Development agendas borrow a term common in the study of global governance that is shaped not only by policy, but also by the decision-making structures that determine who speaks, who is heard, and who ultimately adapts. In the contemporary multilateral landscape, the tendency of weaker actors to align their positions with dominant powers for the sake of security or accessibility has evolved beyond its classical definition in realist theory. It now operates as a subtle but consequential social mechanism, systematically reducing the diplomatic boldness of the Global South countries in international forums.
The bandwagon effect is not just a phenomenon of individual behavior, but a reflection of an institutionalized architecture of structural inequality. Under these conditions, the countries of the Global South often hide their authentic preferences. Not because of argumentative incompetence, but rather because of the incentives created by financial dependence, representation asymmetry, and limited diplomatic capacity. The consequence is a direct contradiction to Sustainable Development Goal 16, which mandates the building of strong, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.
The Bandwagon Effect in the Context of Global Governance
From a realist perspective, countries that have identical votes in UNGA resolutions reflect similar preferences within the framework of the protection of sovereign norms. But empirical research shows a more complex reality. Khan’s (2020) study of Bangladesh’s voting patterns at the UNGA for the period 2001–2017 revealed that vote alignment does not always reflect the proximity of substantive preferences, but is often a product of geopolitical contexts and dependency relationships. Realists themselves recognize that this kind of voice alignment tends to collapse in crisis situations when countries are encouraged to self-help that makes it clear that a seemingly consensus-like may never really exist.
More direct evidence comes from a panel of 123 developing countries in a study of U.S. economic sanctions and UNGA voting patterns for the 1990–2014 period. The study, which limited its analysis to non-OECD countries because foreign aid was not considered to affect the voting behavior of rich countries, confirmed that external pressures, both in the form of incentives and sanctions, significantly shaped developing countries’ voting preferences on important issues. It further states that receive budget support and unconditional assistance from the US tend to vote in line with US interests. A correlation that is difficult to explain solely by the similarity of values.
This pattern was also identified structurally through the analysis of the UNGA voting network. Magu and Mateos (2017) found that the empirical distribution of voting similarity scores is right-skewed towards a value of 1, which means that clusters of countries with a high degree of alignment are much more common than can be explained by pure similarity of interest. This is consistent with the hypothesis that structurally weak states tend to move toward dominant power positions, not because of belief, but because of survival calculations.
The Inequality Architecture That Creates Bandwagon Incentives
Understanding why the bandwagon effect is so entrenched among the Global South requires a reading of the existing global governance architecture. At the International Monetary Fund, the United States holds 16.9 percent of the vote and has an effective veto since major decisions require an 85 percent majority. Meanwhile, Africa, which consists of 54 member states and accounts for most of the IMF’s 2026 active loan portfolio, only controls about 6.5 percent of the vote. On the UN Security Council, not a single African country holds a permanent seat, although more than 60 percent of the Council’s agenda is related to conflicts on the continent.
This representational inequality creates the conditions in which joining a majority position or with a certain power bloc becomes an administratively rational strategy, even when it is contrary to the long-term interests of a country.
The factor of dependence on military suppliers is also relevant. A study of the determinants of developing countries’ voting at the UNGA identified that the choice of military suppliers that placed countries in the orbit of Western, Russian, or Chinese influence also influenced voting tendencies. This provides important context for India’s abstaining position in the UNGA resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which is an inseparable decision from the fact that about 70 percent of India’s military equipment comes from Russia. This is not a moral inconsistency but rather a rationality imposed by the architecture of dependence.
Contradictions with SDGs 16: Measuring What Is Not Measurable
Sustainable Development Goal 16 mandates the development of institutions that are ‘peaceful, equitable, and inclusive at all levels’ is a mandate that explicitly encompasses global, not just domestic, governance. The SDG 16 Global Progress Report (UNDP/UNODC/OHCHR, 2023) describes an alarming situation where progress towards SDG 16 is very slow and in some cases even moving in the wrong direction. Violence is on the rise, inequality is hampering inclusive decision-making, and corruption is undermining the social contract.
