Ukraines

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The attacks have triggered fires in two districts of Kyiv, according to the city’s mayor.

Russian missile attacks have struck Kyiv in the third large-scale assault on the Ukrainian capital in less than a week.

Early on Wednesday, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said in a statement on Telegram that the Russian strikes had triggered fires in two districts of the city. It is not clear if there have been any casualties or damage.

Moscow also launched a large-scale attack on Kyiv on Monday, killing at least 14 people and damaging at least a dozen buildings.

Both Russia and Ukraine have recently expanded their use of long-range weapons, including missiles, marking a new front in Moscow’s four-year war.

Ukraine has focused its attacks on Russian energy facilities to weaken its war efforts.

Ukraine said on Tuesday that its drones attacked a dozen tankers from Russia’s “shadow fleet” over the past two days that were delivering fuel to Moscow-occupied Crimea. Kyiv’s military said they had struck eight vessels subject to sanctions in the Sea of Azov, each with a deadweight of about 7,000 metric tonnes. Two more tankers were hit later in the day.

The Sea of Azov is a key supply route for Russian forces in Crimea and other occupied parts of southern Ukraine.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 – in a move that has been unrecognised internationally – eight years before launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Moscow has not publicly commented on this week’s attacks on Ukraine, which also included strikes on electrical substations, radar systems, and missile installations.

Attacks amid NATO Summit

The latest exchange of fire between Russia and Ukraine also comes amid NATO’s annual summit, which began on Tuesday. The military alliance’s leaders have gathered in Turkey’s capital Ankara for the two-day summit, where defence spending and the Russia-Ukraine war is under discussion.

NATO is expected to pledge further military support for Ukraine, as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urges the alliance to step up aid for the country’s air defences following a deadly escalation of Russian attacks on Kyiv.

Zelenskyy – who has renewed his call for Ukraine to be allowed to join the alliance – wrote on social media on Tuesday that he had signed new agreements with Estonia, the Netherlands, and Denmark in Ankara.

The deals create “new opportunities for joint production, the development of innovative defense technologies, systematic exchange of expertise, and the export of Ukrainian battlefield-proven solutions”, he said.

Further agreements are expected with Germany, Norway, Finland, and Canada.

US President Donald Trump is also expected to meet Zelenskyy on the summit sidelines on Wednesday, having spoken with Russian President Vladimir Putin ahead of the NATO gathering.

Asked about Russia’s war in Ukraine, Trump said he hoped it would be settled “soon”.

“I think they both want to make a deal,” Trump said.

“It’s too bad it took so long, but I think something’s going to come out.”

Over the past several weeks, news began emerging about Ukraine’s use of modified, AI-enhanced kamikaze drones to target Russian cargo trucks, fuel tankers, railroad cars and even vessels as far as 150 miles behind the front lines. Dubbed the mid-range strike campaign by Kyiv, this effort is having a devastating effect on Russian logistics, cutting off key highways to Crimea, helping to halt Moscow’s gains and pave the way for Ukrainian advances.

To learn more about this campaign, we reached out to one of the soldiers leading this effort from the unit that created it. In an exclusive interview, an Unmanned Systems Department Officer for the First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine offered us unique insights into how the program began, how it’s going, where it is headed and how AI is helping to identify and hit targets deep behind the lines. It’s a capability we described in great detail — about how it was rapidly gestating and would arrive on the battlefield around now. The officer spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss operational details.

Some of the questions and answers have been edited for clarity.

Q: Walk me through the genesis of the mid-range strike campaign.

A: I will first of all start with answering the question of why. So the reason why we are currently conducting this campaign is to hunt enemy logistics capabilities, and currently we have a lot of quite cheap assets that can strike enemy targets at quite a deep range. So the overall meaning, the overall sense of this campaign is to strike enemy concentrations of cargo in the places where this concentration is the highest and the protection of those enemy logistical assets is at the lowest level.

So, if we’re talking about enemy logistics very close to the front line, to the line of contact, we are mostly talking about a person with a backpack. Then, if we are moving deeper into the enemy controlled area, further from the front line, then we’re talking about cars. Then even deeper we’re talking about trucks. Even deeper we’re talking about long haulers with trailers, so a higher concentration of cargo. Even deeper into the enemy controlled area, we’re talking about the railroads, the trains that are carrying supplies. So the deeper we go from the line of contact, the higher is the concentration of enemy cargo.

The other part of answering this question is basically about how the enemy protects their logistical assets. So the deeper we go from the line of contact, not only is the distance larger, but also the areas that the enemy needs to protect. So just simple mathematical calculations show us that the distance of 50 kilometers deep from the line of contact is usually the most concentrated area the enemy has to defend against our strike assets. But if we go to the depths of 300 kilometers, then the areas that the enemy should protect are much larger, and it’s basically impossible to saturate that area with all the necessary protection assets that the enemy needs to strike down our drones.

The point I would like to make is that we conduct those strike operations at deeper ranges with basically the same assets that we use for the tactical depths, for example, at the depths of 50 kilometers. That means we do not increase the cost of our assets. We just introduced some technical modifications, and we can use the same assets to strike in the deep area.

How Ukraine Uses the US-made Hornet AI Strike Drone To Disrupt And Cut Russian Logistics Lines

Q: What drones are you using to carry out these attacks and how are you increasing the ranges?

A: Basically, we’re using fixed-wing kamikaze drones with some modifications in terms of communication systems. We’ve installed Starlink systems on those drones, and we have also introduced a number of modifications in terms of the engine of the drones – in terms of the overall propelling unit. And this allowed us to increase the range of the assets that we used previously for the range up to 50 kilometers, with some modifications for longer distances.

Q: What kinds of drones are you using?

A: Just the simple fixed-wing chemical drones, such as Hornet systems, such as the Darts systems, and also some other assets that, for now, we prefer not to mention.

Darts

Q: Can you provide additional details about the modifications you have made to these drones and what is their maximum range?

A: Well, I would say that these are quite technical things, and I wouldn’t want to disclose those, because I would want to avoid the situation where the enemy is going to do the same modifications.

Q: Are you reaching as far as 100 kilometers?

A: From what we can say now, we can cover distances of up to 250 kilometers, but as you might understand, with time we will cover longer and longer distances.

Q: Can you describe how these attacks work? Do you operate these as first-person view drones through a video feed? Do they have a terminal seeker? 

A: The process is really simple. So, for example, we select a section of the road, or the road as a whole and we distribute that road or the sections among our units. And I would like to mention that this is an all Ukrainian operation. It’s not a task for just one single unit, and basically each unit has its own area of responsibility and its own section of the road. 

And then we just send drones there in hunting mode, and I cannot disclose how this works from the standpoint of intelligence, but the overall principle is that the intelligence just gives us the priorities for the targets. For example, they say that you need to target this type of vehicle with these types of cargo.

And in terms of the targeting, I remember that you were also asking the question about how the targets are selected. For this we use both the AI tools and also the operator himself, so we’re using both methods for that.

Q: I want to get back to AI in a bit, but what area of operations do you cover?

A: Our area of interest and area of responsibility is related to all the roads that the enemy is using to bring in supplies to the area of operations of our corps, which is roughly in the area of the town of Dobropillia in eastern Ukraine, and for example, this may be the route from Rostov that goes to Mariupol and then goes to Donetsk, and this could be any other route that the enemy might use to bring military cargo to the area of operations of our corps.

Q: What were some of the more successful mid-range drone strike missions you carried out?

A: That’s basically an easy principle. When I said that we are hunting the enemy’s logistics, I mean that this is a daily process. This is a continuous process, and this is not about one standalone mission, when we fly somewhere, when we hit a target and the mission is over.

Last night, Ukraine expanded its mid-range strike campaign to the Sea of Azov, hitting at least 5 vessels carrying Russian cargo.

At least two of the cargo vessels were hit at the occupied ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol, as Ukrainian forces seek to cut off Russian logistics. pic.twitter.com/NoXeAO7Ca6

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 5, 2026

Q: How are these mid-range strikes on Russian logistics affecting their ability to fight?

A: This is causing shortages of fuel for the enemy. This was already commented on by our media, and also the media resources of the enemy, and now we understand that this is true, not only for Crimea, where there is a severe shortage of fuel now, but also this is true about the other Russian-controlled territories. And basically, when we are striking enemy logistical supplies of fuel, this affects the overall situation, because what is fuel? Fuel is basically the blood of war, which is necessary to fuel the generators that the enemy is using for the FPV operations. The fuel is used for the vehicles that basically bring in those FPVs to the combat zone.

