Turkey

Tehran, Iran – Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have expanded their mutual defence pact to add Turkiye, raising questions about the emergence of a new security architecture at a time when the United States and Iran have yet to reach a final deal to end their war.

Under the agreement signed in Mecca on Friday, any external armed attack on either of the three countries will now be considered an attack on all.

The trilateral pact was announced more than five months after the US and Israel launched a bombing campaign against Iran, triggering a conflict that quickly spread to the Gulf and disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, however, have been careful not to antagonise any regional or international actors while finalising what they said was the result of years of hard work and negotiations. They have stressed the pact, which does not identify a specific threat, is not targeted against any country – particularly Iran – and does not abrogate or replace any existing agreements with others.

In Tehran, the reaction has largely been subdued, with officials mostly focusing on aspects of regional and Muslim cooperation and what they perceive as a declining role for the US.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Friday that when Muslims stand together, “we can face every challenge by malicious outsiders head-on”.

“Time to rely only on ourselves and embrace true brotherhood,” he wrote on X, without directly mentioning the trilateral agreement signed hours earlier.

But Iran certainly sees some reasons to be concerned in the long run, according to Hamidreza Azizi, a researcher and analyst on Iran and Middle Eastern geopolitical dynamics.

The associate at Clingendael Institute told Al Jazeera that the timing is important, since the agreement comes after months of a war in which Saudi Arabia has faced attacks from the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen and armed groups in neighbouring Iraq.

“From Tehran’s perspective, the concern is therefore not only that the pact could strengthen Saudi deterrence, but that it could eventually facilitate coordinated pressure on Iran in Yemen, Iraq, and even economically through Turkiye and Pakistan,” he said.

On Sunday, the Houthis claimed another successful drone strike on the Saudi Aramco refinery in Jizan. Saudi Arabia confirmed a fire was extinguished without inflicting casualties, but did not mention the cause.

Separately in Yemen, Houthi missiles and drones struck the Saudi-backed and internationally recognised government’s Red Sea port of al-Makha, with officials reporting at least seven people killed, 15 wounded and severe infrastructure damage. The Yemeni group, which has also been hitting or turning back Saudi-linked ships in the Red Sea over recent weeks, said it targeted weapons depots.

‘A strong bloc’

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not released a formal statement about the Pakistan-Saudi-Turkiye deal, but a senior official outlined Tehran’s diplomatic thinking in an interview with local media on Saturday.

Hossein Noushabadi, a director general for parliamentary and legal affairs, told the state-linked ISNA news service that the ministry predominantly regards the agreement within the context of a diminishing direct US presence in the region.

The pact “is being viewed as the beginning of the collapse of US security hegemony in West Asia and the Persian Gulf”, said Noushabadi.

“It appears that, in the not-too-distant future, a new regional security order based on cooperation among regional states will replace the power structures imposed by extra-regional actors, heralding the end of the prevailing security and geopolitical paradigm and West Asia’s departure from the sphere of vital US interests,” added the official, who is a former Iranian envoy to Oman.

Political scientist Vali Nasr said he does not believe the pact is currently a threat to Tehran.

“For now, these are all elements of a post-American security order in the Middle East,” the professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University told Al Jazeera.

“This is also as much a balance to the Abraham Accords as a direct challenge to Tehran,” he added, in reference to the US-pushed regional normalisation effort with Israel, which US President Donald Trump last month tied with a civil nuclear deal sought by Saudi Arabia.

Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government at Georgetown University of Qatar, also agreed that decision-makers in Iran do not immediately feel threatened by the pact, especially since they have maintained cordial relations with both Pakistan and Turkiye even under trying circumstances.

“Ultimately, this pact is not that new, nor is it something that, at present at least, has a great deal of substance beyond its symbolic significance. For example, neither Turkiye nor Pakistan would be willing to get involved in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen despite recent Houthi attacks on the kingdom,” Kamrava told Al Jazeera.

Not all inside Iran are content with the pact, however, with some hardline lawmakers and media arguing that it could ultimately be directed against the “resistance front” of Tehran-backed armed forces across the region, and degrade Pakistan’s credibility as a main mediator between Iran and the US and others.

“It’s clear that Arab states finally understand security cannot be imported; it must be built within the region. However, a roadmap is still missing,” Ebrahim Azizi, a member of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said in a more hawkish viewing of the pact.

“Warning: Miscalculation is a historical mistake. Iran has proven that every error comes at a cost. Balance is the only way forward,” he wrote on X.

Ebrahim Rezaei, another member of the commission, also wrote on X that “a paper agreement with Turkiye and Pakistan” will not bring Saudi Arabia security, “just as years of one-sided dependence on the Americans did not bring them security”.

Is Iran missing out?

Clingendael Institute’s Azizi said Tehran’s priority will likely be to avoid turning the pact into an explicitly anti-Iranian coalition amid a war with regional repercussions, and that would mean preserving individual relations with each of the three countries.

He said Tehran can also continue to emphasise its long-standing argument that regional security should ultimately be organised by regional states rather than external powers.

“If those states come to see the pact as providing meaningful protection against Iran or Iran-aligned groups, that would make Iranian membership even more difficult,” said Azizi. “Over the longer term, however, if the arrangement evolves from a balancing coalition into a broader regional security architecture, the question of Iranian participation could look quite different.”

Experts also said it could be a possibility that Iran itself would be seeking potential membership in the pact in a distant future, but that would mean a sustainable end to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and across the region, while expansion to other regional Arab states seems more plausible in the near term. Egypt has already been floated as a candidate, but that could be a complex decision for Cairo to make.

Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North African Programme at Chatham House, said the trilateral pact reflects both short- and long-term security concerns and opportunities for Riyadh, Islamabad and Ankara.

“They are driven together to forge greater diplomatic and defence cooperation in reaction to US unreliability, Israeli revisionism and Iranian retaliation,” she told Al Jazeera.

Turkiye wants to expand its newly formed defence pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to include more countries, says Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, citing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

“Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan told state news agency Anadolu, according to a report published on Saturday.

Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on Friday signed the Mecca Joint Deterrence Agreement, in what analysts say could be a step towards a new security architecture in the region.

So who could join the pact next, and what would an expanded alliance mean for regional security?

What does the pact do?

The Mecca defence pact builds on a previous agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan a year ago.

Regional officials have suggested that the pact could eventually expand to include other countries, strengthening its role as a mechanism for collective security and deterrence.

The pact’s central feature is a NATO-like stipulation that an attack on any one of the three states would be treated as an attack on all of them although the details have yet to be fleshed out.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said the allies will decide through consultations what degree, form and format of support they would ask for in the event of an attack but no country would be considered a threat as long as a member state is not attacked.

Turkish and Saudi officials have stressed that the pact is not meant to supplant any other strategic alliances or relationships while Turkiye, which is a member of NATO, has said the agreement does not target any country, including Iran.

Which countries could join next?

Egypt is the only country whose potential membership has been publicly raised by an official from one of the pact’s signatory countries.

Fidan described Egypt as a “natural partner” and said he expects Cairo to formally join once “technical issues” are ironed out.

“I believe that at the next stage, Egypt will also be among us in the alliance,” Fidan said. “We already act towards one another as if we were alliance members.”

Ali Bakir, professor of international relations, security and defence at Qatar University, said Egypt’s inclusion would “significantly increase the pact’s political weight, regional influence and operational effectiveness” if it materialises.

What might stand in the way of Egypt’s membership?

Egypt already has a solid working relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye, with which it is part of a group called the R4, which consults on regional issues. Egypt has also recently developed stronger military ties with Turkiye despite previous tensions over the Egyptian military’s 2013 overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, the conflict in Libya and the discovery of gasfields in the Eastern Mediterranean.

But analysts said Cairo may be wary of the potential military obligations that could come with a binding defence treaty with states whose interests do not always align with its own as well as the implications for its existing peace treaties.

“Egypt may join only if the language protects its aid relationship with Washington, doesn’t undermine existing alliances and peace treaties, and maintains its own freedom to decide when and where it fights,” Karim Elgendy, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera.

“If the pact stays a political framework with room to calibrate each response, Cairo can live with it and may eventually sign. If it hardens into an obligation that could pull Egyptian forces into someone else’s war, the answer is likely to be negative,” Elgendy said.

Technical issues holding Egypt back could be both “legal and operational”, Elgendy added. “On the legal side, Egypt needs to know exactly what it is committing to defend, and it will want assurances so that a signature never reads as a commitment against Israel or as taking Ankara’s side in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean,” he said.

For Bakir, Cairo’s decision will come down to how it weighs the benefits of membership against the diplomatic complications.  Egypt’s decision on whether to join the pact will hinge on the level of “strategic value” it believes it brings as well as its ability to “manage relations with countries whose interests” contrast with or even “actively oppose” the alliance, he said.

Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera that while Egypt broadly shares the trilateral pact’s security concerns, it “does not share its underpinning threat perception” and may be resistant to “security commitments”.

“Cairo’s preference is to be part of overlapping regional security arrangements that are narrow in scope and are issue-related … rather than being entangled in defence commitments with elevated risks/cost,” Aboudouh said.

He added that Egypt may still opt to join the pact in the future but it would be a “complex decision”.

Which other countries could join?

