USA

This year, in the US-China trade war and the grand military parade, China demonstrated economic and military strength that forced the United States to back down. However, Beijing merely displayed its power; various parties discovered that this giant does not know how to wield it.

The US paused its economic attacks on China, but the Dutch government directly “took control of” a Chinese-owned company in the Netherlands—Nexperia—through public authority. The EU expanded anti-dumping measures against China, with France as the main driver behind anti-China economic policies.

The US publicly acknowledged that China’s rising military power in the Western Pacific can no longer be suppressed and adjusted its global strategy to focus on the Western Hemisphere. Yet Japan shifted the Taiwan issue from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, adopting a more confrontational posture and challenging China’s bottom line. Regional countries, in various ways, have called for “peace” in the Taiwan Strait—support that amounts to nothing less than opposing China’s unification and indirectly endorsing Japan’s position. Meanwhile, the Philippines, mired in internal chaos, continued to provoke China in the South China Sea.

Since China has the capability to confront the US, it should have the ability to punish Europe, Japan, and the Philippines for their unfriendliness toward China. But Beijing did not do so. When facing challenges from these parties, it only issued symbolic verbal protests or took measures that failed to eradicate the problems—putting on a full defensive posture but lacking concrete and effective actions. As a result, events often started with thunderous noise but ended with little rain, fizzling out in the end.

From Beijing’s appeasement toward Europe, Japan, and the Philippines, all parties have reason to believe that China is a giant that doesn’t know how to use its own power. This presents a strategic opportunity for the weak to overcome the strong—especially now, as the US contracts its global strategy and distances itself from its allies. Maximizing benefits from China’s side is the rational choice.

For example, with Japan: Beijing responded to Tokyo’s intervention in the Taiwan issue with high-intensity verbal criticism, but its actions were inconsistent with its words. Although it revisited the “enemy state clauses” at the UN, raised the postwar Ryukyu sovereignty issue, and even conducted joint military exercises with Russia 600 kilometers from Tokyo, these actions were far less intense than the rhetoric. Even the verbal criticism cooled down after a month.

The US maintained a low profile on the China-Japan dispute, adopted a cool attitude toward Tokyo, and even indirectly expressed condemnation—likely the main reason Beijing de-escalated. This shows that China’s original intent in handling the incident was to force the US to “decouple” from Japan on the Taiwan issue and isolate Tokyo, which maintains close ties with Taipei.

Influenced by official attitudes, the Chinese people once again mistook official rhetoric for commitments, believing Beijing would go to war if necessary to eradicate Japan’s interference in internal affairs. After all, unresolved deep-seated hatred—akin to a sea of blood—remains between China and Japan. Moreover, this year marks the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, with various events held throughout the year to engrave in memory the national humiliation of Japan’s invasion of China.

But after Trump indirectly criticized Japan for provoking unnecessary disputes, Beijing seemed satisfied and stepped down gracefully. Although the dispute has not ended and continues to develop, like its handling of Philippine provocations, China has placed disputes with neighbors into long-term games, effectively shelving the issues—and causing the Chinese people renewed frustration.

After this three-way interaction, the asymmetry between Beijing’s words and actions has likely become deeply ingrained. In the future, it will be much harder for Beijing to mobilize the 1.4 billion people’s shared enmity.

The key point: In this dispute, who—China, Japan, or the US—gained the greatest substantive strategic benefits? So far, it’s hard to say who won the first round. China appeared to come out looking the best, preserving the most face, yet Japan also gained, and the US obtained leverage for future talks with China.

In the first round of this dispute, China strategically established the legitimacy of denying Japan’s intervention in the Taiwan issue, narrowing Tokyo’s diplomatic space for anti-China actions via Taiwan. Japan’s right wing advanced toward national normalization, hollowing out its peace constitution to cope with US strategic contraction; additionally, the Liberal Democratic Party regained public support. The US demonstrated its influence in East Asia—even after “withdrawing” its military to the second island chain—and raised its bargaining chips at the US-China negotiation table.

However, from a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan gains nothing worth the loss: the Ryukyu Islands will become a burden rather than an outer defense wall. The two major powers, China and the US, will orderly redraw their spheres of influence in East Asia; the US will gain a dignified pretext for abandoning Taiwan, while China will recover Taiwan at a lower cost.

Conversely, beyond the asymmetry between words and actions, there is also asymmetry between actions and strength. Beijing’s greatest loss is that the international community—especially its neighbors and Europe—has seen through China’s essence of appearing fierce but being timid inwardly. They have once again discovered that antagonizing China brings no adverse consequences; on the contrary, it can yield unexpected benefits—provided they give China the face it needs to achieve strategic gains.

For example, Vietnam: After the China-Japan dispute cooled, a Vietnamese warship transited the Taiwan Strait under the pretext of freedom of navigation without prior notification to China, signaling it is not a vassal of Beijing and aligning with Washington’s position.

Vietnam is a major beneficiary of the US-China confrontation, with massive Chinese goods rerouted through Vietnam to the US; transit trade has skyrocketed its economic growth. Thus, it firmly believes maximizing benefits lies in a neutral stance between China and the US. However, from a supply chain perspective, China is the supplier and the US the customer—the latter slightly more important. Factoring in China-Vietnam South China Sea disputes and China’s habitual concessions versus the lethal US carrot-and-stick approach, Vietnam naturally leans more pro-US.

Additionally, during the China-Japan dispute, Singapore’s prime minister publicly sympathized with Japan, while Thailand and Vietnam jointly called for peace in the Taiwan Strait—showing Southeast Asian nations, like Japan, hope to maintain the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait and oppose military conflict in the region, which is equivalent to opposing China’s recovery of Taiwan. Of course, Northeast Asia’s South Korea holds the same view; some countries publicly state it due to internal and US factors, while others choose silence.