I’d like to add an additional explanation of how this works. If we destroy a car that brings fuel to the line of contact, then we’re talking about destroying like two canisters, so that’s approximately 40 liters of fuel. But if we strike a fuel tank and a tank vehicle, which is bringing fuel to the overall area, so then we can talk about several tons of materials.

Gas stations across Russian-occupied Crimea are facing worsening fuel shortages, with long queues, rationing, and voucher-based distribution reported by residents. Some locals say fuel has become so scarce that it is treated as a luxury, while Moscow insists there is no cause for… pic.twitter.com/0LSYWEqiDH

— Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (@RFERL) June 5, 2026

Q: Is this setting the stage for a Ukrainian advance in the east or Zaporizhia?

A: I would say that blocking the logistical supplies to the Zaporizhia Oblast and also to Crimea is a byproduct of our attacks aimed at cutting enemy logistics to our area of operations. Because we’re targeting the roads that go through Mariupol, also to Crimea, to supply the Zaporizhia region, and as well our area of operations. But as for the most strategic aspect of this question of whether this might influence some counter-offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, I think that is not the question within my scope of responsibility, because I’m an officer responsible for the UAS component of the corps, and I think that this is more of a question that should be directed to the general staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Ukraine 🇺🇦 continues to launch an important number of mid-range strike, targeting Russian 🇷🇺 logistics in occupied territories

Since early may, more than 270 trucks have been hit, together with multiple fuel depots and trains.

🧵THREAD🧵1/14 ⬇️ pic.twitter.com/YnisZf2kJ6

— Clément Molin (@clement_molin) June 4, 2026

Q: Tell me how you came to use the U.S.-made Hornet drones.

A: I would say that this is also a question that should be directed at one level up from my level. We get those drones, we deploy those drones, but the questions of how we get them and what are the specifics of their supply, this is not a question that I can answer.

Q: When did you start getting them?

A: We have been receiving these drones for almost a year.

Q: When you got the Hornet drones, were you given any instructions on what missions to accomplish with them or what targets to pursue?

A: I think that the principle thing to explain here is that the Hornet drone is a tactical level UAV system. It can be used at the maximum range of 50 kilometers – the maximum range of the basic configuration of this drone. The drones we are currently using are the modification of the Hornet drone, but the basic configuration of this drone is only a tactical-level UAV. This is why our mid-strike operations, which have started only recently, are using modified drones.

I think that it is important to add that these modifications are conducted by the units themselves.

The First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine maintains control over enemy logistics near Donetsk.

Strike UAV pilots are targeting Russian logistics deep in the operational rear. Drone units maintain constant surveillance and fire control over all supply routes around… pic.twitter.com/i4TYOWJBg4

— First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine (@azov_media) April 16, 2026

Q: When did you begin to make the modifications and was the mid-range strike concept something that Azov developed?

A: Yeah, I would say that basically that was Azov development. So the first tests of these new modifications started in early winter. After approximately a month of testing, we started combat deployment of those drones approximately in January or February of this year. And we use those new modifications to ensure our middle strike operations. In terms of the tactics, I would also like to say that Azov developed new tactics of the deployment of middle strike drones, because the previous tactics they were mostly concentrated on the use of very expensive assets, which are available in limited numbers, so the targeting cycle was different, which is why we needed to develop new tactics and change this targeting cycle.

Q: What systems were you using before that were so expensive?

A: Well I’m not really talking about some specific assets here. I’m mostly talking about the overall tactics and the targeting cycle. So, the tactics of middle strikes were developed for expensive assets that the Corps didn’t have at the moment. So, this is basically why we started developing our own assets that could ensure that we have those middle strike capabilities, and we can also engage targets at the operational level.

Magyar claims a reduction from 3,800 cargo journeys to 1,100 cargo journey (71.05%) along the E-58 Mariupol -Berdiansk – Melitopol – Simferopol highway in the past two weeks

He makes it clear that doesn’t mean they’ve destroyed 2,700 trucks, nor that they have total fire control… https://t.co/O3K2Iz53Xg pic.twitter.com/VTPn3ghZcD

— Ukraine Control Map (@UAControlMap) June 9, 2026

Q: When you added Starlink, did you have to seek permission from SpaceX to use their system for these weapons?

A: The first thing that I would like to say is that we do not use only Starlink. It is just one of the possible communication systems and communication solutions that we’re using. And the second thing that I would like to add is that all the international issues, international cooperation questions, are the issues that should be dealt with at the level of our ministries and at the level of our central government, so once again, this is not a question that I can answer.

Una parte vital de la efectividad de los drones Hornet con los que Ucrania está atacando las rutas logísticas rusas entre 80 y 120km del frente es la recopilacion de datos para que el algoritmo aprenda. Por eso algunos modelos llevan grandes terminales Starlink. https://t.co/yGePjoPo2K pic.twitter.com/iWu2bLrwq5

— Martin Tuitero (@TuiteroMartin) June 2, 2026

Q: Can you tell me what other communications systems you use?

A: No, this information is still secret, because none of those assets have been taken by the enemy, so the enemy doesn’t know yet that we’re using those. But I think that in some time we will be able to go public with those assets and tell more about what we use, apart from Starlink.

Q: Are you using Starlink and the other systems on the Darts drones as well, or just Hornet?

A: Yes, we are using Darts for those middle strike attacks. So, basically, the overall tactics of those mid-strike attacks with small UAV systems, it can use any fixed wing kamikaze drones with modifications which is why we are using Hornets, we are using Darts and also the other types of drones.

While the Ukrainian “Hornet” strike UAV is receiving a lot of attention recently, the “Darts” UAV remains a workhorse for mid-range strike.
It, too, has AI terminal targeting and control capabilities to defeat Russian jamming. https://t.co/cNcQytap1D pic.twitter.com/C8nYJ20Uer

— Roy🇨🇦 (@GrandpaRoy2) June 6, 2026

Q: Can you talk about the other types of drones? 

A: Unfortunately, no. The enemy has not yet got hold of those assets, and if one of them will be shot down, or if one of them will be captured by the enemy, then I think that we will be able to go public with those assets.

Q: Can you talk more about how you are using AI for the Hornets and Darts?

A: The AI is used for the so-called last-mile system. I’m talking about the terminal guidance here, and also the AI can also be used to identify the targets, especially when the drone is flying in the autonomous mode. It can recognize the type of the target and it can automatically engage the target. So all of these processes can happen without the involvement of the operator. This allows us to launch several drones at the same time, and this also allows us to ensure a higher level of coordination for those attacks.

I think that one of the examples of these attacks was captured by one of our videos that you might have seen when one fixed-wing drone is observing the target and the other drone is actually hitting it. 

1-й корпус НГУ «Азов» контролює ворожу логістику під Донецьком. Знищення російської техніки

Q: Is there a man in the loop or a man on the loop during the terminal phase of the attack or is it fully autonomous?

A: Since we are trying to control the whole process, usually it is the person who takes the final decision and actually makes this decision to strike the target, because we do not want to over rely on the artificial intelligence. If necessary, this whole process can also happen without human involvement, but as I have already mentioned, our policy is that the decision should be made exclusively by the operator.

Q: So this is man in the loop?

A: Yes, so technically men can be out of this loop, but in our case we involve humans in this system, so that’s man in the loop.

Visual look of Hornet UI. Not much new, can mark soldiers individually. Seems aiming is done by either by lock a target (red) or manually aiming by continusly clicking (green) https://t.co/d2LGtV2aON

— Tommy Lund (@TommyLundn) June 6, 2026

Q: Have the Russians developed countermeasures for this effort?

A: Since the overall intent was to go to the massive deployment of those drones against the enemy logistics at once, as for now, the enemy has not yet had enough time to adapt to these tactics of ours. And now they’re desperately trying to find some countermeasures to find some ways to react to this. 

They are putting on anti-drone nets deep into their controlled territory. They are placing people armed with shotguns every 50 meters of their critical roads, but basically, as for now, there is no Russian tactic that would be effective in protecting their logistics. I do not say that they will not come up with this tactic in a month or so, but as for now, they do not have an effective countermeasure for that.

The only thing that I would like to add is that we approximately know the direction in which the enemy is moving to ensure counter measures to this tactic of ours, and we already have countermeasures for their countermeasures.

