned several international versions — confines single hotties in a Fijian villa, where they must explore romantic connections and couple up with each other to remain on the show. Viewers and cast members known as “islanders” vote regularly to decide which contestants or couples must pack up their swimsuits and go home. As with most reality TV, there’s messiness, drama, silliness and sexiness that keeps viewers glued to their screens, and we clock in for our shift at the island mines with dedication.

Espinal, a self-described “Dominican Cinderella,” entered the villa as a “bombshell,” a cast addition meant to stir things up for the original couples. Meanwhile, her Prince Charming, Arenales, who is Puerto Rican and Guatemalan, came in during the Casa Amor segment of the show, when islanders are separated by gender and introduced to hot new cast members vying for their attention.

The two coupled up several episodes after meeting in Casa Amor, igniting a romance in large part over a shared understanding of their cultures. Being super hot probably didn’t hurt either, but it was seeing Arenales stand up for our sweet Amaya Papaya against a pile-on from his fellow male islanders that sealed the deal — not just for Espinal, but for the viewers, in particular Latinx ones.

Espinal’s rough start on the series reflected the cultural valleys that exist between Latinos and their non-Latino counterparts in the United States, which can generally make for a tricky dating experience. Three of the male contestants she coupled up with expressed discomfort with her personality and bold manner of expressing herself. It started with a blowup with contestant Ace Greene after he vocalized his discomfort with Espinal touching him and using terms of endearment, in particular the word “babe.”

The same issue came up when she coupled up with Austin Shepard and Zak Srakaew, who took issue with Espinal “moving too fast” by acting overly romantic (on a show called “Love Island,” mind you). This was despite her explaining that in Dominican culture terms like “mi vida,” “mi amor” and “babe” are common terms of endearment, and asking if it was OK that she use them. (Both agreed it was fine.)

Espinal certainly lost her cool — in most cases, I would argue, rightfully so — and regularly became emotional, struggling with feeling misunderstood and attacked. Still, she defended herself with confidence and strength from those who seemed intent on painting her as erratic, intense, pushy and aggressive. During a game in which islanders wrote letters to air out any grievances, she offered them a simple option: “I’m just not your cup of tea to be drinkin’, so don’t f—ing drink it.”

It was during that game in which Greene, Shepard and Srakaew went in on Espinal that Arenales stepped in to defend her, explaining what Espinal had long been saying: Those terms of endearment are common in Latino households. “You’re telling her to meet you halfway,” he said. “You gotta meet her halfway too.”

Arenales gallantly stepping up to support Espinal against a social firing squad sparked a flame between the two. Fan votes showed this moment to be a turning point for Espinal, who became a favorite. It doesn’t hurt that her nurturing personality and adorable zaniness make her very easy to root for.

Seeing Arenales voice his appreciation for who she is and understanding her background — and Espinal herself refusing to change parts of her personality that she views as the strengths of an “emotional gangsta” — made their coupling a powerful display of Latino love. Those two crazy kids just get each other!

“This is just a message to everyone out there who’s misunderstood: Nobody should be tamed and there’s always someone out there for you who’s going to love you for you and appreciate all your craziness,” Espinal told host Ariana Madix after their win was announced. “Don’t ever settle for nobody.”

This was an especially lovely and important win after this season was marred by a racism scandal in which two Latina islanders were found to have used racial slurs online and in a podcast.

As much as Espinal may have felt misunderstood, Espinal is not a difficult person. There’s no need to decipher her because it’s not that complicated, regardless of her cultural identity. From everything I saw on the show, she showed a tremendous amount of character and kindness. She just didn’t put up with B.S. from guys who were trying to diminish her, call her irrational and insinuate she was clingy. Amaya Papaya always stood on business.

I love that Espinal found someone who sees and appreciates her in Arenales. And judging by their win, she found that in innumerable people who voted for them as well. But there’s nothing anyone should struggle to understand about her.

Yes, parts of her behavior are informed by her culture — but yelling at a man who is trying to make you seem crazy is a universal experience we should all partake in.

Brits heading on USA holidays have been warned of new legislation that will see a big change affecting the country’s tourism visa costs as experts have issued advice

Brits heading on USA holidays should take note of new changes to the country’s visa application process.

Currently, UK holidaymakers wanting to visit the USA for tourism need to apply for the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), underthe Visa Waiver Program. According to the UK Foreign Office: “All Visa Waiver Program (VWP) travellers intending to enter the US by land, sea and air will be required to obtain an approved ESTA prior to application for admission at land border ports of entry.” To enter the US, your passport must be valid for the length of your planned stay.

At the time of writing, the ESTA application costs $21 and is generally valid for valid for two years from the date of authorisation, or until your passport expires, whichever comes first.

However, the US Congress has approved new legislation that includes a price hike for the ESTA from $21 to $40 – so nearly double the price.

As a result, the travel experts at Journeyscape have issued a warning for travellers, urging them to apply for the ESTA now if they have US travel plans. They explained: “While many travellers report receiving approval within minutes, ESTA applications can sometimes take up to 72 hours for approval. It’s wise to apply at least a week before your trip. However, don’t apply more than 90 days before your travel date, as the ESTA is only valid for two years, and applying too early could mean needing to renew sooner than necessary if you frequently visit the US.”

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It’s also worth double checking the information you provide – for example, making sure you match your passport information exactly including your full legal name, passport number and expiration date, and ensuring you give an updated email address as that’s where your approval notification will be sent.

Common mistakes that could see your application rejected include incorrect passport information, failing to disclose previous travel plans, or applying too close to travel dates, as if there’s an issue you may not get the document in time, and therefore you’ll be unable to travel.

They also issued advice for Brits around third party services that could leave you paying even more, explaining: Only use the official ESTA website to avoid additional fees from third-party services. The current application fee is $21, but it was recently announced that it’s set to rise to $40, nearly double the current cost. Many third-party sites charge even more, often without offering any added value.”

Once you’ve applied, the travel pros recommend checking the status of your application; if it’s pending longer than you’d expect, check there isn’t any extra information you may need to supply.

Kerry Manley, Head of Marketing at North America travel specialist Journeyscape added: “Navigating the ESTA process can indeed be smooth and hassle-free if you take a proactive approach. The key is to apply early, ideally at least a week before your departure, to account for any unexpected delays. Using the official ESTA website is crucial to avoid unnecessary fees or scams. Double-checking your details—such as passport information and travel itinerary—can prevent common mistakes that lead to denials.

“Additionally, staying informed about recent rule changes is essential, especially for travellers who may be affected by the latest restrictions, such as those related to travel history in Cuba.

“Even with a valid ESTA, remember that entry to the U.S. is ultimately determined at the border by Customs and Border Protection. Be prepared to answer questions about your travel purpose and itinerary. Following these steps will help ensure a seamless travel experience, minimising stress and maximising your trip’s success.”

You can find out more about US entry requirements on the UK Foreign Office website and on the official ESTA website.

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. — In some ways, one of the longest-serving members of the International Olympic Committee, Anita DeFrantz, paved the way for the new president of the IOC, Kirsty Coventry, to get to where she is today.

That why Coventry, the first female leader of the IOC, pulled a big surprise Saturday. She traveled to Colorado Springs to watch DeFrantz, a trailblazing Olympic rower in 1976 and IOC member since 1986, get inducted into the Team USA Hall of Fame.

“She opened up so many doors, for me and for so many others,” said Coventry, who took over as president last month, in an interview with the Associated Press before the ceremony. “I’m extremely grateful for that. I know that I’ve got to make sure I do that for other women.”

The 72-year-old DeFrantz is part of a class that includes eight individual women — among them 11-time Olympic medalist Allyson Felix, four-time Olympic champion Serena Williams, three-time Olympic champion Kerri Walsh Jennings and 2012 all-around gymnastics champion Gabby Douglas.

Also inducted Saturday were Bode Miller, Mike Krzyzewski, Phil Knight, Steve Cash, Susan Hagel, Flo Hyman and Marla Runyan, along with the 2010 four-man bobsled team and the 2004 women’s wheelchair basketball team.

Coventry showed up for DeFrantz, who played an important role in moving votes toward the five-time Olympic swimmer from Zimbabwe in the seven-person race to succeed Thomas Bach earlier this year.

This was one of Coventry’s first big — albeit low-key — trips in the new role, and DeFrantz was shocked to see the new president standing there as she got out of her car to head into the ceremony at the Broadmoor.

DeFrantz described herself as a little lonely when she went to her first IOC meeting in 1986.

“I walked in and I thought, ‘This is odd,’” she said. “It was this cavernous room” and she was one of only five female committee members there.

One of her main goals in becoming a shaper of world sports policy: “We had to help people open their minds a little.”

While, in some ways, the Olympics has been ahead of its time in the effort to bring women into big-time sports — 22 women participated in the 1900 Olympics while, for instance, it took until 1981 for the NCAA to sanction women’s basketball — it has also shined a global spotlight on some inequities that have existed for decades.

Women’s rowing didn’t debut at the Games until the 1976 Olympics where DeFrantz and her teammates won bronze. Only last year did the Olympics achieve gender parity, with women making up half of the approximately 10,500 athletes, according to the IOC.

DeFrantz, a vice president of the 1984 LA organizing committee, helped spark that progress. She served as chair of the IOC’s women in sport commission for 20 years. She became a member of the IOC executive board in 1992 and was elected as the IOC’s first female vice president in 1997.

Allyson Felix smiles after taking the bronze in the final of women’s 400 meters at the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo.

(Francisco Seco / Associated Press)

A generation later, Felix began her own fight to highlight the way women were treated when they became pregnant. She forced a seismic change in contract terms that, for decades, had given little leeway to female track stars who put careers on hold to have babies.

Felix is now a member of the IOC, as well — following in the footsteps of both DeFrantz and Coventry as Olympic athletes who now have seats at the decision-making table.

“I feel really blessed to come after Anita and I’ve told her this many times, she has paved the way,” Felix said. “She’s a game-changer. Just what she’s seen and contributed to is incredible. For someone like me, it’s just wanting to carry on her legacy.”

DeFrantz’s honor comes at yet another tenuous time for women in sports, punctuated by headline-grabbing debates about eligibility and gender testing in track, boxing, swimming and other sports that will likely bring leaders like Coventry and DeFrantz into the mix.

Coventry said it’s important to “protect the female category,” and has signaled that the IOC will take a more active role in setting guidelines for participation.

But for the 41-year-old president, this was a night for celebrating a mentor who made her role in today’s debates possible.

“It’s all about letting people have opportunities,” DeFrantz said. “You can’t make an Olympian. But you can open the door to possibilities.”

When it became clear that the couple beneath the bedclothes were indeed having sexual intercourse, the West Hollywood crowd that had come to watch cheered loudly and with the exultant delight that one imagines might erupt from courtiers overseeing a royal post-nuptial bedding. Or, in a more contemporary context, from soccer fans after a final-minute, high-left-corner soccer goal.

But no. This was a “Love Island USA” watch party presented by Reality Bar at Roosterfish Tuesday night, one of hundreds of similar gatherings at bars all over the country. After living in the shadow of its wildly popular U.K. progenitor, “Love Island USA” became a hit last year with a genuinely love-filled Season 6. This year, the series has seen more scandal than romance — two contestants have been removed following outcry over their past use of racial slurs in social media posts.

But if the proliferation of watch parties is any indication, those scandals have only increased audience interest.

“I never really understood sports bars before,” my 25-year-old daughter told me. “Now I do.”

For a watch-party neophyte, it was more than a little strange to see tables full of people set aside their watermelon margaritas and mozzarella sticks to applaud the sexual consummation of strangers. But under those sheets cavorted current fan-favorite Amaya “Papaya” Espinal with her current partner Bryan Arenales, which explains the crowd’s voyeuristic joy. On “Love Island,” the couple perceived as the strongest wins the $100,000 prize (and, presumably, romantic bliss).

