USA

The Houthi attack on merchant ships in the Red Sea shows that asymmetric strategies have become one of the most disruptive forces in international security, often more effective than conventional state military power. The operations of these non-state groups not only disrupt global trade routes but also expose fundamental weaknesses in the international maritime security architecture. This phenomenon marks a major shift in the character of modern conflict: war is no longer the monopoly of states, and non-state actors are now capable of altering global strategic calculations at a much lower cost. This article argues that the Houthi operations reflect the failure of the traditional security paradigm and underscore the urgency of understanding irregular threats as a determining factor in contemporary geopolitical dynamics.

The Houthis’ success is rooted in the use of asymmetric strategies that combine low cost, high flexibility, and significant strategic impact. Unlike 20th-century insurgencies that relied on guerrilla tactics, the Houthis have increased the scale of the threat by utilizing kamikaze drones, ballistic missiles, and inexpensive surveillance systems. They direct these low-cost weapons at commercial vessels worth billions of dollars. When a single drone damages or threatens a merchant ship, dozens of global companies are forced to reroute, increase logistics costs, and face widespread economic risks. Asymmetric strategies work by avoiding the opponent’s main strengths and attacking points that render those strengths irrelevant. This is what is happening in the Red Sea: the superiority of modern warships is useless when the threat comes from small drones that are difficult to track and cheap to replace (Baylis and Wirtz, 2016).

The limitations of the navies of major countries in responding to these attacks highlight problems in traditional defense doctrine. The United States and Britain have deployed advanced combat fleets, but Houthi attacks continue and hit strategic targets. Major powers designed defense systems to deal with interstate threats, not irregular attacks from irregular actors who have no diplomatic obligations and do not submit to international norms. Modern insurgencies thrive by exploiting institutional gaps and the unpreparedness of states to respond to rapidly changing conflict dynamics. The Houthis are a case in point: they operate in a grey area that is not accounted for in conventional defense frameworks (Kilcullen, 2009).

The Houthis’ strategic strength stems not only from their military capabilities but also from their ability to exploit global economic interdependence. The Suez–Red Sea route is one of the world’s logistics hubs. When this region is disrupted, the consequences immediately affect the global energy market, European and Asian supply chains, and logistics costs for almost all sectors of international trade. Houthi attacks, although physically limited, have a huge psychological effect. When an attack occurs, dozens of international companies immediately review their navigation routes. This fear has a much greater economic impact than the physical damage to the ships that are targeted. In a strategic context, the Houthis have understood that creating uncertainty is a very cheap and very effective strategic weapon.

Moreover, Houthi operations are not merely military actions but part of broader geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East. They function as non-state actors and instruments in regional competition, particularly between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. With technological and logistical support from patron states such as Iran, the Houthis play a role in a larger regional strategy. This blurs the line between state and non-state actor strategies. Attacks on merchant ships are an effective way to put pressure on major countries without the political risks that usually accompany direct military action.

The involvement of non-state actors in the architecture of modern conflict reveals that the conventional concept of international security is no longer adequate. The doctrine of global maritime security was designed on the assumption that the main threat comes from rival states. However, the greatest threats today come from groups that do not have official navies, do not hold sovereign territory, and are not accountable to the international community. While states remain fixated on traditional threats, groups such as the Houthis are able to move quickly, flexibly, and effectively, exploiting every available opportunity. This is why international stability is increasingly vulnerable, even as the military power of major states continues to advance technologically.

The Red Sea crisis highlights the need for a major paradigm shift in global security strategy. Countries can no longer rely on interstate deterrence as the main pillar. A new model is needed that combines counter-drones, supply chain security, regional diplomacy, and conflict stabilization policies on land. Without a multidimensional approach, countries will continue to be stuck in short-term reactions rather than long-term strategies.

Ultimately, the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are not merely a disruption to international trade but a warning that the global security order is undergoing a fundamental repositioning. The arguments in this paper show that asymmetric strategies have eroded state dominance and revealed the unpreparedness of international security structures to deal with irregular threats. If states fail to update their paradigms, the future of global stability will increasingly be determined by actors who have no international obligations, are not subject to the norms of war, and are able to maximize their power at minimal cost. The world is entering a new era of strategy, and the Red Sea is proof that state dominance is no longer the mainstay of contemporary warfare.

Amid heightened Japan-China tensions, US President Donald Trump spoke by telephone with Chinese President Xi Jinping. While Trump termed it a positive development, stating he would visit China in April 2026, China claimed that it categorically made it clear that “Taiwan’s return to China was an ‘integral part of the postwar international order.” While it has been reported that Trump requested a phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, the details of the conversation between the two haven’t been made public yet.

Trump’s claim of “extremely strong” US-China relations has once again seized global attention. Earlier, last month, just ahead of his highly anticipated meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, Trump boldly announced on Truth Social, “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!”

Unsurprisingly, the statement sparked widespread discussion, directly invoking China and seemingly reviving the long-dormant G2 concept, an idea previously floated by former President Barack Obama.

This apparent attempt to resurrect the “G2” notion, which envisions shared global leadership between the US and China, marks a notable rhetorical shift and is surprising given that Trump has been hawkish on China even during his first term as the president. By invoking it, Washington has brought back a concept dismissed as a faulty trade-off, given the persistent and often adversarial nature of US-China relations. Media analyses suggest that this move reflects a growing recognition within the US of China’s rising power and an uneasy acknowledgement of its near-equal status on the world stage. The renewed attention signals an implicit acceptance within American policy circles of China’s expanding international influence and the shifting balance of global power.

