Former NATO official William Alberque says 440 kg of missing Iranian uranium is blocking a US victory claim. He warns that despite strikes on Natanz Nuclear Facility, the risk of proliferation remains.
Published On 24 Mar 202624 Mar 2026
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The reported idea of a special operation to seize Iran’s uranium should alarm anyone who still thinks there is a line between pressure and recklessness. Sending foreign forces into Iranian territory to capture nuclear material would be far beyond coercion. It would be war in plain sight. That risk looks even sharper when it is paired with talk of unconditional surrender and a revived maximum pressure campaign. Officials call that flexibility. In practice, it often creates confusion and a dangerous illusion of control.
Strategic Ambiguity Has Limits
Trump has long preferred threat inflation as a negotiating tool, and his administration’s National Security Presidential Memorandum on Iran makes clear that Washington wants to deny Tehran every path to a bomb. But there is a difference between pressure meant to shape diplomacy and rhetoric that drifts toward occupation logic. A raid assumes the United States can enter a sovereign state, take possession of fissile material, and leave without igniting a larger conflict. That is not strategy. It is a gamble.
A Raid Would Not Stay Small
Iran is not an isolated militia camp. It is a large state with layered security organs, missile capacity, regional partners, and a long memory of external intervention. Any attempt to seize uranium by force would expose American troops, bases, shipping lanes, diplomats, and partners to retaliation across several fronts. Even before talk of a raid, Washington and Tehran had been engaged in indirect nuclear talks in Oman. Replacing diplomacy with a ground mission would not create leverage. It would destroy what remains of a controlled bargaining space.
The Nuclear Picture Is Already Murky
The hardest fact in this debate is that the nuclear picture is already uncertain. In its February 2026 safeguards report, the IAEA said it could not verify the current status of facilities hit in June 2025. Reuters later highlighted that same report’s estimate that Iran had 440.9 kilograms enriched up to 60 percent before the strikes, while the Associated Press noted the wider stockpile had reached 9,874.9 kilograms of enriched uranium in total. Reuters also reported a cat-and-mouse hunt for missing material and confirmed that tunnel entrances at Isfahan were hit. Those facts do not make a commando operation look cleaner. They make it look less knowable.
Force Has Already Damaged Oversight
This is the contradiction hawks avoid. Military action may damage buildings, but it can also damage the inspection system needed to track what survives. The IAEA chief said that returning to Iranian sites was the top priority after the attacks because the agency had lost visibility. Reuters warned even before the war that any new Iran deal would have to address serious watchdog blind spots. Rafael Grossi had already reminded the Security Council that nuclear facilities must never be attacked and later stressed that inspectors must be allowed to do their job. Once oversight is broken, claims about perfect control become less credible.
Pressure Without Diplomacy Can Harden Iran
Advocates of seizure argue that urgency changes the rules. Their point is easy to grasp. If material has been moved, hidden, or split across sites, then delay is dangerous. But urgency cuts both ways. The less certainty there is, the more any raid grows in scope. A supposedly limited mission can quickly expand into repeated searches, broader strikes, and pressure for a longer presence. That trajectory sits uneasily with both the basic ban on the use of force in the UN Charter and the logic of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which depends on verification and compliance, not theatrical confiscation. Reuters has also shown that the damage from earlier strikes was difficult to measure and that U.S. officials later said there was no known intelligence that Iran had moved the uranium. That uncertainty is exactly why fantasies of a clean raid should be treated with suspicion.
Containment Is Less Dramatic, but Safer
There is another reason to reject this path. Public overstatement can create policy traps. Trump has already brushed aside internal caution, including when Reuters reported that he said his own intelligence chief was wrong about Iran’s program. Tehran, for its part, has insisted through officials speaking to Reuters that it will not give up enrichment under pressure. That is not a recipe for surrender. It is a recipe for concealment and hardening. Serious policy should focus on intelligence work, restored IAEA access, sustained diplomatic pressure backed by credible penalties, and a clear effort to prevent a regional war that would leave the uranium question even murkier.
The appeal of seizure is obvious. It sounds decisive and final. But nuclear crises rarely yield to cinematic solutions. They are managed through verification, containment, bargaining, and steady pressure, not through fantasies of absolute control. If this idea is truly being weighed in Washington, it should be rejected before rhetoric turns into mission planning. A ground effort to capture uranium inside Iran would not settle the problem. It could widen the war, shatter what diplomacy still exists, and leave the world with the same material, less oversight, and far more bloodshed.
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U.S. and Israeli authorities have reportedly been considering a special operations ground raid to extract or otherwise neutralize Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. TWZ previously explored this exact scenario, given that this nuclear material is understood to be stored in deep underground bunkers, presenting challenges for attempting to achieve this objective from the air alone. U.S. and Israeli special operations forces have actively trained for these kinds of missions for decades, and Israel has demonstrated its ability and willingness to carry out complex raids on subterranean facilities, but any such operation would still face immense risks and uncertainties.