Several officials have suggested other Gulf countries could eventually join the alliance.

In a post on X, former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani expressed hope that all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would “take the initiative to join” the pact. In addition to Saudi Arabia, the GCC includes Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

Fidan also spoke about the alliance bringing in more regional countries, saying some nations, which he did not name, had already expressed interest. “Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan said.

Among the Gulf states, Elgendy said, “the names to watch first are Qatar and Kuwait.”

Both countries are “close to all three signatories” and “have the strongest motive to buy extra insurance” after feeling “exposed” during the United States-Israel war on Iran and by Israel’s strike on Doha in September, he said.

Bakir similarly identified Qatar as the “most natural” Gulf state to opt in with Kuwait another possible candidate. He also said Azerbaijan, Syria and Jordan could also join “relatively quickly”.

Elgendy expressed scepticism about the pact transforming into a broader bloc. “This looks like a coalition of the willing that will grow on a case-by-case basis, shaped by each capital’s own risk calculus,” he said.

The pact includes an Article 5-style mutual-defence clause, but questions remain over how it would operate in practice and how Tehran will respond.

Turkish leaders have insisted that the new trilateral defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not directed at Iran.

Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Saturday that the pact does not identify Iran, or any other country, as a common threat.

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement was signed on Friday by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, stating that an armed attack on one of the three countries would be considered an attack on them all.

“There is no common threat that we have put in writing,” Fidan told Turkey’s state-run Anadolu agency, adding that countries that do not attack the signatories would not be considered targets.

An Article 5-style commitment

Fidan described the pact as “technically” similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective-defence clause, under which an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all.

But the response would depend on the circumstances.

A country under attack would have to request assistance and specify what kind of support it needed, Fidan said. That could range from intelligence and logistics to ammunition or the deployment of military units.

The alliance will also establish political and military committees, bringing together foreign and defence ministers and military chiefs, as well as a secretariat in Saudi Arabia.

Fidan said the three countries would work on joint training, intelligence sharing, logistics, threat assessments and military interoperability.

Defence-industry cooperation is also expected to be a notable part of the pact. Fidan said it was one of the main issues discussed by the three leaders in Mecca, including how the countries could benefit from each other’s military technologies.

The Turkish minister said preparations for the agreement had been under way for nearly two years and eight months, suggesting it was not drawn up simply in response to the current tensions involving Iran.

Iran pushes back

Despite Ankara’s assurances, some Iranian officials have questioned the agreement and warned Saudi Arabia against relying on its new partners for security.

Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of Iran’s parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said Saudi leaders should understand that cooperation with Turkiye and Pakistan would not guarantee their security.

Another commission member, Ebrahim Rezaei, similarly dismissed the pact as a “paper agreement”.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi did not directly mention the agreement in a message on X on Friday, but he called on regional states to rely on themselves and pursue what he described as “true brotherhood”.

At the same time, he stressed the strength and readiness of Iran’s armed forces.

Egypt could join next

Fidan portrayed the agreement as part of a broader effort to give regional countries greater responsibility for their own security.

“External hegemons coming into the region do not solve the problems; they make them more acute,” he told Anadolu.

He described Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as the “core countries” of the initiative and made clear that Ankara wants the arrangement to expand.

“Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries,” Fidan said. “We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella.”

Several countries have already expressed interest, according to Fidan, who said he expected Egypt, which he described as a “natural partner”, to join once outstanding technical issues were resolved.

For now, many of the practical details remain to be worked out, including how the three militaries would coordinate in a crisis.

But the planned committees, permanent secretariat and focus on interoperability and defence-industry cooperation suggest the pact is intended to develop beyond a simple mutual defence declaration.

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye have signed a joint defence pact.

It is an alliance that analysts say highlights Riyadh’s desire to diversify its defence partnerships, expanding to Ankara and Islamabad.

The pact was announced at a time of increased regional tension.

Yemen’s Saudi-backed government has launched a military operation against the Iran-aligned Houthis following a series of attacks, while Iran and the US have yet to reach a final deal to end the war.

The trilateral Mecca pact raises questions about the effectiveness of the decades-long US military presence in the Gulf. Does this alliance offer a viable alternative to the security umbrella promised by Washington?

Presenter: Anna Burns-Francis

Guests:

Abdulaziz Alghashian – Senior non-resident fellow at the Gulf International Forum

David Des Roches – Professor at the Thayer Marshall Institute

Zaid M Belbagi – Managing partner at Hardcastle Advisory

The Saudi, Pakistan, Turkiye defence pact faces mixed reactions, with some Iranian officials doubting its security guarantees. Iran and Oman agree on a Hormuz framework, while fighting in Yemen escalates between government forces and Houthis.
Al Jazeera’s @Mohammadfff_ reports.

Egyptian football star Mohamed Salah has been greeted by hundreds of fans upon arriving in Istanbul wearing Trabzonspor’s burgundy-and-blue kit ahead of his expected move to the Turkish Super Lig club.

Ex-Liverpool star Mohamed Salah arrived in Istanbul on Wednesday to complete his move to Turkiye club Trabzonspor.

Mohamed Salah arrived at an Istanbul airport on Wednesday, smiling and wearing Trabzonspor’s burgundy and blue kit before his expected move to ⁠the Turkish top-tier side, as hundreds of fans jostled to get a glimpse of the Egyptian forward.

Trabzonspor announced a day earlier they were in negotiations with Salah, who left Liverpool at the end of last season, and club chairman Ertugrul ⁠Dogan said they expected to sign the 34-year-old on a free transfer at a ceremony in the Black Sea city on Thursday.

“Trabzon, are you ready? I can hear you. See you very soon,” Salah said in a video posted by the club on X.

“Everywhere is Trabzon to us,” he added, referring to the club’s motto while wearing a Trabzonspor ‌kit.

Upon arriving at Ataturk Airport, Salah was met by hundreds of fans. He waved at supporters and initiated a traditional chant with them, before departing for a medical check and a later planned flight east to Trabzon.

Salah spent nine years at Liverpool, scoring 257 goals in 442 appearances and winning the Premier League twice and the Champions League once.

In the 2024-25 season, Salah scored 29 Premier League goals and provided 18 ⁠assists, equalling the league record for most goal involvements in a single ⁠season and setting the record for a 38-game campaign.

He was named Premier League Player of the Season and won the Golden Boot and the Playmaker Award, becoming the first player to take all three in one campaign.

His output waned last season, with ⁠seven goals and seven assists in 27 league matches, and he was left on the bench in Champions League games, leading to a public ⁠spat with Liverpool’s then-manager Arne Slot.

Salah started his career in Europe ⁠at Swiss side Basel in 2012 and later joined Chelsea. He also had brief stints at Fiorentina and AS Roma between 2015 and 2017 before joining Liverpool.

Trabzonspor – generally considered to be the fourth biggest team in Turkiye after Istanbul sides Fenerbahce, Galatasaray, ‌and Besiktas – finished third in the Super Lig last season and will enter the Europa League playoff round. The club’s last league championship was in the 2021-22 season.

Salah had been close to joining Besiktas, ‌but ‌negotiations had stalled over financial and image-rights demands, according to local media.

Details of the contract Salah is expected to sign have not been disclosed yet.

As a wave of cheap Chinese imports has flooded the EU in recent years, Brussels is now facing a new challenge: new import routes passing through Morocco and Turkey, the EU’s neighbouring countries, where Beijing can leverage tariff-free trade agreements with the bloc.

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By investing heavily in those countries, China is seeking to circumvent the EU’s trade barriers, including the extra duties imposed by the EU on products such as electric vehicles, and channel its industrial overcapacity into the European market.

European policymakers are now bracing for a surge in low-cost Chinese goods entering duty-free through these gateway countries, thanks to an association agreement that liberalises trade with Morocco and a customs union linking Turkey to the EU.

The European Commission launched negotiations with Beijing in June in a bid to rebalance a trade relationship that has left the EU with a €1 billion deficit. However, it is not guaranteed to reach concrete results by October — the deadline set by Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.

Brussels has already made clear it is prepared to deploy new unilateral trade defence measures. But Beijing is becoming increasingly adept at getting around the EU’s traditional trade tools, particularly trade defence tariffs.

Its circumvention strategy is now to go through Morocco and Turkey, which are becoming the new front line in the EU’s trade battle with China.

Billions in investments

Over the last four years, these investments have reached a record $6 billion in Morocco and $2 billion in Turkey, according to Rhodium Group, an independent research provider.

Cairo is also attracting Chinese money, with $6 billion invested in 2025 alone. But Chinese products made in Egypt are mainly exported to the US and Gulf countries.

In Morocco, Beijing has been investing in an entire electric vehicles (EV) manufacturing ecosystem. “There is a genuine long-term trend that began after COVID-19. We are seeing Chinese companies setting up operations in the country to manufacture high-value-added goods,” Armand Meyer, an expert at Rhodium Group, told Euronews.

Chinese battery producer Gotion is settling in the country, along with BTR, Tinci and Huayou, which produce battery materials, APG, an automotive brake manufacturer, and Sentury Tire, a tyre maker. All will soon have factories in Morocco.

The EU, which hit Chinese EVs with anti-subsidy duties in 2024, is concerned about China’s move into neighbouring countries.

