USA

South Korea said it remains capable of deterring threats from North Korea even if the United States redeploys some weapons stationed on the Korean peninsula to the Middle East amid the war involving Iran.

The comments by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung come after reports that key U.S. missile defence systems and military assets could be moved from Asia to support operations linked to the Iran conflict.

The potential redeployment has sparked concern among Asian allies that shifting military resources could weaken regional deterrence against China and North Korea at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.

Seoul Says Deterrence Remains Strong

Speaking at a cabinet meeting, Lee acknowledged that reports about the relocation of U.S. military equipment had triggered controversy in South Korea.

He said that while Seoul had expressed opposition to the removal of certain weapons, it could not dictate U.S. military decisions.

However, Lee emphasised that South Korea’s own defence capabilities are strong enough to maintain deterrence against North Korea even if some American systems are temporarily relocated. He noted that South Korea’s defence spending and conventional military strength significantly exceed those of the North.

South Korea hosts about 28,500 U.S. troops as part of the long-standing alliance designed to deter aggression from nuclear-armed North Korea.

Missile Defence Systems May Be Redeployed

Officials have indicated that the U.S. and South Korean militaries are discussing the possible redeployment of Patriot missile defense system batteries to the Middle East.

South Korean media reported that some missile batteries may have already been shipped from Osan Air Base and could be redeployed to U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

There were also reports that parts of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system could be moved from South Korea to the Middle East.

While Patriot systems provide lower-tier defence against shorter-range missiles, THAAD systems are designed to intercept ballistic missiles at high altitude.

United States Forces Korea declined to comment on the possible relocation of equipment, citing operational security.

Analysts Warn of Miscalculation Risks

Military analysts say that although South Korea possesses strong military capabilities, the presence of U.S. forces and weapons in the country serves as a crucial signal of Washington’s commitment to the region.

According to Choi Gi-il, a military studies professor at Sangji University, the removal of some systems could carry strategic risks.

He warned that North Korea might interpret the redeployment as a weakening of allied defences and could attempt limited provocations to test the alliance’s response.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has recently signalled a more aggressive posture, pledging to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal and describing South Korea as its “most hostile enemy.”

Wider Regional Impact

The redeployment of U.S. assets reflects the broader strategic impact of the Iran conflict on global military posture.

Japan, which also hosts major U.S. bases, has seen two U.S. guided-missile destroyers stationed in Yokosuka deployed to the Arabian Sea to support operations linked to the Iran campaign.

The movements have raised concerns in Tokyo as well, with opposition politicians questioning whether U.S. forces stationed in Japan should be used for operations outside the region.

The developments highlight how the conflict in the Middle East is beginning to reshape global military deployments, drawing resources away from Asia and prompting questions about the balance of security commitments across different regions.

With information from Reuters.

When a state’s political leadership announces a ceasefire and its military keeps firing, the instinct is to reach for deception as the explanation. In Iran’s case, the more unsettling answer may be structural. The gap between what Iranian presidents say and what Iranian forces do reflects not a coordinated lie but a command architecture deliberately engineered to operate without central direction. In a serious conflict, the consequences of that architecture would be felt well beyond Iran’s borders.

A Command Architecture Designed to Survive Decapitation

In September 2008, IRGC Commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari oversaw a sweeping restructuring that divided the force into thirty-one provincial corps, each empowered to conduct military operations within its zone without requiring authorization from the center. As Michael Connell of the Center for Naval Analyses noted in his analysis for the United States Institute of Peace, the intent was to strengthen unit cohesion and ensure operational continuity under degraded command conditions. He flagged explicitly that the decentralization could produce unintended escalation dynamics, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

That warning deserves serious attention. The IRGC’s Mosaic Defense doctrine was not designed to make Iran more responsive to political leadership in a crisis. It was designed to ensure that military operations could continue regardless of what happened to that leadership. A force structured that way does not stop firing because a president gives a speech.

The Apology That Wasn’t

The internal contradiction becomes clearest when traced through a hypothetical cascade. A president announces a ceasefire and attributes the directive to an Interim Leadership Council. A fellow council member publicly declares that heavy strikes will continue. A hardline cleric addresses the president directly, calling his position untenable. By the time the president’s original statement is reposted, the ceasefire language has been quietly removed.

The IRGC’s own posture in this scenario resolves the ambiguity on structural grounds. It endorses the president’s language, then appends a caveat that renders it inoperative: all US and Israeli military bases and interests across the region remain primary targets. Since every GCC state hosts American forces, that framing preserves full operational freedom while allowing the presidency to project restraint. The contradiction is not incidental. It is the doctrine functioning as designed.

The Theological Dimension

Iran is not simply a military organization. It is a theocratic state whose constitutional legitimacy flows from velayat-e faqih, the guardianship of the Islamic jurist, which vests supreme authority in a single clerical figure whose religious and political mandates are inseparable. Remove that figure, and the system’s legitimating architecture is suspended rather than transferred. The Assembly of Experts is constitutionally mandated to elect a successor, but wartime conditions would disrupt that process at precisely the moment its resolution matters most.

A RAND Corporation analysis prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense identified the IRGC as the institution best positioned to shape any post-Khamenei transition, with the organizational reach and economic weight to determine outcomes that civilian institutions cannot contest. The result, in a decapitation scenario, is a theocratic state operating without its theological anchor and a military operating under pre-delegated authority with no one capable of recalling it.

Durability Without Effect

The Mosaic Defense doctrine would prove, above all, durable. A decentralized force can survive catastrophic leadership losses and sustain operations. But durability is not the same as capability, and sustained fire is not the same as strategic effect.

Iran’s theory of regional attrition, the calculation that sustained strikes against Gulf infrastructure and American basing would fracture GCC cohesion and coerce Arab neighbors toward neutrality, has produced no evidence of working. The GCC bloc has held. Individual member states have coordinated their responses rather than fractured under pressure. The country absorbing the sharpest volume of Iranian strike activity, the UAE, has demonstrated air defense performance that has exceeded even optimistic prewar assessments. Publicly available figures suggest UAE systems have defeated upward of ninety percent of inbound threats, a result that reflects years of sustained investment, deep integration with American and Israeli platforms, and an operational tempo that has stress-tested those systems at genuine scale.

The picture that emerges is not one of Iran winning a war of attrition. It is one of an Iran burning through accessible inventory, losing launch infrastructure faster than it can regenerate, and discovering that the regional architecture it spent years attempting to destabilize has proven considerably more resilient than it calculated.

That resilience carries its own strategic meaning. A weakened force operating under pre-delegated authority, without a supreme leader to set limits, remains dangerous in a narrow tactical sense. But it is operating without a coherent end state, and the environment it faces is not the one it anticipated. The GCC’s collective posture and the demonstrated effectiveness of layered air defense across the Gulf have closed off the strategic outcomes Iran’s doctrine was written to achieve.

The scenario is instructive for what it reveals about the limits of decentralized military design. A force built to keep firing regardless of political direction is also a force that cannot be steered toward an exit. But the Gulf states have demonstrated something of equal importance in response: that resilience, properly built and consistently resourced, can outlast a doctrine designed for chaos, and that the regional order Iran sought to unravel has shown itself capable of absorbing the blow.

Modern wars are fought not only with weapons but with assumptions—and the most dangerous assumptions are often invisible to those making them. Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between known unknowns (questions we recognize but cannot answer) and unknown unknowns (risks we have not even framed as questions) captures something essential about the current confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran.

The Nuclear Material Problem

The June 2025 12-day war struck several of Iran’s nuclear facilities but left the most consequential question unanswered: where is the material? The March 2026 campaign has struck deeper, targeting hardened and dispersed sites that June’s operations left intact. Yet the fundamental uncertainty has not resolved—it has compounded. Iran reportedly retains roughly 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, approaching weapons-grade, and the precise location of that stockpile is now more opaque than before. On March 2, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported the entrance buildings of Iran’s underground Natanz enrichment plant had been bombed, but without inspection access, the agency cannot reconstruct a monitoring baseline.

The strategic paradox is acute. Any Iranian government—this one or a successor—must now confront a nuclear-armed Israel and a United States willing to strike Iranian territory twice in nine months. Under those conditions, nuclear capability looks less like a provocation and more like a rational insurance policy. The war may have permanently entrenched the very incentive it was designed to dismantle. A further risk of escaping conventional arms-control frameworks is if Iranian institutions fragment, specialized nuclear expertise disperses internationally, potentially becoming available to states or non-state actors.

Regime Change and What Follows

The war’s stated objective rests on uncertain ground. Intelligence assessments before the conflict reportedly concluded that even a large-scale assault was unlikely to produce regime collapse—yet the campaign proceeded anyway. The Iranian state has shown remarkable institutional resilience, with no visible defections among senior leadership, a government operating under its constitutional framework, and a regime that has absorbed the Iran-Iraq War, the Green Movement, and decades of sanctions.

War has accelerated the succession question around Ali Khamenei. One trajectory involves Mojtaba Khamenei, whose rise would mean dynastic continuity rather than transformation; another sees the IRGC consolidating power—equally misaligned with Western hopes. The question of what comes after was not answered before the bombs fell.

Retaliation, Major-Power Shadows, and Strategic Incoherence

Iran’s retaliation has demonstrated its asymmetric reach. The IRGC claims attacks on at least 27 bases hosting American troops across the region, alongside Israeli military facilities. Tehran appears to be pacing its response, sustaining an attrition campaign designed to exhaust interceptor stocks rather than overwhelm them in a single strike.

The major power dimensions compound this. Russia has reportedly been providing intelligence on American naval deployments; Chinese-linked entities have allegedly tracked US forces via satellite. Meanwhile, strategic incoherence in Washington compounds every other risk. Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have framed this as a limited campaign against nuclear infrastructure; Trump has simultaneously floated regime change on social media.

The Munitions Race

The deepest structural vulnerability may not lie on the battlefield but in the arithmetic of an industrial system never designed to fight this kind of war. The first 36 hours consumed more than 3,000 precision-guided munitions and interceptors. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Dan Caine had warned that stockpiles were already significantly depleted before the first strike. Secretary Marco Rubio subsequently acknowledged that Iran produces an estimated 100 missiles a month versus roughly six or seven high-end interceptors that American industry can manufacture in the same period.

That deficit has a history. The US likely expended 100 to 150 THAAD interceptors and 80 SM-3s supporting Israel during June’s Twelve-Day War. Those stocks were never fully replenished. The bottlenecks are physical as well as financial. Lockheed Martin’s plan to raise PAC-3 MSE production to 2,000 units per year addresses a six-to-seven-year horizon, not the current emergency.

The drone dimension adds a layer officials have been slow to acknowledge. Hegseth and Caine admitted in a closed-door briefing that Iran’s Shahed drones present a challenge US air defenses cannot fully meet. The Shahed flies low and slow—hard to detect and poorly matched to the high-end interceptors THAAD and SM-3 are optimized to defeat. Intercepting a drone can cost roughly five times what it costs to manufacture one.

This crystallizes the war’s most consequential known unknown: how much of Iran’s arsenal reflects genuine capability, and how much reflects deliberate restraint? The IDF assessed Iran possessed roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles on February 11.

The search for emergency solutions has produced one remarkable geopolitical inversion. The Pentagon has approached Ukraine about purchasing drone interceptors. They are low-cost systems Ukrainian manufacturers developed specifically to hunt Shaheds, built from years of adapting to exactly the threat now confounding American air defenses in the Gulf. The US is buying drone killers from a country it recently all but abandoned! The implications extend to the Indo-Pacific. Every interceptor fired over the Gulf of Bahrain is one fewer available in the Taiwan Strait.

The Energy Shock

The Strait of Hormuz has moved from a textbook chokepoint to a live emergency. Tanker traffic has come to a near standstill. War-risk insurance premiums have made commercial passage unviable even where it remains physically possible. At least five tankers have been struck across the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and nearby waters. Approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day—a fifth of global consumption—normally transit the strait, alongside roughly 20% of global LNG trade. Traders are warning that oil prices could surge past $100 a barrel if the conflict in Iran continues to escalate. Goldman Sachs Research estimates that a full one-month closure would add $15 per barrel, assuming no compensating measures like spare pipeline utilization or releases from strategic petroleum reserves. Bank of America sees tail risk far higher, estimating a prolonged shutdown could add $40–$80 per barrel above current prices.

The LNG dimension may prove more immediately damaging than oil. QatarEnergy has halted production at Ras Laffan, the world’s largest LNG facility, after Iranian drone attacks. This has already caused European natural gas futures to spike. If global LNG tightens, Europe must compete with Asian buyers on price. That competition may, in turn, force Europe back toward Russian gas, quietly reversing one of the most consequential geopolitical achievements of the post-Ukraine sanctions era.

The exposure is global and unevenly distributed. China, India, Japan, and South Korea account for roughly 75% of Hormuz crude exports and 59% of its LNG flows. South Korea has warned it could exhaust LNG reserves within nine days and has announced a 100 trillion won stabilization fund. India is pivoting toward Russian crude. These developments structurally benefit Moscow regardless of the war’s outcome.

The fertilizer dimension compounds the energy shock with a slower fuse. Nitrogen fertilizers are manufactured from natural gas; roughly a third of globally traded urea transits Hormuz. QatarEnergy’s halt removes fertilizer output simultaneously with LNG. Urea prices have already surged $60 to $80 per ton at New Orleans, with the spring planting window closing. The food-price consequences will not appear in grocery stores for months. But they are already locked in.

