Turkey

BEIRUT — Iran’s economy, already strained by high inflation, years of Western sanctions and a war that has sharply reduced oil revenue, is poised for more instability as the Trump administration tries to coerce other countries into ending all financial dealings with the Islamic Republic.

A decision by the United Arab Emirates to suspend trade relations with Iran last week kick-started the White House’s latest attempt to isolate Tehran into submission. Iran entered the war with its foreign commerce concentrated among a relatively small group of countries, leaving it with fewer places to turn now.

The success of the U.S. strategy largely will hinge on China, the main buyer of Iranian oil and its top trading partner. Russia, a fellow target of sweeping U.S.-led sanctions, has a military conflict and economic crisis of its own and probably can’t offer longtime ally Iran much hard financial support.

Regional partners like Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq maintain important relationships with both Iran and the U.S., giving them reason to avoid exposure to the secondary sanctions that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said awaited nations that did not cut economic ties with Iran.

“Those who stand with the United States will reap the rewards of our partnership,” Bessent said Monday while outlining the plan he called “Operation Economic Outcast.” “Those who tether themselves to the Iranian regime should expect to share in the isolation.”

The Emirates will be hard for Iran to replace as a conduit for foreign goods and payments

Despite Western sanctions, Iran in 2024 exchanged $125 billion worth of goods globally, according to Trade Data Monitor, a private firm. Iran is not a member of the World Trade Organization.

The bulk of its declared international trade, though, was with a handful of partners. The UAE, China and Turkey supplied nearly three-quarters of Iran’s merchandise imports. Four countries — China, Iraq, the UAE and Turkey — accounted for more than two-thirds of its non-oil exports.

On the supply side, the UAE held outsized importance. It was Iran’s biggest source of imported items and a gateway to financial channels that helped Iranian businesses make and receive international payments. Both roles kept Iran connected to the global economy.

As a reexport hub, the UAE processed shipments from foreign suppliers reluctant to deal directly with Iranian customers.

“From Iran’s perspective, the UAE can be replaced, but the Iranians are openly saying it’s not going to happen overnight,” said Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington.

China has deep economic ties to Iran but depends less on the relationship

Beijing has economic interests in the Persian Gulf beyond Iran, and so far has avoided getting drawn into the conflict the U.S. and Israel initiated. China buys the overwhelming majority of Iran’s crude through opaque trading networks that bypass sanctions.

Its manufacturing clout and stranglehold on critical mineral supplies nonetheless give Beijing more room than Iran’s other partners to resist U.S. pressure, said David Lubin, a senior research fellow at Chatham House. Aggressive action against major Chinese banks and businesses could revive trade tensions as Chinese leader Xi Jinping prepares to meet with President Trump in Washington next month.

“I don’t see China playing ball by any means,” Lubin said.

China is both Iran’s largest reported export market and a supplier of essential parts and products, according to WTO and United Nations data.

During the Obama administration, Beijing did agree to reduce energy imports from Iran, said Atlantic Council fellow Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland.

“We will want the Chinese to go a lot farther than they have gone in the past,” Fried said. “But it’s a lot harder now.”

China has experience helping an ally survive sanctions: It has long been North Korea’s economic lifeline and main diplomatic backer. Experts say China has avoided fully enforcing U.N. sanctions on North Korea and sent clandestine aid to help its impoverished neighbor stay afloat.

Expanding bilateral trade would create problems for Iran’s neighbors

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, who has been his country’s lead negotiator over the last six months, was in Iraq the day of the UAE’s trade suspension. A purpose of his visit, he said, was “speeding up efforts to expand joint cooperation among all countries in the region, without foreign interference.”

The U.S. dollar’s preeminence in international trade and finance, however, means none of Iran’s trading partners would antagonize Washington lightly, Vatanka said. “We’re still at a point where if the U.S. wants to hurt you, it will matter,” he said.

Underscoring potential consequences, Turkey settled a years-long U.S. dispute in July over the role of a state-owned bank in helping Iran evade sanctions through an oil-for-gold scheme. Trump also moved to lift sanctions on its fellow NATO member stemming from Turkey’s purchase of a sophisticated Russian missile system.

“I really don’t think Turkey would like to become the next country helping Iran to evade sanctions right now,” said Riccardo Gasco, an analyst at the IstanPol think tank in Istanbul.

Iran is a vital import source for Iraq and retains influence there through allied political factions and armed groups. Baghdad has sought closer economic and security ties with Washington. Since it invaded Iraq in 2003, the U.S. has significant control over the nation’s foreign currency reserves because they are housed in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York.

Oman, a frequent intermediary between Washington and Tehran, has found its balancing act suddenly precarious. Trump threatened Oman last week over its ongoing negotiations with Iran on the future management of the Strait of Hormuz.

One easy route for goods slipping past sanctions on Iran would be ports like Gwadar near the Persian Gulf in Pakistan, said Peter Harrell, a visiting scholar at Georgetown University.

“Ship an intermodal container of drone parts to one of the ports in western Pakistan and unload it onto a truck and have it driven across the border into Iran,” he said.

While Pakistan, a key ally and economic partner of China in the region, wants to increase trade with Iran, it faces competing pressures. It is serving as a key mediator between Tehran and Washington and has deep security ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s longtime regional rival.

Caspian Sea trade route alternatives unlikely to grow quickly

With the Strait of Hormuz mostly blocked and Russia’s war with Ukraine endangering ships on the Black Sea, Iran has sought to develop a “road of life” on the Caspian Sea, said Nikita Smagin, an independent analyst and a former Russian state news agency correspondent in Tehran.

Russia reportedly sent drones to Iran this year, repaying Tehran’s favor after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It also rerouted exports to Iran via Caspian Sea ports like Astrakhan. Agricultural products make up 80% of Russia and Iran’s reported trade.

“Both economies are exporting natural resources and have little to offer each other,” Smagin said.

The other countries that border the Caspian — Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan — probably won’t rush to join in, said Umud Shokri, a fellow at George Mason University.

Yet Russia and Iran are already in an “axis of the sanctioned,” said Mark Galeotti, executive director of the Mayak Intelligence firm. For decades the pair have collaborated to thwart trade restrictions, and increasing bilateral trade in both “strategic goods” and contraband like military technology, microchips and Gucci handbags could be a next step.

“Pomegranates and tomatoes only go so far,” he said.

Chehayeb and McNeil write for the Associated Press. McNeil reported from Brussels. AP writers Amir Vahdat in Tehran and Dasha Litvinova in Tallinn, Estonia, contributed to this report.

On Tuesday, Israeli fighter jets attacked Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria, drawing condemnations from the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, as well as regional countries. The Israeli government claimed that it had intelligence of Turkish military movement to the site.

In a subsequent interview, US Ambassador to Turkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack said the US had received this intelligence from the Israelis six days before the attack. However, US intelligence conducted its own due diligence and found no basis for the claim.

The incident not only reflects a shift in the dynamics between Turkiye and Israel, but also signals a regional reordering that the latter is no longer at the centre of.

The Turkish response

Seeing the Israeli attack on the Syrian base as a provocation, Ankara refrained from escalating and instead provided an off-ramp out of the crisis. It framed the issue not in bilateral terms but as one between Israel and the US, and between Israel and the regional and international consensus.

Normally, there is a deconfliction mechanism between Turkiye and Israel. However, as Barrack indicated in the interview, Israel did not warn Turkiye about the attack, which could have triggered a military response.

The US envoy called for a deconfliction mechanism, but such an initiative can be effective only if the sides involved want it to be. In this case, there is no evidence that Israel sought de-escalation. In fact, it appears escalation was the intended outcome, as Israel notified neither Turkiye nor the US about the attack and acted on a pretext that the US intelligence found no basis for – a ploy to boost Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s electoral campaign.

After the US-imposed lull on the Iran front, Netanyahu is likely seeking escalation on other fronts, be it Syria, Lebanon or Gaza, in the run-up to the Israeli election. The challenge for Turkiye would be to avoid taking Netanyahu’s bait while also preventing the normalisation of such aggression.

That would require direct intervention by US President Donald Trump to rein in Netanyahu. Indeed, a trilateral deconfliction mechanism can work and be credible only if the US throws real weight behind it.

But even if a mechanism is in place, it would not change the fact that Syria has altered the lens through which Turkiye and Israel view each other. For a long time, the core of Turkiye’s discontent with Israel was the Palestinian issue. Hence, it was more humanitarian-, identity- and solidarity-based in nature.

Today, Ankara views Israeli attempts to undermine the Syrian transition as having direct repercussions for its national security. Therefore, Turkiye is no longer seeing Israel solely through the prism of the Palestinian question. Rather, it increasingly sees it as a national security challenge, with Israeli regional revisionism threatening its interests.

