Ukraines

In one of the more unusual examples yet of where Ukraine is sourcing military hardware, a Danish military museum has begun transferring vehicles from its own collection for use in the war against Russia. Panzermuseum East, a privately run museum in Denmark specializing in Soviet and Warsaw Pact armor, announced that it has delivered its first batch of armored vehicles to Ukraine.

“We have now completed the first shipment of vehicles to Ukraine. The first one to be picked up was our fine BMP-1, and the second was the MT-LB SNAR-10. We hope they’ll last a long time and make a difference,” the museum said on social media today.

The museum describes itself as Scandinavia’s largest collection of vehicles, uniforms, and equipment from the former Eastern Bloc.

The donation includes a BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle and an MT-LB amphibious tracked armoured fighting vehicle fitted with the SNAR-10 battlefield surveillance radar. This is an uncommon artillery reconnaissance variant that was designed to detect troop movements, vehicles, and artillery fire while directing friendly fires.

While governments across Europe have emptied Cold War stockpiles to support Kyiv, it is considerably rarer to see museum exhibits making the journey to the front. The transfer underscores the increasingly varied mix of equipment finding its way into Ukrainian service after more than four years of high-intensity warfare.

Entering service in the late 1960s, the BMP-1 is among the most iconic Soviet armored fighting vehicles ever built. Although obsolete by modern standards, Ukraine already operates the type in significant numbers, meaning integrating another example should be straightforward, assuming it remains mechanically sound.

The BMP-1 was a revolutionary design when it appeared, becoming the world’s first true infantry fighting vehicle by combining mobility, armor, and the ability for infantry to fight from within the vehicle. Armed with a 73mm low-pressure gun, a coaxial machine gun, and a 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) anti-tank missile launcher, it was designed to accompany tanks across the battlefield while carrying an eight-man infantry squad. More than 20,000 were built, and the vehicle was exported widely across the Warsaw Pact and beyond, spawning numerous variants and licensed copies.

Today, its armor and armament are outdated, but it continues to be prized on account of its amphibious capability, ease of maintenance, and the availability of extensive stocks of spare parts and upgrade packages.

Despite being more than half a century old, the BMP-1 continues to demonstrate its utility on modern battlefields. Reflecting sustained demand for the Soviet-designed infantry fighting vehicle, Slovakia’s STV Machinery secured a contract to serially produce newly manufactured BMP-1 hulls for an unnamed foreign customer. The company says the hulls will incorporate modern armor materials and updated production techniques, with manufacturing capacity expected to reach up to 100 vehicles annually, underscoring the enduring value of the platform.

Previously, there have been known BMP-1 transfers to Ukraine from Greek stocks (40 BMP-1A1s, delivered from October 2022 onwards), and from Slovak stocks (30 BVP-1s, from November 2022). Another 56 upgraded ex-East German BMP-1s were provided by the Czech Republic.

The more intriguing donation is the MT-LB SNAR-10. Based on the ubiquitous MT-LB multipurpose tracked vehicle, the SNAR-10 carries a ground surveillance radar intended primarily for artillery spotting and battlefield reconnaissance. The system can detect moving vehicles, troop concentrations, explosions, and shell impacts, helping artillery units adjust fire and build battlefield awareness.

Exactly what condition either vehicle is in is unclear. Museum vehicles are often maintained in running condition, particularly at private collections that conduct demonstrations, but they also lack military equipment, sensitive electronics, or functional weapons. The museum has not disclosed whether the vehicles required refurbishment or modification before transfer.

The donation nevertheless reflects a broader trend that has become increasingly apparent throughout the conflict. Ukraine has sourced equipment from virtually anywhere it can be found. Beyond government transfers, Kyiv has received privately donated vehicles, civilian pickups converted into military transports, restored Soviet-era equipment, commercially purchased armored vehicles, and even aircraft and helicopters acquired through unconventional channels.

As traditional Cold War reserves continue to shrink across Europe, previously overlooked sources of compatible Soviet-designed equipment have become increasingly valuable. Private collections, museums, training establishments, and industrial storage yards have all become potential sources of hardware that can be returned to operational service.

The SNAR-10 is especially noteworthy because it represents a relatively niche capability rather than simply another armored hull. Battlefield surveillance radars remain useful assets for locating enemy activity, adjusting indirect fire, and supporting reconnaissance, even if newer drone-based systems increasingly perform many of the same functions. Even if the SNAR-10 is delivered without an operational radar, it would still be useful for its MT-LB chassis.

More broadly, whether these two vehicles ultimately see frontline service, are used for training, or serve as sources of spare parts remains unknown.

However, the museum’s wording (“first shipment”) strongly suggests more donations for Ukraine may already be planned.

Beyond the BMP-1 and SNAR-10 that have now gone to Ukraine, the Panzermuseum East collection remains packed with Warsaw Pact hardware, including T-72 and T-55 main battle tanks, a PT-76 amphibious light tank, a 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer, BRDM reconnaissance and anti-tank vehicles, BTR-60 command vehicles, and more. The museum also displays dozens of Cold War military trucks, field support vehicles, artillery pieces, and other specialist equipment.

Examples of foreign museums releasing collection vehicles for Ukrainian military use remain uncommon but not unheard of. Ukrainian museums have also returned equipment to military units, based on available reports, as well.

Britain’s Tank Museum did not donate vehicles, but it helped Ukraine by giving Cook Defense Systems — which also produces tracks for the British-made Challenger 2 main battle tank — access to its Soviet vehicle collection, manuals, and physical components to reverse-engineer tracks and sprockets for T-72s, BMPs, and MT-LBs. You can read more about that here.

The departure of these armored vehicles from a Danish museum floor for an active war zone is another reminder of the extraordinary lengths Ukraine and its supporters continue to go to sustain the country’s war effort, and of how almost any usable piece of Soviet-designed equipment can still find new life on today’s battlefield.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

As a keen reminder of the threats Ukraine is facing, Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh had to stop a recent interview with TWZ to scramble to a shelter as Russian ballistic missiles were approaching. A 35-year-old architect by training, Terekh helped turn Fire Point from a Ukrainian start-up making weapons in a garage into a leading producer of indigenously made long-range strike drones and missiles, and we talked to her about the company’s weapons and future plans. 

Fire Point’s FP-1 and FP-2 drones have been striking Russian targets to devastating effect and its heavy-hitting Flamingo cruise missiles are adding a new level of long-range threat. 

Beyond these, Fire Point is developing the FP-9 ballistic missile to hit targets up to about 500 miles away and the FP-7.x ballistic missile interceptor, intended to provide a more plentiful and cheaper alternative to Patriot munitions.

Among the many topics discussed, Terekh talked about the status of the FP-9 ballistic missile program, roadblocks to fielding an indigenous Patriot interceptor alternative, how her firm is using AI, why the FP-2 drones were so successful against Russian ships in the Sea of Azov and the challenges of building complex weapons systems while under constant Russian fire. Some of the questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity.

Q: Tell me how Fire Point came to build drones and missiles.

A: Well, we started with the intention to win the war and destroy the Russian Empire, some knowledge in engineering, physics, mathematics, and industrial production, and we started with the FP-1 drone, which was basically the idea behind this. There were two ideas. First is to make an analog of the Shahed drone by technical characteristics, and the second was to utilize a huge stock of Fab 50 bombs. It’s an old Soviet aviation bomb. There was a rumor that there were dozens of thousands of these in Ukrainian stocks, so we decided to build a platform to carry this huge stock.

When we finished designing the aircraft, it turned out that this rumor was just a rumor about the huge stocks of Fab 50s. But anyway, this was a start for FP-1. And when we started to really scale up the production and design a model that would be fitting to be scaled at volume, then we were forced to build a lot of satellite productions around the main production because very soon we met all the possible bottlenecks. And while developing this huge satellite network of productions of the spare parts of different components, we understood that probably we now have enough missiles to go into missile design. That’s the short story.

Footage of the production and testing of the FP-1/2 attack UAVs and the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile

Q: The Flamingo ground-launched cruise missile, which broke cover last fall, has a claimed range of about 1,800 miles. It uses Ivchenko AI-25 turbofan engines that are commonly found on the L-39 Albatros jet trainer. How many of these engines still exist and how long can you sustain production with those surplus powerplants without switching to something that can be produced en masse cheaply today?

A: First of all, the AI-25 TL was the initial engine with which we started to fly, but this is just one of five different engines that we use on Flamingo. So it’s not the only engine, and Flamingo was initially designed to be flexible and to be able to work with different types of engines. So we can really widen up the stock of used engines. 

But at the same time, we started to develop our own turbojet engine with the same design bureau that designed the 25 TL many years ago, and we built it specifically for the purpose of UAV, not for aviation. And it took quite some time, more than a year and a half. And now we are assembling our first 10 prototypes of the future turbojet fan engines of our production.

