Ukraines

According to reports, UkrArmoTech has begun factory testing a prototype of the Skif, which has apparently been developed in direct response to the requirements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, drawing from lessons learned since the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022.

UkrArmoTech is among the leading developers and manufacturers of armored vehicles for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but has, to date, focused on wheeled models such as the Desna, Gyurza, and Tisa. With that in mind, the Skif marks a new direction for the company.

“First and foremost, we relied on our contacts with the military, our understanding of their needs, and our experience with the use of wheeled vehicles on the battlefield,” UkrArmoTech CEO Hennadii Khirhii told the Ukrainian Defense Express website. “Active combat operations in Ukraine have demonstrated the need for a significant number of armored vehicles to ensure and maintain the mobility of units and formations of the Armed Forces and Defense Forces.”

The design of the Skif is heavily influenced by the U.S.-developed M113, a Cold War-era tracked APC, many hundreds of which have been supplied to Ukraine since February 2022.

Despite its age, it seems the M113 has been a success in Ukrainian hands, offering a useful combination of reliability, maintainability, troop-carrying capacity, and off-road mobility.

The designers of the Skif were therefore instructed to produce a vehicle that matched the M113’s mobility while improving on its levels of protection and firepower.

According to reports, the Skif makes use of off-the-shelf components and assemblies from foreign manufacturers involved in the production of armored vehicles that are “descendants” of the M113.

It’s unclear if this implies that the Skif uses components from Western manufacturers that have built the M113 and its derivatives, or if the Ukrainian vehicle employs parts from other Western-made APCs. Noteworthy is the fact that members of the broader M113 family have been built under license in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, as well as several other countries outside Europe.

Reportedly, 60 percent of the vehicle’s components will initially be imported, and these will include the engine, transmission, suspension components, transfer case, and tracks. If production is launched, an increasing proportion of the components will be made locally.

In its basic form, the Skif is intended to transport soldiers from mechanized units across the battlefield and to provide them with fire support. As well as three crew (driver, commander, and gunner), located in the front section behind the power module, the Skif can accommodate eight soldiers in the rear troop compartment. The troops enter and exit via a rear ramp, as on the M113.

The prototype of the Skif has an aluminum hull, reportedly the first time this has been used on a Ukrainian combat vehicle. However, a series-production version will likely feature an armored steel. While steel offers better ballistic resistance and is easier to repair in the field, it comes with a significant weight penalty.

With the aluminum hull, the Skif weighs around 15 tons and is driven by a 360-horsepower diesel engine. The modular design means that different engines can be installed, for example, if more power is needed for a steel hull, or when fitted with heavier weapons.

In its basic form, the Skif has a Ukrainian-made remotely controlled combat module on the hull roof. This can be armed either with a 12.7mm or 14.5mm heavy machine gun paired with a 7.62mm auxiliary machine gun. As seen in the photos, the prototype does not currently have the combat module fitted.

Armor protection is in line with NATO STANAG 4569 Level 4 over the frontal section (withstanding, for example, 14.5mm machine gun fire, or a 155mm artillery projectile detonating at 25 meters), and Level 3 on the sides and rear (resistant to 7.62mm gunfire, or a 155mm artillery projectile detonating at 60 meters). Mine protection below the hull is rated at Levels 3a and 3b. The vehicle is expected to withstand the detonation of around 13 pounds of explosives under the hull or tracks.

It’s unclear what kinds of protection are provided against the threat of attack drones, but some type of electronic warfare gear is included; it would also be expected that the vehicle receives a purpose-designed ‘cope cage’ of the kind that has appeared on most Ukrainian and Russian combat vehicle types during the conflict. Otherwise, the Skif is equipped with communications, navigation, situational awareness, and fire-control systems of Ukrainian origin. A bank of smoke grenade launchers is fitted across the front of the hull on the Skif prototype.

The modular design means that the Skif can be adapted for other missions. These are likely to include vehicles equipped for command and control, reconnaissance, anti-armor, mortar carrier, medical evacuation, and more.

With the continued debate over wheeled versus tracked combat vehicles, it is interesting to note that Ukraine, after focusing on the local production of wheeled fighting vehicles, continues to see the necessity for tracked APCs. While heavier, more complex, and more costly, they are better able to deal with the brutal mud that is a feature of Ukrainian winters. They are also generally better in terms of armor protection.

For that reason, the aging M113 and the Soviet-era MT-LB remain popular choices for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

According to the Oryx open-source tracking group, since the start of the current conflict, more than 500 Ukrainian M113s and more than 150 MT-LBs have been confirmed destroyed or damaged. The actual figures are certainly higher, as Oryx only tallies losses that are confirmed with visual evidence.