The international consensus on Syria

From the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa and the wider Middle East, Turkiye and Israel have conflicting policies, priorities and threat perceptions. Despite this, Syria serves as a microcosm of Turkiye and Israel’s visions of the regional order.

Ankara wants its southern neighbour to be centralised, stable and capable militarily. In contrast, Israel wants a Syria that is weak, fragmented and bereft of serious military might.

Yet this is not merely a conflict between Turkish and Israeli visions. Israel is at odds with the regional and international consensus on Syria. The US, the UK, Europe and regional states have all supported a centralised and stable government in Damascus. In an ironic way, the only other regional state that probably wants a weak or failed Syria is Iran.

Like any other sovereign state, Syria will have an army. If Israel believes that the only way to ensure its own security is by keeping its neighbouring or regional states weak, fragmented and bereft of military capability, this is a recipe for perpetual wars and for regional and international isolation.

The undermining of the Syrian state and the failure of its transition would pave the way for non-state actors and radicalism, which would bode ill for the entire region, including Israel. Indeed, neighbouring Lebanon should serve as a cautionary tale. The Israeli occupation and the weakness of the Lebanese state gave birth to and empowered Hezbollah.

Post-Abrahamic Middle East

Israel and Turkiye’s ideas of regional order are also at odds. The recent Mecca Pact, which brought together Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, is not inherently anti-Israel. However, it represents a regional shift that signals the failure of the order envisioned by the Abraham Accords, or similar initiatives such as India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) or the strategic partnership between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the US known as I2U2.

The Abrahamic vision of the regional order was premised on Arab-Israeli normalisation and cooperation under the US security umbrella. Hard containment of Iran, soft containment of Turkiye, and de-emphasising the Palestinian issue were also part of the same vision.

Inherently, this Abrahamic vision had more to do with Israel and its regional normalisation than the Arab states and their needs and priorities.

However, with its aggressive and revisionist policies, Israel has deepened the prospect of its regional isolation, increased the cost of any normalisation, and doomed this Abrahamic – or Israeli-centric – vision of regional order.

Israeli revisionism is not only driving a wedge between Israel and other major regional states, but it is also revealing the gap between Israel and the US on the question of regional reordering.

While Israel opposes the Mecca Pact, Trump has hailed it, likely seeing it as aligned with his strategy of burden-sharing and burden-shifting with regional allies, and as enjoying more regional legitimacy and acceptance. The US position might also reflect a recalibration of Washington’s regional vision.

Over the last decade, the US invested heavily in creating a regional order premised on Israel and the Arab-Gulf states. But this was essentially an Israeli-centric project for the regional order.

This vision is no longer tenable, and no one is more responsible for its demise than Israel itself.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Fifteen years since the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya began, and with civil strife leading to the downfall of what was once one of Africa’s wealthiest countries, several actors are seeking to end the civil war and reunite the country.

Among them are the US, which has commercial interests in Libya’s oil fields. Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye are also pushing for a return to “One Libya”, after more than a decade of fighting between two rival authorities for control of the country.

Here’s what we know:

What happened 15 years ago?

The Libyan uprising erupted during the Arab Spring, when thousands of people in the port city of Benghazi took to the streets to protest against Gaddafi’s more than four decades of absolute power.

Violence against the demonstrations pushed the protesters into an armed rebellion against Gaddafi’s rule, with a civil war starting between the two sides.

A United Nations Security Council resolution authorised an international military intervention force – led by NATO members, the United States, United Kingdom and France – to enforce a no-fly zone and ensure the protection of civilians in Libya. This bombing campaign pushed back Gaddafi’s forces from Benghazi and aided the rebels in seizing territory.

Gaddafi was eventually captured and killed in October 2011, 42 years after he first seized power in a military coup that overthrew King Idris.

How is Libya divided?

Following Gaddafi’s death, a power vacuum emerged, with multiple groups – and their allied militias – competing for power.

Control of the country is now split between two rival administrations: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dheibah, and the eastern, Tobruk-based administration backed by Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA).

The GNU is recognised by the UN and other countries, and officially has authority in the capital and western Libya.

Under Gaddafi, Haftar was exiled in the US for two decades where he holds citizenship.

His forces control vast resource-rich lands in the east, including the strategic port city of Benghazi, reportedly with the backing of Russia.

The UN began formal mediation efforts in 2020 under the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This roadmap advocates for a three-track strategy that includes unifying the two rival administrations, presidential and parliamentary elections, and hosting national dialogue meetings.

The US was a key mediator behind the scenes, and in May 2021, appointed Ambassador Richard Norlan as Special Envoy to Libya, to lead high-level talks between the two sides.

What is the US’s new plan?

Under Massad Boulous, US President Donald Trump’s African and Middle Eastern affairs adviser, and father-in-law to Tiffany Trump, Washington is intensifying efforts to reunite the country. But this can only be achieved if both sides agree to form a single government.

According to leaked details, Trump’s initiative centres on the promise that if the rival governments cooperate, the US would encourage American investment in Libya’s sizable oil fields. This comes as the Libyan Central Bank, which is attempting to finance both authorities, sounds the alarm over the dire economic situation.

While Tripoli has international legitimacy, Haftar’s forces control the oilfields and terminals.

The US is also proposing a power-sharing deal that would see Dheibah continue to lead the government while Haftar’s son and LNA army chief, 35-year-old Saddam Haftar, serves as president.

There are obvious opportunities for US energy companies and economic and political incentives for European countries in a unified and stable Libya.

They include stopping irregular migration from Libya and other North African countries to the EU.

Some criticise the US-led plan as lacking input from the Libyan people. The deal, some say, could entrench the power of political dynasties, which might be best for long-term stability in Libya.

What have the results been?

There are signs that Haftar’s camp, at least, is on board with the US plan. Saddam Haftar, whose father, Khalifa, was based in Virginia until 2011, reportedly met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in DC in July.

Experts attribute the ongoing mediation efforts to the unified national budget of 2026, signed in April – the first in more than a decade.

However, there are still no talks or signs of a unified government forming.

What is Turkiye’s role?

Turkiye, which earlier deployed troops to support the GNU, has also made efforts to mediate between the two sides and is pushing a ‘One Libya’ policy.

Last month, Foreign Affairs Minister, Hakan Fidan, met with Saddam Haftar in Ankara. Earlier this month, Fidan travelled to both Tripoli and Benghazi for high-level talks with Dheibah and Khalifa Haftar.

What has Egypt done?

The Egyptian government has traditionally cooperated with Haftar’s Tobruk government, which is just across the border.

On Wednesday, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with Khalifa Haftar in Cairo and discussed unification talks.

Earlier this month, Dheibah visited Cairo, while Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad travelled to Tripoli.

What is Qatar’s stance?

Qatar has largely backed the UN mediation channels in Libya: the UNSMIL and the UN roadmap for peace.

While it has good relations with the GNU, Qatar seeks stabilisation efforts led by Libyan parties and elections.

In April, Qatar and other states welcomed the unified budget for 2026. A statement issued by Qatar, Egypt, France, Germany and several others called for all parties in Libya to follow the UN roadmap to “advance a Libyan-led political process leading to unified governance and national elections.”

The foreign minister says in an interview that Turkish military officials had visited the airbase as part of training.

Syria has no plans to establish a Turkish military presence at the Abu al-Duhur airbase attacked by Israel earlier this week, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani has said.

Al-Shaibani said in an interview with the US news outlet Axios on Wednesday that while Turkish military officials had visited the site as part of training and broader military cooperation, he denied any Turkish military build-up, explaining that the facility was largely empty.

“There was no intention to establish a Turkish base there, nor to establish a permanent Turkish military presence or deploy Turkish forces at the site,” al-Shaibani said, adding that he had made this clear to Israel.

On Tuesday, Israel carried out eight air strikes on the runway and storage facilities at the Abu al-Duhur base near Aleppo, state media reported, in what appeared to be Israel’s first attack on Syrian government assets since March.

No casualties were reported from the attack, which drew international condemnation.

Al-Shaibani said Israel had no legitimate justification for attacking the facility.

He said that while Syria remained open to negotiations with Israel on de-escalation, any future deal must address the security concerns of both countries, reiterating that Israeli military operations would increase regional instability.

The strikes came amid worsening security tensions between Israel and Turkiye over Syria, where both countries’ militaries are active.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel warned Syria ahead of the strike not to allow a Turkish presence at the base.

“Our message was very clear. Don’t. I guess they didn’t quite understand the message,” Netanyahu said on Wednesday.

On Thursday morning, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz claimed that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was “dragging Turkiye into dangerous adventures in Syria”.

“Israel will not allow any entity to threaten its security,” he said.

“It is preferable for Erdogan to continue delivering empty, delusional speeches against Israel in the Turkish parliament rather than testing Israel’s resolve to defend itself,” Katz added.

Turkiye has rejected what it called “untenable allegations” by Israel over its military position in Syria.

