Ukraines

Ukraine’s combat-proven Magura family of uncrewed surface vessels (USV) has gained its largest member to date. The new MV11 is designed for open-ocean operations lasting up to a week and can carry payloads weighing up to 4,850 pounds (2,200 kilograms). The drone boat has so far been shown in one configuration, loaded with 18 small vertically launched Sting interceptors, turning it into a small floating counter-drone battery. Given its significant payload capacity and other capabilities, it could be utilized in other roles, too.

The MV11 made its public debut yesterday at Ukraine’s Independence Day parade in the country’s capital, Kyiv. The uncrewed air, ground, and maritime systems were the centerpieces of this event, underscoring the central place they now hold in the Ukrainian armed forces. The maritime portion of the parade, which took place along a section of the Dnipro River, featured additional members of the Magura family, as well as other USVs, including kamikaze types and ones armed with repurposed air-to-air missiles. A drone boat with a launcher for first-person-view (FPV) type aerial kamikaze drones and another with an array of small domed antennas (possibly tied to an electronic warfare system or for use as a communications node) were also present. Various types of aerial kamikaze drones, as well as uncrewed ground vehicles (UGV) armed with anti-tank guided missiles, automatic grenade launchers, and machine guns, were also showcased at the event.

The video below shows the various USVs, as well as other uncrewed platforms showcased at Ukraine’s Independence Day parade in Kyiv yesterday.

“We are proud to present the MV11 on Ukraine’s Independence Day. This is not just the largest naval drone – it is a platform that delivers multi-domain capability: a single carrier that transports and launches other unmanned systems far from shore, enabling operations across all domains,” Oleg Roginsky, CEO of UFORCE, said in a statement. “At UFORCE, we are focused on building the best capabilities for Ukraine and its allies who stand for freedom. We are confident the MV11 will become the foundation for many successful missions and for pushing the enemy back even further.”

UFORCE was founded in Ukraine, but has its main headquarters in London in the United Kingdom. It is often described as an uncrewed-focused defense conglomerate with several different enterprises operating under its umbrella. Many of its components are also located outside of Ukraine. For instance, the main design, research, and development bureau for the Magura family is located in Portugal.

As mentioned, the configuration the MV11 has been shown in so far, both at the parade yesterday and in other marketing material released by UFORCE, features a payload of 18 Sting interceptors. They are loaded individually in box-like launchers, which can also be employed in other domains, including mounted on trucks or positioned on the ground. Weighing roughly nine pounds, the Sting interceptor is an electrically powered quad-rotor system with a small explosive warhead. It makes heavy use of 3D-printed components, and each one has a reported cost of around $2,100.

The Ukrainian developer, Wild Hornets, says Sting can reach altitudes up to nearly 23,000 feet (7,000 meters) and has a maximum range of around 23 miles (37 kilometers), depending “on battery capacity, weather conditions, payload weight, and operator flight style.” Typical flying time is said to be shorter, and the system can be recovered for reuse if it does not intercept a target after launch. Sting has proven itself effective at intercepting Russian variants and derivatives of the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 one-way attack drone and other similar designs.

Sting is manually operated by a human controller via a wireless link. How this works exactly with the MV11 as the launch platform is unclear, and TWZ has reached out for more information. Wild Hornets has said in the past that the interceptors can be remotely operated from locations up to 2,000 kilometers away from the launch point via a user interface that can be installed on a laptop.

Wild Hornets 2,000 Km

What capabilities the MV11 has onboard to spot and track targets to begin with is also unknown. However, the USV does have a mast at the rear, and images available so far show it equipped with a camera turret, navigation radar, and two other horn-like antennas. The camera system could be used for target detection and tracking, as well as just to help with situational awareness. The additional antennas might allow for passive detection of aerial targets via their signal emissions, or serve some other purpose. As noted, Ukraine does already have USVs armed with traditional anti-air missiles, which the country has claimed to have used to successfully down Russian fixed-wing jets and helicopters.

The MV11 also has a fixed-forward camera on top of the bow, which is a common feature on drone boats to aid general navigation. There are what appear to be a pair of rectangular satellite communications (SATCOM) terminals in the open main deck area, as well. A reliable SATCOM link would be key to linking the Sting interceptors with their operators.