Despite the need for a vehicle in this class, there remain significant challenges in getting it into production. Very likely, Ukraine will have to rely heavily on foreign funds and expertise if it is to put the Skif into quantity production. Should that prove realistic, Ukraine will likely also seek to sell the Skif to foreign customers, too.

Continued factory testing of the Skif prototype should provide a practical assessment of the new platform’s design maturity, including whether its mobility and running performance meet local requirements. Certainly, the new tracked APC is a bold venture for Ukraine’s war-ravaged industry, but it represents a class of vehicle for which there is a near-insatiable local demand.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Other details about the Koral missile remain a closely guarded secret.

It is said to make extensive use of various pre-existing subsystems, some of which are already proven, likely including the motor, inertial navigation system, and the radio and/or laser proximity fuze.

It is expected that the Koral will use a gas-dynamic control system, with conventional control surfaces allied with thrust-vectoring vanes in the exhaust nozzle, to ensure ‘endgame’ maneuverability. This is necessary for intercepting highly agile targets and those at extreme altitudes. However, while the original Koral mockup had Patriot PAC-3-style thrusters mounted at the forward end of the body to achieve extreme precision during the terminal phase of interception, these have disappeared from the latest version, which also features revised guidance fins with greater surface area.

Even before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine had a need for a missile in this class.

For medium- and long-range surface-to-air missiles, Ukraine relied primarily on the Soviet-era S-300P (SA-10 Grumble), smaller numbers of the S-300V1 (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant) with an anti-ballistic missile capability, and the Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly) mobile medium-range system. Of these, only a handful of surplus S-300Ps have been donated to Kyiv since the full-scale invasion. You can read about all these Soviet-era missiles here.

Ukraine has also received more capable Western surface-to-air missiles in this class, most prominently the U.S.-made Patriot, as well as the Franco-Italian SAMP/T. However, these are once again available only in limited numbers, and their respective effectors are notably expensive.

At one time, the Koral was also proposed as the main air defense weapon for the Ukrainian Navy’s two future Ada class corvettes being built in Turkey. However, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense chose an MBDA alternative, and the future of those vessels remains questionable.

Regardless, Ukraine has an even greater demand for ground-based air defense systems than it did in the first weeks of the full-scale invasion, when we first looked at this issue in depth.

Since then, Russia has only stepped up its barrages of missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure, putting an enormous burden on the available ground-based air defenses.

To help make up the shortfall, Ukraine, with U.S. support, embarked on the ‘FrankenSAM’ program, in which it leveraged existing capabilities within the Ukrainian Armed Forces arsenal to help rapidly provide badly needed additional air defenses.

There is, meanwhile, a growing list of ground-based air defense systems that fire repurposed Soviet-era heat-seeking R-73 air-to-air missiles as interceptors.

Other efforts have combined the R-73 with Western-developed launchers and sensors, like the containerized Gravehawk system, which the United Kingdom and Denmark developed for Ukraine.

Ukraine has also fielded modified 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) wheeled air defense vehicles armed with R-73 missiles instead of their usual 9M33 interceptors. This is notable for being a domestic initiative combining a Soviet-era surface-to-air missile vehicle with Soviet-era air-to-air missiles.

The Ukrainian military has also introduced R-73-armed uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), an application known locally as the Sea Dragon.

The Koral missile differs, however, in that it should provide a much greater range than most of the currently fielded FrankenSAMs, as well as an anti-ballistic missile capability. If all goes to plan, this will provide a replacement for longer-ranged Soviet-era systems, as well as a supplement to the costly Patriot and SAMP/T, the reliable supply of which cannot be guaranteed, certainly not in the numbers Ukraine requires.

For now, the Koral program remains very much shrouded in secrecy. We don’t yet know if the missile has been tested, let alone whether it’s in series production. We also have no idea about what kind of launchers it will be compatible with. Based on the FrankenSAM concept, it is conceivable that it might find its way onto existing S-300 series or even Patriot launchers.

Speaking in 2025, Andriy Hyrtseniuk, the head of Ukraine’s Brave1 defense tech incubator, told TWZ that “multiple” homegrown missiles of different classes had already been tested on firing ranges and “in some cases on the battlefield.”