Multiple outlets have now reported on deliberations within the U.S. and Israeli governments over a ground raid targeting Iran’s enriched uranium stocks this past weekend, citing unnamed sources. It is unclear whether the mission being considered would be carried out by U.S. or Israeli forces, or be conducted jointly by both parties.
“People are going to have to go and get it,” Secretary of State and acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio said at a congressional briefing back on March 3 in response to a question about securing Iran’s enriched uranium, according to a report from Axios on Saturday.
“We’re going to find out about that. We haven’t talked about it, but it was a total obliteration. They haven’t been able to get to it. And at some point, maybe we will,” President Donald Trump also told reporters on Air Force One on Saturday. “You know, that’d be a great thing, but right now we’re just decimating them. We haven’t gone after it, but it’s something we can do later on. We wouldn’t do it now. Maybe we’d do it later.”
Reporter: Mr. President, don’t you need ground troops to secure the enriched uranium at the nuclear sites?
Trump: We’re going to find out about that. We haven’t talked about it, but it was a total obliteration. They haven’t been able to get to it. And at some point, maybe we… pic.twitter.com/f9LR6BzIdn
— Acyn (@Acyn) March 7, 2026
NBC News reported last week that President Trump had “privately expressed serious interest” in sending “a small contingent of U.S. troops that would be used for specific strategic purposes” into Iran.
The U.S. government says that preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon is a core goal of its current operations targeting the country. If the Iranian government were to collapse, and do so suddenly, there would be additional concerns about the proliferation of the country’s nuclear material, including to regional proxies and terrorist groups, as well as other potential buyers on the black market.
By its last firm estimate, as of June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assessed that Iran had just over 972 pounds (just under 441 kilograms) of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity. This stockpile has long been a proliferation concern and evidence of Iranian authorities maintaining the option of rapidly pursuing a nuclear weapon even in the absence of an active development program.
It is understood to be a relatively quick process, in technical terms, to get uranium from 60 percent to 90 percent purity, at which point it is considered highly enriched or weapons-grade. Per the IAEA, 92.5 pounds of 60 percent uranium is sufficient to be enriched into enough 90 percent material for one nuclear bomb. Using this metric, Iran’s declared stockpile of enriched uranium is enough for at least 10 bombs.
“In that first meeting, both of the Iranian negotiators said to us directly, with no shame, that they controlled 460 kilograms of 60 percent, and they were aware that that could make 11 nuclear bombs,” Steve Witkoff, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East, who had been leading talks with Iranian officials head of the current conflict, said in an interview with Fox News’ Sean Hannity on March 2. “They have 10,000, roughly, kilograms of fissionable material. That’s broken up into roughly 460 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, another thousand kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium, and the balance is at 3.67 [percent purity].”
Uranium that is not pure enough for a nuclear weapon could still be fashioned into a so-called ‘dirty bomb’ designed just to spread radioactive contamination across an area. Even if the immediate impacts of the detonation of such a device are minimal, it could cause widespread panic and would require significant effort to clean up. This is a threat that has also often been associated with non-state actors in the past.
Iran’s underground nuclear site at Isfahan has long been understood to be the primary storehouse for its stockpile of enriched uranium. That facility was among those targeted in U.S. strikes last June, dubbed Operation Midnight Hammer. Though access to any uranium there was subsequently curtailed, the U.S. Intelligence Community has more recently assessed that Iranian authorities have regained entry, at least to a degree, according to a report from The New York Times over the weekend.
As an aside, in the weeks leading up to the current conflict, satellite imagery showed Iran taking steps to seal off Isfahan, as well as other key facilities, which would help hamper any potential ground raids. TWZ highlighted similar activity at Iranian nuclear sites ahead of Operation Midnight Hammer.
NEW: High resolution satellite imagery taken yesterday shows the extent to which Iran has covered the tunnel entrances at the Esfahan nuclear complex with soil. The middle and southern entrances are unrecognizable and fully covered in soil. The northernmost tunnel entrance which… pic.twitter.com/baYI2zCuN0
— Inst for Science (@TheGoodISIS) February 9, 2026
NEW: Satellite imagery of the Esfahan nuclear site taken today shows new activity at the tunnel entrances. As of today, Iran has re-buried the middle entrance with soil and is adding more fresh soil to the southernmost entrance. The northernmost entrance, which was reworked after… pic.twitter.com/7ujiku8VRg
— Inst for Science (@TheGoodISIS) January 29, 2026
There are lingering questions about the degree to which Iran may have dispersed its enriched uranium beyond Isfahan. The day before the current conflict erupted, the AP reported that the IAEA had been circulating a report saying that it could not “verify whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities” or the “size of Iran’s uranium stockpile at the affected nuclear facilities,” and was unable to “provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran.”
