USA

One of the greatest strikers of the past 15 years – Poland’s Robert Lewandowski – is among the big names who will not be playing at the 2026 World Cup in Canada, the United States and Mexico.

The 37-year-old Barcelona striker, who has scored 89 goals for his country, was not able to inspire his side as they lost 3-2 in Stockholm against Sweden in Tuesday’s play-off final.

Lewandowski, who won the German Bundesliga title on 10 occasions – twice with Borussia Dortmund and then in eight successive seasons with Bayern Munich, before winning La Liga twice with Barca – may have played in his last major international tournament.

We have taken a look at six players who have missed out on qualifying for this summer’s finals.

The Italian wins his fifth straight Grand Prix to take control of the world championship standings after three rounds.

Aprilia’s Marco Bezzecchi extended his perfect ⁠start to the ⁠year by winning the United States Grand Prix in Austin on Sunday for his third consecutive win of the ⁠year and fifth straight dating back to last season.

Bezzecchi led all 20 laps at the Circuit of the Americas, where he ⁠crossed the line 2.036 seconds ahead of teammate Jorge Martin. Pedro Acosta, who finished third in Saturday’s sprint before a penalty dropped him to eighth, rounded out the podium.

Bezzecchi, racing a day after he failed ‌to finish a sprint for the second time this season after a crash, also reclaimed the lead in the MotoGP standings with 81 points, four points clear of Martin, who won Saturday’s sprint race.

With the win, Bezzecchi became the third Italian rider to win five in a row after Hall of Famers Valentino ⁠Rossi and Giacomo Agostini. He is also ⁠the first rider to win the first three grands prix of the season since Marc Marquez in 2014.

“This is amazing. I mean, I wasn’t expecting a day like ⁠this after yesterday, because it wasn’t easy, and I made a mistake, and it was important ⁠to bounce back,” said Bezzecchi.

“Luckily, my team, ⁠my squad, was very close to me, and they gave me the motivation to try to bounce back.

“But anyway, I wasn’t expecting a race like this, and I’m ‌so happy – I really can’t describe my emotion right now. Very, very happy and proud.”

Polesitter Fabio Di Giannantonio of VR46 Racing finished ‌fourth, ‌while defending Austin champion Francesco Bagnaia of the Ducati Lenovo Team was 10th.

Comic and television host Stephen Colbert knows the feeling William Person recounts in his new lawsuit alleging that USA Bobsled/Skeleton was negligent by concealing knowledge that the repeated sub-concussive blows sledders endure could cause permanent brain damage.

Shortly after taking a bobsled run with Team USA in Lake Placid, N.Y., in 2009, Colbert described the experience.

“It felt like I was being hit in the head with ice hammers,” he said . “It was like losing the worst snowball fight of your life.”

Person can relate, according to his attorneys, who wrote in the suit filed Tuesday in Los Angeles County Superior Court that the symptoms of brain injury have a name among bobsled and skeleton athletes : “Sled Head.”

“This action seeks justice for a decorated American athlete who, in his pursuit of Olympic glory, was knowingly sacrificed to a silent epidemic of brain injury,” the court filing said.

Person says he experienced chronic headaches, migraines, fogginess, vertigo and blackouts during his career.

“[He] currently suffers from traumatic brain injury and latent neurodegenerative disease,” the filing said. “Memory loss, cognitive decline, emotional instability, and chronic pain. These injuries have required, and will continue to require, extensive medical care.”

The action is the second brought on behalf of Person, who competed internationally for the United States from 1999 to 2007. He filed a lawsuit in December 2021 that asked USA Bobsled/Skeleton to implement a medical monitoring system to identify and treat sledders with sled head symptoms.

That lawsuit, which languished in court for five years, included a class-action component and accumulated several hundred plaintiffs. Person’s new lawyers, Kamau Edwards and Christopher Perry, are taking a different approach. They plan to file separate lawsuits and seek monetary damages for each plaintiff based on their circumstances and diagnosis.

Edwards and Perry also added new defendants. In addition to USA Bobsled/Skeleton, the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee, Anschutz Southern California Sports Complex and former bobsledding supervisor Tracy Lamb are named.

Anschutz owns the Home Depot Center, where the U.S. bobsled and skeleton teams train. The lawsuit says the venue is responsible for premises liability and Lamb for negligent hiring and supervision.

The defendants have yet to be served with the lawsuit and declined to comment. Once served, they will have 30 days to respond through the court.

Edwards and Perry also filed personal injury lawsuits last week on behalf of two other former USA sledders — Joe Sisson and Rick Baird. Through their court filings, both recount head injuries sustained while sledding and lingering symptoms.

The New York Times published stories several years ago about former bobsled and skeleton athletes who struggled with symptoms similar to what Person, Sisson and Baird describe. A handful were posthumously diagnosed with chronic traumatic encephalopathy, the progressive, degenerative brain disease found in people with a history of repetitive head impacts.

Dr. Ann McKee, director of Boston University’s CTE Center, studied the brain of former Olympic bobsledder Pavle Jovanovic, who killed himself in 2020 at 43, and determined he had CTE.

Jovanovic wasn’t the first elite bobsledder to commit suicide. Steven Holcomb, who piloted the American bobsled known as the “Night Train” to the Olympic gold medal in 2010, was found dead in Lake Placid, N.Y., in 2017 from an apparent overdose of alcohol and sleeping pills.

Also, Sisson’s sledding mentor Travis Bell killed himself in 2012 at 27 after experiencing years of debilitating symptoms that Sisson believes stemmed from his career as a driver on the U.S. bobsled team.

“I’ve got survivor’s guilt big time,” Sisson told the New York Times in 2022.

Person’s lawsuit alleges that Lamb and USABS coaches witnessed his symptoms during training sessions but failed to intervene.