In Turkey, part of the investment targets the local market, while Chinese export plans also threaten European producers. China’s EV giant BYD was granted preferential access to the Turkish market to build a factory, although the project has been suspended for now.

“The idea was to build a mega-factory in exchange for an exemption from Turkish import duties, as Turkey imposes tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles,” Meyer said. Chinese home appliance maker Haier is also investing in the country, as is Astronergy, which manufactures solar panels.

China’s manufacturing push in those countries spans multiple sectors, exploiting trade agreements with the EU that cover a wide range of products.

“The free trade agreements with Morocco and Turkey cover almost all goods. So it’s complicated to counter the Chinese export strategy,” Thomas Grjebine, an economist at the French Centre for Research and Expertise on the World Economy, told Euronews.

Grjebine added that China has understood these countries can serve as “a staging ground”, with investments rising year after year.

“Investments in these gateway countries account for about a quarter of China’s total investment in Europe and the Maghreb,” he said.

Reducing Morocco and Turkey’s access to the EU market

However, in March, the Commission proposed a landmark bill called the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) which aims to protect the EU market from foreign competitors — provoking anger from China.

The IAA creates a European preference for access to public procurement and EU public funding schemes, ruling out non-EU countries under certain conditions. China was targeted in particular, leading to threats of retaliation from Beijing.

All foreign countries are now lobbying EU lawmakers, who are discussing the bill, to be considered trusted partners, allowing their products to qualify as “Made in Europe”.

Industries with parts of their value chains outside the EU are also urging MEPs to include those countries. Euronews has learnt that ACEA, for instance, which represents European carmakers in Brussels, has been lobbying EU lawmakers to include Morocco, where many European manufacturers have production plants.

Paradoxically, if Morocco and Turkey — where European carmakers are also established — were considered trusted partners whose products could be labelled “Made in Europe”, it would also serve Beijing’s interests — despite fierce competition with the EU in the automotive sector — as China is building factories there.

“The Chinese know full well that a number of companies have located part of their value chain in those countries and are lobbying hard to ensure that Morocco and Turkey are not excluded from what is considered ‘Made in Europe’,” French socialist MEP Pierre Jouvet told Euronews.

“This is part of Beijing’s investment and tariff circumvention strategy,” he said.

The MEP is campaigning to exclude Morocco and Turkey from the scope of the IAA unless both countries open their public procurement markets to EU companies.

That position is backed by French liberal MEP Christophe Grudler and German Green MEP Anna Cavazzini, who, along with Jouvet, are expected to present a report on the issue to fellow MEPs in September.

EU trade defence instruments lack effectiveness

Without such a bill, the EU’s trade defence instruments remain modest compared with the scale of the coming wave of cheap Chinese products manufactured in those neighbouring countries.

The EU can only tackle Chinese dumping — where a product is sold below its normal value — on a product-by-product basis, as well as tariff circumvention when parts of the goods come from China and have only been assembled in Morocco or Turkey. The Commission usually assesses the value added generated in those countries before deciding whether to sanction Chinese companies with duties.

“For years, it was mostly a matter of transhipment through these countries, with Chinese exporters simply changing the certificate of origin, but defending the EU market has now become far more challenging,” Laurent Ruessmann, partner at law firm RB Legal, told Euronews.

Ruessmann has represented European glass fibre producers — whose products are used as reinforcement materials — in their fight against cheap Chinese imports. Eventually, glass fibre from China and from Chinese companies located in Egypt was hit with EU anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties in 2020.

But the Commission then had to open new cases involving glass fibre fabrics — used in wind turbine blades — imported from Morocco and Turkey. In 2022, it found that they were made using Chinese glass fibre already subject to EU anti-dumping duties imposed in 2020, a textbook case of tariff circumvention.

More recently, in 2025, the Commission also slapped countervailing duties on aluminium road wheels made in Morocco after concluding China had unfairly subsidised them.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Chinese companies receive up to eight times more subsidies than Western firms.

With recent investments in Morocco and Turkey, the EU executive is facing a new challenge: Chinese companies are setting up factories abroad, generating more added value in those countries than in China.

“In those cases, the Commission can no longer rely on anti-circumvention rules and has to launch a fresh investigation. The challenge is that it is much more difficult to prove dumping or unfair subsidies, making it far harder to impose duties high enough to protect the European market,” Victor Crochet of law firm Nishimura & Asahi told Euronews.

Looking at recent judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union, however, the lawyer believes EU judges will progressively allow the Commission to be “more aggressive” towards Chinese operations located in the EU’s neighbouring countries.

“The Commission will have to come up with new instruments. It will try to push the boundaries of the concept of circumvention to keep pace with the times, even when the raw materials no longer come from China,” Crochet said.

People should brush up on this code before heading on their next holiday

Going to the beach or cooling off in the sea when on holiday is one of the most common activities tourists do – and not think twice about. However, when people enter bodies of water, there is always a risk of injury or even death.

Holiday hotspots – like Spain, Turkey and Greece – all have warnings listed on the official GOV.UK Foreign Office pages that provide advice to travellers swimming abroad. The Foreign Office says every year, “people drown in the sea and in swimming pools”.

People who are holidaying with young children should “always supervise” them around pools and the sea – even if they can swim or a lifeguard is present. Situations can change in an instant, even for experienced swimmers.

On the country’s Foreign Office advice page, it said: “Some beaches, especially around Spanish islands, may have strong undercurrents. Hidden rocks or shallow depths can cause serious injury or death. Do not dive into unknown water and do not swim at beaches where a river runs into the sea.”

It adds that most beaches, including those in tourist spots, will use a simple colour-coded flag system to indicate whether an area is safe. These flags follow a standard set of guidelines that are universally recognised, and one should be a clear warning to anyone setting up for a day at the beach.

The Foreign Office said: “Many beaches have a flag system. Make sure you understand the system and follow any warnings (a red flag means you must not enter the water). Take extra care and get local knowledge if there are no lifeguards, flags or signs.”

Beach lifeguards will frequently fly multiple flags at the same time to signal different types of hazards. For example, one flag might be linked to the strength of the water, while another can signal if there is marine life in the area that could sting, like jellyfish.

What do the different coloured flags mean?

• Red flag (high danger)
• Yellow flag (medium hazard)
• Green flag (low hazard)
• Purple flag (marine pests)
• Black and white checkered flag
• Red over yellow (lifeguarded area)

Red flag warns of water conditions that are unsafe, like strong currents, rough surf, or severe undertows. If you see two red flags flying together, the water is completely closed to the public.

Yellow flag warns of moderate surf, light currents, or rougher waters. While swimming is permitted, weak swimmers or children are discouraged from entering, and everyone should take extra care generally.

Green flag signals calm ocean conditions and a low risk of dangerous currents. While it means the water is generally safe, swimmers should still remain aware of their surroundings.

Purple flag warns beachgoers that dangerous stinging marine life is present in the water. This typically means an influx of jellyfish, stingrays, or sea urchins. Crucially, a purple flag is used for smaller marine pests and does not indicate sharks.

Black and white checkered flag designates a specific area reserved exclusively for surfboards, kayaks, and other non-powered watercraft. Swimming or bodyboarding is strictly prohibited inside this zone to prevent dangerous collisions.

Red over yellow flag marks the safest area of the beach. This zone is actively monitored by lifeguards.

Netanyahu and board director Maldenov meet amid tensions over Gaza disarmament roadmap and recent Israeli attacks.

The US-led Board of Peace has said that an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will only take place after the disarmament of Hamas is complete, following a meeting between the body’s director, Nickolay Mladenov, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The meeting on Monday in West Jerusalem came as Israeli politicians signalled their displeasure with the deal, announced by US President Donald Trump last Thursday.

“Contrary to inaccurate reports, we note that the withdrawal of the [Israeli military] beyond the Yellow Line will take place only once decommissioning is complete, as Hamas committed to the mediators,” the Board of Peace, established by Trump in January to oversee the administration of Gaza after Israel’s genocidal war, said. “This applies to light weapons, heavy weapons, and the tunnels alike.”

The “Yellow Line” is the term used to refer to the demarcation line behind which Israeli forces continue to base themselves in Gaza.

“The goal is clear and is not in question: the complete decommissioning of weapons in the Strip and the transition away from rule by the gun to civilian governance,” the Board of Peace added in a social media post after the meeting.

For its part, Hamas has insisted that the deal will not be implemented unless Israel implements its part of the agreement.

During the talks, Mladenov urged Netanyahu to stop attacks on Gaza, two people familiar with the meeting told The Associated Press news agency. Israel has steadfastly refused to do so, despite an October 2025 “ceasefire”, since which it has killed more than 1,200 Palestinians, including more than 36 after the disarmament deal was announced.

Israel has killed more than 73,000 Palestinians in Gaza since its genocidal war began in October 2023.

Before the meeting, Netanyahu’s office said that the version of the agreement made public “does not reflect Israel’s positions”, and that its concerns had been shared with the US.

Members of the Israeli prime minister’s far-right government have already signalled that they want to backtrack on the deal.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said the agreement was “completely different” to the one the Israeli government had approved, and demanded a new vote “immediately”.

Israel has repeatedly flouted agreements and has been accused of being unwilling to make concessions during negotiations. The latest reversal comes despite a push from Trump to secure a deal, but months ahead of an Israeli election in which the government is under pressure from its base to demonstrate it has achieved total victory in Gaza.