China’s neighboring countries all see the fact that the Philippines’ intense anti-China stance has gone unpunished. Despite deep internal political turmoil, Manila can still spare efforts to provoke China in the South China Sea—clearly a profitable path. Neighbors conclude: If China can concede on core interests, what can’t it concede?

On the other side of the globe, Europe has noticed this phenomenon too. The Dutch government rashly took over a Chinese enterprise, severely damaging China’s interests and prestige; Beijing’s response started strong but ended weakly—mainly to avoid impacting China-EU trade, even amid decoupling risks everywhere. No wonder Britain subsequently sanctioned two Chinese companies on suspicion of cyberattacks, unafraid of angering Beijing just before Prime Minister Starmer’s planned January visit to China.

In short, whether on the regional Taiwan issue or extraterritorial China-EU economic issues, China faces a broken windows effect. Although from a grand strategic view, all related events remain controllable for Beijing, appeasement only invites more trouble. It’s not impossible that China will eventually be unable to suppress public indignation and be forced to suddenly take tough measures—like at the end of the pandemic, when people took to the streets and Beijing immediately lifted lockdowns, rendering all prior lockdown justifications untenable overnight.

Indeed, China currently appears as a giant that doesn’t know how to use its power. But when a rabbit is cornered, it bites. When Beijing is forced to align actions with strength, the intensity will be astonishing; then, China will want more than just face.

There’s a saying: Attack is the best defense. But with its long history, this nation views offense and defense more comprehensively. The Chinese believe that when weak, attack is the best defense; when holding an advantage, defense is the best attack. As long as the opponent’s offense can be controlled within acceptable limits, persistent defense inflicts less damage than the opponent’s self-exhaustion in stamina. Conversely, when at a disadvantage, a full assault is needed to reverse it.

In other words, China doesn’t fail to know how to use power; it deems using power uneconomical. This explains why the West walks a path of decline while China continues rising—the latter accumulates power, and the former overdraws it.

President Trump is shrewd and pragmatic; he knows cornering China awakens the giant, so he eased US-China relations. But simultaneously, the US doesn’t mind—and even quietly encourages—its allies to provoke China, while positioning itself as a mediator to benefit. This is a reasonable tactic and the most effective offensive against China.

Xi Jinping once said China has great patience—implying that if patience is exhausted, the world will see a completely different China, one that uses power without regard for cost.

The recent decision by the United States Navy (USN) to cancel the Constellation-class frigate program after eight years of development and billions of dollars in investment represents a significant setback in US naval modernization drive. The Constellation-class was meant to become a modern, multi-mission combat vessel capable of relieving operational pressure from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and narrowing the growing numerical advantage of the China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Instead, continuous design changes, and subsequent delays changed what was supposed to be an easy-to-construct warship platform into a costly and significantly delayed project. After failure of several major projects like Zumwalt destroyer and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), the cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate project has degraded Washington’s efforts to sustain the naval balance of power against rapidly expanding naval fleet of PLAN.

The Constellation-class project was a product of USN’s urgent need to fill the gap left behind Oliver Hazard Perry-class (OHP) frigates which were phased out from USN services in 2015. The OHPs, despite lack of built-in vertical launch system (VLS), were regarded for their reliability, and versatility in missions ranging from open-ocean escorting to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW). The retired hulls of OHPs were purchased by navies of several US allies including Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Egypt, Pakistan, Spain, Taiwan, and Turkiye. Their withdrawal from USN created a capability void that the Littoral LCS program – comprising of Freedom class and Independent class vessels – was expected to fill. However the LCS encountered numerous mechanical failures in hulls and propulsion system, cost overruns, and capability gaps that rendered it unsuitable for missions in contested naval environments.

As USN halted further procurement and early retirement of LCS, it attempted to follow a new approach, i.e., opt for a proven design tailored to meet USN requirements. Franco-Italian FREMM frigate design was chosen as the baseline for a modern, affordable American Constellation-class frigate. At initial stage, it appeared a sound idea. The FREMM platform had already proven itself in European naval forces, and the USN specific variant was modified to carry 32 Mk-41 VLS cells capable of firing SM-series interceptors and even Tomahawk cruise missiles, alongside Naval Strike Missiles. This program committed to be a potent yet affordable and rapid addition in USN fleet while retaining 85 percent commonality with original design. But as USN continued to impose new requirements, complications in construction, and alteration in designing began to inhibit the efficiency of the program. Constellation-class frigate undertook major size increment than parent FREMM design, stretching from 466 feet to nearly 500 and increasing to over 7,200 tons. Instead of leveraging a proven design, USN trapped itself with a pseudo-original design which now shared mere 15 percent commonality with the original design. By 2024, the first frigate was already three years behind schedule, and the program’s cost enlarged well beyond initial estimations. Faced with increasing costs, long delays, and design complications, the USN eventually axed the Constellation-class frigate program too, leaving behind a significant gap in USN surface fleet which this frigate was supposed to fill.

USN now wants a new frigate class structured on proven American design by 2028. Reportedly, the design of US Coast Guard (USCG) Legend Class cutter will be used as baseline to develop a USN specific variant. These 4,600 tons class ships are capable of conducting blue water operations and support 57mm deck gun, Phalanx CIWS, and flight deck with hanger to support rotary wing operations.  Its USN specific frigate version can accommodate a 16-cell Mk-41 VLS module, 8x Harpoon/NSM cruise missiles in canisters, RIM-116 Sea RAM, and torpedo tubes. Using an American proven design for mass producing USN specific frigate of relatively smaller size and low tonnage will allow USN to produce and commission larger number of hulls in relatively less time. But on flip side, this new frigate class will be far less capable than recently cancelled Constellation-class as they are unlikely to carry Aegis CMS, and will have significantly less range, endurance, and weapon load-out.