“They did not pull [Person] from the sled. They did not refer him for a neurological evaluation. They did not institute a concussion protocol,” the lawyers wrote. “Instead, fostering a culture of silence, they encouraged [him] to continue training through the injury, exacerbating the damage to his brain.”

The lawsuit asserts that the link between sledding and brain injury has been known since the 1980s and that officials intentionally concealed the information because “a full disclosure of the risks of CTE and permanent brain damage would deter top-tier athletes like [Person} from competing,” the suit said. “By suppressing this information, they robbed [him] of his ability to make an informed choice about his own life and health.”

Person was a track and field athlete at Weber State in Utah when he was recruited by USA Bobsled/Skeleton. He represented the United States in the America’s Cup, World Cup, Olympic Trials and World Championships from 1999 through 2007.

The dangers of sliding sports took center stage at the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics when 11 crashes occurred in two days of bobsled training ahead of the Games. Gold medal bobsled favorite Beat Hefti of Switzerland suffered a concussion and luger Nodar Kumaritashvili died after being ejected from the track at nearly 90 mph during the final training run.

MIAMI — The victors erupted onto the field and into multiple dogpiles. Some wore national flags around their shoulders. Within minutes, the Venezuelans wore T-shirts that read: “The Best Baseball in the World.”

The players from the United States watched from their dugout. Within minutes, they trudged back onto the field so a silver medal could be draped around their necks. Not every player wore the medal all the way back to the dugout.

You can say all you want about how the World Baseball Classic has matured into a must-see event for fans and a must-play event for the game’s elite players. You can salute Venezuela for a spirited and thrilling victory, and the Venezuelan fans for nine innings of joyful delirium.

But you also can say this: A U.S. team billed as featuring a killer lineup could not hit, and the U.S. could not use its best pitcher because the San Diego Padres said so. The result: For the second consecutive World Baseball Classic, the U.S. lost the championship by a 3-2 score.

U.S. captain Aaron Judge looks across the field after striking out against Velezuela at the World Baseball Classic Tuesday.

(Lynne Sladky / Associated Press)

“I’m not OK with winning silver,” Bryce Harper said. “I don’t want to win silver.

“I want to win gold, just like anybody else. But, at the end of the night, they did it, they won, all the congratulations to them. They fought hard. I’ve got nothing but respect for them.”

By the time the eighth inning rolled around, the mighty U.S. offense had not gotten a runner into scoring position on Tuesday, and had gone scoreless for 18 of its previous 19 innings. With two out in the eighth, and Venezuela up 2-0, Bobby Witt Jr. walked, and Harper followed with a 432-foot home run, so monstrous that Venezuelan pitcher Andres Machado could only watch the flight of the ball and smile.

Harper stood and watched too, then he flipped his bat toward the dugout. At third base, he stopped to give a salute, then spotted the cameraman trailing him around the bases and pointed to the American flag on his left sleeve.

“Just enjoying the moment,” Harper said. “Super grateful for it.”

With the game tied 2-2 entering the ninth, the pitcher trotting in from the U.S. bullpen should have been Mason Miller, who had not given up a hit in the WBC and struck out 10 of the 14 batters he had faced.

Before the game, U.S. manager Mark DeRosa had said Miller would be available. After the game, DeRosa said he and Miller’s employers, the Padres, had agreed Miller would only be used to protect a lead.

Once the game entered the ninth, Miller would not be able to protect a lead, since the U.S. was the home team and there could be no save situation for him. DeRosa nonetheless declined to use Miller.

“Honoring the Padres,” DeRosa said.

This is not on DeRosa, but that is nonsense. If a closer cannot be used three times in five days — with another week to ease into the regular season by throwing bullpens or in structured B games, or taking a few days off, or whatever — then he should stay home.

Venezuela scored the winning run in the ninth off Garrett Whitlock, on a walk, stolen base and RBI double by Eugenio Suárez.

In its final five WBC games — after routs of Brazil and Britain — the U.S. scored more than five runs once, with a two-run win, a two-run loss, a two-run win, a one-run win, and a one-run loss. In the semifinal and final, the U.S. combined to bat .159 and strike out 25 times, and every run came on a home run.

That — not any attempt at small ball — is American baseball. And the U.S. was outslugged by six other teams, including Australia and Italy. For glory, as the U.S. team hoodies said.

“A lot of pop ups, a lot of just-missed pitches,” U.S. captain Aaron Judge said. “I wouldn’t say we tensed up. We just didn’t execute when we needed to.”

Said DeRosa: “I mean, surprised because of the names at the back of the jersey, but not surprised because of where they’re at in spring training.

“Yeah, that’s my answer. I really don’t have a rhyme or reason to why. I just think you’re either hot or not in a seven-game blast like this.”

American Bryce Harper celebrates at home plate with teammates after hitting a two-run home run during the World Baseball Classic Tuesday in Miami.

(Lynne Sladky / Associated Press)

The WBC absolutely was a blast. The Venezuelan fans delivered concert-level noise all night long, without needing a silly stadium host or scoreboard command to do so. The WBC allowed fans to bring in 16 “permissible instruments,” including bongos, cowbells, maracas and trumpets.

“There’s bands playing,” Judge said. “There’s chants going on. You don’t usually hear that too much in the World Series games. That’s amazing. So much fun.”

More Americans watched the U.S.-Dominican Republic semifinal than watched last year’s NBA All-Star Game, according to Fox. The championship game almost certainly will have drawn more viewers than at least one game of last year’s NBA Finals.

In the 10 minutes I spent along the concourse before Tuesday’s game, I counted fans wearing the jerseys of many national teams and 17 MLB teams, plus the late and greatly beloved Montreal Expos. Japan did not qualify for the final four, but I nonetheless counted 11 fans in Japan jerseys with Shohei Ohtani’s name on the back. The advertisers believed too: DeRosa spoke in front of a banner displaying the logo of nine corporate sponsors, eight of them Japanese.