The Gulf Security Paradox

For decades the Gulf states managed their rivalry with Iran below the threshold of open confrontation, relying on the American security umbrella while avoiding direct entanglement. The war has collapsed that strategy. The Gulf states did not arrive at this crisis as Iran’s adversaries but rather as reluctant bystanders who had invested enormous diplomatic capital in preventing it. They gave ironclad assurances to Tehran, both before the war and up to its eve, that their territories would not serve as launchpads. That Iran responded by striking these same neighbors is a strategic miscalculation of historic proportions and a moral failure that may poison relations for a generation.

This has opened a structural debate now conducted in public. Is American military presence a protective shield or a magnet for retaliation? Citizens and analysts are asking why Gulf states should bear the risk of hosting US forces when Washington appears unable to protect them. Undoubtedly, Tehran understands this dynamic. Drone strikes on UAE-based data centers targeted Gulf publics’ confidence in the connectivity model as much as American commercial interests. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have staked their post-oil futures on projecting stability and attracting mobile capital. Intercepting most of the incoming fire is not sufficient when global firms are deciding where to invest next decade.

The crisis confronts the Gulf Cooperation Council with a strategic fork. One path leads toward deeper collective security, featuring integrated missile defense, expanded intelligence sharing, and coordinated maritime protection that could reduce dependence on any single external patron. The other leads toward renewed fragmentation as internal rivalries re-emerge.

Former Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani warned that the Gulf “must not be dragged into a direct confrontation with Iran,” arguing that such a clash would “deplete the resources of both sides and provide an opportunity for outside forces to control us under the pretext of helping us escape the crisis.” Yet the same crisis that could finally catalyze genuine Gulf collective security could just as easily deepen the divisions that have historically prevented it.

The Mediator’s Dilemma and the Meta-Unknown

The conflict has also damaged the diplomatic architecture that previously helped manage US-Iran tensions. Oman and Qatar built genuine credibility as intermediaries through years of patient back-channel work. Effective mediation requires neutrality. When conflict spreads into the territory of potential mediators, that credibility erodes. Iran’s decision to strike the very states whose neutrality made diplomacy possible may have burned the bridges needed to end the war—which is perhaps the most consequential unknown unknown in the entire conflict, second only to the US twice striking Iran in the span of nine months while negotiations were still ongoing.

At the deepest level lies a question no intelligence assessment can answer: whether the strategic logic of the war is coherent at all. Negotiations failed because each side demanded outcomes the other could not accept. The same incompatibility that made diplomacy impossible may make military victory equally elusive. Iran cannot surrender unconditionally without ceasing to be the Islamic Republic. And the conditions that make nuclear deterrence attractive to any Iranian government—this one or a successor—have not been removed by the strikes; they have been reinforced.

Conclusion

In sum, the US-Israeli campaign against Iran has illuminated the limits of military certainty. Known unknowns—munition shortages, asymmetric retaliation, and energy vulnerabilities—interact with unknown unknowns—nuclear dispersal, regime succession, and Gulf fragmentation—to create a conflict whose trajectory is inherently unpredictable. Rather than eliminating threats, the strikes may have entrenched incentives for nuclear retention, incentivized strategic caution, and stressed regional and global systems. The coherence of the war itself is in question, as military action and diplomacy pull in contradictory directions. Ultimately, the conflict underscores that modern warfare is as much about managing uncertainties as it is about destroying targets.

The reported idea of a special operation to seize Iran’s uranium should alarm anyone who still thinks there is a line between pressure and recklessness. Sending foreign forces into Iranian territory to capture nuclear material would be far beyond coercion. It would be war in plain sight. That risk looks even sharper when it is paired with talk of unconditional surrender and a revived maximum pressure campaign. Officials call that flexibility. In practice, it often creates confusion and a dangerous illusion of control.

Strategic Ambiguity Has Limits

Trump has long preferred threat inflation as a negotiating tool, and his administration’s National Security Presidential Memorandum on Iran makes clear that Washington wants to deny Tehran every path to a bomb. But there is a difference between pressure meant to shape diplomacy and rhetoric that drifts toward occupation logic. A raid assumes the United States can enter a sovereign state, take possession of fissile material, and leave without igniting a larger conflict. That is not strategy. It is a gamble.

A Raid Would Not Stay Small

Iran is not an isolated militia camp. It is a large state with layered security organs, missile capacity, regional partners, and a long memory of external intervention. Any attempt to seize uranium by force would expose American troops, bases, shipping lanes, diplomats, and partners to retaliation across several fronts. Even before talk of a raid, Washington and Tehran had been engaged in indirect nuclear talks in Oman. Replacing diplomacy with a ground mission would not create leverage. It would destroy what remains of a controlled bargaining space.

The Nuclear Picture Is Already Murky

The hardest fact in this debate is that the nuclear picture is already uncertain. In its February 2026 safeguards report, the IAEA said it could not verify the current status of facilities hit in June 2025. Reuters later highlighted that same report’s estimate that Iran had 440.9 kilograms enriched up to 60 percent before the strikes, while the Associated Press noted the wider stockpile had reached 9,874.9 kilograms of enriched uranium in total. Reuters also reported a cat-and-mouse hunt for missing material and confirmed that tunnel entrances at Isfahan were hit. Those facts do not make a commando operation look cleaner. They make it look less knowable.

Force Has Already Damaged Oversight

This is the contradiction hawks avoid. Military action may damage buildings, but it can also damage the inspection system needed to track what survives. The IAEA chief said that returning to Iranian sites was the top priority after the attacks because the agency had lost visibility. Reuters warned even before the war that any new Iran deal would have to address serious watchdog blind spots. Rafael Grossi had already reminded the Security Council that nuclear facilities must never be attacked and later stressed that inspectors must be allowed to do their job. Once oversight is broken, claims about perfect control become less credible.

Pressure Without Diplomacy Can Harden Iran

Advocates of seizure argue that urgency changes the rules. Their point is easy to grasp. If material has been moved, hidden, or split across sites, then delay is dangerous. But urgency cuts both ways. The less certainty there is, the more any raid grows in scope. A supposedly limited mission can quickly expand into repeated searches, broader strikes, and pressure for a longer presence. That trajectory sits uneasily with both the basic ban on the use of force in the UN Charter and the logic of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which depends on verification and compliance, not theatrical confiscation. Reuters has also shown that the damage from earlier strikes was difficult to measure and that U.S. officials later said there was no known intelligence that Iran had moved the uranium. That uncertainty is exactly why fantasies of a clean raid should be treated with suspicion.

Containment Is Less Dramatic, but Safer

There is another reason to reject this path. Public overstatement can create policy traps. Trump has already brushed aside internal caution, including when Reuters reported that he said his own intelligence chief was wrong about Iran’s program. Tehran, for its part, has insisted through officials speaking to Reuters that it will not give up enrichment under pressure. That is not a recipe for surrender. It is a recipe for concealment and hardening. Serious policy should focus on intelligence work, restored IAEA access, sustained diplomatic pressure backed by credible penalties, and a clear effort to prevent a regional war that would leave the uranium question even murkier.

The appeal of seizure is obvious. It sounds decisive and final. But nuclear crises rarely yield to cinematic solutions. They are managed through verification, containment, bargaining, and steady pressure, not through fantasies of absolute control. If this idea is truly being weighed in Washington, it should be rejected before rhetoric turns into mission planning. A ground effort to capture uranium inside Iran would not settle the problem. It could widen the war, shatter what diplomacy still exists, and leave the world with the same material, less oversight, and far more bloodshed.

The ongoing U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran has sent oil prices soaring, rattling global financial markets and prompting governments to implement urgent measures to protect their economies and citizens from energy shortages and rising costs. As the war disrupts critical supply routes through the Strait of Hormuz, countries heavily reliant on oil imports are scrambling to stabilize domestic fuel supplies and mitigate inflationary pressures.

South Korea Caps Fuel Prices

In a historic move, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung announced that the government would cap domestic fuel prices for the first time in nearly 30 years. Authorities are also seeking alternative energy sources beyond shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. To support the measure, a 100 trillion won ($67 billion) market-stabilization program may be expanded if necessary, reflecting the severity of the supply shock.

Japan Prepares Strategic Oil Reserves

Japan has instructed a national oil reserve storage facility to prepare for a possible release of crude oil, according to opposition party lawmaker Akira Nagatsuma. While precise details and timing remain unclear, this measure underscores Japan’s reliance on strategic reserves to manage sudden spikes in global energy prices.

Vietnam Removes Fuel Import Tariffs

Vietnam is temporarily eliminating import tariffs on fuels to ensure continued domestic supply amidst global disruptions. The government expects this measure to remain in effect until the end of April, aiming to reduce cost pressures on both businesses and consumers.

Indonesia Boosts Fuel Subsidies and Biodiesel Plans

Indonesia is increasing budget allocations for fuel subsidies, currently totaling 381.3 trillion rupiah ($22.5 billion), to offset rising energy costs and maintain affordable electricity and fuel prices. The government may also revive plans to expand the B50 biodiesel program, blending 50% palm oil-based biodiesel with conventional diesel, as a longer-term strategy to reduce dependency on imported oil.

China Halts Fuel Exports

China has directed refiners to suspend new fuel export contracts and attempt to cancel previously committed shipments. This policy excludes jet fuel for international flights, bonded bunkering, and supplies to Hong Kong or Macau. The move is designed to secure domestic fuel availability amid soaring global prices.

Bangladesh Closes Universities and Rations Fuel

Bangladesh, which depends on imports for 95% of its energy, has implemented emergency measures including university closures and rationing fuel sales to conserve electricity and fuel. Daily fuel sale limits were imposed after panic buying and stockpiling, highlighting the country’s vulnerability to regional energy disruptions.

Analysis: A Coordinated Global Response

These measures illustrate the unprecedented economic ripple effects of the Middle East conflict. Countries with high import dependency are balancing immediate crisis management such as subsidies, price caps, and rationing with longer-term energy strategies, including strategic reserve releases and alternative fuel initiatives.

The rapid policy responses also underscore the fragility of global energy markets in the face of geopolitical conflicts. Central banks and governments must navigate a complex trade-off: containing inflation while ensuring sufficient energy supply to prevent industrial slowdowns and social unrest.

As the conflict persists, global energy markets remain highly volatile, and governments may need to continue adjusting policy tools to stabilize domestic economies, with potential implications for trade, inflation, and energy security worldwide.

With information from Reuters.

Middle Eastern crises seldom stay localized. They frequently go well beyond the battlefield in terms of politics, strategy, and psychology. Officials in Beijing, Moscow, Taipei, and Kyiv will be keeping a tight eye on events surrounding Iran today, in addition to those in Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv. Power perceptions are shaped by situations like this, and in international politics, perception can be almost as important as actual power.

The current state of affairs presents an unsettling question for China and Russia. A large-scale military operation against a prominent regional actor will unavoidably send signals about the balance of power in the international system if it continues without significant opposition from other big states. The Middle East is not where those signals will end. They will visit other geopolitical hotspots, like Taiwan and Ukraine, where credibility is crucial to deterrence.

Iran has progressively evolved into more than simply another diplomatic friend in Beijing’s eyes. It now plays a part in China’s larger Eurasian economic and strategic strategy. Beijing has been building energy and transportation networks that connect western China to the Arabian Sea through projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Chinese planners considering long-term energy security have taken note of the geographical proximity of the Pakistani port of Gwadar to Iran’s Jask Oil Terminal.

Beijing has long sought variety, which these lines provide. Chinese strategists have been concerned about dependence on maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca for decades. The energy lifelines of the second-largest economy in the world could be threatened by any interruption there. Iran fits into China’s attempt to lessen that vulnerability because of its location and resources. Trade in energy has already strengthened ties between the two nations. Iran has quietly emerged as a major supplier of cheap crude to China in spite of U.S. sanctions. Both nations are able to avoid some aspects of the Western financial architecture since many of those transactions go through China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System and are settled in renminbi.

However, the partnership has grown beyond oil. Beijing and Tehran signed a long-term strategic agreement in 2021 with the goal of working together on infrastructure, energy, and technology for decades. Later, China backed Iran’s admission to groups like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Then came a diplomatic surprise: Beijing assisted in mediating the reestablishment of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, a development that surprised many Western observers.

Taken together, these actions indicated a significant development. China was starting to portray itself not only as a regional economic force but also as a diplomatic player with the ability to influence its political environment.

That ambition makes the current moment particularly sensitive for Beijing. Governments in the Middle East and a large portion of the Global South frequently evaluate great powers based on their actions during times of crisis rather than their words during times of peace. Some capitals may discreetly reevaluate how reliable such support would be in an actual security crisis if China seems unwilling to protect the strategic environment surrounding its alliances.

The ramifications go well beyond Iran. Chinese officials have made it clear time and time again that they would not support Taiwan’s formal independence efforts and will not allow outside meddling in the Taiwan Strait. The legitimacy of those warnings is just as important to deterrence as military prowess. Some Washington policymakers may assume that China is unlikely to take more aggressive action in other areas if Beijing’s response to significant geopolitical shocks involving its partners primarily consists of diplomatic criticism.

Russia faces a different—but no less consequential—set of calculations. Moscow has positioned itself as a major Middle Eastern political mediator for the majority of the last ten years through its military engagement in Syria. Russian soldiers established a key base on the Mediterranean coast and assisted in stabilizing Bashar al-Assad’s regime starting in 2015. From such a vantage point, Moscow participated in almost all meaningful discussions regarding the future of the area.