Nowhere is this challenge more evident than in the rapid growth of China’s naval power. PLAN is now commissioning highly capable naval combatants including flat-deck aircraft carrier (Fujian), next generation destroyers (Type-055 and Type-52DL) and frigates (Type-54B), and new class of conventional as well as nuclear submarines. Chinese coast guard, and maritime militia collectively operate more than 750 vessels – more than twice the number of hulls under US control. While the US Navy still retains qualitative advantages, especially in nuclear submarines and carrier aviation, trends in shipbuilding capacity significantly favor Beijing. China commands more than half of global commercial ship production, while the US share barely registers at a tenth of a percent. This allows China to mass produce modern warships for PLAN at a pace the United States cannot simply match.

Although USN plans to expand its fleet from 296 manned warships to 381 manned warships and 134 unmanned vessels by 2045, but so far trends of decline hull strengths have been observed. Ticonderoga class cruisers are gradually retiring, next-generation DDG(X) destroyers are still in far future, Ford class nuclear aircraft-carriers and Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are facing delays, and Arleigh Burke Flight-III destroyers are not producing at rate faster enough to accommodate these growing gaps. Unmanned vessels are sometimes perceived as a viable solution to fill-up the gaps but these vessels cannot replace manned warships on one-on-one basis. In sum, aforementioned projects expose the persistent limitations of ship production capacity of US shipyards. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that reviving the shipbuilding sector to meet the USN long-term needs would require annual investments of more than $40 billion for three consecutive decades—a staggering commitment that would require political consensus and sustained strategic vision.

The cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate, just like past projects of Zumwalt and LCS- thus represents a persistent crisis in US naval build-up. As China accelerates its naval production and expands power projection into the Indo-Pacific, the United States finds itself struggling to revive its own shipbuilding capacity. Whether Washington can reverse this trajectory will depend on its ability to reform procurement processes, invest in industrial capacity, and adopt realistic designs aligned with strategic needs. Without such changes USN risks entering the next decade with too few ships to meet global demands.

Dealmakers in 2025 enjoyed a near-record year for mergers and acquisitions, despite a turbulent spring that threatened hopes of a broader revival. So far this year, there were 70 global deals valued at more than $10 billion each, 22 of them in the fourth quarter, according to Dealogic. Total deal value has surpassed $4.8 trillion, up 41% from 2024, though the number of deals fell 6% to 38,395, marking the second-largest year ever behind 2021.

The spike in mega deals reflects a growing focus on scale. “M&A today is all about the mega deals, the race for scale,” said Anu Aiyengar, JPMorgan’s global head of advisory and M&A. There were at least four deals above $50 billion, with two notable bids for Warner Bros. Discovery totaling over $80 billion and Paramount Skydance’s $108 billion hostile offer.

Drivers of Late-Year Rally

A more permissive regulatory environment in the U.S., coupled with a calmer macroeconomic outlook, is encouraging companies to pursue transformative deals. With antitrust scrutiny easing under the Trump administration, boards and executives are seizing opportunities for strategic acquisitions, according to Frank Aquila, partner at Sullivan & Cromwell.

Dealmakers also say valuations are rising, prompting companies to pay higher multiples while expecting their own stocks to maintain relative strength. “Valuations have been bid up and we’ve seen clients be more aggressive in terms of multiples,” said Lazard’s Mark McMaster.

Technology and AI Influence

Technology deals, particularly those tied to artificial intelligence, have played a prominent role. OpenAI raised $40 billion in funding led by SoftBank, and Aligned Data Centers was acquired for $40 billion. Morgan Stanley’s John Collins said companies are pursuing scale to invest in AI-driven changes, both in tech and across other industries.

Cross-Border and Global Trends

Cross-border M&A activity surged in 2025, reaching $1.24 trillion, the highest since 2021. U.S. and UK companies were the most targeted, while U.S., France, and Japan were the most acquisitive. Multinational companies, particularly from Europe and Japan, are investing in the U.S. to capitalize on the world’s largest market. China and Japan are also seeing strong outbound activity, with Japanese deal values boosted by high-profile transactions like OpenAI and Toyota Industries.

Corporate divestitures are rising, up 30% in volume from last year, exemplified by Holcim’s $30 billion spin-off of its North American business, Amrize. Private equity is also regaining momentum, with global buyouts reaching $1.1 trillion, a 51% increase from 2024.

Outlook for 2026

Dealmakers expect the M&A rally to continue into 2026, with $50 billion–$70 billion deals already in the pipeline and a $100 billion tech transaction not ruled out. Analysts see a multi-year run of high-value deals, fueled by scale-seeking corporations, AI-related opportunities, cross-border expansion, and corporate restructuring. While caution remains in politically uncertain markets like the UK, the global appetite for transformative deals appears set to drive another strong year for mergers and acquisitions.

With information from Reuters.

More than two months after a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas ended two years of intense fighting in Gaza, both sides claim the other has violated the agreement, and there is no progress on the more challenging steps that follow.

The ceasefire involves three main documents. The most comprehensive is a 20-point plan by former U. S. President Donald Trump, which proposes that Hamas disarm and cease its governing role in Gaza, accompanied by an Israeli withdrawal. Although a more limited agreement was made on October 9, it mainly focused on hostages, a halt to hostilities, partial Israeli withdrawal, and a boost in aid. This agreement was supported by a United Nations Security Council resolution that aimed to set up a transitional governing body and an international force in Gaza.

The results of the ceasefire have seen all surviving hostages returned and hundreds of Palestinian prisoners released. However, the return of deceased hostages has been slow. Aid distribution has become contentious, with Hamas claiming that fewer aid trucks are entering Gaza than promised. Aid organizations report a significant shortfall in necessary supplies, while Israel asserts it is fulfilling its commitments under the truce. The Rafah border crossing with Egypt remains closed, with Israel stating it will only open it once the last hostage’s body is returned. The living conditions in Gaza are dire, with many residents constructing makeshift shelters from debris, and a large number of children suffering from malnutrition, worsened by floods affecting temporary shelters and sanitation.