So the approving roar was, in part, driven by relief and hope for a team Amaya Papaya win.

Amaya “Papaya” Espinal and Bryan Arenales in Tuesday’s episode of “Love Island USA.”

(Peacock)

It was also the sound of the latest attempt to revive the smoldering embers of the electronic hearth and save linear television.

You don’t have to love “Love Island,” with its appalling candy-colored villa in Fiji, unapologetic emphasis on “hotness” and endless dramatic pauses to appreciate the fact that in the increasingly fractured and isolated viewership experience of modern television, it is drawing people together, physically, and in real time.

The platform may be NBCUniversal‘s streaming service Peacock, but “Love Island” is returning TV to its roots.

Frankly, that’s much more startling than the sight and sound of people devouring the messy drama of competitive intercourse along with their happy-hour priced drinks and bites.

Twenty years ago, reality television was viewed by many as a threat to traditional TV. Yes, there had always been daytime game shows, but after “American Idol” and “Survivor” became prime-time hits and the Kardashians began their empire building, the reality craze spread like kudzu through broadcast and cable. Cheap to make, reality series didn’t need huge audiences to be successful. Network executives couldn’t green-light them fast enough, and for a few years, it seemed that scripted programming would become the exception, found mostly on subscription-based platforms like HBO and Showtime.

That isn’t what happened, of course. Beginning with AMC, a wide variety of cable networks began producing original scripted series, followed closely by Netflix, Prime Video and other streamers. Reality TV remained popular, but there was a new cultural phenomenon in town — the prestige dramas and comedies of what some called the new Golden Age of television. For a few glorious years, highly produced scripted series were watched, and then discussed, together and in real time. A thousand recap blogs bloomed, and whether it was “Breaking Bad” or “Downton Abbey,” all anyone talked about was television.

Alas, as is so often the case, bust followed boom. The proliferation of platforms and shows splintered the audience and ad revenues. Streaming, with its binge model and personal-device availability, made viewing increasingly less about a family or group of friends gathering around a flat-screen and more about everyone balancing their laptop on their stomachs or hunching over their phones. Since no one knew who was watching what and when, watercooler chat and even many recap blogs spluttered out.

But reality TV, quietly chugging along as the number of scripted series swelled to unsustainable proportions, has always been a spectator’s sport. Sure you can binge past seasons of “The Great British Baking Show,” but when it comes to “The Bachelor,” “Love Is Blind” or “The Traitors,” it’s much more rewarding to watch and to comment in real time.

While the rise in interest in “Love Island USA” has been attributed to the Season 6 casting that led to several genuine couples, the show has also upped its social media presence and emphasized the fact that episodes air little more than a day after they are shot, making it as close to a live viewing experience as an edited series can get.

So it’s not surprising that the crowd watching at Roosterfish would act as if they were part of a live audience — groaning when one of the men suggests that his partner is “worthy,” or shouting out opinions to Huda Mustafa when she asks if she or her partner is to blame for that day’s miscommunication (according to the women at the next table, it is definitely her).

Chris Seeley and Huda Mustafa in “Love Island USA.”

(Ben Symons / Peacock)

Here is where I confess that, after watching several seasons, including 6 and 7, for the purposes of this column, I am not a fan of “Love Island USA,” and considering my aged demographic, I cannot imagine the good folks at ITV America or Peacock care at all.

I find all the blindfolded kissing troubling, the close-ups of those waiting to be voted safe or dumped gratuitously painful and the endless shots of contestant-grooming tedious. (Except when the guys are ironing — that’s my favorite part.) As a mother, I worry that between the “islanders’” sleep deprivation, complete lack of privacy and requisite emotional manipulation, whatever partnerships emerge are likely to be trauma-bonds, which is just not healthy. Mostly though, I think it’s boring — for every three minutes of “action,” the audience is expected to endure 30 minutes of analysis, mostly by people who overuse the words “queen” and “bro.” Also, I think the villa is hideous and the most fake moments are when everyone has to pretend it’s not.

But…

I did have a lot of fun at the watch party. The audience reaction, whether it was cheering or a collective cringe, amplified the drama while also making it right-sized — the show is ridiculous; that’s precisely why so many people love it.

As any theatergoer or stage actor will tell you — often ad nauseam — the audience is always part of the performance; the story is not just occurring in front of you, it’s all around you. The laughter and groans, the suspenseful silence of those watching play as big a part as whatever is happening on stage.

The same is true for television, and we are in grave danger of forgetting this. More than any other art form, television was created to be communal — to allow a large group of people to share something simultaneously.

Very few of us would give up our modern ability to watch what we want whenever we feel like it, but wholly surrendering the joys of old-fashioned, vying-for-the-best-seat, “what-did-he-say?” television is too high a price to pay for the ability to binge. The power of an audience is not limited to voting people out of the villa or determining a series’ success — it’s an energy source in itself.

Gathering with friends and family, or a group of strangers, to regularly enjoy a certain show together doesn’t just lift the spirit, it makes the show more than just something to watch.

If “Love Island USA” manages to remind us of that in a meaningful way, well, I may never like it much, but I will be a fan for life.

“Let it go!” one person screamed at a massive TV screen.

“Get him out of my villa!” shouted another.

“Oh, we’re voting tonight!” declared another as they whipped their index finger in a circular motion as if to say, “We need to round up the troops and get ready for war.”

It’s 8 p.m. at the Palm & the Pine and every single seat is taken, so some people have resorted to huddling outside to watch the action through a window. A small crew of bartenders are working double time to serve up wings, french fries and tropical-themed cocktails.

Attendees celebrate the start of the episode.

(Jason Armond / Los Angeles Times)

On most nights at the family-owned Hollywood spot, dubbed “your girlfriend’s favorite sports bar,” patrons might come to watch tennis or basketball or soccer. But on this Tuesday evening, the guests were there to watch a different type of game. They came to the crowded bar to watch “Love Island USA” with 200 other fans who are just as invested in the reality dating show as they are.

“The decibel levels crush any Super Bowl, World Series or anything we’ve shown there,” said Colin Magalong, co-owner of the Palm & the Pine.

“This is our Super Bowl,” added Madeline Biebel, founder of the pop-up event series that screens reality TV shows called Reality Bar, which has been hosting free “Love Island USA” watch parties at the Palm & the Pine and other bars across L.A.

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While people have been gathering to watch high-profile television episodes in public spaces for years, the communal watch party has been having a resurgence, fueled in part by social media and the highly dissectible nature of shows like “The White Lotus,” “Severance” and “Traitors.” This summer, “Love Island USA,” a spinoff of the U.K. reality dating show that airs six days a week, has sparked a pop culture craze and Angelenos are flocking to coffee shops, bars, restaurants, social clubs like Soho House and arcades like Dave & Buster’s just to watch the show and kiki about it with others in person.

“This is our Super Bowl,” says Madeline Biebel, founder of Reality Bar, which hosts reality TV watch parties around L.A.

(Jason Armond / Los Angeles Times)

Now in its seventh season, the premise of “Love Island USA” is fairly simple: Ten singles are plopped into a lavish villa in Fiji, where they must couple up with a member of the opposite sex or risk getting dumped from the island. Over the course of several weeks, contestants (who are referred to as “islanders”) participate in extravagant challenges — many of which require them to wear revealing outfits and make out with one another — that are designed to stir up drama. At random, “bombshells” are brought into the mix to encourage the islanders to test their romantic connections. All the while, viewers at home can vote for their favorite islanders, sort of like “American Idol,” with hopes that they will make it to the end and win the $100,000 prize.

“It is so outlandish,” said Lauren Sowa, who lectures on television and pop culture at Pepperdine. “Shows like ‘The Bachelor’ try to maintain a level of decorum and something like ‘Love Island’ throws that into their ocean and their pool and their foam parties with both hands.”

Between the spicy games, the contestants’ disconnection from the world, their dorm room-style living conditions and the ultimate challenge of finding love, Sowa says, “The stakes couldn’t be higher. The drama couldn’t be more and therefore we could not be more entertained.”

The idea of bringing people together to watch “Love Island” and other reality TV shows came to Biebel in 2021 when L.A. was starting to reopen after the COVID pandemic. She wondered, “Why isn’t there a bar or restaurant that shows ‘The Bachelor’?” Biebel, 28, recalled.

At first the bartenders at her local sports bar laughed at her request to turn on the show, but when a crowd of people joined her to watch it on the patio, she knew that she was onto something.

Attendees arrive as early as 5 p.m. to secure a seat at the “Love Island USA” watch party in Hollywood. (Jason Armond / Los Angeles Times)

“Those moments where everyone is freaking out together are just magical,” said Madeline Biebel, founder of Reality Bar. (Jason Armond / Los Angeles Times)

She hosted the first Reality Bar event in 2023 at a restaurant on the rooftop of the Kimpton Hotel Wilshire and 40 people showed up to watch “Love Island USA” Season 5. She continued hosting watch parties for reality shows including “The Real Housewives” and “The Bachelor,” one in which Joey Graziadei, the Bachelor himself, made a surprise appearance.

But none of the events have been as popular as the parties for the current season of “Love Island USA.” Thanks to a TikTok that got nearly 3 million views, the watch party at the Palm & the Pine went from having about 100 RSVPs to 1,500. On Sunday, fans cheered when Austin Shepard and Charlie Georgiou, who were booted from the island, made an appearance at the event. To keep up with the growing demand, Biebel added 10 other venues to watch the show at including the Nickel Mine in Sawtelle, Roosterfish in West Hollywood and the Happy Rabbit in Sherman Oaks.

“People are just so hungry for connection and community especially post-COVID,” said Biebel, adding that it brings people together who share a common interest. “Those moments where everyone is freaking out together are just magical.”

(Clockwise from left) 1.) Fans of “Love Island USA” cheer, scream and gasp during the dramatic episode. 2.) Reality Bar’s “Love Island USA” watch parties became so popular that 10 more L.A. locations were added. 3.) Maya Suarez, left, and Reanna Davidson enjoy drinks and roses courtesy of Reality Bar. (Jason Armond / Los Angeles Times)

At the Tuesday night party, people started arriving as early as 5 p.m. to secure a seat inside the two-story bar. As pop and hip-hop music played loudly over a sound system, attendees sipped on “Love Island”-themed cocktails with clever names like the “I’ve Got a Text-ini” (a vodka martini with cranberry juice), “Bare Minimum” (an espresso martini), “Hot New Bombshell” (tequila, grapefruit and lime), “Aftersun Spritz” (Prosecco, mint, soda and lemon) and “I’m Open” (cucumber, vodka, lemon and soda).

When the show promptly appeared on the bar’s multiple TV screens at 8 p.m., a thunderous roar of cheers exploded. Throughout the dramatic episode — which involved the islanders reading anonymous letters about how their fellow cast mates truly felt about them — many patrons talked among themselves and shouted at the TV, but no one seemed bothered. The energy was high and the subtitles were on.

Branson Bond, 27, of Hollywood and six of his friends went to the watch party for the first time after learning about it on social media.

“It’s one thing to see people’s perception online, but it means so much more — whether it’s music or film — to be around people who have a common interest,” said Bond, who managed to find a booth in the upstairs area of the bar with his friends. “Especially with everything going on in the world, it’s cool to kind of decompress with something silly every now and then.”

“We love to kiki, to party [and] we need a debrief like immediately after the show, so I needed to experience this,” said Giselle Gonzalez, 27, of Hollywood.

Reanna Davidson, 26, and her sister Maya Suarez usually rotate watching “Love Island USA” together at one of their homes, but they thought a watch party would be more fun.

“I feel like we’re obsessed with “Love Island” and we go crazy at home so we wanted to see what the environment was like here,” Davidson said in between sips of a martini.

“I like the drama, but also I like the love,” she said. “Like last year, watching them all fall in love and really have relationships outside of it was so sweet.”

“I love the camaraderie here and everybody yelling,” says attendee DeVante Waugh.

