Turkey

Days after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed forging a network of allied nations, including in the Middle East and Africa, to stand against what he called “radical” adversaries, the country’s president is on an official visit to key ally, Ethiopia.

It is not yet known which Arab and African countries will form part of Netanyahu’s hypothetical “hexagon of alliances”, which he said on Sunday will include Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and others to stand against their enemies in the Middle East. Chief among those enemies is presumably Iran and its network of resistance groups from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis of Yemen.

Analysts doubt Israel could secure enough influence over nation-states to form a formal security pact.

However, the country is deepening its ongoing charm offensive in Africa, which it began during the genocide in Gaza, as its reputation suffered a decline on the continent, with the African Union (AU) releasing multiple statements condemning Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians.

In a rare visit, Israeli President Isaac Herzog arrived in Ethiopia on Tuesday. The last presidential trip to the East African country took place in 2018.

“The relationship between our peoples is woven deep into the pages of history and human tradition,” Herzog said in a statement upon his arrival. “At the heart of the story of both our nations lies a clear common thread – the ability to join hands, unite resources of spirit and substance, to innovate, develop, and grow for the benefit of all.”

Herzog, on Wednesday, met with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who said the two leaders talked about “ways to improve collaboration in areas of mutual interest,” without revealing further details.

But beneath the surface, observers say the visit also represents a battle for influence over Addis Ababa, which has received similar high-level delegations from Turkiye and Saudi Arabia in recent days.

Shared ties and shared anger

Ethiopia and Israel are bound by several links, from shared histories of their people to shared scrutiny over recent political moves in the Horn of Africa that have angered several of the region’s influential nations.

Both countries maintain friendly ties largely due to the Beta Israel community, or Ethiopian Jews, who hail from northern Tigray and Amhara. Historically, Ethiopian Jews suffered religious persecution, and after Israel’s formation, it sought their emigration under its Law of Return policy. Between the late 1970s and mid-1990s, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews were covertly transported to Israel – during a time when several African countries, including Ethiopia, had cut off ties with Israel over the 1973 Yom Kippur War and its invasion of Egypt. On the cusp of a civil war in Ethiopia in 1991, Mossad, Israel’s spy agency, launched a daring operation that airlifted 14,000 Ethiopians over the course of just two days.

About 160,000 Ethiopian Jews now live in Israel. Many within the community have struggled to integrate and have complained of discrimination and racism. In 2019, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews flooded the streets in protest across Israeli cities after a 19-year-old of Ethiopian origin was shot dead by the police.

Ethiopia-Israel state relations have, meanwhile, remained steady. In 2016, when Netanyahu visited the country in his first prime ministerial visit – Addis Ababa became one of the first African countries to voice support for Israel’s long-sought observer status at the AU. Fierce opposition from South Africa, Algeria and other countries supporting Palestine delayed the process until 2021. Later, in 2023, the AU confirmed it had withdrawn the status.

Mashav, Israel’s aid agency, has, in the past decade, provided aid to Ethiopia in the form of agriculture and water cooperation projects, although Addis Ababa receives much more significant funding from wealthier partners like China. When Israel sponsored several African journalists on media trips to the country last year, Ethiopia was among the countries it invited journalists from.

More recently, both countries are bound by their support for Somaliland, which Somalia claims as part of its territory and which Israel sees as critical to its own national security, Hargeisa-based analyst Moustafa Ahmad told Al Jazeera.

In December, Israel recognised Somaliland’s statehood, becoming the first country to do so. Months before, there were unconfirmed talks about plans to move displaced Palestinians to Somaliland or to South Sudan, another key Israeli ally in the region. Analysts speculate that countries like South Sudan and the United Arab Emirates, another close friend of Israel, may also recognise Somaliland.

Israel’s focus on the Horn of Africa intensified after a late 2024 report from a United Nations expert panel, which found that the Somalia-based armed group, al-Shabab, was actively collaborating with Yemen’s Houthis. Where the Houthis were providing weapons and drone training, al-Shabab was, in return, granting access to a smuggling corridor stretching along the Somali coast and connecting to the Gulf of Aden, where Iranian weapons could be smuggled into Yemen.

The move to recognise Somaliland was therefore meant to disrupt that cooperation by stationing an Israeli naval base in the region, analysts note.

“It’s part of their calculations even if they haven’t said it publicly,” Ahmad said.

Several countries, as well as the AU, have pushed back on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, calling it a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. In Somaliland, however, many have celebrated the move.

Addis Ababa under pressure

While neither Israel nor Ethiopia has provided details of topics on the agenda during Herzog’s visit, Somaliland is likely at the top of the list.

Addis Ababa had in 2024 enraged its neighbours after it signed a controversial port deal with Hargeisa that would allow it access to the sea, reportedly in exchange for a future recognition of Somaliland. Although massive and rapidly industrialising, Ethiopia is landlocked, having lost its sea access after Eritrea seceded in 1993. Prime Minister Abiy has often said sea access is critical for his country.