However, that impact has been diminished. The political landscape has drastically changed as a result of the fall of the Syrian government and the growing power of actors supported by the West in Damascus. In addition to losing a strategic ally, Russia has also lost a significant portion of the regional clout it developed over the course of almost 10 years of diplomatic and military engagement.

In that context, Iran now occupies a far more important place in Moscow’s strategic thinking than it once did. Defense and energy cooperation are two areas where the two nations’ relationship has grown. Iranian drones have contributed to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, establishing a clear connection between the conflict in Eastern Europe and events in the Middle East. The message would reverberate much beyond the immediate battlefield if Iran were to sustain a significant military defeat at the hands of a concerted operation by the United States and Israel. While opposing major powers stayed mostly on the sidelines, observers from all around the world would see that Washington still had the capability to change regional dynamics.

These impressions build up in geopolitics. Credibility develops gradually, frequently over years, but it can deteriorate rapidly. Some governments may start to doubt the geopolitical benefit of aligning with Moscow if Russia seems incapable—or unwilling—to react when a close ally is under severe strain. However, competing nations might feel more confident to test Russian interests in other disputed areas, such as the Black Sea or Ukraine. However, Moscow’s choices are far from straightforward. In order to lessen the impact of Western sanctions, Russia has been fostering stronger commercial connections with a number of Gulf governments in recent years. Openly supporting Iran might make those relations more difficult. But staying completely silent runs the danger of conveying a contrary message: that when tensions rise, Russian alliances provide little strategic defense.

It seems unlikely that either China or Russia will move quickly to engage in direct combat. There would be significant risks of escalation. However, great-power competition seldom relies solely on choices made on the battlefield. There are plenty of other ways to be influential. Both nations have permanent seats in the UN Security Council. They can guarantee that any military action is politically disputed on the international scene by imposing debates, contesting legal justifications, and introducing resolutions, even symbolic ones. Beyond the Security Council, diplomacy is also important. Sovereignty and non-intervention have long been valued in nations like South Africa, Brazil, and India. Even if it doesn’t instantly change the situation on the ground, coordinated pressure from a larger group of states could influence how the issue is portrayed worldwide.

Another option is economic levers. The energy markets continue to be extremely vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. Major exporters continue to have the power to affect supply and pricing decisions by working with producers in organizations like OPEC+. Even little changes can serve as a reminder to the globe that regional conflicts have far-reaching economic repercussions. Great powers are also capable of sending quieter signals. Regional balances are not changing in isolation, as seen by intelligence collaboration, defensive technology transfers, and conspicuous naval deployments in nearby waterways. These actions convey that other important actors are keeping a close eye on them even while they avoid open confrontation.

Ultimately, this moment’s significance goes well beyond Iran. Expectations about how power functions in the international system are gradually shaped by incidents such as these. The precedent starts to take hold if armed action consistently reshapes regional orders without significant opposition from opposing nations. That precedent unavoidably affects Taiwan’s future for China. For Russia, it relates to both the larger security balance throughout Europe and the continuing conflict in Ukraine. Credibility is crucial in both situations.

Moments like this become inevitable tests if Beijing and Moscow want to maintain an international system where power is more widely spread. It is not always necessary to escalate conflict in order to respond. It often involves proving that significant changes in regional power will not happen completely unchallenged through diplomacy, economic pressure, and strategic signaling. There is meaning in silence as well. In places far from the Persian Gulf, how Tehran interprets that silence now could influence strategic decisions tomorrow.

Wizz Air has announced that it’s received approval to operate flights between the UK and USA with its first flights set to take off in the summer in time for the World Cup

Budget airline Wizz Air has confirmed it now has “regulatory approval” to operate flights to the United States. The airline, who currently offer routes from the UK to destinations such as Poland, Turkey, Italy, and Romania, will offer the flights for football fans visiting the USA for the 2026 World Cup.

The airline confirmed it will now offer tailored charter flights to groups from teams to supporters and tour operators who are organising group travel to the USA. It confirmed that charter enquiries for summer travel are now open.

However, the airline also clarified that it has “no intention or plans to launch regular commercial flights to the US” but that “the new authorization represents a significant achievement and reflects months of preparation, regulatory coordination, and operational planning.”

So, while individuals won’t be able to book onto scheduled services, those who are travelling with large groups, organising a tour, or travellers looking for a private travel experience will be able to charter a transatlantic flight with Wizz Air.

Yvonne Moynihan, Managing Director of Wizz Air UK, said in a statement: “This is a proud and exciting day for everyone at our airline,” said . “Receiving approval to operate between the UK and the United States is a huge milestone for our company. It opens the door to incredible opportunities, particularly for European football teams and supporters travelling across the Atlantic this summer.

“We are ready to deliver exceptional charter experiences and bring fans closer to the action in the United States.”

England’s first fixture is set for June 17 at Dallas Stadium in Arlington, meaning many football fans are likely to descend on the Texas city to watch the big game. Its other group games are England vs Ghana, set for June 23 in Boston, and Panama vs England on June 27 in New York.

Scotland’s World Cup fixtures are set for June 14 when they take on Haiti in Boston, followed by another match in the city against Morocco on June 19. The team will then head to Miami for Scotland vs Brazil on June 24.

Wales and Northern Ireland are yet to secure their places in the World Cup as both teams are still in the qualifying stages. In addition to fixtures across the USA, some matches will also be held in Canada and Mexico who are joint hosts.

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However, seeing the matches in person is likely to be an expensive undertaking. Tickets for group stage games range from $100 to $575 (about £75 to £431), although FIFA has announced a very limited number of £45 tickets to each game. A seat at the July 19 final, which will take place in New Jersey, will be especially costly. Tickets bought at face value range from $2,030 to $6,370, about £1,500 to £4,800, with resellers no doubt charging even more.

Have a story you want to share? Email us at webtravel@reachplc.com

President Donald Trump has repeatedly touted the U.S. economy as “roaring” and declared inflation “defeated” since returning to office in January 2025. In his recent State of the Union address, he called it “the golden age of America,” claiming unprecedented economic prosperity.

However, a new Reuters/Ipsos poll suggests that most Americans across party lines do not share that view. The poll, conducted online with 4,638 adults and a two-point margin of error, finds that 68% of respondents disagree with the statement that “the U.S. economy is booming.” Even among Republicans, who form Trump’s political base, opinion is sharply divided: 56% agree the economy is booming, while 43% disagree.

Cost of Living Remains Top Concern

Americans interviewed cited rising costs as their primary worry. In Tennessee, manufacturing worker Marcus Tripp said: “Even as a two-income household, we are struggling… I am worried more about how much my rent and everything is going up than I am about whether the guy down the street has citizenship documents or not.”

Poll respondents overwhelmingly rejected Trump’s claim that inflation has been defeated. Only 16% agreed with the statement that “there is hardly any inflation in the U.S.,” while 82% of independents and 72% of Republicans disagreed. Democrats were even more skeptical, with a strong majority rejecting the notion of a booming economy.

Awareness of Trump’s Economic Policies

The poll also revealed limited public knowledge of Trump’s specific proposals:

• 44% had never heard of the plan to restrict large investors from buying single-family homes.
• 48% were unaware of the proposed cap on credit card interest rates at 10%.
• By contrast, 78% were aware of tariff increases on imported goods, with many expecting the tariffs to raise the cost of living 54% overall, including 69% of Democrats and 42% of Republicans.

Some voters expressed frustration that policies emphasizing tariffs may not address the issues they feel most acutely. Independent voter Tiffany Ritchie of Corpus Christi said, “We’re not going to tariff our way out of this.”

Political Implications Ahead of Midterms

The poll’s results are a warning for Trump and the Republican Party as they head into the November 3 midterms, defending majorities in both the House and Senate. Cost-of-living concerns are emerging as a decisive factor for voters, potentially outweighing immigration and other campaign issues that Trump has emphasized.

Primaries are already underway in states such as Texas, North Carolina, and Arkansas, with both parties beginning to select candidates for the midterms. Economists predict modest growth this year, but few expect the kind of “booming” economy Trump describes.

Analysis

From my perspective, the poll highlights a growing disconnect between Trump’s rhetoric and the lived experience of many Americans. While the administration touts economic successes, households are still struggling with rising rents, groceries, and energy costs.

The division among Republicans is also notable. While Trump’s base remains partially supportive of his economic claims, nearly half of the party’s voters see little evidence of a boom. This split could weaken the Republican message in key battleground districts, especially where cost-of-living pressures are most acute.

Moreover, the limited public awareness of some Trump policies suggests that policy communication is lagging. Tariffs are well-known, but policies targeting housing and credit remain obscure, potentially limiting their political impact.

In short, while Trump frames the U.S. economy as a “golden age,” the reality for many voters is very different. Rising living costs, skepticism among independents, and division within his own party suggest that economic messaging alone may not be enough to secure midterm victories.

With information from Reuters.

In a recent move, China’s top general and a longtime confidant of President Xi Jinping, Zhang Youxia, and Joint Staff chief Liu Zhenli were removed from the Central Military Commission (CMC). An editorial published in Liberation Army Daily described both men as “seriously betraying the trust and expectations” of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the CMC.

Beyond corruption allegations, Zhang was reportedly accused of leaking core technical data on China’s nuclear weapons programme to the United States. In the aftermath, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a Mandarin language recruitment video targeting disaffected Chinese soldiers. Titled “The Reason for Stepping Forward To Save the Future,” portrays a disillusioned midlevel officer choosing to contact American intelligence. The outreach appears aimed at deepening internal doubts and positioning itself as an alternative confidant for officers who may feel exposed. However, this is not the first time the agency has sought to infiltrate the country.

A History of Intelligence Operations and Resets

Intelligence rivalry stretches back to the late 1940s, when the CIA tried to monitor the Soviet nuclear programme by placing listening devices within China and along its Soviet border. Surveillance also extended to the Xinjiang region, tracking uranium, gold, petroleum, and Soviet aid to the CPC during its war with the US backed Guomindang for regional control. Despite these efforts, the intelligence gathered remained minimal at best, from October 1950 to July 1953 the agency also failed to achieve its primary objective of diverting significant resources away from China’s military campaign in Korea.

As Cold War rivalries hardened, the CIA launched Operation Circus in the late 1950s to support Tibetan rebels against the CPC. The CIA supplied guerrilla groups, including the most active Chushi Gangdruk group, with arms and ammunition and trained fighters at Camp Hale. Allen Dulles, then CIA deputy director, saw the effort as an opportunity to destabilize the CPC and counter Communist influence across Asia. The group continued its operations from Nepal until 1974, when funding ended after US-China rapprochement.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the CIA cooperated with Chinese intelligence under Project Chestnut, establishing listening posts in the northwest to monitor Soviet communications. In 1989, as the Tiananmen Square protests rocked the CPC, the CIA provided communications equipment, including fax machines and typewriters to protestors. It also assisted in the escape of protest leaders with the help of sympathizers in Hong Kong under Operation Yellow Bird. Relations deteriorated in 2001, when an aircraft built in the US for General Secretary Jiang Zemin was found to contain at least 27 listening devices, including one embedded in the headboard of a bed, operable via satellite.

However, these gains proved fragile as major setbacks soon followed, with reports that between 2010 and 2012 Chinese authorities dismantled a large CIA network. In total, between 18 and 20 sources were killed or imprisoned, according to two former senior American officials. One asset was reportedly shot in front of colleagues in the courtyard of a government building as a warning to others suspected of working with the CIA.

Espionage in the Xi Jinping Era

Estimates in 2024 suggested the Ministry of State Security (MSS) employed as many as 800,000 personnel, compared with roughly 480,000 at the height of the KGB. After taking power in 2012, Xi further consolidated control over its security apparatus, chairing a high level national security task force.

His approach also followed revelations that an American informant network had infiltrated the MSS. An executive assistant to MSS Vice Minister Lu Zhongwei was discovered in 2012 to have passed sensitive information to the CIA. The ministry was also influenced by former security chief Zhou Yongkang, who was charged with abuse of power and intentionally leaking state secrets in 2014. He was subsequently expelled from the politburo in one of the most consequential purges in the country’s history.

In light of these developments, Xi’s “comprehensive state security concept,” promulgated in 2014, linked internal and external threats and underscored the dangers of destabilization through foreign subversion and infiltration. He also enacted the 2014 Counter Espionage Law, revised in 2023 to broaden espionage definitions, coinciding with detentions of foreign firm employees and tighter data controls.

Under his leadership, another major initiative allowed the MSS to establish direct public contact in 2015 through a hotline and website urging citizens to report threats to national security. In 2017, MSS offered rewards of up to 500,000 RMB for reporting suspected threats. In the same year, counterintelligence services also launched a broad awareness campaign through websites, animations, and television dramas promoting this “special work,” often targeting journalists, academics, and Chinese American and Taiwanese businesspeople.

Chinese courts have also imposed severe punishments in such cases. In April 2025, a former employee of a military research institute was sentenced to life imprisonment for selling secret documents to foreign intelligence agencies. The ruling followed the sentencing of a former engineer to death in March on similar charges.

China also deploys operatives abroad to curb criticism and preserve regime stability. Overseas police stations reportedly directed by provincial MSS offices combine administrative services with intelligence functions. One established in New York by the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau drew headlines in 2023. In fact, the earliest cyber incidents targeting UK government systems in the early 2000s originated not from Russia but from China, and were aimed at gathering information on overseas dissident communities, including Tibetan and Uighur groups.