For China, however, the idea holds little appeal. First, China continues to present itself as a developing country, aspiring to lead the Global South and, eventually, to achieve broader global influence. Unlike the West, China sees strategic value in retaining the support of developing nations to bolster its legitimacy. While it aims to surpass the US militarily, economically, and technologically, it is unlikely to embrace a bilateral framework implying formalized co-governance of the world. Second, the ideological, strategic, and global ambitions gap between China and the US remains vast, limiting the feasibility of any institutionalized G2 arrangement. Third, if such a framework were ever to exist, it would likely involve broader coalitions of nations with differing ideologies, capacities, and priorities, rather than a US-China duopoly. In this light, the G2 concept appears even less plausible for China in 2025 than it did in the 2000s.

While much commentary has focused on how this discourse may be interpreted in China, the implications extend far beyond the bilateral relationship. Washington’s allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific are closely observing these developments. For many in the region, stability in US-China relations is desirable, as it would help mitigate the risks of confrontation, economic disruption, regional instability, and global upheavals. Yet Trump’s rhetoric has also generated unease among America’s regional partners regarding Washington’s long-term strategic intentions.

Concerns are growing that a return to the G2 framework could signal a weakening of US commitment to the Indo-Pacific, particularly in terms of security and regional order. While sustained engagement with China is widely accepted as necessary, framing the relationship as one of shared global governance may alarm America’s allies and partners, especially the Quad countries, the Philippines, and Taiwan. For these countries, any suggestion of a US-China condominium raises doubts about the credibility of the US’s status as a security guarantor and its assurances of collective defense and regional stability.

From the US perspective, reviving the G2 discourse may appear advantageous to smooth the way for a rare earth materials deal with China or to ease bilateral tensions. But fundamental differences and rivalry cannot be erased: China’s ultimate goal is to overtake the US. In all likelihood, China will view G2 rhetoric skeptically, interpreting it as a sign of US weakness and declining influence in the Indo-Pacific.

The Xi-Trump phone call and China’s reiteration of the Taiwan claim put pressure on Trump’s G2 plan. How Trump would manage ties with Japan and Taiwan while building relations with China is an issue worthy of international attention.

Trump’s episodic and erratic approach to China and the region risks eroding the trust the US has painstakingly built with its partners. There is little chance that countries such as India, Japan, or the Philippines would accept a bipolar world dominated solely by the US and China. Rather than serving as a stabilizer, the G2 concept is more likely to be seen as an attempt to divide the world into two poles once again, or worse, as a signal that the US is content with a bipolar world rather than a genuinely multipolar order.

Even if the G2 never materializes, the rhetoric has already strengthened China’s position while placing the US in a strategic bind. In effect, it is a win-win for China but a lose-lose for America. There are limitations to America First not only for the region but also for America itself and its foreign policy. The Trump administration’s path would do well to seriously consider the perspectives of its allies and partners, rather than advancing a strategy that ultimately benefits China.

US and China have long competed to become world powers, particularly in the technology sector. Since 2022, the US has systematically restricted the supply of high-performance NVIDIA chips to China. In today’s world, competition for power is no longer achieved through traditional means, such as military power. The US uses chips (semiconductors) as an instrument of political pressure. This policy is not just about economic or trade value, but has become part of technological statecraft designed to counter China’s military potential and its use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

Semiconductors as a Provision of Power

The US policy of restricting high-end semiconductors to China shows a paradigm shift, chips (semiconductors) are not only industrial commodities, but have shifted to become a tool for achieving power. Export controls on high-performance chips and components that enable their production have been implemented by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). These steps show that the US is restructuring the geopolitical arena of technology.

AI today relies heavily on chips that can process vast amounts of data. The US restricts the export of high-end chips, such as the NVIDIA H100 and A100. A country’s AI development capacity could be severely compromised without access to these chips. The H100 is more than just a technological component; it serves as a strategic enabler that determines a country’s ability to maintain military dominance.

NVIDIA and the Security Logic Behind Export Control

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on 2023 announcement expanded export oversight, not only targeting on specific chip models but also on component values, most notably in frontier algorithm development. The NVIDIA A100 and H100 are highly advanced datacenter and AI chips. The guidelines are particularly high for training complex AI models on supercomputers, even for military applications or demanding research.

To prevent misuse, the US government has implemented licensing requirements for chips like the A100 and H100 chips, which have put chips like the A300 and H800, made by NVIDIA, under increased scrutiny, despite being categorized as “weak service” chips. Export restrictions stem from concerns that NVIDIA GPUs could be used by China in training AI models related to the US military, not only to slow China’s technological progress but also to safeguard its own national interests.

The US understands very well that high-performance chips are “brain machines” that can accelerate the development of military superiority, intelligence analysis, and even autonomous systems. So it is very clear that limiting the capacity of computing and high-performance hardware is the way to go. To delay a rival’s capabilities without resorting to direct military confrontation. This is a concrete manifestation of the shift in the “battlefield” taking place in the technological and regulatory arenas.

Vulnerable Supply Chains and Dependence on Taiwan

In chip control, the US must recognize that there are undeniable realities. NVIDIA’s chip production goes through a fabrication process that is almost entirely carried out in Taiwan, a country that lies in the geopolitical conflict between Washington and Beijing. The Congressional Research Service (2024) shows that approximately 90% of global advanced semiconductor chip production is based in Taiwan, manufactured by the leading Taiwanese foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. (TSMC). This creates a structural dependency that poses serious risks to US economic and technological security.