The fall-out between Ethiopia and Somalia was so severe that analysts sounded the alarm over possible armed conflict between the two neighbours until Turkiye, a key development partner for Mogadishu, stepped in to smooth things over by pressuring Addis Ababa to coordinate with Mogadishu instead.

It is likely, analysts say, that Israel is now hoping to push Ethiopia further towards recognising Somaliland, which boasts a 850km (528-mile) coastline. In Hargeisa, many are disappointed after more countries failed to follow Israel’s steps, Ahmad said.

Addis Ababa, though, might not appreciate further pressure at the moment as it faces increasing regional isolation on several fronts.

One key reason is the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt and Sudan say is blocking the water supply they need for irrigation.

A source of national pride for Ethiopians, the dam was funded almost entirely through citizens’ donations and government funds. Israeli engineers participated in the project, and Israel reportedly sold weapons to Ethiopia to protect the dam amid tensions with its neighbours, although the Israeli government denies this.

At the same time, Addis Ababa is also facing tensions with Eritrea, which has moved closer to Somalia and Egypt. Both countries have historically feuded, and recently, tensions have again risen over the 2020 Tigray War and Abiy’s repeated statements about his country needing access to the sea.

“Addis Ababa is cautious of making a decision that will cement its regional isolation at this time [because] it is clearly hedging among various actors seeking to influence the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region,” Ahmad said.

Pressure is also mounting on Addis Ababa from countries eager to keep the status quo.

On Sunday, Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Ethiopia and said in his speech: “I would like to emphasise that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland does not benefit Somaliland or the Horn of Africa.”

His statement drew a backlash from Hargeisa, which called it “unacceptable interference” aimed at wrecking relations between Somaliland and its partners.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, which is embroiled in an ongoing rift with the United Arab Emirates over how to deal with the conflict in Yemen, also intervened in the fray in February. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Waleed Elkhereiji was in Addis Ababa this week to discuss “regional peace”, just two weeks after Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud arrived in the city for talks with Abiy.

So far, it is unclear if Riyadh has recorded any success in influencing Addis Ababa.

How Israel will fare in that regard is also still unclear.

Greece’s coastguard says 26 other people have been rescued from Aegean Sea as search-and-rescue operations continue.

A boat carrying migrants and asylum seekers has collided with a Greek coastguard vessel in the Aegean Sea near the island of Chios, killing at least 14 people, the coastguard says.

The incident occurred around 9pm local time on Tuesday (19:00 GMT) off the coast of Chios’s Mersinidi area, Greece’s Athens-Macedonian News Agency (AMNA) reported.

The coastguard said 26 people were rescued and brought to a hospital in Chios, including 24 migrants and two coastguard officers.

It said it was not immediately clear how many others had been on the speedboat.

Seven children and a pregnant woman were among the injured, Greek media reported.

A search-and-rescue operation involving patrol boats, a helicopter and divers was under way in the area, AMNA said.

Footage shared by Greece’s Ta Nea newspaper appeared to show at least one person being brought from a boat docked next to a jetty into a vehicle with blue flashing lights.

An unnamed coastguard official told the Reuters news agency that the collision occurred after the migrant boat “manoeuvred toward” a coastguard vessel that had instructed it to turn back.

Greece has long been a key transit point for migrants and refugees from the Middle East, Africa ‌and Asia trying to reach Europe.

In 2015 and 2016, Greece was on the front line of a migration crisis, with nearly one million people landing on its islands, including in Chios, from nearby Turkiye.

But arrivals have dropped in recent years as Greece ‌has toughened its asylum seeker and migrant policies, including by tightening border controls and sea ‌patrols.

The country has come under scrutiny for its ⁠treatment of migrants and asylum seekers approaching by sea, including after a shipwreck in 2023 in which hundreds of migrants and refugees died after what witnesses said was the coastguard’s attempt to tow their trawler.

The European Union’s border ‌agency said last year that it was reviewing 12 cases of potential human rights violations by Greece, including some allegations that people seeking asylum were pushed back from Greece’s ‍frontiers.

Greece has denied carrying out human rights violations or pushing asylum seekers from its shores.

Last month during the violent clashes between Kurdish forces and the Syrian army, the United States delivered a devastating message to Syria’s Kurds: Their partnership with Washington had “expired“. This was not merely a statement of shifting priorities – it was a clear signal that the US was siding with Damascus and abandoning the Kurds at their most vulnerable moment.

For the Kurds across the region watching events unfold, the implications were profound. The US is no longer perceived as a reliable partner or supporter of minorities.

This development is likely to have an impact not just on the Kurdish community in Syria but also those in Iraq, Turkiye and Iran.

Fears of repeat marginalisation in Syria

US support for Damascus under interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa paves the way for a centralised Syrian state – an arrangement that Kurds throughout the region view with deep suspicion. Their wariness is rooted in bitter historical experience.