The Turkish defence ministry said on Thursday that Ankara would continue supporting Syria’s efforts to develop its own military capacity and infrastructure.

It said there was no military delegation at the air base hit by Israel before or during the attacks, calling for the international community to take more concrete and effective measures against Israel’s actions, which it said threatened regional peace and stability.

Turkiye, a NATO member, has emerged as one of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s main allies and has accused Israel of trying to destabilise Syria and undermine its new administration.

It has also repeatedly called for international pressure and measures on Israel to respect Syria’s territorial integrity.

Last year, Turkiye and Israel established a line of communication to avoid any incidents in Syria.

The Egyptian forward, who joined the Turkish club on a free transfer, came off the bench early in the second half.

Ex-Liverpool star Mohamed Salah made his competitive ⁠debut for ⁠Trabzonspor on Saturday, coming off the bench in their Turkish Super Lig opener as Kasimpasa rallied from a goal down to secure a 1-1 draw.

Trabzonspor took the ⁠lead in the first half through Noah Saviolo before Kasimpasa’s Adrian Benedyczak levelled from the penalty spot in the second half.

Salah, who joined ‌Trabzonspor on a free transfer after nine seasons at Liverpool, was introduced in the 58th minute shortly after Kasimpasa scored the equaliser.

The Egypt forward, deployed on the right wing, helped create a number of ⁠openings for the visitors ⁠but Trabzonspor were unable to find a winner.

“It’s a sad start today,” Trabzonspor coach Fatih Tekke said.

“It was a game we had to ⁠be victorious in, but we couldn’t succeed.”

“Thursday is really ⁠important; we play a ⁠match in Europe, and the opponent is far better than us,” Tekke added, referring to Trabzonspor’s Europa League playoff with Hungarian side Ferencvaros on August 20.

Trabzonspor, seven-time Turkish champions, finished third ‌in the Super Lig last season and won the Turkish Cup.

Earlier this month, Salah, 34, signed a two-year contract with Trabzonspor, shortly after guiding Egypt to a historic last-16 run at the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

Widely known as the “Egyptian King” among his fans, Salah established himself as a Premier League great with Liverpool, winning two league titles and the Champions League among eight major honours at the Anfield club.

The forward is considered among the greatest players of all time and the best from the African continent in recent years.

STACEY Solomon has given an insight into her family holiday in ‘paradise’ with Joe Swash and her sister Jemma.

The TV presenter, 36, is currently enjoying a holiday in Turkey and has shared snaps and videos of their amazing experience.

The TV star looked incredible in a baby pink bikini while enjoying time with daughter Belle in a leafy swimming pool.

She also shared rare snaps of the family all together – but said she looked like a mole in them.

Stacey also enjoyed having fun in the stunning swimming pool with her sister as a bemused stranger looked on at their antics.

The TV presenter also shared a sweet snap of her cuddling her daughters on the golden sand in front of rows of luxurious sun loungers.

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Stacey also shared a super sweet clip of her family trying out a viral trend and captioned it: “Thought I’d share this for anyone who sees the cutest family video trends but this is what you’re dealing with.

“Take my hat off to those families who can get everyone to comply.”

Fans flocked to comment and one wrote: “You are all so cute”!

Another added: “We love this sister love.”

A third said: “I have loved this holiday I felt like I was there with you all.”

While a fourth wrote: “Beautiful family and beautiful holiday.”

Jemma and her husband Lee marked their 21 year anniversary while on holiday – after their recent business woes.

It came after Jemma’s home organising company was taken over by Lord Alan Sugar after she tearfully closed down the firm earlier this year.

Meanwhile, Stacey gave birth to Belle, her third child with former EastEnders star Joe, back in February 2023.

The couple had previously welcomed son Rex and daughter Rose, in 2019 and 2021 respectively.

Stacey already had older sons Zachary and Leighton from prior relationships, while Joe had son Harry.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Egypt could join the joint defence agreement recently signed by Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, describing Cairo’s accession as “possible” and the pact as open to further members.

Speaking to Al Jazeera in an exclusive interview for Al Muqabala (The Interview), which will air on Sunday evening on Al Jazeera Arabic, Erdogan said the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement commits signatories to taking unified steps should any one of them come under external attack.

“This agreement has sent an important message to the world,” Erdogan said, adding that Egypt’s participation was among the options for its future expansion.

The deal, also known as the Mecca Pact, was signed in the holy city last Friday by Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif. It stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three would be treated as an attack against them all, a collective-deterrence provision that analysts have compared to NATO’s Article 5. However, officials in Islamabad have cautioned against interpreting it as a NATO equivalent or as being directed at any single country.

Erdogan spoke on a range of regional issues, including tensions over the Strait of Hormuz and the wars in Syria, Gaza and Lebanon.

The Turkish leader said reopening the strait was a priority for Ankara, arguing that its continued closure served no one’s interests. He credited Qatar with playing an important role in mediation efforts to halt fighting in the region.

Syria, Gaza and Lebanon

Erdogan pledged that Turkiye would not leave its neighbours to face regional turmoil alone, singling out Syria, Gaza and Lebanon.

He said Ankara would do everything in its power to support stability in Syria, noting his plans to visit the country, and that Syria’s Kurds would have “a share of peace and stability”. Turkiye would also continue to strengthen ties with Kurdish communities and safeguard their rights across the region, he added.

Concerning Gaza, Erdogan said Turkiye “cannot leave Gaza alone” and would do whatever was necessary to support it. He said Hamas was meeting its commitments in good faith, while Israel continued its war.

Turning to Lebanon, the Turkish president said continued Israeli attacks were a source of serious concern for Ankara. He said he had raised the need to end the war on Lebanon with the US president during Donald Trump’s recent visit to Turkiye, stressing Washington’s role in bringing the fighting to a close.

Erdogan said Turkiye would continue to support Sudan and described his relations with the head of its Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as good. He said Ankara’s relations with Libya were stable and that Turkiye would not abandon it.

On Europe, Erdogan said the European Union did not appear willing to admit Turkiye, adding that membership was no longer a priority for Ankara and that Europe would be “the loser” as a result.

He also said he had received a promise from Trump regarding F-35 fighter jets and was waiting for it to be honoured.

Turkiye was removed from the multinational F-35 programme in 2019 after taking delivery of the Russian-made S-400 air defence system, which Washington argued could compromise the stealth jet’s technology. Standing beside Erdogan during the NATO summit in Ankara last month, Trump said his administration would lift the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Turkiye in December 2020 over the S-400 purchase, and said a return to the F-35 programme was “something certainly we’d consider”.

Any sale, however, still faces resistance in Congress and a 2020 law bars the Pentagon from transferring F-35s to Turkiye for as long as it retains the S-400 system.

One week on from Saudi ⁠⁠Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye signing their ⁠joint defence agreement, the Turkish defence ministry revealed more details about the alliance on Thursday. They include plans to hold ⁠⁠joint military exercises and to deepen cooperation between their defence industries.

The bid to deepen security cooperation between three of the biggest economies among Muslim-majority countries comes amid heightened military tensions and conflicts in the Middle East.

Over the course of the US-Israeli war on Iran, Saudi Arabia has been repeatedly hit by Iran, which says it is targeting US military assets in the Gulf.

Pakistan’s ⁠⁠foreign ministry said that the agreement states ⁠⁠that an armed ⁠⁠attack on any one of the ⁠⁠three countries would be ⁠⁠regarded as an ⁠⁠attack against them all –  similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause.

At a weekly briefing in the Turkish capital Ankara on Thursday, the Turkish defence ministry said the pact’s fundamental goal was to ensure defence and military ties were put on a “more institutional and sustainable” footing.

“Under the accord, strategic political and military mechanisms plan to be established involving the defence ministers, foreign ministers, and chiefs of general ⁠⁠staff/armed forces commanders and that coordination among the three countries will ⁠⁠be conducted at the highest level,” it said.

What do we know about the Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Pakistan pact?

It follows a visit by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, accompanied by army chief Asim Munir, to Saudi Arabia to perform the Umrah pilgrimage in Mecca.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also travelled to Saudi Arabia on Friday to meet Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Turkiye, which has NATO’s second-largest army, has said the pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan and major oil ‌‌exporter Saudi Arabia was open to expansion – Egypt has been touted as a potential candidate — and did not seek to replace any existing alliances.

How have similar defence pacts fared?

The mutual defence pact is similar to several others in the region and beyond, yet many have had mixed records in practice.

Such alliances have the potential to deter large-scale interstate wars against their members, analysts say. But their effectiveness drops once conflicts move into a ‘grey zone’, which can include military occupation, settlements, internal repression or proxy violence.

Experts say they often serve merely as a signal of a strengthened political alliance rather than being a true collective defence.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 1949

NATO grew largely out of Cold War fears of aggression and expansionism by the Soviet Union.