Mladenov criticised the strikes over the weekend, without directly naming Israel. “Achieving a lasting peace is hard but achievable if everyone makes their best efforts,” he wrote.

Egypt, Qatar, and Turkiye, which mediated the disarmament deal, issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s targeting of civilians and healthcare facilities as a “flagrant violation of international law”.

Hamas said it and other Palestinian factions remained committed to the completion of the second phase of the ceasefire, and were awaiting a clear, official response from Mladenov and the mediators.

EUROPE is sizzling through a major heatwave, but that doesn’t need to melt your getaway plans.

These waterpark hotels will ensure kids stay cool in the sun — and they are all in areas currently deemed safe from wildfires.

With plenty of deals still out there, Sophie Swietochowski picks some of the top waterpark resorts across the continent.

TURKEY – The Land Of Legends Kingdom Hotel and Aqualand

Thrill-seeking teens will be bowled over by this giant theme park in Antalya, on the southern coast.

Often labelled as the Disneyland of Turkey, it is home to a thrilling 62metre Hyper Coaster, a mega shopping district and a waterpark.

Typhoon Coaster is the highlight, hurling riders at mega speeds from 43-metres up, in to a splash basin.

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There’s plenty for youngsters too, including a mini wave pool and slides, and a lazy river.

Guests staying at the onsite Kingdom Hotel get unlimited access to the parks.

GO: Four nights’ all-inclusive at the 5* The Land Of Legends Kingdom Hotel is from £972.50pp for a family of four sharing, flying from Stansted on August 26. Details at onthebeach.co.uk.

CORFU – Aqualand Resort and Waterpark

This resort, attached to the well-known Aqualand park, offers round-the-clock ice cream, pizzas, and burgers for hungry little mouths, as well as tasty Mediterranean-inspired grub for the grown-ups.

Guests get unlimited access to the waterpark where the whole family can get stuck in, thanks to the massive mishmash of rides.

Mum, Dad and the youngsters can head for the family rafting ride, down a 180metre tube, while the brave can tackle the 24metre-high free-fall slides and the open flume “kamikaze” slides.

With 15 pools and swimming areas, the kids will never get bored.

GO: Seven nights’ all-inclusive at the 4H Aqualand Resort and Waterpark is from £943pp, based on a family of four sharing and including flights from Liverpool John Lennon on August 17. See firstchoice.co.uk.

SPAIN – Evenia Olympic Park and WaterWorld Lloret

For adventurers, Tui offers a special package that combines a stay at the 4* Evenia Olympic Park with complimentary access to adjacent WaterWorld Lloret, one of Europe’s largest waterparks.

If it is too hot for the ten- minute walk, you can catch a free shuttle and then cool off straight away in the splash lagoon.

Meanwhile, older kids will want to make a beeline for X-trem Mountain, a 260metre watercoaster with steep drops, dark tubes and sharp bends.

There is also an onsite waterpark at the hotel with multi-lane racer slides, and a pirate ship.

GO: Seven nights’ all-inclusive at the Evenia Olympic Park and Waterworld Lloret is from £876.53pp based on a family of four sharing and including flights from Manchester on August 22. See tui.co.uk.

CYPRUS ­– Leonardo Laura Beach & Splash Resort

One of the best holiday destinations for waterpark fans, but don’t just take my word for it. It is frequently ranked among the best in Tripadvisor’s Travellers’ Choice Awards.

The kids’ activity pool, featuring a series of mini slides and water jets, will ensure under-12s don’t miss out, while adrenalin junkies are catered for by the Tornado King ride.

When you are not splashing around, there are five onsite restaurants as well as kids’ clubs, an escape room and cinema.

GO: Four nights’ all-inclusive at the 4* Leonardo Laura Beach & Splash Resort is from £965pp based on a family of four sharing and including flights on August 12 from East Midlands airport. To book, see thomascook.com.

Ahmet Davutoglu was once one of Turkiye’s most powerful figures: The academic who helped shape the country’s ambitious foreign policy after the turn of the century, served as foreign minister and prime minister, and was chosen by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to lead the governing Justice and Development Party, or AK Party.

But later, he became a critic of the political system he had helped build.

Now, after announcing that his opposition Future Party would cease political activities, Davutoglu is withdrawing from party politics. He described the decision not as surrender but as an effort to distance himself from what he called Turkiye’s “polluted political climate”.

His departure leaves a contested legacy – that of an intellectual who transformed Tukiye’s diplomatic outlook, but struggled to turn his ideas and prominence into an independent political movement.

From professor to foreign minister

Born in 1959 in Taskent, in the central province of Konya, Davutoglu studied economics and political science at Bogazici University before becoming an academic.

He taught in Malaysia and at universities in Turkiye, with students calling him “Hoca”, or the professor – a title that followed him into government.

Davutoglu became widely known for his so-called “strategic depth” doctrine, the argument that Turkiye’s geography, Ottoman history and connections across the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia could make it a central diplomatic power rather than a country confined to Europe’s periphery.

After the AK Party came to power in 2002, he became Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser. He was appointed foreign minister in 2009 and entered parliament in 2011.

His early years in government coincided with an expansion of Turkish influence.

Ankara opened embassies, strengthened its presence in Africa and the Middle East, mediated regional disputes and promoted trade and visa-free travel with neighbouring countries. The approach became known as “zero problems with neighbours”.

Tarik Celenk, a writer and analyst familiar with Turkiye’s conservative intellectual tradition, said Davutoglu altered the country’s diplomatic culture.

“Davutoglu brought a change of mentality to the Foreign Ministry cadres,” Celenk said, crediting him with opening diplomacy to businesses and civil society.

Celenk noted that Davutoglu sought to position Turkiye as a country capable of communicating with otherwise incompatible actors. “Davutoglu was able to have good relations with Hamas, with Russia, and also to have good relations with the US,” he added.

Davutoglu called this intensive and multidirectional engagement “rhythmic diplomacy” – an effort to maintain dialogue across competing regional and global power centres.

But the Arab uprisings, particularly the war in Syria, exposed the limits of that vision, analysts said. Turkiye supported the Syrian opposition and anticipated that President Bashar al-Assad’s government would fall quickly. Instead, the conflict brought mass displacement, security threats and prolonged instability.

“His principal mistake in foreign policy was that he was very emotional, very romantic,” said Celenk, arguing that Davutoglu struggled to establish boundaries between “idealism, romanticism and realism”.

Erdogan’s chosen successor

When Erdogan moved from the prime minister’s office to the presidency in 2014, he selected Davutoglu to succeed him as AK Party leader and prime minister.

The arrangement contained a fundamental contradiction. Under Turkiye’s parliamentary system at the time, Davutoglu formally headed the government. But Erdogan continued to dominate the governing party and exercise authority from the presidency while advocating an executive presidential system.

Davutoglu led the AK Party through two elections in 2015. After losing its parliamentary majority in June, the party regained it in November with nearly half the national vote. Yet the victory did not give Davutoglu an independent power base.

According to Celenk, Davutoglu entered politics imagining a forest without “wolves, foxes, jackals or snakes” – but discovered while prime minister “that this forest did not exist”.

Amid disagreements over appointments, governance and Erdogan’s efforts to expand presidential authority, Davutoglu stepped down in 2016. He remained in the AK Party for another three years before resigning and establishing the Future Party in 2019.

An opposition party without a base

The party sought to attract conservative voters disillusioned with Erdogan while advocating parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and accountable government. It never developed substantial electoral support.

Political scientist Berk Esen said opposition parties face structural disadvantages in Turkiye, where the governing party has extensive access to state resources and much of the media.

But those conditions did not fully explain the failure of Davutoglu’s party, he added. “For one thing, the Future Party was already half stillborn by its very foundation,” argued Esen.

Davutoglu and Ali Babacan, another former senior AK Party figure, established separate opposition parties, dividing an already limited pool of disaffected conservative voters. Both also struggled to confront the records of the governments in which they had served.

In the 2023 elections, Future Party candidates entered parliament on the lists of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, then Turkiye’s main opposition party. The arrangement delivered seats but exposed the party’s dependence on a larger organisation.

Esen said pursuing guaranteed representation prevented the Future Party from fielding its own candidates across Turkiye and building local networks.

“In order to achieve a small success in the short term, they squandered the party’s institutional identity in the medium term,” he said. “And that is already why this party closed.”

Celenk offered a similar assessment: “You could say that the Future Party was never the party of the future. It became stuck in the past.”

Yet he distinguished between Davutoglu, the unsuccessful party leader, and Davutoglu, the intellectual.

“Let us criticise Ahmet Davutoglu the politician together, all the way to the end,” he said.

“But Ahmet Davutoglu’s intellectual production capacity within the conservative community was belittled and not taken seriously,” added Celenk, referring to sections of Turkiye’s conservative political and religious establishment which, according to him, benefited from Davutoglu’s ideas and intellectual framework but did not sufficiently acknowledge his contribution.

Esen said he doubts Davutoglu could exercise significant political influence while Erdogan remains in power. “But I think, in practice, his political career appears to be over,” he said.