Some violence persists, as Palestinian militants have attacked Israeli forces, resulting in casualties on both sides. A proposed international stabilisation force intended to maintain order in Gaza is still undefined, with disagreements over its composition and tasks. Plans for a Palestinian governing body, independent of Hamas, have also not been clarified. The Palestinian Authority, which governs parts of the West Bank, is expected to implement reforms before taking a role in Gaza, but no details have been shared.

The possibility of lasting peace remains uncertain. Israel suggests military action may resume if Hamas does not disarm, yet a return to full-scale war does not seem imminent. Both Israelis and Palestinians are skeptical about the long-term success of the Trump plan and fear it may lead to a continued, unresolved conflict. Many Israelis are concerned about the potential for Hamas to rearm, while Palestinians worry about ongoing Israeli control and lack of resources for rebuilding Gaza.

Trust between Israelis and Palestinians is at a low point, with the two-state solution, considered vital for lasting peace, appearing increasingly distant. Despite international support for Palestinian statehood, Israeli leadership continues to reject this notion, raising doubts about future negotiations and outcomes.

With information from Reuters

The United States has fully commited to its enforcement of sanctions on Venezuela by seizing a large oil tanker off its coast. President Donald Trump publicly announced the operation on December 10^th and authorities said a joint FBI/Homeland Security/Coast Guard team executed a court-ordered seizure of the vessel, which was transporting Iranian and Venezuelan crude in violation of U.S imposed sanctions.

This is reportedly the first U.S. seizure of a Venezuelan oil shipment since sanctions began way back in 2019. “We’ve just seized a tanker on the coast of Venezuela, a large tanker, very large, largest one ever seized, actually,” says Donald Trump.

Trying to maintain the credibility of U.S. sanctions at a time when their enforcement have increasingly been challenged by other international actors such as Russia or Iran. Now, The U.S. is willing to take direct action beyond economic wars, even at the risk of diplomatic and military escalation.

Reactions from Caracas

Venezuela publicly denounced the action and accused Washington of blatant theft describing the seizure as “an act of international piracy”. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has long cast himself as the victim of a U.S. led campaign to oust him from the country in order to seize the vast oil wealth on the country’s shores. He reiterated that the U.S. military buildup, which started this summer, including carrier strike groups and bases is directly aimed at overthrowing him.

Maduro’s supporters rallied in the streets against foreign aggression even as officials prepared diplomatic protests to international bodies. For the time being, he faces limited other practical options for retaliation as Venezuela’s navy is in no position to challenge U.S. maritime dominance, and legal recourse through international courts would likely take years.

Russia’s Offers Full Support

Moscow reaffirmed its backing for Maduro, emphasising the legitimacy of Venezuela’s government and condemning what it described as unilateral U.S. actions. An ally in South America provides Russia opportunities for energy investment, and a way to challenge U.S. influence.

The tanker seizure allows Moscow to frame Washington as overreaching and destabilising, a narrative it also applies to recent U.S. actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. While Russia is unlikely to escalate militarily, its political backing is significant.

China’s Strategic Role, A Potential Mediator?

Avoiding direct confrontation with Washington over the seizure, Beijing has reiterated its general opposition to unilateral sanctions and calling for international dialogue. However, China remains Venezuela’s most important economic partner and oil consumer, giving it substantial influence over any talks in the region.

Chinese companies have adapted to sanctions by purchasing Venezuelan crude oil at discounted prices, often through intermediaries. For Beijing, Venezuela is also part of a broader strategy to diversify energy supplies and expand its economic reach to the Americas.

Impact on Oil Markets

The announcement caused a modest spike in oil prices around the globe; for example: Brent crude briefly rose about 0.4% to around $62 a barrel, before returning to normal levels in the following few days.

The incident also highlighted Venezuela’s export challenges: under sanctions, its oil trades at a deep discount for its main trade partners, China and Russia. American oil companies with Venezuelan ties reported no immediate trouble. Chevron the U.S. firm that co-owns Venezuela’s largest oil project said its operations there continue normally, and U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude have even ticked up slightly in recent months.

Broader Consequences

Neighbouring countries such as Cuba and other Caribbean states depend on Venezuelan oil and could feel its effects. Sanctioning Venezuela was intended to pressure the regime into political concessions, yet Maduro remains firmly in power.

Enforcement actions like this tanker seizure may increase short-term pressure, but they also come with great risk for the stability of the Caribbean. Venezuela’s experience mirrors that of Iran and Russia, suggesting that sanctions alone may be insufficient to produce regime change, particularly when the targeted government is provided external backing.

Possible Future Scenarios and Implications

One scenario is a continuation of this low-level rise in tensions, with the U.S. stepping up enforcement and Venezuela responding through diplomatic protests while relying on Russian support.

Another is a negotiated de-escalation, potentially linked to limited sanctions relief in exchange for political concessions, though past efforts suggest this would be difficult to achieve with the current White House administration.

A more destabilising scenario would involve a potential confrontation at sea and broader disruption to energy markets. However, this scenario remains unlikely for the time being.

With information from Reuters and BBC News.

The first National Security Strategy of the United States of America was released in 1950 under President Truman. It set firm strategic goals based on the containment doctrine to limit the influence of communist ideology in the global order. This first national security strategy marked the beginning of limited global policing in US geopolitics, but it was less pragmatic and more principled realism.  American interests became specific to liberal internationalism and focused only on areas facing the spread of the communist threat.