The current Ukrainian superiority in mid-range drone warfare is a brilliant advantage that comes with an expiration date.

Failing to prepare for the day Russia matches this capability guarantees a catastrophic collapse of front line logistics for Ukraine.

Ukraine is rightfully… pic.twitter.com/RI1NWLNYUc

— Joni Askola (@joni_askola) June 8, 2026

Q: Is the AI enhancement helping to mitigate Russian jamming and electronic warfare measures?

A: Well, I would like to say that EW is not the only way to counter UAVs. So, in addition to EW assets, there are other counter drone methods. Nets can be used. Air observation posts can be used. The drones can be shot down with enemy interceptor drones, and also there are hundreds and hundreds of people armed with shotguns who can also try to shoot the drones down. So the EW systems are just a small part of this overall system of drone countermeasures, and it is a general misconception that all anti-drone efforts are from the EW system. I would say that EW accounts for approximately 10% of overall counter drone efforts.

The main idea of the use of the AI systems is not only to help operators to counter enemy drone countermeasures, but the AI also helps the operator with navigation, with orientation, with the identification of the targets. So this is a complex system that helps the operator with many tasks.

Here: strike by the Ukrainian-American “Hornet” drone on occupier positions. Two Russians confirmed as “gruz 200” (KIA).
Interestingly, the Russians call this drone “Martian-2” because its capabilities seem “out of this world” to them.

High Autonomy: Operates with AI (autonomous… pic.twitter.com/Ao0MAiCqUp

— Takeshi Kovacs (@PrzemekShura) May 12, 2026

Q: What are the lessons that the U.S. can learn from your mid-range drone strike campaign, given the importance of logistics everywhere.

A: Well, I would say that the main lesson that the U.S. can learn from our experience is that drones in their basic configuration, right out of the box, is not something that can work, and this is not something that can bring you the best results at once. This is why every unit should have their own drone laboratory that can reconfigure those drones and modify them, and I’m not only talking about reconfiguring tactical level drones to turn them into middle strike capacities. I’m talking about all warfare in general.

Assets become obsolete very quickly and in three months everything can change, starting from the navigation systems and ending with the control systems. For example, today the GPS signal works, in a month it doesn’t work anymore. Today we use this set of frequency ranges, and in a month all those frequency ranges are jammed by the enemy. So I’m saying this for you to understand that for example, if the U.S. government purchases Hornet drones for their units, then the units are going to have good tactical level drones. But if you want to squeeze all of the possible benefits from those drones, then you will need to modify the structure of your units and include the departments, include the sections that will deal with the modification and reconfiguration of those drones to ensure the most efficient results that can be achieved.

From what I see now, the U.S. is mostly just giving the unit some assets, but they are not thinking about re-configuring or repurposing those drones.

Q: Is there anything I haven’t asked you that you would like to address?

A: I think that we have covered all the topics. The only thing that I would like to add is that I would like your audience to see that Ukraine introduces new innovations that can basically change the battlefield, and this is why trying to forecast the outcome of the war based on the number of tanks or aircraft or bombs that would be incorrect, so the victory will belong to the side capable of adapting faster and not to the side that has more resources.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

No handshake and no photo as Mirra Andreeva of Russia beats Marta Kostyuk of Ukraine to reach French Open tennis final.

Russian teenager Mirra Andreeva reached her first Grand Slam final by beating Marta Kostyuk of Ukraine 6-1, 6-3 in a tense encounter at the French Open.

Andreeva converted her first match point when she served for the tennis match on Thursday.

There was no post-match handshake between the pair, however, and Kostyuk walked off quickly, turning only to wave and blow kisses to the crowd at Court Philippe-Chatrier, where some fans were draped in Ukrainian flags.

The atmosphere beforehand was somewhat tense as the players had separate photos taken as they each stood next to two children on their respective sides of the net. Usually, the players pose for the same photo, standing right next to each other by the net.

Kostyuk and countrywoman Oleksandra Oliynykova have spoken out during the tournament about the impact Russia’s four-year invasion of Ukraine is having on their country.

The eighth seed seized control from the outset and never loosened her grip on the contest, overwhelming Kostyuk with her ⁠depth and aggression on Court Philippe-Chatrier to set up a title clash against compatriot Diana Shnaider or Polish qualifier Maja Chwalinska.

Andreeva, 19, raced into a 4-0 lead in the opening set and barely looked back in the third meeting between the two ⁠players, the Ukrainian having won the first ⁠two.

Kostyuk briefly threatened to make a contest of it in the second set, but the Russian swiftly snuffed out any hopes of a comeback before serving ⁠out the match to complete a dominant display.

“I’m still very nervous, very nervous coming to ⁠this match as she’s had an ⁠amazing season, she hadn’t lost on clay, so that put pressure,” said Andreeva.

“She’s an amazing player, a tough opponent, so I’m super happy with the way ‌I played. I’m happy I got revenge for the Madrid final, and to reach my first Grand Slam final.

“All of these ‌feelings ‌combined, I’ve never felt anything like this. I’m very excited about the last match here in Paris.”

Top-seeded Sara Errani and Andrea Vavassori of Italy won the mixed doubles final earlier Thursday, beating Gabriela Dabrowski of Canada and Evan King of the US 4-6, 6-3, 10-4.

An Italian is guaranteed to be in Sunday’s men’s French Open singles final, with Flavio Cobolli facing fellow Italian Matteo Arnaldi on Friday in the first Grand Slam semifinal for both players.

It has been more than four years since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, expanding its occupation of Ukrainian lands, which started in 2014. In the chaos and violence of the first months of the invasion, families were separated, and childcare institutions were cut off from the control of the central authorities in Kyiv. As a result, the occupation forces forcibly transferred more than 20,000 Ukrainian children to Russia.

Russian officials claimed that they did not abduct Ukrainian children, but “saved” them through humanitarian evacuations. However, international investigations have since found that many such transfers were unlawful under international humanitarian law. In many documented cases, transfers were carried out without the consent of the living parent or legal guardians of the child.

International humanitarian law prohibits all forcible transfers and deportations of protected people from occupied territory, except for evacuations strictly required to ensure the population’s safety. Even then, evacuation must happen within occupied territory, be temporary, preserve family unity and return evacuees home as soon as hostilities cease.

Today, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian children are devastated by this forcible transfer. Instead of abiding by international legal obligations and returning them to their homeland, Russia has transformed the issue into yet another bargaining chip against the Ukrainian people.

But Ukraine refuses to abandon its children. For the past four years, there have been intense efforts from families, NGOs and the Ukrainian government to bring them back.

Take the case of Lesya (the name has been changed to protect her identity), whose testimony was recorded by The Reckoning Project— a global team of journalists and lawyers documenting and publicising atrocities committed in the war. Lesya was 15 years old when Russian forces occupied her village in the Kherson region in 2022. When the occupation authorities imposed a mandatory evacuation, she was put on a truck with more than 30 other children and was sent to a rehabilitation centre in Feodosia, Crimea. A woman accompanying the children told her that her mother would join her shortly.

At the facility, Lesya and other Ukrainian children were subjected to a strict routine, forced to do chores and study in Russian, using Russian textbooks. They were kept under surveillance indoors most of the time in a building with windows that could not be opened. Two days a week, the children underwent military training.

Eventually, a relative located her, and with the help of Save Ukraine, a Ukrainian NGO facilitating children’s return, her mother managed to bring her back.

But Lesya’s case is the exception rather than the rule. More than 2,000 Ukrainian children have been brought back thanks to efforts by NGOs, the government and foreign mediators.

Pressure through international institutions has also been pursued, but that has not accelerated the process of return.

In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued warrants of arrest for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.

In July 2025, the European Court of Human Rights, in Ukraine and the Netherlands v Russia, found Russia responsible for a number of human rights violations, including the organised removal of children. The court also required Russia to cooperate in establishing a mechanism to find and safely return children.

In March this year, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine concluded that Russia’s deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children amount to crimes against humanity. The report identifies the removal of Ukrainian children as a part of a well-planned and systematically executed policy, conceived at the highest level.

On May 11, the European Union sanctioned 16 individuals and seven entities, while the United Kingdom sanctioned 29 individuals and entities responsible for the deportation, forced transfer, forced assimilation, indoctrination, militarisation and unlawful adoption of Ukrainian children. Overall, the EU has sanctioned more than 130 people and organisations for these actions. The United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Switzerland and several other countries have introduced similar measures.