With their own range and endurance, Sting-armed MV11s could offer Ukraine valuable forward-deployed counter-drone nodes out in the Black Sea and along other waterways. Being able to thin out groups of incoming Russian drones further away from their intended targets could help reduce the pressure on land-based forces, including more traditional surface-to-air missile batteries. It is well established at this point that Ukrainian air defense units are under heavy strain from Russia’s constant barrages of drones and missiles on targets across the country.

With a 4,850-pound (2,200-kilogram) payload capacity, the MV11 could easily be adapted to other roles. This could include launching groups of uncrewed aerial one-way attack drones at targets at sea or on land, or conducting direct attacks using other mounted weapon systems. These are capabilities that Ukraine has already demonstrated in real combat using smaller USVs.

MV11s could use their ample payload capacity in other ways, possibly including carrying sensor, electronic warfare, or communications packages. In a press release today, UFORCE said that the MV11 could be employed for more general surveillance and reconnaissance missions, as well as to support amphibious operations or transport cargo. In July, video emerged of Ukrainian forces using a smaller USV to land an armed UGV into a Russian-occupied area. While the exact outcome of that mission is still unclear, it did clearly serve as a proof-of-concept that could be a sign of things to come that could be further enabled by larger USVs.

On a more general level, the MV11 underscores the pace at which Ukraine continues to expand and evolve its uncrewed capabilities in the maritime, as well as air and ground domains. Other countries, including the United States, are taking notice and even moving to acquire Ukrainian-developed drone and counter-drone capabilities. Gulf Arab States have notably sought assistance from Ukraine in the wake of Iranian drone attacks this year. In that particular context, an MV11 loaded with Stings could be a very useful and lower-cost system for intercepting Shaheds and other one-way-attack drones heading across the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, especially when tied in with even a basic early warning network.

Now that the MV11 has been shown publicly, we could well see it in action soon as a counter-drone platform and/or in other roles.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

In early August, a Pentagon official stood in front of reporters and conceded something the department almost never says out loud: the world’s best-funded military cannot out-produce a country under invasion. Travis Metz, deputy director of the Defense Innovation Unit, put a number on it. Ukraine will manufacture six to seven million small first-person-view attack drones this year — roughly 500,000 a month, built in garages, repurposed furniture factories and basements within range of Russian glide bombs. The Pentagon’s own flagship drone program, a $1.1 billion initiative branded Drone Dominance, will have ordered fewer than 200,000 drones, cumulatively, by February 2027. Metz’s response was not defensive. It was aspirational: “I see no reason why we shouldn’t… be the world champions of this as well.” The gap he was describing is not a technology gap. It is a speed gap, and speed is the one metric wartime industry cannot fake.

The instinct is to read this as a story about Ukrainian ingenuity, and it is one. But it is also the epilogue to a specific American failure. In 2023 the Pentagon launched Replicator, a program to field “multiple thousands” of autonomous systems within 24 months to counter China. By its August 2025 deadline it had delivered “hundreds,” not thousands, after burning through roughly $1 billion — undone by drones that were unfinished at selection, software that could not command large numbers of different systems at once, and a Switchblade loitering munition priced above $100,000 a unit. Washington’s answer was not to slow down and fix the model; it was to bring in the Department of Government Efficiency to override procurement rules and reclassify small drones as disposable supplies rather than regulated weapons systems. Meanwhile, Russia’s own Shahed and decoy drone output is reportedly climbing toward several hundred, and by some Ukrainian estimates up to a thousand, units a day. The war that forced Ukraine to mass-produce cheap drones is the same war exposing how slowly America still moves.

Why the gap isn’t about money

Start with unit economics, because they explain most of the gap. A Ukrainian FPV drone can be built for as little as $300 to $500 — an airframe, a camera, a battery and a warhead, assembled by hand and flown once. The Pentagon’s comparable systems have historically cost orders of magnitude more, not because the components are better but because they were designed inside an acquisition culture built for exquisite, low-volume platforms like fighter jets, where every part is sourced, tested and certified over years. Layer onto that a July 2026 rule requiring a “wholly domestic” supply chain — no Chinese-made motors, no Chinese battery packs — and the honest tension becomes visible: the policy meant to make American drone production more secure is, in the near term, also what makes it slower and more expensive to scale. Metz’s own explanation was blunt: it is “much harder to get from zero to 200,000” than to expand an existing line. Ukraine skipped that problem by never centralizing production in the first place — thousands of small, dispersed workshops that are individually replaceable and collectively enormous.