After such a lively event, can these players get fired up to go back to spring training, and then for the grind of a 162-game season?

“I’m always fired up for the Yankees, but I’m still pissed about this,” Judge said.

“I’m looking forward to the next time we get a chance to throw on the red, white and blue and take care of business.”

That would be the 2028 Olympics in Los Angeles, where Dave Roberts has expressed interest in managing Team USA at Dodger Stadium. The major leaguers are almost certainly coming, even if the details are still being worked out.

See you there, Bryce Harper?

“I hope so,” he said. “I really do.”

Venezuela upset the star-studded host nation to win a politically charged showdown in Miami.

Venezuela scored a stunning 3-2 upset over tournament hosts United States to capture the World Baseball Classic for the first time on Tuesday in a tense final played out against a backdrop of political tensions.

Eugenio Suarez drove in the winning run in the top of the ninth inning to seal a victory for Venezuela over an American lineup that had been hyped as a baseball “dream team”.

Trailing for most of the game, the Team USA looked to have hauled themselves back into the contest when Bryce Harper blasted a game-tying two-run homer in the eighth inning.

But Harper’s salvo proved to be in vain as Venezuela regained the lead in the ninth inning, punishing a shaky performance from USA reliever Garrett Whitlock to clinch victory.

“What can I say, it’s amazing,” Venezuela hero Suarez said. “Nobody believed in Venezuela, but now we win the championship today. This is a celebration for all the Venezuelan country.”

Suarez’s winning double settled a final that had got under way in a raucous atmosphere at Miami’s LoanDepot Park, with a large contingent of Venezuela fans in a sold-out crowd of 36,190 booing the USA lineup during pre-game introductions.

US President Donald Trump, whose government captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in a military raid in January, had stoked tensions with a social media post on Monday, congratulating Venezuela for reaching the final while simultaneously suggesting the country could become the US’s “51st state”.

Trump again returned to the theme moments after Tuesday’s defeat, declaring in a post on his Truth Social platform: “STATEHOOD!!! President DJT.”

Venezuela’s interim leader, Delcy Rodriguez, who replaced the ousted Maduro, declared a “national day of jubilation” on Wednesday.

“This triumph is the victory of the passion, talent and unity that define us as Venezuelans,” Rodriguez wrote on X.

“An achievement that will remain forever in the heart of our country. ¡VIVA VENEZUELA!”

Venezuela dominate

Venezuela, whose players had been instructed by team management to avoid commenting on politics throughout the tournament, dominated the vaunted Team USA lineup for long periods, with starting pitcher Eduardo Rodriguez stifling the American batters led by New York Yankees home run king Aaron Judge.

The South Americans took the lead in the top of the third as USA starter Nolan McLean struggled for command from the mound.

Salvador Perez singled to get on base before Atlanta Braves star Ronald Acuna Jr drew a walk.

A wild pitch from McLean left Venezuela with runners on second and third base, and on the next pitch, Kansas City Royals slugger Maikel Garcia’s sacrifice fly allowed Perez to score.

With the USA bats continuing to flail against Rodriguez, the Venezuelans doubled their lead in the top of the fifth inning.

McLean delivered a four-seam fastball into the centre of the strike zone, and Boston Red Sox left-fielder Wilyer Abreu duly pounced, crushing a 414-foot (126-metre) solo home run to centre field for a 2-0 lead.

Venezuela appeared to be closing in on victory, but were jolted by Harper’s 432-foot (132-metre) home run to centre field off reliever Andres Machado in the eighth.

But the USA rally was short-lived, and Venezuela grabbed the lead again in the ninth when Luis Arraez drew a lead-off walk from Whitlock before Suarez’s blast to left centre field gave Venezuela the winning run.

Closer Daniel Palencia removed Kyle Schwarber, Gunnar Henderson and Roman Anthony in quick succession to seal Venezuela’s triumph.

South Korea said it remains capable of deterring threats from North Korea even if the United States redeploys some weapons stationed on the Korean peninsula to the Middle East amid the war involving Iran.

The comments by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung come after reports that key U.S. missile defence systems and military assets could be moved from Asia to support operations linked to the Iran conflict.

The potential redeployment has sparked concern among Asian allies that shifting military resources could weaken regional deterrence against China and North Korea at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.

Seoul Says Deterrence Remains Strong

Speaking at a cabinet meeting, Lee acknowledged that reports about the relocation of U.S. military equipment had triggered controversy in South Korea.

He said that while Seoul had expressed opposition to the removal of certain weapons, it could not dictate U.S. military decisions.

However, Lee emphasised that South Korea’s own defence capabilities are strong enough to maintain deterrence against North Korea even if some American systems are temporarily relocated. He noted that South Korea’s defence spending and conventional military strength significantly exceed those of the North.

South Korea hosts about 28,500 U.S. troops as part of the long-standing alliance designed to deter aggression from nuclear-armed North Korea.

Missile Defence Systems May Be Redeployed

Officials have indicated that the U.S. and South Korean militaries are discussing the possible redeployment of Patriot missile defense system batteries to the Middle East.

South Korean media reported that some missile batteries may have already been shipped from Osan Air Base and could be redeployed to U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

There were also reports that parts of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system could be moved from South Korea to the Middle East.

While Patriot systems provide lower-tier defence against shorter-range missiles, THAAD systems are designed to intercept ballistic missiles at high altitude.

United States Forces Korea declined to comment on the possible relocation of equipment, citing operational security.

Analysts Warn of Miscalculation Risks

Military analysts say that although South Korea possesses strong military capabilities, the presence of U.S. forces and weapons in the country serves as a crucial signal of Washington’s commitment to the region.

According to Choi Gi-il, a military studies professor at Sangji University, the removal of some systems could carry strategic risks.