Yet the analysts found substance in Davutoglu’s explanation for withdrawing. Celenk said his four-page letter offered a serious diagnosis of “the state the country, its politics and its society have reached”, including the risk that Turkiye was “losing its character as a nation”. Esen agreed that “Turkish politics has become very polluted and authoritarian”, adding that some of Davutoglu’s criticisms were therefore well grounded.

Davutoglu exits party politics without establishing the conservative democratic alternative he promised. But some of the ideas and diplomatic practices he introduced survived his loss of power, ensuring that debate over his legacy will outlast the party he founded.

“At least as Davutoglu leaves politics and withdraws from institutional politics, this must be remembered,” said Celenk.

WILDFIRES are continuing to sweep across Europe and Turkey is one of the latest countries to battle the blazes.

Here’s everything you need to know right now about travelling to Turkey.

Where are the wildfires in Turkey?

Fires have broken out in various parts of Turkey.

One location which is popular for holidays is Antalya, and within the province there are multiple wildfires.

Currently, these are further inland than the coastal resorts popular with tourists.

The Fethiye–Antalya highway was temporarily closed due to smoke but later reopened under controlled conditions.

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Another serious and active fire is in Seydikemer, 20-minutes away from the city of Fethiye, where 600 people have been evacuated from their homes.

It’s in the hills between Fethiye and Marmaris – the fire started on Wednesday morning and spread into woodland.

On the northwestern Aegean coast, three neighborhoods in the Ayvalık district – Hacıveliler, Tıfıllar, and Bağyüzü – have been evacuated.

This is as a precaution due to a wildfire spreading across Turkey’s western Balıkesir province.

Agriculture Minister Ibrahim Yumakli said on X: “We are continuing to fight the wildfires day and night.

He said emergency responders had tackled 169 fires across the country since Wednesday, and 163 of those have “been completely brought under control.”

Is it safe to travel to Turkey right now?

Most of Turkey is still considered safe to travel to, excluding the areas of the Syrian-Turkey border.

But officials do heed warning about the natural disaster as there is a “high risk of wildfires during the summer season from April to October”.

It reads: “Wildfires happen frequently in Turkey during summer.

“You could get a fine or prison sentence for lighting a fire of any kind or discarding cigarettes in risk areas such as woodland. Look out for signs that tell you fires, barbeques, and smoking are prohibited.

“If there is a wildfire in your area, local authorities may tell you to leave your accommodation. Follow the directions of local authorities.

“If you see a wildfire, call emergency services on 112.”

GOV.UK adds that “extreme temperatures can affect many areas of Turkey over the summer months.”

Are flights still going to Turkey?

Flights to Turkey remain unaffected.

If you are due to fly in and have concerns, it may be worth contacting your airline to check if they are operating normally.

What if I have a holiday to Turkey booked?

As the Foreign Office has not warned against travel to Greece, there are no special circumstances in place for holidaymakers to cancel their trip and receive a full refund.

Depending on what travel insurance you have, your policy might include natural disaster cover.

If so, your insurance policy should cover you for when you are unable to reach your holiday destination due to natural disasters, like wildfires.

So it is worth checking your travel insurance policy.

Can I cancel my trip?

If you do choose to cancel your trip, it is best to contact your airline or holiday provider.

There is no obligation for companies to refund bookings unless government advice changes.

Climate change has helped southern Europe’s likelihood of wildfires double since 1981, say researchers.

Southern Europe is “becoming more flammable,” with the number of summer days featuring conditions likely to produce fires having more than doubled since 1981, according to a new report.

The study, published on Thursday in the Scientific Reports journal, said that this “major intensification” of fire-prone weather is driven by climate change. It noted that these effects are especially pronounced in France and Spain, which have been battling some of their largest blazes since records began in recent weeks.

The steep increase in the frequency of fire weather – characterised by searing temperatures, low humidity, dryness, and strong winds – “can only be attributed to global warming,” said study co-author Raul Cordero.

European countries are enduring an above-average season for wildfires, and have already overtaken 2025, which was a record-breaking year for destructive blazes.

Cooling weather and rain helped to calm the worst of the fires in France and Spain on Thursday.

France told 84,000 evacuees in the southwest of the country that it was now safe to go home, as France’s largest wildfire since 1949 pulled back.

Spain ended its state of national emergency as wildfires threatening areas near Madrid – the largest Spain has experienced since records began in 1961 – began to come under control.

However, as high temperatures moved eastwards, fires were being fought in Greece, Turkiye, and the United Kingdom.

In Greece, two firefighters died on the island of Crete on Wednesday, the fire department said, as several fires started around the country, fanned by gale-force winds. Another died in a separate fire in the Peloponnese region as the blazes continued into Thursday.

“We have difficult days ahead of us,” Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said.

Firefighters in Turkiye have been battling at least 115 fires across the country, although at least 110 were under control, according to the country’s agriculture minister.

An enormous wildfire has forced evacuations and prompted road closures in eastern England. The fire at Dunwich Heath, a significant biodiversity site, is one of the largest the region has seen.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is leading a high-level delegation to Turkiye, in his first visit to the neighbouring country since taking office in May.

Accompanied by ministers and senior officials, al-Zaidi’s visit on Tuesday will focus on “strategic cooperation” between the two countries, as well as issues related to security, water and the economy, according to government spokesman Haider al-Aboudi.

Relations between Iraq and Turkiye have fluctuated over the past decade but remained a priority for both sides, particularly for Iraq in relation to oil and water resources.

And the launch of the US-Israel war on Iran in February and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz have elevated Ankara’s importance for Baghdad, prompting it to press Turkish authorities to resume and increase the exporting of oil through the Iraqi-Turkiye pipeline after years of suspension.

New oil agreement

The two countries are seeking to sign an oil pipeline agreement that governs the export of Iraqi oil after the expiration of the previous deal on Monday.

A source from Iraq’s Ministry of Oil told Al Jazeera that a technical delegation arrived in Ankara late last week to finalise a one-year extension of the old oil-exporting agreement until a new deal is concluded.

“The new Turkish terms regarding a new agreement are very difficult to be accepted by Iraq. For this reason, no one other than the Iraqi council of ministers is to take such a decision regarding this issue,” said the official on condition of anonymity.

”Turkiye wants to increase the interest from $1.35 for each barrel to $7, and the export capacity must not be less than 1.5 million bpd [barrels per day], whether Iraq can reach this level or not,” the source added.

Part of al-Zaidi’s plan is to find new energy deals and secure alternate routes to export Iraqi crude via Turkiye and Syria and to the Mediterranean Sea.

Iraq signed energy deals estimated at $200bn with US companies during al-Zaidi’s visit to the United States earlier this month, and the government aims to increase its oil and gas production, as well as to diversify exporting options.

“There is an urgent need to find new export outlets away from the Strait of Hormuz, which no longer meets Iraq’s requirements. We must expedite and shorten the timeframe for negotiations and contracting in order to establish new export routes,” said Iraqi Oil Minister Basim Khudair.

Development Route 

During his visit, al-Zaidi is also expected to pursue the establishment of strong trade, development and economic ties while seeking to draw from Turkiye’s experience across different industries.

A government source told Al Jazeera that the prime minister will highlight the importance of utilising Turkish expertise in the energy, infrastructure and transport sectors to boost Iraq’s development initiatives.

Among the main projects is the so-called Development Route – a vital transport project that connects Iraq’s al-Fao port in the south all the way north to the Iraq-Turkiye-Syria border triangle through a 1,200km (746-mile) rail and a highway network that passes through 10 Iraqi provinces.

Abd al-Jabar Ahmad, a professor of political science, said continued attacks by armed groups “have effectively derailed” the project.

He also cast doubt al-Zaidi visit’s will yield major results in relation to it, pointing to Ankara’s involvement in a transport corridor seeking to link Turkiye to Jordan through Syria and then Saudi Arabia.

“In my view, the Saudi project stripped Iraq’s Development Road Project of much of its economic and investment appeal,” he added.

Water and security   

Water management is also expected to be prioritised during al-Zaidi’s discussions in Turkiye.

Iraq blames Turkiye for building dams that have affected the flow of water from its two main rivers – the Tigris and the Euphrates – which originate in Turkish territory.

“Iraq views it as an issue that impacts the future of millions of Iraqis,” said the government source.

But the most complicated and sensitive issue concerns security – particularly, the presence of Turkish forces on Iraqi soil to fight the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which Turkiye, the US and European Union have designated as a “terrorist” group.

Military estimates suggest that Turkiye has about 50 small and big bases in three Iraqi provinces – Erbil, Duhok and Nineveh – hosting some 5,000 soldiers and weaponry, including artillery and armoured vehicles, as well as heavy and medium arms.

In mid-2025, the PKK announced it had taken its first steps towards disarmament as part of a wider peace deal with Ankara to end 40 years of war against the Turkish state in a conflict that has killed more than 40,000 people. Still, Turkiye continues to view the armed group’s presence in different mountainous areas in northern Iraq as a national security threat.

But despite the challenges, there is wide support in Iraq to strengthen relations with Turkiye, driven by the belief that ties with the neighbouring country remain important and serve Iraq’s national interests.

“There is a strong Iraqi desire to deepen relations with Turkiye in many aspects, especially in oil as Turkiye becomes one of the most important countries in the region in terms of transit routes for exporting oil to Europe and the rest of the world,” said Issam al-Faily, a political science professor.