The Core Security Thinking of the US

The core security thinking of Americans was to preserve their sphere of influence from any adversarial influence or intervention, echoing the Monroe Doctrine. The initial period had this core, and the first national security strategy laid the groundwork for this security thinking. In 1988, the scope of core security thinking expanded, and elements of realism advanced further, with the US beginning to engage in deterrence calculations and global outreach to build collective military alliances against the Soviets. Most importantly, the strategy also focused on strengthening the economy. The core security thinking in the US’s national security strategy by the late 1980s began to realize that, while the Monroe Doctrine is important, US strategic interests must also require adopting flexibility in its confrontational approach, guided by liberal internationalism and the containment of communism.

Pragmatism and Realism

After the Soviet disintegration, US National Security Strategy focused on navigating a multipolar world by reinforcing the idea of collective security under the H.W. Bush Administration. The 1991 and 1993 US National Security strategies expanded on the concepts that started to emerge in the late 1980s—deterrence and engagement. In the 1990s, this strategy was continued through Powell’s four pillars: strong defense, forward presence, alliances, and coalition-building. The national security strategy designs suggest that elements of pragmatism and distinctions of pure realism gradually began to take center stage in the US national security approach.

Strategy in Crises

The National Security Strategy changed after 9/11, possibly in response to shifted security priorities. The previous approach of principled realism, which involved pragmatic and defensive tactics, now showed a slight shift, with the US’s national security strategy emphasizing more openly offensive realism and dogmatism. By the mid-2000s, the US had reactionary national security strategies, moving away from the approach that began to develop in the late 1980s. Key shifts in security strategies after 2001 included the doctrine of preemption and unilateral actions, but another significant change was a major shift in the collective engagement perspective, differing from earlier ideas of shared strategic responsibilities among allies.

After 9/11, the US called on allies, particularly in NATO, to bear a greater share of the burden for collective defense efforts, shifting away from reliance solely on the US. The core security thinking, rooted in peace through engagement, shifted during the 1990s toward peace through strength. Another aspect, after the Monroe Doctrine, peace through strength, gained a label of permanence in the US National Security Strategy, though its effectiveness and emphasis varied over time.

Trump’s National Security Strategy: Rebooting and Readjustments

Trump’s 2025 national security strategy resembles his 2017 National Security Strategy. The nationalist ideals of America First and the focus on economic engagement—which is the main security approach this time—are a mix of realizations and reactions. The first reaction to the current global situation is reasserting the Monroe Doctrine, dubbed “Trump Corollary,” and the second is showing the will for peace through strength by deterrence. Even if conflicts occur, the strategy emphasizes engaging in conflict with strategic skill to quickly win wars with little to no casualties. The realization part of the strategy is the US increasing its understanding of collective efforts and economic strength. The strategy highlights stronger partnerships with countries like India for the Indo-Pacific.

Reaction and Challenge

The realistic approach in this strategy is flexible realism, aiming not at domination but at maintaining a balance of power, while not fully adopting defensive realism. The United States has embraced both offensive and defensive realism. Over the past ten years, the US National Security Strategy under Obama, Trump 1.0, and Biden has incorporated elements of defensive realism along with principled realism, with the US gradually increasing its efforts to balance power through the promotion of liberal and pro-democratic values—examples include its Middle East policy and the revival of QUAD in 2017. However, a notable development in the 2025 strategy is the US’s willingness to undertake offensive actions to maximize security, such as Operation Midnight Hammer against Iran and expanding operations in Latin America against Venezuela. Another prominent aspect of this strategy is the US’s focus on Europe’s burden-sharing, attempting to lighten its responsibilities and emphasizing that Europe should stand on its own, while the US remains a facilitator in Europe’s development. However, it is no longer willing to assume a broader role—similar to sentiments after 9/11. This strategy likely reflects the challenges posed by a rising China, Russia’s multipolar approach, and increasing strategic competition in multilateral arenas. The Trump approach—as mentioned in the strategy—is not just a reboot of the US National Security strategy after the 2000s but with some realizations.

Realization

There is a growing realization, as highlighted earlier, that the US can no longer sustain a confrontational approach and aggressive, offensive realism. The Trump strategy for 2025 recognizes the need to incorporate elements from both the late Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The latter was characterized by defensive realism and principal realism features—approaches that the US emphasized during the Clinton years, when embracing multilateralism, economic diplomacy, and regional collective engagements became central to US national security strategy, paving the way for more pragmatic interventions. A similar recognition of Clinton’s policy of enlargement through engagement is reflected in Trump 2.0 National Security Strategy—Shifting from Aid to Trade with Africa, which exemplifies this focus on promoting economic diplomacy and broadening engagement.

The US National Security Strategy 2025 reflects the nation’s understanding of how to adapt its engagement with the global order while maintaining realism. This time, US security thinking appears to find a balance between engagement and deterrence, which in previous years often seemed to conflict.

For the first time since the termination of the Cold War, a major military crisis is heating up in the Caribbean. Since early September 2025, United States aerial combat drones have been patrolling and targeting the suspected smuggler boats in the international waters of the Caribbean Sea. These strikes were initially portrayed as kinetic measures to choke off the drug trade through the Caribbean Sea. According to US officials, by 04 December, 22 strikes have been conducted and 87 narco-terrorists have been killed. However, it’s worthy to note that the majority of cocaine production is centered in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico and enters into the United States through an inland or Pacific route—not through the Caribbean Sea. Out of 22 strikes, only 10 have been conducted in the Pacific waters.