The AI-25 turbofan engine, part 1

Q: And when will that be ready?

A: As soon as possible. Obviously it is harder to make a turbojet engine than it is to make a missile.

Q: What’s the timeline?

A: The goal is to finish testing all the samples and making all the improvements by the end of this year, and next year go into mass production. 

Q: Fire Point has said that it aims to increase Flamingo production to a daily rate of at least seven missiles by October of this year. This would translate to 2,555 built annually. How can you make this happen?

A: We did not increase the production to these numbers. This is the maximum capacity of our production that we built. Unfortunately, since Ukraine was waiting for the funds coming from the European Union loan, the orders did not match the maximum capacity of the production, so the production was lowered to a lower percentage of what it could possibly provide. We expect to ramp it up to the named number. Probably by the end of this year or beginning next year. It depends on how the contracts will arrive. 

Q: How does the Flamingo do its job? Can you run us through what mission preparation, launch, navigation, impact and after action activities look like? 

A: I personally place Flamingo in the drone category, despite the fact that it’s a big missile, because the process looks almost the same. 

Of course, there are nuances that we need to count on during mission planning, but the mission planning is on the side of Ukrainian armed forces. In terms of our company, as a manufacturer, we do a very detailed after-action review. After each mission, we understand how it reacted to electronic warfare. We were able to do a very effective countermeasure against on-ground air defense systems like Pantsir and Tor. So basically, there is just one threat that is really left for Flamingo, and this is aviation. Against this, we cannot really fight. Otherwise, it’s half of the technical perfection of the missile and half of the art of mission planning. So, to fly as low as possible to plan the mission correctly, to understand the altitudes, we cannot afford the luxury of doing the ramp up before the final attack, because then we would be visible to radars. 

Therefore, when you plan the ramp up picket, it is much easier than to plan a very smooth, almost horizontal few degrees attack. 

Anyway, our armed forces already mastered this as well, and from our side, it is important that we provide a navigation solution that is completely resistant towards electronic warfare, jamming, spoofing, any sort of interference, and this we did. So we see the improvements after each mission on both sides, both on our software part and on the mission planning part.

Q: What navigation and target package suites are available for Flamingo at this time? What about in the future?

A: I don’t want to name exact systems for obvious reasons, but it’s a combination of a [Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna] antenna, inertial navigation system, of specific software, of additional data sources, and sometimes it’s visual navigation as well.

Q: Olena Kryzhanivska, a defense fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, recently told the New York Times that the Flamingo missiles have shown “low effectiveness,” possibly because of accuracy problems and that the “results that we see are not the ones that Ukraine would like to have.” How do you respond?

A: Honestly, I don’t respond to such things at all because in the end, we are no magicians. If anybody could create a cruise missile in one year and then already pay back all of the money spent on this missile with the effect of the damage on the enemy’s territory, they can show better and more effective results.

Ukraine’s New FP-5 Missile Has Twice the Range of a Tomahawk | WSJ Equipped

Q: Let’s talk about the FP-9. Ukraine getting its own ballistic missile is a big deal. What went into developing it and what can you tell us about its design?

A: The FP-9 is a missile that we planned would be able to reach Moscow with a range of 850 kilometers. It required building the whole new infrastructure specifically for casting solid rocket propellants in such a huge amount. The engine itself is 4.6 tons of solid rocket fuel, compared to FP-7, where it’s just one ton of solid rocket fuel, so a whole set of factories of preparation infrastructure. 

Anyway, as we are speaking now, the engines are being cast. Therefore, we expect test launches soon, as soon as possible. The navigation solution, everything else on this missile is already ready. So basically, it’s the last touch on the engine, and we are ready to start. 

Ukrainian FP-9 ballistics ready to strike! 800 km range – MOSCOW is now within reach!

Q: So when will it be operational? It hasn’t been used yet, right?

A: No, we are preparing for the first flight.

Q: When do you think that will be?

A: I understand the curiosity behind the question on when exactly this would happen, but we have our specific dates in mind where we are aiming. But I don’t like naming them because a lot of things could go wrong on the way, so my expectation is that this would be autumn. I would not specify better at this moment.

Q: For the FP-9 ballistic missile, Ukraine had to build a new solid-fuel engine casting facility. How difficult was that and what is the status of it?

A: Obviously, it was quite a challenge because we do have such a factory. Ukraine had such a factory in Pavlograd, but Pavlograd is under constant attack, and also they’re using a little bit different technology for that. We understand if we do not build an alternative to Pavlograd, then we will have no future for the missile program. 

So we built multiple factories in Ukraine and one in Denmark for the sake of solving this task. Of course, it’s extremely challenging. It’s equipment. It’s mixers for casting. It’s a specific post-curing process, casting process. This is a dangerous production, and we had to reinvent in a way this whole technology almost from scratch. Therefore, it was quite a challenge, but I like how it went out. Since we are already casting a lot of solid rocket fuel for smaller rockets, I like how it’s developing and how it’s going. 

Q: How difficult is it to put all this together from so many dispersed locations?

A: Well, the logistics are hell, to be frank (chuckles). But we do not have the luxury to have the factory in a classic way, with the walls and roof, we if when I say factory and we have 90 of them in the moment, when I say factory I mean this whole ecosystem with logistics, with warehouses, everything is hidden and dissolved in a way that the critical components are always duplicated, triplicated, quadruplicated. It’s a lot of additional investments and, of course, a lot of risks and a lot of additional time for logistics specifically, but again, we do not have any other choice. Therefore, the factory in this matter is a whole ecosystem.

Q: Fire Point claims that Ukraine can build missiles faster than Russia by building cheaper, less complex missiles. How would that work?

A: I personally believe that if you want to build something in volume, you need to think of this from day one of future product development, and this is probably a critical thing that we changed in this culture at Fire Point. So understanding how the production works is a very important thought to be established as a fundament of the future development. So in practice, how it looks when we start the R&D process, our chief designer has a lot of ideas. But I have the power to interrupt and to block any idea that will not be possible to mass produce later. Therefore, we are rethinking and rethinking until we get the solution that is possible to mass produce. 

And when you think of this in the design stage, then of course it is easier to do it. In fact, and also technological sovereignty is very important for all the critical components and processes. We have our own capabilities inside Fire Point, all the critical, even the machine production. So we do cover lots of things. We rely at least on subcontractors and contractors, and we try to set up the maximum control over the supply chain. 

Author’s note: At this point Terekh stops talking and looks at her phone.

Terekh: I am looking to see if this is a ballistic missile attack or not. Yeah, it’s ballistics. So, I would be glad to maybe talk more with you on this point, but I have to evacuate now to the shelter. The flight time is like two minutes.

Author’s note: A week later, we continued the conversation.

Q: Can you talk about the arrangement with Diehl Defense to build Flamingos in Germany? How does this help Fire Point and Ukraine? Can you provide any details about the new seeker Diehl is working to outfit the weapon with and any other details about how Diehl will improve the munition?

A: I cannot provide many details yet because the negotiations are ongoing. But basically, in terms of Germany, we are in negotiations with Diehl Defense, they initiated this discussion. We, I’m sure, can be a mutually interested industrial partner for each other. There is something that Diehl can bring to the table in terms of technology. There is definitely something that we could bring to the table in terms of technology and industrial knowledge.

So I consider such types of negotiations and cooperations very useful. Because the way big primes rethink their future by learning from Ukrainian companies and at the same time using their legacy knowledge for future development – I think is very fruitful for both sides. And of course, it all started by an initiative of the German government because everybody wants to have long-range capabilities of domestic production. 

Q: Let’s talk about the FP-1 drone. Created in 2023, it has been widely used in Ukrainian attacks on targets deep inside Russia. How did you ramp up production of this system and improve it to keep it effective against always adapting Russian defenses?

A: At the beginning, I thought that just constantly analyzing the feedback in a correct way, and then adapting and making changes would be enough. But from today’s point of view, I would say that’s definitely not enough. You have to be so deep in the context of what’s happening on the front line, and in general of the development of enemy tactics of electronic warfare. So you have to be able to make some sort of forecast and try to predict what will happen in the future, find a solution for this future problem, test it, validate it, and when the problem actually comes, you have to have something on your shelf already ready for solving this solution. 

So we are trying to trick the timelines a little bit, even if in some cases, my forecasts are not correct. Eighty percent of the time, they are correct, and that’s definitely enough to always keep up in this technological race. 

You can see video of an FP-1 drone being used in an attack below:

Q: There are now two configurations of this drone, one for longer range and one for a larger warhead. Can you talk about them and how they were adapted to be useful over such a wide range of target sets?