The deeper obstacle is not money but structure. Replicator had no dedicated budget line, was bounced between the Defense Innovation Unit and a newly created Defense Autonomous Warfare Group under Special Operations Command, and repeatedly selected systems that existed as concepts rather than finished products, in a rush to hit an artificial 24-month deadline. Congress, by its own research service’s account, has struggled to get basic cost and capability data out of the program. This is what forced DOGE’s intervention: not a shortage of appropriated dollars, but a procurement system engineered for careful, low-volume exquisiteness trying to behave like a wartime factory floor, and failing at both.

The strongest objection to treating this as a straightforward American failure is that the comparison is not apples to apples. Ukraine’s FPVs are disposable, short-range and built for a static front line; American planners are chasing autonomy, jamming resistance and long-range swarm coordination for a Pacific theatre defined by vast distances rather than trench lines, and that ambition costs more and takes longer to get right. That is a fair distinction — but it does not rescue the record. Years and a billion dollars into that more ambitious bet, the Pentagon still lacks software able to command mixed fleets of different drones, while Ukrainian manufacturers are already fielding AI-assisted terminal guidance on sub-$500 airframes, refined through thousands of real combat sorties a month. The ambition gap did not produce a capability lead. It produced the same failure as the cost gap: exquisite requirements colliding with a timeline the requirements were never built to meet.

Which is why the Pentagon’s actual fix looks nothing like a bigger budget. Six Ukrainian manufacturers, including F-Drones and General Cherry, are now required to form joint ventures with American companies — near Toledo, Ohio, and in New Hampshire — as a condition of future Pentagon orders. Washington is not just buying drones. It is importing the production model, and with it the tacit admission that the expertise now runs the other way.

Three ways this goes

What happens next depends on whether the joint-venture model actually transplants Ukraine’s manufacturing tempo onto US soil, or just its branding.

Base case (roughly 50 percent probability). The Ohio and New Hampshire joint ventures scale gradually. By 2027–28, US-based output climbs into the low hundreds of thousands annually — a real improvement, but still an order of magnitude below Ukraine’s current pace, held back by the domestic-sourcing rule’s cost premium. The program becomes a credible proof of concept for a future Indo-Pacific contingency rather than a fix for any current shortfall, and “Drone Dominance” quietly redefines success downward to match what it can actually deliver.

Downside case. The DOGE-driven bypass of standard testing repeats Replicator’s failure mode at greater scale: units purchased without adequate vetting turn out unreliable in the field, a GAO or inspector-general report documents it, and Congress reimposes the very procurement safeguards that were just stripped away. Combined with a Chinese-component ban that keeps unit costs well above Ukrainian levels, US output stalls again, and the gap that Metz conceded in August widens rather than closes by the time it next matters.

Upside case. The joint-venture model works as intended — not just as a purchasing arrangement but as a transplant of Ukrainian manufacturing culture, its dispersed micro-factories, rapid iteration and tolerance for combat-tested imperfection, into the American industrial base. That model, proven on drones, becomes the template for how Washington arms the next partner already fighting a war, whether Taiwan or a Baltic state: not a slow pipeline of finished stockpiles shipped from the continental United States, but manufacturing capability transplanted onto the partner’s own soil, and now, in this instance, onto America’s.

The takeaway

So: what does the mismatch reveal? Not that Ukraine builds better drones — the Pentagon never disputed that its own designs, on paper, are more capable. It reveals that capability on paper is not the same as capability in time, and that the American defense-industrial base, even backed by an executive order, a billion-dollar program and a DOGE override of its own rules, still cannot mobilize at wartime tempo on its own. The fix Washington has actually reached for is not more money. It is outsourcing the missing ingredient — speed — to the one partner that has been forced to master it under fire. That is the real admission, and it may be the more durable one: the next time the United States arms a country fighting a live war, it may look less like supplying an ally and more like apprenticing to one.