“The problem lies in the nature of the Iraqi political climate, which is affected by the ongoing power struggles. The covert Turkish–Iranian rivalry may be one of the reasons that could prevent al-Zaidi from achieving his aspirations in relations with Turkiye. He should balance these very critical issues, if he wants this visit to be successful,” added al-Faily.

United States President Donald Trump agreed to a 30-year nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia on Wednesday that would see Washington transfer nuclear technology to the Gulf kingdom.

This has drawn concerns that if the deal comes to fruition, it could spark a nuclear arms race across the Middle East amid reports that Riyadh would be able to enrich its own uranium, a necessary step in acquiring nuclear weapons.

US officials have stressed the proposed deal would serve civilian nuclear purposes, although exact details of the agreement have not been made public.

It has now been tabled in the US Congress for a review, but is expected to survive resistance from Democrats.

Here’s why some are concerned about the agreement:

Could this spur a nuclear arms race in the region?

Analysts have raised concerns about whether the proposed deal could lead to Saudi Arabia seeking to develop military-grade uranium, which the US Energy Department has not yet confirmed.

Some analysts have warned this could open the door to spurring an arms race with other regional powers.

Saudi Arabia has long voiced its intention to use nuclear energy for power generation, but in 2018, de facto leader Mohammad bin Salman told CBS that Riyadh would “without a doubt” develop a nuclear weapon if Iran did the same.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted on Thursday that the deal would not lead to nuclear proliferation, as US contractors would handle the project, allowing Washington to monitor it. US nuclear reactor designer Westinghouse is believed to be a major contractor.

Former Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Liberman said in a post on X on Wednesday that Israel must oppose the deal with “all our might.”

“We must all understand that Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear programme will end in nuclear weapons and lead to a mad arms race across the entire Middle East,” he posted.

Israel, which developed a nuclear arsenal in the 1960s, has long sought to stop Arab countries and other regional countries from gaining their own nuclear weapons.

Is there a risk of nuclear reactors being attacked in strikes?

Some others have also raised concerns over possible nuclear leaks amid the tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, for example, has seen some of its outer facilities hit in the US and Israel’s war on Iran. Iran too has hit the perimeter of the United Arab Emirates’ Barakah nuclear power plant in a drone strike.

None of these strikes hit the nuclear plants’ reactors, but analysts say allowing more such facilities in the Middle East when tensions are so high is a mistake.

Damage to a reactor’s core could release highly radioactive gases, causing immediate catastrophic damage within a 20- to 30-kilometre (12- to 18-mile) radius.

Nuclear accidents at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear plant in 2011 and Chornobyl in Ukraine in the former Soviet Union in 1986 are cautionary stories.

Could Saudi Arabia have access to sensitive material?

That’s unclear for now.

Highly enriched uranium and spent nuclear reactor fuel are key components of nuclear bombs.

According to US media, the agreement includes a clause providing for a “black box” uranium enrichment facility that would be situated in Saudi Arabia but run by US companies.

A joint study by the two countries, set to last two years, will determine whether such a facility is needed, or if Saudi Arabia should import commercial-grade low-enriched uranium.

“That’s really the concern,” Matthew Kroenig, a fellow with the Atlantic Council, told Al Jazeera, saying there’s been no such arrangement anywhere else in the world.

“What does the US really mean by a ‘black box’? So will the US bring its engineers there full time, forever? Realistically, the Saudis will be involved, they will learn the tech, and they could kick out the US in the future,” Kroenig said.

Washington could be seeking to model Moscow’s agreement with Turkiye and Egypt, where Russian contractors manage active nuclear power plants, including the needed uranium and the highly radioactive spent fuel from the reactors.

The difference, Kroenig pointed out, is that Russia does not enrich the uranium in those cases.

On the other hand, the UAE, which runs a civilian nuclear programme that has been held up as a gold standard for non-proliferation, imports all of its low-enriched uranium from France, the United Kingdom and Russia among other countries.

Kroenig suggested that the US could be using the two-year study as a negotiating tactic, noting that the same claims of impact studies have been used to stall South Korea’s requests to enrich its own uranium.

“The deal doesn’t immediately speak about uranium enrichment, so my hope is that this is a negotiating tactic and that after two years the US will say ‘oh no, this doesn’t make sense right now’”, he said.

HEADING to Turkey for your summer holiday in the next few weeks? Make sure to double check your passport before flying.

Brits are repeatedly being caught out before they travel by things like passport expiry dates and leaving blank pages for stamps.

Thomas Cook has found that travel to Turkey is up 37 per cent year-on-year with Brits heading to places like the sparkling Turquoise Coast.

For those heading on holiday soon, it’s important to have a reminder of the entry rules as they are different to countries in the Schengen Area.

Brits heading to Turkey need at least 150 days left on their passport from the date of arrival.

This is different to the EU rules which requires three months, compared to Turkey’s nearly five months.

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If you don’t have the right amount of time then you may be denied entry by your airline before flying, or at the border on arrival.

Even worse news is that if this happens, travel insurance is unlikely to cover the cost of cancelled accommodation, missed flights or return travel.

Another requirement to enter Turkey is that passports need to have one completely blank page.

This is to allow room for entry and exit stamps or full-page visas.

Airlines may check this before passengers even board the plane, as they could face fines if a passenger is later refused entry.

So if you’re a frequent flyer, check how many blank pages you have remaining in your passport before booking a trip.

The UK Foreign Office currently states: “To enter Turkey, your passport must have an ‘expiry date’ at least 150 days after the date you arrive and at least 1 blank page.

“You will be denied entry if you do not have a valid travel document.”

If you need a new passport for your holiday, you may want to look at applying now as typical renewals can take around three weeks.

There is a fast-track service if your passport isn’t valid and you need to travel soon.

For more information on passport rules, visas and items you need to pack in your hand luggage this summer – head here.

Istanbul, Turkiye – At around 19:30 GMT on July 15, 2016, a faction of the Turkish military launched a coordinated attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s democratically elected government.

But within hours, the attempted takeover involving tanks and fighter jets had been quashed. Thousands of people poured onto the streets of major cities, joining loyalist members of the army and the police, and much of the chain of command, in defeating the putschists.

The failed coup attempt 10 years ago was not only the bloodiest in Turkiye’s modern history – some 250 were killed and more than 2,200 wounded – but also a watershed moment that fundamentally changed relations between civil and military authorities in the country.

“The failure of July 15 had three pillars,” said retired Colonel Unal Atabay.

“The resistance of the people, the officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers inside the Turkish Armed Forces who resisted the coup, and the institutional reflex of the armed forces themselves.”

Military intervention cast a long shadow over Turkish politics for decades.

The armed forces overthrew governments in 1960 and 1980; intervened through a memorandum in 1971; and forced another elected government from office in what became known as the “post-modern coup” of 1997.

Although civilian rule returned after each intervention, the military remained one of Turkiye’s most influential institutions, seeing itself as the guardian of the republic’s founding principles.

Yet that was not how the republic’s founders had envisioned civil-military relations. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu, both commanders during the War of Independence of the early 1920s, entered politics only after leaving military service.

“If the military had remained involved in politics, it would most likely have been exploited by various groups in the uncertain and weak conditions of those early years of the republic. They made the most accurate diagnosis and said that the military should stay out of politics.

Political scientist Ali Carkoglu said separation between military command and civilian politics was regarded as one of the republic’s founding principles, calling it “the most accurate diagnosis”.

Over time, however, the armed forces increasingly came to see themselves as guardians of the state, repeatedly invoking that role to justify intervention in politics.

But 10 years since the latest attempt, few experts believe Turkiye faces another conventional coup.

“You never say never,” said Howard Eissenstat, a Turkiye specialist at St Lawrence University in New York. “But to bet on a military coup in Turkiye is to lose money.”

While the military’s political role appears to have receded, the broader consequences of the post-coup transformation remain the subject of debate.

Reducing the military’s influence over politics had already become a central objective of the governing Justice and Development Party, or AK Party, after it came to power in 2002.

Following years of tension with the military establishment, the government steadily expanded civilian oversight – and the failed coup accelerated that process dramatically.

Ankara accused the network of United States-based Muslim scholar Fethullah Gulen, designated by the Turkish government as the Fethullah Terrorist Organisation (FETO), of orchestrating the coup attempt. Tens of thousands of soldiers, judges, police officers, teachers and civil servants were dismissed or arrested. Military academies were replaced by the National Defence University, command structures were overhauled, and civilian oversight of the armed forces expanded.

Atabay said these changes have fundamentally reshaped the relationship between the military, the state and society.

He added the military has strengthened its internal oversight after the coup to prevent another organised infiltration, noting that both the armed forces and wider society are now more alert to attempts to penetrate state institutions.

“External centres of power may always make such attempts,” he said. “The important thing is to detect them early, expose them and build a system that prevents them from infiltrating the state.”

For Carkoglu, however, the military cannot be examined in isolation from the broader health of Turkiye’s democratic institutions.

He said bringing the armed forces firmly under civilian authority was essential. But civilian supremacy alone, he argued, does not necessarily amount to democratic consolidation.

“It is certainly a success that civilian authority has established greater control over the military,” he said. “But if that comes at the expense of democracy, then it is, at the very least, an unfortunate outcome for Turkish politics.”