A: You know, when we just made the FP-1, it was just 700 kilometers, and then we found a way to increase the distance and increase the accuracy as well. The same logic happened with FP-2. It started as a middle strike of 200 kilometers, and now it’s up to 500 kilometers. So these are gentle improvements, or as I call them, nuanceful improvements. You can work with an engine. You can work with engine consumption. You can work with reassembling some part of the aircraft in a way that is more aerodynamically effective. So when you make a product that you are satisfied with, there is always room for improvement, to be frank. 

In the case of the longer-ranged version of FP-1, it is a little bit more complicated in production. So it’s not possible, at the moment, to make 300 of them per day, but it allows us to go such long distances. It has a different wing. This wing contains additional fuel tanks, and there are also some minor improvements here and there that provide this result.

Q: And the FP-2?

A: The same logic. It could be different changes, but the same logic.

Q: Can you provide any insights into the ongoing Sea of Azov campaign against Russian shipping that relies heavily on the FP-2 drone? What makes this a good weapon for such attacks?

A: It is controlled manually. There is additional AI assistance on that control. So basically, that makes it the best option to fight dynamic moving targets. Especially, it has multiple options for content streamline. I would explain it like this. So, in case one type of connectivity does not work, there are other options for this as well, and it is very effective when you are controlling your aircraft in real time. Then the pilot can target the most vulnerable part of the ship, and unfortunately, as far as I can see, these are the only sanctions that our enemy really understands.

Q: What other options are there when one type of connectivity doesn’t work?

A: I don’t really want to share exactly what the setup we use is because the more detailed I will explain it, the faster the enemy will find the countermeasures for this.

The following video shows Fire Point drones being used to attack Russian ships in the Sea of Azov:

Q: News reports state that you look to arm this drone with rockets to take on multiple ground targets at standoff ranges. Can you talk about this concept and how you aim to see it be used on the battlefield? 

A: Actually, the FP-1 and FP-2 are pretty universal platforms. There are so many versions of this that we didn’t announce it publicly yet, however these airplanes can make a lot of different side quests, and one of these side quests is of course carrying uncontrolled short-range missiles. We do have a huge stockpile of this missile in the Ukrainian army that is not largely used, and it is the way to utilize them with the most possible sense. It helps to counterattack the mobile interceptor groups, and when the aircraft is done with letting the missiles out, it can go further for the initial mission. So it’s really like a side quest. 

Q: What kind of rockets are you talking about?

A: Old Soviet 57mm S-5 rockets.

Soviet 57mm S-5KO High Explosive Anti-Tank FRAG Aircraft Rocket #military #coldwar #airforce #rocket

Q: How many S-5 rockets can it carry?

A: But it could be any, to be frank. But that does not matter much.

Q: But how many can the drone carry?

A: Eight.

You can see an FP-1 drone launching rockets in this video:

Q: How do you use AI in these drones and other weapons? Where is this headed in the future? 

A: Since we are using quite a big platform, our user experience with AI is slightly different from smaller FPV or reconnaissance drones. We use it for visual map-matching for final target corrections. But I do not say that it’s largely changing the narrative of how we’re using drones because I still believe there should be a person behind making a final decision. So we do use AI a lot in our daily work in software development, in technical consultancy, but in terms of directing the flight, it is still in the end a human who makes the final decision.

Q: Do you use man-in-the-loop or man-on-the-loop?

A: Both.

Q: Can you provide more details about how you use AI in the terminal phase of an attack?

A: There are multiple versions for this type of terminal work. At the moment, we are mostly at the point of collecting more precise data for more inertial platforms like ours. At the same time, it helps to correct and lead the aircraft if the connectivity is lost for quite some time because it has the target recognition possibility and the final targeting as well. But it should still be human-in-the-loop at this moment. 

Q: Where is this headed in the future? 

A: You know, AI companies are now hiring philosophers to decide on where it’s heading in the future. My perfect scenario would be that we will use AI for finding alternative deterrence options. What I mean is, instead of just relying on nukes as a deterrent, it could be that we will build some sort of drone walls, or we will operate the kill zones where the decision-making would be solely on AI. 

There are pros and cons to this as well. For example, we all knew of cases where Russians were infiltrating their agents in the governments of different countries, and when it came to making a fair response to barbarian actions, somebody sabotaged this fair response. So probably AI could be an instrument to provide an immediate response for aggressive actions in the future of whoever this could be, the aggressor. I don’t have a clear answer. Obviously, we are all thinking about this: to what point we can delegate the responsibility, and it’s still an open question.

Q: Satellite communications are also key to long-range strikes against dynamic targets like ships. How has the miniaturization of this technology changed how your products are used? 

A: Miniaturization is crucial, but that is all the detail I can share at this stage.

Q: Let’s talk about Project Freya and the FP-7.x interceptor missile you are developing. Who is providing the seeker to make this work? What is the timeline and what are the expected costs per interceptor? And how will it compare to PAC-3 Patriot?

A: We are working with two European and one Ukrainian company on secret development, and I don’t know which of the options would be the fastest out of this. The final goal is to make the whole interceptor cheaper than 1 million euros. I think with the expected price range of the seekers that we discussed with our partners, this is doable. Probably not from the first iterations, but definitely in serial production. 

Q: What seekers are you using, and from which companies?

A: It is [imaging infrared] seekers. One deal is public, so one option is from Diehl Defense that we are currently integrating. The other is – I don’t know if they’re comfortable with public disclosure yet, so I have to talk with them first.

Q: What’s the timeline for this?

A: Nobody can answer at this point. So the deep technical integration is happening right now. We expect, of course, it to be in the nearest months, because the seekers aside, we are on a good level of readiness. But nobody can answer this point. 

Q: What’s the major issue that still has to be overcome?

A: On technical integration?

Q: On being able to produce the interceptor at scale.

A: If we look at everything but the seeker, our production is already ready, even for mass production, and we finished all the tests on this matter. But the amount in which we will have seekers and their accuracy and the results of technical integration – it’s still something that we are cooking at the moment. Of course, we will be doing our best to maximize both the accuracy, the energy consumption, and the mass production in the future. But we have to understand that even the seeker manufacturers are doing this for the first time in such an integration. So it requires a lot of talent, a lot.

Q: How will it compare to PAC-3 Patriot interceptor?

A: The PAC-3 is a different missile designed for different consumption levels. I think FP-7.x is more comparable in the first iteration to the Patriot PAC-2 because we do not expect immediate success with hit-to-kill, and the first interception we expect to do with the blast interception. Hit-to-kill is the next iteration. So at the beginning we will have more the analog of the PAC-2, but more mass-produced and cheaper.

Q: How many do you think you will be able to make?

A: From our side, we are ready to make almost an infinite amount. So we are targeting to do at least 2,000 a year as a starter, and then develop the production. Right now, we are solving the bottlenecks again, especially on the seeker part of this. But everything that is dependent on Fire Point, we can scale these numbers up.

Q: What do you think about the Patriot interceptor licensing deal Presidents Trump and Zelensky discussed before the American leader backed away from that? Would this affect anything you are doing?

A: No, it could be a good addition to what we are already doing.

Q: Why?

A: Because, in my opinion, every industrial corporation is like the greatest university of all. And the more you cooperate with different companies – there are not that many companies in the world who can produce anti-ballistic capabilities, and we have to kind of stay together on solving massive threats.

Q: On his last day as defense minister, Mykhalio Fedorov wrote that “a successful ballistics test was conducted, which was developed within the Ministry of Defense’s area of responsibility. We significantly changed the technical specifications and demonstrated maximum accuracy. We reduced the price by 30%. Ukraine will enter a new league.” Is this something you are working on or is it the government-run Sapsan program? What can you tell me about this?

A: I don’t know what exactly his words meant to be about because around the same time we were both testing our missiles and Pivdenne was testing theirs [the Sapsan], but from what I know, Sapsan also got a big improvement, and they had recently one of their first big successes with accuracy and technologically. So I think probably he meant both of us or just Sapsan. I don’t know.

🚀 Moscow has a new reason to worry. Ukraine has tested a new ballistic missile

In his farewell post, Mykhailo Fedorov revealed that successful tests of a Ukrainian ballistic missile took place on the very day the government stepped down. He did not specify which missile it was.… pic.twitter.com/PoprVjAUx8

— NEXTA (@nexta_tv) July 16, 2026

Q: A little more than six months after naming the tech-savvy Fedorov defense minister, Zelensky fired him, ultimately replacing him with Major General Yevhen Khmara, who now serves as acting defense minister. How has the change in command in the Ministry of Defense affected Fire Point and Ukrainian domestic weapons development in general?

A: I think in general, our president has a big vision on why he’s doing specific things. The team of Mykhailo Fedorov helped a lot to develop Ukrainian industry, specifically with removing a lot of bureaucracy from the process. I think this initiative alone was the reason why Ukrainian industry is looking like this today. It was back in 2023. But the new minister is a war person. He is deep in the knowledge of asymmetric actions. So we expect a positive future.