The US, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom signed the initial treaty on April 4, 1949.

The group has expanded into a 32-member alliance, with Sweden being the most recent member two years ago.

Many argue that NATO was a factor behind the Soviet Union’s reluctance to directly attack Western European member states during the Cold War, and vice versa with the Warsaw Pact.

The US also entered multiple bilateral treaties with different countries in the 1950s and 1960s. This provided Washington with strategic reassurances to its pact partners and went some way to shape their domestic and foreign policies.

A key provision of the NATO treaty, the so-called Article 5, states that if one member of the alliance is attacked in Europe or North America, it will be considered an attack on all members. That effectively put Western Europe under the ‘nuclear umbrella’ of the US.

NATO has invoked Article 5 only once in its history, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the US.

According to NATO, the alliance plays an important role in fighting “terrorism”.

Arab League Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty, 1950

The League of Arab States, or Arab League, was established in 1945 to promote economic, political and social cohesion among emerging Middle Eastern states Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

It came amid the formation of Israel and its threats to countries in the region.

In 1950, Arab states signed a mutual defence treaty, stating that an attack on one is an attack on all – at least on paper.

Inter‑American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947

Following the Second World War and the start of the Cold War, leaders in the Americas signed this treaty in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, also known as the Rio Treaty.

Its core principle was that an attack on one member country counts as an attack on all.

This treaty was invoked during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the September 11 attacks in 2001.

The ANZUS Treaty, 1951

In September 1951, the US, New Zealand and Australia signed a treaty pledging to meet the common dangers in the Pacific region.

Following the September 11 attacks, ANZUS was invoked for the first time.

In 1986, the United States suspended its ANZUS security obligations to New Zealand over Wellington’s anti‑nuclear policy. This effectively froze New Zealand out of the alliance, while US–Australia cooperation continued.

US-Japan Security Treaty, 1951

The US and Japan pledged in a bilateral agreement to act and meet the common danger in case either of them faced an armed attack.

This agreement was signed in 1951 in San Francisco alongside the World War II peace treaty.

While the treaty was never invoked, about 50,000 US military personnel are stationed in Japan.

US-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty, 1953

Following the end of the Korean War, the US and South Korea pledged to help each other from external armed attacks. This treaty came into effect in 1954.

While it was never invoked, it gave the US a legal framework to station about 28,500 troops in South Korea.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s Peninsula Shield Force 1984

The GCC is a political and economic alliance of six countries in the Arabian Peninsula: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The GCC was established in Saudi Arabia in 1981, aiming to promote economic, security, cultural and social cooperation between the six member states.

In 1984, the GCC established a standing coalition land force, the Peninsula Shield Force, tasked to defend the six-member states amid the Iran-Iraq War.

It is composed of infantry, armour, artillery and combat support elements from each of the states, with 40,000 personnel.

The 2000 Joint Defence Agreement was signed to develop a joint military industry for arms manufacturing.

In September 2025, when Israel attacked Hamas leaders in Qatar, the GCC pledged to “activate a joint defence mechanism”.

Treaty on European Union (TEU), 2009

The modern EU was officially formed in 1993 in the Netherlands with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

In 2009, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) created the mutual defence obligation which was signed into EU law.

Under Article 42(7) of the TEU, if one EU member is the victim of “armed aggression”, others have an obligation to aid and assist by all the means in their power.

France has invoked this clause only once, in 2015, following the Paris attacks that killed 130 people. Other EU members provided bilateral military support — including deployments to French‑led operations abroad — so that France could redeploy troops to strengthen security at home.

Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), 2002

The CSTO is a Russia-led military alliance that includes some former Soviet republics.

Established in 2002, its members comprise Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus.

Article 4 of the CSTO states that aggression against one is considered aggression against all, with an obligation to provide necessary aid, including military.

The CSTO has deployed troops once, in 2022 in Kazakhstan upon the request of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to help manage demonstrations caused by rising fuel prices.

The initial step taken on August 14, 2001 cannot be viewed merely as the submission of a political party’s founding petition within the annals of international political history; rather, it is the reincarnation of a millennium-old, deep-rooted civilisational vision on the modern world stage. Today, having left a quarter of a century behind, the AK Party is not merely a tale of national development within its borders, but an unparalleled 25-year epic of democracy on a global scale. Coming to power with immense public favour just 16 months after its founding, and steering the country with uninterrupted stability for a quarter of a century, this political movement has secured a highly exceptional place in world political history.

The greatest power behind this stability lies in the fact that this movement is not a rootless structure blown about by the wind. It carries on its shoulders, as a historical trust, the democratic struggle of the late Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his companions, who sacrificed their lives for the nation’s beliefs during the arduous days of the single-party era. The mighty plane tree founded by our President and Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdogan – under whose shade our nation and oppressed geographies have drawn a breath of relief for 25 years – is the very embodiment of this tremendous historical legacy.

While the lifespans of political parties are generally measured by election results or their terms in government, the AK Party’s ability to overcome successive global and national crises with the continuous support of vastly diverse social segments over 25 years can be explained by a much more structural concept: Its “capacity for political translation”.

This capacity is the process of accurately hearing the expectations, needs, and objections within society, transforming them into viable party programmes, budgets, and public policies, and submitting the resulting outcomes back for societal evaluation. Social needs do not always arrive in politics as ready-made texts; it is here that the AK Party has established a colossal “translation” mechanism that turns seemingly disparate experiences into common problems and solutions. Indeed, for someone of a generation like mine – who grew up in a Turkiye shaped by the AK Party, took on responsibilities in its youth branches since childhood, and today serves as a member of parliament and the party’s secretary-general – this political ground is the very essence of that transformation.

To grasp the magnitude of this transformation, one must look back at the Turkiye of the 1990s. It is essential to read those years not just as an “era of a unipolar world and severe economic crises”, but as a colossal “age of political collapse and instability” that paralysed the state and deepened societal fault lines.

The 90s were a lost decade in which fragile coalitions lasting only months, political bargaining and recurring crises shook state authority. While unsolved murders and an escalating spiral of terror threatened citizens’ lives on the one hand, the heavy fist of tutelage brought down upon civilian politics via the February 28 post-modern coup explicitly usurped the nation’s will on the other. Even though voter turnout reached 87 percent in parliamentary elections during that era, this high public interest in politics could not translate into a stable and effective governing capacity, with no single party able to form a majority government.

The closure of the Refah Party in 1998 and the Fazilet Party in 2001 through judicial tutelage created a profound crisis regarding the continuity of legitimate channels of representation for the masses. Therefore, the year 2001 was a historical threshold – not merely a year of economic bankruptcy marked by cash registers being thrown in protest, but the absolute peak of political fragmentation, tutelary regimes, governance vulnerabilities, and constitutional rights remaining strictly on paper. Inheriting this multidimensional political and economic wreckage, the AK Party built the world’s most experienced cadres in every field, from security to economics, from foreign policy to social policies, establishing a “game-changing” political style.

At the core of this game-changing politics lies the dismantling of the “state commands its citizens” mentality, replacing it with the principle that “the state is the servant of the nation”. Believing that true change lies in execution rather than packaging, the AK Party tore down the cold walls built between the state and the nation, making the nation’s red lines the same as the state’s.

The silent majority, who for decades had been left disheartened like “tenants” in their own homeland, rose with self-confidence to become the true “landlords” of their country. Today, as the world’s largest and most dynamic school of politics with more than 12 million members, the AK Party conducts politics not by pontificating from television screens, but by directly sharing the burdens of the people and keeping a finger on the pulse of the streets. The secret behind these victories is hidden in these devoted organisations that hold the nation’s consent above all else, and in the vision of the leader of this great march, our President and Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The party’s quarter-century has gone down in history not through noisy destructions and polarising conflicts, but through institutional “silent revolutions” woven stitch by stitch. The Health Transformation Program and national fighter jets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) produced in the defence industry are the building blocks of this revolution.

Moreover, Turkiye does not view technological transformation merely as instrumental progress; it presents a brand new vision. By openly opposing the algorithmic exploitation of global digital giants, it advocates for a value-oriented and ethical technological order that places human dignity, privacy, and the family at its centre. TEKNOFEST is not just a technology fair; it is a ceremony of institutional self-confidence where a generation – once intended to be manipulated in the streets during past coup eras – becomes the builder of this very moral and fully independent technological future.

The greatest outcome of this will for full independence is the historic struggle waged against the scourge of terrorism – which has made the nation weep blood – under the ideal of a “Terror-Free Turkiye”. Recipes dictated from the outside have been crumpled up and thrown away; terrorism has been dried up at its source, and the dirty corridors intended to be established at our borders have been shattered by the “Turkiye Model”. A Turkiye completely cleansed of terrorism has thwarted Israel’s expansionist ambitions built on dividing, weakening, and destabilising the region; it has become the greatest hope for the Palestinian cause, for Jerusalem, and for the oppressed in Gaza.