The lack of progress on this issue has driven families to desperation. Some have tried to bring their children back on their own or through often-daring missions by Save Ukraine and five other Ukrainian NGOs.

There should be no need for these risky missions. Under international humanitarian law, Russia is obligated to identify and register Ukrainian children in their care, facilitate family reunification, and permit access to neutral actors assisting Ukrainian children.

As negotiations for the end of the war have stalled and other global events have displaced Ukraine from global headlines, we urgently need to put the issue of the abducted Ukrainian children back in the spotlight.

There are several areas in which existing efforts can expand.

First, a comprehensive tracing mechanism needs to be established and financed to track abducted Ukrainian children and prevent their disappearance into dispersed care and adoption systems.

Second, ongoing legal efforts to hold to account Russian officials involved in the abduction should be intensified. This means coordinated prosecutions in states where the universal jurisdiction principle can be applied, as well as joint investigation strategies supported by Eurojust, the EU’s judicial hub. Ukraine’s partners should support its judicial processes launched against Russian officials and cooperate where needed, including through extraditions where legally applicable and other lawful transfer mechanisms. While justice may be slow, the prospect of accountability can have a deterrent effect.

Third, states can and should fully implement sanctions, trade restrictions and other obligations they assumed but did not consistently observe in practice. The sanctions regime on Russia has severely hurt its economy, but it has also seen continuous evasion. A strict implementation can help put more pressure on the regime in Moscow.

While stories of family reunions are heartening, they are just a drop in a bucket compared with the number of children who continue to be separated from their families and absorbed into a system of indoctrination and militarisation.

We must not allow the issue of returning Ukrainian children to be yet another negotiating chip for Moscow. It cannot be put on hold because negotiations have stalled or because other priorities have captured the world’s attention.

Four years is a long time in a child’s life. Each passing day further erodes their national identity and deepens the pain of separation, as they grow up in a hostile environment. There is no principle more universal than the belief that children belong with their parents and loved ones, and Ukrainian children deserve this basic human right today, not at some point in the future.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

With ground maneuver a huge risk thanks to the ubiquity of deadly aerial drones, Ukraine is increasingly relying on uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) to move supplies, rescue the wounded, shoot down drones, lay mines and even fight battles. As a result, the head of the country’s defense technology incubator has been tasked with ensuring that there are enough of these systems to meet the voracious demand.

These efforts are being closely watched. Five years into an existential fight, Ukraine has become a global leader in ground drone technology. Kyiv is deploying these systems at a scale and pace that even the most advanced militaries can’t come close to keeping up with.

In an exclusive hour-long interview earlier this month, Brave1 CEO Andrii Hrytseniuk spoke with us about how Ukraine is set to produce tens of thousands of UGVs this year, how they are being used, and the importance of artificial intelligence in increasing the efficiency of these robots in combat.

This is the second of a two part interview. The first part focused on Ukraine’s interceptor drones, which you can read here.

Some of the questions and answers have been edited for clarity.

Q: President Zelensky set a goal of producing 50,000 unmanned ground vehicles this year. How is that going? And how can you hit that target?

A: We are moving according to the plan that was announced by President Zelensky. And this is a very ambitious goal, but we feel pretty confident that we will be able to execute this plan and this task and the armed forces will get many times more drones than in previous years.

Q: How do you reach that goal?

A:  On the frontline, we use only Ukrainian drones, maybe just a few international ones, but about 99% of the drones that are used on the battlefield are fully manufactured here in Ukraine, and this is the high priority area for us for the last two years. There are 280 Ukrainian companies, private companies, that are producing UGVs. And in total, there are 550 different models of UGV. This is a big variety, starting from small to very big UGVs. And there are different types of categories of ground vehicles.

Inside A Ukrainian Secret Ground Drone Factory | Shaping the Future of Ground Battlest

Q: What are some of those categories?

A: The first are those used for logistics. Their main purpose is to provide transportation in the gray zone, because it’s very dangerous on the last 10 to 15 kilometers from the front line, and there are a lot of drones used for transportation of goods, like construction materials, ammunition and provisions. It’s very risky for soldiers and our philosophy is that we should not risk our soldiers. 

Everything that is possible to be done by drones has to be done by drones for transportation. In March, we performed 9,000 missions. In April, more than 10,000, so the implementation of logistics by drones is permanently increasing.

Ukraine’s ‘Khartia’ brigade turns to land drones to survive the drone-saturated frontline

Q: What are the other categories of UGVs?

A: The second category are special UGVs that are used for evacuation of wounded soldiers.

You can see an example of one of those rescue missions in the following video.

The third one is combat UGVs. And we have more than 10 different models of combat UGVs. They are used for attacking Russian soldiers and hitting Russian armored vehicles. Also they are used as anti-drone aerial defense systems. We use combat UGVs to hit Shaheds, to hit FPV drones, including those using fiber optics and even small Russian planes.

Q: How are these combat UGVs armed?

A: We have different combat UGVs using 5.45mm, 5.56mm, 7.62mm and 12.7mm guns. And we have a variety of different grenade launchers, like the Mk19 and others.

Q: Can you provide any details about what kinds of sensors these weapons use to engage drones?

A: I will not share the technical details, but I can tell you that combat UGVs without artificial intelligence do not work at appropriate effectiveness. All combat turrets that we are using have elements of artificial intelligence, and it allows them to be as effective as they are.

Q: How are the UGVs using AI to target drones?

A: First of all, this is machine vision. This is object recognition, identification, classification, tracking and providing recommendations for the operator on what to do.

Q: So basically, these systems acquire the target, determine how far away they are, at what altitude and speed and that they open fire on their own?

A: Yes. We are more advanced than Russia in combat turrets and combat UGVs, that’s why I would avoid sharing the technical details about how we are doing that.

Ukraine’s New AI-controlled Turret Is Taking Down Russian Drones | Sky Sentinel in Action

Q: How common is the use of fiber optic cables to guide UGVs?

A: For UGVs, fiber optics is not used.

Q: Not at all?

A: There are some experiments, but the use cases for fiber optics on UGVs are very, very limited. Only a very small percentage of UGVs use fiber optics.

Q: Why?

A:  UGVs typically have multiple missions. They go forward and go back, and when you’re using fiber optics, typically, this is a one-way mission.

Q: What can you tell me about how troops communicate with UGVs for combat missions?

A: Without the Delta command and control system, all these advanced technologies on the battlefield will not be working. The Delta command and control system, which is number one in the world, is absolutely crucial. And this is for all our drones, multi-domain operations, everything.

War in Ukraine: An advanced digital map. The Delta system #shorts #warinukraine #united24media

Q Can you provide any details about how that works?

A: No.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Russia pounded Ukraine’s capital overnight on Saturday with drones and ballistic missiles, including a powerful hypersonic Oreshnik missile, killing at least four people and damaging residential buildings. Footage shows people sheltering underground, while firefighters work above.

Ukraine has provided imagery of its first homegrown glide bomb, which it says is now ready for combat. Developments by both sides in the Ukraine conflict underscore the fact that standoff munitions of all kinds are in particularly high demand, to counter the increasing density and lethality of enemy air defenses.

According to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Mykhailo Fedorov, the development of the weapon — the name of which hasn’t been revealed — took 17 months. A product of Brave1, the defense tech arm of the Ukrainian government, the weapon is said to carry a 250-kilogram (551-pound) warhead, to which is attached a wing kit and some kind of guidance system, the nature of which has not been disclosed.

In a statement today, Brave1 said the glide bomb “has completed all required trials,” and has now been declared ready for combat. The weapon is said to be able to hit targets “dozens of kilometers behind enemy lines.”

With the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense having placed a first order, pilots are now said to be training with the weapon, meaning that combat deployment is “imminent.”

Ukrainian authorities claim that the weapon was designed from scratch and was “not copied from Western or Soviet systems.”

An accompanying video shows the release of the weapon from a Ukrainian Air Force Su-24 Fencer swing-wing attack jet. The bomb is then seen with its range-extending wings deployed; interestingly, these are seen extended immediately after release. Otherwise, the weapon also features notably large cruciform tailfins. The apparent lugs seen under the body of the munitions suggest that, like Russian glide bombs, the weapon ‘topples over’ to assume the correct profile before the wings deploy.

We have reached out to Brave1 for more details on the glide bomb.