Q: Fire Point has talked about the need for a Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) UAS armed with a 30mm cannon that can intercept glide bombs before they hit their targets. What details can you provide about that?

A: There is a version of this, like an interceptor. We have multiple versions for interceptors on the platform of FP-1. One is with a gun, the other with small interceptors, like the ones that are popular now, the [General Cherry] Bullet interceptors. And there are also a few other options. As I mentioned at the beginning, it’s a pretty universal platform that can do a side quest. 

Q: What kind of gun are you talking about?

A: Honestly, it was created to intercept Shaheds. I think for intercepting the glide bombs, it’s almost impossible to do so after the glide bomb has left the aircraft. It looks unrealistic to me, to be frank. Maybe, there would be a way, for example, to try and catch the aircraft before it launches. But the most effective way to fight glide bombs is to destroy Russian aviation, and I don’t know yet a more effective way to do this. 

⚡ Russia may have brought back UMPB-5R jet-powered glide bombs. Recent strikes suggest the weapons can reach targets about 150 km away.https://t.co/xiZ6Nf0H1X

— Militarnyi (@militarnyi) August 2, 2026

Q: What else is on the horizon for Fire Point? What new capabilities and platforms are you looking at developing and what battlefield realities are driving those developments?

A: Aside from everything that is well known, we are also focusing on creating our own satellite constellation, so we have an independent connectivity for the drones. So this is one of the focuses, and of course we are working on improving the autonomous flight for the drones, so there are many small and big developments, but the biggest one is probably satcom.

Q: Tell me about this. Are you actually going to launch your own satellites? Are you building satellites for someone else to launch?

A: We are working together with a company that produces satellites, and we are also starting to develop our future possibility to deliver satellites. We are far from that yet, but we already have the equipment, and we already are experimenting with the bigger rocket engines. So this development had already started. It’s not the main focus at the moment, of course, because at the moment we have to win the war first. But this is something we are preparing for the future. 

Q: What company are you working with?

A: Again, I have to talk with them whether or not they want to be public.

Q: Finally, what about Fire Point as a weapons exporter? Where do you see the company as a global arms provider in the near future and after the war hopefully ends?

A: We have a big interest from a majority of European countries to have Fire Point products in their armies, and we already started to work on that because they all saw the threat that may potentially come from Russia. Of course, we also have other negotiations, but now we have to be more careful how we ensure that our products do not wind up with the bad guys. So every export movement would be treated with the maximum cautiousness.

Q: How could your weapons land in the hands of the bad guys?

A: Ah, that’s a good question, how these deals could be possibly secured from being redirected to the wrong place? We have a huge level of trust with our partners, but those countries that are new to us, we do not yet have this relationship and this level of trust.

Q: Are you selling any weapons right now to either the U.S. or, say, some of the Gulf Arab nations, given what’s going on there? 

A: Not at the moment.

Q: Are you in negotiations with the U.S. and/or Gulf Arab nations?

A: Yeah, we have a lot of negotiations and discussions going on in parallel. I will comment once the negotiations are successful.

Q: Are there any weapons or products that you’re developing that I haven’t asked about?

A: I think it is important to understand that we will soon consider all the weapons more in terms of security subscription rather than actual hardware product.

Q: What do you mean?

A: I mean the amount of updates that we make, even on the software side, is huge and happens so often. It kinda reminds me of how you update your smartphone. This does not mean that you have to buy each new smartphone every month, but the software updates quite fast, and also could be that in a year or two you will need a new smartphone. So Ukraine is rethinking the weaponry more in the possibility of how the company can ensure that the army will always have a capability, and how this capability is provided is now a headache of the company. 

So in the old model, when a defense contractor delivers the contract, that’s it. Maybe after some time he will be called for maintenance. But our responsibility isn’t finished on the day that we deploy the weapon, but after I finally receive the post-flight analysis and I’m happy with this. So the whole logistic services, software updates, up-training, any changes that are happening on the way we do by ourselves. The end user can focus on launching and planning the missions, and of course we work shoulder to shoulder to ensure that we will use the battlefield data to a maximum level of usefulness.

The post-Cold War order was built on assumptions russia never shared.

Today’s queues at the Fire Point stand suggest Europe has understood the assignment.

Exceptional second day at Eurosatory. pic.twitter.com/hwMLEMcZXN

— terekh (@iraterekh) June 16, 2026

Q: What can the U.S. learn from Fire Point?

A: Make the market more transparent and attractive to younger startups. Remove bureaucracy as much as possible, share the risks with the contractors to make everybody more flexible, and probably that’s it. 

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The US Senate will vote Tuesday on Russian sanctions, days after Ukraine attacked an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to meet United States President Donald Trump in the White House on Tuesday, a meeting that could coincide with the introduction of tough new sanctions on Russia.

Zelenskyy, who will attend the funeral of US Senator Lindsey Graham, ⁠is also scheduled to meet ‌with the Senate on ⁠Tuesday ⁠evening, the Reuters news agency reported, citing two Senate aides.

The vote on Russia sanctions, legislation that has been pending for months and was championed by Graham, could happen that same day.

If enacted, the Russian sanctions bill would ratchet up pressure on Moscow by imposing 100 percent tariffs on goods from the five largest importers of Russian oil and gas, including China and India.

In a last-minute intervention, Trump sought to add sanctions on Iran to the same bill.  Zelenskyy told Trump ally Laura Loomer last week that he thinks the move is a “great idea”.

Iran and Ukraine wars converge

The two wars, taking place roughly 2,500km (1,550 miles) apart, have converged in recent days.

On Saturday, Ukraine attacked an Iranian tanker in the Caspian Sea that Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel, Yevgen Korniychuk, said was carrying drones and military components from Iran to Russia. Iran has promised to retaliate.

By attacking Iranian ships, Kyiv is not only doing itself a favour but also attacking Washington’s “enemy number one”, which will please the US, former US ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia, William Courtney, told Al Jazeera.

But while Zelenskyy supports Iranian sanctions as part of the Russian sanctions bill, Ukraine is unlikely to want to be too closely associated with the “unpopular” US war on Iran, he added.

The US no longer provides direct financial aid to Ukraine for its war against the Russian invasion, but it still provides crucial intelligence for long-range strikes and sells weapons to Europe that are then passed on to Ukraine.

Trump-Zelenskyy relationship

While their relationship seemed tense during a heated exchange in the White House in February 2025, relations between Zelenskyy and Trump have improved significantly in recent months.

The two leaders agreed earlier this month to allow Ukraine to jointly produce Patriot air defence interceptors, a crucial component for the country’s defence against Russian aerial attacks.

Ukraine and the US are also moving closer to a deal on joint drone production, a move that could help the US catch up with Ukraine in this crucial military technology.

Ukraine is on track to produce 6 to 7 million short-range attack drones this year, while the Pentagon’s $1.1bn production programme will have ordered just under 200,000 drones cumulatively by February 2027.

Fighting continues

Heavy fighting continues on Ukraine’s front lines, and long-range strikes are taking place almost every day.

On Monday, Russian strikes on eastern Ukraine killed seven people and ⁠injured more than 20, officials said.

In Russia’s Belgorod region, a Ukrainian drone struck ‌a ‌commercial building, killing one person and injuring two.

Fighting is heaviest in Ukraine’s Konstantinyvka and Pokrovsk directions, both of which are in the Donetsk region.

Ukraine has appointed veteran energy executive Sergii Koretskyi as its new prime minister, marking a significant leadership change as the country continues to battle Russia’s invasion and prepares for another difficult winter.

Parliament approved the 48-year-old on Thursday as part of a wider government reshuffle announced by President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. Koretskyi becomes Ukraine’s third wartime prime minister and takes office at a time when Kyiv faces mounting military, economic and energy challenges.

A Political Outsider Takes Office

Unlike many of his predecessors, Koretskyi arrives in government without a political background. An engineer and economist by training, he has never held elected office or served in government and is not affiliated with any political party.

Analysts say that independence could work in his favour. Volodymyr Fesenko, director of the Penta think tank, has described Koretskyi as an experienced manager whose political neutrality makes him well suited to lead a technocratic government focused on wartime priorities rather than party politics.

More Than Two Decades in Ukraine’s Energy Sector

Koretskyi is best known for his extensive career in Ukraine’s energy industry, where he has spent more than two decades working across oil production, refining, retail fuel operations, wholesale energy management and international financing.

Since May 2025, he has served as chief executive of Naftogaz, Ukraine’s state-owned oil and gas company that oversees much of the country’s natural gas production, imports and distribution. Before taking over Naftogaz, he led Ukrnafta, Ukraine’s largest oil producer and a subsidiary of the Naftogaz Group.