Viewing democracy not as a tool but as an unshakable value, this political mindset forever closed the dark parenthesis of tutelage opened on May 27, 1960, on the night of July 15, when the nation lay down in front of tanks and braved gun barrels. This democratic resilience achieved at home has today made Turkiye the vanguard of a global conscience movement abroad.

The objection raised by our President and Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdogan that “The World is Bigger Than Five!” has transformed into an “Erdogan Doctrine” that maps the conscience of humanity against those who fancy themselves masters of the globe. This quest for justice – embodied in the human tragedy in Gaza, in baby Aylan whose washed-up body shook the world, and in a little boy who recited the Quran with his last breath under the rubble – is the clearest indicator of Turkiye’s determination to defend the rights of the innocent in international diplomacy.

Today, moving far beyond being a passive ally in global politics, Turkiye has risen to the position of a subject that rewrites the rules of the international system, produces solutions to geopolitical crises, and personally steers diplomatic change.

Having long transcended artificial agendas and polemics in domestic politics, the AK Party’s true power in this multipolar world lies not only in the country’s economic and strategic capacity. It lies in the unshakeable democratic legitimacy behind our President and Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdogan – one of the most senior and experienced heads of state in world politics – and in the profound trust that all oppressed peoples across the earth place in Turkiye.

Our tremendous state experience over the past quarter-century is our most solid reference; yet, this political movement, with its face always turned towards the future, is determined to build the “Century of Turkiye” vision on the axis of justice, compassion, and sustainable global peace by blending it with the nation’s internal dynamics. In this new age marked by great trials that deeply affect humanity, under the leadership of our President and Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdogan – who shapes global politics with his unparalleled state experience and vision in the international arena – Turkiye marches forward with strong steps, shoulder to shoulder with our nation, as a playmaker towards new targets and a bright new quarter-century.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

A series of Houthi attacks in recent weeks, which are among the deadliest in years, is raising fears that Yemen could be sliding back towards all-out war as conflict spreads across the Middle East.

A 2022 truce led to the end of heavy fighting between the pro-Iranian Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces, which had been ongoing since September 2014.

But a series of clashes over the last month between the two sides – intensifying in the last two weeks – has led to civilian and military casualties and threatened to reignite the war.

Here is what we know.

What are the latest attacks?

The Houthis have killed a number of civilians in a series of attacks on the government-controlled west coast port of al-Makha, also known as Mocha.

There was also an attack on a commercial vessel in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait on Tuesday, which Yemen’s coastguard said killed six people and injured 10 others. The Houthis said the vessel was carrying weapons.

It followed the Houthis targeting Yemeni government military sites in eastern Yemen with drones and rockets, killing at least 30 government soldiers and causing further clashes. The Houthis have also attacked Saudi Aramco’s Jazan oil refinery.

In response, Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), said the internationally -recognised government would not accept “a new truce that reproduces previous experiences”.

“No action by the Houthi militias will go unanswered or unchecked,” al-Alimi said, according to Yemen’s Saba news agency.

But he also appeared to leave space for a political way back, saying the Houthis could still “lay down their arms, engage in political life and compete through the ballot box on an equal footing with all other Yemenis”.

What is behind the latest tensions?

The Houthis seized the capital Sanaa in 2014 and have since fought a war with the government for control of the country.

Although the intensity of the war declined significantly after the 2022 truce, no comprehensive peace settlement followed.

The fragile status quo came under increasing pressure after the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28 .

On July 13 , Yemeni government forces – which are backed by Saudi Arabia – attacked Sanaa airport, reportedly to prevent an Iranian aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation from landing. The government accuses Iran of arming the Houthis.

The rebel movement responded by launching missiles towards Saudi Arabia. Then, on July 20 , the Houthis announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, threatening oil shipments diverted towards the Red Sea and attacking Saudi Aramco facilities in Jizan and Yanbu.

Is Saudi Arabia changing its approach?

As the attacks have intensified, Saudi Arabia has begun to take a more proactive approach to its security – both in Yemen and across the region, according to experts.

Some analysts believe the prospect of the Houthis ultimately blocking Bab al-Mandeb – the narrow strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean – may have helped push the Saudis to change their strategy.

Saudi Arabia was somewhat insulated from Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz because it could use its East-West Pipeline to transport oil from fields in the east to the Red Sea, bypassing the strait.

If the Houthis were to severely restrict shipping through Bab al-Mandeb, that would threaten the Red Sea route for one of the world’s largest oil exporters.

Last month, Riyadh announced a new international alliance intended to protect shipping in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks. Dozens of countries were invited, with the kingdom saying 13 had agreed to participate.

It is also deepening its security relationships with Pakistan and Turkiye through a new joint defence agreement, while Saudi coordination with Washington also appears to be strengthening.

The Saudi Defence Minister, Khalid bin Salman, recently met US Vice President JD Vance amid reports that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had secured US support for potential military action against the Houthis.

But in Yemen, the shift in the Saudi position may have been more visible when the Saudis intervened against the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) at the end of last year. That allowed Yemen’s fractious anti-Houthi coalition to coalesce around the Yemeni government and present a more united front against the rebels.

Simon Mabon, professor of international relations at Lancaster University in the UK, said Saudi policy on the issue has changed significantly.

“After years of attempting to de-escalate and work towards an accommodation with the Houthis, Riyadh appears to have concluded that approach is no longer viable,” Mabon told Al Jazeera.

“Saudi Arabia’s concern has become particularly acute because conflict around the Strait of Hormuz has increased the importance of alternative oil and shipping routes through the Red Sea.”

But rather than trying to totally defeat the Houthis and retake the capital Sanaa, Mabon said Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government now appear to be focused on pushing Houthi forces away from the coast.

“That’s a marked shift from what we had been seeing previously,” he said.

Could Pakistan and Turkiye be drawn into the war?

The Saudi-Pakistan-Turkiye agreement potentially raises the stakes of any further Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said the latest attacks were being interpreted by some experts as a direct defiance of the new defence pact.

Pakistan has been directly affected by the recent escalation. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said three Pakistanis were killed and another person injured in a Houthi attack on a vessel in the Red Sea.

“Pakistan strongly condemns the Houthi attack on a non-combatant commercial vessel,” Dar said, adding that the government was in contact with Saudi and Yemeni authorities.

But experts say the defence pact does not mean that Pakistani or Turkish troops will join the war in Yemen on behalf of their ally.

Wolfgang Pusztai, a security policy and defence analyst, told Al Jazeera that the agreement so -far is “just ink on paper”.

What role is Iran playing?

Iran has long cultivated a so-called “axis of resistance” of governments and groups opposed to Israel and the United States, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, armed groups in Iraq and Syria and the Houthis in Yemen.

The Houthis supported Iran towards the end of March by launching attacks towards northern Israel and have since threatened to expand their operations in the Red Sea.

Last month, Iran reportedly asked the Houthis to prepare to close the Red Sea oil route if the US attacked Iranian power infrastructure.

A source close to the Houthis told Reuters that missiles and drones had been positioned near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait in Yemen’s highlands overlooking Hodeidah and the Gulf of Aden.

Mohammed Albasha, a Yemeni American analyst and former spokesperson for Yemen’s embassy in Washington, said the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia should therefore also be understood within the broader US-Iran confrontation.

“By threatening Saudi shipping there, the Houthis can increase pressure on both Riyadh and Washington, while supporting Iran in its wider confrontation with the United States,” Albasha said.

Is another all-out war imminent?

Analysts say the crucial question is whether the latest attacks are intended to pressure the Saudi and Yemeni governments, or whether the Houthis believe they are simply taking the initiative in a new potential ground war.

The Houthis also say Saudi Arabia is using the port of al-Makah to reinforce and resupply government forces and believe Riyadh and its Yemeni allies are preparing an offensive against Houthi-held territory.

Nadwa Al-Dawsari, Associate Fellow at the Middle East Institute, said those fears may be fuelling the current escalation.

“Since January, there has been significant progress towards bringing Yemen’s different government forces under a more unified command,” Al-Dawsari told Al Jazeera.

“Government forces have also demonstrated growing air capabilities, carrying out air and drone strikes against Houthi missile and drone launchers and other military sites.”

“The Houthis’ objective in this recent escalation is to disrupt these preparations before government forces are ready, degrade their capabilities and force them onto the defensive.”

Ultimately, she said, the Houthis are trying to shape the rules of any coming confrontation so that “if escalation takes place, it happens on their own terms”.

While a Saudi-led ground offensive is not inevitable, the Houthis have also shown over the past decade that they cannot be defeated by air power alone, Mabon said.

“Yemen’s mountainous terrain makes a ground campaign exceptionally difficult, while Riyadh has little appetite to become trapped again in a prolonged war,” he said.