“Publicly, U.S. officials have projected confidence that they know where the uranium is stored. Privately, there is said to be less certainty,” according to a report from Bloomberg today.
In terms of the specifics of how a ground raid would neutralize Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, multiple options are reportedly being considered.
“The first question is, where is it? The second question is, how do we get to it and how do we get physical control?” a U.S. official said, according to Axios. “And then, it would be a decision of the president and the Department of War, CIA, as to whether we wanted to physically transport it or dilute it on premises.”
“The mission would likely involve special operators alongside scientists, possibly from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),” Axios‘ report added.
TWZ had outlined exactly these possibilities when discussing the prospect of a ground raid targeting Iran’s nuclear program, and one potentially involving U.S. forces, in the midst of last year’s 12 Day War. As we wrote at that time:
“U.S. special operations units are ideally suited to rapidly and discreetly infiltrate into a target area to extract items of interest from an objective like a nuclear facility in Iran. If the items in question are too large to be moved by the special operations force, depending on what they are, they could then be destroyed in place or secured until a larger follow-on force arrives. Conventional supporting forces and interagency elements offering unique capabilities could accompany special operations forces on initial raids, as well.”
“Special operations forces are also well-positioned to help intercept high-value targets on the move, including nuclear material that might make its way out of Iran, or threaten to do so, as the conflict with Israel continues. This could potentially include operations on land or at sea.”
U.S. special operations forces, especially so-called “tier one” units like the U.S. Army’s Delta Force and the U.S. Navy’s SEAL Team Six, train regularly to conduct exercises centering on counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) scenarios and others involving chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological hazards. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was formally designated the lead entity for the Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) mission set in 2016. An array of specialized conventional U.S. military units, as well as personnel from other ends of the U.S. government, such as the Department of Energy, are also expected to take part in these operations and are often integrated directly into relevant training events alongside special operations elements. You can read more about all of this here.
Israel has its own long history of spectacular air and ground raids, as well as covert or clandestine intelligence operations, which have often targeted nuclear programs in hostile countries, especially in Iran. Operations of this kind have also been launched against conventional weapons capabilities deemed to present particular threats.
As one particularly spectacular example, in 2024, Israeli forces destroyed an underground ballistic missile factory in Syria, which had been built with Iranian assistance. The raiding party was on the ground for approximately two and a half hours, during which time 660 pounds of explosives were rigged throughout the site. “A planetary mixer, numerous weapons, and intelligence documents,” were also extracted, according to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). TWZ noted at the time that this operation sent a clear signal to Iran that its underground facilities were not untouchable.
100 Shaldag soldiers raid and dismantle Syrian missile factory in secret operation
There is the potential that Israel might have launched ground raids against Iran’s nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and/or Isfahan unilaterally last year if the U.S. military had not conducted Operation Midnight Hammer. There would have been few, if any other options for Israel to have gone after those underground facilities. This, in turn, raises the possibility that Israeli forces may have prepared more explicitly to execute these operations just in the past year.
Executing any special operations raid targeting Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, wherever it might be held, would not be without immense challenges.
For one, there are real questions about what it would take to move nearly 1,000 pounds of enriched uranium out of Iran, even if it is largely located at one site. The material would be even heavier and bulkier when taking into account the secure containers it is likely to be stored in.
Similar questions have been raised about the feasibility of neutralizing the stockpile in place if it is determined to be impractical to move it. Experts and observers have highlighted the immense time and resources that would be required to try to dilute the purity of any nuclear material on-site, processes that typically require industrial machinery under normal conditions.
Unlike conventional weapons, or even other key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, like centrifuges, fissile material cannot simply be blown up to destroy it in place, either.
Having to carry out any such operation, however long it might take, in an active conflict zone and likely under enemy fire, would only add to the complexities of a ground raid. As already noted, Iran looks to have taken steps to physically hamper access to Isfahan and other sites, adding to the time it would take friendly forces to gain entry to their objectives in the first place. Heavy machinery could be required to dig into these facilities.
The longer friendly forces are on the ground, the more time Iran has to put together a response. Airpower can help keep hostile forces at bay, but Iranian security forces could eventually muster significant firepower, including artillery. Keeping nuclear facilities safe from attack has been a top priority for the regime in Tehran, and Iranian security forces will have reaction plans in place.
There is also simply the matter of getting the raiding force to and from the objective. As has been established, we are talking about what would have to be a relatively large contingent, burdened with specialized equipment, along with a typical array of weaponry and other gear.
The U.S. military, specifically, has a very complicated relationship with these kinds of operations, dating back to the failed attempt to rescue hostages being held in the American embassy in Tehran following the revolution that put the current Iranian regime into power in the first place. That operation exposed deficiencies that did lead to the development of new capabilities, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures, and continues to be a key case study in special operations planning today.