Earlier in his career, Koretskyi headed Western Oil Group, served as chief executive of the Continuum Group, and managed WOG, one of Ukraine’s largest fuel station networks. Outside the energy sector, he also founded a coffee chain business in his hometown of Lutsk in western Ukraine.

Winter Energy Security Will Be the First Test

His appointment comes as Ukraine’s energy sector remains under relentless pressure from Russian missile and drone strikes. Last winter, Russia launched its most extensive campaign against Ukraine’s power infrastructure since the war began, damaging power plants, substations and transmission networks across the country.

Preparing the energy system for another winter has become one of the government’s most urgent priorities. President Zelenskiy has said ensuring stable electricity and heating supplies while strengthening protection for critical infrastructure will be among the new government’s immediate tasks.

Leading Ukraine During Wartime

Koretskyi also takes office as Ukraine faces continued battlefield pressure despite making gains through long-range strikes against Russian energy facilities and military logistics. At the same time, Kyiv continues to rely heavily on international military and financial assistance while confronting shortages of air defence interceptors needed to counter Russian missile attacks.

His background suggests the government will place a strong emphasis on energy security, infrastructure resilience and economic management as the war enters another challenging phase.

Whether Koretskyi’s experience in managing some of Ukraine’s largest energy companies translates into effective wartime leadership will likely become one of the key tests for Zelenskiy’s newly reshuffled government in the months ahead. His ability to secure Ukraine’s energy network, maintain economic stability and coordinate with international partners will be closely watched as the country prepares for another winter under the shadow of war.

With information from Reuters.

Yulia Svyrydenko to step down as prime minister amid government shake-up aimed at prioritising foreign policy and security goals.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has announced a government reshuffle, as well as proposing the replacement of Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko and the heads of some law enforcement agencies.

“Ukraine is changing its political strategy. Each priority foreign policy direction will be overseen by a specific individual with substantial experience who is capable of delivering on the agreements reached at the leaders’ level and fulfilling the expectations of the Ukrainian people,” Zelenskyy said on Sunday in a lengthy post on social media.

“I discussed the details with Ukraine’s Prime Minister, Yulia Svyrydenko. We agreed that implementing these changes requires a renewal of the Cabinet of Ministers.”

Svyrydenko became prime minister a year ago, succeeding Denys Shmyhal. She previously served as first deputy prime minister and economy minister, roles that brought her into close contact with the administration of US President Donald Trump. She was widely credited with negotiating a critical minerals agreement between Washington and Kyiv last year that helped thaw what had initially been a frosty relationship between Trump and Zelenskyy.

“I am proud to have had the honour of leading the Government during one of the most difficult periods in Ukraine’s modern history. I thank every man and woman defending Ukrainian land. Our warriors are our strength and the foundation of our independence,” the 39-year-old wrote on X.

Zelenskyy also said there would be changes in the leadership of law enforcement agencies.

He said the new political strategy would focus on key foreign policy priorities, including agreements to manufacture Patriot air defence systems under licence, advancing Ukraine’s bid for European Union membership and deepening ties with the Gulf region, which he described as one of the world’s “most promising” areas for security and economic cooperation.

Zelenskyy thanked Svyrydenko for her offer to lead a “new significant direction in relations with a key partner”.

DEVELOPING STORYDEVELOPING STORY,

The attacks have triggered fires in two districts of Kyiv, according to the city’s mayor.

Russian missile attacks have struck Kyiv in the third large-scale assault on the Ukrainian capital in less than a week.

Early on Wednesday, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said in a statement on Telegram that the Russian strikes had triggered fires in two districts of the city. It is not clear if there have been any casualties or damage.

Moscow also launched a large-scale attack on Kyiv on Monday, killing at least 14 people and damaging at least a dozen buildings.

Both Russia and Ukraine have recently expanded their use of long-range weapons, including missiles, marking a new front in Moscow’s four-year war.

Ukraine has focused its attacks on Russian energy facilities to weaken its war efforts.

Ukraine said on Tuesday that its drones attacked a dozen tankers from Russia’s “shadow fleet” over the past two days that were delivering fuel to Moscow-occupied Crimea. Kyiv’s military said they had struck eight vessels subject to sanctions in the Sea of Azov, each with a deadweight of about 7,000 metric tonnes. Two more tankers were hit later in the day.

The Sea of Azov is a key supply route for Russian forces in Crimea and other occupied parts of southern Ukraine.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 – in a move that has been unrecognised internationally – eight years before launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Moscow has not publicly commented on this week’s attacks on Ukraine, which also included strikes on electrical substations, radar systems, and missile installations.

Attacks amid NATO Summit

The latest exchange of fire between Russia and Ukraine also comes amid NATO’s annual summit, which began on Tuesday. The military alliance’s leaders have gathered in Turkey’s capital Ankara for the two-day summit, where defence spending and the Russia-Ukraine war is under discussion.

NATO is expected to pledge further military support for Ukraine, as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urges the alliance to step up aid for the country’s air defences following a deadly escalation of Russian attacks on Kyiv.

Zelenskyy – who has renewed his call for Ukraine to be allowed to join the alliance – wrote on social media on Tuesday that he had signed new agreements with Estonia, the Netherlands, and Denmark in Ankara.

The deals create “new opportunities for joint production, the development of innovative defense technologies, systematic exchange of expertise, and the export of Ukrainian battlefield-proven solutions”, he said.

Further agreements are expected with Germany, Norway, Finland, and Canada.

US President Donald Trump is also expected to meet Zelenskyy on the summit sidelines on Wednesday, having spoken with Russian President Vladimir Putin ahead of the NATO gathering.

Asked about Russia’s war in Ukraine, Trump said he hoped it would be settled “soon”.

“I think they both want to make a deal,” Trump said.

“It’s too bad it took so long, but I think something’s going to come out.”

Over the past several weeks, news began emerging about Ukraine’s use of modified, AI-enhanced kamikaze drones to target Russian cargo trucks, fuel tankers, railroad cars and even vessels as far as 150 miles behind the front lines. Dubbed the mid-range strike campaign by Kyiv, this effort is having a devastating effect on Russian logistics, cutting off key highways to Crimea, helping to halt Moscow’s gains and pave the way for Ukrainian advances.

To learn more about this campaign, we reached out to one of the soldiers leading this effort from the unit that created it. In an exclusive interview, an Unmanned Systems Department Officer for the First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine offered us unique insights into how the program began, how it’s going, where it is headed and how AI is helping to identify and hit targets deep behind the lines. It’s a capability we described in great detail — about how it was rapidly gestating and would arrive on the battlefield around now. The officer spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss operational details.

Some of the questions and answers have been edited for clarity.

Q: Walk me through the genesis of the mid-range strike campaign.

A: I will first of all start with answering the question of why. So the reason why we are currently conducting this campaign is to hunt enemy logistics capabilities, and currently we have a lot of quite cheap assets that can strike enemy targets at quite a deep range. So the overall meaning, the overall sense of this campaign is to strike enemy concentrations of cargo in the places where this concentration is the highest and the protection of those enemy logistical assets is at the lowest level.

So, if we’re talking about enemy logistics very close to the front line, to the line of contact, we are mostly talking about a person with a backpack. Then, if we are moving deeper into the enemy controlled area, further from the front line, then we’re talking about cars. Then even deeper we’re talking about trucks. Even deeper we’re talking about long haulers with trailers, so a higher concentration of cargo. Even deeper into the enemy controlled area, we’re talking about the railroads, the trains that are carrying supplies. So the deeper we go from the line of contact, the higher is the concentration of enemy cargo.

The other part of answering this question is basically about how the enemy protects their logistical assets. So the deeper we go from the line of contact, not only is the distance larger, but also the areas that the enemy needs to protect. So just simple mathematical calculations show us that the distance of 50 kilometers deep from the line of contact is usually the most concentrated area the enemy has to defend against our strike assets. But if we go to the depths of 300 kilometers, then the areas that the enemy should protect are much larger, and it’s basically impossible to saturate that area with all the necessary protection assets that the enemy needs to strike down our drones.

The point I would like to make is that we conduct those strike operations at deeper ranges with basically the same assets that we use for the tactical depths, for example, at the depths of 50 kilometers. That means we do not increase the cost of our assets. We just introduced some technical modifications, and we can use the same assets to strike in the deep area.

How Ukraine Uses the US-made Hornet AI Strike Drone To Disrupt And Cut Russian Logistics Lines

Q: What drones are you using to carry out these attacks and how are you increasing the ranges?

A: Basically, we’re using fixed-wing kamikaze drones with some modifications in terms of communication systems. We’ve installed Starlink systems on those drones, and we have also introduced a number of modifications in terms of the engine of the drones – in terms of the overall propelling unit. And this allowed us to increase the range of the assets that we used previously for the range up to 50 kilometers, with some modifications for longer distances.

Q: What kinds of drones are you using?