He warned that North Korea might interpret the redeployment as a weakening of allied defences and could attempt limited provocations to test the alliance’s response.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has recently signalled a more aggressive posture, pledging to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal and describing South Korea as its “most hostile enemy.”

Wider Regional Impact

The redeployment of U.S. assets reflects the broader strategic impact of the Iran conflict on global military posture.

Japan, which also hosts major U.S. bases, has seen two U.S. guided-missile destroyers stationed in Yokosuka deployed to the Arabian Sea to support operations linked to the Iran campaign.

The movements have raised concerns in Tokyo as well, with opposition politicians questioning whether U.S. forces stationed in Japan should be used for operations outside the region.

The developments highlight how the conflict in the Middle East is beginning to reshape global military deployments, drawing resources away from Asia and prompting questions about the balance of security commitments across different regions.

With information from Reuters.

When a state’s political leadership announces a ceasefire and its military keeps firing, the instinct is to reach for deception as the explanation. In Iran’s case, the more unsettling answer may be structural. The gap between what Iranian presidents say and what Iranian forces do reflects not a coordinated lie but a command architecture deliberately engineered to operate without central direction. In a serious conflict, the consequences of that architecture would be felt well beyond Iran’s borders.

A Command Architecture Designed to Survive Decapitation

In September 2008, IRGC Commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari oversaw a sweeping restructuring that divided the force into thirty-one provincial corps, each empowered to conduct military operations within its zone without requiring authorization from the center. As Michael Connell of the Center for Naval Analyses noted in his analysis for the United States Institute of Peace, the intent was to strengthen unit cohesion and ensure operational continuity under degraded command conditions. He flagged explicitly that the decentralization could produce unintended escalation dynamics, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

That warning deserves serious attention. The IRGC’s Mosaic Defense doctrine was not designed to make Iran more responsive to political leadership in a crisis. It was designed to ensure that military operations could continue regardless of what happened to that leadership. A force structured that way does not stop firing because a president gives a speech.

The Apology That Wasn’t

The internal contradiction becomes clearest when traced through a hypothetical cascade. A president announces a ceasefire and attributes the directive to an Interim Leadership Council. A fellow council member publicly declares that heavy strikes will continue. A hardline cleric addresses the president directly, calling his position untenable. By the time the president’s original statement is reposted, the ceasefire language has been quietly removed.

The IRGC’s own posture in this scenario resolves the ambiguity on structural grounds. It endorses the president’s language, then appends a caveat that renders it inoperative: all US and Israeli military bases and interests across the region remain primary targets. Since every GCC state hosts American forces, that framing preserves full operational freedom while allowing the presidency to project restraint. The contradiction is not incidental. It is the doctrine functioning as designed.

The Theological Dimension

Iran is not simply a military organization. It is a theocratic state whose constitutional legitimacy flows from velayat-e faqih, the guardianship of the Islamic jurist, which vests supreme authority in a single clerical figure whose religious and political mandates are inseparable. Remove that figure, and the system’s legitimating architecture is suspended rather than transferred. The Assembly of Experts is constitutionally mandated to elect a successor, but wartime conditions would disrupt that process at precisely the moment its resolution matters most.

A RAND Corporation analysis prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense identified the IRGC as the institution best positioned to shape any post-Khamenei transition, with the organizational reach and economic weight to determine outcomes that civilian institutions cannot contest. The result, in a decapitation scenario, is a theocratic state operating without its theological anchor and a military operating under pre-delegated authority with no one capable of recalling it.

Durability Without Effect

The Mosaic Defense doctrine would prove, above all, durable. A decentralized force can survive catastrophic leadership losses and sustain operations. But durability is not the same as capability, and sustained fire is not the same as strategic effect.

Iran’s theory of regional attrition, the calculation that sustained strikes against Gulf infrastructure and American basing would fracture GCC cohesion and coerce Arab neighbors toward neutrality, has produced no evidence of working. The GCC bloc has held. Individual member states have coordinated their responses rather than fractured under pressure. The country absorbing the sharpest volume of Iranian strike activity, the UAE, has demonstrated air defense performance that has exceeded even optimistic prewar assessments. Publicly available figures suggest UAE systems have defeated upward of ninety percent of inbound threats, a result that reflects years of sustained investment, deep integration with American and Israeli platforms, and an operational tempo that has stress-tested those systems at genuine scale.

The picture that emerges is not one of Iran winning a war of attrition. It is one of an Iran burning through accessible inventory, losing launch infrastructure faster than it can regenerate, and discovering that the regional architecture it spent years attempting to destabilize has proven considerably more resilient than it calculated.

That resilience carries its own strategic meaning. A weakened force operating under pre-delegated authority, without a supreme leader to set limits, remains dangerous in a narrow tactical sense. But it is operating without a coherent end state, and the environment it faces is not the one it anticipated. The GCC’s collective posture and the demonstrated effectiveness of layered air defense across the Gulf have closed off the strategic outcomes Iran’s doctrine was written to achieve.

The scenario is instructive for what it reveals about the limits of decentralized military design. A force built to keep firing regardless of political direction is also a force that cannot be steered toward an exit. But the Gulf states have demonstrated something of equal importance in response: that resilience, properly built and consistently resourced, can outlast a doctrine designed for chaos, and that the regional order Iran sought to unravel has shown itself capable of absorbing the blow.

Modern wars are fought not only with weapons but with assumptions—and the most dangerous assumptions are often invisible to those making them. Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between known unknowns (questions we recognize but cannot answer) and unknown unknowns (risks we have not even framed as questions) captures something essential about the current confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran.