(Jason Armond / Los Angeles Times)

After attending one of Reality Bar’s watch parties at a different venue, DeVante Waugh, 32, wanted to come back with a group of his work friends who all started watching the show recently.

“I love the camaraderie here and everybody yelling,” said Waugh, adding that he’s still mad that Jeremiah was sent home during one of the show’s most shocking moments. “It’s fun. It’s like watching a game. And then there’s a lot of pretty women, not a lot of guys,” he adds jokingly.

While some attendees left the bar immediately after the episode was over, some stayed to do karaoke, strike a pose in the photo booth or to recap what happened on the show with their new friends. It’s this community aspect that JP Stanley, 29, of Hollywood appreciates most about watch parties.

“I think it’s the sense of being a part of something,” said Stanley as he sipped on a glass of Prosecco. He attended the event with a friend and said he hopes to see more watch parties even after the current season of “Love Island” wraps. “L.A. is really yearning for that community and I think this is something that really gives people of any age a place to connect, and it’s such an easy common denominator.”

He added, “There’s no prerequisite required. You don’t have to know anything about me and I don’t have to know anything about you. I can just be like, “So, Love Island” and you’ll be like, “Right, Amaya!”

Swap surfing in California for Santa Cruz in Portugal

Sprawled on a towel, observing silhouetted surfers chasing the ocean-plunging carmine sun, I don’t need to squint to imagine I’m in the Golden State. But my sandy toes and salty hair are products of the Atlantic, not the Pacific. And this Santa Cruz belongs to Portugal’s Costa de Prata, not California.

Mutual monikers are not the only parallels: this coast has 300 sunny days a year, top-notch surf (after Malibu, nearby Ericeira was the second place to be designated a World Surfing Reserve), and blond sands stretching towards wave-carved coastal bluffs and ocean arches.

In this former fishing village, just an hour’s drive north-west of Lisbon, tranquillity flows like the tides. A soul-healing clutch of low-slung, whitewashed streets waymarked by an out-of-place beachside crenellated turret – the sole remnant of a palace plan thwarted by the 1929 Wall Street crash – it’s the kind of delightfully textbook Portuguese place you stumble upon serendipitously. And once you do, you won’t want to leave. Japanese poet Kazuo Dan visited in 1971 to have a “conversation between Heaven and Earth” – a chat he continued for 16 months.

If you’re a surfer, you’ll instantly agree. If not, lessons will leave you convinced. Check-in at chic Noah Surf House (room sleeping four from €320 B&B), complete with an ocean-view infinity pool and skate park, and arranging all-age surf classes is effortless. Flawlessly renovated Villa Galega (doubles from €115 B&B) affords a more homely escape.

Santa Cruz and surrounding Torres Vedras boasts 11 beaches certified as pollution-free – more than any other Portuguese municipality. Tread the dune-crossing boardwalk to river-wrapped Praia Azul to flop on the finest sweep.

Back in town, beachside feasts don’t come better than breezy Bronzear. Split a steaming pot of arroz de peixe, a seafood-stacked rice stew, or take plump, signature crabs as your table’s centrepiece during September’s Festival da Sapateira. California cravings? Noah’s grilled cheese and portobello burgers hit the spot. Pair with a local Touriga Nacional red wine – a robust stand-in for a Cali Cab Sav – or slip away to the family-run winery Quinta da Almiara for a vine-hemmed, in situ tasting.

Evenings usually end ringing the doorbell of Manel, the town’s oldest bar, for jazz-accompanied candlelit cocktails and Lisbon-brewed IPAs. Out front, an engraved stone shares Kazuo’s words contemplating chasing the setting sun to the end of the sea – the haiku that Santa Cruz’s surfers now scrupulously honour.
Daniel James Clarke

Swap a cabin in New England for a mökki in Finland

Almost two centuries after it was written, Walden; or, Life in the Woods, Henry David Thoreau’s book about the two years he spent living in a self-built cabin on a lake in Massachusetts, still inspires generations of Americans to go in search of what he called the “tonic of wildness”. It’s an American dream of simplicity and self-sufficiency that was also beautifully captured in the 1981 film On Golden Pond, in which Henry Fonda and Katharine Hepburn fish, paddle and ponder life for one last summer in Maine (though it was filmed in New Hampshire).

But North America doesn’t have a monopoly on this kind of bucolic escape. The Nordic countries know all about the appeal of cabin life – and Finland, with 19 hours of sunlight in midsummer and sublime wild landscapes, is an idyllic alternative.

Mökki, or Finnish summer cottages, sit on lake shores or on rocks by the seashore and are often passed down through families. With about 20% of Finns living within the Helsinki metropolitan area, these cabins are a sanctuary for spending time in nature: fishing and messing about on the water in summer; skiing, ice-swimming and snowshoeing in winter. Many are off-grid, so part of the ritual includes splitting wood, gathering water, warming up in the wood-fired sauna … and letting your phone battery die. You’re free to roam the coast or forage in the surrounding forest too – the Jokaisenoikeudet or “everyman’s rights” law gives everyone the freedom to wander and collect wild food.

You don’t need to have friends or family with a mökki to stay in one – there are an estimated 500,000 of them and only a fifth of Finns own one outright, so many are available for those new to mökkielämä (Finnish cottage life). Lomarengas and Finland Cottage Rentals allow you to rent directly from owners, while on Sviskär in the southern Åland archipelago you get a 28-hectare (69-acre) island all to yourself – perfect for foraging, sea dipping and the “tonic of wildness”.
Sian Lewis

Swap the Appalachian Trail for Europe’s even longer E1 path

In 1948, Earl Shaffer, a US second world war veteran, set off on a long walk. He had his ex-army rucksack and some old boots, but no tent or cooker. His goal was to be the first person to complete the 2,200 miles of the Appalachian Trail in one continuous yomp, a thru-hike as it came to be known. When 67-year-old grandmother Emma Gatewood repeated the feat in 1955 (with even simpler kit), the Appalachian Trail was on its way to becoming the world’s first long-distance celebrity footpath.

These days about 3,000 people attempt a thru-hike every year (about a quarter of those succeed) but the experience is now very different, with huts every six to eight miles, water stashes left by “trail angels”, and well-established support logistics.

In Europe it can be harder to find sustained remoteness, but the 2,050-mile Scandinavian section of the E1 long-distance footpath is about as close as you get.

This full 4,420-mile route had its origins in post-second-world-war rapprochement ideals and was devised by a team from the then European Ramblers Association led by the British walker Arthur Howcroft (who died in 2023 aged 96). The path starts at Norway’s North Cape and officially finishes in Palermo, but it is in Scandinavia that it crosses the greatest amount of wilderness.

The early stages are well inside the Arctic Circle and not to be underestimated, with navigation, river crossings and snowfields constant challenges. Long stretches are unmarked. There are some concessions to practicalities: both Norway and Sweden have excellent systems of mountain huts.

Once you reach Halmstad on the Swedish coast, you have almost one Appalachian Trail’s worth of walking under your belt, but there is no need to stop: in E1 terms you are not even halfway. A ferry crosses to the Danish port of Grenaa, and the path begins again, continuing across Germany and the Alps with several long, tough days. Some great stages then cross Tuscany and Umbria, but once in southern Italy the path, by all accounts, can be a bit sketchy and seems to fade away in Campania, though route-marking is improving.

After his failed attempt to complete the Appalachian Trail, author Bill Bryson described the benefits of long-distance trails succinctly: “For a brief, proud period I was slender and fit. I gained a profound respect for wilderness and nature and the benign dark power of woods. I understand now, in a way I never did before, the colossal scale of the world.”
Kevin Rushby

Swap New York for Berlin

Buzzy and culturally rich, with extensive museums and galleries, oodles of nightlife and concerts – from classical venues to techno clubs – lush green spaces, family-friendly activities and striking architecture, New York and Berlin have plenty in common. But as someone who knows both cities well, Berlin gets my vote.

While NYC’s nightlife is diverse – and has bounced back since Rudy Giuliani’s ugly, destructive campaign against it in the 1990s – it’s way more commercial than Berlin, whose underground electronic scene, especially techno, is edgier and more experimental. From Berghain to Sisyphos, Berlin’s clubs also stay open longer (sometimes for days; it truly is the city that never sleeps, at least on weekends). They also don’t tend to have dress codes – unless you count skimpy lingerie and kinky harnesses. VIP areas and even mobile phone photography are strictly verboten. Berliners can quaff beers openly on the streets, and indulge in a bit of public nookie at nightclubs – as distinct from official swinger or sex spots such as KitKat.

Berlin gives great gastro, too, excelling at affordable, mid-range restaurants that tick all the trend boxes – small plates, natural wines, plant-based menus found at buzzy neighbourhood spots such as Kreuzberg’s vegan haven Happa, Neukölln’s La Côte and Sorrel, and Prenzlauer Berg’s Estelle. And while it doesn’t have a Chinatown or a Little Italy, you can find every national cuisine on the planet (albeit with less spice, to appease the sensitive German palate).

NYC certainly has fantastic cultural big-hitters, from the Guggenheim and the Met to Moma and the American Museum of Natural History, but Berlin has the Unesco-heritage Museum Island, Mies van der Rohe’s slickly modernist Neue Nationalgalerie and its own natural history and German history museums. It also excels in unusual venues that New York doesn’t have, such as the Hamburger Bahnhof, in a former railway station, the Boros Collection inside a second world war bunker, and Silent Green, an art and concert space in a former crematorium.

As for green space, New York’s Central Park may be one-and-a-half times the size of the Tiergarten, but Berlin has vastly more green recreational spaces overall, with about 2,500 inner-city parks and unique areas such as the sprawling Tempelhofer Feld, a former airport, and the massive Grunewald forest.

One last thing: with much lower population density and fewer tourists (12.7 million people visited Berlin in 2024 versus the 64 million who went to New York), there’s more room on the streets and fewer queues for the major sights. Bis bald (see you soon) … y’all.
Paul Sullivan

Swap the Grand Canyon for Montenegro’s Tara River Canyon

Let’s get one thing straight: size wise, the Grand Canyon sprawls for 278 miles along the Colorado River, whereas the Tara River Canyon covers a mere 51. But what the Montenegrin canyon lacks in size it makes up for in depth: as Europe’s deepest gorge, it plunges 1,300 metres (4,300ft), only 300 metres less than the average depth of the Grand Canyon (and just over 500 metres less than its deepest point).

As this Unesco world heritage site slices through northern Montenegro’s Durmitor national park and eventually slides across the border into Bosnia, it adds even more drama to this section of the Dinaric Alps’ forbidding mountains and glacial  lakes.

For adventurers who like a challenge, Tara means one thing: white-water rafting. The choice of excursions all around the region is enormous, but you can get a taste of it in a few hours by joining one of the trips from the town of Žabljak, which in winter is one of Montenegro’s ski centres. Eventually, you’ll be rafting under the soaring concrete arches of the awe-inspiring Đurđevića Tara Bridge, whose beauty is best admired from below.

There’s a whole mini industry set up around the bridge, including ziplining and stalls selling souvenirs. As someone at the opposite end of the daredevilry scale – and thanks to speeding cars and a concrete path that’s barely a foot wide – I found it scary enough just walking on the bridge to take in the admittedly extraordinary view.

But there are other ways of enjoying the beauty of Tara without worrying about Montenegrin motorists. Not far from Žabljak is the car park for the Ćurevac mountain peak and viewpoint, which is reached after a 40-minute hike and offers sweeping views of those magnificent gorges. It’s only one of scores of hiking routes that wind above and alongside the river, some of which are part of the 1,200-mile Via Dinarica trail that goes from Slovenia all the way to Albania.

Right by the border with Bosnia and the confluence of the Tara and Piva rivers is another collection of rafting centres as well as campsites offering mellower ways of exploring Tara. Boat trips along gentler stretches  of water give you the chance to swim in absurdly clear waters, lunch on organic food and drink cold beer brewed with spring water. And in this land of €3 pints, you’ll find your euro going way further than your dollar ever would.