Carkoglu noted that institutions derive legitimacy not simply from who controls them, but from whether citizens trust them.

“The healthy development of trust in institutions requires competitive politics and the possibility of free expression,” he said. “Otherwise, institutions themselves begin to lose credibility.”

That debate has become increasingly prominent in recent years.

The arrests of several opposition mayors – including Istanbul mayor and presidential candidate for the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Ekrem Imamoglu, together with investigations into other opposition politicians, have fuelled criticism from political parties and rights groups, who argue judicial processes are increasingly being used against rivals.

The government rejects those accusations, saying the investigations are conducted independently and are based solely on evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

The debate has unfolded during a period of remarkable political continuity. Since coming to power in 2002, the AK Party has won every parliamentary election, most recently in 2023, when the governing People’s Alliance retained its parliamentary majority.

Rights groups, meanwhile, focus on a different legacy of the coup.

Human Rights Watch says emergency powers introduced after the 2016 coup attempt gradually evolved into broader restrictions on civil liberties. It argues the crackdown extended well beyond those responsible for the attempted overthrow, leaving many dismissed public employees unable to rebuild their professional lives even after acquittal.

The government says the measures were necessary to dismantle clandestine networks inside the state and prevent Turkiye from facing a similar threat again.

Ten years on, that effort continues. On Monday, two days before the anniversary, Turkish authorities launched coordinated operations across all 81 provinces targeting nearly 1,000 suspects over alleged links to FETO.

For the government, it was another reminder that the events of July 2016 remain an active national security issue rather than a closed chapter in the country’s history.

WASHINGTON — The Department of Justice has subpoenaed New York Times journalists after they reported on security concerns involving the new, Qatari-gifted Air Force One, marking a dramatic escalation of President Trump’s campaign against the media that has drawn condemnation for eroding a fundamental freedom of American democracy.

The new jet, a present from the U.S. ally on which the administration spent $400 million to retrofit and upgrade, entered service this month. But Trump used an older model Air Force One jet to leave a NATO summit in Turkey and later referenced threats against him made by Iran.

The subpoenas seek to force the reporters to testify before a federal grand jury in Manhattan next week, the New York Times said, adding that federal agents delivered some subpoenas to the reporters at their homes.

They were issued after FBI Director Kash Patel and other Justice Department officials met at the White House on Friday to talk about the matter, according to a person familiar with the discussions who was not authorized to discuss the issue publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.

The journalists subpoenaed included Julian E. Barnes, Eric Lipton, Tyler Pager and Eric Schmitt, the Times reported.

“The appearance of federal law enforcement agents on the doorstep of news reporters should shock the conscience of any American who believes in the Constitution and the press freedom it protects,” David McCraw, a lawyer for the Times, said in a statement.

Bruce D. Brown, president of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, said Trump’s “war on the press is looking for another victim.”

He said in a statement that the subpoenas “break from long-standing Justice Department practice to protect the public interest and press independence by requiring prosecutors to only seek information from reporters as a last resort when all other avenues have been exhausted.”

The department said that “to be clear, reporters are not the targets, those leaking classified information are.”

Its statement said that “we value and appreciate the important role that the press plays in this country, but DOJ also plays an important role to make sure that the people entrusted with our nation’s secrets do what they’re supposed to do with that information, which means not sharing classified information.”

While recognizing “there may always be natural tension there,” the department said, “we are not going to ignore the law and stop investigating the people who work in the administration and think it’s OK to leak classified information impacting national security.”

Pattern of anti-press actions

Issuing subpoenas represents a further ramping up of Trump’s effort to threaten independent new organizations by leveraging the power of the federal government against them. It is also part of a systematic pattern by the Republican president to attempt to undermine press freedom in order to shield him from negative coverage.

Earlier this year, the Justice Department issued subpoenas seeking to compel testimony from reporters at the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal. In both cases, the department later withdrew the subpoenas.

In January, FBI agents searched the home of Washington Post reporter Hannah Natanson, who has been covering Trump’s transformation of the federal government, as part of a leak investigation into a Pentagon contractor accused of taking home classified information.

Adam Steinbaugh, senior attorney for the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, said Friday’s subpoenas and the prospect of “hauling reporters before grand juries sends a chilling message to journalists and whistleblowers alike: Watch what you say, or expect a knock on the door.”

“These tactics are becoming more common,” Steinbaugh said in a statement. “That doesn’t make them normal.”

During his first term, Trump suggested that the press constituted an “enemy” of the American people. Since returning to the White House, he has waged an aggressive campaign against the media unlike any in modern U.S. history.

Trump’s attacks against news outlets and media figures he believes are overly critical of him has included filing lawsuits against outlets whose coverage he dislikes, threatening to revoke TV broadcast licenses and seeking to bend news organizations and social media companies to his will.

The Justice Department over the years has developed and revised internal policies governing how it will respond to news media leaks.

Though the department across presidential administrations has periodically seized the phone records of individual journalists in hopes of identifying sources for national security stories, it is extremely rare for the government to attempt to compel reporters to reveal their sources before a grand jury.

In April 2025, then-Atty. Gen. Pam Bondi rescinded a Biden administration policy that protected journalists from having their phone records secretly seized during leak investigations — a practice long decried by news organizations and press freedom groups.

Doing so again gave prosecutors the authority to use subpoenas, court orders and search warrants to hunt for government officials who make “unauthorized disclosures” to journalists.

A memo Bondi issued said members of the press are “presumptively entitled to advance notice of such investigative activities,” and subpoenas are to be “narrowly drawn.” Warrants must also include “protocols designed to limit the scope of intrusion into potentially protected materials or newsgathering activities,” the memo stated.

Security issues with new Air Force One

The president flew the new Air Force One to Turkey during this week’s visit. But he departed Wednesday on one of the older-model Air Force One jets for Mildenhall, a Royal Air Force base in Suffolk, England.

The newer plane also flew to Mildenhall. Trump then switched to that plane for the flight home to Joint Base Andrews in Maryland.

The abrupt swap came as a shaky ceasefire with Iran had collapsed, with the U.S. launching airstrikes on Iran and Tehran attacking three gulf Arab states. Iran and Turkey share a border, sparking speculation that the new jet lacked certain sophisticated security and countermeasure systems.

The New York Times, citing anonymous sources, reported that the switch had come at the urging of the Secret Service, and that the newer plane lacked some of the advanced security features of the older aircraft, including antimissile capabilities.

Trump denied any security concerns, posting on social media that the stop in Mildenhall was so that service members there could view the new jet. During the flight, Trump denied to the reporters accompanying him that security concerns involving Iran were a factor in flying two planes home.

Still, asked if he was aware of any credible threats against Air Force One by Iran, Trump responded, “I have a threat all the time. I’m No. 1 on their list.”

The White House did not answer messages seeking comment about the subpoenas of the Times journalists.

Weissert and Khalil write for the Associated Press. AP writers Eric Tucker, Alanna Durkin Richer, Michelle L. Price and Konstantin Toropin contributed to this report.

The Kremlin today confirmed it’s in contact with Turkey over the fate of Ankara’s Russian-made S-400 air defense systems. Reports have emerged that Turkey could soon transfer the controversial missiles to an unnamed Gulf state in a move aimed at convincing Washington to lift sanctions and clear the way for Ankara’s return to the F-35 program.

Asked Friday whether Turkey had sought Russia’s approval for the reported transfer, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to comment on the substance of the report but confirmed Moscow is discussing the issue with Ankara.

“I can say one thing here: this is an extremely sensitive issue. However, we have been in contact with the Turkish side on this matter, and we will continue to maintain contact with them on this issue.”

Reports in the Turkish media say that Ankara is considering transferring its S-400 systems to an unspecified Gulf country, but the Turkish government has not confirmed that.

“According to the information I’ve gathered, the S-400s have been sold to a third country,” journalist Abdulkadir Selvi wrote in the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet on Friday. “The sale will be announced today. The S-400s are going to a country in the Gulf.”

Both the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have been named as potential candidates to receive the systems.

Turkey will announce today the sale of its S-400 batteries to the United Arab Emirates, in order to lift the restrictions on the sale of F-35s to the country.

— Amit Segal (@AmitSegal) July 10, 2026

There were indications at the NATO Summit in Ankara earlier this week that the United States was considering softening its stance on the issue of F-35s for Turkey.

“Why wouldn’t we do that?” U.S. President Trump said when asked if he would let Turkey back into the program. “Turkey, in many ways, has been much more loyal than other countries that we think would be loyal.”

Nevertheless, Turkey’s possession of the S-400 remains a sticking point.

Turkey was removed from the F-35 program in 2019 despite being a manufacturing partner and planning to buy around 100 aircraft after refusing to abandon its purchase of the S-400.

Washington took that decision after Turkey refused to abandon its purchase of S-400 systems, amid security concerns around the Russian-made system and the F-35. By that time, around 30 F-35As had been built for Turkey. Most of these were later transferred to the U.S. Air Force.

It now seems that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is willing to give up the S-400s to regain access to the F-35 program.

Turkey bought the S-400 in 2017, but the systems have reportedly spent most of their service life in storage. Separate reports have also questioned the S-400’s combat performance in Indian service during last year’s India-Pakistan conflict.