New Intelligence Order Enters a Decisive Era

As China’s influence grew in the 2000s, Western policymakers were focused on the war on terror and interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, political leaders often preferred that intelligence chiefs avoid publicly naming China. Businesses faced mounting pressure to prioritize access to its vast market, while remaining reluctant to acknowledge that their proprietary information was being targeted.

In 2021, the FBI reported opening a new Chinese espionage case roughly every 12 hours, most involving cyber disruption. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of Justice, and other US bodies repeatedly identified MSS affiliated actors in advisories and indictments. Analysts assess MSS linked groups have surpassed PLA associated actors in both the sophistication and scope of their hacking campaigns. In 2024, authorities announced that Salt Typhoon had breached major US telecommunications companies in one of the most damaging publicly reported cyber campaigns. The National Security Agency (NSA) also noted that China’s reliance on indigenous technology makes its networks harder to track.

Former CIA director William J. Burns, under the Biden administration described these intelligence shortcomings as a “pacing challenge.” The administration created a China Mission Centre and a technology intelligence centre to address it. An executive order was also issued in 2024, prohibiting funding for Chinese semiconductors, microelectronics, quantum computing, and certain AI applications in sectors that are considered capable of enhancing military capabilities.

When the Trump administration returned in 2025, it triggered significant disruptions across the US government. In early May 2025, plans were announced to cut 1,200  positions at CIA and 2,000 at the NSA, with similar reductions reportedly planned for other intelligence bodies as well. Such cuts were expected to disrupt operations and deter long term asset relationships. The “Signalgate scandal” further revealed that senior national security officials had shared classified information in an unsecured Signal group chat. These avoidable lapses posed a serious threat to operational security and heightened the risks faced by intelligence assets worldwide.

As China pursues its vision of a unipolar world while escalating espionage and global security threats, international attention on its actions has intensified. Trump’s planned visit to China in April 2026 will be closely watched to assess whether the recruitment videos are part of a broader strategy targeting Xi’s establishment or merely a pressure tactic.

Introduction

The Arctic has long been known as “high North, low tension”, as its frozen waters and permafrost landscape offered no incentives to the states. However, due to global warming, it is changing. The rate of warming in the Arctic region is four times faster than the globe, resulting in massive ice loss. This anthropogenic anomaly has made the Arctic a region of geopolitical significance.

The Strategic Importance

The strategic importance of any region primarily depends on two factors: The first is Geographical position; which not only emboldens its importance as a trade passage but also defines its fruitfulness as a strategic location in both peace and war. The second; its Resources which offer economic benefits to the states, which can be translated into military might. The Arctic, indeed, has manifested both qualities. Its seas are becoming navigable as the ice recedes. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest passage (NWP) provide the countries in the high latitudes lucrative trade opportunities. Similarly, the geo-economic weight of the Arctic is augmented by its huge reserves of petroleum and minerals. It holds almost 13% (90 billion barrels) of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered gas resources. Moreover, the Arctic has a large amount of mineral resources. For example, Greenland; which comprises almost 15% of the Arctic region and its second largest contiguous landmass, is estimated to possess large deposits of Rare Earths, Copper, Zinc, Iron ore, Gold, Nickel and Uranium. Therefore, the big powers have set eye on the Arctic, including the US; Russia and China, with ambitions to dominate which may be termed as The Arctic Great Game.

Strategic location of the Arctic

“Whoever holds Alaska will hold the world”, General Billy Mitchell was not wrong when he uttered this phrase in 1935. Indeed, during the Cold War, the possession of Alaska for the US, its only in the Arctic, proved fruitful. American early warning satellites and missile defenses were installed in Alaska to detect Soviet infiltration. The Cold War is over now, but the competition over the Arctic has reinvigorated. The US, under Trump administration, is ambitious to dominate

the Western Hemisphere. The Arctic, especially Greenland, can be defined as the head of the Western Hemisphere. The geographical position of the Greenland is indeed enviable. East of it runs the widest gap between the Arctic and the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, America holds the Island in esteem for its strategic location. The 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the US military and commercial access to the Arctic, especially Greenland. It already operates the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in Greenland, in addition to its Alaskan military bases in the Arctic.

Russia, an important stakeholder in the region, enjoys one of the longest coastlines and largest territories in the Arctic. Russian activities in the Arctic are not novice. In the late 18^th century, Russian emperor Peter the Great launched the ‘Great Northern Expedition’ which aimed to search for a northern sea route that could connect the Pacific and Europe. The quest for a such a sea route seems promising now as the Arctic waters become traversable. In 2020, Russia unveiled its Arctic policy till 2035. Among others, it emphasized the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as ‘a national transport communication of the Russian Federation that is competitive on the world market’. However, after Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin adopted a staunch outlook. In Feb 2023, Putin decreed to amend the country’s Arctic policy. The amended document mentioned the prioritization of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. For this purpose, Russia has endeavored to transform NSR into a global trade and energy route. Russia currently operates the largest Icebreaker fleet and thanks to this technology, the transit of trade vessels is expected to increase through the NSR.

Routes through the Arctic Ocean. Source: Author’s creation

However, any unilateral Russian action in the Arctic Ocean would not land off the attention of the other Arctic states. While Russia is ambitious to hew the Arctic Ocean as a “Russian Lake”, the other Arctic countries too deem the Arctic as their ‘number one priority’. The Nordic countries consider the Arctic as a security concern, they also see Russia as a threat in the region while emphasizing sustainable development in the region. Therefore, the strategic competition in the Arctic will, inevitably, shape the European security dynamics.

The strategic importance of GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a body of open water between the three countries, is still relevant. During the Cold War, it provided the Soviet vessels an outlet into the North Atlantic Ocean which conferred optimal range to strike NATO targets. However, in late 2019, Russian submarines surged through the gap into the North Atlantic in what was a large-scale military exercise to which NATO forces counteracted with air missions to gather reconnaissance. Therefore, the Arctic is of strategic significance. It acts as a vanguard for the defenses of the Americas and Europe.

The most interesting case offered in the Arctic security is that of China, which lacks any geographical connection to the region. For Beijing, the Arctic begets new opportunities. China has already declared itself a “Near-Arctic State”  in its Arctic Policy 2018 and seeks to participate in the development of the Arctic shipping routes. China’s growing interest in the Arctic shipping routes can be interpreted as its efforts to diversify its trade routes. Compare the two routes which link China to the Western European markets: First is from the Chinese ports through the East and South China Sea, into the Indian Ocean, then crossing the Suez and reaching Mediterranean, squeezing through Gibraltar strait and reaching destinations. China’s apparition, utilizing this route, is evident in what has been translated as the “Malacca dilemma”. The second runs northerly from the Chinese ports and then cruising along the Arctic reaches Northern and Western Europe. The first is long, time-consuming and precarious in case of conflict given complex maritime features of the region. The second not only cost saving but also relatively more secure and safe. Therefore, the prospects for China to make the Arctic a “Polar Silk Road” are rewarding.

Future Power Politics in the Arctic. Source: Author’s creation

The Race to Secure the Arctic Resources

President Trump, during his first term, had tried to buy Greenland. However, his efforts were reinvigorated after his re-election in late 2024. During his second term, he has repeatedly threatened to occupy Greenland by using military force, the island defined by him as a matter of national security. The strategic importance of the Greenland is evident. Trump’s interest in the Greenland can be defined by two reasons. First to oust China and Russia from the region who have been increasing their influence in the region, as he perceives. Secondly, Trump wants to secure the resources of the Greenland for the US. Greenland, as said earlier, is rich in rare-earth minerals, which have their application in military industries, medical equipment, oil refining and green energy. Currently, China is the largest exporter of the rare earths. US deems ramping up its rare earth’s resources crucial for countering the Chinese monopoly over them. Last year, a global supply chains crisis loomed following China’s restrictions on the exports of the critical minerals. Moreover, to meet the threat imposed by climate change, the real progenitor of the shift in Arctic security, the transition to renewable and smart energy sources demands sufficient mineral resources including the rare earths. These are used in wind turbines and electric vehicles.

Russia extracts a huge amount of its energy and mineral resources from the Arctic. It produces rare earths, nickel and cobalt from its Arctic territory. Russian Arctic also holds almost 37.5 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, 75% of Russia’s gas reserves. As the permafrost thaws and the sea ice melts in the Arctic, Russia will expand its efforts to secure the resources in the region. Therefore, the Kremlin keenly observes changing environmental and political dynamics in the Arctic.

Lastly, the ‘Near-Arctic State’ has also augmented its footholds in the Arctic. China has invested in economic sectors in the Arctic. It is yet to be unveiled whether China’s ambitions in the Arctic are solely for peaceful economic purposes or rather they embody a strategic objective. So far, China has remained innocuous, focusing on economic ties with the Arctic states which benefit all.

Conclusion

The Arctic is going to witness a tense geostrategic competition. Climate Change has transformed this previously unnoticed region into a new stage of strategic competition. Arctic routes and resources invite regional as well as extra-regional powers to vie for dominance in the high north. Therefore, states have shifted their focus to the Arctic. The political and strategic facts imply that in the future the master of the Arctic will decide the matters of the world.

China officially announced in late January 2026 its refusal to join the Board of Peace at the “International Peace Council for the Administration of the Gaza Strip.” This council, proposed by the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump, is a new international entity launched by the US president as an alternative to traditional UN mechanisms. China confirmed in January 2026 that it had received a formal invitation from the United States to join the “International Peace Council” for Gaza, launched by President “Trump” as a global initiative to resolve the conflict. China’s stance toward this council is characterized by caution and a demand for further details while adhering to its established principles.

The reasons for China’s rejection of the US-sponsored peace council for the Gaza Strip are based on several strategic and legal justifications, the most important of which is the marginalization of the UN’s role by the International Peace Council, sponsored by Washington. Beijing believes that the council seeks to replace the role of the United Nations and the Security Council, and it affirms its commitment to an international system centered on the United Nations and based on international law. Regarding China’s criticism of the lack of Palestinian representation within the International Peace Council, China criticized the Council’s charter for failing to mention the Palestinians or respect their will, asserting that any arrangements for the future of Gaza must be based on the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine.” Furthermore, (China’s concerns about “American dominance” over the International Peace Council): Beijing warned that the Council could be a tool for Washington to impose “control” or establish military bases in the Gaza envelope area under the guise of reconstruction. Also, (China’s rejection of the financial membership criteria within the International Peace Council): The Council requires substantial financial contributions (up to one billion dollars for permanent membership), which China views as transforming peace into a “deal” driven by financial power rather than the legal rights of the Palestinians.

At the same time, China is demanding structural clarity regarding the resolution establishing the International Peace Council and its actual feasibility. China, through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, “Fu Cong,” expressed concern that the resolution establishing the council lacks essential details, particularly concerning its structure, composition, and terms of reference, as well as the nature of the proposed “international stabilization force” in Gaza. Therefore, Beijing insisted on the UN’s authority in this matter, maintaining that any future arrangements for Gaza must be made under the auspices of UN Security Council resolutions and with broad participation including Palestinian parties and Arab states. China rejected any “closed” or “unilateral” mechanisms that could marginalize the UN’s role. Furthermore, China categorically emphasized the principle of “Palestinian governance of Gaza,” considering the Gaza Strip an integral part of Palestinian territory. China rejects any plans aimed at imposing external trusteeship or control over its administration, affirming that the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine” is the foundation for any post-conflict governance. China has supported Arab initiatives on post-war management of the Gaza Strip, explicitly endorsing reconstruction and peace plans proposed by Egypt and other Arab states, deeming them consistent with the aspirations of the Palestinian people. China firmly adheres to the two-state solution, maintaining that any peace efforts must ultimately lead to a two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Therefore, the motives behind China’s rejection of the American request to join the International Peace Council on Gaza can be summarized as follows: China’s insistence on upholding the international legitimacy of the United Nations and its deep suspicions regarding the security and political objectives behind the council’s formation and Washington’s enthusiasm for it. The main reasons for China’s rejection of the International Peace Council on Gaza are China’s desire to protect the UN system. Beijing believes the proposed council seeks to replace or marginalize the role of the United Nations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry affirmed its commitment to an international system centered on the United Nations and based on its Charter and international law, rejecting any “alternative frameworks” outside of this scope. (Ambiguity in structure and tasks): The Chinese representative to the United Nations, “Fu Cong,” criticized the draft resolution concerning the council (Resolution 2803) for its lack of clear details regarding its structure, composition, and criteria for participation, describing it as “worrying.” In addition to China’s security concerns regarding the Gaza issue: Chinese intelligence reports indicate that one of the hidden objectives of the Washington-sponsored International Peace Council in Gaza is to destroy Hamas tunnels under the guise of “reconstruction,” which Beijing considers a “provocative and extremely dangerous” foreign military intervention. Furthermore, (China rejects American unilateralism in dealing with regional and global issues): China views the American International Peace Council initiative in Gaza as part of Washington’s attempts to impose “unilateralism” and exacerbate confrontation between blocs, which contradicts the “Global Governance Initiative” championed by Chinese President “Xi Jinping. ”.

Herein lies China’s alternative vision to the American initiative to form the International Peace Council: China, in its alternative to joining the Council, calls for the activation of the two-state solution as the only way to guarantee lasting peace in the Middle East and the implementation of the Beijing Declaration to support Palestinian national unity and strengthen the legitimacy of the Palestinian state. (UN Reform): Instead of creating parallel initiatives, Beijing calls for making the Security Council more responsive to the expectations of the world’s people on its 80th anniversary.