It is also worth noting that a previous video, from August 2024, showed another type of air-launched munition, apparently also homegrown, being released from a Ukrainian Su-24, as you can read about here.

Again, we have reached out to Brave1 to better understand if there is any relationship between these weapons. However, the development of the new weapon officially began in December of 2024, several months after the mystery munition appeared.

As for the Ukrainian Air Force, the new glide bomb should provide an important addition to Western-supplied weapons in this class.

Ukraine already employs the Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) and AASM-250 Hammer bomb supplied by the United States and France, respectively. The Ukrainian Air Force also makes extensive use of the U.S.-supplied Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), which also has pop-out wings.

At the same time, the new weapon helps Ukraine match similar weapons that are proliferating in the Russian inventory. The Russian Aerospace Forces have, for several years now, been making extensive use of increasingly larger dumb bombs fitted with add-on precision guidance kits. Russia has also been working to refine its glide bombs, making them more effective than the original, fairly crude designs.

Based on Ukraine’s experience with its expanding roster of longer-range kamikaze drones and glide bombs currently in service with both sites, a satellite navigation-assisted inertial guidance system would be used to direct the glide bomb to a specific set of coordinates. Additional seekers are possible, but not probable at this time.

It is not clear if the new Ukrainian weapon has any kind of powerplant. Ukraine has already been employing multiple types of jet-powered kamikaze drones. More importantly, Ukraine’s French-supplied Hammer precision-guided bombs also feature a rocket booster. This feature is of unique utility for Ukraine, which often slings its glide bombs via pop-up launch profiles from low level executed by its fighter and attack aircraft. This is due to the extremely heavy air defenses near the front lines. Even without a motor, however, the weapon provides an important capability and one that is increasingly important as stocks of Western-supplied munitions are eroded or their supply is otherwise interrupted.

A video compilation provides a look at the French-made Hammer munition being used by Ukrainian Su-25 attack jets, including low-level toss bombing:

ЖАБА. ЗСУ Су-25 . З Новим роком , друзі !

We will likely have to wait to see the weapon in action before establishing whether it can be launched from platforms other than the Su-24, although this would seem almost guaranteed.

While Ukraine’s Su-24s are the country’s launch platforms for stealthy Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles provided by the United Kingdom and France, its MiG-29 Fulcrums and Su-27 Flankers have been the primary carriers for other Western-supplied air-launched precision air-to-ground munitions like the JDAM-ER, SDB, and Hammer bombs, as well as AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM). The size of the weapon would allow it to be carried by any of these platforms, as well as Su-25 Frogfoot attack jets, which also deliver Hammers.

Whatever the launch platforms and the new weapon’s exact capabilities, its biggest advantage is that it offers a domestic source of air-launched precision-guided munitions with some kind of standoff range. The longer-range Storm Shadows and SCALP-EGs were provided only in relatively limited quantities to Ukraine. They can only be launched by the Su-24 and are reserved for more strategic targets.

Meanwhile, the JDAM-ER has never been in widespread use with the U.S. military or other foreign armed forces, so the quantities available are questionable.

To help meet the shortfall, the U.S. Air Force launched a project to develop a new, relatively low-cost precision-guided air-launched standoff munition focused primarily on meeting Ukrainian demands for weapons of this kind. In August of last year, it was reported that Washington had approved the transfer of thousands of these Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAM) to Ukraine. As well as the Rusty Dagger from Zone 5 Technologies, CoAspire developed the Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile (RAACM) under the ERAM program. 

However, evidence of these weapons being employed by Ukraine has yet to emerge.

There is also the fact that a domestically developed standoff weapon can be used without restriction against any kind of target. Previously, longer-ranged Western-supplied weapons have come with restrictions on their employment. As a result, Ukrainian officials have repeatedly and publicly called for more flexibility in striking targets inside Russia proper. This became especially critical during the Ukrainian incursion into the latter country’s Kursk region.

The apparent rapid pace of development of Ukraine’s first homegrown glide bomb suggests that this is an urgent requirement and one that may well have been driven by problems in the availability of equivalent Western munitions. With that in mind, combined with claims that the weapon is now ready for combat, we may not have to wait too long for evidence of it being used in action.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Hours after hunkering down during Russia’s most intense Shahed-136 drone barrage of the war, the head of the country’s defense technology incubator spoke with us about the interceptor drones his country developed to defend against them.

Some of these small munitions cost about $1,000 a piece and can reach speeds of nearly 200 miles per hour. Some also have AI-assisted guidance. They have proven to be a far cheaper alternative to effectors like Patriot interceptors – costing more than $5 million a piece – and even far less advanced missiles for downing Shaheds, which have caused widespread destruction across Ukraine for years. In an hour-long interview, Brave1 CEO Andrii Hrytseniuk talked about how Ukraine developed Shahed interceptors, their effectiveness and the growing interest from the U.S. – which produced its own drone-killing interceptor that Ukraine has used – and other allies. He also spoke about Ukraine’s burgeoning uncrewed ground vehicle industry, which we will discuss in the second part of this interview.

Some of the questions and answers have been lightly edited for clarity.

In total, we have more than 150 Ukrainian companies who are producing interceptors. And these are interceptors of different architecture. Some are small rocket type first-person view (FPV) drones. In some cases, they resemble small planes. In some cases, they resemble big planes. Some of them are X wings, like a combination between FPV and fixed wing. We use different varieties in different regions and different conditions. 

Q: How do you determine which interceptors are right for the job?

A: As an example, in case the Shaheds are coming from the Black Sea, where we have Odessa and other cities on the coast, small interceptors are used only in the last kilometers. The planes are used like loitering munitions, flying for hours and when they find a Shahed, they destroy it.

We need some interceptors that are capable of flying for hours and for hundreds of kilometers. For some, we need just a small diameter zone of protection.

Q: Given the success you’ve had with interceptor drones, have the U.S. and allies in the Gulf reached out, considering the death and destruction caused by Shahed drones launched by Iran?

You can see video of one of those attacks below.

A: I am permanently discussing and we are involved in discussion of interceptors and the potential of interceptors. And of course, it’s one of the top priorities for all countries to build the capability to use interceptors.

Ukraine is able to produce more than 2,000 interceptors per day, and this is not a maximum per day, more than 2,000. And for us, this is not a threshold, not a limit. In the case of export contracts and procurements, we can do much more than 2,000 per day. As an example, during the terroristic attack of Russia, they used more than 1,300 Shaheds and this was just during the last 24 hours. So of course, we need to have a huge number of interceptors.

Q:  Did you use more than 1,000 interceptors to defend against them?

A: I will not share details of how many Shaheds were destroyed by interceptors or other types of weapons, but in total, we were able to hit 97% of all Shaheds. This is the public information from our air defense command.

The following video shows some of the aftermath of the recent Russian Shahed barrage.

Search and rescue operations are ongoing in Kyiv following a Russian strike on a residential apartment building.

As of now, five people have been killed by Russia, and more than 10 people remain missing.

Around 40 people were injured in the attack, while 28 have been rescued… pic.twitter.com/n7z2mB42lu

— MFA of Ukraine 🇺🇦 (@MFA_Ukraine) May 14, 2026

Q: So when the U.S. and allies ask for help, what do you tell them and what is the current status of exports? The last time I wrote about this issue, the law prevented exports.

A: Brave1 works with Ukrainian and international companies to build and test solutions. We are not deeply involved in export questions. So I cannot comment here, because I’m not aware of the current status.

Q: The U.S. sent its own interceptor drones, the Merops system, to Ukraine in 2024. It proved so effective that it was sent to the Middle East to protect U.S. assets during the now-paused war against Iran. How much, if anything, did Ukraine learn from it?

A: Most successful defense manufacturers learned from our military and Brave1 – both Ukrainian manufacturers, and Merops. Without the direct input of the Ukrainian military and experts, Merops would never have become such a high-performing system, as it is now.

Q: What can you tell me about the relationship between Ukraine and the U.S. and allies as a result of what’s taking place in the Middle East?

A: It’s extremely interesting, and a lot of questions are coming to us, and we are sharing our experience.

Q: Have you had direct conversations with the U.S. military?

A: We are working with the majority of our allied countries. We have calls, sessions, conferences where we are sharing our experience, and the results of Brave1 transforming and improving the Ukrainian defense industry. Everyone is interested. This is the magic that it’s possible to do in such a short period of time. Right now, in Brave1, we have more than 2,300 different Ukrainian companies that are building weapons. And when the war started, it was a majority of state run companies and a very small number of private companies, and right now there is a huge list of companies.