Stay at Green Top near Žabljak, which has well-equipped one-bedroom self-catering wooden chalets with gardens, barbecues and mountain views from £95 a night.
Mary Novakovich

Swap the Mojave desert for Tabernas in Spain

When the Italian film director Sergio Leone chose to shoot his westerns in Europe, there was only one place that could convincingly double for the American west – the Tabernas desert in south-east Spain. With its dry riverbeds snaking through arid mountains and sandstone canyons, it’s easy to imagine yourself in California’s Mojave desert.

Tabernas might not have the Mojave’s famous Joshua trees, but it is home to flora, fauna and a landscape reminiscent of the US desert. Prickly pears, giant aloe and palm trees line the trails, while lizards scuttle among otherworldly rock formations and eagles soar in the vast sky.

Tourism is still low-key here. For decades this barren part of Andalucía was not on the radar of the Spanish tourist board, and large areas are monopolised by swathes of plastic greenhouses. But with a growing appreciation for Tabernas’ unique status as Europe’s only desert, as well as the renaissance of Leone’s movies, its charms are being re-evaluated. You can take a guided horseback ride through the desert with the Malcaminos ranch and pitch your tent at Camping Fort Bravo (€45 a night), one of the original movie sets still in use today. For a little more comfort –and to live out your California homesteading fantasy – you can book into one of their western-styled log cabins (from €80).

It’s an easy sell for me. Bewitched by cowboy lore as a teenager, I rode across the American deserts in search of the mythical west (admittedly on a motorcycle rather than horseback), seduced by the romance of life on the trail – billy cans boiling over campfires and a wide-open wilderness that promised a freedom unimaginable in fenced-off, old-world Europe.

Joshua Tree national park in the Mojave desert became my go-to destination each time I found myself in California. But in recent years, I’ve been exploring Spain, scouting routes for the forthcoming Spaghetti Western Trail, and finding the same magic in the Desierto de Tabernas. The scale is of course smaller than the Mojave, but the silence, the stillness, the hint of sage on the warm air and the sense of exploration are as thrilling as my early US road trips.

Leone was enthralled by American style and myth but always from a distance. “I can’t see the US any other way than with a European’s eyes,” he said. “It’s a country that fascinates me and terrifies me at the same time.”

If you feel the same way right now, but still yearn for a cowboy adventure, you could do worse than follow in his footsteps and head for Tabernas.
Lois Pryce

Swap Yellowstone for Carpathia in Romania

The jaw-dropping landscapes of the US’s 63 national parks lure millions of visitors to the great outdoors each year. Yellowstone, established in 1872, is the oldest of them all – a sprawling 3,472 square miles of dazzling scenery including canyons and active geysers. Mostly in Wyoming but stretching into Montana and Idaho, it’s home to wildlife from grizzly bears and wolves to bison and antelope, and is crisscrossed by thousands of miles of trails.

Although it can’t compete in size, the rugged, forested Făgăraș mountains in Romania offer a thrilling taste of the wild and exciting wildlife-spotting opportunities closer to home. This area of Transylvania, on the southern edge of the Carpathians, is among the wildest places in Europe, where brown bear, wolves, lynx and – recently reintroduced – bison roam.

It’s where the Foundation Conservation Carpathia is working to create the continent’s largest forest national park, buying land for conservation and reforesting clear-cut areas on its mission to establish a 200,000-hectare wilderness reserve, which has been dubbed a “Yellowstone for Europe”.

As I hike through forests on steep zigzagging paths with my guide Răzvan, the thrill of the wild is real – we see a viper and pass fresh bear prints. Gouge marks on a tree and overturned stones reveal the bear’s hunt for food. I watch with bated breath as a group of bison wander on a hillside close by – thankfully upwind of our scent.

We stay at Bunea hide, a wooden shelter overlooking a lake, with bunks, a double bedroom, a kitchen and huge soundproofed windows that make the most of the views. As night falls, I stare into the dark as if glued to a movie. Something moves in the half-light – and slowly a young female brown bear wanders into view, sniffing the air, rubbing against a tree. It’s not long before a large male appears, just metres away from the hide. I’m mesmerised as I watch him pawing the ground for food before sloping off into the woods.

Unlike the vast lodges in Yellowstone, staying in these tiny cabins mean you’re close to the action, engulfed by the landscape. We hike higher to Comisu hide, at 1,600 metres, with sweeping views over the mountains as a storm rolls in. Owls call out in the moonlit night as I drift off to sleep, dreaming about this vibrant wild world.
Jane Dunford
Visit Foundation Conservation Carpathia for more information

Swap seafood in New England for Normandy and Brittany

For all our sniffiness about American cuisine, few people dispute the quality of the country’s seafood. Although you can no longer get a lobster roll at McDonald’s in New England, the fast-food joint is one of the few places in the region where they’re not on the menu. Cycling down the Atlantic coast last summer as part of research for a US travelogue, I rejoiced in the casual abundance on offer at the roadside – baskets of fried clams in Connecticut, oysters in Maine, crab benedict in Massachusetts … 3,000 miles and a world away from the grand silver fruits de mer platters of Europe.

You don’t have to fly across an ocean to get your shellfish fix, however. While you’re unlikely to find yourself tempted by a lobster surf and turf burger in France, seafood can be surprisingly accessible if you swerve Parisian bistros and go straight to the source.

La Cale, in Blainville-sur-Mer on Normandy’s Cotentin peninsula, an easy drive (or a day’s cycle) from Cherbourg, is typiquement français for its pride in local produce (oysters, whelks, clams etc, as well as galettes and spit-roast meat), but rather less so in its casual feet-in-the-sand ethos and informal service. Remi, the proprietor, is described online as “eccentric” – his van is graffitied with the words “Rosbeefs welcome … frogs too”. Do not pass up the moules frites, or the teurgoule, a traditional Normande spiced rice pudding.

Further down the coast, in Brittany, I’ve earmarked Cancale, in the Bay of Mont Saint Michel, for a return visit, because if you ever wanted proof that the French can let their hair down, look no further than the people sitting on the sea wall with paper platters of oysters and plastic cups of cold sancerre. The oysters come from the seafront marché aux huîtres, which offers a bamboozling selection, all shucked to order, and the wine from an enterprising booze van parked nearby. The shells, once you’ve finished, are thrown on to the beach.

One step up, in that there’s table service, but with no more steps between sea and plate, is Maison Quintin, on the Atlantic coast near Saint-Philibert, where you can feast on the family’s own oysters under the pines as the sun sets over the estuary, supplemented with skewers of plump prawns and langoustines, crab, grilled lobster, and their homemade seafood rillettes on toast. Reservations essential – laid-back vibes guaranteed.
Felicity Cloake
Peach Street to Lobster Lane: Coast to Coast in Search of Real American Cuisine by Felicity Cloake is published by Mudlark (£16.99)

Swap the Florida Everglades for Italy’s Marano Lagoon

It was on a slow journey through the extensive wetlands that border Italy’s Adriatic that I first came upon the little-known Laguna di Marano, a carefully preserved eco-paradise, barely touched by tourism. This gossamer web of interlocking lagoons, canals and river deltas stretches from Venice all the way up to Trieste. Local legend has it that Ernest Hemingway called these wetlands and the adjoining sandy beach resort of Lignano “piccola Florida”, because it reminded him of the Everglades and the Florida Keys.

The US author first came to this part of Italy as a volunteer at the end of the first world war. He returned in the 1950s to find inspiration for his book Across the River and Into the Trees while duck hunting and fishing on the Marano Lagoon – though for sea bream and mullet rather than marlin, his favourite quarry in the waters around Florida.

At the bar of the rustic Trattoria Barcaneta in the bustling medieval port of Marano Lagunare, I order a glass of refosco dal peduncolo rosso, a rustic local red wine favoured by the writer. It may not be as glamorous as sipping a Hemingway martini in a Key West cocktail bar, but it was the perfect aperitivo before tasting chef Claudio Moretti’s exquisite cuisine, a delicate carpaccio of sea bass and grilled eel from the nearby Stella River delta, both freshly caught by the port’s many fishers.

Marano Lagunare is the perfect base for exploring the surrounding wetlands. The tourism office can arrange activities from canoeing and kayaking to walking and horse riding. Renting a small boat with a guide is my choice, a retired pescatore (fisher) for the perfect insight into local life on the water. While the vast, open expanse of the lagoon is breathtaking, dotted along the edge of the water is something you will never see in Florida – traditional casoni thatched huts still used today by fishers.

The landscape changes dramatically as we enter the protected reserve of the Stella delta. Here, the freshwater channels become narrower, bordered on both sides by tall golden reeds – definitely a feel of the Everglades – as we catch glimpses of pink flamingos, purple herons, egrets, cormorants swooping down and a neat squadron of geese flying past. It may be smaller than the Everglades (62 square miles as opposed to 2,357), but the one thing truly different from a Florida nature excursion is that there is no need to look out for alligators.
John Brunton

Swap California’s Highway 1 for Ireland’s Wild Atlantic Way

My left foot shook on the clutch – not from tiredness, but from something resembling fear. Conor Pass had seemed like a good idea at breakfast. One of Ireland’s highest and narrowest mountain roads? Why not? The car seemed to float as the road narrowed to a one-lane ledge between cliff and sky. No turning back now – just a slow crawl upwards with mist curling over the bonnet from the valley below.

Still, this is the scenery the Wild Atlantic Way promises – and delivers. It’s a 1,600-mile coastal drive from Malin Head, the country’s most northerly point, in County Donegal, to Kinsale in County Cork in the south-west – and Ireland’s answer to California’s Highway 1, the 656-mile Pacific Coast route that skirts sea bluffs, redwood groves and epic coastal views.

Big Sur’s iconic Bixby Bridge resembles the Mizen Head footbridge in West Cork. Highway 1’s “million dollar view” is eclipsed by the Atlantic sweep from Slieve League, or the cliffs that tower above powder-white Keem beach on Achill Island. Connemara’s Sky Road and the Burren’s Atlantic Drive echo Big Sur’s drama, winding between limestone and ocean. However, my favourite stretch – the Dingle peninsula – is hard to match. Its mountain-to-ocean setting is visual theatre dialled to max.

Inch beach, a long curve of sand stretching three miles into Dingle Bay, is a gentle introduction before I turned north to hair-raising Conor Pass (optional and clearly marked) and descended into Dingle town.

The road then turns otherworldly along the Slea Head Drive with Ventry beach’s three miles of bone-white sand perfect for barefoot walking – somewhat like Highway 1’s famous Moonstone beach.

As I drove on I stopped at every layby I could, because there’s always something around the corner; a hidden cove or early Christian monument. At Coumeenoole beach, I stepped out on the headland and watched the surf pound the shore ferociously as if it was punishing it for some ancient grievance.

And then came Dunquin Pier – the lane zigzags down a steep slope like a spiral staircase that plunges into the ocean, which was enough of a reason to ditch the car on the roadside and walk down. This is where the boats leave for the Blaskets, and it feels like the edge of the world.

Offshore, the Three Sisters – three jagged peaks rising from the ocean floor – remain in focus, their silhouettes a reminder of the sea stacks off Big Sur. About halfway along the Slea Head Drive, the magnificent Blasket Centre delivers staggering island views.

Vic O’Sullivan

Despite Israel’s considerable military power in the Middle East, it can never achieve regional hegemony—a position that requires unquestionable dominance over all competitors and acceptance of its authority by neighboring countries. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel, relying on its military superiority and broad Western support, particularly from the United States, has managed to establish significant influence in the region. However, Israel’s ambitions to become the dominant power in the Middle East face structural, political, and social obstacles that go beyond its military capabilities. Israel’s recent attacks on Iran in June 2025, under the operation “Lion Rising,” are an example of the country’s aggressive efforts to weaken its rivals and demonstrate its authority. However, these actions have only led to greater regional instability and strengthened resistance against Israel. As Stephen Walt, a professor of international relations at Harvard, argues, true hegemony requires political acceptance and regional legitimacy—something Israel, due to its policies, is unable to achieve.