China proposes a different vision for managing the Gaza and Middle East issues, based on the following pillars: (Security Council Authority): This involves full adherence to UN Security Council resolutions as the sole basis for international legitimacy in Gaza. The Chinese call for (the principle of self-governance in the Gaza Strip): This involves China’s insistence that post-war administration of Gaza must be in the hands of the Palestinians themselves, rejecting any plans for forced displacement or external trusteeship. The Chinese call for a broad international peace conference on Gaza: Beijing calls for a more inclusive and credible international peace conference under UN auspices, with the aim of concretely implementing the two-state solution within a defined timeframe. With China prioritizing land routes over sea routes or temporary docks, as proposed by the US, China rejects maritime alternatives or “temporary docks” as substitutes for land corridors, viewing them as attempts to circumvent international obligations regarding humanitarian relief in the Gaza Strip.

From the preceding analysis, we understand that China considers itself a “positive stabilizing force” seeking to end the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip through comprehensive dialogue, in contrast to what it describes as the “unilateral” US approach, which it believes could deepen regional divisions. In short, while China does not reject participation in international dialogue on Gaza, it stipulates that the international peace council, sponsored by Washington, should be an instrument for strengthening international legitimacy, not a replacement for it, while preserving full Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza.

The Trump administration has directed U.S. diplomats to actively oppose foreign laws that restrict how American tech companies handle citizens’ data abroad. An internal State Department cable, dated February 18 and signed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, described such measures as threats to artificial intelligence services, global data flows, and civil liberties.

Experts say the move signals a return to a more confrontational approach after previous efforts focused on building goodwill with European customers. The administration warned that data sovereignty rules could increase costs, introduce cybersecurity risks, and expand government control in ways that enable censorship.

Data Sovereignty in Focus

Data sovereignty or localization initiatives have accelerated, especially in Europe, amid ongoing tensions over U.S. trade policies and concerns about privacy and surveillance. European regulators, wary of American tech giants, have tightened rules on how data is stored and shared. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) remains the most prominent example, restricting cross-border data transfers and imposing stiff fines on companies that fail to comply.

The State Department cable cited GDPR as “unnecessarily burdensome” and highlighted China’s restrictive data policies as an example of how technology rules can expand geopolitical influence. Beijing, it noted, bundles infrastructure projects with policies that provide access to international data for surveillance and strategic leverage.

Diplomatic Action Plan

The cable, labeled as an “action request,” instructed diplomats to track proposals that could limit cross-border data flows and to counter regulations deemed excessive. Talking points included promotion of the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules Forum, a multinational initiative launched in 2022 by the United States, Mexico, Canada, Australia, and Japan to support free flow of data while ensuring privacy protections.

This directive follows a pattern of U.S. opposition to European digital regulation. Last year, diplomats were ordered to challenge the EU’s Digital Services Act, aimed at making the internet safer by forcing social media firms to remove illegal content. The U.S. is also reportedly planning an online portal to help users bypass content moderation, including restrictions on material flagged as hate speech or terrorist propaganda.

Analysis: A More Assertive U.S. Digital Strategy

The cable reflects a strategic shift toward actively protecting the interests of U.S. tech companies globally. While previous administrations attempted to engage Europe diplomatically, the current approach pressures foreign governments to loosen privacy and data storage regulations that could hinder U.S. business.

By framing data sovereignty laws as a threat to AI development, cybersecurity, and civil liberties, the administration is positioning the free flow of data as a cornerstone of U.S. economic and technological influence. At the same time, rising competition from China in digital infrastructure and AI adds urgency, highlighting the geopolitical stakes of controlling international data flows.

The broader implication is a growing clash between national data policies and global digital commerce. As countries enact stricter rules to protect citizens’ data, U.S. tech firms and policymakers are increasingly asserting that global interoperability and AI innovation must take priority, signaling potential tensions in transatlantic and international digital governance for years to come.

With information from Reuters.

President Trump on Tuesday awarded Team USA’s hockey goalie Connor Hellebuyck the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor.

The American team won the Olympic gold medal on Sunday, the first time in 46 years, on the anniversary of the team’s legendary triumph over the USSR, known as the “Miracle on Ice.” They won in a 2-1 overtime game against Canada, with Hellebuyck’s performance widely lauded throughout the tournament. He received credit for the second assist on the tournament-winning goal.

“I just want to say a … very big congratulations to Team USA,” Trump said in the opening moments of his speech, adding that he asked team members to vote on awarding the medal to Hellebuyck. “I just want to tell you that the members of this great hockey squad will be very happy to hear based on their vote and my vote — and in this case, my vote was more important — that I will soon be presenting Connor with our highest civilian honor.”

Hellebuyck, 32, plays for the National Hockey League’s Winnipeg Jets.

The Presidential Medal of Freedom has previously been awarded to politicians, religious leaders, artists, fashion designers and others who have made significant contributions to American society. Prior athletes who have received the honor include soccer legend Lionel Messi, former Los Angeles Laker Magic Johnson and Olympians Katie Ledecky, Simone Biles and Megan Rapinoe.

The men’s team visited the White House earlier Tuesday and several members attended the State of the Union address.

The team has been a source of controversy for the administration after FBI Director Kash Patel was seen chugging beer in their locker room after their victory in the midst of multiple law-enforcement emergencies, including Americans trapped in Mexico in the aftermath of the killing of Mexico’s most powerful cartel leader, Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes.

In video posted on social media, Patel appears to hold out a phone in the locker room as Trump invites the team to the White House and says he will also have to invite the U.S. women’s hockey team, which also won a gold medal, or “be impeached.”

During his State of the Union address, the president claimed that the women’s team would be visiting the White House “very soon.” The team earlier announced that it had turned down the White House’s invitation this week.

“We are sincerely grateful for the invitation extended to our gold medal-winning U.S. Women’s Hockey Team and deeply appreciate the recognition of their extraordinary achievement,” the team said in a statement. “Due to the timing and previously scheduled academic and professional commitments following the Games, the athletes are unable to participate. They were honored to be included and are grateful for the acknowledgment.”

Rapper-turned-Olympian patron Flavor Flav invited them to party with him and with other Olympic athletes in Las Vegas instead.

U.S. President Donald Trump on Monday warned countries against backing away from recently negotiated trade deals with the U.S. after the Supreme Court struck down his emergency tariffs, saying that if they did, he would hit them with much higher duties under different trade laws.

Trump, in a series of social media posts, said he also may impose license fees on trading partners as uncertainty over his next tariff moves gripped the global economy and sent stocks lower.

“Any Country that wants to ‘play games’ with the ridiculous supreme court decision, especially those that have ‘Ripped Off’ the U.S.A. for years, and even decades, will be met with a much higher Tariff, and worse, than that which they just recently agreed to. BUYER BEWARE!!!” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

Trump said that despite the court’s decision to invalidate his tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), its decision affirmed his ability to use tariffs under other legal authorities “in a much more powerful and obnoxious way, with legal certainty, than the Tariffs as initially used.”

He suggested that the U.S. could impose new license fees on trading partners but did not provide further details. A spokesperson for the U.S. Trade Representative’s office did not immediately respond to requests for comment on Trump’s plans.

EU Trade Deal on Hold

In Brussels, the European Parliament decided on Monday to postpone a vote on the European Union’s trade deal with the U.S. after Trump said he would impose a new temporary import duty of 15% on imports from all countries.

EU goods under the deal would face a 15% U.S. tariff, with exemptions for hundreds of food items, aircraft parts, critical minerals, pharmaceutical ingredients, and other goods, while the EU would remove duties on many imports from the U.S., including industrial goods.

Trump initially announced the temporary duty under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 at 10% but promised on Saturday to raise it to 15%, the maximum allowed under the statute. An initial 10% tariff came into effect at a minute past midnight on Tuesday, though it is unclear when the 15% rate would take effect, as Trump has only signed an executive order for the 10% tariff so far.

Markets React

Wall Street stocks ended lower on Monday as renewed tariff uncertainty following the Supreme Court decision, coupled with concerns about AI-fueled disruption, unnerved investors.

• The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 1.65%
• The S&P 500 fell 1.02%
• The Nasdaq Composite fell 1.01%

The dollar weakened against the euro and the yen, reflecting market anxiety over potential trade escalation and economic uncertainty.

Global Trade Uncertainty

The path forward for Trump’s foreign trade deals remains unclear:

• China has urged Washington to scrap tariff measures.
• The EU has frozen its approval process.
• India delayed planned talks.

The U.S. Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, said the administration expects to open new Section 301 unfair trade practices investigations on several countries, potentially paving the way for new tariffs.

Meanwhile, a group of 22 Democratic U.S. senators introduced legislation to force the Trump administration to issue refunds for all now-illegal IEEPA-based tariffs within 180 days, although the bill faces an uncertain path to a vote.

Trump also criticized the Supreme Court justices who ruled against him, including two he appointed, and expressed concern that the Court could rule against his administration in a forthcoming birthright citizenship case.

Analysis

Trump’s latest moves reflect his ongoing use of tariffs as a negotiating tool and political messaging device, rather than a targeted economic strategy. By threatening higher tariffs and potential license fees, he is signaling to trading partners that backing away from deals could carry immediate financial consequences.

However, the approach carries multiple risks:

1. Market Volatility: Investors are already responding with caution, as uncertainty over tariffs can disrupt supply chains, raise costs for U.S. companies, and weigh on stock prices.
2. Diplomatic Strain: Allies such as the EU, as well as emerging partners like India, may view the moves as destabilizing, complicating future trade negotiations.
3. Legal Vulnerabilities: Section 122 of the Trade Act has rarely been invoked, and using it in place of IEEPA may invite further litigation, leaving Trump’s administration open to judicial challenges.
4. Global Trade Ripple Effects: A 15% tariff on broad imports could increase prices for U.S. consumers, provoke retaliatory tariffs, and shift global supply chains, particularly in sectors like tech, automotive, and pharmaceuticals.

Economists suggest that while Trump’s threats may pressure trading partners, the overall economic rationale is weak, since the U.S. is not in a balance-of-payments crisis, and broad-based tariffs risk collateral damage to U.S. businesses and consumers.

In sum, Trump’s tariff strategy highlights a blend of economic pressure and political signaling, but it comes with high uncertainty and potential unintended consequences for both the U.S. and global markets.

With information from Reuters.

On 18 February 2026, reports emerged that Britain was withholding American permission to use Diego Garcia in any hypothetical strike against Iran. The following day, Trump posted “DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA” on Truth Social, linking the base directly to potential operations against Tehran in terms that left no room for diplomatic interpretation. The sequence lasted forty-eight hours and revealed what months of careful legal construction had obscured: that the architecture of conditional access Britain had built around a strategically significant military installation was worth precisely what the decisive power chose to make it worth. Whether the intervention also carried tactical signalling toward Tehran is a legitimate question, and intra-alliance friction of this kind sometimes functions as maximalist positioning before settlement. What matters analytically, however, is not the post itself but what the post revealed when operational pressure arrived. It was also, for anyone who had read Washington’s December 2025 National Security Strategy carefully, entirely predictable.

Power Does Not Ask

There are two ways to understand how military power operates in the international system, and the Chagos episode forces a choice between them. The first holds that great powers are meaningfully constrained by the frameworks they inhabit, alliance structures, legal agreements, and diplomatic settlements, and that these frameworks produce stable, predictable behavior even when the underlying interests they were designed to manage come under pressure. The second holds that frameworks are expressions of power relationships at a given moment rather than independent constraints upon them, so that when power shifts or decides to assert itself, the frameworks adjust to reflect the new reality rather than containing it. The first is the language of liberal internationalism. The second is the language of realism, and what February produced was an unambiguous realist moment.

The December 2025 National Security Strategy had already committed this diagnosis to paper. The document did not describe Europe as weak through circumstance. It described Europe as having chosen weakness, identifying a “loss of national identities and self-confidence” as the continent’s defining condition and stating openly that it is “far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” The strategy framed European concerns about Russia as evidence of that same condition, noting that this lack of self-confidence was most evident in Europe’s relationship with Russia, despite the fact that European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure save nuclear weapons. Washington’s reading of its European partners, formalized two months before the Diego Garcia friction became public, was of states that had systematically preferred institutional solutions over sovereign ones, legal arrangements over unconditional control, and managed conditionality over the exercise of will. Britain’s handling of Chagos was, in that context, not an anomaly. It was a confirmation.

What is analytically significant about Trump’s intervention is not simply that he rejected the deal but that he did not engage it at all, did not address the ICJ ruling that gave it legal foundation, did not contest the lease terms that were its operational expression, and did not enter the diplomatic logic that had produced it over months of negotiation. A decision of this kind does not derive its authority from the framework it overrides, because it precedes that framework, and the framework itself only ever existed on the sufferance of the power now choosing to move against it. When Trump asserted that leases are “no good when it comes to countries,” he was not making a legal argument that could be answered within the same register. He was stating a principle about the nature of sovereign will: that when it moves, it moves prior to and above whatever conditional arrangements were constructed in the period of its dormancy.

This is realism in its purest operational form, in which states pursue interests, great powers pursue interests with the capacity to enforce them, and legal architecture functions as an instrument of power when it serves those interests and an obstacle to be displaced when it does not. The Chagos deal did not alter the underlying power relationship between Washington and London, but it did create a layer of conditionality over an asset Washington considers operationally essential, and when operational pressure arrived, that conditionality became intolerable, not because Mauritius is hostile, not because Britain is an adversary, but because no great power conducting military projection at a global scale can accept that a weak state sits structurally inside the chain of its operational decisions, regardless of how that state arrived there or how benign its intentions are understood to be.