A: Just the simple fixed-wing chemical drones, such as Hornet systems, such as the Darts systems, and also some other assets that, for now, we prefer not to mention.

Darts

Q: Can you provide additional details about the modifications you have made to these drones and what is their maximum range?

A: Well, I would say that these are quite technical things, and I wouldn’t want to disclose those, because I would want to avoid the situation where the enemy is going to do the same modifications.

Q: Are you reaching as far as 100 kilometers?

A: From what we can say now, we can cover distances of up to 250 kilometers, but as you might understand, with time we will cover longer and longer distances.

Q: Can you describe how these attacks work? Do you operate these as first-person view drones through a video feed? Do they have a terminal seeker? 

A: The process is really simple. So, for example, we select a section of the road, or the road as a whole and we distribute that road or the sections among our units. And I would like to mention that this is an all Ukrainian operation. It’s not a task for just one single unit, and basically each unit has its own area of responsibility and its own section of the road. 

And then we just send drones there in hunting mode, and I cannot disclose how this works from the standpoint of intelligence, but the overall principle is that the intelligence just gives us the priorities for the targets. For example, they say that you need to target this type of vehicle with these types of cargo.

And in terms of the targeting, I remember that you were also asking the question about how the targets are selected. For this we use both the AI tools and also the operator himself, so we’re using both methods for that.

Q: I want to get back to AI in a bit, but what area of operations do you cover?

A: Our area of interest and area of responsibility is related to all the roads that the enemy is using to bring in supplies to the area of operations of our corps, which is roughly in the area of the town of Dobropillia in eastern Ukraine, and for example, this may be the route from Rostov that goes to Mariupol and then goes to Donetsk, and this could be any other route that the enemy might use to bring military cargo to the area of operations of our corps.

Q: What were some of the more successful mid-range drone strike missions you carried out?

A: That’s basically an easy principle. When I said that we are hunting the enemy’s logistics, I mean that this is a daily process. This is a continuous process, and this is not about one standalone mission, when we fly somewhere, when we hit a target and the mission is over.

Last night, Ukraine expanded its mid-range strike campaign to the Sea of Azov, hitting at least 5 vessels carrying Russian cargo.

At least two of the cargo vessels were hit at the occupied ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol, as Ukrainian forces seek to cut off Russian logistics. pic.twitter.com/NoXeAO7Ca6

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 5, 2026

Q: How are these mid-range strikes on Russian logistics affecting their ability to fight?

A: This is causing shortages of fuel for the enemy. This was already commented on by our media, and also the media resources of the enemy, and now we understand that this is true, not only for Crimea, where there is a severe shortage of fuel now, but also this is true about the other Russian-controlled territories. And basically, when we are striking enemy logistical supplies of fuel, this affects the overall situation, because what is fuel? Fuel is basically the blood of war, which is necessary to fuel the generators that the enemy is using for the FPV operations. The fuel is used for the vehicles that basically bring in those FPVs to the combat zone.

I’d like to add an additional explanation of how this works. If we destroy a car that brings fuel to the line of contact, then we’re talking about destroying like two canisters, so that’s approximately 40 liters of fuel. But if we strike a fuel tank and a tank vehicle, which is bringing fuel to the overall area, so then we can talk about several tons of materials.

Gas stations across Russian-occupied Crimea are facing worsening fuel shortages, with long queues, rationing, and voucher-based distribution reported by residents. Some locals say fuel has become so scarce that it is treated as a luxury, while Moscow insists there is no cause for… pic.twitter.com/0LSYWEqiDH

— Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (@RFERL) June 5, 2026

Q: Is this setting the stage for a Ukrainian advance in the east or Zaporizhia?

A: I would say that blocking the logistical supplies to the Zaporizhia Oblast and also to Crimea is a byproduct of our attacks aimed at cutting enemy logistics to our area of operations. Because we’re targeting the roads that go through Mariupol, also to Crimea, to supply the Zaporizhia region, and as well our area of operations. But as for the most strategic aspect of this question of whether this might influence some counter-offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, I think that is not the question within my scope of responsibility, because I’m an officer responsible for the UAS component of the corps, and I think that this is more of a question that should be directed to the general staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Ukraine 🇺🇦 continues to launch an important number of mid-range strike, targeting Russian 🇷🇺 logistics in occupied territories

Since early may, more than 270 trucks have been hit, together with multiple fuel depots and trains.

🧵THREAD🧵1/14 ⬇️ pic.twitter.com/YnisZf2kJ6

— Clément Molin (@clement_molin) June 4, 2026

Q: Tell me how you came to use the U.S.-made Hornet drones.

A: I would say that this is also a question that should be directed at one level up from my level. We get those drones, we deploy those drones, but the questions of how we get them and what are the specifics of their supply, this is not a question that I can answer.

Q: When did you start getting them?

A: We have been receiving these drones for almost a year.

Q: When you got the Hornet drones, were you given any instructions on what missions to accomplish with them or what targets to pursue?

A: I think that the principle thing to explain here is that the Hornet drone is a tactical level UAV system. It can be used at the maximum range of 50 kilometers – the maximum range of the basic configuration of this drone. The drones we are currently using are the modification of the Hornet drone, but the basic configuration of this drone is only a tactical-level UAV. This is why our mid-strike operations, which have started only recently, are using modified drones.

I think that it is important to add that these modifications are conducted by the units themselves.

The First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine maintains control over enemy logistics near Donetsk.

Strike UAV pilots are targeting Russian logistics deep in the operational rear. Drone units maintain constant surveillance and fire control over all supply routes around… pic.twitter.com/i4TYOWJBg4

— First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine (@azov_media) April 16, 2026

Q: When did you begin to make the modifications and was the mid-range strike concept something that Azov developed?

A: Yeah, I would say that basically that was Azov development. So the first tests of these new modifications started in early winter. After approximately a month of testing, we started combat deployment of those drones approximately in January or February of this year. And we use those new modifications to ensure our middle strike operations. In terms of the tactics, I would also like to say that Azov developed new tactics of the deployment of middle strike drones, because the previous tactics they were mostly concentrated on the use of very expensive assets, which are available in limited numbers, so the targeting cycle was different, which is why we needed to develop new tactics and change this targeting cycle.

Q: What systems were you using before that were so expensive?

A: Well I’m not really talking about some specific assets here. I’m mostly talking about the overall tactics and the targeting cycle. So, the tactics of middle strikes were developed for expensive assets that the Corps didn’t have at the moment. So, this is basically why we started developing our own assets that could ensure that we have those middle strike capabilities, and we can also engage targets at the operational level.

Magyar claims a reduction from 3,800 cargo journeys to 1,100 cargo journey (71.05%) along the E-58 Mariupol -Berdiansk – Melitopol – Simferopol highway in the past two weeks

He makes it clear that doesn’t mean they’ve destroyed 2,700 trucks, nor that they have total fire control… https://t.co/O3K2Iz53Xg pic.twitter.com/VTPn3ghZcD

— Ukraine Control Map (@UAControlMap) June 9, 2026

Q: When you added Starlink, did you have to seek permission from SpaceX to use their system for these weapons?

A: The first thing that I would like to say is that we do not use only Starlink. It is just one of the possible communication systems and communication solutions that we’re using. And the second thing that I would like to add is that all the international issues, international cooperation questions, are the issues that should be dealt with at the level of our ministries and at the level of our central government, so once again, this is not a question that I can answer.

Una parte vital de la efectividad de los drones Hornet con los que Ucrania está atacando las rutas logísticas rusas entre 80 y 120km del frente es la recopilacion de datos para que el algoritmo aprenda. Por eso algunos modelos llevan grandes terminales Starlink. https://t.co/yGePjoPo2K pic.twitter.com/iWu2bLrwq5

— Martin Tuitero (@TuiteroMartin) June 2, 2026

Q: Can you tell me what other communications systems you use?

A: No, this information is still secret, because none of those assets have been taken by the enemy, so the enemy doesn’t know yet that we’re using those. But I think that in some time we will be able to go public with those assets and tell more about what we use, apart from Starlink.

Q: Are you using Starlink and the other systems on the Darts drones as well, or just Hornet?

A: Yes, we are using Darts for those middle strike attacks. So, basically, the overall tactics of those mid-strike attacks with small UAV systems, it can use any fixed wing kamikaze drones with modifications which is why we are using Hornets, we are using Darts and also the other types of drones.

While the Ukrainian “Hornet” strike UAV is receiving a lot of attention recently, the “Darts” UAV remains a workhorse for mid-range strike.
It, too, has AI terminal targeting and control capabilities to defeat Russian jamming. https://t.co/cNcQytap1D pic.twitter.com/C8nYJ20Uer

— Roy🇨🇦 (@GrandpaRoy2) June 6, 2026

Q: Can you talk about the other types of drones? 