A Saudi-backed offensive led by Yemeni government forces is still more plausible than a large Saudi ground deployment, he added.

The consequences of major fighting on the ground between the two sides will inevitably mean that civilians will suffer most.

“Amidst all of this, the tragedy is that people in Yemen are paying the price,” Mabon said.

“It wasn’t long ago that Yemen was facing one of the worst humanitarian crises since the Second World War. People are struggling, and continued fighting will make it far worse.”

Three nations to group ministers, hold ⁠joint exercises and deepen defence industry cooperation under the pact signed last week.

Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will group senior ministers, hold ⁠joint exercises and deepen defence industry cooperation under a military pact signed between the regional powers last week, Turkiye’s defence ministry says.

The three countries on August 7 signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on August 7, which stipulates that an armed attack against any member would be regarded as ‌an attack on all, similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause.

At a weekly briefing in Ankara on Thursday, the Turkish defence ministry said the pact’s fundamental goal was to ensure defence and military ties were put on a “more institutional and sustainable” footing.

“Under the accord, strategic political and military mechanisms plan to be established involving the Defence Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Chiefs of General ⁠Staff/Armed Forces Commanders, and that coordination among the three countries will ⁠be conducted at the highest level,” it said.

The ministry added that joint military exercises involving land, naval and air forces, as well as air defence and unmanned systems were planned, in ⁠addition to deeper defence industry cooperation.

“The aim is to provide not only product and system supply, but also joint ⁠development and production, technology cooperation, and sustainable maintenance and ⁠logistics support,” it said, adding that unmanned and autonomous systems, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence capabilities would be prioritised.

Turkiye, which has NATO’s second-largest army, has said the pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan and top oil ‌exporter Saudi Arabia was open to expansion — with Egypt as a potential candidate — and did not seek to replace any existing alliances.

The ministry also said Turkiye ‌was ‌participating in meetings in Jeddah aimed at establishing an international coalition to protect Red Sea shipping.

On developments in the Middle East, ministry spokesperson Rear Admiral Zeki Akturk said lasting peace and stability in the region would be possible if Israel ends its occupation and attacks in Gaza and Lebanon.

He said Israel continues attacks that have deepened the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, as also reflected in United Nations reports.

“Israel’s rejection of the 15-point Gaza Plan has been another indication that it is pursuing a policy of regional expansionism. On the other hand, despite the framework agreement that was signed, Israel similarly continues its attacks and military activities in southern Lebanon,” Akturk said, referring to the plan proposed by the United States.

“We once again emphasise that it is essential for the international community to take a more determined and stronger stance against Israel’s actions by upholding international law and humanitarian values in order to establish peace and stability in the region,” he said.

The tournament from February 2 to 7 will feature Barcelona, Real Madrid, Atletico Madrid and Real Sociedad.

The 2027 Spanish Super Cup will be held in Turkiye at Istanbul’s Ataturk Olympic Stadium, the Spanish Football Federation has announced.

The Final Four tournament will take place from February 2 to 7 and feature Barcelona, Real Madrid, Atletico Madrid and Real Sociedad, the federation said in a statement on Thursday.

Saudi Arabia has hosted the competition since 2020 but was ruled out as the dates coincide with the Asian Cup, the continent’s premier men’s international football tournament.

Barcelona, the reigning Super Cup champions after beating Real Madrid in the 2026 final, said in a statement that the Superr Cup will return to Saudi Arabia in 2028.

The Spanish Super Cup features the winners and runners-up of La Liga and the Copa del Rey.

President Trump secretly flew out of last month’s NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, on an alternate military aircraft while the White House made it appear that the president was flying on Air Force One, the Washington Post reported.

The Post said Monday that the operation was prompted by an Iranian assassination threat against Trump. The ruse was carried out as journalists and some White House staff members were led to believe they were on the same plane as the president as he began his journey back to Washington from the annual gathering of leaders of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries.

The Post cited material reviewed by the newspaper, a U.S. official familiar with the operation and another person with knowledge of the president’s travel. The Associated Press has not independently confirmed the report.

Trump had flown to the summit in a new Qatari-gifted and retrofitted red, white and navy blue jet. But ahead of departing Turkey, he said he would fly partway home on an older-model baby blue Air Force One plane instead.

The president at the time said the new luxury jet was being flown out ahead of his departure from Ankara to give some U.S. troops based in eastern England a chance to check out the new Air Force One.

In Ankara, Trump boarded the old Air Force One jumbo jet in view of television cameras ahead of the plane flying to Royal Air Force Mildenhall in the United Kingdom.

However, according to the Post report, after boarding the legacy Air Force One jet, he was secretly shuttled minutes later to a smaller plane — an Air Force C-32A — via an airport catering truck typically used to load meals and other supplies. Trump flew to Mildenhall on that smaller jet.

The White House did not respond directly to questions about the Post report of the secret operation to whisk Trump out of the country on a third aircraft, or the reported elaborate ruse to make it appear he was on the baby blue Air Force One jet flying to Mildenhall.

“As the President has said recently, there are many enemies of America who have their sights on him, and we use every tool at our disposal to address those threats,” White House communications director Steven Cheung said in a statement.

The U.S. Secret Service declined to comment. The Air Force, which maintains the fleet of executive travel aircraft, referred questions to the White House.

While Trump was in Turkey, the U.S. military conducted a series of large strikes in Iran in retaliation for its attacks on merchant shipping in the region.

The New York Times and CBS News reported last month that intelligence officials had raised concerns about a potential attack on the president or his jet, triggering additional precautions and the decision not to use the newly inaugurated aircraft gifted to Trump by Qatar for the first leg of Trump’s trip home from Ankara.

The swap had spurred questions about the security of the Qatar-provided aircraft, and Trump said last month after the trip that it would undergo additional upgrades.

Cheung on Monday maintained that the new, Qatari-gifted plane was “a state-of-the-art aircraft that has been fitted with high-level security protocols that ensure the safety of the President and his staff.”

The new Post report on clandestinely putting Trump on a third aircraft and quietly whisking him out of the country adds a fresh layer to just how seriously concerned U.S. security officials were about the threat against Trump during the ongoing war with Iran.

Paul Eckloff, a former special agent with the Secret Service, said such an unusual move could either reflect actionable intelligence or an abundance of caution given volatility in the region with the wars in Iran and Ukraine.

“I would not say unprecedented, but it is an unusual occurrence,” Eckloff told the Associated Press.

The Post reported that to exit that plane without being seen by those uninvolved in the operation, Trump and several aides stepped aboard an airport catering truck, which was elevated planeside using hydraulics and positioned at a door on the opposite side of Air Force One’s entrance.

The small group of reporters who thought they were traveling with Trump were advised to lower their window shades ahead of takeoff.

After arriving at Mildenhall, news photographers captured images of Trump getting off the presidential plane — suggesting he reboarded Air Force One out of sight of the pack of journalists who thought they were traveling with him.

Democratic Sen. Richard Blumenthal called for a congressional briefing on what happened.

“It is unprecedented and it is surreal,” he said Monday on CNN, calling the incident “downright scary.”

After the brief visit to the base at Mildenhall, Trump boarded the new Air Force One aircraft to fly the rest of the way to Washington.

During a gaggle with reporters aboard the aircraft, Trump was asked directly if there were any credible threats against Air Force One by Iran.

“Well, I have a threat all the time. I’m No. 1 on their list before you,” Trump said. He added to the traveling reporters, “But if I go, you go.”

Associated Press writers Josh Boak, Aamer Madhani and Konstantin Toropin contributed to this report.

Leaders of Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement last Friday, pledging to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression and stating that an armed attack on any one of the three would be regarded as an attack on all.

The pact comes as the three countries navigate growing regional tensions, including concerns over Israel’s expanding military reach and Iran’s regional influence.

Together, these countries form a sizeable military bloc. Riyadh is a top oil exporter, Ankara has NATO’s second-largest military, and Islamabad is the only nuclear-armed Muslim country.

In this explainer, Al Jazeera breaks down their combined land, air and naval strength.

Joint land, air and naval strength

Together, the three countries combine nearly 1.4 million active military personnel, 3,400 aircraft, 6,000 tanks and more than 340 naval assets according to the 2026 Global Firepower Index, which ranks the defence capabilities of 145 countries.

The index scores each country’s potential war-making capability across land, air and sea, drawing on factors including manpower, equipment, natural resources, finances and geography.