Watch for: whether the Ohio and New Hampshire joint-venture lines are shipping US-assembled drones at anything close to Ukrainian unit costs by the next Gauntlet test cycle at Fort Carson. If the “wholly domestic” sourcing rule keeps American-made units several multiples more expensive than their Ukrainian counterparts, the joint ventures will have transferred the branding of Ukraine’s drone war without transferring its speed.

As its defense against Russia grinds on and with the future of foreign military assistance never assured, Ukraine is ramping up procurement of its new, domestically produced “Equalizer” aerial glide bomb, according to the Ukrainian military. Brave1, the Ukrainian defense technology incubator, on Tuesday provided us with some new details about this weapon, which extends the range and accuracy of so-called dumb bombs by adding guidance kits and pop-out wings.

Also known by its Ukrainian name “Vyrivniuvach,” this bomb first broke cover in May, which you can read more about in our initial story on the topic here. It was developed by the Ukrainian company DG Industry with the Brave1’s support.

While glide bombs have been used to great effect by both sides, Kyiv has had to rely on donated weapons like the U.S.-made Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range munition (JDAM-ER) and the French-made AASM-250 Hammer bomb. The Ukrainian Air Force also makes extensive use of the U.S.-supplied Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), which is smaller and also has pop-out wings.

The Ukrainian Air Force began launching JDAM-ERs in March 2023 and SDBs that November, though the use of the latter wasn’t officially confirmed until May 2024. The weapons became critical for striking Russian targets over the front lines because they allowed Ukrainian jets to release them from standoff distances and better avoid Russian air defenses.

Russia, meanwhile, produced its own crude glide bomb earlier in the war and it has become a highly problematic and deadly threat for Ukraine to contend with since. Now Ukraine is building its own.

As we noted in our earlier piece, the weapon had cleared trials and is ready for combat, giving Ukraine a domestically produced standoff munition that could augment its current arsenal of donated ones and provide a more secure supply chain given the uncertain nature of foreign assistance. One of our outstanding questions at the time was whether the Equalizer would have independent propulsion, a modification that provides this class of munition with a significant boost in range beyond the “dozens of kilometers,” Brave1 claims it can reach. By comparison, the stated JDAM-ER range is more definitive, able to hit targets about 45 miles away.

Russia last year introduced a small turbojet engine to its glide bombs, with claims that this has boosted range to at least 60 miles. Ukraine says it is developing that capability as well, with the goal of reaching targets as far as 125 miles away.

It’s worth noting that Ukraine’s French-supplied Hammer precision-guided bombs also feature a rocket booster. This feature is of unique utility for Ukraine, which often slings its glide bombs via pop-up launch profiles from low level executed by its fighter and attack aircraft. This is due to the extremely heavy air defenses near the front lines.

You can see a Ukrainian MiG-29 launch two Hammers in the following video.

The Equalizer “has no motor,” Brave1 spokesman Yurii Voronkov told us.

“A major challenge was the lack of an engine, as navigation and control rely entirely on the bomb’s own inertia and aerodynamics,” he explained. “Naturally, this demands precise calculations, structural balancing, and extensive testing.”

“The main difficulty lay in combining several critical factors: speed, high g-forces, and aircraft integration,” the Brave1 spokesman added. “This is precisely the type of system where even millimeters are critical, and choosing the right components directly impacts the structure’s effectiveness and resilience.” 

“The weapon was designed with high-precision targeting and compatibility with current Ukrainian aircraft and systems,” Voronkov stated. While designed for Ukrainian Su-24, Su-27, and MiG-29 jets, it can also be used with donated F-16 and Mirage fighters, though it “has to receive additional certification for usage on F-16s and Mirages.”

“The bomb also has modern guidance algorithms that promote better targeting and accuracy,” he noted, without providing additional details.

“Structurally speaking, the product differs from both Russian and foreign counterparts,” Voronkov added. “During development, the developers researched existing systems, incorporating real combat experience and feedback from the military. As a result, the product integrates all the advantages of existing solutions while addressing their shortcomings.”