The Nuclear Material Problem

The June 2025 12-day war struck several of Iran’s nuclear facilities but left the most consequential question unanswered: where is the material? The March 2026 campaign has struck deeper, targeting hardened and dispersed sites that June’s operations left intact. Yet the fundamental uncertainty has not resolved—it has compounded. Iran reportedly retains roughly 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, approaching weapons-grade, and the precise location of that stockpile is now more opaque than before. On March 2, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported the entrance buildings of Iran’s underground Natanz enrichment plant had been bombed, but without inspection access, the agency cannot reconstruct a monitoring baseline.

The strategic paradox is acute. Any Iranian government—this one or a successor—must now confront a nuclear-armed Israel and a United States willing to strike Iranian territory twice in nine months. Under those conditions, nuclear capability looks less like a provocation and more like a rational insurance policy. The war may have permanently entrenched the very incentive it was designed to dismantle. A further risk of escaping conventional arms-control frameworks is if Iranian institutions fragment, specialized nuclear expertise disperses internationally, potentially becoming available to states or non-state actors.

Regime Change and What Follows

The war’s stated objective rests on uncertain ground. Intelligence assessments before the conflict reportedly concluded that even a large-scale assault was unlikely to produce regime collapse—yet the campaign proceeded anyway. The Iranian state has shown remarkable institutional resilience, with no visible defections among senior leadership, a government operating under its constitutional framework, and a regime that has absorbed the Iran-Iraq War, the Green Movement, and decades of sanctions.

War has accelerated the succession question around Ali Khamenei. One trajectory involves Mojtaba Khamenei, whose rise would mean dynastic continuity rather than transformation; another sees the IRGC consolidating power—equally misaligned with Western hopes. The question of what comes after was not answered before the bombs fell.

Retaliation, Major-Power Shadows, and Strategic Incoherence

Iran’s retaliation has demonstrated its asymmetric reach. The IRGC claims attacks on at least 27 bases hosting American troops across the region, alongside Israeli military facilities. Tehran appears to be pacing its response, sustaining an attrition campaign designed to exhaust interceptor stocks rather than overwhelm them in a single strike.

The major power dimensions compound this. Russia has reportedly been providing intelligence on American naval deployments; Chinese-linked entities have allegedly tracked US forces via satellite. Meanwhile, strategic incoherence in Washington compounds every other risk. Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have framed this as a limited campaign against nuclear infrastructure; Trump has simultaneously floated regime change on social media.

The Munitions Race

The deepest structural vulnerability may not lie on the battlefield but in the arithmetic of an industrial system never designed to fight this kind of war. The first 36 hours consumed more than 3,000 precision-guided munitions and interceptors. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Dan Caine had warned that stockpiles were already significantly depleted before the first strike. Secretary Marco Rubio subsequently acknowledged that Iran produces an estimated 100 missiles a month versus roughly six or seven high-end interceptors that American industry can manufacture in the same period.

That deficit has a history. The US likely expended 100 to 150 THAAD interceptors and 80 SM-3s supporting Israel during June’s Twelve-Day War. Those stocks were never fully replenished. The bottlenecks are physical as well as financial. Lockheed Martin’s plan to raise PAC-3 MSE production to 2,000 units per year addresses a six-to-seven-year horizon, not the current emergency.

The drone dimension adds a layer officials have been slow to acknowledge. Hegseth and Caine admitted in a closed-door briefing that Iran’s Shahed drones present a challenge US air defenses cannot fully meet. The Shahed flies low and slow—hard to detect and poorly matched to the high-end interceptors THAAD and SM-3 are optimized to defeat. Intercepting a drone can cost roughly five times what it costs to manufacture one.

This crystallizes the war’s most consequential known unknown: how much of Iran’s arsenal reflects genuine capability, and how much reflects deliberate restraint? The IDF assessed Iran possessed roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles on February 11.

The search for emergency solutions has produced one remarkable geopolitical inversion. The Pentagon has approached Ukraine about purchasing drone interceptors. They are low-cost systems Ukrainian manufacturers developed specifically to hunt Shaheds, built from years of adapting to exactly the threat now confounding American air defenses in the Gulf. The US is buying drone killers from a country it recently all but abandoned! The implications extend to the Indo-Pacific. Every interceptor fired over the Gulf of Bahrain is one fewer available in the Taiwan Strait.

The Energy Shock

The Strait of Hormuz has moved from a textbook chokepoint to a live emergency. Tanker traffic has come to a near standstill. War-risk insurance premiums have made commercial passage unviable even where it remains physically possible. At least five tankers have been struck across the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and nearby waters. Approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day—a fifth of global consumption—normally transit the strait, alongside roughly 20% of global LNG trade. Traders are warning that oil prices could surge past $100 a barrel if the conflict in Iran continues to escalate. Goldman Sachs Research estimates that a full one-month closure would add $15 per barrel, assuming no compensating measures like spare pipeline utilization or releases from strategic petroleum reserves. Bank of America sees tail risk far higher, estimating a prolonged shutdown could add $40–$80 per barrel above current prices.

The LNG dimension may prove more immediately damaging than oil. QatarEnergy has halted production at Ras Laffan, the world’s largest LNG facility, after Iranian drone attacks. This has already caused European natural gas futures to spike. If global LNG tightens, Europe must compete with Asian buyers on price. That competition may, in turn, force Europe back toward Russian gas, quietly reversing one of the most consequential geopolitical achievements of the post-Ukraine sanctions era.

The exposure is global and unevenly distributed. China, India, Japan, and South Korea account for roughly 75% of Hormuz crude exports and 59% of its LNG flows. South Korea has warned it could exhaust LNG reserves within nine days and has announced a 100 trillion won stabilization fund. India is pivoting toward Russian crude. These developments structurally benefit Moscow regardless of the war’s outcome.