• Manpower: Combined, the three countries include about 1.4 million active personnel, backed by large paramilitary and reserve forces. Pakistan provides the largest pool of active personnel at 660,000, followed by Turkiye at 481,000 and Saudi Arabia at 247,000.
• Air power: Together they operate 3,415 military aircraft including fighter jets, helicopters, transporters and training military aircraft. Pakistan possesses some 1,397 aircraft, followed by Turkiye at 1,101 and Saudi Arabia with 917.
• Land forces: The three countries field some 6,046 tanks and more than 179,000 armoured vehicles, alongside thousands of artillery systems and multiple-launch rocket systems. Pakistan has the highest number of tanks at 2,677, Turkiye has 2,284 and Saudi Arabia, 1,085.
• Naval power: Their combined fleets include 344 naval assets, including 33 frigates, 24 corvettes and 22 submarines. Turkiye comes out top here with 192 naval assets, followed by Pakistan’s 120 and Saudi Arabia’s 32.
• Defence spending: Their combined defence budgets amount to about $124.4bn annually. Saudi Arabia has the largest military budget of the three at $63.9bn in 2026, while Turkiye set aside $51.4bn and Pakistan $9.1bn according to Global Firepower.

Complementary military powers

Andreas Krieg, an academic, security analyst and political risk consultant specialising in the Middle East and North Africa, said the pact’s significance lies in how the three countries’ different capabilities could complement one another.

“Saudi Arabia contributes capital, geography, infrastructure and political convening power. Turkiye contributes an increasingly sophisticated defence-industrial base, drones, missiles, sensors, electronic warfare, naval systems and NATO-derived military expertise,” he said.

Meanwhile, Pakistan contributes manpower, a large professional military establishment, operational experience, defence production and nuclear capability.

What does the alliance mean for each country?

For Saudi Arabia, the pact diversifies its defence partnerships beyond the United States, adding Turkiye’s advanced military capabilities and Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, amid growing threats to vital maritime corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb.

Pakistan is one of nine states that possess nuclear weapons, which it first tested in 1998. The country of more than 250 million people relies heavily on China for its arms imports.

Turkiye, which joined NATO in 1952, has no nuclear weapons of its own but hosts US warheads under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements.

David Des Roches, a former director of Arabian Peninsula affairs in the US Department of Defense, told Al Jazeera that the deal also serves Saudi arms diversification amid Western export unpredictability, since Turkiye and Pakistan can supply items like 155mm artillery shells at scale.

For Turkiye and Pakistan, it opens Saudi financial markets for their defence industries – both have manufacturing capacity exceeding what their own economies can sustain.

Zaid M Belbagi, managing partner at Hardcastle Advisory, told Al Jazeera that, for the US, the stakes are high. “Pakistan is a recipient of US aid, Saudi Arabia is the largest foreign buyer of US military equipment, and Turkiye is NATO’s second-largest army after the United States – so the spectre of the US within this agreement is quite interesting,” he said.

Krieg added that the US remains highly important, particularly for intelligence, advanced missile defence, and high-end military technology – but said that regional actors want to convert their own resources into usable power rather than purchasing from Washington.

“The old model was overwhelmingly hub-and-spokes, with Washington at the centre and individual states looking primarily to the United States for security. What is emerging now is horizontal connectivity between regional powers,” said Krieg.

Which other countries could join the pact?

Egypt is the only country whose potential membership has been publicly raised by a signatory. Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan called Egypt a “natural partner” and said he expected Cairo to join once technical issues are resolved.

Krieg said Egypt’s military weight, strategic geography and control of the Suez Canal would make it a significant addition to the pact.

But Cairo may be wary of binding military obligations and the impact on its existing agreements, analysts said. “Egypt may join only if the language protects its aid relationship with Washington, doesn’t undermine existing alliances and peace treaties, and maintains its own freedom to decide when and where it fights,” said Karim Elgendy at Chatham House.

We all know the classic Seven Wonders of the World, but Lonely Planet has now revealed its most ‘Secret Wonders of the World’.

From bright thermal spas to haunting bell towers and oddly-named villages, these are nine of the most incredible spots either natural and manmade.

Pamukkale-Hierapolis, Turkey

When it comes to natural wonders, one of those highlighted by Lonely Planet is Pamukkale-Hierapolis in southwestern Turkey.

The striking thermal springs have white rocks with bright turquoise water and waterfalls.

Visitors can actually swim in part of Pamukkale in the man-made Cleopatra Pool.

In some parts you can walk through or even wade through the water.

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Zhangye Danxia National Geopark, China

Another colourful spot is Zhangye Danxia National Geopark in Gansu, China.

The mountainous site is full of bright colours from green to pink and orange that has formed over millions of years.

Around the geopark are dedicated paths and platforms so you can see the mountains in all their glory.

One of the best times to visit is during the wet season between May and September – the combination of rain and the sunrise or sunset make the colours more vivid.

Beehive Huts, Ireland

One secret wonder is much closer to the UK as it’s found on the south-west coast of Ireland.

Beehive Huts, or clochán, date back to the 8th century, thought to once be used to store grain or shelter against storms.

Lots are easy to visit with many on the Dingle Peninsula with views across the coastline.

Some of the most easily accessible are the Fahan Beehive Huts which cost around €3 (£2.56) to enter.

Campanile de Curon, Italy

Another is Campanile de Curon, a bell tower in the middle of a lake in Italy.

It’s actually on the site of a sunken village which was flooded when three lakes merged into one.

It submerged the village of Curon Venosta leaving only the bell tower to be seen.

In the winter when the lake freezes over, it’s possible to walk over to it.

Chiricahua National Monument, USA

The Chiricahua National Monument is an enormous site made up of towers of balanced rocks.

Across 12,000 acres, the protected area in Arizona is known as a ‘wonderland of rocks’.

The area is open to visitors who want to explore its creeks, volcanic formations, and grottoes.

Most head to see Big Balanced Rock which, as the name suggest, s is a large rock that is perched on a narrow pedestal in a way that doesn’t look possible.

Chicken, Alaska

Found deep in Alaska is a former gold rush village called Chicken – and it even has a huge chicken Mr. Eggee as the mascot.

The village got its name back in the 1900s when workers could not agree on the spelling of ptarmigan, a bird found in the local area.

Instead, they settled on chicken, and now the village even holds a Chickenstock music festival with live folk music and plenty do the chicken dance.

The village is accessible between April and September as in winter its connecting highway closes due to extreme weather like heavy snow.

Völklinger Hütte, Germany

Some of the man-made secret wonders include the Völklinger Ironworks, in Germany, which looks more like something from a steampunk film.

Found in the south-west of the country, these are the world’s only fully preserved ironworks from what was considered the “Golden Age” of the iron and steel industry.

It’s no longer in use and is actually a museum and gallery space with entry from €17 (£14.52).

There are regular exhibitions and tours of the ironworks too.

Quinta da Regaleira Wells, Portugal

Just a few hours away from the UK in Sintra, Portugal is Quinta da Regaleira Wells.

The well is made up of two staircases across nine levels, they are found beneath the UNESCO-protected Quinta da Regaleira.

Unlike traditional wells, these don’t hold any water but were rather used for secret Masonic ceremonies.

For anyone heading to Lisbon, it’s a 35-minute drive away – you need to buy a ticket and can either do a guided or self-guided tour of the site.

Moray, Peru

Another man-made secret wonder is Moray in Peru which are deep carved circles with steps – essentially like an amphitheatre.

It’s in the Sacred Valley region around 11,500 feet above sea level.

It was built by the Inca Empire between the 15th and early 16th centuries believed to be used to experiment with agriculture at the time.

For those who want to visit, you have to buy a tourist ticket which covers 16 historical sites across Cusco and the Sacred Valley.

For the full 385 Secret Wonders of the World check out the book at shop.lonelyplanet.com.

Tehran, Iran – Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have expanded their mutual defence pact to add Turkiye, raising questions about the emergence of a new security architecture at a time when the United States and Iran have yet to reach a final deal to end their war.

Under the agreement signed in Mecca on Friday, any external armed attack on either of the three countries will now be considered an attack on all.

The trilateral pact was announced more than five months after the US and Israel launched a bombing campaign against Iran, triggering a conflict that quickly spread to the Gulf and disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, however, have been careful not to antagonise any regional or international actors while finalising what they said was the result of years of hard work and negotiations. They have stressed the pact, which does not identify a specific threat, is not targeted against any country – particularly Iran – and does not abrogate or replace any existing agreements with others.

In Tehran, the reaction has largely been subdued, with officials mostly focusing on aspects of regional and Muslim cooperation and what they perceive as a declining role for the US.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Friday that when Muslims stand together, “we can face every challenge by malicious outsiders head-on”.

“Time to rely only on ourselves and embrace true brotherhood,” he wrote on X, without directly mentioning the trilateral agreement signed hours earlier.

But Iran certainly sees some reasons to be concerned in the long run, according to Hamidreza Azizi, a researcher and analyst on Iran and Middle Eastern geopolitical dynamics.

The associate at Clingendael Institute told Al Jazeera that the timing is important, since the agreement comes after months of a war in which Saudi Arabia has faced attacks from the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen and armed groups in neighbouring Iraq.