Voronkov declined to elaborate, but highlighted that “everything—from the wings to the flight controller software—was developed in Ukraine, with the exception of the chips and microcircuits. In terms of the component base, approximately 90% consists of Ukrainian, European, and American parts. Overall, the company managed to avoid critical dependence on foreign components.”

Ukraine began developing the Equalizer two years ago over concerns about the future flow of arms into the country, Voronkov said. Given that with the war dragging on, the U.S. has stopped donating weapons to Ukraine and other nations, like the Netherlands, have as well, it was not an academic exercise.

“In 2024, a team of developers asked themselves a practical question: what happens if foreign arms supplies stop?” Voronokov proffered. “Ukraine needed its own capabilities to help its military carry out combat missions independently. That marked the beginning of their mission to develop a domestic guided aerial bomb.”

“By May 2025, following a series of successful tests, the team proved the concept was viable and decided to move forward,” the Brave1 spokesman added. “They transitioned to producing the initial prototypes and scaling up manufacturing. Naturally, it was a gradual process—the team continued refining the product and fine-tuning specific technical solutions, work that remains ongoing to this day.” 

“Brave1 supported this project from its inception in 2024,” Voronkov stated. “We aim to back innovations right from the start because it gives teams a real shot at success. We recognized the chance that the project would reach completion and prove its capabilities quickly, but we were equally aware it might take much longer. In the end, going from concept to the first working prototype took 17 months.”

DG Industry is one of “at least eight manufacturers working on glide bombs altogether,” Voronkov noted.

“The guided aerial bomb itself isn’t just a single product—it represents a technology that has now emerged in our country,” Yaroslav Vinnytskyi, Head of Defense Technologies at Brave1, told us. “It will continue to evolve, and its application can be scaled across various types and sizes. Mastering this technology is a major milestone, providing additional capabilities for both manufacturers and the armed forces.”

Beyond seeking supply independence, by developing its own weapons like Equalizer, Ukraine won’t have to worry about preclusions placed on their use by foreign donors, something that happened with several weapons systems, though the limits ebbed and flowed.

As we noted earlier in this story, the Equalizer “is already being officially purchased for supply to the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn, head of the Central Department of Innovation Activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, told the Ukrainian Ukrinform media outlet.

Voloshyn noted that Russia has increased its daily use of glide bombs from about 180 last year to more than 300 this year. It remains unknown when the Equalizer will arrive on the battlefield for Ukraine at scale, or when the other options will either.

Given what these weapons can bring to the table if they truly work as advertised, for Kyiv they cannot come soon enough.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

In one of the more unusual examples yet of where Ukraine is sourcing military hardware, a Danish military museum has begun transferring vehicles from its own collection for use in the war against Russia. Panzermuseum East, a privately run museum in Denmark specializing in Soviet and Warsaw Pact armor, announced that it has delivered its first batch of armored vehicles to Ukraine.

“We have now completed the first shipment of vehicles to Ukraine. The first one to be picked up was our fine BMP-1, and the second was the MT-LB SNAR-10. We hope they’ll last a long time and make a difference,” the museum said on social media today.

The museum describes itself as Scandinavia’s largest collection of vehicles, uniforms, and equipment from the former Eastern Bloc.

The donation includes a BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle and an MT-LB amphibious tracked armoured fighting vehicle fitted with the SNAR-10 battlefield surveillance radar. This is an uncommon artillery reconnaissance variant that was designed to detect troop movements, vehicles, and artillery fire while directing friendly fires.

While governments across Europe have emptied Cold War stockpiles to support Kyiv, it is considerably rarer to see museum exhibits making the journey to the front. The transfer underscores the increasingly varied mix of equipment finding its way into Ukrainian service after more than four years of high-intensity warfare.

Entering service in the late 1960s, the BMP-1 is among the most iconic Soviet armored fighting vehicles ever built. Although obsolete by modern standards, Ukraine already operates the type in significant numbers, meaning integrating another example should be straightforward, assuming it remains mechanically sound.

The BMP-1 was a revolutionary design when it appeared, becoming the world’s first true infantry fighting vehicle by combining mobility, armor, and the ability for infantry to fight from within the vehicle. Armed with a 73mm low-pressure gun, a coaxial machine gun, and a 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) anti-tank missile launcher, it was designed to accompany tanks across the battlefield while carrying an eight-man infantry squad. More than 20,000 were built, and the vehicle was exported widely across the Warsaw Pact and beyond, spawning numerous variants and licensed copies.