If semiconductor production were concentrated in a single region, it would create vulnerabilities that could destabilize the global technological system. Therefore, any tensions in the Taiwan Strait would disrupt US access to the computing infrastructure it maintains. Export restrictions are just one step in a much more complex strategy, requiring the US to diversify production locations and ensure that the chip supply chain is not concentrated in a single region.

Effectiveness and Adaptation Room for China

NVIDIA’s chip restrictions were intended to curb the pace of AI modernization in China, but China was still able to optimize the model’s efficiency. This demonstrates that limiting hardware performance doesn’t always equate to limiting innovation. On the other hand, unofficial market entities have emerged, allowing NVIDIA GPUs to remain accessible through third parties. This adaptation demonstrates that hardware control has limitations, especially when demand remains high and global distribution networks are not always transparent.

Looking at its overall effectiveness, US policy has been effective in slowing China’s computing capabilities, but it hasn’t stopped its strategic potential. Instead, it’s encouraging China to be self-sufficient in strengthening its technological foundation, even though the quality of local chips hasn’t yet matched NVIDA’s standards. In other words, restricting NVIDIA’s chip exports isn’t meant to end competition, but rather to transform it into a race toward technological independence. The policy’s effectiveness will only last as long as China finds a way to adapt, while China is working to fill that gap.

Policy Directions with Greater Strategic Opportunities

The effectiveness of the compute policy is based on a governance architecture that holds every allied country accountable to the same standards. Without a disciplined framework, export controls on China are merely an illusion that is easily penetrated by gaps in different economic and regulatory interests. By creating strategic alignment, which forces every democratic country to reduce the fragmentation of interests, it can open up greater policy opportunities to emerge. Many developing countries see this semiconductor race as a competition for dominance, not as an effort to maintain security.

In other words, a successful computing policy is not one that simply limits China’s space, but one that manages technological gaps without creating competing computing blocs. The geopolitical challenge is maintaining superiority without forcing the world into two technological divides that would be difficult to control. The US strategy to secure a leading position in future technologies requires flexibility in responding to global dynamics.

A Future Determined by Computational Capacity

The debate over NVIDIA chips demonstrates the growing integration of political and technological power. US policy aims not only to restrain the flow of strategic goods but also to build a new computing-based power architecture. However, this policy also presents challenges, including dependence on Taiwan, China’s flexibility, and economic pressure on US chip companies.

In a global world that continues to move toward an AI-driven economy, the future will be determined by who can manage geopolitical risks, understand supply chain dynamics, and design visionary policies. Ultimately, GPU regulation is no longer simply a matter of export control; it demonstrates how countries navigate a power struggle now measured in microchips.

When South Africa opens the 2025 G20 Summit on November 22nd in Cape Town, the meeting will not simply be another high-level diplomatic gathering. It will be a test of what global leadership looks like in an era defined by debt crises, climate shocks, and geopolitical fragmentation. It will also be a summit shaped as much by who is present as by who is absent.

For the first time since leaders began to regularly attend the G20, the United States is not expected to attend at the presidential level. That absence will hang heavily over a summit built around three themes that South Africa has placed at the core of its G20 hosting: solidarity, equality, and sustainability. This is not symbolic branding. These are principles that directly challenge the structure and priorities of the current international system and America’s decision not to participate will only magnify their political weight.

South Africa’s Vision for a More Equal Order

South Africa has been clear about what it wants this G20 to represent. The country’s diplomats have framed the summit as an opportunity to “rebalance global governance” and restore trust between advanced economies and the Global South. That begins with solidarity, not as a moral appeal but as a practical necessity in a world where the gaps in competition are tightening across virtually every sector.

South African officials have emphasized that the world is too interconnected, through supply chains, energy markets, debt exposures, and climate shocks, for any nation to pursue growth alone. Solidarity, in their framing, means shared responsibility for global risks and shared input into global rules.

Expect to see debt restructuring as a key component of the weekend. Dozens of low and middle-income countries are approaching insolvency. Many see the G20 as the only venue capable of compelling creditors, including China, Western banks, and the IMF to negotiate jointly. South Africa intends to push for more predictable mechanisms, faster timelines, and deeper reductions of overall debt.

The theme of equality is expected to be even more pointed. Pretoria has argued that the international financial system remains structurally biased. Voting power at the IMF does not reflect modern economic reality. Climate finance packages distribute risk upward and accountability downward. Supply chain standards reflect the priorities of wealthy states far more than those of producing states.

South Africa wants this summit to pressure advanced economies to move beyond incrementalism and to recognize developing nations as cooperators, not beneficiaries, of global economic design.

Sustainability as an Economic Imperative

As noted in the central theme of the summit, sustainability is the key talking point of the weekend. South Africa is expected to focus on climate adaptation financing, food security resilience, renewable infrastructure gaps, green industrialization, and the economic displacement climate change is already causing.

Pretoria’s message is blunt: sustainability is not the environmental chapter of the global economy, it is the global economy. The safeguards nations build today will determine whether their populations can withstand the shocks of the coming decade.

The Symbolism of America’s Absence

While the summit’s themes are forward-looking, the headlines thus far are dominated by one glaring issue; The United States is boycotting the event, and not sending a single delegate.

This absence is certainly meant to be received as a bold statement. In a moment when most of the global agenda is being rewritten around solidarity, shared burdens, debt relief, and climate vulnerability, the United States is choosing not to stand at the table.

Many delegations will read this as confirmation of what they already suspected: that the U.S. is prioritizing bilateral leverage and transactional deals over multilateral governance. In other words, America is choosing power over partnership.