“From Tehran’s perspective, the concern is therefore not only that the pact could strengthen Saudi deterrence, but that it could eventually facilitate coordinated pressure on Iran in Yemen, Iraq, and even economically through Turkiye and Pakistan,” he said.

On Sunday, the Houthis claimed another successful drone strike on the Saudi Aramco refinery in Jizan. Saudi Arabia confirmed a fire was extinguished without inflicting casualties, but did not mention the cause.

Separately in Yemen, Houthi missiles and drones struck the Saudi-backed and internationally recognised government’s Red Sea port of al-Makha, with officials reporting at least seven people killed, 15 wounded and severe infrastructure damage. The Yemeni group, which has also been hitting or turning back Saudi-linked ships in the Red Sea over recent weeks, said it targeted weapons depots.

‘A strong bloc’

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not released a formal statement about the Pakistan-Saudi-Turkiye deal, but a senior official outlined Tehran’s diplomatic thinking in an interview with local media on Saturday.

Hossein Noushabadi, a director general for parliamentary and legal affairs, told the state-linked ISNA news service that the ministry predominantly regards the agreement within the context of a diminishing direct US presence in the region.

The pact “is being viewed as the beginning of the collapse of US security hegemony in West Asia and the Persian Gulf”, said Noushabadi.

“It appears that, in the not-too-distant future, a new regional security order based on cooperation among regional states will replace the power structures imposed by extra-regional actors, heralding the end of the prevailing security and geopolitical paradigm and West Asia’s departure from the sphere of vital US interests,” added the official, who is a former Iranian envoy to Oman.

Political scientist Vali Nasr said he does not believe the pact is currently a threat to Tehran.

“For now, these are all elements of a post-American security order in the Middle East,” the professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University told Al Jazeera.

“This is also as much a balance to the Abraham Accords as a direct challenge to Tehran,” he added, in reference to the US-pushed regional normalisation effort with Israel, which US President Donald Trump last month tied with a civil nuclear deal sought by Saudi Arabia.

Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government at Georgetown University of Qatar, also agreed that decision-makers in Iran do not immediately feel threatened by the pact, especially since they have maintained cordial relations with both Pakistan and Turkiye even under trying circumstances.

“Ultimately, this pact is not that new, nor is it something that, at present at least, has a great deal of substance beyond its symbolic significance. For example, neither Turkiye nor Pakistan would be willing to get involved in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen despite recent Houthi attacks on the kingdom,” Kamrava told Al Jazeera.

Not all inside Iran are content with the pact, however, with some hardline lawmakers and media arguing that it could ultimately be directed against the “resistance front” of Tehran-backed armed forces across the region, and degrade Pakistan’s credibility as a main mediator between Iran and the US and others.

“It’s clear that Arab states finally understand security cannot be imported; it must be built within the region. However, a roadmap is still missing,” Ebrahim Azizi, a member of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said in a more hawkish viewing of the pact.

“Warning: Miscalculation is a historical mistake. Iran has proven that every error comes at a cost. Balance is the only way forward,” he wrote on X.

Ebrahim Rezaei, another member of the commission, also wrote on X that “a paper agreement with Turkiye and Pakistan” will not bring Saudi Arabia security, “just as years of one-sided dependence on the Americans did not bring them security”.

Is Iran missing out?

Clingendael Institute’s Azizi said Tehran’s priority will likely be to avoid turning the pact into an explicitly anti-Iranian coalition amid a war with regional repercussions, and that would mean preserving individual relations with each of the three countries.

He said Tehran can also continue to emphasise its long-standing argument that regional security should ultimately be organised by regional states rather than external powers.

“If those states come to see the pact as providing meaningful protection against Iran or Iran-aligned groups, that would make Iranian membership even more difficult,” said Azizi. “Over the longer term, however, if the arrangement evolves from a balancing coalition into a broader regional security architecture, the question of Iranian participation could look quite different.”

Experts also said it could be a possibility that Iran itself would be seeking potential membership in the pact in a distant future, but that would mean a sustainable end to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and across the region, while expansion to other regional Arab states seems more plausible in the near term. Egypt has already been floated as a candidate, but that could be a complex decision for Cairo to make.

Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North African Programme at Chatham House, said the trilateral pact reflects both short- and long-term security concerns and opportunities for Riyadh, Islamabad and Ankara.

“They are driven together to forge greater diplomatic and defence cooperation in reaction to US unreliability, Israeli revisionism and Iranian retaliation,” she told Al Jazeera.

Turkiye wants to expand its newly formed defence pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to include more countries, says Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, citing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

“Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan told state news agency Anadolu, according to a report published on Saturday.

Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on Friday signed the Mecca Joint Deterrence Agreement, in what analysts say could be a step towards a new security architecture in the region.

So who could join the pact next, and what would an expanded alliance mean for regional security?

What does the pact do?

The Mecca defence pact builds on a previous agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan a year ago.

Regional officials have suggested that the pact could eventually expand to include other countries, strengthening its role as a mechanism for collective security and deterrence.

The pact’s central feature is a NATO-like stipulation that an attack on any one of the three states would be treated as an attack on all of them although the details have yet to be fleshed out.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said the allies will decide through consultations what degree, form and format of support they would ask for in the event of an attack but no country would be considered a threat as long as a member state is not attacked.

Turkish and Saudi officials have stressed that the pact is not meant to supplant any other strategic alliances or relationships while Turkiye, which is a member of NATO, has said the agreement does not target any country, including Iran.

Which countries could join next?

Egypt is the only country whose potential membership has been publicly raised by an official from one of the pact’s signatory countries.

Fidan described Egypt as a “natural partner” and said he expects Cairo to formally join once “technical issues” are ironed out.

“I believe that at the next stage, Egypt will also be among us in the alliance,” Fidan said. “We already act towards one another as if we were alliance members.”

Ali Bakir, professor of international relations, security and defence at Qatar University, said Egypt’s inclusion would “significantly increase the pact’s political weight, regional influence and operational effectiveness” if it materialises.

What might stand in the way of Egypt’s membership?

Egypt already has a solid working relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye, with which it is part of a group called the R4, which consults on regional issues. Egypt has also recently developed stronger military ties with Turkiye despite previous tensions over the Egyptian military’s 2013 overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, the conflict in Libya and the discovery of gasfields in the Eastern Mediterranean.

But analysts said Cairo may be wary of the potential military obligations that could come with a binding defence treaty with states whose interests do not always align with its own as well as the implications for its existing peace treaties.

“Egypt may join only if the language protects its aid relationship with Washington, doesn’t undermine existing alliances and peace treaties, and maintains its own freedom to decide when and where it fights,” Karim Elgendy, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera.

“If the pact stays a political framework with room to calibrate each response, Cairo can live with it and may eventually sign. If it hardens into an obligation that could pull Egyptian forces into someone else’s war, the answer is likely to be negative,” Elgendy said.

Technical issues holding Egypt back could be both “legal and operational”, Elgendy added. “On the legal side, Egypt needs to know exactly what it is committing to defend, and it will want assurances so that a signature never reads as a commitment against Israel or as taking Ankara’s side in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean,” he said.

For Bakir, Cairo’s decision will come down to how it weighs the benefits of membership against the diplomatic complications.  Egypt’s decision on whether to join the pact will hinge on the level of “strategic value” it believes it brings as well as its ability to “manage relations with countries whose interests” contrast with or even “actively oppose” the alliance, he said.

Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera that while Egypt broadly shares the trilateral pact’s security concerns, it “does not share its underpinning threat perception” and may be resistant to “security commitments”.

“Cairo’s preference is to be part of overlapping regional security arrangements that are narrow in scope and are issue-related … rather than being entangled in defence commitments with elevated risks/cost,” Aboudouh said.

He added that Egypt may still opt to join the pact in the future but it would be a “complex decision”.

Which other countries could join?

Several officials have suggested other Gulf countries could eventually join the alliance.

In a post on X, former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani expressed hope that all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would “take the initiative to join” the pact. In addition to Saudi Arabia, the GCC includes Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

Fidan also spoke about the alliance bringing in more regional countries, saying some nations, which he did not name, had already expressed interest. “Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan said.

Among the Gulf states, Elgendy said, “the names to watch first are Qatar and Kuwait.”

Both countries are “close to all three signatories” and “have the strongest motive to buy extra insurance” after feeling “exposed” during the United States-Israel war on Iran and by Israel’s strike on Doha in September, he said.

Bakir similarly identified Qatar as the “most natural” Gulf state to opt in with Kuwait another possible candidate. He also said Azerbaijan, Syria and Jordan could also join “relatively quickly”.

Elgendy expressed scepticism about the pact transforming into a broader bloc. “This looks like a coalition of the willing that will grow on a case-by-case basis, shaped by each capital’s own risk calculus,” he said.