From Turkey’s perspective, regaining access to the F-35 would deliver far greater long-term military and industrial benefits than retaining the S-400. Lockheed Martin anticipates that by the 2030s, more than 600 F-35s will be operated from more than 10 European countries, including two U.S. Air Force squadrons in the United Kingdom. Turkey would be able to benefit from a significant European operator footprint and, potentially, could reinstate lucrative local production for F-35 components.

In the past, Moscow has said that contractual obligations from the S-400 acquisition prevent it from being resold or transferred by Turkey without formal authorization. However, there is now also the possibility that Russia might want to take back the S-400s to bolster its own air defenses, which are increasingly strained by the ongoing war in Ukraine. As Kyiv piles on the pressure with long-range drone and cruise missile strikes against Russia, getting more S-400s for homeland defense would also be very welcome.

Operators of the NGU special unit “Lasar’s Group” struck an S-400 air defense launcher in the Belgorod region using a heavy bomber drone.

The operation was carried out jointly with the 429th Separate UAV Battalion and the Joint Forces Grouping. pic.twitter.com/FnQp82ZjGc

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) March 4, 2026

On the other hand, there will still be some resistance to Turkey’s readmission to the F-35 program. Any kind of major defense deal with Turkey involves some kind of pushback from U.S. lawmakers.

As well as the S-400 issue, U.S. lawmakers have historically been concerned about Turkey’s relations with Greece, its other connections with Russia and Azerbaijan (which included the deployment of F-16s to the latter country), its conduct in the Syrian civil war, and human rights abuses. Previously, Turkey’s opposition to Sweden joining NATO also proved to be a significant hurdle.

The process to get Turkey back into the F-35 program would involve a lifting of the sanctions placed on it under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). To do this, Trump would need to formally notify Congress that the S-400s are no longer operational, that Turkey no longer possesses any of the systems, and that Ankara has pledged not to pursue similar defense ties with Russia in the future. Congress could still put the matter to a vote if lawmakers were still unconvinced that these conditions have been met.

There have been recent signs that, under Trump in particular, Turkey is getting more access to high-end defense equipment. This reflects broader improvements in Washington’s relationship with Ankara, with Erdogan frequently receiving praise from the U.S. leader.

Last month, reports emerged that the Trump administration planned to go ahead with the sale of dozens of F110 engines required to power Turkey’s homegrown TF Kaan combat jet, despite some resistance from Congress. You can read more about that here.

In early 2024, the U.S. State Department finally approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to Turkey of 40 new F-16C/D Block 70 fighters, which Ankara had long campaigned for, plus the upgrade of 79 existing aircraft to F-16V configuration.

Ankara’s push to regain access to the F-35 has taken on added urgency as rival Greece moves ahead with its own approved purchase of the stealth jets. We explored how that rivalry is reshaping both countries’ air forces in this previous feature.

Moreover, Turkey is looking to modernize its fighter fleet and, denied the F-35 and with F-16 deals moving forward only slowly, it has been forced to look elsewhere to meet its short-term fighter needs. Most notably, it signed a deal for 20 Eurofighter Typhoon jets last year.

A Turkish return to the F-35 program would also have implications for the Kaan program. Renewed defense ties with Washington could ease access to critical technologies and support for the homegrown jet, while acquiring the F-35 would also reduce some of the urgency behind the Kaan, which was accelerated in part after expulsion from the Joint Strike Fighter program. Even so, Ankara has consistently presented the Kaan as a long-term strategic project intended to give it an independent fighter capability rather than simply replace the F-35. It also comes with the option for lucrative exports.

With the strongest signs yet that Ankara is ready to relinquish its S-400s, it would represent a remarkable reversal of one of the most consequential defense procurement decisions in Turkey’s recent history. Whether that proves sufficient to reopen the door to the F-35 program, however, will ultimately depend as much on Congress as on the White House.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Turkey emerged as one of the biggest diplomatic winners from the NATO summit in Ankara after President Donald Trump lavished praise on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, promised to lift U.S. sanctions and signalled openness to restoring Turkey’s access to the F-35 fighter jet programme.

The public display of warmth contrasted sharply with Trump’s criticism of several NATO allies during the summit and highlighted improving U.S.-Turkey relations after years of tensions.

Turkey rolls out high-profile welcome for Trump

Turkey spared little effort in welcoming Trump to Ankara.

The visit featured a red, white and blue aerial display by Turkish jets, while a newly opened airport terminal was named after the U.S. president. Erdogan personally greeted Trump at the airport before the two leaders walked together, exchanged warm remarks and held talks ahead of the summit.

Trump later described Erdogan as a close friend and repeatedly praised the Turkish leader during the two-day gathering.

Trump says Erdogan convinced him to attend

For Turkish officials, securing Trump’s attendance was itself considered a diplomatic achievement.

Trump, who has frequently criticised NATO and questioned the alliance’s value, said he attended the summit because Erdogan was hosting it.

Erdogan welcomed the remarks after the summit.

“It was valuable that Trump emphasised the importance he places on myself and our friendship,” Erdogan said.

US signals shift on sanctions and F-35 fighter jets

The most significant outcome for Ankara was Trump’s indication that he intends to remove U.S. sanctions imposed after Turkey purchased Russia’s S-400 missile defence system in 2019.

Trump also said he was willing to consider allowing Turkey back into the F-35 stealth fighter programme, although he later clarified that he had not made a final decision.

If implemented, both moves would reverse major elements of U.S. policy that had severely strained bilateral relations during Trump’s first presidency.

Congress and Russia remain potential obstacles

Despite Trump’s promises, significant hurdles remain.

U.S. lawmakers have previously insisted Turkey cannot participate in the F-35 programme while retaining the Russian-made S-400 system, making congressional approval uncertain.

Turkey could also face complications with Russia because agreements governing the S-400 purchase include end-user obligations that may limit Ankara’s options.

As a result, the announcements currently represent political commitments rather than guaranteed policy changes.

Erdogan strengthens Turkey’s position inside NATO

The summit reinforced Turkey’s ambition to play a larger role within NATO.

As the alliance’s second-largest military, Turkey has increasingly promoted itself as an indispensable security partner while seeking greater participation in European defence initiatives.

Trump also publicly defended Erdogan against criticism from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who opposed potential U.S. sales of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey.

The episode underscored Ankara’s growing diplomatic influence within the alliance.

Trump overshadows summit with disputes involving allies

While relations with Turkey improved, Trump generated fresh tensions elsewhere during the summit.

He threatened to halt U.S. trade with Spain over defence spending disputes and repeated claims regarding Greenland, drawing criticism from fellow NATO members.

Despite those disagreements, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte later described the summit as demonstrating alliance unity.

Human rights concerns receive limited attention

The summit also highlighted how Turkey’s strategic importance has reduced public Western criticism over democratic issues.

The gathering took place amid arrests of opposition figures, journalists and a prominent comedian in Turkey, prompting questions about democratic freedoms.

Rutte reiterated that democracy includes freedom of expression, free media and the right to protest.

Opposition figures argued Erdogan’s increasingly close relationship with Washington reflects growing political dependence on the United States, while critics contend Western governments have become less vocal about human rights as Turkey’s military and geopolitical importance has grown.

Future outlook

The NATO summit could mark a turning point in U.S.-Turkey relations if Trump’s pledges on sanctions relief and the F-35 programme translate into policy. However, congressional resistance, Turkey’s continued possession of the Russian S-400 system and wider geopolitical considerations remain significant obstacles. Ankara is also expected to continue pushing for greater influence within NATO and broader participation in European defence initiatives.

Analysis

The NATO summit marked one of the strongest public displays of U.S.-Turkey relations in years, with President Donald Trump using the gathering to signal a willingness to reset ties with Ankara after years of friction over Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defence system. For President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, simply hosting Trump and receiving repeated public praise from him represented a significant diplomatic victory that reinforced Turkey’s strategic importance within the alliance.

Trump’s promises to lift sanctions and reconsider Turkey’s return to the F-35 fighter jet programme address two of Ankara’s longest-standing demands. However, turning those pledges into reality will be far more difficult. U.S. law and congressional opposition remain major obstacles, particularly while Turkey continues to possess the Russian-made S-400 system. Moscow could also object if Ankara takes steps that undermine agreements linked to the missile purchase.

The summit also highlighted a broader shift in Western priorities. During previous U.S. administrations, especially under Joe Biden, democratic backsliding and human rights concerns were central issues in relations with Turkey. This time, those concerns received relatively little attention as NATO focused on defence spending, military cooperation and regional security, reflecting Turkey’s growing value as a defence producer and a key NATO member on the alliance’s southeastern flank.

Trump’s warm embrace of Erdogan contrasted sharply with his confrontational approach toward several other NATO allies, including Spain and Denmark. That dynamic allowed Turkey to emerge from the summit with enhanced diplomatic standing even as broader alliance tensions persisted.

Whether this diplomatic momentum produces lasting policy changes will depend on decisions in Washington after the summit. If sanctions are eased and progress is made on the F-35 issue, bilateral ties could enter their most constructive phase in years. If congressional or legal barriers prevent those moves, however, the summit may ultimately be remembered more for its symbolism than for delivering concrete strategic gains.

With information from Reuters.