That decision will have ripple effects. If Washington is not present to influence the language of solidarity or the scope of sustainability targets, other powers will be. The U.S. forfeits not only visibility, but the ability to shape norms that will define the next phase of global cooperation. The strongman tactic will prove less effective as the world continues to accelerate towards a multipolar world, as opposed to a unipolar order where D.C. stands above the rest.

China and India Eager to Fill the Vacuum

China is expected to enter the summit with a confident posture, despite Xi Jinping not attending. Beijing has spent the past several years positioning itself as the Global South’s premier development partner. A G20 centered around equality and solidarity aligns perfectly with China’s messaging: that it represents a more inclusive, less conditional model of global cooperation. This message will be even more prominent with an absentee America. To capitalize on the overall theme of moving away from Western dominated structures, it would be reasonable to assume that many lending systems denominated in the Yuan will be discussed on the sidelines.

India, meanwhile, will frame itself as the democratic partner of choice for developing economies. Expect New Delhi to emphasize supply chain diversification, digital equality, and climate-resilient infrastructure. India will also push for greater representation of Global South nations in multilateral institutions, a message that will resonate strongly in Africa and Southeast Asia.

Europe Attempts to Lead

European leaders will arrive prepared to engage deeply on sustainability and climate finance, but without Washington their influence will be limited. Europe cannot match America’s financial firepower nor China’s development machinery.

While Europeans tend to embrace the rhetoric of solidarity, they remain cautious about large-scale debt forgiveness, new climate financing mandates, and reforms that would dilute their institutional voting power. That tension prevents Europe from presenting itself as the natural successor to U.S. leadership, but rather an extension of it in the eyes of many developing nations.

A Summit That Signals a Changing Global Order

If South Africa succeeds in shaping the weekend around solidarity, equality, and sustainability, the summit could represent the most significant shift in G20 philosophy since its creation.

Tomorrow’s G20 will not be remembered for dramatic breakthroughs. It will be remembered for something subtler but more consequential; a turning point in global governance where the United States stepped back and the rest of the world showed it could step forward.

Kateryna Golizdra has been dealing with uncertainty about her legal status in the United States for six months. She hopes to endure another six months as she waits for the Trump administration to make decisions regarding a humanitarian program that allowed around 260,000 Ukrainians, displaced by the war, to live and work in the U. S. When her legal status expired in May, Golizdra became at risk of deportation, lost her job as a manager at the Ritz-Carlton that paid over $50,000, and lost her health insurance for a liver condition. She can no longer send financial support to her mother who lives in Germany.

As of March 31, nearly 200,000 Ukrainians faced similar risks due to processing delays in renewing their legal status caused by the Trump administration. The humanitarian program, which started in April 2022, was meant to offer short-term refuge to Ukrainians but is only a small part of the larger refugee crisis, with 5.9 million Ukrainian refugees globally. Golizdra is left unsure of when, or if, her legal status will be renewed, which creates a sense of ongoing anxiety about her future.

During interviews with various Ukrainian individuals affected by the temporary loss of their work permits, many shared stories of struggling financially. They reported dipping into their savings, seeking community assistance, and going into debt while they wait for updates. Some are afraid of being arrested by immigration authorities, prompting them to stay indoors or even leave the U. S. for safer locations in Canada, Europe, or South America. Returning to Ukraine is not an option for Golizdra, as her home was destroyed during the conflict.

The Trump administration halted processing applications for the humanitarian program in January, citing security concerns stemming from a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. While the program was not completely canceled, and a federal judge ordered officials to resume processing, only a tiny fraction of renewal applications have been processed since then. Additionally, a new spending package increased fees for humanitarian applications, adding to the burdens faced by these displaced individuals.

U. S. Representative Mike Quigley noted that his office has received numerous requests for help from Ukrainians in similar situations, with fears of deportation looming large for those whose applications are incomplete. Anne Smith, from the Ukraine Immigration Task Force, reported an uptick in calls from families worrying about detained relatives. This has led to chaotic interactions, with some being arrested while working or out in public.

Some Ukrainians have decided to leave the U. S. to avoid the risk of detention. Yevhenii Padafa, a software engineer, sought to renew his status but faced delays that left him without legal standing. Worrying about future complications, he tried to “self deport” using a government app that promised assistance for those voluntarily leaving the country. However, he encountered obstacles that made it difficult to relocate to a safer country. Instead, he ended up traveling to Argentina, which offers a humanitarian program, despite feeling financially strained upon arrival. He expressed the grim reality of preferring to be homeless in a foreign country rather than return to Ukraine, which is fraught with danger.

With information from Reuters

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy is racing to contain the fallout from a high-level corruption scandal that could undermine his authority, just as his country’s soldiers and civilians face potentially their toughest winter of the war with Russia.

A week after anti-corruption investigators said they had smashed an alleged $100 million (€86 million) kickback scheme centered on state nuclear power firm Energoatom, the furor is still swirling around Zelenskiy—even as Ukraine’s troops are under severe pressure on the battlefield with Russia, and its ailing energy grid suffers nightly attacks.

Justice Minister Herman Halushchenko and Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk have resigned over the scandal, but more damaging for the Ukrainian president is what appears to be significant involvement of businessman Timur Mindich, a protégé of Zelenskiy and co-owner of the media company that Zelenskiy founded before entering politics in 2019. Apparently having been tipped off, Mindich reportedly fled Ukraine shortly before last Monday’s raids and arrests.

The Ukrainian parliament has also voted to dismiss Energy Minister Svetlana Grinchuk, marking the second high-level ouster in a single day as the government struggles to contain a growing corruption scandal linked to a close ally of Vladimir Zelenskyy.