We did get to see a demonstration of the U.S. military’s current capability and capacity to launch a major special operations raid in January with Operation Absolute Resolve, which resulted in the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro from the middle of a fortress-like military facility. At the same time, it also showed the immense resources required to ensure the success of a mission like that, with hundreds of aircraft, ships offshore, and an array of other assets involved. The main raiding force consisted of 200 special operators. You can read more about what is known about the extensive preparations for the mission, including having forces specifically poised to destroy three airfields if it looked like Venezuelan Air Force fighters were attempting to scramble, here.
In addition, the Venezuela operation had the benefit of surprise, rather than coming in the middle of already ongoing major combat operations against an enemy that says it is actively prepared to respond to any kind of ground incursion. Iran’s military capabilities and overall capacity have been seriously degraded by U.S. and Israeli strikes in the past week, but significant threats remain, as TWZ regularly stresses.
Even under the most optimal conditions, launching a major special operations raid into Iran amid the ongoing hostilities would be extremely risky.
Axios‘ report notably said a special operations raid against Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile “would likely only take place after both countries [the United States and Israel] are confident Iran’s military can no longer mount a serious threat to the forces involved.” This would also align with President Trump’s comments on Saturday.
However, other factors could still influence that decision-making process. As has been made clear, there are already serious questions about where all of Iran’s enriched uranium may be hidden away now. This is compounded by the reports that the Iranians may have regained access to where material was being stored in Isfahan, which could then allow them to move it elsewhere.
Even if persistent surveillance gives a good sense of where the material is being moved, dispersal can only increase the total number of sites that would have to be secured. It would also reduce any guarantees of neutralizing even the majority of the stockpile in one fell swoop.
As mentioned earlier, interdicting nuclear shipments on the move would still require a ground force of some kind to secure the material. Simply kinetically targeting vehicles carrying enriched uranium from the air would not be sufficient and would risk scattering nuclear material in an uncontrolled manner, making such a strike an absolute last resort option.
As pointed out earlier, there could also be a concern that regional proxies, terrorists, or other third parties might attempt to exploit the current conflict to spirit away a portion of Iran’s stockpile from Isfahan or sites for their own nefarious uses. This, in turn, could further drive a demand for action to secure that material on a timetable that does not allow for waiting for ideal conditions to emerge.
In the meantime, the United States and Israel could seek to carry out new strikes to try to seal entrances to underground facilities at Isfahan and other locations. Strikes last week on Iran’s nuclear site at Natanz look to have been intended to do just this. Those sites could then be surveilled to watch for any further attempts on the part of the Iranians to dig them out. Additional action, including more strikes or launching a ground raid, could then be taken, as necessary.
We have prepared an overview slide summarizing the visible damage at the Natanz uranium enrichment site from the recent attack, pulling together multiple images showing before and after satellite images of the two personnel entrances and the sole vehicle entrance with comparable… pic.twitter.com/mMGvOyHgkQ
— Inst for Science (@TheGoodISIS) March 3, 2026
On top of everything else, not being able to definitely find, fix, and secure Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium would make it difficult for the U.S. government to say it has achieved its core objective of preventing the country from building a nuclear weapon. Inversely, doing so could be seen as essential, especially by the Trump administration, for creating the conditions necessary to end the current conflict.
Altogether, it remains to be seen whether or not the United States and Israel decide that mounting a major special operation targeting Iran’s enriched uranium outweighs the risks.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young attends a National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee meeting in Seoul on Thursday. Photo by Asia Today
March 6 (Asia Today) — South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said Thursday that North Korea is operating uranium enrichment facilities in Yongbyon, Kangson and Kusong, marking the first time a senior South Korean official has publicly identified Kusong as a third such site.
Chung made the remarks during a plenary session of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee. Until now, South Korea’s government and the International Atomic Energy Agency had publicly identified Yongbyon and Kangson as North Korea’s main uranium enrichment locations.
Chung said halting North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities should be the priority. He cited recent remarks by Rafael Grossi, head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog, and said North Korea’s enrichment facilities were producing 90% highly enriched uranium, a weapons-grade level. He also said Grossi had reported that another enrichment-related facility was being added at Yongbyon.
Kusong, a city in North Pyongan Province, has at times been mentioned by researchers and outside analysts as a possible nuclear-related site, but Chung’s statement was unusual because it came in an official public setting.
Chung also estimated that North Korea may have extracted about 100 kilograms of plutonium over six processing cycles during the past 30 years, including 16 kilograms last year, which he said would be enough to build roughly 20 plutonium-based nuclear weapons.
Asked about the effect of the recent U.S. strike on Iran on prospects for a new summit between North Korea and the United States, Chung said uncertainty had increased and that the development was “not a positive influence.”
— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.
Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260306010001810