Washington’s political ambitions eventually became evident in October once it forward deployed a naval flotilla at the strike range to Venezuela. Currently, eight US Navy vessels are operating in the Caribbean Sea. The USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier, with its vast combat aviation wing comprising F-35C Lightning IIs, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, and a variety of support fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, is currently stationed in the US Virgin Islands. Other forward-deployed naval vessels include the MV Ocean Trader command vessel and the USS Iwo Jima amphibious assault ship with over 4,000 marines. These ships are supported by two Ticonderoga-class cruisers, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and the USS Newport News, a Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarine (SSN), each equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles. The presence of this naval flotilla suggests that the USN has mustered enough capability to not only launch aerial and cruise missile strikes but also conduct amphibious operations at the Venezuelan coast. In parallel, Venezuelan airspace has been declared ‘closed’ by the Trump administration. Such assertive measures are not meant for anti-narcotic operations but perhaps for regime change either through coercive diplomacy or through direct military action. Whatever the case may be, it’s evident that for the first time in decades, the United States is apparently preparing for a direct military conflict in its own hemisphere.

Understanding how this crisis escalated requires looking back at the recent history of bilateral tensions. The fractures began to appear in US-Venezuela relations from 1999, when Hugo Chávez came to rule on a wave of anti-American populism and nationalized the country’s oil industry. Within three years, mutual relations collapsed so abruptly that first Washington imposed sanctions and then briefly removed Chávez from power through a CIA-backed coup. Chávez regained the rule in a matter of a few days. This move, however, further intensified anti-American sentiments in the Venezuelan public. Chávez made subversion of Washington a political identity; his successor Nicolás Maduro turned it into state doctrine. In 2019, Washington even declared Juan Guaidó, the opposition leader of Venezuela, as the country’s ‘legitimate president.’ Besides the open political signaling of the White House, the CIA also attempted another coup to topple the Maduro regime but again failed to achieve the requisite results.

Maduro successfully exploited continuous intervention by the United States to augment its political narrative at the public level and managed to earn a third consecutive term in 2025. However, the results of elections were regarded as dubious and were generally dismissed as fraudulent, further degrading relations with the West.

For Venezuela, oil has attracted more trouble than prosperity. The country has more than 300 billion barrels of proven oil reserves—more than Saudi Arabia (267 billion barrels)—yet it produces less than 10 percent of its 1990s highest productivity rate. The Venezuelan crude oil is ultra-heavy (8-12° API) and has very high sulfur content. Such dense oil is not only very challenging to refine—both economically and technologically—but also very hard to transfer and cannot be pumped through pipelines without imported diluents. In a nutshell, despite possessing the largest proven oil reserves, Venezuela cannot refine and export its black gold without significant foreign assistance. The current oil infrastructure, developed during the Cold War, is gradually crumbling. Pipelines are either blocked or leaking, and refineries are now operating below 15 percent capacity. Approximately 58 billion USD worth of investment is required to repair and revive the current infrastructure. Being a struggling economy, Venezuela simply does not have the financial capacity to do so. Meanwhile, the majority of technical expertise has been eroded due to brain drain. For example, PDVSA once employed more than 40,000 engineers but now has a total strength of only 12,000 with a large portion of untrained manpower. Currently, while Gulf nations are earning huge revenue from oil exports, Venezuela stands isolated as an oil superpower that cannot even power itself.

The aforementioned factors have imparted grave consequences on the Venezuelan economy. Its national GDP has shrunk from about 300 billion USD to a mere 110 billion USD approximately. More than half of the population is living in poverty, and unemployment has crippled public development. Roughly 28 percent of the total population is in need of humanitarian assistance. These financial woes have compelled common Venezuelan citizens to seek refuge outside the country. Currently, nearly 8 million locals have left the country and are living as refugees in neighboring countries, including Columbia, Peru, Brazil, and even the United States.

To survive internal implosion, Caracas has sought external assistance from Washington’s strategic competitors, including Russia, China, and even Iran. Both Russia and Venezuela are signatories of the 10-year Strategic Partnership Treaty, which was ratified in Oct-Nov 2025 with the overarching objective of combating unilateral coercive measures. Russia has provided military assistance and technical support for the training of troops and maintenance of military equipment, which is predominantly of Soviet origin. China has repeatedly provided diplomatic support and financial loans to support Venezuela’s energy infrastructure. Both Russia and China have vetoed resolutions at the UN Security Council for imposing stringent sanctions against Venezuela. With Iran, Venezuela also shares a strong relation, which was formalized by a 20-year agreement in 2022. Their domains of cooperation include trade, repairing of energy infrastructure, modernization of the defense force, and technology sharing for refinement of crude oil. For the United States, these collaborations are meant to develop a foothold in Latin America by Russia, China, and Iran—something Washington considers intolerable.

When the Trump administration returned in 2025, within weeks, it scrapped Chevron’s license, eliminating Venezuela’s last stable revenue stream. The most significant escalation came on July 25, 2025, when the US Treasury designated Venezuela’s military leadership—the Cartel de los Soles—as a global terrorist organization. No foreign military in American history had ever received such a label. Simultaneously, the reward for the arrest of President Nicolás Maduro has been doubled to 50 million USD by the Trump administration on federal charges of narcoterrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine. And now, with a fully equipped US naval strike force sailing in the Caribbean Sea, the situation is getting increasingly volatile. The Venezuelan military simply does not possess the capability to defend against such a strike force.

If hostilities break out, then instead of placing boots on the ground, the United States is likely to conduct targeted strikes at key assets, impose and sustain a naval blockade, and eventually undermine the Venezuelan military’s and nation’s loyalty to Maduro through coercive diplomacy. The current crisis illustrates that although the Trump administration claims to have taken numerous initiatives to end conflicts and promote trade & collaboration in the Eastern Hemisphere, it will show little to no tolerance for the growing influence of Moscow and Beijing in the Western Hemisphere. Under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States seeks to sustain its control in the Western Hemisphere, including Latin America. For Trump, an example can be crafted out of Venezuela to demonstrate the potential consequences of deepening collaboration with Moscow and Beijing in Washington’s backyard.