Today, its armor and armament are outdated, but it continues to be prized on account of its amphibious capability, ease of maintenance, and the availability of extensive stocks of spare parts and upgrade packages.

Despite being more than half a century old, the BMP-1 continues to demonstrate its utility on modern battlefields. Reflecting sustained demand for the Soviet-designed infantry fighting vehicle, Slovakia’s STV Machinery secured a contract to serially produce newly manufactured BMP-1 hulls for an unnamed foreign customer. The company says the hulls will incorporate modern armor materials and updated production techniques, with manufacturing capacity expected to reach up to 100 vehicles annually, underscoring the enduring value of the platform.

Previously, there have been known BMP-1 transfers to Ukraine from Greek stocks (40 BMP-1A1s, delivered from October 2022 onwards), and from Slovak stocks (30 BVP-1s, from November 2022). Another 56 upgraded ex-East German BMP-1s were provided by the Czech Republic.

The more intriguing donation is the MT-LB SNAR-10. Based on the ubiquitous MT-LB multipurpose tracked vehicle, the SNAR-10 carries a ground surveillance radar intended primarily for artillery spotting and battlefield reconnaissance. The system can detect moving vehicles, troop concentrations, explosions, and shell impacts, helping artillery units adjust fire and build battlefield awareness.

Exactly what condition either vehicle is in is unclear. Museum vehicles are often maintained in running condition, particularly at private collections that conduct demonstrations, but they also lack military equipment, sensitive electronics, or functional weapons. The museum has not disclosed whether the vehicles required refurbishment or modification before transfer.

The donation nevertheless reflects a broader trend that has become increasingly apparent throughout the conflict. Ukraine has sourced equipment from virtually anywhere it can be found. Beyond government transfers, Kyiv has received privately donated vehicles, civilian pickups converted into military transports, restored Soviet-era equipment, commercially purchased armored vehicles, and even aircraft and helicopters acquired through unconventional channels.

As traditional Cold War reserves continue to shrink across Europe, previously overlooked sources of compatible Soviet-designed equipment have become increasingly valuable. Private collections, museums, training establishments, and industrial storage yards have all become potential sources of hardware that can be returned to operational service.

The SNAR-10 is especially noteworthy because it represents a relatively niche capability rather than simply another armored hull. Battlefield surveillance radars remain useful assets for locating enemy activity, adjusting indirect fire, and supporting reconnaissance, even if newer drone-based systems increasingly perform many of the same functions. Even if the SNAR-10 is delivered without an operational radar, it would still be useful for its MT-LB chassis.

More broadly, whether these two vehicles ultimately see frontline service, are used for training, or serve as sources of spare parts remains unknown.

However, the museum’s wording (“first shipment”) strongly suggests more donations for Ukraine may already be planned.

Beyond the BMP-1 and SNAR-10 that have now gone to Ukraine, the Panzermuseum East collection remains packed with Warsaw Pact hardware, including T-72 and T-55 main battle tanks, a PT-76 amphibious light tank, a 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer, BRDM reconnaissance and anti-tank vehicles, BTR-60 command vehicles, and more. The museum also displays dozens of Cold War military trucks, field support vehicles, artillery pieces, and other specialist equipment.

Examples of foreign museums releasing collection vehicles for Ukrainian military use remain uncommon but not unheard of. Ukrainian museums have also returned equipment to military units, based on available reports, as well.

Britain’s Tank Museum did not donate vehicles, but it helped Ukraine by giving Cook Defense Systems — which also produces tracks for the British-made Challenger 2 main battle tank — access to its Soviet vehicle collection, manuals, and physical components to reverse-engineer tracks and sprockets for T-72s, BMPs, and MT-LBs. You can read more about that here.

The departure of these armored vehicles from a Danish museum floor for an active war zone is another reminder of the extraordinary lengths Ukraine and its supporters continue to go to sustain the country’s war effort, and of how almost any usable piece of Soviet-designed equipment can still find new life on today’s battlefield.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com