At the very least, the apparent inclusion of the Koral in the recent public exhibition underscores the fact that Ukraine is still badly in need of additional air defenses. The recent conflict in the Middle East makes it even harder for Kyiv’s Western allies to keep up the already modest deliveries of more capable air defense systems. Clearly, Ukraine needs a surface-to-air missile in the class of the Koral, and one that’s available in sufficient numbers to help offset the challenge of repeated Russian attacks.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Stockholm’s transfer of two Saab 340 AEW&C aircraft to Ukraine was announced in May 2024, as we reported at the time. The donation was part of the biggest Swedish military aid package for Ukraine up to that point, worth around $1.25 billion.

At the time, it was said that it would take around a year to train the aircrew and maintenance personnel, as well as prepare the ground facilities for the new aircraft.

The Saab 340 AEW&C aircraft is known in Swedish military service as the ASC 890 and alternatively as the S 100D Argus. The Swedish Air Force operated two of these aircraft, with both understood to have been provided to Kyiv. Another two ex-Swedish Saab 340 AEW&C aircraft are operated by Thailand, and another pair were sold to Poland, having previously been operated by the United Arab Emirates.

Royal Thai Air Force Gripen and Saab 340 Erieye AEW

For Ukraine, the significance of the Saab 340 AEW&C is hard to overstate.

It brings an entirely new capability for the Ukrainian Air Force, which has never operated any type of AEW&C platform.

The core of the aircraft is its Saab Erieye active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. Carried atop the fuselage, this can detect air and sea targets at ranges of up to around 280 miles, with the aircraft typically operating at an altitude of 20,000 feet. Reportedly, the AESA system can track up to 1,000 airborne and 500 surface targets simultaneously.

Erieye explained

All this data is handled by three mission crew: a mission control officer, a combat control operator, and a surveillance operator. It can also be downlinked to ground stations and to other aircraft, at least in theory, of which more later.

Unlike a surface-based air defense radar, the Erieye provides a ‘lookdown’ capability. Without the line-of-sight limitations of terrain, the radar will be especially useful for detecting low-flying Russian drones and cruise missiles. These are otherwise notably tricky targets, due to the low altitudes at which they fly and their small radar signatures. With that in mind, the aircraft should provide Ukraine’s air defenses with a huge situational-awareness boost.

Within its layered air defense network, Ukraine relies heavily on crewed fighter jets (as well as other aircraft platforms) to intercept drones and cruise missiles. Adding the Saab 340 AEW&C to the equation, the radar plane should be able to work as a fighter controller, detecting targets, prioritizing them, and then assigning them to the fighters for interception. Equally, this data could be provided to other air defense assets.

Especially useful in this regard would be the NATO-standard Link 16 datalink communications system. This would, in theory, be compatible with Ukraine’s F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters, as well as Western-supplied ground-based air defense systems.

Український пілот про ефективність Mirage2000/Ukrainian Pilot on the Effectiveness of the Mirage2000

However, in late 2024, it was reported that the F-16s donated to Ukraine have had Link 16 systems removed or disabled, due to U.S. worries that they could end up in Russian hands.

This would deprive those fighters of a real-time air defense ‘picture’ sourced from the Erieye radar, and, at this point, it’s unclear if the Link 16 connectivity is available to Ukraine.

As of March 2025, it was reported that the delivery of the radar planes was on track, and they would be able to operate effectively with Ukraine’s F-16s.

“The timing of ASC 890 deliveries is linked to when certain modifications to F-16 fighters will be ready. There is no delay in the transfer of airborne early warning aircraft to Ukraine,” the Lithuanian Delfi news agency reported. This sounds very much like a reference to enabling the Link 16 connectivity.

However, even without Link 16, the Saab 340 AEW&C is able to provide much-enhanced air and sea surveillance for Ukraine.

Later versions of the Erieye radar also have a synthetic aperture radar and ground moving target indication (SAR/GMTI) capability, although it’s not clear if Ukraine has received that either. While SAR provides detailed image-like mapping of the ground at standoff ranges, GMTI detects and tracks movements on the ground over time, which would allow monitoring of Russian troop movements.

Should Ukraine’s ambitious plans to buy Saab Gripen fighters in the future materialize, the combination of these jets and the Saab 340 AEW&C could make a tailor-made solution for air defense and other missions.

For all its capabilities, the Saab 340 AEW&C will also be a prime target for Russia.

Russia’s own A-50 Mainstay AEW&C aircraft have been repeatedly targeted by Ukraine, in recognition of their value as force multipliers.

Russia was estimated to have nine A-50s in active service at the start of the full-scale invasion. Since then, there have been two combat losses, and another of these aircraft was damaged in a drone attack while on the ground at a base in Belarus, and its current status is unknown. More recently, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces claimed an A-50 had been hit in a strike on a maintenance facility in the Novgorod region of Russia.