Limitations of Military Power

With a military budget of $27.5 billion in 2023 and access to advanced technologies, Israel possesses one of the region’s most powerful militaries. Its attacks on Lebanon, Syria, and recently Iran, which targeted both military and civilian infrastructure, demonstrate its ability to strike heavy blows against its competitors. However, military power alone is not sufficient for hegemony. A regional hegemon must be able to fully suppress its rivals or compel them to accept its authority—a challenge Israel has failed at. For example, despite weakening Hezbollah and other resistance groups after attacks in 2023 and 2024, these groups continue to act as a resilient force against Israel. The June 2025 attacks on Iran, while causing significant damage, have not been able to fully halt Iran’s nuclear program. Reports suggest that the Fordow facility remains operational, and Iran is able to accelerate its pursuit of nuclear capabilities. These failures highlight that Israel’s military power, while destructive, cannot lead to lasting dominance, as regional resistance against it persists.

Lack of Regional Legitimacy

Hegemony requires acceptance and legitimacy among regional countries, something Israel lacks due to its aggressive and occupation-driven policies. The occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the siege and bombing of Gaza, and the repression of Palestinians, condemned by human rights organizations as gross violations of human rights, have painted Israel as a repressive force. These policies have not only angered Palestinians but have also prevented regional countries, including powerful players like Turkey and Qatar, from accepting Israel as the dominant power. Even countries that have established diplomatic relations with Israel, such as the UAE and Bahrain, maintain these relations largely for strategic reasons and under Western pressure, not out of acceptance of Israel’s hegemony. Furthermore, recent attacks on Iran, conducted amidst nuclear negotiations, have exacerbated regional anger and strengthened Iran’s position as a force of resistance against Israeli aggression. This lack of legitimacy is a significant barrier to Israel’s hegemonic ambitions.

Geopolitical Complexity of the Middle East

The Middle East is a region of multiple actors and conflicting interests, making it practically impossible for any country, including Israel, to achieve hegemony. Iran, despite economic and military pressures, still maintains significant influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, although its proxy networks have been weakened. Turkey, with its own regional ambitions, and Saudi Arabia, with its vast financial resources, are also powerful competitors unwilling to accept Israeli dominance. Even the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, which was seen as a blow to Iran, failed to shift the balance of power in Israel’s favor, as new actors like Sunni groups backed by Turkey entered the fray. Hegemony requires military superiority over a mix of rivals, but Israel has not been able to establish full dominance even over a single actor like Iran, which, despite recent attacks, still has the ability to respond. These geopolitical complexities, combined with persistent regional resistance, prevent Israel from achieving hegemonic status.

Dependence on the West and Strategic Fragility

Despite its military power, Israel is heavily dependent on the support of the United States and Europe. Annual U.S. military aid of $3.8 billion and political backing in institutions like the United Nations form the backbone of Israel’s power. However, this dependence creates a strategic vulnerability. If Western support decreases—either due to changes in U.S. domestic policies or global pressure for Israel to be held accountable for human rights violations—Israel will lose its ability to maintain its current position. True hegemony requires strategic self-sufficiency, which Israel lacks. Moreover, aggressive actions like the “Lion Rising” operation increase the risk of drawing the U.S. into a broader conflict, which could reduce Western support. This fragility shows that Israel, rather than a hegemon, functions more as a player dependent on foreign powers.

Global Consequences of Israel’s Actions

Israel’s efforts to weaken its rivals, such as the recent attacks on Iran, have not led to hegemony but have instead exacerbated regional and global instability. These attacks, carried out amid nuclear negotiations between Iran and global powers, disrupted diplomatic efforts and increased the risk of a broader conflict. These actions could disrupt the global energy supply chain, as Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz plays a critical role in oil and gas markets. Additionally, the anger generated by Israel’s aggressive policies has sparked widespread protests in the Muslim world, raising the risk of political and security instability on a global scale. These consequences, rooted in Israel’s actions, show that the pursuit of hegemony not only remains unattainable but leads to further instability.

The Need for Peace, Not Domination

Israel cannot become the hegemon of the Middle East because true hegemony requires a combination of military power, political legitimacy, and regional acceptance—elements Israel lacks. Israel’s long-term security lies not in military domination but in achieving a lasting political agreement with its neighbors, including the Palestinians. Israel’s aggressive policies, from occupying Palestinian territories to attacking Iran, have only strengthened regional resistance and pushed the country further from its hegemonic goal. The world must recognize this reality and, instead of blindly supporting Israel’s actions, focus on diplomacy and dialogue to establish lasting peace in the Middle East. Only through this approach can the endless cycle of tension and conflict be broken.

As tensions escalate between Iran and its Western adversaries, the Iranian government is now considering one of the most consequential diplomatic withdrawals in contemporary arms control history: the potential abandonment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This decision, should it materialize, would not merely represent a legal realignment of Iran’s international obligations but would constitute a seismic strategic maneuver—disrupting the global nonproliferation architecture, reshaping diplomatic alliances, and accelerating the regional arms race in a Middle East already teetering under the weight of protracted conflict and fractured diplomacy.

Established in 1970, the NPT rests on three foundational pillars: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and promoting disarmament. Iran’s current commitment to the treaty has remained, at least in formal terms, one of the last remaining legal barriers preventing its open development of nuclear weapons. As of 2025, 191 states remain parties to the NPT, making it the most widely adopted arms control agreement in human history. However, should Iran exit, the symbolic and material damage to this institutional cornerstone may extend well beyond the region.

From a strategic standpoint, Iran’s withdrawal would signal a clear departure from what Jacques E.C. Hymans in Achieving Nuclear Ambitions (2017) characterizes as “nuclear latency”—the state of possessing technological capability without crossing the threshold. Until now, Iran has carefully danced on the periphery of weapons capability, maintaining plausible deniability while accumulating enriched uranium and advanced centrifuge design. Abandoning the NPT, however, would mark an irreversible step from latency to overt preparation, thereby dismantling the carefully curated ambiguity that has served as both shield and sword in Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy.

The political ramifications of this decision are likely to be equally profound. In Nuclear Politics (2017) by Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro, the authors argue that nuclear proliferation is inherently political—tied not only to the technological constraints of a state but also to its perception of existential threat and diplomatic isolation. With the recent U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, Tehran’s calculus has dramatically shifted. The strikes may have paradoxically accelerated the very outcome they purported to prevent, legitimizing within Iran a discourse of resistance that views nuclear armament not as an offensive ambition, but as a necessary deterrent in an anarchic international system.

On the diplomatic front, Iran’s departure would further erode the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization charged with verification and monitoring under the NPT. As explained in Maria Rost Rublee’s Nonproliferation Norms (2017), much of the success of nonproliferation hinges on normative adherence, not merely technical inspections. Should Iran expel inspectors and cease all cooperation with the IAEA—as is anticipated in the wake of withdrawal—other states disillusioned with Western double standards may reconsider the utility of remaining bound by a treaty perceived as discriminatory and selectively enforced.

The security implications are perhaps most destabilizing. Mark Fitzpatrick, a noted arms control expert, argues that such a move would remove Iran’s final legal constraints and free it to pursue weaponization openly. Already, Iran is believed to possess over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity, technically just short of the 90% required for a weapon. With the infrastructure for advanced enrichment in place and a cadre of nuclear scientists—despite the assassination of several key figures by Israeli operations—still intact, Fitzpatrick warns that Iran could feasibly complete a weapons program within a year. This timeline finds corroboration in Jeffrey Lewis’ The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States (2018), which, while fictionalized, illustrates how rapidly a state with the technical base and political will can escalate from enrichment to deployment.

Moreover, Iran’s exit from the NPT would not exist in isolation. The regional fallout, especially in terms of proliferation contagion, cannot be overstated. As noted in Shashank Joshi’s The Future of Nuclear Deterrence (2020), the exit of one state from the global arms control regime often triggers anxieties in others, particularly those with existing rivalries. Saudi Arabia has already pledged to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities should it proceed toward weaponization, and Egypt, long aggrieved by Israel’s undeclared arsenal and exemption from NPT scrutiny, may see an opportunity to challenge the status quo. The fragile balance of deterrence across the Middle East could thus collapse into a cascade of armament and instability.

The global normative order also stands at risk. If the U.S.—itself a founding signatory of the NPT—can target another signatory’s nuclear infrastructure without consequence, and if the IAEA proves unable to enforce compliance or prevent escalation, then the treaty’s legitimacy may begin to unravel. As articulated in Fiona Cunningham’s Nuclear Norms in East Asia (2021), international regimes rely not merely on legal instruments but on perceived fairness and reciprocity. The perception that the NPT regime disproportionately penalizes non-Western states while tolerating exceptions for allies—such as Israel or India—could hasten a broader exodus from the treaty.

Russia’s role as a potential counterbalance on the diplomatic chessboard must also be considered. While Moscow remains a signatory of the NPT and is unlikely to openly assist Iran in developing a nuclear weapon, its alignment with Tehran in international forums—especially at the United Nations Security Council—could serve as a strategic shield against renewed sanctions or enforcement actions. This maneuvering resembles the patterns described in Andrew Futter’s Hacking the Bomb (2018), which explores how nuclear power is now shaped as much by information warfare and diplomatic alliance as by kilotons and centrifuges.

Finally, there is the matter of strategic miscalculation. Should Iran proceed with weaponization and Israel respond with preemptive strikes—potentially supported again by U.S. tactical operations—the possibility of a full-scale regional war would no longer be hypothetical. As Caitlin Talmadge notes in The Dictator’s Army (2017), nuclear breakout scenarios often escalate not through deliberate choice, but through misinterpretation, miscommunication, and the psychology of brinkmanship. Each step away from treaty obligations narrows the window for de-escalation and expands the risk of unintended catastrophe.

In conclusion, Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the NPT represents not merely a response to recent attacks but a profound inflection point in international security architecture. The unraveling of treaty commitments, the weakening of normative frameworks, and the potential for cascading proliferation across the Middle East suggest that the cost of unilateral coercive diplomacy may be greater than the strategic benefits it purports to yield. The global community stands at a precipice, where the pursuit of short-term tactical gains may irreparably fracture the long-standing scaffolding of nuclear restraint.

After the recent military escalations between Iran and Israel, where the U.S. was involved symbolically but in a limited manner, the focus of the international strategic community has shifted back to one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz. Although the matter of closing such a waterway has been around in various forms of threats since the 1980s, the current situation in the Middle East is a clear signal that those threats are going to be actual events instead of mere rhetoric. Accordingly, the issue of how the world would react to a decision of Iran to shut down or impose restrictions on the Strait is now not a merely theoretical discussion—it is a current situation that is capable of affecting the whole world.

Why Hormuz Matters

The Strait of Hormuz acts as the main artery through which around 20% of the world’s oil for trade and more than 30% of global liquefied natural gas are transported each day. Its narrow geography—only 33 kilometers wide at the narrowest point—makes it a region that is unstoppably within Iran’s influence. This location is critical as it is the area where the Middle East’s vast oil resources are transported to the world’s markets. A conflict here would not only be equivalent to cutting off the energy export infrastructure in Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar but also to a power outage in international energy markets. In a global economic scenario currently facing various challenges such as supply chain realignments, inflationary trends, and geopolitical rivalries, the closure of Hormuz would not just be an energy crisis; it would be a major systemic event.