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Russia has reportedly captured parts of Pokrovsk in Donetsk, though Ukraine still holds positions in the northern sections. The city, largely in ruins, was a critical logistical hub and home to 60,000 people before the war. Its capture comes at a sensitive time, coinciding with U.S. envoy discussions, including those involving former President Trump, on a possible plan to end the war.

WHY IT MATTERS

The fall of Pokrovsk does not signal a collapse of Ukraine’s eastern front, but it affects Kyiv’s leverage in negotiations. Russian control of high ground provides tactical advantages, including drone launch capabilities. Meanwhile, U.S. support and military aid remain pivotal for Ukraine’s defense. The city’s loss could influence American perceptions of Ukraine’s strength, particularly in political circles advocating a quick resolution.

CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION

Russian troops have advanced in small assault groups, showing the slow, attritional nature of their operations. Ukraine has reinforced key positions with elite units, including special forces, but is mindful of troop shortages. Frontline fortifications, drones, and piecemeal Russian advances suggest Ukraine’s defenses remain resilient despite localized losses. Russia has also made limited gains in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions, though rapid territorial expansion is unlikely.

GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS

Control over Pokrovsk is central to broader negotiations involving the U.S., where Trump has advocated a tougher line on Ukraine. Russia likely intends to use Pokrovsk as a platform to target nearby “fortress cities” such as Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. European allies’ financial and military support remains crucial, especially given Ukraine’s ongoing attacks on Russian energy infrastructure to weaken Moscow’s revenue streams.

CHALLENGES FOR UKRAINE

Maintaining troop strength amid attritional warfare and draft limitations.

Avoiding pressure to cede territory while securing ongoing U.S. and European support.

Managing long-term resilience against persistent Russian missile and drone attacks, which damage civilian infrastructure.

Balancing strategic defense with political messaging to allies, particularly the U.S.

ANALYSIS

The fall of Pokrovsk illustrates the psychological and strategic impact of attritional warfare. While Ukraine’s frontline holds, the loss of a city at a negotiation-sensitive moment could weaken Kyiv’s perceived bargaining power, especially in U.S. circles influenced by former President Trump’s assessment of the conflict. Militarily, the slow pace of Russian operations suggests that while gains like Pokrovsk are symbolic and tactical, they do not threaten an immediate collapse of Ukraine’s defenses.

Looking forward, Ukraine must focus on consolidating defenses, leveraging drone technology, and securing more support from European allies. Politically, the timing underscores the importance of maintaining strong ties with Washington, balancing pressure from U.S. actors advocating a settlement with the need to protect sovereignty over the Donbas region. The war remains likely to continue in a stalemated, attritional pattern, with momentum shifts driven as much by geopolitical influence as by battlefield developments.

With information from Reuters.

“The threat that I worry the most about vis-a-vis Europe is not Russia, it’s not China, it’s not any other external actor. What I worry about is the threat from within,” Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference, February 14, 2025.

America’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) marks an ideological and substantive shift in U.S. foreign policy. The administration of President Donald Trump is attempting to define a new “America First” foreign policy doctrine that is deeply pragmatic. It invokes the Monroe Doctrine but with a “Trump Corollary.” The agenda of previous administrations to spread democracy around the world through foreign military interventions is no longer the aim. Foreign policy choices will be made based on what makes the United States more powerful and prosperous. This is a truly pivotal moment in the way the US will navigate world affairs.

This NSS is a real, painful, shocking wake-up call for Europe. It is a moment of significant divergence between Europe’s view of itself and Trump’s vision of as well as for Europe. If Europe had any doubt that the Trump administration is fully committed to a tough love strategy, it now knows it with certainty. The administration is asking — demanding, really — that Europe polices its own part of the world and, most importantly, pays for it itself. The strategy—which has been long overdue—chastises Europe for losing its European character. The orientation behind the words seems to indicate that the US sees Europe as evolving into a rigid, intransigent, globalist entity. And the latter is apparent given the EU’s reaction to the new NSS as illustrated by Brussels and the establishment elite of France, Germany, Poland and the Baltics: one of shock and dismay as met Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech.

The continent of Europe is plagued with immigration issues and a predilection towards censorship, according to the US president’s newly issued National Security Strategy (NSS).

Europe is facing potential “civilizational erasure” as EU policymakers encourage censorship, stifling of political dissent, and turning a blind eye to mass immigration.

The landmark and strongly worded document released on Friday says that while the EU is showing worrying signs of economic decline, its restive cultural environment and internal political instability pose an even greater threat.

The strategy cites as serious concerns EU-backed immigration policies, suppression of political opposition, curbs on speech, collapsing birthrates, and “loss of national identities and self-confidence.” It warns that Europe could become “unrecognizable in 20 years or less.”

Over-regulation

The document argues that many European governments are “doubling down on their present path,” while the US wants Europe “to remain European” and abandon what it termed “regulatory suffocation.”  The latter is an apparent reference to America’s push back against the EU over its strict digital market guidelines, which Washington claims discriminate against US-based tech giants such as Microsoft, Google, and Meta.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday denounced the European Commission’s $140 million fine against Elon Musk’s social media platform X, calling it an attack on American tech companies and “the American people.”

Rubio wrote on X, “The European Commission’s $140 million fine isn’t just an attack on @X, it’s an attack on all American tech platforms and the American people by foreign governments. The days of censoring Americans online are over.”

Rubio’s comments reflected others within the Trump administration, including Vice President JD Vance, who also posted on the social media platform that the Commission was punishing X for not engaging in censorship.

“The EU should be supporting free speech, not attacking American companies over garbage,” he wrote.

Immigration

Another one of Washington’s key objectives is “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations,” the paper adds.

Trump’s strategy notes that the rise of “patriotic European parties” offers “cause for great optimism,” in a reference to growing bloc-wide support for right-wing Euroskeptic parties calling for strict immigration limits.