Beneath the realist logic sits a transactional one, and the two reinforce each other in ways that matter for how Britain should read what happened. Trump does not evaluate alliance relationships by their historical depth or their institutional architecture. He evaluates them by what they yield in the current moment, and every asset is a leverage point to be maximized. Diego Garcia represents unconditional American operational value. The Chagos deal reduced that value by inserting a condition. From a transactional perspective, that insertion was not a diplomatic nuance to be managed but a concession to be reversed, because Trump’s governing principle across every alliance relationship is maximum American gain, and conditionality is by definition a reduction of gain. The decisionism explains how he responded. The transactionalism explains why.

The Geography of Decision

Diego Garcia is not incidental to American power projection in the region, though its significance is that of an enabler rather than a prerequisite. The base sits at the center of the Indian Ocean, within operational reach of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca, and the East African littoral, and it has supported American military operations across that entire arc for half a century through bomber rotations, logistics chains, and a sustained forward presence that no other installation in the basin fully replicates at the same scale and permanence. It does not make American power projection possible in any absolute sense, but it makes it faster, cheaper, and more sustained, which in the context of time-sensitive operational planning against a target like Iran is not a marginal difference but a meaningful one.

The Iran dimension exposes the conditionality problem with particular clarity because the operational context in which Diego Garcia’s value is most acute is precisely the context in which conditional access is most dangerous. American military assets have accumulated across the Middle East, talks are active, and a base capable of projecting strategic airpower directly into the Persian Gulf theater is not a background consideration but a variable whose availability, or unavailability, shapes what options exist and on what timeline. Britain’s reported reluctance to grant operational clearance, under a deal still unratified and still contested in domestic courts, still legally dependent on Mauritius’s continued cooperation, revealed that the conditionality embedded in the arrangement had already entered the operational calculus before any of the stabilizing assumptions behind the deal had time to establish themselves. Strategic friction did not arrive at the end of a long maturation period. It arrived in weeks, because operational pressure does not wait for diplomatic frameworks to consolidate.

That compression of the timeline is itself the most realistic lesson. Power does not defer to the developmental logic of legal arrangements, and when the operational moment arrives, whatever sits between a great power’s will and its objective is reclassified from a framework to be respected into a problem to be solved.

The Structural Position of the Weak

The analytical core of the Chagos case is not about Mauritius’s intentions, which by all available evidence are not hostile, but about the structural position that the deal assigned to it within the architecture of American operational planning, because in the logic of great power competition, it is position rather than intention that determines strategic relevance. By inserting itself, or being inserted, into the chain of conditions governing a great power’s operational freedom, a weak state acquires a form of leverage it could never achieve through military means, and the Chagos deal gave Mauritius exactly that position, not through hostility but through legal standing, not through power but through presence within a conditional architecture that a great power now had reason to find constraining.

For Washington operating within a decisionist strategic logic, that presence is categorically unacceptable regardless of Mauritius’s intentions. The relevant question is not whether Mauritius would obstruct American operations but whether, under the terms of the arrangement, it structurally could, and the answer is yes in a way that no amount of diplomatic goodwill can fully neutralize. Sovereignty transferred to Mauritius is not sovereignty parked with a neutral party but sovereignty that now sits within reach of Chinese economic leverage, meaning the lease does not merely introduce conditionality but introduces conditionality whose future content Washington cannot determine or guarantee. A great power conducting global military projection cannot organize its operational planning around the sustained goodwill of a small state whose strategic orientation it cannot guarantee. That such goodwill is required at all is the problem the deal created.

Weak states do not constrain great powers through legal arrangements in any durable sense, because the constraint only holds when the great power chooses to honor it, and great powers choose to honor constraints only when the cost of non-compliance exceeds the cost of compliance, a calculation that shifts decisively once operational necessity enters the equation and the framework reveals itself to be dependent on tolerance rather than grounded in power.

Conclusion

Britain converted unconditional sovereign control over a strategically significant military installation into a conditional leasehold arrangement whose operationalization depended on a small state’s legal cooperation and presented that conversion as a resolution of vulnerability rather than the creation of a new one. Britain was not being naive. It was an attempt to preserve the base’s long-term legal viability against mounting international pressure, a calculation that the alliance relationship would absorb any friction that followed. What Britain did not account for was that its ally evaluates arrangements not by their legal durability but by whether they constrain American will, and a solution sophisticated enough to satisfy international law was simultaneously insufficiently decisive to satisfy Washington.

From the perspective of the December 2025 National Security Strategy, that conversion was not a surprise. It was the predictable output of a European strategic culture that Washington had already formally diagnosed: one that reaches instinctively for institutional solutions when strong states would resolve through will, that mistakes legal legitimacy for strategic security, and that has internalized the habits of the post-Cold War order to the point where it can no longer easily distinguish between a framework and the power that makes frameworks real.

Trump’s response was the most realistic verdict on that presentation, not an argument against the deal’s legal coherence, which was never in question, but a decision that the framework was insufficient for the operational reality it was meant to serve, delivered in terms that made the underlying logic unmistakable. The framework did not collapse under the pressure. It was revealed, under pressure, to have rested entirely on the assumption that the decisive power would continue to choose not to decide otherwise, an assumption that realism has always identified as the central fragility of arrangements built on consent rather than grounded in power.

The strong do not negotiate with the architecture of constraint, and for Europe, February was less a shock than a reminder that the rules it has built its strategic identity around have always depended on the continued willingness of a decisive power to operate within them.

The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, six frigates, three light warships, and approximately thirty fighter jets and support aircraft have entered the Middle East by order of Donald Trump who, by repeatedly touting the slogan “I have ended six/seven/eight wars,” has considered (and continues to consider) himself deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize. What objective do all these tensions that the U.S. administration has generated in the region actually pursue? The weakening of Iran, or the overthrow of the incumbent government? Whatever his and his administration’s aim may be, it appears that—within the cost–benefit calculations of his trader’s mindset—he has yet to arrive at a definitive conclusion as to what kind of blow, and at what scale, could deliver the desired outcome. His recent military posturing around Iran and his increasingly threatening rhetoric against the Islamic Republic have placed him in a no-win situation whose end few can predict.

Why a no-win situation for Trump?

First Strike Doubt: Trump and the constellation of officials currently in the White House—who, notably, are far from unified or aligned on how to approach Iran—have reached no certainty regarding the effectiveness of a first strike against Iran or the likelihood of achieving their desired results. It is evident to all that the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither Venezuela, nor Libya, nor Syria, nor Afghanistan, nor Iraq, nor anything akin to the historical cases in which the United States has intervened militarily in the name of democracy verbally and in pursuit of its own interests operationally. This very reality has, thus far, prevented Trump from issuing the order to “open fire” on Iran up to now.

On the other side, there is no sign of the flexibility or concession sought by the United States in the behavior or rhetoric of Iranian officials—a fact acknowledged by American officials themselves. This indicates that pressure, intimidation, and threats have thus far yielded no results. The reason is clear: the Islamic Republic views any potential confrontation as an existential war and is unwilling to grant any concessions. Trump, however—who seeks to manufacture achievements out of even the smallest events and whose penchant for exaggeration is among his defining traits—perceives such circumstances as detrimental to his personal prestige and standing.

Iran’s Resilience: The experience of the Israeli attack and the hybrid war launched against Iran in June 2025, with direct assistance from the United States and indirect support from so many others, demonstrated that the instability they sought within the governing structure of the Islamic Republic and even the internal social fragmentation and rifts that had been cultivated for years through various media tools did not materialize. Despite the blows inflicted on Iran, none of the long-term strategic objectives of the United States and Israel were achieved. Likewise, the unrest and riots of January 8 and 9, despite the violence and damage they caused to the public and the state, were ultimately brought under control and culminated in a multi-million-person rally on January 12 condemning the unrest and supporting the central government of the Islamic Republic.

High costs and Persian Gulf Worries: Operationalizing a military threat would impose heavy costs on the United States and its allies. The Islamic Republic has explicitly declared that any military action against its territory, at any scale, would be regarded as all-out war, and that, consequently, the entire region—as well as U.S. interests wherever they may be—would fall within range of Iran’s retaliatory strikes. This serious warning has also prompted Persian Gulf states to mobilize their capacities to dissuade Trump from attacking Iran. The strikes on U.S. bases at Ayn al-Asad and Al-Udeid entrenched the perception that the Islamic Republic does not shy away from responding to foreign aggression, even if large segments of the world regard the attacking state as a “superpower.”

Global Energy Risks: The ignition of war in the Persian Gulf would amount to a grave threat to global energy supply routes. Roughly 30 percent of the world’s crude oil and 20 percent of liquefied natural gas are supplied by Persian Gulf countries, and 20–25 percent of global crude oil transits the Strait of Hormuz. Any aggressive action by the United States would jeopardize the security of one-fifth of the world’s fuel and profoundly affect the global economy.

Although the U.S. National Security Strategy does not place the Middle East among America’s top strategic priorities, the same document states that: “We (the United States) want to prevent an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass while avoiding the forever wars”, which shows Persian Gulf oil is still of high importance for Washington.

Tilting Power Balance: In addition, heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf would endanger China’s economic interests, and any large-scale military confrontation would likely lead to a more pronounced military-security presence by Russia and China in the Gulf—tilting the balance in favor of America’s rivals.

And finally?

The embers beneath the region’s ashes today could be ignited by the slightest breeze, engulfing a vast area. Israel, while likely the first target of Iran’s retaliatory response in the event of a U.S. attack, is nevertheless eager to initiate confrontation based on the calculation that a war waged with the full might of the United States could ultimately erode the very existence of the Islamic Republic or weaken it to the point of capitulation. In this context, it is not far-fetched to suggest that the disclosure of new documents and details concerning Trump’s links to the notorious Epstein case and his mysterious island may have been driven by the Mossad, as such revelations could compel the U.S. president to undertake an irrational action to divert attention elsewhere.

Today, Trump is acting more than ever in contradiction to his own professed principles—from trampling on his signature MAGA slogan and morphing it into MIGA (Make Israel Great Again), to undermining his administration’s efforts to reduce unnecessary international expenditures; from his paradoxical pride in having ended “eight wars” to the strategy of off-shore balancing the Middle East. Should a war of this magnitude and consequence erupt, no country involved—whether through direct action or geographic proximity—would be spared its consequences. Regarding these circumstances, it appears that the only desirable scenario for Trump, the region, and the world at large is the opening of a genuine dialogue, free from the shadow of threats, intimidation, and American bullying.

U.S. trade policy uncertainty has sent shockwaves through global markets, as President Donald Trump moved to impose a 15% tariff following the Supreme Court of the United States ruling invalidating his emergency trade levies. Investors reacted quickly, rotating out of risk assets and the dollar, while seeking shelter in gold, silver, and safe-haven currencies. The turbulence highlights the fragility of global investor confidence when policy reversals collide with high-stakes geopolitical and economic risks.

Wall Street and Currency Volatility

U.S. stock futures fell sharply, with S&P 500 futures down 0.5% and Nasdaq futures slipping 0.6%. The dollar weakened across major pairs, losing 0.21% versus the yen and 0.34% against the Swiss franc, while the euro gained 0.23%. European equities also reflected caution: the STOXX 600 fell 0.19%, Germany’s DAX slid 0.36%, and Britain’s FTSE 100 edged down 0.1%.

Asian markets, however, were mixed. The MSCI Asia index excluding Japan rose 0.83%, while Hong Kong’s Hang Seng surged 2.53% on expectations of lower tariffs for China. Japan’s Nikkei futures fell 0.4% ahead of a holiday, highlighting regional divergence driven by perceived winners and losers in U.S. tariff policy.

Safe-Haven Assets Rally

Amid the uncertainty, investors sought protection in gold and silver, which climbed 0.6% and 2% respectively. Safe-haven currencies, including the Japanese yen and Swiss franc, appreciated as risk-off sentiment grew. Government bonds saw slight gains, with the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield dipping to 4.077%, reflecting flight-to-quality buying. Brent crude prices fell 1.1% to $70.97 a barrel, reversing gains from earlier geopolitical risk sentiment linked to U.S.-Iran tensions.

Tariff Confusion and Its Economic Implications

Trump’s latest tariffs add layers of ambiguity. While the Supreme Court struck down his emergency powers, the new 15% levy relies on Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, an untested statute. Questions remain over timing, exclusions, and applicability by country. Some nations, including the UK and Australia, had lower tariffs under prior rules, while many Asian exporters faced higher duties. The Yale Budget Lab estimates the average effective tariff rate at 13.7% following the announcement, down from 16% pre-ruling, with the 15% rate potentially dropping to 9.1% after 150 days.

“This circular process of tariff announcements, legal challenges, and revisions is creating profound uncertainty for markets,” said Rodrigo Catril, senior FX strategist at NAB.

Market Sentiment and Investor Behavior

The episode reflects broader structural concerns about U.S. trade policy’s unpredictability. Investors are no longer just reacting to tariffs themselves, but to the instability and volatility of policy enforcement. The uncertainty affects supply chains, corporate earnings forecasts, and capital allocation decisions. Nvidia’s upcoming earnings, for example, are being closely watched, given the company’s 8% weighting in the S&P 500, demonstrating how trade policy shocks can amplify market sensitivity to specific corporate results.