It is reported by the Kiev Post that Zelenskiy could fire his influential chief of staff, Andrey Yermak, this week. A full-scale “riot” has unfolded within parliament over the vast corruption scandal that allegedly links Yermak with the multimillion-dollar kickback scheme in the country’s energy sector. The scandal has also reminded Ukrainians of how the president curbed the independence of the nation’s top EU-initiated anti-corruption agencies in July—before being forced to backtrack by street protests and international criticism—in what critics called a brazen attempt to shield associates from scrutiny.

It threatens to become the biggest political crisis of the war for Zelenskiy and comes at a time when Ukrainian troops are under severe pressure from Russia in parts of four regions—Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk.

Bags of cash and a golden toilet

The West’s “dis-ease” with Ukraine and its president is no longer speculation. It’s happening in plain sight, slowly but ineluctably. The Financial Times, hardly a Kremlin mouthpiece, has published a piece titled “Bags of cash and a gold toilet: the corruption crisis engulfing Zelenskiy’s government.” Its reporters now openly state that Ukrainian elites expect even more explosive revelations from NABU investigations. And once outlets like FT put something like this in print, it usually means the groundwork has been laid behind the scenes.

That Western Europe and the United States are still approving new aid says little about confidence in Kiev. But it speaks volumes about bureaucratic inertia and the reluctance of those who profit from this war to let the tap close suddenly. Even so, you can now hear cautious whispers in Brussels asking whether it makes sense to send billions to a government whose officials seem determined to conjure up a scheme to steal the money before it arrives. These are not new revelations; rather, the surprise is that anyone actually pretends to be surprised.

The truth is easy to discern: the West knew exactly who it was dealing with from the inception. Nobody in Brussels, London, or Washington was under any delusion that Ukraine was somehow to be confused with, say, Switzerland. They knowingly entered into a political partnership with what is, and has long been, one of the most corrupt and internally unstable political systems in Europe. To pretend otherwise is to feign ignorance—pure theater.

For more than thirty years, Ukrainian statehood has rested on the same shaky foundations: competing clans, oligarchic rule, privatized security services, and a political class willing to plunder their own population. Changing leadership never went so far as to alter the underlying structure; it never happened because each leader owed his position to the same network of cash, patronage, and power.

Consider Leonid Kravchuk: under his auspices, Ukraine began its slow “Banderization,” while state assets were siphoned away and local power brokers entrenched themselves. Leonid Kuchma then perfected this system. Under his presidency, Ukraine saw questionable arms deals, the murders of journalists and opposition figures, and audiotapes revealing orders to eliminate critics. Economic sectors with predictable profits were carved up among regional clans who ruled their fiefdoms in exchange for loyalty. And a steady stream of kickbacks to Kiev.

Viktor Yushchenko’s years brought more of the same: corruption schemes around energy, political assassinations, and the continued exploitation of ordinary Ukrainians. Viktor Yanukovych and Petro Poroshenko added their own layers to this hierarchy of detritus. Zelenskiy inherited it but then accelerated it, surrounding himself with loyalists whose main qualification was their willingness to feed at the same trough as previous leaders and look the other way.

Resistance to federalism

All of these leaders shared one common denominator: resisting federalization. Ukraine is a country with a large landmass; yet, it operates through a centralized, unitary form of governance in which a legislative body or a single individual is given supreme authority and thus ultimate power over regional and local needs of the country. There are distinct disadvantages inherent in such a structure:

·        It tends to subordinate local and regional needs to that of those in power.

·        It can encourage an abuse of power, which is one reason why the United States and a dozen other nations created a federated state instead. Instead of having one form of centralized power, there is a system of checks and balances designed to provide more equality and give greater voice to those being governed.

· Greater opportunities for manipulation exist. Those in power can pursue more wealth or governing opportunities for themselves, because few ways exist to stop such activity.

·        The governing structure will protect the central body first.

·        Sub-national regions are not allowed to decide their own laws, rights, and freedoms; there is no sharing of power.

·        The few control the many. If there is a shift in policy that takes rights away from select groups or individuals, there is little, if anything, the general population can do to stop it.

·        The central authority can artificially shape the discussions of society; it can decide that their political opponents are a threat, then pass laws that allow them to be silenced or imprisoned for what they have allegedly done.

The current scandal in Ukraine is testament to the issues noted above relating to its form of governance.

A federal Ukraine would devolve power and financial control to the regions, and that is the nightmare scenario for Kiev’s elites. It would loosen their grip on revenue streams, limit their political leverage, and allow regional identities to express themselves without fear of punishment from the center. So instead of reform, those with power offered forced Ukrainization and nationalist slogans about one people, one language, and one state. It was a political survival strategy, not a nation-building project.

This is why changing presidents will solve nothing. Remove Zelenskyy, and you likely get another figure produced by the same system. Perhaps Zaluzhnyi, perhaps a recycled face from a previous era. The choreography will be identical; only the masks of the actors will change. The deeper problem is the structure of Ukrainian statehood itself. As long as Ukraine remains in its current unitary form of central authority, it will continue producing conflict, corruption, and internal instability. War is not an aberration in such a system. It is an outcome.

If the elites refuse to reform and the population has no means to compel them, then the discussion must move beyond personalities. The uncomfortable truth is that the only lasting solution may be to abandon the current model of Ukrainian statehood altogether. No cosmetic change will save a system, the very design of which fosters autocracy and corruption.