A: Unfortunately, no. The enemy has not yet got hold of those assets, and if one of them will be shot down, or if one of them will be captured by the enemy, then I think that we will be able to go public with those assets.

Q: Can you talk more about how you are using AI for the Hornets and Darts?

A: The AI is used for the so-called last-mile system. I’m talking about the terminal guidance here, and also the AI can also be used to identify the targets, especially when the drone is flying in the autonomous mode. It can recognize the type of the target and it can automatically engage the target. So all of these processes can happen without the involvement of the operator. This allows us to launch several drones at the same time, and this also allows us to ensure a higher level of coordination for those attacks.

I think that one of the examples of these attacks was captured by one of our videos that you might have seen when one fixed-wing drone is observing the target and the other drone is actually hitting it. 

1-й корпус НГУ «Азов» контролює ворожу логістику під Донецьком. Знищення російської техніки

Q: Is there a man in the loop or a man on the loop during the terminal phase of the attack or is it fully autonomous?

A: Since we are trying to control the whole process, usually it is the person who takes the final decision and actually makes this decision to strike the target, because we do not want to over rely on the artificial intelligence. If necessary, this whole process can also happen without human involvement, but as I have already mentioned, our policy is that the decision should be made exclusively by the operator.

Q: So this is man in the loop?

A: Yes, so technically men can be out of this loop, but in our case we involve humans in this system, so that’s man in the loop.

Visual look of Hornet UI. Not much new, can mark soldiers individually. Seems aiming is done by either by lock a target (red) or manually aiming by continusly clicking (green) https://t.co/d2LGtV2aON

— Tommy Lund (@TommyLundn) June 6, 2026

Q: Have the Russians developed countermeasures for this effort?

A: Since the overall intent was to go to the massive deployment of those drones against the enemy logistics at once, as for now, the enemy has not yet had enough time to adapt to these tactics of ours. And now they’re desperately trying to find some countermeasures to find some ways to react to this. 

They are putting on anti-drone nets deep into their controlled territory. They are placing people armed with shotguns every 50 meters of their critical roads, but basically, as for now, there is no Russian tactic that would be effective in protecting their logistics. I do not say that they will not come up with this tactic in a month or so, but as for now, they do not have an effective countermeasure for that.

The only thing that I would like to add is that we approximately know the direction in which the enemy is moving to ensure counter measures to this tactic of ours, and we already have countermeasures for their countermeasures.

The current Ukrainian superiority in mid-range drone warfare is a brilliant advantage that comes with an expiration date.

Failing to prepare for the day Russia matches this capability guarantees a catastrophic collapse of front line logistics for Ukraine.

Ukraine is rightfully… pic.twitter.com/RI1NWLNYUc

— Joni Askola (@joni_askola) June 8, 2026

Q: Is the AI enhancement helping to mitigate Russian jamming and electronic warfare measures?

A: Well, I would like to say that EW is not the only way to counter UAVs. So, in addition to EW assets, there are other counter drone methods. Nets can be used. Air observation posts can be used. The drones can be shot down with enemy interceptor drones, and also there are hundreds and hundreds of people armed with shotguns who can also try to shoot the drones down. So the EW systems are just a small part of this overall system of drone countermeasures, and it is a general misconception that all anti-drone efforts are from the EW system. I would say that EW accounts for approximately 10% of overall counter drone efforts.

The main idea of the use of the AI systems is not only to help operators to counter enemy drone countermeasures, but the AI also helps the operator with navigation, with orientation, with the identification of the targets. So this is a complex system that helps the operator with many tasks.

Here: strike by the Ukrainian-American “Hornet” drone on occupier positions. Two Russians confirmed as “gruz 200” (KIA).
Interestingly, the Russians call this drone “Martian-2” because its capabilities seem “out of this world” to them.

High Autonomy: Operates with AI (autonomous… pic.twitter.com/Ao0MAiCqUp

— Takeshi Kovacs (@PrzemekShura) May 12, 2026

Q: What are the lessons that the U.S. can learn from your mid-range drone strike campaign, given the importance of logistics everywhere.

A: Well, I would say that the main lesson that the U.S. can learn from our experience is that drones in their basic configuration, right out of the box, is not something that can work, and this is not something that can bring you the best results at once. This is why every unit should have their own drone laboratory that can reconfigure those drones and modify them, and I’m not only talking about reconfiguring tactical level drones to turn them into middle strike capacities. I’m talking about all warfare in general.

Assets become obsolete very quickly and in three months everything can change, starting from the navigation systems and ending with the control systems. For example, today the GPS signal works, in a month it doesn’t work anymore. Today we use this set of frequency ranges, and in a month all those frequency ranges are jammed by the enemy. So I’m saying this for you to understand that for example, if the U.S. government purchases Hornet drones for their units, then the units are going to have good tactical level drones. But if you want to squeeze all of the possible benefits from those drones, then you will need to modify the structure of your units and include the departments, include the sections that will deal with the modification and reconfiguration of those drones to ensure the most efficient results that can be achieved.

From what I see now, the U.S. is mostly just giving the unit some assets, but they are not thinking about re-configuring or repurposing those drones.

Q: Is there anything I haven’t asked you that you would like to address?

A: I think that we have covered all the topics. The only thing that I would like to add is that I would like your audience to see that Ukraine introduces new innovations that can basically change the battlefield, and this is why trying to forecast the outcome of the war based on the number of tanks or aircraft or bombs that would be incorrect, so the victory will belong to the side capable of adapting faster and not to the side that has more resources.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

No handshake and no photo as Mirra Andreeva of Russia beats Marta Kostyuk of Ukraine to reach French Open tennis final.

Russian teenager Mirra Andreeva reached her first Grand Slam final by beating Marta Kostyuk of Ukraine 6-1, 6-3 in a tense encounter at the French Open.

Andreeva converted her first match point when she served for the tennis match on Thursday.

There was no post-match handshake between the pair, however, and Kostyuk walked off quickly, turning only to wave and blow kisses to the crowd at Court Philippe-Chatrier, where some fans were draped in Ukrainian flags.

The atmosphere beforehand was somewhat tense as the players had separate photos taken as they each stood next to two children on their respective sides of the net. Usually, the players pose for the same photo, standing right next to each other by the net.

Kostyuk and countrywoman Oleksandra Oliynykova have spoken out during the tournament about the impact Russia’s four-year invasion of Ukraine is having on their country.

The eighth seed seized control from the outset and never loosened her grip on the contest, overwhelming Kostyuk with her ⁠depth and aggression on Court Philippe-Chatrier to set up a title clash against compatriot Diana Shnaider or Polish qualifier Maja Chwalinska.

Andreeva, 19, raced into a 4-0 lead in the opening set and barely looked back in the third meeting between the two ⁠players, the Ukrainian having won the first ⁠two.

Kostyuk briefly threatened to make a contest of it in the second set, but the Russian swiftly snuffed out any hopes of a comeback before serving ⁠out the match to complete a dominant display.

“I’m still very nervous, very nervous coming to ⁠this match as she’s had an ⁠amazing season, she hadn’t lost on clay, so that put pressure,” said Andreeva.

“She’s an amazing player, a tough opponent, so I’m super happy with the way ‌I played. I’m happy I got revenge for the Madrid final, and to reach my first Grand Slam final.

“All of these ‌feelings ‌combined, I’ve never felt anything like this. I’m very excited about the last match here in Paris.”

Top-seeded Sara Errani and Andrea Vavassori of Italy won the mixed doubles final earlier Thursday, beating Gabriela Dabrowski of Canada and Evan King of the US 4-6, 6-3, 10-4.

An Italian is guaranteed to be in Sunday’s men’s French Open singles final, with Flavio Cobolli facing fellow Italian Matteo Arnaldi on Friday in the first Grand Slam semifinal for both players.

It has been more than four years since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, expanding its occupation of Ukrainian lands, which started in 2014. In the chaos and violence of the first months of the invasion, families were separated, and childcare institutions were cut off from the control of the central authorities in Kyiv. As a result, the occupation forces forcibly transferred more than 20,000 Ukrainian children to Russia.

Russian officials claimed that they did not abduct Ukrainian children, but “saved” them through humanitarian evacuations. However, international investigations have since found that many such transfers were unlawful under international humanitarian law. In many documented cases, transfers were carried out without the consent of the living parent or legal guardians of the child.

International humanitarian law prohibits all forcible transfers and deportations of protected people from occupied territory, except for evacuations strictly required to ensure the population’s safety. Even then, evacuation must happen within occupied territory, be temporary, preserve family unity and return evacuees home as soon as hostilities cease.

Today, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian children are devastated by this forcible transfer. Instead of abiding by international legal obligations and returning them to their homeland, Russia has transformed the issue into yet another bargaining chip against the Ukrainian people.

But Ukraine refuses to abandon its children. For the past four years, there have been intense efforts from families, NGOs and the Ukrainian government to bring them back.