The fertilizer dimension compounds the energy shock with a slower fuse. Nitrogen fertilizers are manufactured from natural gas; roughly a third of globally traded urea transits Hormuz. QatarEnergy’s halt removes fertilizer output simultaneously with LNG. Urea prices have already surged $60 to $80 per ton at New Orleans, with the spring planting window closing. The food-price consequences will not appear in grocery stores for months. But they are already locked in.

The Gulf Security Paradox

For decades the Gulf states managed their rivalry with Iran below the threshold of open confrontation, relying on the American security umbrella while avoiding direct entanglement. The war has collapsed that strategy. The Gulf states did not arrive at this crisis as Iran’s adversaries but rather as reluctant bystanders who had invested enormous diplomatic capital in preventing it. They gave ironclad assurances to Tehran, both before the war and up to its eve, that their territories would not serve as launchpads. That Iran responded by striking these same neighbors is a strategic miscalculation of historic proportions and a moral failure that may poison relations for a generation.

This has opened a structural debate now conducted in public. Is American military presence a protective shield or a magnet for retaliation? Citizens and analysts are asking why Gulf states should bear the risk of hosting US forces when Washington appears unable to protect them. Undoubtedly, Tehran understands this dynamic. Drone strikes on UAE-based data centers targeted Gulf publics’ confidence in the connectivity model as much as American commercial interests. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have staked their post-oil futures on projecting stability and attracting mobile capital. Intercepting most of the incoming fire is not sufficient when global firms are deciding where to invest next decade.

The crisis confronts the Gulf Cooperation Council with a strategic fork. One path leads toward deeper collective security, featuring integrated missile defense, expanded intelligence sharing, and coordinated maritime protection that could reduce dependence on any single external patron. The other leads toward renewed fragmentation as internal rivalries re-emerge.

Former Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani warned that the Gulf “must not be dragged into a direct confrontation with Iran,” arguing that such a clash would “deplete the resources of both sides and provide an opportunity for outside forces to control us under the pretext of helping us escape the crisis.” Yet the same crisis that could finally catalyze genuine Gulf collective security could just as easily deepen the divisions that have historically prevented it.

The Mediator’s Dilemma and the Meta-Unknown

The conflict has also damaged the diplomatic architecture that previously helped manage US-Iran tensions. Oman and Qatar built genuine credibility as intermediaries through years of patient back-channel work. Effective mediation requires neutrality. When conflict spreads into the territory of potential mediators, that credibility erodes. Iran’s decision to strike the very states whose neutrality made diplomacy possible may have burned the bridges needed to end the war—which is perhaps the most consequential unknown unknown in the entire conflict, second only to the US twice striking Iran in the span of nine months while negotiations were still ongoing.

At the deepest level lies a question no intelligence assessment can answer: whether the strategic logic of the war is coherent at all. Negotiations failed because each side demanded outcomes the other could not accept. The same incompatibility that made diplomacy impossible may make military victory equally elusive. Iran cannot surrender unconditionally without ceasing to be the Islamic Republic. And the conditions that make nuclear deterrence attractive to any Iranian government—this one or a successor—have not been removed by the strikes; they have been reinforced.

Conclusion

In sum, the US-Israeli campaign against Iran has illuminated the limits of military certainty. Known unknowns—munition shortages, asymmetric retaliation, and energy vulnerabilities—interact with unknown unknowns—nuclear dispersal, regime succession, and Gulf fragmentation—to create a conflict whose trajectory is inherently unpredictable. Rather than eliminating threats, the strikes may have entrenched incentives for nuclear retention, incentivized strategic caution, and stressed regional and global systems. The coherence of the war itself is in question, as military action and diplomacy pull in contradictory directions. Ultimately, the conflict underscores that modern warfare is as much about managing uncertainties as it is about destroying targets.

The reported idea of a special operation to seize Iran’s uranium should alarm anyone who still thinks there is a line between pressure and recklessness. Sending foreign forces into Iranian territory to capture nuclear material would be far beyond coercion. It would be war in plain sight. That risk looks even sharper when it is paired with talk of unconditional surrender and a revived maximum pressure campaign. Officials call that flexibility. In practice, it often creates confusion and a dangerous illusion of control.

Strategic Ambiguity Has Limits

Trump has long preferred threat inflation as a negotiating tool, and his administration’s National Security Presidential Memorandum on Iran makes clear that Washington wants to deny Tehran every path to a bomb. But there is a difference between pressure meant to shape diplomacy and rhetoric that drifts toward occupation logic. A raid assumes the United States can enter a sovereign state, take possession of fissile material, and leave without igniting a larger conflict. That is not strategy. It is a gamble.

A Raid Would Not Stay Small

Iran is not an isolated militia camp. It is a large state with layered security organs, missile capacity, regional partners, and a long memory of external intervention. Any attempt to seize uranium by force would expose American troops, bases, shipping lanes, diplomats, and partners to retaliation across several fronts. Even before talk of a raid, Washington and Tehran had been engaged in indirect nuclear talks in Oman. Replacing diplomacy with a ground mission would not create leverage. It would destroy what remains of a controlled bargaining space.

The Nuclear Picture Is Already Murky

The hardest fact in this debate is that the nuclear picture is already uncertain. In its February 2026 safeguards report, the IAEA said it could not verify the current status of facilities hit in June 2025. Reuters later highlighted that same report’s estimate that Iran had 440.9 kilograms enriched up to 60 percent before the strikes, while the Associated Press noted the wider stockpile had reached 9,874.9 kilograms of enriched uranium in total. Reuters also reported a cat-and-mouse hunt for missing material and confirmed that tunnel entrances at Isfahan were hit. Those facts do not make a commando operation look cleaner. They make it look less knowable.

Force Has Already Damaged Oversight

This is the contradiction hawks avoid. Military action may damage buildings, but it can also damage the inspection system needed to track what survives. The IAEA chief said that returning to Iranian sites was the top priority after the attacks because the agency had lost visibility. Reuters warned even before the war that any new Iran deal would have to address serious watchdog blind spots. Rafael Grossi had already reminded the Security Council that nuclear facilities must never be attacked and later stressed that inspectors must be allowed to do their job. Once oversight is broken, claims about perfect control become less credible.