President Donald Trump is set to welcome Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia at the White House, emphasizing the rehabilitation of the crown prince’s global standing after the controversial assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, and the strengthening of U.S.-Saudi relations. This visit marks bin Salman’s first return to the White House in over seven years, and he will experience a grand ceremonial reception orchestrated by Trump. The discussions are anticipated to enhance security cooperation, promote civil nuclear collaboration, and explore substantial business opportunities, including issues around a $600 billion investment commitment made during Trump’s earlier visit to Saudi Arabia.

However, despite these discussions, major advancements in Saudi Arabia’s normalization of relations with Israel are not expected. This meeting highlights the critical partnership between the U.S., the world’s largest economy, and Saudi Arabia, the leading oil producer, a relationship that has become a focal point for Trump during his presidency, particularly as the international outrage related to Khashoggi’s murder has diminished over time. While U.S. intelligence indicates that bin Salman sanctioned Khashoggi’s assassination, he has publicly distanced himself from the act, accepting accountability only in his capacity as leader.

The agenda includes strategic talks at the White House, a lunch in the Cabinet Room, and a formal black-tie dinner. Notably, Trump has indicated plans to approve the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, a significant policy adjustment that would be the first U.S. sale of these aircraft to the nation, potentially shifting the military dynamics in the region. Alongside military discussions, Saudi Arabia seeks new security guarantees, with expectations of an executive order from Trump forming a defense pact similar to that offered to Qatar, but less comprehensive than a NATO-style treaty.

Experts express that Trump is keen to forge a diversified partnership that secures Saudi Arabia’s alignment away from China’s influence, thereby deepening cooperation across security, finance, and technology sectors. Additionally, Trump is likely to push for Saudi involvement in the Abraham Accords to normalize relations with Israel, a notion the Saudis are hesitant to embrace without clear advancements towards Palestinian statehood amid current regional conflicts.

The overarching goal for Trump regards solidifying a broader Middle East peace arrangement through Saudi participation in the Accords, which represent a crucial geopolitical pivot. While pressure on bin Salman regarding normalization with Israel is expected, analysts believe that a U.S.-Saudi security agreement could still be established independently of significant progress on this front. Overall, the visit aims to reaffirm the longstanding U.S.-Saudi alliance while navigating the complex regional context.

With information from Reuters

As the world moves into the final weeks of 2025, the global landscape looks markedly different from that of 2024. Over the past year, the world has witnessed a greater number of conflicts than at any time since the turbulence in the Middle East in the early 2000s. The Israel–Iran confrontation, the Thailand–Cambodia clashes, and most recently the U.S.–Venezuela conflict—together with earlier crises such as the Russia–Ukraine war that began in 2022 and Myanmar’s protracted internal turmoil—illustrate how sharply the global strategic chessboard is being reshaped.

These conflicts form a chain of consecutive flashpoints, each diverting global attention away from Taiwan—a uniquely sensitive entity for China.

China’s Moves Behind the Scenes

Following Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed on December 31, 2024, “No one can halt China’s drive to reunify with Taiwan.” Far from being a one-off remark, this declaration reflects a long-standing stance repeatedly voiced by Xi. He had frequently told President Joe Biden that Taiwan remains a “loaded gun” positioned by the United States at China’s doorstep—mirroring the Cold War dynamic when the Soviet Union stationed missiles in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs crisis. For Beijing, the absorption of Taiwan is therefore seen as indispensable to securing China’s national defense interests.

Across global media, China has been detected amassing large quantities of weaponry and military personnel in Fujian Province, only about 130 kilometers from Taiwan at its nearest point. Well before the Russia–Ukraine war broke out in 2022, Beijing had already been discreetly improving infrastructure in Fujian and stockpiling cutting-edge weapons in preparation for future contingencies.

Any state planning a major military operation must invest years into upgrading logistics networks, fortifications, and weapons production. Since 2022—while the world has been preoccupied with overlapping conflicts—China has had ample time to build the capacity needed for a move on Taiwan.

With multiple crises flaring at once, the United States cannot realistically stretch its resources to fully assist all allies. This dynamic underscores the possibility that the succession of global conflicts since 2022 has ultimately helped divert attention and dilute Western, especially American, bandwidth—conveniently easing China’s path toward its long-standing objective regarding Taiwan.

What has the US done?

Despite a clear weakening since the beginning of the 21st century, the United States still holds a ‘relatively’ firm position in leading the world order. Many US officials across two presidential administrations have shared the view regarding the possibility of China annexing Taiwan by force in 2027. President Joe Biden, a member of the Democratic Party who was initially an advocate for minimizing disagreements with China, has also exerted maximum pressure on Beijing throughout his term, surprising and confusing many experts.

In 2024, the establishment of the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral link signals the utmost concern from policymakers regarding China’s activities. Strategically, US partners and allies will therefore form a continuous arc-shaped formation to deter China’s negative activities. This support will generate significant regional influence and form the US ecosystem in the Indo-Pacific. In the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, US partners and allies will assist Washington in pressuring Beijing, forcing the country to reconsider the possibility of escalating the conflict with Taiwan.

After Trump’s election, he strengthened cooperation with Taiwan. When he imposed tariffs on Taiwan, along with other countries, it was not merely a simple economic move but also demonstrated his desire for the world’s attention on this entity. Notably, the increase in TSMC’s investment in the US to $165 billion in March 2025, compared to $65 billion, suggests the Trump administration’s subtle backing of Taiwan. When a crucial company from an investing nation is attacked, resources and investment activities will be delayed, leading to economic damage, in this case, to the US. Although the role of Taiwan was not directly integrated, the Trump administration made a very sharp move.

Furthermore, the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities in Israel’s Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 serves as a signal to China regarding the possibility of military conflict escalation with US presence should Beijing use force against Taipei. The renaming of the department back to the ‘Department of War’ further reinforces the possibility that the US could proactively attack any nation that confronts Washington’s interests.