Analytical Outlook

Trump’s oscillating trade policy highlights a critical tension between political objectives and market stability. While tariffs are framed as instruments to advance domestic economic priorities, the resulting unpredictability imposes systemic costs: currency swings, equity market volatility, and flight to safe assets. The mixed regional responses Asian equities partially rallying, European markets cautious underscore how interconnected global trade and finance are, and how unevenly shocks are absorbed.

In essence, this episode illustrates a modern economic paradox: protective trade measures intended to strengthen domestic interests can, in practice, destabilize markets worldwide. Investors now must hedge not only against tariffs themselves but also against the policy volatility that accompanies them a scenario likely to persist as long as U.S. trade decisions are made unilaterally and unpredictably.

Trump’s approach has transformed trade from a predictable framework into a high-stakes, reactive arena, forcing global markets to continuously recalibrate. The lesson is clear: in today’s interconnected financial system, the cost of policy uncertainty often outweighs the intended protectionist benefit.

With information from Reuters.

Authors: Ajay Kumar Mishra and Shraddha Rishi*

At the Davos World Economic Forum, Mark Carney, the prime minister of Canada, shared his thoughts on the hegemonic and subservient world order. When integration turns into a source of subordination, one cannot “live within the lie” of mutual benefit in the midst of a collapsing global order. The trading communities appear to have a hegemonic and subservient relationship as a result of the dollar’s adoption as the world’s reserve currency. Furthermore, the competing global order between the US and China appears to be caving in to Chinese modus operandi without investigating the reasons for US authoritarian dominance, which could result in the acceptance of Chinese domination. The recognition of the US dollar as the worldwide currency and its dominance over oil, one of the most traded commodities, have put the US in leadership of the world trading regime. Furthermore, it appears that China’s monopoly over rare earth elements (REEs) is giving the Chinese yuan the same reserve currency power. Therefore, the globe might witness a change of control from the US to China, thus jeopardizing the world trading system to the whims and fancies of the country holding the reserve currency.

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According to this essay, the dollar’s reserve currency status is the true cause of the world order’s disintegration, which equates to allowing the US to take the only seat at the table. It contends that a multipolar currency is essential for a multipolar world order. This understanding is necessary to prevent the rule of any country based on currency supremacy. Diversifying the currency basket for trade transactions is encouraged. To show how the currency dominance of a reserve currency would rise to currency imperialism, this article looks into the petrodollar problem and the duality of reserve currency and trade deficit to delegitimize the necessity of the dollar as a reserve currency. Any currency in question is subject to the same reasoning. Thus, a multi-currency trading framework is advocated in this article.

Geoeconomics of the Petrodollar Crisis’s Spiral

The dollar controls trade, payments, and reserves. About 96 percent of trade in the Americas, 74 percent in the Asia-Pacific area, and 79 percent in the rest of the world is denominated in the currency. About 60 percent of international and foreign currency claims (mainly loans) and liabilities (mostly deposits) are in US dollars. Its proportion of foreign exchange transactions is roughly 90 percent. Approximately 60% of the world’s official foreign reserves are in US dollars. Furthermore, in Q1 2025, the US dollar’s percentage of global foreign exchange reserves dropped to 53.6%. Additionally, the 50-year security agreement with Saudi Arabia to price oil only in dollars and invest surpluses in U.S. Treasury bonds in exchange for military protection expired in 2024. This could result in a shift toward accepting different currencies, albeit it won’t happen right away. Additionally, countries like Russia, China, and Iran are increasingly using non-dollar currencies for energy trade, aiming to reduce reliance on Western financial networks.

To achieve its geoeconomic goals, US authorities have attempted to preserve the dollar’s reserve currency status in several ways, compensating for economic weaknesses such as a lack of competitiveness in particular. The US appears to be addressing the growing trade deficit by maintaining the dollar as the world’s currency and matching China’s hegemony over rare earth elements. The US’s current dominance over the trade regime is largely due to dollar-based trade. The oil trade in dollars gives the US significant influence to shape geopolitics globally, both bilaterally and multilaterally, as oil holds a premier position in the international trading landscape.One commodity (oil) and one currency (the US dollar) have the power to both destabilise and stabilise the global price system. Its “as good as gold” quality can only be maintained in a world where the dominant currency is no longer associated with gold if it is associated with oil, that is, if wealthy people have faith that oil prices won’t continue to rise relative to the US dollar. The US gains influence over the oil trade by controlling the petro-dollar trade.

The globe is essentially on an “oil-dollar standard” during the post-Bretton Woods system, when currencies are meant to be “floating.” The US is under pressure to control oil sources, which it does through coercion or persuasion, to maintain wealth-holders’ faith in the value of the dollar, without which the global economy will experience severe financial turmoil, particularly given the ongoing US current account deficit. In a nutshell, war is a result of today’s necessity to preserve US financial stability. It does, however, produce a spiral effect. To control a significant oil source for financial stability, the US attacked oil-rich Iraq and, more recently, Venezuela. However, as a result of the opposition this strike provoked, oil prices skyrocketed, increasing the threat to financial stability and the temptation to wage war on other oil-rich nations like Iran. Additionally, the US would experience the same spiral consequences in a much more severe form if it decided to go to war with Iran.

The Reserve Currency and Trade Deficit “Trade-off”

Trade deficit and reserve currency operate in a trade-off scenario wherein a nation whose currency serves as the world’s reserve currency must maintain a trade deficit. It is based on two fundamental ideas. The first is the ‘policy trilemma’ or ‘impossible trinity’ thesis of economists Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming. It contends that an economy cannot sustain unrestricted capital flow, a fixed exchange rate, and an autonomous monetary policy at the same time. The second paradox bears the name of Robert Triffin, an economist. This states that where their money works as the global reserve currency, a nation must run huge trade deficits to meet the demand for reserves. Any candidate for a new global reserve currency position must run significant current account deficits and risk an intolerable loss of economic control.

However, trade imbalances are thought to be self-correcting. A nation’s currency is predicted to lose value when it has a trade imbalance. Exports will then rise, while imports will fall, resulting in a reduction in the trade deficit. However, as the dollar is the world’s reserve currency, this idea does not apply to the US economy. A large portion of a country’s foreign exchange reserves is invested in US government securities. As a result, the dollar is overpriced. A chronic trade deficit results from higher imports and lower exports due to an overpriced dollar. Therefore, the US has a trade deficit not because it imports more goods, but rather because it supplies the world’s reserve currency.

In the face of “unfair” trade and an overpriced currency, how can the US bring manufacturing back and lower the country’s trade deficit? Enter duties on imports. Tariffs will decrease imports and increase their cost, lowering the trade imbalance. By shielding American manufacturers from import competition, they will promote domestic production. However, the US’s return to a more protectionist policy through tariffs has led to increased bilateral commerce in non-dollar currency. For instance, India-Russia oil trade and China’s increasing use of bilateral currency swaps with its trading partners have caused major concern for the US reserve currency supremacy. Moreover, it caused a spiral effect. For example, the reserve currency of the central banks has become less dollarized as a result of the recent US policy of reciprocal tariffs to safeguard trade transactions in dollars. It promotes asking about options for a reserve currency basket and the possibility of de-dollarization. Trump has made no secret about retaining the US dollar’s global supremacy, even threatening the BRICS nations with 100% additional tax should they move forward with a unified currency to “degenerate” and “destroy” the dollar. After all, de-dollarization has the potential to tip the scales against the United States and reduce its capacity to influence international financial markets and the global economy. Furthermore, to protect dollar dominance from the assault of renewable energy, the US withdrawal from India’s solar alliance must be considered.

Economists fear that tariffs go against the concept of economic efficiency. Tariffs, they warn, will imply greater expenses for American consumers, an increase in the inflation rate, and an inefficient manufacturing sector. Moreover, tariffs will encourage nations to undermine the dollar’s standing as a reserve currency by making imports more expensive. It will portend the trading of multiple currencies. Even when Trump managed the inevitability of a trade deficit because of having a reserve currency, the US was still faced with two additional problems: the increasing bilateral trade in member countries’ currencies and China’s control over modern-era gold, ‘rare earth minerals’ critical for key industries. China’s hegemony over REEs and chip production challenges the US dollar’s hegemony.

Conclusion

It reflects that the actual geo-economic strength of the US lies in the acceptability of its currency as a global reserve and its hold over one of the most traded commodities, oil. The rise of China and the evolving structure of international trade are changing the dynamics of this area, even though the US dollar continues to be the most important reserve currency. However, there wouldn’t be any surpluses to invest or deficits to finance if trade were more bilaterally balanced over time, which would lessen the demand for a reserve currency like dollars. The world looks to be headed towards a multi-currency structure for harmonious commercial ties. By encouraging alternate payment methods among trading nations and choosing the currency used for the IMF’s reserve holdings, for instance, it is necessary to end the US monopoly on currency arrangements. The structure can be extended to incorporate trading blocs, where imbalances net out amongst members when aggregated. It suggests a world with several reserve and trade currencies.

This bilateral or multilateral currency autarky might unleash the potential to trade freely as well as to obtain investment capital for emerging economies. Moreover, this strategy is embedded in the evolving industrial structure driven by economic sovereignty. Meanwhile, the US’s capacity to finance its ongoing budget and trade deficits would be impacted by the dollar’s declining value. Dollar interest rates may have to climb, and the currency may depreciate. The role of its capital markets and financial institutions would shrink. It would give more space for the formation of a multipolar currency regime.

*Shraddha Rishi teaches Political Science at Magadh University, Bodhgaya. She has obtained her PhD from the Centre for South Asian Studies, JNU, New Delhi.

China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, viewing the increasing American bases and military buildup in the region as a strategy of containment and undermining Chinese influence. Beijing seeks to achieve regional balance through counter-diplomacy, both economic and security, and sees the American escalation as a threat to global stability, prompting it to strengthen its partnerships to protect its interests in the region. The Chinese perspective on the militarization of the region is that the American strategy in the Middle East is an extension of the policy of deterrence and containment, which extends from the Pacific to broader spheres of influence. China views American bases, such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, and other US military bases in Kuwait and the UAE, as an indirect tool to undermine Chinese economic and geopolitical stability. China considers the American military bases in the Middle East as instruments of hegemony and an attempt to contain and diminish its influence. Therefore, Beijing seeks to strengthen its military, diplomatic, and economic presence in the region as a strategic alternative, expanding its influence through its Belt and Road Initiative.

China adopts an approach that opposes the American military presence in the Middle East, prioritizing economic stability to serve its interests. This opposition manifests itself in several ways: supporting parallel security partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia, pressuring host countries like the UAE to prevent American expansion, and pursuing civil-military integration in strategic ports. The Egyptian researcher will attempt to identify and present specific examples of China’s rejection of the American military presence in the Middle East, such as China’s obstruction of the UAE’s F-35 deals. Beijing exerted pressure and raised security concerns that led to the stalling of negotiations for the UAE to acquire American F-35 fighter jets, due to Washington’s apprehension about the growing Chinese presence at the UAE’s Khalifa Port. Another example is China’s intensification of joint military exercises with Washington’s and Israel’s adversaries: China has increased its naval and air military exercises with Iran, a direct rival of the American presence in the region, thus posing a strategic challenge to American hegemony. China has also tried to secure oil routes away from Washington’s protection: China seeks to secure its oil interests through independent partnerships in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf ports, reducing the Arab states’ need for American security protection and reinforcing Beijing’s vision of rejecting American “hegemony.” With (China’s criticism of the US “offensive strategy”): Chinese diplomacy criticizes the excessive US presence and instead calls for diplomatic solutions and “civil-military integration” through infrastructure investment, thus undermining traditional US bases. Here, China uses “soft power” and economic investments in ports, such as those in Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, as tools to diminish the strategic importance of US military bases.

The Chinese perspective is that US bases are used to restrict its movement in vital maritime routes and are viewed as tools of deterrence within the context of great power competition. Therefore, China seeks to secure its economic interests by ensuring its oil and gas import routes and protecting its projects, which has led it to strengthen its military presence, including its base in Djibouti, to match its economic influence. With China offering a “developmental and security alternative”: By enhancing its influence through massive investments and security and technology partnerships, such as developing Huawei’s 5G digital infrastructure and China’s defense partnerships with Egypt, Iran, and the Gulf states, to serve as an alternative to direct military presence. Here, China seeks to achieve “absolute security” by protecting its supply chains and projects without directly engaging in managing regional crises in the American manner, preferring instead to project geoeconomic influence.

Here, China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, deeming it an “adventure” that threatens stability and pushes the region toward the brink. Beijing instead seeks to enhance its influence through diplomacy and economics, with Chinese efforts aimed at undermining the American military presence and supporting regional stability through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. The most prominent features of China’s rejection of the US militarization of the Middle East are China’s opposition to the “militarization” of the region and China believes that US strategies based on military bases and deterrence, particularly against Iran, increase instability. (China’s focus on finding a diplomatic and economic alternative): China focuses on comprehensive economic partnerships, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and prioritizes diplomacy to resolve conflicts, making it appear as a strategic alternative to the US “gunboat diplomacy.” The US “gunboat diplomacy” is a declared strategy of President Trump to counter Beijing’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. To counter this, China is focusing on partnerships and economic interests. From the Chinese perspective, regional stability ensures secure energy supplies and massive infrastructure investments in the region.