Ukraine’s $2,000 Drone Is Destroying Russia’s $50,000 Shaheds. And Everyone Wants It

Q: You told me that Ukraine has a wide variety of interceptor drones, from the small ones to the bigger ones. How many different kinds of interceptors do the U.S. and allies need to defend against what Iran was launching?

A: I believe that the minimum is 10.

Q: 10? Why?

A: It takes 10 different types of architecture. For us, it’s important to have more different products, because it creates competition between Ukrainian companies, and they are much quicker, building new innovations, and they run faster to get ahead of the competitors – of their rivals. Also, it’s important to have not only interceptors. Interceptors themselves do nothing. This is the combination of variety of technologies, radars, permanent control system, the navigation systems, the systems for remote control, because the soldiers operating them should be not on the front line. They need to be in shelters. So this is the variety of different sub technologies, and as a whole, this is the segment of drone-based aerial defense.

Q: Wild Hornets, for instance, claims its Sting interceptor can be operated by soldiers from 2,000 kilometers away. How common is that?

A: Right now our pilots are able to manage interceptors from any place in the world.

Wild Hornets 2,000 Km

Q: Could pilots at the Tampa, Florida headquarters of U.S. Central Command, which oversees American military efforts in the Middle East, operate interceptor drones?

A: Let’s imagine I’m sending my pilot to the U.S. on a business trip and something happens, and my pilot will be needed to manage interceptors. He will be able to do it from New York or California.

Q: Getting back to the 10 different kinds of interceptor drones the U.S. and allies need. What different kinds? What are the differences?

A: Interceptors against ISR drones. Interceptors against Shahed heavyweight kamikaze drones. Interceptors against decoys. Interceptors that are capable of flying extremely high. Interceptors that are capable of increasing their speed to catch jet kamikazes. Interceptors that can throttle very quickly. Interceptors that have a long flight time and can fly a long distance. So there are a variety of different interceptors.

Q: How do you use AI?

A: We have a very responsible attitude about the ethical aspects of AI. Human-in-the-loop sometimes is used, but mostly we use human-on-the-loop where it’s a synchronous usage of human to arm, disarm, to cancel decisions, but not the human-in-the-loop where we need to wait for the human decisions, because speed of decisions should be taken into account. The effective hitting of Shahed drones is much higher when the human is not in the loop, but on the loop.

Q: Has Ukraine learned any lessons watching the U.S. and its allies defend against Iranian Shahed drones?

A: That’s the best question from all my interviews, for the last period of time. I can tell this subjectively from myself, not a representative of Brave1 or the country. One of the main lessons is that you should never be sure that you are secure enough and your technologies are perfect, because you don’t know what is in the pocket of your enemy. And you always need to be ready for the worst case scenario and permanently improve the level of readiness to counteract or react to absolutely non-predictable different things. And the speed of your reaction is crucial.

You can see one such Iranian Shahed attack on U.S. forces in the following video.

Video footage filmed by an American servicemember of an Iranian one-way attack drone, likely a Shahed-136, nearly impacting a radar tower at a U.S. military base in the Middle East earlier this week, possibly located at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait. pic.twitter.com/zsPyuFXK1c

— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) March 8, 2026

Q: Is there anything in particular you’ve seen about the performance of Iranian drones against the U.S., Israel, the UAE and other countries that surprises you and that you need to develop new ways to defeat them?

A: No. As you know, there is a strong cooperation between Russia and Iran, and Iranian technologies appear to have been used on the battlefield by Russia, and I’m sure vice versa as well.

Q: Have you seen anything different about how Iran is using these drones?

A: I didn’t see anything different. The things that I saw were the same, but I’m not a military expert. We are focusing on technologies.

You can see Iran’s Shahed drone attack on the U.S. Navy’s facility in Bahrain on the opening day of the war below.

Q: What about Ukrainian companies? How closely are they watching this conflict, and when they talk to you, are they saying anything about what they’ve learned and can use to improve Ukrainian weapons?

A: Everyone would like to help. And because we see that Ukraine, this is the only country who knows – and proven for years – how to defend itself against Russian new technologies. And of course, for us, it’s very painful to see because we have this experience. We know what to do, but all these tens of millions [of] people are facing these problems, but we could help.

Q: In March, President Donald Trump said: ‘We don’t need their help in drone defense. We know more about drones than anybody. We have the best drones in the world, actually.’ What do you think about that?

A: I cannot comment.

Q: Would you say there was a difference in the level of interest from the U.S. and allies at the beginning of the war to now? 

A: Of course, absolutely different interest. Previously, it was almost zero interest. And right now, this is number one topic.

Q: What advice would you give to the U.S. about defeating Shaheds?

A: Number one is, do not believe that you have plenty of time, a lot of time for preparation. The time is gone. The second one is cost matters. And the expenses for defense should be less than the expenses of your enemy to attack you. Number three is permanently focus on asymmetrical solutions.

Q: Like what?

A: When Ukraine didn’t have enough air defense missiles, we invented interceptors (drones). When we had a lack of 155mm ammunition, we invented FPV drones. When we had a lack of helicopters, we invented drone bombers. We had a lack of naval fleet, so we invented naval drones. 

And we see that such tremendous change of new technologies on the battlefield posed a lot of different new innovations everywhere, and we are the Ukrainian government cluster that analyzes all military ideas of different industry players. We see that every month the number of ideas is increasing, nothing. This is just opening new doors to a new era of new technologies.

Q: Have interceptor drones been able to replace those fired by high-end systems like the Patriot air defense system and others?

A: No. It’s not about replacement. Interceptors will never replace Patriot. Patriot is a great technology, the best in the world missiles for protection against ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles. But of course, it absolutely doesn’t make any sense to use it against Shaheds. It’s extremely expensive, extremely it is overkill.

In our next installment, Hrytseniuk talks about how Ukraine plans to meet President Volodymyr Zelensky’s directive to produce 50,000 uncrewed ground vehicles this year.

Contact the author: howard@TWZ.com

A UN humanitarian convoy delivering aid to the city of Kherson was hit twice by drones, despite prior coordination with Ukrainian and Russian forces. No injuries were reported, and the UN has not attributed the attack to either side.

May 9 is a venerated date on the Russian calendar. The anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in World War II is usually commemorated with a grand military parade outside the Kremlin, on Moscow’s Red Square.

“For modern Russia, it’s the main holiday of the year,” said Oleg Ignatov, senior Russia analyst at Crisis Group. “There are two main holidays in Russia, the ninth of May and the New Year. And if you asked Russians, what is the main holiday, I think they would answer you that it’s the ninth of May.”

This year, however, for the first time in nearly 20 years, there will be no tanks, missiles or junior cadets in the parade. The decision to hold back on showcasing military equipment comes as a result of heightened security fears over the war in Ukraine.

However, personnel from higher-level military academies will still take part in the procession on foot, while the aerial portion of the programme will remain unchanged – an aerobatic show, followed by a team of Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets painting the sky in the tricolours of the Russian flag.

In official statements, the Kremlin has referred to “the current operational situation,” and threats of “Ukrainian terrorist activity.”

Ukrainian drones are now striking deeper and deeper into Russian territory on an almost daily basis, hitting targets such as oil facilities and airfields. A recent spate of drone attacks on the oil refinery in Tuapse, on Russia’s Black Sea coast, has caused an ecological catastrophe and prompted the evacuation of the town.

“Drones are indeed the primary means to attack Russia’s territory,” explained Olha Polishchuk, research manager for Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus at Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED). “They are relatively cheap, modifiable and can travel long distances … Both Ukraine and Russia have switched to using primarily drones for their attacks.

He said that since 2025, drone strikes “completely overshadowed other attacks”.

“Their use has been effective overall; most drones are intercepted but if you send enough of them, some will reach the target.”

Fears of ‘political and psychological consequences’

Security and anti-drone defences have been tightened in the capital since the Ukrainian armed forces began sending drones there in 2023, with one striking the Kremlin itself.

Mobile internet has been periodically shut off in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and other areas of the country in the days running up to the event, with providers citing “security reasons”.

“Moscow has very strong air defence, which includes short-range surface-to-air missile systems, other missile systems, small arms and electronic warfare systems,” explained Polishchuk. “It is a multilayered system located both around and inside the city. In the past, authorities have shut down cellular networks in Moscow to complicate drone navigation.