Will a conflict in the Taiwan Strait occur?

Many experts and scholars have discussed whether China will invade Taiwan, as asserted by the country’s leaders. When a conflict occurs in a region/area, the global order will easily witness numerous impacts.

For China, in the event that Beijing captures the island, the country will incur sanctions from the US and its allies and partners. Furthermore, the possibility of intervention from countries within the US’s ‘hub-and-spoke’ model in the Taiwan situation is entirely feasible.

Japan is the country that made the strongest declaration when the new Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, stated in a National Assembly meeting that if Taiwan is attacked, Japan will be directly affected and it concerns Tokyo’s ‘survival.’ Japan has also progressively amended and interpreted its constitution to legitimize the action of deploying troops overseas to assist its partners. The fact that an individual who has just taken office as Prime Minister of Japan has made such tough statements regarding Taiwan indicates that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait is entirely possible, lending more credence to the 2027 forecast.

According to a RAND report, the countries that could potentially join the group defending Taiwan alongside the US include the UK, Australia, and Japan within the next ‘3–6 months,’ corresponding to Q1 and Q2 of 2026. This further reinforces the possibility of a conflict occurring in the Taiwan Strait, aligning with the statements made by US defense officials (and later the Department of War), as well as President Xi Jinping’s long-standing declarations regarding the possibility of annexing Taiwan by 2027.

It is clear that Taiwan, despite being an island, has a significant impact on the US-China competition. In the context of ongoing global conflicts, Taiwan is viewed as the final destination for conflicts in recent years. The US and its partners and allies may increase their presence on this island in various forms to ensure its ‘safety.’ 

In an interview—with Fox News on November 11, 2025—US President Donald Trump defended the H1B Visa, saying that the US needed foreigners with special skills and talents that US workers did not possess.

Said Trump

“You don’t have certain talents… And people have to learn, you can’t take people off an unemployment line and say, I’m going to put you into a factory. We’re going to make missiles.” 

In September 2025, the Trump administration had announced a massive hike in H-1B visa application fees. The revised fees for the H-1B Visa were fixed at $100,000. This decision had caused a lot of concern within several Information Technology (IT) companies and also among IT professionals already working in the US (Indian professionals account for 70% of H-1B visas issued in 2024).

 Later, some clarifications were made by the Trump administration. The first was that this was a one-time visa fee that needed to be paid only by new applicants, and the second was that those already on F-1 or L1 visas would not need to pay this fee (this new fee was applicable only to applicants who were based outside of the United States). While these clarifications were important, the decision to raise the H-1B application fees had already created an atmosphere of uncertainty.

In the same interview with Fox News, the US president also said that while he did not want international students, they were essential for the US economy. Said Trump:

“We take in trillions of dollars from students. You know, the students pay more than double when they come in from most foreign countries. I want to see our school system thrive… It’s not that I want them, but I view it as a business.”

International Students in the US

International students make a significant contribution towards the US economy and also help in creating jobs in the US. In 2023-2024 there were well over 1.5 million international students, and they contributed over $40 billion to the US economy. A significant percentage of international students were from China and India (in 2024, India accounted for well over 1/4th of the total international student community). August 2025 witnessed a significant dip in the inflow of international students into the US, and this is likely to cause a significant dent to the US economy, according to estimates. Certain top US universities also witnessed significant budget cuts and layoffs.

Trump, while speaking at the White House earlier this month, also said that he is keen to welcome 600,000 Chinese students to the US.

Several international students, especially from India, have begun to look at alternatives to the US. There has been a rise in the number of Indian students going to Germany, Finland, and the UAE.

Reaction to Trump’s comments

Both comments of Trump—pertaining to H1B visas as well as international students—are likely to annoy the MAGA camp within the Republican party. Steve Bannon, a former aide of Trump, while criticizing the US President’s statements, said:

“This is Davos in a red tie! Telling American engineers and factory workers we lack talent? Then flooding campuses with CCP-linked students? It’s a gut-punch to every voter who bled for this movement. Wake up, Mr. President—this isn’t MAGA; it’s Chamber of Commerce betrayal.”

Significantly, in an interview with Fox TV, Nalin Haley, the son of Nikki Haley—former US Ambassador to the United Nations (UN)—had criticized H1B visas and said that US workers were suffering because of the same.

Trump’s statements reiterate the point that while not just the US — but other countries in the Anglosphere have legitimate concerns vis-à-vis illegal immigration — it is important to have a nuanced approach towards immigration issues and not view the issue from simplistic binaries. It remains to be seen if the US president sticks to this current stand.

These days, when politicians toss around the word “peace” like it’s going out of style, its real meaning has gotten pretty murky. Sometimes, peace isn’t about freeing people—it’s more like slapping a new kind of control on societies that are already hurting. Take the latest U.S. draft resolution to send an international stabilization force into Gaza, which they pitched to the UN Security Council. It sounds all nice with talk of stability, rebuilding, and keeping civilians safe, but if you dig a little deeper, you see the sneaky play of power and the drive to stay in charge. After all these years of fighting, blockades, and total destruction, the same folks who helped cause the mess are now stepping up like they’re the heroes here to fix it and watch over the peace. So, the big question pops up: Can a peace that’s forced by those in power really count as peace, or is it just a fancy label for keeping things the way they’ve always been—a calm on the outside, but underneath, it’s all about hanging onto inequality and the rules of who dominates whom? 