Military Feasibility and Constraints

Technically, Iran definitely has the capabilities to disrupt or block the Strait for a short period. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has multiple layers of assets in the region, such as fast-attack boats, coastal missile batteries, naval mines, and drone systems. It has been building and rehearsing asymmetric strategies that are intended to fool the shipping lanes and stop the U.S. from intervening in its navy; these strategies are implemented through repeated exercises. On the other hand, Iran could carry out such a closure or be the major disruptor, but the continuation of it would be difficult. This move would most probably incite a very strong and well-coordinated military counterattack from the United States and its partners, which may also include a multinational maritime security coalition, apart from those opponents mentioned. Besides that, the international community would certainly impose severe penalties on Iran in the form of retaliatory actions, diplomatic isolation, and economic free-fall. Therefore, it is possible that Tehran wants to continue to calibrate its harassment or partial closures instead of implementing a full-scale blockade.

Energy Security and Economic Fallout

An incident in the Strait of Hormuz would cause a very rapid increase in oil and gas prices, and Brent crude would probably go up to more than $150 a barrel in the first few days of the crisis. Energy-exporting countries—especially in Asia, where China, India, South Korea, and Japan are the main players—would not only have energy shortages but also energy price inflation. After the Ukraine crisis, Europe changed the direction of its gas imports to Gulf LNG, but it is still going to be affected. Though some capacity exists in the form of overland pipelines, like Saudi Arabia’s East-West system, these alternatives are not sufficient to make up for the shortage of the flow through Hormuz. The impact would be felt globally—through inflation, increased shipping insurance charges, currency instability, and lack of investor confidence in emerging markets. At the end of the day, the economic cost would not be limited to energy consumers alone; it would also hit the very core of the global economic interdependence structure.

Diplomatic and Legal Implications

International law legally defines the Strait of Hormuz as an international strait—that means it is the free navigation route allowed for ships under the law of the sea. This right of passage is given to ships registered as UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). Although Iran is not a party to UNCLOS and they firmly believe that they have the right to issue regulations for traffic, especially at times of insecurity, they are nonetheless free to assert their prerogatives. This situation of uncertainty in the interpretation of the laws only goes to highlight a bigger issue: necks like Hormuz are not only regulated by law but also by power. When the legal norms conflict with geopolitical situations, the implementation of the law is more influenced by the use of force, negotiations, or peacekeeping units than by court decisions. In the course of the global order’s evolution toward multipolarity, traditional means of enforcement are more and more divided; the international community has to come to terms with the fact that maritime governance is at its end.

Global Responses and Strategic Calculus

If Iran were to interfere with the transit in the Strait of Hormuz in a serious manner, it would necessitate a strong reaction from the United States. The latter has always considered the freedom of navigation as a vital interest. To this end, they could send their naval forces, form coalitions as in 2019 and carry out Operation Sentinel, or ask the UN Security Council to solve the issue, though Russia or China are likely to block any resolution. European countries could request the de-escalation and the mediation of the conflict, but they do not have a unified military force in the region. China and India, on the other hand, need to think about their next moves: they can’t lose their energy security, but they shouldn’t look like they’re sticking with the West; otherwise, they’ll be in trouble with their other friends. Russia might be in a good position to profit from the rising oil prices, but on the other hand, it has to be careful not to damage its partnerships in the region. Most importantly, nations in the Gulf region such as Oman, Qatar, and the UAE are expected to be at the forefront of diplomatic efforts to calm down tensions, using their secret communication channels to reach a truce, thus preventing the situation from spiraling into open warfare.

Conclusion: A Chokepoint as a Global Fault Line

The hypothetical closing of the Strait of Hormuz has attracted attention not only to it as a regional conflict but also as a challenge for the international system. It displays, first of all, the weakness of energy and trade flows, which are extremely dependent on special narrow geographic corridors. Oddly enough, after so many years of discussions about energy diversification and supply chain resilience, the world still remains terribly dependent on several maritime corridors that are at the center of geopolitical struggles. The second point is that this event shows the absence of any credible regional security framework in the Persian Gulf. Several next attempts to build inclusive architectures—whether led by the United States, Russia, or even China—were not successful in creating crisis prevention or conflict resolution mechanisms. As a result of this situation, the region is no longer strategically stable but becomes reactive all the time.

On the third point, the whole situation with Hormuz undermines those sea governance foundations that still remain. Legal concepts like transit passage only work when they are supported by a multilateral consensus and have credible enforcement. In their absence, rules give way to power politics, and coercive signaling becomes a tool of diplomacy. Way, The precedent it would establish at Existing even time would lead to other chokepoints at play: the Suez Canal, the Bab el-Mandeb, and the South China Sea. In conclusion, the crisis would be a strong reassertion of the supply of preventive diplomacy. The current escalatory spiral between Iran and Israel, compounded by the lack of sustained dialogue mechanisms, leaves the door open for miscalculation and unintended conflict. Restoring regional diplomacy, be it through a new Gulf security initiative or improved nuclear talks, is not an option—it is a must.

In conclusion, the Strait of Hormuz is definitely not only a maritime corridor. It is a political fault line where local crises meet with global insecurity. The manner in which the international community deals with or neglects the danger could be the factor that decides the path of world peace in the next ten years.

A new poll says most Europeans accept they must prepare for war.

This comes in the wake of President  Trump’s decision to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities at the weekend.

The multi-country polling report, published ahead of the 2025 NATO Summit, shows widespread support across Europe for increases in defence spending, scaled rearmament programmes, and the reintroduction of mandatory military service. 

Polling by the  European Council on Foreign Relations suggests Europeans remain committed to Ukraine, and will not countenance withdrawing military support, pressuring Kyiv to cede occupied territories, or lifting sanctions on Russia if the U.S. changes course. 

Despite anti-EU rhetoric from the White House, and rising anti-American sentiment in a number of European countries, many citizens still believe the U.S. can be relied upon for nuclear deterrence and a military presence on the continent. There is also widespread optimism that the Transatlantic Alliance can be repaired in the future.   

In their analysis, published on Monday, ECFR report authors and foreign policy experts, Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, argue that the second coming of Trump has already had far-reaching impacts and led to a breakout of ‘political cross-dressing’ in Europe. They believe today’s disorder presents an opportunity for those of the political mainstream to “get out of the business of defending the status-quo – and reinvent European identity for a revolutionary new world”. 

The trajectory of Donald Trump’s second presidency is upending European opinion, vis-a-vis defence and security, and forcing citizens to accept that they must prepare for a world at war, according to a new multi-country polling report published today by the (ECFR). 

Data from the think-tank’s latest study suggest sthat the second coming of Trump has changed not only the internal political system of the United States (U.S.), but how Europeans view their own security and identities. It points to a fundamental shift, away from the Transatlantic Alliance and Washington-backed security guarantees, towards a more autonomous Europe that must ramp up its own capabilities. This has changed Europe from a ‘peace project’ to one that is now scaling, at speed, in preparation for war, with publics in a number of leading Atlanticist states (including Denmark, Germany and the UK) being among those most confident about the need for Europe to take care of its own security and defence.  

Published to coincide with this week’s 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, the multi-country poll of 12 European countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) reveals widespread support across Europe for an increase in defence spending (50% on average across 12 polled countries vs. 24% opposing), a commitment to maintaining military support to Ukraine in the event of the U.S. withdrawal (59%), and backing for developing an alternative European nuclear deterrent that does not rely on the US (54%).  

The dataset, which was commissioned through leading pollsters, YouGov, Datapraxis and Norstat, also indicates far-reaching ideological shifts within political parties following Trump’s return to the White House. It shows that Europe’s far-right have, in the space of six months, transformed themselves from ‘sovereigntists’ to ‘internationalists’, and become ideological allies of the U.S. President in his quest to remake the ‘world order’. Several mainstream parties have also similarly recast themselves as national-minded advocates, and agitators for a more autonomous Europe, with the power to push back at U.S. interference. This transformation constitutes a form of “political cross-dressing”, according to the report’s authors, Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard.  

Krastev and Leonard, in their analysis, note that while many in Europe are sceptical of Trump, and want to see greater continent-wide rearmament and defence, this does not translate into full confidence that the EU can stand on its own. The authors argue that while Europeans are convinced that their governments should part with American policy when it comes to Ukraine, they are relaxed about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and the possibility of rekindling bands across the Atlantic once Trump leaves office.   

They believe Europe, today, is responding to the Trump ‘revolution’ in a similar manner to the 2016 Brexit vote – by “stepping back” and “buying time to prepare for the coming leap”. That so many citizens still believe the U.S. can be counted on to provide a nuclear deterrence (48%), and a military presence on the continent (55%), speaks to this, they argue. They also point to widely felt optimism surrounding the future of the Transatlantic Alliance (with 45% of respondents across the surveyed countries believing it will be ‘repaired’), and a majority view (54%) that the EU can avert a trade war with Washington, as further examples. While the authors see merit in this “wait and see” approach, they also encourage European governments to use Trump’s prominence to reshape their own politics. Today’s disorder, they write, has presented a path for the political mainstream to “get out of the business of defending the status-quo”, and an opportunity for them to recreate a European identity for a “revolutionary new world”. 

Key findings from ECFR’s multi-country survey include: 

There is widespread agreement in Europe that defence spending must rise. Majorities in Poland (70%), Denmark (70%), the UK (57%), Estonia (56%) and Portugal (54%), support (either ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’) the idea of increasing national defence spending – with majorities in Denmark and Estonia (the only two countries where the other question was asked) also in favour of increasing defence spending to 5% of national GDP. Pluralities in Romania (50%), Spain (46%), France (45%), Hungary (45%), Germany (47%), and Switzerland (40%) also expressed support for increased defence spending. Italy, however, is an outlier to this trend, with a 57% majority either ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly’ opposed, and only 17% supporting a hike in defence spending.  
 

Majorities also favour reintroducing mandatory military service. Respondents in France (62%), Germany (53%), and Poland (51%) are the strongest supporters for such a move, with the softest support coming from Hungary (32%), Spain (37%) and the UK (37%) (this question was not asked in Denmark, Estonia, and Switzerland because military service is already mandatory there). Those within the age groupings 60-69 and 70+ are keenest on the idea of mandatory military service (with 54% and 58%, respectively, indicating their support). This plummets, however, when put to the youngest demographic group (those ages 18-29). On average, just 27% of this group – who are of age to serve in any armed conflict – expressed support, while a majority, 57%, indicated that they would oppose such a move.  

Europeans are committed to Ukraine, irrespective of U.S. policy. ECFR data shows that majorities or pluralities in eleven of the twelve countries surveyed are against the idea of Europe withdrawing its military support for Ukraine, pushing Ukraine to give up on territory occupied by Russia, or lifting economic sanctions on Russia – irrespective of a U.S. policy shift across these points. Respondents in Denmark (78%), Portugal (74%), the UK (73%), and Estonia (68%) are the staunchest supporters of continued military support in the event of a U.S. withdrawal. Similarly, those in Denmark (72%), Portugal (71%), the United Kingdom (69%), and Estonia (68%) are the most opposed to the idea of pushing Ukraine to give up occupied territory, if the U.S. adopted such an approach; and are also the strongest opponents of lifting economic sanctions against Russia, if the U.S.  behaved in this manner (Denmark, 77%; the UK, 71%; Estonia, 69%; and Poland, 68%). 

Trump’s hostility towards Europe has given rise to anti-American sentiment. This is particularly true in Denmark, where 86% of respondents believe the U.S. political system is ‘broken’, and where the share of population that consider Trump’s re-election a bad thing for American citizens has increased from 54% to 76% per cent in just six months. A similar picture emerges among Portuguese citizens, where 70% view the U.S. political system, today, as ‘broken’, compared to just 60%, when ECFR asked the same question in November 2020, following Joe Biden’s election victory. In the UK, and Germany, majorities of 74% and 67% also think the U.S system is broken. And, even in traditionally pro-American Poland, the share of citizens sharing this view has risen from 25% to 36% since November 2020.  