Pressure Without Diplomacy Can Harden Iran

Advocates of seizure argue that urgency changes the rules. Their point is easy to grasp. If material has been moved, hidden, or split across sites, then delay is dangerous. But urgency cuts both ways. The less certainty there is, the more any raid grows in scope. A supposedly limited mission can quickly expand into repeated searches, broader strikes, and pressure for a longer presence. That trajectory sits uneasily with both the basic ban on the use of force in the UN Charter and the logic of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which depends on verification and compliance, not theatrical confiscation. Reuters has also shown that the damage from earlier strikes was difficult to measure and that U.S. officials later said there was no known intelligence that Iran had moved the uranium. That uncertainty is exactly why fantasies of a clean raid should be treated with suspicion.

Containment Is Less Dramatic, but Safer

There is another reason to reject this path. Public overstatement can create policy traps. Trump has already brushed aside internal caution, including when Reuters reported that he said his own intelligence chief was wrong about Iran’s program. Tehran, for its part, has insisted through officials speaking to Reuters that it will not give up enrichment under pressure. That is not a recipe for surrender. It is a recipe for concealment and hardening. Serious policy should focus on intelligence work, restored IAEA access, sustained diplomatic pressure backed by credible penalties, and a clear effort to prevent a regional war that would leave the uranium question even murkier.

The appeal of seizure is obvious. It sounds decisive and final. But nuclear crises rarely yield to cinematic solutions. They are managed through verification, containment, bargaining, and steady pressure, not through fantasies of absolute control. If this idea is truly being weighed in Washington, it should be rejected before rhetoric turns into mission planning. A ground effort to capture uranium inside Iran would not settle the problem. It could widen the war, shatter what diplomacy still exists, and leave the world with the same material, less oversight, and far more bloodshed.

The ongoing U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran has sent oil prices soaring, rattling global financial markets and prompting governments to implement urgent measures to protect their economies and citizens from energy shortages and rising costs. As the war disrupts critical supply routes through the Strait of Hormuz, countries heavily reliant on oil imports are scrambling to stabilize domestic fuel supplies and mitigate inflationary pressures.

South Korea Caps Fuel Prices

In a historic move, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung announced that the government would cap domestic fuel prices for the first time in nearly 30 years. Authorities are also seeking alternative energy sources beyond shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. To support the measure, a 100 trillion won ($67 billion) market-stabilization program may be expanded if necessary, reflecting the severity of the supply shock.

Japan Prepares Strategic Oil Reserves

Japan has instructed a national oil reserve storage facility to prepare for a possible release of crude oil, according to opposition party lawmaker Akira Nagatsuma. While precise details and timing remain unclear, this measure underscores Japan’s reliance on strategic reserves to manage sudden spikes in global energy prices.

Vietnam Removes Fuel Import Tariffs

Vietnam is temporarily eliminating import tariffs on fuels to ensure continued domestic supply amidst global disruptions. The government expects this measure to remain in effect until the end of April, aiming to reduce cost pressures on both businesses and consumers.

Indonesia Boosts Fuel Subsidies and Biodiesel Plans

Indonesia is increasing budget allocations for fuel subsidies, currently totaling 381.3 trillion rupiah ($22.5 billion), to offset rising energy costs and maintain affordable electricity and fuel prices. The government may also revive plans to expand the B50 biodiesel program, blending 50% palm oil-based biodiesel with conventional diesel, as a longer-term strategy to reduce dependency on imported oil.

China Halts Fuel Exports

China has directed refiners to suspend new fuel export contracts and attempt to cancel previously committed shipments. This policy excludes jet fuel for international flights, bonded bunkering, and supplies to Hong Kong or Macau. The move is designed to secure domestic fuel availability amid soaring global prices.

Bangladesh Closes Universities and Rations Fuel

Bangladesh, which depends on imports for 95% of its energy, has implemented emergency measures including university closures and rationing fuel sales to conserve electricity and fuel. Daily fuel sale limits were imposed after panic buying and stockpiling, highlighting the country’s vulnerability to regional energy disruptions.

Analysis: A Coordinated Global Response

These measures illustrate the unprecedented economic ripple effects of the Middle East conflict. Countries with high import dependency are balancing immediate crisis management such as subsidies, price caps, and rationing with longer-term energy strategies, including strategic reserve releases and alternative fuel initiatives.

The rapid policy responses also underscore the fragility of global energy markets in the face of geopolitical conflicts. Central banks and governments must navigate a complex trade-off: containing inflation while ensuring sufficient energy supply to prevent industrial slowdowns and social unrest.

As the conflict persists, global energy markets remain highly volatile, and governments may need to continue adjusting policy tools to stabilize domestic economies, with potential implications for trade, inflation, and energy security worldwide.

With information from Reuters.

Middle Eastern crises seldom stay localized. They frequently go well beyond the battlefield in terms of politics, strategy, and psychology. Officials in Beijing, Moscow, Taipei, and Kyiv will be keeping a tight eye on events surrounding Iran today, in addition to those in Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv. Power perceptions are shaped by situations like this, and in international politics, perception can be almost as important as actual power.

The current state of affairs presents an unsettling question for China and Russia. A large-scale military operation against a prominent regional actor will unavoidably send signals about the balance of power in the international system if it continues without significant opposition from other big states. The Middle East is not where those signals will end. They will visit other geopolitical hotspots, like Taiwan and Ukraine, where credibility is crucial to deterrence.