The U.S. draft seems like it’s trying to fill the security hole after a ceasefire and deal with the broken-down government setups in Gaza. But right from the start, in its opening parts, it’s obvious that the whole thing leans more on outside management of the crisis than on actual justice or letting Palestinians decide their own fate. Suggesting a two-year “International Stabilization Force” basically sets up something that feels a lot like an occupation, where the key choices get yanked away from the people on the ground. This kind of top-down approach, what experts in international relations call “peace from above,” has bombed time and again because it doesn’t build up the local ability to bounce back—instead, it locks in a reliance on foreign powers for politics and security. 

Another big problem is how this force is set up to be more about taking charge than just keeping an eye on things. Regular UN peacekeeping gigs are all about staying neutral and observing, but this U.S. version gives the green light to use force to “get the job done.” That change in wording—from peacekeeping to straight-up enforcement—shows how Washington wants to bend international groups to fit its own foreign policy goals. When a force like that can throw its weight around with coercion, it stops being about mediating and starts turning into

actual governing, making peace more about who has the muscle than about talking things out. 

The third sticking point is around political legitimacy and who gets to represent folks. Sure, the draft throws in mentions of a “transitional authority” or “peace council” to run Gaza for a bit, but it doesn’t lay out any real democratic way to pick who’s on it. In reality, this group would just be the paperwork side for the international troops, and at most, it’d represent Palestinians in name only. Looking at it through the lens of international law, this setup is dicey because it could stomp all over the idea of people ruling themselves, swapping it out for some kind of condescending oversight—kind of like what happened with those international setups in Kosovo and Bosnia after their wars. 

On the economic side, the rebuilding plan tucked into this thing doesn’t have much of a focus on fairness. The resolution hammers home how urgent it is to rebuild, but the ways to hand out the money and resources stay firmly in the grip of international committees that are tied financially and politically to Western governments. Instead of giving power back to Palestinian communities, this could just repeat the old “strings-attached aid” routine, where fixing things up becomes a way to pull political strings. In that setup, help with the economy isn’t really about growing or developing—it’s more like a tool for keeping society in line, turning the whole recovery process into something that controls people rather than mending what’s broken. 

Politically speaking, sidelining the nearby countries is another major flaw. Arab nations, who are right there geographically and share a lot culturally with the Gaza situation, only get a nod as backup players. This built-in shutout creates a bigger divide between what’s actually happening on the ground and where the decisions are being made, which hurts both how legitimate the mission looks and how well it might work. We’ve seen from history that when international efforts don’t have buy-in from the region, they usually flop because they miss the local nuances and push cookie-cutter policies instead of real back-and-forth conversations. 

From a humanitarian angle, the draft has drawn a ton of heat. Groups that watch out for human rights are sounding alarms that putting a force with wide military reach into such a shaky spot could ramp up the chances of abuses against regular people. The plan doesn’t spell out any solid way for independent checks or holding folks accountable if things go wrong. We’ve got examples from past UN operations in Africa and the Balkans showing that without those protections, you can end up with some serious ethical and human disasters. So, ironically, a plan that’s supposed to shield civilians might wind up putting them in more danger. 

In terms of how it’s worded, the U.S. draft keeps pushing this old-school idea of “security as something good for the whole world,” where the big powers paint themselves as the keepers of order and peace. In this way of talking, peace isn’t born from fair deals—it’s the result of managing everything from the top and wiping out any say from the locals. The draft’s full of gentle phrases like “stability,” “reconstruction,” and “humanitarian aid,” but they hide a whole web of uneven relationships and power structures. Even though it’s smoothed out for diplomacy, the text is a classic case of what critical thinkers in international relations dub “interventionist neoliberalism”: keeping domination going while pretending it’s all about a stable global setup. 

On a symbolic level, the draft says a lot too. By floating this plan, the United States is trying to come off as the fair broker for peace, despite everyone knowing its track record of backing the occupation and keeping inequalities alive in Palestinian areas. This split personality chips away at the plan’s credibility right from the heart. When the folks writing the resolution are also key players in the conflict, any talk of being neutral just doesn’t hold water. A peace that comes from that kind of mess isn’t built on trust—it’s hanging on a shaky power balance that’s way too fragile to last. 

We shouldn’t just see the recent U.S. draft resolution on Gaza as some routine diplomatic paper. It points to a bigger pattern in world politics: using peace as a way to control things. On the face of it, it stresses security, rebuilding, and keeping things steady, but underneath, it’s based on this unequal split between the “bosses” and the “ones being bossed.” Rather than handing back control to the people in Gaza, it keeps them stuck in the loop of outsiders calling the shots and trades away their local say-so for the sake of some international system. From that angle, the peace they’re proposing isn’t stopping the violence—it’s just reshaping it. 

The way the plan structures politics and security is more about enforcing rules and holding things in than about delivering justice or letting people stand on their own. No real ways to check accountability, wiping out Palestinian input, the heavy-handed military vibe in the writing, and leaning so much on institutions run by the West—all of that screams that this resolution isn’t fixing anything; it’s adding to the mess. Even if it dials down the fighting for a while, it could spawn a fresh kind of reliance that links Gaza’s comeback to giving in politically. 

In our world right now, you can’t have lasting peace without justice at its core. When you ditch justice for meddling politics, peace turns into just a break before the next round of fighting. What Gaza really needs isn’t some bossy international force—it’s a real promise to respect their right to decide their own path. Any idea that skips over that basic truth, no matter how nicely it’s dressed up in caring words, is bound to keep the violence spinning. The U.S. draft, with its fake peaceful front, definitely walks right into that pitfall: a peace lurking in the shadow of power, not shining with justice.