There is scepticism about whether the EU can effectively decouple from the U.S.  on defence and security. Respondents inDenmark and Portugal are the most optimistic about achieving this, with 52% and 50% of citizens, respectively, believing it is ‘possible’ for the EU to become independent of the U.S. on defence and security in the next five years. Scepticism is the most pronounced in Italy and Hungary, where 54% and 51%, respectively, see EU autonomy on security and defence as ‘very difficult’ or ‘practically impossible’ to achieve in the next five years. Elsewhere, respondents are torn, including in Romania (45% think it is possible vs. 39% think it is difficult or impossible), France (44% vs. 39%), Germany (44% vs. 45%), Poland (38% vs. 48%), Estonia (41% vs. 49%) and Spain (43% vs. 47%). Europeans are also sceptical about whether the EU can put aside its internal differences and become a global power, capable of competing economically with the U.S. and China. Belief that the EU can become such a player is soft – and a minority view – In eleven of the twelve countries polled by ECFR (with Danes being the sole outliers in their optimism).  

Many also harbour the belief that the Transatlantic Alliance will be repaired, once Trump leaves office. There is a widespread expectation that the transatlantic relationship will improve once Trump leaves office, with this view most evident in Denmark (62%), Portugal (54%), Germany and Spain (52%), and France (50%). This view is the weakest in Hungary (20%) and Romania (28%), where relatively many people – 24% and 19% respectively – believe Donald Trump hasn’t really damaged the transatlantic relationship. Only a minority in every country – and 22% on average, across 12 countries polled – are of an opinion that not only Donald Trump has damaged the relationship between Europe and the USA but also that ‘the damage will probably last even once Trump has left office’. Besides, the prevailing view, across the twelve countries surveyed by ECFR, is that Europe can continue to rely on U.S. nuclear deterrence (48% of citizens, on average across polled markets, share this view), maintain the U.S. military presence on the continent (55%), and avoid a trade war with Washington (54%).  
 

Trump 2.0 has prompted a revolution in not just Europe’s geopolitical – but also in the political identity of its main political parties. Trump’s return to power appears to have driven an outbreak of ‘political cross-dressing’ in Europe. Supporters of populist parties are no longer exclusively against the status-quo – they are now in favour of the Trumpian counter-project. And those who back mainstream parties are no longer simply in favour of the status-quo – they are now increasingly drawing energy from being defenders of national sovereignty against Trump. As a result, the European public is currently strongly polarised in its perceptions of the U.S. political system. For example, voters of the right-wing parties, Fidesz (Hungary), PiS (Poland), Brothers of Italy (Italy), AfD (Germany) and Vox (Spain), have a predominantly positive view of America – while the mainstream electorates in their countries hold a mostly negative view of the U.S. political system. Furthermore, being able to treat the U.S. as the model appears to allow voters of the far-right to become even more outspoken in their criticism of the EU. This represents a huge leap for supporters of some populist parties – like those of PiS (Poland), Vox (Spain) or Chega (Portugal) – where the perception that the EU is broken has now become majoritarian, after being previously held only be a minority of their voters. Conversely, voters for mainstream parties appear to be rallying around the European flag – most visibly in Germany and in France. The result of these various changes in public opinion is the emergence of a reverse relationship in the perception of the U.S. and the EU, which wasn’t there before.  

Commenting on the multi-country survey report, co-author and founding director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, Mark Leonard, said: 

“Donald Trump’s revolution has come to Europe – overturning its political and geopolitical identity. Our poll shows that Europeans feel unsafe and that Trump is driving demand for increased defence spending, the reintroduction of military service, and an extension of nuclear capabilities across much of Europe.  

He is also transforming domestics politics in a similar way to Brexit. Far-right parties are no longer simply seen as anti-system; they have become part of a pro-Trump internationale. On the other hand, many mainstream parties are reinventing themselves as defenders of sovereignty against Trumpian chaos.” 

Co-author and chair of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Ivan Krastev, added: 

“The real effect of Trump’s second coming is that the United States now presents a credible model for Europe’s far-right.  

To be pro-American today mostly means to be sceptical of the EU, to be pro-European means being critical of Trump’s America.” 

The 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, held in late May 2025 in Singapore, continued to clearly reflect the escalating strategic tensions between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region. Mutual criticism of freedom of navigation, militarization of the South China Sea, and the “rules-based” international order created an atmosphere of near-confrontation.

In that context, Vietnam—a country with a strategic position and close relations with both the United States and China—has once again attracted the attention of international analysts as a potential model of the “soft balancing” strategy. The question is, can Vietnam continue to maintain an independent and autonomous foreign policy while the great powers are increasingly exerting pressure?

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s speech at Shangri-La Dialogue 2025 reaffirmed America’s “unwavering” commitment to the security of its allies and partners in Asia, with a particular emphasis on “freedom of navigation in the South China Sea” and opposition to “unilateral actions that change the status quo.” Hegseth also announced the expansion of defense cooperation with many Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam.

In turn, China has criticized the United States for using the Shangri-La Dialogue to “create disputes, sow discord, provoke confrontation, and pursue selfish interests,” after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called China a threat in the Indo-Pacific region.

The war of words between the United States and China at Shangri-La 22 not only reflects the stance of the two powers but also an effort to shape the understanding of regional security, leaving countries like Vietnam facing many difficult choices.

Since 2023, when upgrading relations with the US to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” Vietnam has entered a new phase in its policy of “multilateralization and diversification” of international relations. Bilateral trade turnover between Vietnam and the US has exceeded the 124 billion USD mark in 2024, while the US has also actively promoted cooperation in technology, cybersecurity, and maritime patrol support.

However, China remains Vietnam’s largest trading partner, with total two-way trade reaching a peak of over 230 billion USD in 2023. In addition, China is also an important source of input materials in many manufacturing and processing sectors.

Geostrategically, Vietnam is caught between two increasingly clear poles of influence. Leaning too heavily toward one side not only violates Hanoi’s principle of independent and autonomous diplomacy but also carries the risk of being drawn into conflicts that are not its own.

Vietnam’s “four no’s” defense policy—no participation in military alliances; no alliance with one country against another; no allowing foreign countries to set up military bases; No use of force or threat of use of force—continues to be affirmed after Shangri-La.

However, the challenge lies in practical implementation in the context of the US increasing its military presence in the East Sea, while China continues to consolidate artificial outposts and increase its maritime law enforcement forces.

Vietnam has been strengthening its defense capabilities, but it is not seeking a rigid alliance. Its defense procurement from multiple sources (Russia, Israel, South Korea, India, etc.) reflects its desire to maintain a flexible neutrality. In addition, Vietnam prioritizes bilateral and multilateral defense dialogues—including the ADMM+ and the ASEAN Maritime Security Capacity Building Initiative—to maintain regional stability.

For many experts, Vietnam is currently one of the few ASEAN countries with the capacity and courage to maintain a “dual pivot ”strategy”—maintaining warm relations with the US while maintaining stability with China. After the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, Vietnam will continue to play an active role in maintaining the stability of the regional power structure. By raising its voice, it will strengthen ASEAN’s central role, from the East Sea issue to building military-security dialogue mechanisms.

However, it cannot be denied that the increasing strategic pressure from both sides may hurt Vietnam’s independent policy space, especially when some countries in the region have begun to lean heavily towards one side; for example, the Philippines has increased military exercises and signed many extensive military agreements with the US.

Vietnam needs to continue moving in the direction of “not choosing sides, but choosing interests.” This means prioritizing substantive projects: energy transition, green technology, improving maritime security capacity, and responding to climate change.

Equally important is to promote bilateral and multilateral dialogue channels to resolve disagreements, especially the East Sea issue. In the context of the Code of Conduct (COC) still not reaching consensus after nearly two decades of negotiations, Vietnam’s proactive mediating role in ASEAN is extremely necessary.

Finally, Vietnam needs to invest more heavily in its domestic “strategic analytical capacity” and foreign policy advisory apparatus to provide flexible, realistic options and respond promptly to strategic movements in the region.

Thus, after the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, although no solution to regional security conflicts emerged, it was a clear reminder that US-China competition will continue, even more fiercely. In that environment, Vietnam has no other choice but to uphold the principles of independence, self-reliance, and cooperation while strengthening internal strength, expanding partnerships, and firmly maintaining a principled stance.

It is not an easy road. But as history has shown, Vietnam’s sobriety and steadfastness in the midst of major strategic currents is the foundation for long-term stability and development.

In the intricate and often contentious geopolitical landscape of South Asia, the counter-terrorism alliance between Pakistan and the United States has been a defining, albeit fraught, feature of the post-9/11 era. While periods of significant friction have punctuated the relationship, recent unequivocal commendations from senior US defence and intelligence officials serve as a stark reminder of Pakistan’s pivotal, costly, and phenomenally consequential contributions to the global fight against terrorism. This recognition, emerging from the crucible of shared threats and sacrifices, underscores a partnership whose strategic importance transcends transient diplomatic disagreements.

The most resonant affirmation came recently from General Michael Kurilla, Commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), who explicitly lauded Pakistan as a “phenomenal counter-terrorism partner.” This is not mere diplomatic platitude; it reflects decades of operational collaboration forged in the face of grave mutual threats emanating from the region. The significance of this statement lies in its source, the commander directly responsible for US military operations across the Middle East and Central/South Asia, including the ongoing campaign against the ISIS and Al-Qaeda remnants. His praise signifies a concrete appreciation for actionable intelligence, coordinated operations, and shared strategic objectives on the ground. Further substantiating this, Kash Patel, a former senior US Defence Department official and key figure in counter-terrorism efforts, publicly confirmed Pakistan’s indispensable role in facilitating the extradition of an ISIS facilitator from Canada to the United States, demonstrating critical ongoing cooperation in disrupting transnational terror networks.

The historical depth of this collaboration is profound and irrevocably linked to watershed moments in global security. Pakistan’s intelligence and security agencies played an indispensable role in the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principal architect of the September 11th attacks, alongside numerous other high-value Al-Qaeda operatives. These operations, often conducted under extreme peril and requiring unparalleled human intelligence penetration, dealt devastating blows to the core leadership of global jihadism. Beyond targeted captures, Pakistan provided critical, non-negotiable ground and air logistics that sustained the massive US and NATO military presence in landlocked Afghanistan for two decades. Pakistani airspace and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) were the vital arteries supplying the coalition war effort, a contribution without which the campaign’s scale would have been logistically untenable. Moreover, the efficacy of the much-debated US drone campaign in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was fundamentally predicated on logistical access and crucial intelligence support facilitated by Pakistani agencies, enabling precision strikes against high-value targets.

Recognizing that passive cooperation was insufficient against an entrenched insurgency, Pakistan launched decisive, large-scale military offensives with significant regional and global implications. Operations like Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad represented massive, internally driven campaigns to dismantle terrorist sanctuaries within Pakistan’s own borders. These were not mere tactical skirmishes but comprehensive, corps-level operations involving tens of thousands of troops, resulting in the clearing of vast territories previously held by groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and various Al-Qaeda affiliates. The disruption caused by these offensives directly degraded the capabilities of groups plotting transnational attacks, thereby enhancing global security. This kinetic action was complemented by relentless joint intelligence operations with US agencies, consistently disrupting imminent ISIS and Al-Qaeda plots targeting Western interests and regional stability.

The partnership extends beyond kinetic action and intelligence sharing into the complex realms of countering terror financing (CTF) and managing cross-border threats. Pakistan continues to coordinate assiduously with US Treasury and intelligence entities to track and disrupt the financial lifelines of proscribed terrorist organizations. This ongoing collaboration addresses the persistent challenge of militants exploiting the porous Pak-Afghan border, a task demanding constant vigilance and real-time intelligence exchange. Reinforcing this multifaceted cooperation are regular military-to-military engagements and structured coordination mechanisms with CENTCOM, ensuring interoperability and strategic alignment for long-term counter-terrorism objectives. Furthermore, Pakistan has undertaken significant, albeit less heralded, efforts in regional de-radicalization and counter-extremism initiatives, aiming to dismantle the ideological underpinnings of terrorism within its society.