Iran has progressively evolved into more than simply another diplomatic friend in Beijing’s eyes. It now plays a part in China’s larger Eurasian economic and strategic strategy. Beijing has been building energy and transportation networks that connect western China to the Arabian Sea through projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Chinese planners considering long-term energy security have taken note of the geographical proximity of the Pakistani port of Gwadar to Iran’s Jask Oil Terminal.

Beijing has long sought variety, which these lines provide. Chinese strategists have been concerned about dependence on maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca for decades. The energy lifelines of the second-largest economy in the world could be threatened by any interruption there. Iran fits into China’s attempt to lessen that vulnerability because of its location and resources. Trade in energy has already strengthened ties between the two nations. Iran has quietly emerged as a major supplier of cheap crude to China in spite of U.S. sanctions. Both nations are able to avoid some aspects of the Western financial architecture since many of those transactions go through China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System and are settled in renminbi.

However, the partnership has grown beyond oil. Beijing and Tehran signed a long-term strategic agreement in 2021 with the goal of working together on infrastructure, energy, and technology for decades. Later, China backed Iran’s admission to groups like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Then came a diplomatic surprise: Beijing assisted in mediating the reestablishment of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, a development that surprised many Western observers.

Taken together, these actions indicated a significant development. China was starting to portray itself not only as a regional economic force but also as a diplomatic player with the ability to influence its political environment.

That ambition makes the current moment particularly sensitive for Beijing. Governments in the Middle East and a large portion of the Global South frequently evaluate great powers based on their actions during times of crisis rather than their words during times of peace. Some capitals may discreetly reevaluate how reliable such support would be in an actual security crisis if China seems unwilling to protect the strategic environment surrounding its alliances.

The ramifications go well beyond Iran. Chinese officials have made it clear time and time again that they would not support Taiwan’s formal independence efforts and will not allow outside meddling in the Taiwan Strait. The legitimacy of those warnings is just as important to deterrence as military prowess. Some Washington policymakers may assume that China is unlikely to take more aggressive action in other areas if Beijing’s response to significant geopolitical shocks involving its partners primarily consists of diplomatic criticism.

Russia faces a different—but no less consequential—set of calculations. Moscow has positioned itself as a major Middle Eastern political mediator for the majority of the last ten years through its military engagement in Syria. Russian soldiers established a key base on the Mediterranean coast and assisted in stabilizing Bashar al-Assad’s regime starting in 2015. From such a vantage point, Moscow participated in almost all meaningful discussions regarding the future of the area.

However, that impact has been diminished. The political landscape has drastically changed as a result of the fall of the Syrian government and the growing power of actors supported by the West in Damascus. In addition to losing a strategic ally, Russia has also lost a significant portion of the regional clout it developed over the course of almost 10 years of diplomatic and military engagement.

In that context, Iran now occupies a far more important place in Moscow’s strategic thinking than it once did. Defense and energy cooperation are two areas where the two nations’ relationship has grown. Iranian drones have contributed to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, establishing a clear connection between the conflict in Eastern Europe and events in the Middle East. The message would reverberate much beyond the immediate battlefield if Iran were to sustain a significant military defeat at the hands of a concerted operation by the United States and Israel. While opposing major powers stayed mostly on the sidelines, observers from all around the world would see that Washington still had the capability to change regional dynamics.

These impressions build up in geopolitics. Credibility develops gradually, frequently over years, but it can deteriorate rapidly. Some governments may start to doubt the geopolitical benefit of aligning with Moscow if Russia seems incapable—or unwilling—to react when a close ally is under severe strain. However, competing nations might feel more confident to test Russian interests in other disputed areas, such as the Black Sea or Ukraine. However, Moscow’s choices are far from straightforward. In order to lessen the impact of Western sanctions, Russia has been fostering stronger commercial connections with a number of Gulf governments in recent years. Openly supporting Iran might make those relations more difficult. But staying completely silent runs the danger of conveying a contrary message: that when tensions rise, Russian alliances provide little strategic defense.

It seems unlikely that either China or Russia will move quickly to engage in direct combat. There would be significant risks of escalation. However, great-power competition seldom relies solely on choices made on the battlefield. There are plenty of other ways to be influential. Both nations have permanent seats in the UN Security Council. They can guarantee that any military action is politically disputed on the international scene by imposing debates, contesting legal justifications, and introducing resolutions, even symbolic ones. Beyond the Security Council, diplomacy is also important. Sovereignty and non-intervention have long been valued in nations like South Africa, Brazil, and India. Even if it doesn’t instantly change the situation on the ground, coordinated pressure from a larger group of states could influence how the issue is portrayed worldwide.

Another option is economic levers. The energy markets continue to be extremely vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. Major exporters continue to have the power to affect supply and pricing decisions by working with producers in organizations like OPEC+. Even little changes can serve as a reminder to the globe that regional conflicts have far-reaching economic repercussions. Great powers are also capable of sending quieter signals. Regional balances are not changing in isolation, as seen by intelligence collaboration, defensive technology transfers, and conspicuous naval deployments in nearby waterways. These actions convey that other important actors are keeping a close eye on them even while they avoid open confrontation.

Ultimately, this moment’s significance goes well beyond Iran. Expectations about how power functions in the international system are gradually shaped by incidents such as these. The precedent starts to take hold if armed action consistently reshapes regional orders without significant opposition from opposing nations. That precedent unavoidably affects Taiwan’s future for China. For Russia, it relates to both the larger security balance throughout Europe and the continuing conflict in Ukraine. Credibility is crucial in both situations.

Moments like this become inevitable tests if Beijing and Moscow want to maintain an international system where power is more widely spread. It is not always necessary to escalate conflict in order to respond. It often involves proving that significant changes in regional power will not happen completely unchallenged through diplomacy, economic pressure, and strategic signaling. There is meaning in silence as well. In places far from the Persian Gulf, how Tehran interprets that silence now could influence strategic decisions tomorrow.