“Ukraine very rarely attacks Moscow because the air defence would require a very large swarm of drones for any attack to land, but also because there are plenty of other strategically relevant targets that do not carry such a high risk of civilian casualties.”

Nevertheless, the Victory Day ceremonies present a clear risk. Such a concentration of troops and vehicles is vulnerable not only on the day of the parade itself but before and after, too: after all, that hardware must be stored somewhere.

“Of course, they care about drones which can fly from Ukraine, but most of these drones are being intercepted,” Crisis Group’s Ignatov told Al Jazeera. “They are more afraid of groups of people using small drones which are delivered to Russia, and used against targets inside Russia, like in Operation Spiderweb [in 2025] … Even if one or a couple of small drones hit a military parade, it may not cause a casualty, but it will have a demonstrative and psychological effect. I think what they care about is the political and psychological consequences of this.”

The Victory Day parade is a tradition from the communist era, an occasion on which the citizenry could catch a glimpse of Soviet statesmen waving from atop Lenin’s tomb, as well as a chance for the then-superpower to show off its military might. But when the USSR collapsed in December 1991, the parades were shelved for nearly two decades until they were revived by President Vladimir Putin in 2008.

Since the start of the full-scale war in 2022, the Victory Day parade has been scaled back again. Only a solitary Soviet-era T-34 tank symbolically rolled across Red Square in 2024, although other types of vehicles, such as armoured personnel carriers and mobile missile launchers, were present.

Last year’s proceedings, however, packed a little more pomp. Not only did the parade feature modern tanks, the TOS-2 Tosochka heavy flamethrower systems and Iskander ballistic missiles, but also Russian troops marching alongside Chinese soldiers.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping watched the show sitting beside Putin, one of 27 heads of state in attendance, including Brazilian President Lula da Silva and Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso. The turnout seemed to indicate that, despite international condemnation of the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow was not isolated.

‘Victory over Nazi barbarism’ or a ‘cynical distortion of history’

“A celebration of the Soviet and Allied defeat of Hitler’s Nazi-Fascist alliance, Victory Day is the most sacred date on Russia’s political calendar,” said British historian Geoffrey Roberts.

“As ever, Victory Day will be celebrated as a Soviet as well as a Russian victory – the result of the common struggle of all the peoples of the multinational USSR, not least millions of Ukrainians. Victory Day is for the Russian government a day of multiethnic unity. It is also a reminder of the international antifascist unity – of the Soviet-Western coalition during World War II that together saved the world from Nazi barbarism.”

The Eastern Front of the second world war, known as the Great Patriotic War in Russia, occupies a central place in Russian national memory. About 27 million Soviet citizens, including Russians, lost their lives in the conflict, more than any other country, and it was the Red Army’s soldiers that hoisted their flag over the Reichstag in Berlin in 1945. The German surrender was officially finalised on May 9.

This memory is evoked by Putin’s government today, claiming it is fighting “Nazis” on the battlefields of Ukraine.

“It appears that in modern Russia, 9 May has been twisted to actually support aggressive behaviour and militarisation,” Polishchuk said.

“It is a big source of pride which supports the notion that Russia is strong, undefeated, and will not tolerate disrespect from anyone. The more common ‘never again’ in reference to WWII became ‘we can do it again’ in Russia as a popular Victory Day slogan. This posturing becomes even more important during an ongoing war, as it supports another sort of reality – one where Russia has not made a mistake by invading Ukraine and is not currently failing to achieve its military objectives.”

According to the open-source intelligence project Oryx, more than 14,000 Russian tanks, APCs and other combat vehicles have been destroyed, captured, abandoned or otherwise lost since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Modern Ukraine considers Victory Day, as celebrated in Russia today, a cynical distortion of history and seeks to discourage foreign dignitaries from attending, Polishchuk added.

“Ukraine is generally more level-headed than Russia in sticking to targets that have a military objective, but this is indeed one of the instances where the [potential] attack appears largely symbolic,” she said. “Ukraine may decide to save resources this time and not attack Moscow – it could be a sane choice since air defence will be on high alert and security concerns may already discourage participation, yet Russian authorities have no choice but to try to reduce the risk regardless.”

Ukraine has begun testing a new homegrown armored personnel carrier, a tracked vehicle named Skif (Scythian, an ancient warrior tribe that also lived in parts of modern Ukraine). The development underscores the fact that, despite extensive losses of legacy tracked APCs, this is a class of vehicle that the Ukrainian Armed Forces still prioritizes as it tries to hold off the Russian invasion.

According to reports, UkrArmoTech has begun factory testing a prototype of the Skif, which has apparently been developed in direct response to the requirements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, drawing from lessons learned since the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022.

UkrArmoTech is among the leading developers and manufacturers of armored vehicles for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but has, to date, focused on wheeled models such as the Desna, Gyurza, and Tisa. With that in mind, the Skif marks a new direction for the company.

“First and foremost, we relied on our contacts with the military, our understanding of their needs, and our experience with the use of wheeled vehicles on the battlefield,” UkrArmoTech CEO Hennadii Khirhii told the Ukrainian Defense Express website. “Active combat operations in Ukraine have demonstrated the need for a significant number of armored vehicles to ensure and maintain the mobility of units and formations of the Armed Forces and Defense Forces.”

The design of the Skif is heavily influenced by the U.S.-developed M113, a Cold War-era tracked APC, many hundreds of which have been supplied to Ukraine since February 2022.

Despite its age, it seems the M113 has been a success in Ukrainian hands, offering a useful combination of reliability, maintainability, troop-carrying capacity, and off-road mobility.

The designers of the Skif were therefore instructed to produce a vehicle that matched the M113’s mobility while improving on its levels of protection and firepower.

According to reports, the Skif makes use of off-the-shelf components and assemblies from foreign manufacturers involved in the production of armored vehicles that are “descendants” of the M113.

It’s unclear if this implies that the Skif uses components from Western manufacturers that have built the M113 and its derivatives, or if the Ukrainian vehicle employs parts from other Western-made APCs. Noteworthy is the fact that members of the broader M113 family have been built under license in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, as well as several other countries outside Europe.

Reportedly, 60 percent of the vehicle’s components will initially be imported, and these will include the engine, transmission, suspension components, transfer case, and tracks. If production is launched, an increasing proportion of the components will be made locally.

In its basic form, the Skif is intended to transport soldiers from mechanized units across the battlefield and to provide them with fire support. As well as three crew (driver, commander, and gunner), located in the front section behind the power module, the Skif can accommodate eight soldiers in the rear troop compartment. The troops enter and exit via a rear ramp, as on the M113.

The prototype of the Skif has an aluminum hull, reportedly the first time this has been used on a Ukrainian combat vehicle. However, a series-production version will likely feature an armored steel. While steel offers better ballistic resistance and is easier to repair in the field, it comes with a significant weight penalty.

With the aluminum hull, the Skif weighs around 15 tons and is driven by a 360-horsepower diesel engine. The modular design means that different engines can be installed, for example, if more power is needed for a steel hull, or when fitted with heavier weapons.

In its basic form, the Skif has a Ukrainian-made remotely controlled combat module on the hull roof. This can be armed either with a 12.7mm or 14.5mm heavy machine gun paired with a 7.62mm auxiliary machine gun. As seen in the photos, the prototype does not currently have the combat module fitted.

Armor protection is in line with NATO STANAG 4569 Level 4 over the frontal section (withstanding, for example, 14.5mm machine gun fire, or a 155mm artillery projectile detonating at 25 meters), and Level 3 on the sides and rear (resistant to 7.62mm gunfire, or a 155mm artillery projectile detonating at 60 meters). Mine protection below the hull is rated at Levels 3a and 3b. The vehicle is expected to withstand the detonation of around 13 pounds of explosives under the hull or tracks.

It’s unclear what kinds of protection are provided against the threat of attack drones, but some type of electronic warfare gear is included; it would also be expected that the vehicle receives a purpose-designed ‘cope cage’ of the kind that has appeared on most Ukrainian and Russian combat vehicle types during the conflict. Otherwise, the Skif is equipped with communications, navigation, situational awareness, and fire-control systems of Ukrainian origin. A bank of smoke grenade launchers is fitted across the front of the hull on the Skif prototype.

The modular design means that the Skif can be adapted for other missions. These are likely to include vehicles equipped for command and control, reconnaissance, anti-armor, mortar carrier, medical evacuation, and more.