Centralised states in the Middle East have historically marginalised, excluded and assimilated Kurdish minorities. The prospect of such a system emerging in Syria, with US backing, represents a fundamental divergence from Kurdish hopes for the region’s future.

The approach the Assad regime to the Kurdish question was built on systematic denial. Kurds were not recognised as a distinct collective group within Syria’s national fabric; the state banned the public use of the Kurdish language and Kurdish names. Many Kurds were denied citizenship.

Al-Sharaa’s presidential decree of January 16 promised Kurds some rights while the January 30 agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) included limited recognition of Kurdish collective identity, including acknowledgment of “Kurdish regions” – terminology conspicuously absent from Syria’s political vocabulary and government documents in the past.

These represent incremental gains, but they are unfolding within a transitional government structure that aims for centralisation as its ultimate objective. That is why Syrian Kurds remain suspicious of whether the promises made today will be upheld in the future.

While a consensus has emerged among the majority of Kurdish groups that armed resistance is not strategically viable at this stage, any future engagement with the US will be perceived with mistrust.

Possibility of renewed Shia-Kurdish alliance in Iraq

After years of power rivalries between Shia and Kurdish parties in Iraq, both groups are now observing developments in Syria and potential changes in Iran with a shared sense of threat and common interests. If in 2003, their alliance was driven by a shared past – the suffering under Saddam Hussein’s regime – today it is being guided by a shared future shaped by fears of being marginalised in the region.

At both the political and popular levels, Shia and Kurdish parties and communities have had much more in common over the past few weeks than in the past. This convergence is evident not only in elite political calculations but also in public sentiment across both communities.

For the first time in recent memory, both Kurdish elites and ordinary citizens in Iraq are no longer enthusiastic about regime change in Iran, a position that would have been unthinkable just a few weeks ago.

In addition, last month, Iraq’s Shia Coordination Framework, an alliance of its Shia political parties, nominated Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister, the most powerful position in the Iraqi government. Remarkably, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the dominant Kurdish political force, welcomed the nomination.

The KDP’s support for al-Maliki was not solely a reaction to anger over US policy in Syria. It was also rooted in Iraqi and Kurdish internal politics. The endorsement is part of an ongoing rivalry between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) over Iraq’s presidency, an office reserved for the Kurds. The KDP needs allies in Baghdad to ensure its candidate, rather than the PUK’s, secures the position.

However, Washington might see an alignment between the KDP-led Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq and an al-Maliki-led government or a similar government in Baghdad as not conducive to its interests in Iraq, especially its efforts to curb Iranian influence.

Before casting blame, Washington should ask itself why the Kurds feels compelled to adopt this position. The Kurdish stance cannot be fully understood without factoring US policy in Syria into the discussion. From a Kurdish perspective, the US has not been a neutral arbiter in Syria.

The peace process in Turkiye

Over the past year, many believed that the sustainability of Turkiye’s peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) hinged on a resolution of the Kurdish question in Syria and the fate of the SDF.

The violent clashes between Damascus, backed by Ankara and Washington, and the SDF threatened to close the door on negotiations. Remarkably, however, not all avenues have been shut.

It now appears the two issues are being treated as separate files. Negotiations with the PKK are likely to continue within Turkiye’s borders, and crucially, PKK leaders have not translated their disappointment over the weakening of the SDF into a definitive rejection of talks with Ankara.

What sustains this dynamic is that the SDF has not been entirely dismantled, leaving some breathing room for continued dialogue between Ankara and the PKK.

The Iranian Kurds

The Iranian Kurds, although farther away from Syria, have also observed events there and made their conclusions. The abandonment of the SDF reveals the unpredictable nature of US support for the region’s minorities.

In light of this and given continuing US incitement against the Iranian regime, it is quite significant that the Iranian Kurds collectively and deliberately decided not to be at the forefront of the recent protests or allow themselves to be instrumentalised by Western media.

The Kurdish community in Iran is not enthusiastic about a potential return of Reza Pahlavi, who clearly enjoys support from Washington, and the restoration of the shah’s legacy, which was also oppressive. Iranian opposition groups – many of them based in the West – have not offered a better prospect for the Kurdish question. There is widespread fear that the current regime could simply be replaced by another with no guarantee for Kurdish rights.

Some Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish armed groups did carry out attacks on Iranian positions near the Iran-Iraq border. But the main Iranian Kurdish armed actors chose not to engage directly or escalate militarily. Their calculations are based on the uncertainty about the endgame envisioned by Israel and the US and the reality that any escalation would provoke Iranian retaliation against Iraqi Kurds.

With each abandonment of its Kurdish allies, the US further erodes the foundation of trust upon which its local partnerships rest. Iraqi and Syrian Kurds have learned to live with American unreliability, but this arrangement may not endure indefinitely. When it fractures, the consequences for US influence in the region could be profound.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.