This coincides with China’s exploitation of the American retreat in the region. China seeks to capitalize on the relative decline in American strategic interest to act as a balancing power, without direct involvement in crisis management, but with an increasing role in maintaining regional equilibrium. Conversely, China fears that American policies will lead to its encirclement and the curtailment of its economic influence, prompting it to strengthen its military ties with certain regional actors as a form of indirect response.

Therefore, China rejects the principle of American militarization of the Middle East. China seeks to find alternatives to American hegemony by strengthening its diplomatic and economic presence, especially given the recent escalation of American military activity. Chinese military analyses indicate that the recent American military buildup, including aircraft carriers and air forces in the region, increases the likelihood of widespread regional conflicts. To that end, China promotes the concept of “common security,” directly rejecting American military involvement that puts pressure on China’s traditional allies in the region, such as Iran.

Concerned circles in Beijing view the American militarization of the Middle East as a perpetuation of a “Cold War mentality.” This is evident in China’s rejection of the ongoing military alliances established by Washington, which Beijing considers attempts to contain its rising influence and force regional states into alignment, a situation Beijing describes as “American hypocrisy.” The Chinese alternative to American militarization in the region is centered on its strategy of “development over militarization.” China seeks to market itself as a “peaceful partner” focused on development and infrastructure, capitalizing on the partial American retreat to expand its diplomatic and economic influence. Beijing adopts a policy of “cautious neutrality,” committing to “non-interference” in regional conflicts and avoiding replacing the American role as the region’s policeman militarily, preferring instead to focus on its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. While fully aware that the militarization of the region impacts China’s energy security, China prefers to address this through diplomacy and economic partnerships rather than direct military presence. China aims to protect its interests by deepening its economic engagement, thereby prompting a gradual US withdrawal, especially as China continues to present itself as a “responsible power” in the Global South.

China reacted angrily to the CIA’s public campaign, launched in February 2026, to recruit spies from within the ranks of the Chinese military, vowing to take “all necessary measures” to protect its national security. The Chinese response to the “recruitment video” included an official warning: Foreign Ministry spokesperson “Lin Jian” stated that the attempts by forces hostile to China “will not succeed,” emphasizing that Beijing would resolutely counter foreign infiltration and sabotage operations. In addition to Beijing’s accusation that the United States engaged in blatant political provocation, the Chinese Embassy in Washington described the American recruitment video targeting Chinese military personnel as a “blatant political provocation” and an explicit admission by the United States of its attempts to steal other countries’ secrets. This was especially true given the nature of the video, released by the CIA, which featured Mandarin Chinese and targeted “disillusioned” Chinese military officers, exploiting corruption within the Chinese army and recent purges within the Chinese military leadership. While other foreign intelligence agencies typically maintain contact with sources and agents within both friendly and hostile militaries, observers noted that the 95-second CIA video was “unusually explicit,” as described by Newsweek magazine. This angered China, prompting it to lodge a formal protest through the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

To counter this American intelligence campaign, official Chinese measures to contain Western and American intelligence intensified. Beijing pursued a multi-pronged strategy to tighten the noose on espionage activities, including expanding the Anti-Espionage Law: China amended its laws to broaden the definition of “espionage” to include any data or documents that threaten national security, granting authorities greater powers to search and access electronic devices. (Increasing Public Awareness and “Reporting Hotlines”): The Chinese Ministry of State Security, which acts as China’s intelligence agency, encouraged citizens to report suspicious activities through substantial financial rewards and released educational videos on how to detect “foreign spies” who might be disguised as researchers or diplomats. (Chinese Technological Counter-Response): China used artificial intelligence and simulation tools to mock American recruitment videos, releasing videos that mimicked the same style to highlight “Wall Street corruption” and internal American crises. With (China’s purge of sensitive leaders): Beijing launched a widespread purge within the People’s Liberation Army, targeting high-ranking generals such as “Zhang Youxia” on charges of corruption and leaking sensitive information. With China’s expansion in drafting and enacting counter-sanctions laws: In March 2025, China activated new regulations for its Foreign Counter-Sanctions Law, allowing it to freeze assets and impose visa bans on any foreign individuals or entities that interfere in its internal affairs or threaten its security interests.

This confrontation comes at a time when reports indicate that the CIA is seeking to rebuild its human network in China after most of it was dismantled between 2010 and 2012. China has begun intensifying its internal security measures to counter Western espionage, particularly American espionage, by updating its anti-espionage laws, strengthening cybersecurity, and raising public awareness, targeting the activities of the CIA and Mossad. These efforts include strict data controls, protecting sensitive technology, dismantling spy recruitment networks, and considering Western espionage a direct security threat. Among the most prominent Chinese measures to contain Western and American intelligence activities are the following (updating anti-espionage laws): China has broadened the definition of espionage in its laws to include any documents, data, or materials related to national security, granting authorities wider powers to search and investigate suspects. (Strengthening cybersecurity): Beijing is conducting intensive campaigns to secure sensitive networks and data and is working to protect its digital infrastructure from infiltration, especially after reports indicating widespread cyber operations by Western actors. This is in addition to (Chinese security awareness campaigns): The Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) is urging citizens to report any suspicious activities, considering counter-espionage a societal responsibility. It has also published warnings about methods used to recruit spies. Along with Chinese authorities tightening control over foreigners and foreign companies in China, control has been intensified over foreign consultancies and companies that could be used as cover for intelligence activities, with a focus on uncovering foreign spies, whether affiliated with the CIA or any other foreign agency. Along with China’s emphasis on protecting technology and scientific research: Here, Beijing is taking strict measures to protect its technological and industrial secrets from theft, especially in the fields of artificial intelligence and computing, to prevent their exploitation to advance the interests of foreign countries.

This Chinese escalation comes at a time when US intelligence reports have described China as the “greatest overall military and security threat” to the interests of the United States and its allies, further intensifying the intelligence conflict between the two sides. Therefore, China began taking strict and decisive measures to contain Western and American intelligence activities within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These measures include strengthening information security through the Information Support Force, enforcing anti-espionage laws, and increasing internal oversight to ensure the protection of national security and development interests from infiltration and sabotage. The most prominent measures include tightening digital surveillance by enhancing capabilities in electronic espionage, signals intelligence, and cybersecurity to counter any breaches; strengthening internal security by tightening security measures around personnel and sensitive data to prevent recruitment or leaks; and activating the role of the Ministry of State Security domestically. The Chinese intelligence ministry, “MSS,” has become highly effective in combating foreign espionage, particularly American espionage, and in maintaining political security within military and civilian institutions. The Chinese authorities also established the Information Support Force: this force was created to promote the development and implementation of secure network information systems, thereby enhancing the army’s ability to repel infiltrations. With China’s keenness to modernize its anti-espionage laws, it has taken strict measures against infiltration and sabotage activities, pledging to protect China’s national security.

Based on the preceding analysis, we understand that these Chinese security measures are a response to intensive US intelligence efforts to recruit informants within the Chinese military, which has provoked Beijing’s ire and resentment. This is especially true given the sensitive timing for the Chinese military establishment, coming just weeks after another senior officer was implicated in President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign within the army. The video released by the CIA showing the recruitment and targeting of Chinese military personnel represents the latest episode in a US intelligence campaign targeting Chinese military personnel on social media. This campaign, which openly targets China, has been described by CIA Director “John Ratcliffe” as the agency’s top intelligence priority amidst what he called a generational competition with Beijing.

Sunday’s live TV and streaming broadcasts for the Milan-Cortina Olympics unless noted (subject to change). All events stream live on Peacock or NBCOlympics.com with a streaming or cable login. All times Pacific. 🏅 — medal event for live broadcasts.

CLOSING CEREMONY
11:30 a.m. — NBC

MULTIPLE SPORTS
2 p.m. — Best of the 2026 Milan-Cortina Olympic Games | NBC
9 p.m. — “Primetime in Milan” (delay): Closing ceremony, bobsled, cross-country skiing, curling, hockey. | NBC

BOBSLED
1 a.m. — Four-man bobsled, Run 3 | Peacock
3:15 a.m. — 🏅Four-man bobsled, final run | Peacock
3:35 a.m. — 🏅Four-man bobsled, final run (in progress) | USA
4:15 a.m. — Four-man bobsled, final run (delay) | NBC
8 a.m. — Four-man bobsled, runs 3-4 (re-air) | NBC

CROSS-COUNTRY SKIING
1 a.m. — 🏅Women’s 50-kilometer mass start classic | USA
4 a.m. — Women’s 50-kilometer mass start classic (re-air) | USA
8:45 a.m. — Women’s 50-kilometer mass start classic (re-air) | NBC

CURLING
🏅Women’s gold-medal match
2:05 a.m. — Switzerland vs. Sweden | Peacock
4 a.m. — Switzerland vs. Sweden (delay) | USA, NBC
10:30 a.m. — Switzerland vs. Sweden (re-air) | USA

HOCKEY
🏅Men’s gold-medal match
5:10 a.m. — United States vs. Canada | NBC
1:30 p.m. — United States vs. Canada (re-air) | USA

US President Trump’s announcement of the creation of the so-called “Peace Council,” involving several countries, including Morocco, sparks a deep debate that goes beyond the diplomatic event itself. It addresses the core of the international order established after World War II. The issue isn’t only about establishing a new international body but also raises an implicit question: Is the United Nations still capable of managing global peace and security, or are we entering a phase in which alternatives are being sought?

From this perspective, the Peace Council becomes a political project par excellence, reflecting shifts in the American vision of the role of international institutions and revealing a structural crisis within the United Nations system.

First: The Peace Council… Read for the idea, not the structure.

Internationally and institutionally, the Peace Council cannot be considered a direct alternative to the United Nations. The latter is grounded in an international charter, legal legitimacy, and semi-inclusive membership, whereas the Peace Council remains a selective framework, initially limited in membership, and its legitimacy is based, in particular, on the political will of the countries involved, foremost among them the United States. However, attention to this formal aspect may overlook the substance of the matter. The true value of the Peace Council lies not in its organizational and administrative structure, but in the political message it carries: explicitly questioning the United Nations’ ability to perform its historical function, offering an alternative grounded in effectiveness rather than consensus, and prioritizing alliance over inclusiveness. In other words, we are facing a shift in how international peace is managed, not just a new institutional addition.

Second: Why does the US administration believe that the United Nations has failed? Washington’s view is rooted in the strong belief that the United Nations has faced significant challenges: it has become hostage to the veto powers within the Security Council; it struggles to enforce its strategic decisions in major international conflicts; and it has shifted from being a mechanism for resolution to more of a platform for political battles. This perspective is not merely popular opinion; it is shared by many international relations scholars, who argue that the UN has not evolved sufficiently to address emerging global and regional issues, including unconventional conflicts, the rise of non-state actors, shifting global power dynamics, and a waning collective commitment to international law. In this context, the Peace Council is regarded by the United States as a tool to address what it perceives as a long-standing institutional paralysis.

Third: The Peace Council… Is it truly an alternative or just a parallel path?

When we look at international relations realistically, we usually consider three levels: 1. Legal level: The Peace Council can’t replace the United Nations when it comes to legitimacy grounded in international law. 2. Practical level: The Council aims to fill a real gap in conflict management, especially in cases where the United Nations has struggled to resolve or contain issues. 3. Symbolic and expressive level: This is where the concern grows, as the Council challenges the UN’s exclusive claim to legitimacy in the “peace industry.” In the end, it’s not just about being an alternative or a supporting body. It’s more like a parallel system that could, over time, become a real competitor if it gains more influence and members.

Fourth: The American Dimension… Redefining International Leadership.

The creation of the Peace Council aligns with Trump’s broader perspective on international relations, emphasizing three key points: reducing dependence on multilateral organizations, strengthening alliances, and shifting decision-making authority to major global powers. From this standpoint, the Council is less about promoting peace and more about reshaping America’s influence and alliances, especially in a world where Washington is reluctant to bear the costs of a global order it cannot fully control. This reflects a shift away from seeking international legitimacy toward a focus on “realistic legitimacy,” in which institutions are judged more by their results than by strict adherence to rules.

Fifth: Morocco and the Peace Council… a strategically chosen location

The Kingdom of Morocco’s decision to join the Peace Council should not be seen as a departure from the United Nations, but rather as a strategic move in its diplomatic efforts to diversify its international partnerships. Morocco maintains strong institutional ties with the UN, actively participates in peacekeeping missions, and is also eager to expand its presence in new global initiatives. By joining the Peace Council, Morocco positions itself favorably in discussions on security and stability, gaining an influential role in shaping international approaches to conflict management. This move also helps to reinforce Morocco’s image as a responsible actor that avoids relying solely on a single framework for its diplomatic and security strategies.

Sixth: Is the time of the United Nations over?

The prediction that the United Nations mission is coming to an end may be premature, but it still carries weight. The key point is that the UN is facing a crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness, not one of existence. It continues to exist, but it can no longer handle alone a world marked by multiple power centers, rising complex conflicts, and waning trust in collective action. So, the Peace Council isn’t signaling its demise but rather highlighting the deepening challenges facing the traditional international system.

In the end, the Peace Council put together by the Trump administration isn’t officially replacing the United Nations yet, but it definitely marks a shift—signaling that we’re moving from one phase to another. We’re entering a time when peace and security are handled through selective alliances and initiatives driven by major powers, rather than through large umbrella organizations. The big question is, will this new approach bring about more effective peace, or will it make the world less legitimate and more fragile? The answer won’t be found just in the data but in how this new model actually plays out on the ground.