Take the case of Lesya (the name has been changed to protect her identity), whose testimony was recorded by The Reckoning Project— a global team of journalists and lawyers documenting and publicising atrocities committed in the war. Lesya was 15 years old when Russian forces occupied her village in the Kherson region in 2022. When the occupation authorities imposed a mandatory evacuation, she was put on a truck with more than 30 other children and was sent to a rehabilitation centre in Feodosia, Crimea. A woman accompanying the children told her that her mother would join her shortly.

At the facility, Lesya and other Ukrainian children were subjected to a strict routine, forced to do chores and study in Russian, using Russian textbooks. They were kept under surveillance indoors most of the time in a building with windows that could not be opened. Two days a week, the children underwent military training.

Eventually, a relative located her, and with the help of Save Ukraine, a Ukrainian NGO facilitating children’s return, her mother managed to bring her back.

But Lesya’s case is the exception rather than the rule. More than 2,000 Ukrainian children have been brought back thanks to efforts by NGOs, the government and foreign mediators.

Pressure through international institutions has also been pursued, but that has not accelerated the process of return.

In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued warrants of arrest for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.

In July 2025, the European Court of Human Rights, in Ukraine and the Netherlands v Russia, found Russia responsible for a number of human rights violations, including the organised removal of children. The court also required Russia to cooperate in establishing a mechanism to find and safely return children.

In March this year, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine concluded that Russia’s deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children amount to crimes against humanity. The report identifies the removal of Ukrainian children as a part of a well-planned and systematically executed policy, conceived at the highest level.

On May 11, the European Union sanctioned 16 individuals and seven entities, while the United Kingdom sanctioned 29 individuals and entities responsible for the deportation, forced transfer, forced assimilation, indoctrination, militarisation and unlawful adoption of Ukrainian children. Overall, the EU has sanctioned more than 130 people and organisations for these actions. The United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Switzerland and several other countries have introduced similar measures.

The lack of progress on this issue has driven families to desperation. Some have tried to bring their children back on their own or through often-daring missions by Save Ukraine and five other Ukrainian NGOs.

There should be no need for these risky missions. Under international humanitarian law, Russia is obligated to identify and register Ukrainian children in their care, facilitate family reunification, and permit access to neutral actors assisting Ukrainian children.

As negotiations for the end of the war have stalled and other global events have displaced Ukraine from global headlines, we urgently need to put the issue of the abducted Ukrainian children back in the spotlight.

There are several areas in which existing efforts can expand.

First, a comprehensive tracing mechanism needs to be established and financed to track abducted Ukrainian children and prevent their disappearance into dispersed care and adoption systems.

Second, ongoing legal efforts to hold to account Russian officials involved in the abduction should be intensified. This means coordinated prosecutions in states where the universal jurisdiction principle can be applied, as well as joint investigation strategies supported by Eurojust, the EU’s judicial hub. Ukraine’s partners should support its judicial processes launched against Russian officials and cooperate where needed, including through extraditions where legally applicable and other lawful transfer mechanisms. While justice may be slow, the prospect of accountability can have a deterrent effect.

Third, states can and should fully implement sanctions, trade restrictions and other obligations they assumed but did not consistently observe in practice. The sanctions regime on Russia has severely hurt its economy, but it has also seen continuous evasion. A strict implementation can help put more pressure on the regime in Moscow.

While stories of family reunions are heartening, they are just a drop in a bucket compared with the number of children who continue to be separated from their families and absorbed into a system of indoctrination and militarisation.

We must not allow the issue of returning Ukrainian children to be yet another negotiating chip for Moscow. It cannot be put on hold because negotiations have stalled or because other priorities have captured the world’s attention.

Four years is a long time in a child’s life. Each passing day further erodes their national identity and deepens the pain of separation, as they grow up in a hostile environment. There is no principle more universal than the belief that children belong with their parents and loved ones, and Ukrainian children deserve this basic human right today, not at some point in the future.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

With ground maneuver a huge risk thanks to the ubiquity of deadly aerial drones, Ukraine is increasingly relying on uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) to move supplies, rescue the wounded, shoot down drones, lay mines and even fight battles. As a result, the head of the country’s defense technology incubator has been tasked with ensuring that there are enough of these systems to meet the voracious demand.

These efforts are being closely watched. Five years into an existential fight, Ukraine has become a global leader in ground drone technology. Kyiv is deploying these systems at a scale and pace that even the most advanced militaries can’t come close to keeping up with.

In an exclusive hour-long interview earlier this month, Brave1 CEO Andrii Hrytseniuk spoke with us about how Ukraine is set to produce tens of thousands of UGVs this year, how they are being used, and the importance of artificial intelligence in increasing the efficiency of these robots in combat.

This is the second of a two part interview. The first part focused on Ukraine’s interceptor drones, which you can read here.

Some of the questions and answers have been edited for clarity.

Q: President Zelensky set a goal of producing 50,000 unmanned ground vehicles this year. How is that going? And how can you hit that target?

A: We are moving according to the plan that was announced by President Zelensky. And this is a very ambitious goal, but we feel pretty confident that we will be able to execute this plan and this task and the armed forces will get many times more drones than in previous years.

Q: How do you reach that goal?

A:  On the frontline, we use only Ukrainian drones, maybe just a few international ones, but about 99% of the drones that are used on the battlefield are fully manufactured here in Ukraine, and this is the high priority area for us for the last two years. There are 280 Ukrainian companies, private companies, that are producing UGVs. And in total, there are 550 different models of UGV. This is a big variety, starting from small to very big UGVs. And there are different types of categories of ground vehicles.

Inside A Ukrainian Secret Ground Drone Factory | Shaping the Future of Ground Battlest

Q: What are some of those categories?

A: The first are those used for logistics. Their main purpose is to provide transportation in the gray zone, because it’s very dangerous on the last 10 to 15 kilometers from the front line, and there are a lot of drones used for transportation of goods, like construction materials, ammunition and provisions. It’s very risky for soldiers and our philosophy is that we should not risk our soldiers. 

Everything that is possible to be done by drones has to be done by drones for transportation. In March, we performed 9,000 missions. In April, more than 10,000, so the implementation of logistics by drones is permanently increasing.

Ukraine’s ‘Khartia’ brigade turns to land drones to survive the drone-saturated frontline

Q: What are the other categories of UGVs?

A: The second category are special UGVs that are used for evacuation of wounded soldiers.

You can see an example of one of those rescue missions in the following video.

The third one is combat UGVs. And we have more than 10 different models of combat UGVs. They are used for attacking Russian soldiers and hitting Russian armored vehicles. Also they are used as anti-drone aerial defense systems. We use combat UGVs to hit Shaheds, to hit FPV drones, including those using fiber optics and even small Russian planes.

Q: How are these combat UGVs armed?

A: We have different combat UGVs using 5.45mm, 5.56mm, 7.62mm and 12.7mm guns. And we have a variety of different grenade launchers, like the Mk19 and others.

Q: Can you provide any details about what kinds of sensors these weapons use to engage drones?

A: I will not share the technical details, but I can tell you that combat UGVs without artificial intelligence do not work at appropriate effectiveness. All combat turrets that we are using have elements of artificial intelligence, and it allows them to be as effective as they are.

Q: How are the UGVs using AI to target drones?

A: First of all, this is machine vision. This is object recognition, identification, classification, tracking and providing recommendations for the operator on what to do.

Q: So basically, these systems acquire the target, determine how far away they are, at what altitude and speed and that they open fire on their own?

A: Yes. We are more advanced than Russia in combat turrets and combat UGVs, that’s why I would avoid sharing the technical details about how we are doing that.

Ukraine’s New AI-controlled Turret Is Taking Down Russian Drones | Sky Sentinel in Action

Q: How common is the use of fiber optic cables to guide UGVs?

A: For UGVs, fiber optics is not used.

Q: Not at all?

A: There are some experiments, but the use cases for fiber optics on UGVs are very, very limited. Only a very small percentage of UGVs use fiber optics.

Q: Why?

A:  UGVs typically have multiple missions. They go forward and go back, and when you’re using fiber optics, typically, this is a one-way mission.

Q: What can you tell me about how troops communicate with UGVs for combat missions?

A: Without the Delta command and control system, all these advanced technologies on the battlefield will not be working. The Delta command and control system, which is number one in the world, is absolutely crucial. And this is for all our drones, multi-domain operations, everything.

War in Ukraine: An advanced digital map. The Delta system #shorts #warinukraine #united24media

Q Can you provide any details about how that works?

A: No.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Russia pounded Ukraine’s capital overnight on Saturday with drones and ballistic missiles, including a powerful hypersonic Oreshnik missile, killing at least four people and damaging residential buildings. Footage shows people sheltering underground, while firefighters work above.