With the continued debate over wheeled versus tracked combat vehicles, it is interesting to note that Ukraine, after focusing on the local production of wheeled fighting vehicles, continues to see the necessity for tracked APCs. While heavier, more complex, and more costly, they are better able to deal with the brutal mud that is a feature of Ukrainian winters. They are also generally better in terms of armor protection.

For that reason, the aging M113 and the Soviet-era MT-LB remain popular choices for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

According to the Oryx open-source tracking group, since the start of the current conflict, more than 500 Ukrainian M113s and more than 150 MT-LBs have been confirmed destroyed or damaged. The actual figures are certainly higher, as Oryx only tallies losses that are confirmed with visual evidence.

Despite the need for a vehicle in this class, there remain significant challenges in getting it into production. Very likely, Ukraine will have to rely heavily on foreign funds and expertise if it is to put the Skif into quantity production. Should that prove realistic, Ukraine will likely also seek to sell the Skif to foreign customers, too.

Continued factory testing of the Skif prototype should provide a practical assessment of the new platform’s design maturity, including whether its mobility and running performance meet local requirements. Certainly, the new tracked APC is a bold venture for Ukraine’s war-ravaged industry, but it represents a class of vehicle for which there is a near-insatiable local demand.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Four years ago, Robert Brovdi was more comfortable in auction houses like Christie’s than filthy trenches. A well-off grain dealer in those days, with a sideline as an art collector, fragments of his pre-war life survive in the paintings and sculptures by Ukrainian artists dotted around the bunker. They’re displayed beside missile casings and captured drones. He’s an ethnic Hungarian, from Uzhgorod in western Ukraine, and best known by his military call sign, Magyar. Clean-shaven before the war, he now wears a long ginger and grey-speckled beard.

Ukraine’s Shahed-killing Antonov An-28 Cash twin-turboprop utility aircraft are now air-launching interceptor drones to provide another means of defeating their targets. This is among the latest developments in Ukraine’s battle against Russian long-range one-way attack drones, one that has seen each side introduce new technologies and countermeasures in what has become one of the fastest-moving aspects of the conflict.

⚡️The legendary civilian Ukrainian An-28, modified into a “Shahed hunter” with over 150 confirmed kills, has now been adapted to launch interceptor drones in flight. pic.twitter.com/aAv3by9gLA

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) April 23, 2026

The video of the An-28 armed with interceptor drones was apparently first published by Ukrainian pilot and volunteer Tymur Fatkullin, who has previously documented other extemporized aviation initiatives, including using the six-barrel Gatling-type M134 Minigun to blast Russian drones out of the air.

In this new iteration, the An-28 has underwing hardpoints mounting two types of Ukrainian-made interceptor drones, the SkyFall P1-Sun and the Merops AS-3 Surveyor. Earlier this month, we wrote about how the Merops drones have been effectively used by the U.S. military to counter Iranian Shahed attacks in the Middle East.

Alongside the video, Fatkullin provided the following account:

“Aircraft-launched P1-Sun interceptor against hostile Shaheds. This method has already proven effective in real combat conditions. We have also tested several other interceptor drones during training flights. You could call it a cheap air-to-air missile.”

Fatkullin also added that, at this point, the An-28 has additionally brought down 222 Russian drones using gun armament.

A passenger An-28 aircraft armed with miniguns is shooting down Russian drones over Ukraine, French TF1 got an inside. The crew consists of civilian volunteers who have already destroyed nearly 150 drones during air defense missions. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/x1E921TPT2

— NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) February 5, 2026

As we have previously reported, Ukraine has been successfully using several locally produced drones to counter Russian Shaheds for some time now.

Both the P1-Sun and the AS-3 Surveyor are small, relatively inexpensive drones built specifically to zip through the skies and intercept long-range one-way attack drones.

In the case of the P1-Sun, this uses a modular, 3D-printed airframe, can operate at altitudes up to 16,400 feet (5,000 meters), and reach speeds of up to 280 miles per hour (450 km/h). This is sufficient to intercept jet-powered drones such as the Russian Geran-3, under some circumstances.

Meanwhile, the AS-3 Surveyor is a somewhat more expensive and more capable option, intended for use against higher-end threats. These interceptors can operate autonomously or be remotely piloted and are equipped with onboard sensors for target tracking. The interceptor carries an explosive warhead and destroys targets either through a direct collision or a proximity detonation.

A video shows the AS-3 Surveyor during a live-fire demonstration in Poland in November 2025:

A new system to identify and take down Russian drones is deployed to NATO’s eastern flank

According to the U.S. Army, a single example of the Merops-made drone costs around $15,000, with the potential to reduce this to between $3,000 and $5,000 if production is scaled up. This compares with the estimated cost of between $30,000 and $50,000 for a Shahed. Provided the interceptor drones are effective, the economic case is a very compelling one.

Having interceptor drones launched from aircraft provides a number of advantages. The An-28 is able to bring the interceptor drone closer to the target and to use its own sensors to help locate these. As we have reported in the past, the An-28 crew initially relies on air traffic controllers to guide them to the area where drones are known to be flying. One of the crew is a ‘camera operator,’ monitoring a feed from an infrared camera. Members of the crew are also provided with night-vision goggles (NVGs) for spotting the mainly nocturnal drones.

The turboprop also offers significant loiter time for standing anti-drone patrols, which can be set up as a screen where they are most advantageous. At the same time, having the drone launched from the air reduces the response time. Launching from height gives the interceptor drone additional altitude and range.

There is also the benefit of having a choice of weapons (different types of drones, guns, and potentially also rockets) to respond to various drone threats.

Furthermore, the An-28’s short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability makes it ideal for operating in and out of shorter and more austere airstrips, of the kind that Ukraine makes extensive use of in the conflict with Russia.

This threat is only set to grow. Russia, as we have previously noted, now manufactures Shahed/Geran drones at the rate of 2,000 per month and has announced plans to nearly triple that.

Already, interceptor drones have established themselves as a much more cost-effective option compared to surface-to-air missile interceptors like the Patriot system, and even cheaper, less advanced missiles when it comes to countering Shahed-type drones. Although these drones lack the payload and range of high-end munitions, they can be deployed in large numbers, allowing them to cover broad areas. This, in turn, helps preserve the limited supply of more sophisticated interceptors and reverses the unfavorable cost dynamic between targets and defensive systems. Even so, such solutions are most effective when integrated into a layered defense, particularly for protecting high-value sites and critical infrastructure.

The small size of interceptor drones also makes them suitable for arming lighter aircraft, crewed and uncrewed. Ukraine already makes use of ‘mothership’ drones, while helicopters and even gun-armed Yakovlev Yak-52 prop trainers, also used to hunt drones, could potentially carry them under their wings. Already, light aircraft and helicopters are said to be responsible for downing between 10 and 12 percent of all drones claimed by Ukrainian air defenses of all kinds.

Inside the Cockpit of Ukraine’s Secretive Unit Hunting Russian Drones | WSJ News

It isn’t hard to see how this concept could be rapidly evolved and executed even more effectively and efficiently with better technology. For instance, having MQ-9 Reapers loaded with these drones and equipped with air-to-air radar would allow for a long-range, long-endurance picket aircraft of sorts. In the context of the war in the Middle East, parking these between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran, over the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, could go a long way to stopping incoming Shahed-136 and other one-way attack drones at a tiny fraction of the cost of surface-to-air missiles.

Arming crewed aircraft with interceptor drones is the latest expression of Ukraine’s fast-developing counter-drone arsenal. If it proves successful, we will likely see its wider adoption. After all, anything that helps change the calculus for Ukraine in the drone war is likely to be enthusiastically adopted.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

BREAKINGBREAKING,

Kyiv’s mayor says the attacks hit Podilskyi and Obolonsky districts, causing large fires and damage to residential buildings.

Russian forces have bombed the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, killing a 12-year-old child and wounding at least 10 people, including several doctors, according to the city’s mayor.

The child was killed early on Thursday in Kyiv’s Podilskyi district, where rocket fragments hit a 16-storey building and caused a fire at a residential building, Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko wrote in a post on Telegram.

He said rescuers have pulled another child and her mother were pulled from the rubble in Podilskyi.

The attack also hit Kyiv’s Obolonsky district, with falling rocket debris causing a large fire at a non-residential building. “Cars are also on fire,” Klitschko wrote.

More soon…