The document proclaims that “the era of mass migration is over.”  It argues that large inflows have strained resources, increased violence, and weakened social cohesion, adding that Washington is seeking a world in which sovereign states “work together to stop rather than manage” migration flows.

Normalizing relations with Russia

President Trump’s security strategy for the US also calls for a swift end to the Ukraine conflict and preventing further escalation in Europe.

To this end, the US has placed the restoration of normal ties with Russia at the center of its newly released National Security Strategy, presenting both aims as among America’s core interests.

The 33-page report outlining President Donald Trump’s foreign-policy vision was released by the White House last Friday.

“It is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine,” the paper states, “in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and reestablish strategic stability with Russia.”

It notes that the Ukraine conflict has left “European relations with Russia… deeply attenuated,” resulting in destabilization of the entire region.

The report criticizes EU leaders for “unrealistic expectations” regarding the outcome of the conflict, arguing that “a large European majority wants peace, yet that desire is not translated into policy.”

The US, it says, is ready for “significant diplomatic engagement” to “help Europe correct its current trajectory,” reestablish stability, and “mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.”

In contrast with the US national strategy during Trump’s first term, which emphasized competition with Russia and China, the new strategy shifts the focus to the Western Hemisphere and to protecting the homeland, the borders, and regional interests. It calls for resources to be redirected from distant theaters to challenges closer to home and urges NATO and European states to shoulder primary responsibility for their own defense.

The document also calls for an end to NATO expansion—a demand that Russia has repeatedly voiced, calling it a root cause of the Ukraine conflict, which Moscow views as a Western proxy war.

Overall, the new strategy signals a shift away from global interventionism toward a more transactional foreign policy, arguing that the US should act abroad only when its interests are directly at stake.

President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy puts the Western Hemisphere at the center of US foreign policy and revives the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, appending it with a “Trump Corollary.”

The document invokes the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine but pushes it further. It states that the US will block “non-Hemispheric competitors” from owning or controlling “strategically vital assets” in the Americas, including ports, energy facilities, and telecommunications networks. It describes the Western Hemisphere as the top regional priority, above Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific, and ties that status to controlling migration, drug flows, and foreign influence before they can reach US territory—clearly a fundamental and much-needed break with the foreign policies of recent presidential administrations.

Several important agreements were signed during the India visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin (December 4-5, 2025). Apart from the bilateral dimension of the visit — where several agreements were signed — both sides sought to strengthen their partnership under the umbrella of the UN and other multilateral platforms including G20, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS. Putin and Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi held talks on a wide range of issues during the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit held at New Delhi.

A joint statement issued after the summit, while referring to BRICS+, stated that both sides:

    “.. further committed themselves to promote cooperation in the expanded BRICS under the three pillars of political and security, economic and financial, cultural, and people-to-people cooperation. They reaffirmed their commitment to the BRICS spirit of mutual respect and understanding, sovereign equality, solidarity, democracy, openness, inclusiveness, collaboration, and consensus. Russia pledged its full support for India’s upcoming BRICS Chairmanship in 2026.”

BRICS Common currency and trade in local currencies

One of the aspects that was discussed during Putin’s visit was the issue of a common BRICS currency and trade in local currencies between BRICS members. Intra-BRICS trade has grown in recent years with the entry of new members—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025. If one were to look at intra-BRICS trade in local currencies, this too has witnessed a significant rise. 90% of bilateral trade between Russia and China is in local currencies, while a significant percentage of trade between India and Russia—estimated at well over 90%—is in local currencies. BRICS member states have been pushing a common payment platform for giving a push to trade. This issue was high on the agenda at the 2024 BRICS Summit held at Kazan, Russia, as well as the 2025 BRICS Summit held at Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). While speaking at the 2024 BRICS Summit, Putin had said:

“The dollar is being used as a weapon. We really see that this is so. I think that this is a big mistake by those who do this.”

While trade in local currencies is essential to circumvent sanctions and several countries are seeking to diversify economic relations, the idea of a common currency has been rejected by most BRICS members, including Russia. During his India visit, Putin while highlighting the need for increasing bilateral trade — including in local currencies — said that the organisation needed to be cautious as far as the idea of a common BRICS currency was concerned. In a media interview the Russian President said:

“There is no need for haste. And if there is no hurry, then you will avoid many grave mistakes.” 

He underscored the need to learn lessons from the Eurozone, saying that countries cannot be forced to follow a “common system” if structures are not aligned.

India which will be chairing the BRICS Presidency, in 2026, has taken a nuanced position. While pushing for trade in local currencies and pitching for other BRICS countries to adopt the Unified Payment Interface (UPI), it has categorically distanced itself on more than one occasion from the idea of a common BRICS currency. Apart from the economic factors for the same, there is a clear geopolitical reason – India is sceptical about sharing a currency with China.

BRICS, De-dollarisation, sanctions and the US Dollar

 It is important to understand that a changing geopolitical situation, especially economic sanctions, has propelled several countries to trade in local currencies, but this does not mean that all of them are doing it with the objective of undermining the US dollar. Those who believe that the US Dollar will be threatened by trade in local currencies – including the US President Donald Trump – need to adopt a more nuanced approach vis-à-vis the growing trade in local currencies between developing countries – especially members of BRICS. Recently, American investor and the author of ‘Rich Dad Poor Dad’ Robert Kiyosaki while commenting on the announcement of a Gold currency by BRICS in a post on X highlighted the need for investors to move away from the US Dollar and explore alternatives such as cryptocurrencies and precious metals. In his post, he wrote, “…Bye Bye US Dollar…”

In conclusion, the idea of a BRICS common currency is unfeasible, while trade in non-dollar currencies is likely to grow due to sanctions imposed upon Russia. Countries are looking to reduce their dependence upon the US Dollar, but this phenomenon is extremely complex and cannot be viewed from simplistic binaries as has been mentioned earlier.