Washington consistently, and rightly, acknowledges the staggering human cost borne by Pakistan in this shared struggle. Estimates suggest over 80,000 Pakistani civilians and security personnel have lost their lives to terrorist violence since 2001, a sacrifice unparalleled by any other US partner in this conflict. Thousands more have been wounded, and millions displaced by military operations. This immense toll underscores the existential nature of the threat Pakistan faced and continues to confront, making its counter-terrorism efforts not merely an alliance obligation but a fundamental national survival imperative. The elimination of countless high-value targets along the volatile Pak-Afghan border stands as a testament to Pakistani resolve, achieved often through perilous joint or unilaterally coordinated actions.

The recent US praise is a significant diplomatic marker, reflecting a pragmatic recognition of Pakistan’s indispensable contributions. It signifies a mature understanding that despite differences on other strategic issues, notably Afghanistan’s political trajectory, counterterrorism remains a vital area of convergent interest demanding sustained collaboration. The fight against ISIS-Khorasan and other emerging regional affiliates necessitates this continued partnership. While challenges persist, particularly concerning cross-border militant havens and the evolving regional landscape, the operational history and recent affirmations highlight a resilient, if complex, counter-terrorism axis. Pakistan’s role, forged in sacrifice and sustained through operational necessity, remains phenomenally significant in the enduring global effort to counter transnational terrorism.

Following Recommendations

• Enhance Real-Time Intelligence Fusion: Establish more robust, technologically advanced platforms for instantaneous sharing and joint analysis of HUMINT, SIGINT, and financial intelligence between Pakistani agencies (ISI, FIA, CTD) and US counterparts (CIA, FBI, DIA, NCTC), focusing on ISIS-K, TTP, and emerging threats.
• Deepen Regional Security Coordination: Proactively foster structured intelligence and operational trilateral dialogues involving Pakistan, Afghanistan (de facto authorities), and the US/CENTCOM to address cross-border militant sanctuaries and movement, leveraging existing communication channels but seeking greater operational transparency.
• Augment CTF & Border Security Capacity: Sustain and expand US technical assistance and training programs for Pakistan’s Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU), law enforcement agencies (CTDs), and border security forces (FC, PAK Rangers) to combat sophisticated terror financing networks and improve cross-border surveillance/control.
• Strengthen De-Radicalization & CVE Infrastructure: Increase international support (technical expertise, funding) for Pakistan’s de-radicalization programs and community-based Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiatives, ensuring long-term sustainability and measurable impact assessment frameworks.
• Maintain High-Level Strategic Dialogue: Institutionalize regular, high-level (Ministerial/Command Level) bilateral counter-terrorism consultations separate from broader political dialogues to ensure strategic alignment, swiftly address operational friction points, and adapt to evolving threat landscapes.

“The fight against terrorism is not just Pakistan’s war, it is the world’s war.” General Pervez Musharraf

A president who built his reputation as a real estate mogul and TV personality, not through political office or military service. A cultural influencer and entrepreneur best known as the CEO of Tesla and SpaceX, he also leads companies like Neuralink and The Boring Company, both embroiled in a feud. An intriguing moment in politics, one that could steer the direction of public discourse and holds potential for both factionalism and authoritarian tendencies. Two political outsiders beefing in the political space. Perhaps, if both were real politicians, the first thing to say would be that in politics there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests. Since both are businessmen, perhaps the philosophy of supply and demand should take the lead.

One key area of tension is their vision for power and influence. Trump has traditionally sought loyalty and absolute control over his political base. Musk, on the other hand, champions a decentralized, free speech-centric internet and promotes what he calls “rational centrism.” Their feud exposes a broader struggle over who gets to define the conservative movement in the digital age. Is it career politicians like Trump or tech disruptors like Musk?

As the feud between Elon Musk and Donald Trump escalates, it signals a seismic shift in where power and influence now reside in America. Musk represents the rise of the tech oligarch—billionaires who command not only wealth but also control over critical digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence. In contrast, Trump embodies the traditional fusion of business interests and political power. This public clash reflects more than a personal rivalry; it marks a defining moment in history when unelected figures with vast digital reach are rivaling, and in some cases eclipsing, the authority of elected officials. At stake is the very foundation of American democracy.

The cultural impact is equally significant. In today’s fragmented media landscape, Musk owns and controls X (formerly Twitter), one of the most influential social media platforms. Trump, meanwhile, promotes his views through Truth Social, his own media venture. Their battles play out in real time across these platforms, often fueling misinformation, deepening tribal divides, and eroding a shared sense of truth. This dynamic contributes to a growing destabilization of democratic norms. The rise of personality-driven politics is not confined to the United States; it is a global trend, reshaping leadership and public discourse worldwide. As Musk and Trump dominate headlines, millions are drawn into a media spectacle that distracts from urgent challenges like climate change, economic inequality, healthcare reform, and global instability. In this new era of digital power, the question remains: who truly holds the reins of influence, and at what cost to democratic society?

Elon Musk’s companies play a pivotal role in the U.S. economy, particularly in the automotive, aerospace, and infrastructure sectors. Should President Donald Trump choose to launch a political or rhetorical campaign against Musk, it could prompt Republican policymakers to reassess their support for clean energy subsidies, government contracts, or regulatory leniency. At the same time, Musk’s significant influence over financial markets—including cryptocurrencies and tech stocks—means that any sustained public clash with Trump could spark market volatility, especially if investors anticipate political retaliation or regulatory changes.

Should this feud be prolonged, the two figures could have far-reaching implications for Silicon Valley and the broader culture of innovation. Elon Musk is widely regarded as a symbol of entrepreneurial ambition and visionary risk-taking. Should former President Trump cast him as a political adversary, it could politicize certain elements of the tech industry, potentially undermining bipartisan support for innovation-driven initiatives. On the other hand, such a clash might encourage other tech leaders to adopt more overt political positions, either aligning with Musk’s views or deliberately distancing themselves from his influence, thereby challenging the traditionally apolitical posture of the tech sector.

The cultural implications of such a feud could be profound. Elon Musk resonates with younger, tech-savvy audiences through memes, livestreams, and direct engagement on social media platforms. In contrast, Donald Trump appeals to an older demographic that emphasizes traditional values and nationalist rhetoric. A prolonged conflict between the two figures could highlight and deepen the generational and ideological divides in American society. As business and politics become increasingly performative and adversarial, the space for collaboration, empathy, and thoughtful public discourse may continue to shrink.

Ultimately, in a nation already grappling with deep polarization, media fragmentation, and widespread institutional mistrust, a public clash between Elon Musk and Donald Trump could intensify existing divisions. While such a feud may appear, at first glance, to be mere spectacle, its ripple effects could extend far beyond headlines, impacting politics, economics, culture, and technology. As highly influential figures, both Musk and Trump bear a responsibility that transcends their personal brands. Their actions and their conflicts resonate throughout American society, making the consequences of their feud not just personal, but profoundly national.

As Canada hosts the G7 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, from June 15 to 17, 2025, an orchestra of economic collapse plays across free economies like Canada, the United States, and the European Union. The conductor is not war or scarcity but a silent plague: Anti-Job Creation Syndrome, fueled by a job-seeker mindset where individuals, driven by a quest for stability, prioritize secure careers over the daring act of building enterprises.

Job creators, those rare alchemists who forge businesses from dreams, are the antidote, yet they are stifled by a culture that clings to caution. Canada’s G7 presidency must spark a global shift toward job-creating prosperity or risk a financial collapse that reverberates across continents.

The spark of entrepreneurial mysticism—a primal force weaving prosperity from village squares to global markets—has long defined human progress. From the wheel’s invention to Steve Jobs’ digital revolution, this unexplainable drive has birthed enterprises, from humble workshops to towering giants.

In Canada, small and medium-sized enterprises account for 50% of GDP, yet too many falter under job-seeker policies that favor bureaucracy over risk. In contrast, China’s job creators drive 60% of GDP; their billion entrepreneurs are a symphony of innovation. Canada’s G7 stage must champion this mysticism to counter the syndrome’s chokehold, lest free economies fade into a dissonant fog.

Free economies suffer because 99% of their economic teams are job seekers, trained to support enterprises, not start them. Job creators, wielding tacit knowledge—the intuitive brilliance of innovation—face a world that prizes explicit skills like accounting or law. Canada’s education system, like its G7 peers, churns out resume-builders, not enterprise-builders, leaving small businesses to wither.

Across the European Union, 50% of small enterprises have closed since 2020, while India’s multi-million startups thrive on risk-taking. This divide fuels the Anti-Job Creation Syndrome, where job seekers caution against starving the entrepreneurial flame. Canada must lead the G7 in nurturing job creators, not coddling job seekers.

The global economy splits into abstract and real realms. Abstract economies, like those of Canada and the United States, indulge in financial games—stock manipulations and debt bubbles—while real economies, grounded in value creation, flourish in job-creator nations.

Canada’s enterprises, burdened by $1.3 trillion in national debt, struggle in this abstract haze, unable to match China’s relentless advance. G7 elections, despite bold promises, fail to launch grassroots prosperity, blinded by job-seeker policies. The summit’s focus on digital resilience and climate change risks missing the primal need for enterprise creation. Canada’s leadership must shift this narrative to real economies, where job creators forge lasting wealth.

Canada’s G7 presidency is a clarion call to host a global summit, uniting nations to forge strategies for real economies rooted in value creation. The absence of bold economic debates to address declining productivity demands this reckoning. When 99% of economic teams lack the spark to grow small and medium-sized enterprises, the damage is profound.

How long will Canada’s enterprises languish in debt’s shadow? A summit could draw lessons from job-creator nations, rekindling the entrepreneurial mysticism embedded in every community.

Five steps chart the path: promote entrepreneurial education to inspire job-creators; incentivize small and medium-sized enterprises with tax breaks; invest in training that blends tacit and explicit knowledge; foster public-private partnerships to break dependency; and convene a summit to share value-driven strategies.

The world watches as Canada stands at Kananaskis, its G7 baton poised to conduct a new symphony. Free economies teeter on collapse, their job-seeker mindset a weary colossus crumbling under caution.

Why is Expothon Worldwide gaining global attention? An international platform for entrepreneurial innovation and authority on National Mobilization of SME protocols, now so focused on 100 countries. Why is it challenging to use immediately deployable methodologies for all massive SME sectors within the GCC, OIC, European Union, African Union, Commonwealth, BRICS, and ASEAN for national mobilization of entrepreneurialism as pragmatic solutions? Over the last decade, these insights have been shared weekly and reached approximately 2000 selected VIP recipients at the National Cabinet-Level senior government officials across 100 free economies. This track record of expertise and trust forms the foundation of its proposed strategies.

Population-rich nations like India and China play a vibrant melody; their billion entrepreneurs are a testament to the reward of risk. Canada must lead the G7 in unleashing job creators, not job seekers, by forging enterprises that light up the global stage. Free economies and G& have some bigger challenges, like facing the anti-job creation syndrome.

Without this mega-shift, the old economic model risks a grand financial collapse, leaving free economies in darkness. Canada’s summit is the last stand to ensure job-creators triumph, creating a future of prosperity for all.

The rest is easy.

Donald Trump’s return to the office of presidency of the United States has restored to prominence issues of NATO’s unity and general strategic purpose. Backtracking from the emphasis of previous administrations on allied unity and common defense, Trump once more put in the spotlight issues of fiscal responsibility, pushing NATO allies to make good on economic commitments or risk reduced American involvement. This transactional orientation has renewed tensions at home in the alliance and challenged the very basic precept of collective defense. Preceding the forthcoming Hague Summit (24–26 June 2025), member states will prepare not only to deal with this American approach but also to encounter a rapidly deteriorating security situation produced by the relentless behavior of Russia in Ukraine.