On a broader level, the Sustainable Development Report 2024 (SDSN), which covers all 193 UN member states, found that on average only 16 percent of the SDG targets are on track to be achieved by 2030. SDG 16 is specifically mentioned as one of the goals that are furthest from the target. More significantly, among the five SDG targets that showed the most regression since 2015, press freedom, which is an indicator under SDG 16, is also included.
The connection between the bandwagon effect and the setback of SDG 16 is not just correlative. It is mechanistic. When countries are unable to express their authentic preferences in the multilateral negotiation process due to structural pressures, the three key pillars of SDG 16 inclusivity, accountability, and effectiveness are degraded simultaneously. Inclusivity is degraded as voices that are supposed to represent the global majority are eroded into a consensus designed by and for minorities. Accountability is degraded because countries that choose to go against the interests of their people in order to maintain relations with donors or trading partners cannot be held coherently accountable by their constituents. Effectiveness is degraded because resolutions born of pseudo-consensus will never be implemented with sincere commitment.
The Bandwagon Effect as a Social Phenomenon, Not an Individual Failure
It is important to emphasize that the bandwagon effect in this context is not a failure of diplomatic character or moral inconsistency. It is a rational response to unequal structural incentives. A quantitative analysis of UNGA voting in the period 1946–2014 shows that the voting patterns of developing countries consistently shifted to the dominant power configuration in that period not because of the convergence of values, but because of changes in the distribution of power and dependency.
This makes the bandwagon effect a social phenomenon in the strictest sense. It is not behavior that is freely chosen by individuals or states, but behavior that is conditioned by the structure of the system. As the literature on public voting behavior and foreign policy shows, public opinion and domestic pressures do influence foreign policy but in countries with low state capacity, external factors such as aid dependence and pressure from international financial institutions are often more decisive.
The consequences of this framing are very important in policy. The solution is not moral persuasion, but in the transformation of structural incentives. The countries of the Global South do not need to be educated to be braver, they just need to be given conditions where diplomatic courage does not mean financial suicide or geopolitical isolation.
If the bandwagon effect is understood as a product of the architecture of inequality, then meaningful reform must target that architecture. First, reform of representation in the Bretton Woods institutions remains a prerequisite that cannot be postponed. As long as the quota formula remains biased towards advanced economies and as long as the U.S. retains its veto, the structural incentives for the bandwagon will continue to exist. The SDSN Sustainable Development Report 2024 itself identifies strengthening UN-based multilateralism as one of the urgent needs of a recommendation that presupposes a more equitable representation architecture reform.
Second, transparency in the multilateral negotiation process must be expanded. If negotiating positions could be monitored more openly by civil society and the media, the space between publicly stated positions and actual behavior at the negotiating table would become narrower. This is especially relevant for the negotiation process in international financial institutions that have been operating with a high level of secrecy.
Third, strengthening a substantive south-south coalition that should go beyond solidarity rhetoric can also provide a buffer against external pressure. But this requires that the countries of the Global South build real policy coordination mechanisms in multilateral forums, not just in bilateral meetings. Without this kind of mechanism, Global South solidarity will continue to be an aspiration that is defeated by the calculation of bilateral dependency in critical moments.
Conclusion
The bandwagon effect in global governance is a manifestation of institutionalized inequality. It works discreetly, through incentives and dependencies, to produce consensuses that look strong on the outside but fragile on the inside. SDG 16 which mandates inclusive, accountable, and effective institutions cannot be realized as long as the global decision-making mechanisms themselves continue to produce conditions that encourage countries to hide their true preferences.
As UNDP affirms in its latest SDG 16 progress report, peace and prosperity for all people and the planet is only possible with decisive and innovative action on SDG 16. Such actions cannot be limited to the domestic realm alone, they must include a fundamental transformation in the global governance architecture that currently systematically penalizes diplomatic courage and incentivizes compliance.
Effective global governance is not built on consensus imposed by dependencies. It is built on genuine participation and genuine participation requires conditions in which authentic choices are not punished by structures that are supposed to serve all.
