Turkey

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have captured Mocha port and now threaten to control the main waterway of the Bab al-Mandeb strait. They have also attacked several cities in Saudi Arabia, wounding about 70 people, including women and children.

The repeated attacks against Saudi energy, civil, and defence facilities, combined with the maritime blockage by Iran and its Yemeni partner the Houthis, directly raise the question of the Mecca Pact’s operationalisation between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan.

The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia can activate the mutual defence agreement. If that happens, what could a Pakistani and Turkish intervention look like?

The answer to this question necessitates some crucial background first.

The US – the main security partner of the Gulf states – has signalled for a while now that it expects regional countries to take primary responsibility for their own defence and deterrence, with US help remaining critical but limited.

That posture is already visible on the ground. Since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, the US has not been able to provide comprehensive defence for its regional partners. On several occasions, it has even failed to stop attacks on its own bases in the Gulf.

With US presence receding and Washington emphasising regional burden-sharing, Gulf states have had to look into a new defence architecture. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed their first mutual defence agreement, which expanded in August this year to include Turkiye and became the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.

The three countries have since established a joint secretariat, with its headquarters in Riyadh, with Pakistan taking the chairmanship for an initial three-year term.

The pact remains in a gestation period. It does not publicly identify the thresholds or scenarios under which a member would move to direct military intervention. Its organisational and institutional structure, including rules of engagement, mechanisms of consultation, and collective defence and deterrence, are yet to be formally developed.

Now, back to the question of how the pact will be operational if a member state is attacked.

Earlier this week, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that an unprovoked aggression against Saudi Arabia, or a spillover of the Yemen conflict into the kingdom, would make the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement operational, adding that “there should be no doubt in this.”

Asif, however, did not share specific details on what shape that operationalisation would take. Last month, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan clarified that the Mecca Pact would work the same way as NATO: If a member state is attacked, it must actively request and define the specific type of help it needs.

NATO’s Article 4 allows for a member to call alliance consultations and exchange of information. Article 5 requires mutual assistance from allies, but it leaves each state to decide the nature of that assistance.

In 2012, after Syria shot down a Turkish warplane, Ankara invoked Article 4 for consultation and requested specific defence assistance. Instead of demanding direct military intervention, the Turkish government explicitly asked for Patriot missile defence batteries. NATO approved the request and deployed the systems to protect Turkish airspace.

In this context, if the Mecca Pact is to be operationalised, it would have to be Saudi Arabia that defines the type of military assistance and involvement that it needs. If, for example, Riyadh makes an actual request for Pakistani direct military intervention, beyond materiel and intelligence support, Islamabad would be obliged to comply. But the request, and the scale of the response, would still likely need to be defined and agreed in a consultation meeting.

For now, none of this has been tested as Riyadh has not invoked the pact with either Pakistan or Turkiye.

In the meantime, diplomatic efforts have intensified, with Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud talking to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Islamabad has also publicly urged Iran to rein in the Houthis from attacking Saudi Arabia and threatening the Bab al-Mandeb, and has reminded Tehran of Pakistan’s commitment to Riyadh’s defence through the pact. Ankara would likely play its own part in diplomatically restraining the Houthis and Iran.

If diplomacy fails and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia or the Bab al-Mandeb continue, Turkiye and Pakistan would likely expand the air and technological support they already provide. Islamabad already has an air squadron of about 16 JF-17 Thunder multirole aircraft, defence systems, and thousands of troops deployed in Saudi Arabia.

But a direct military operation by Pakistani forces inside Yemen remains unlikely at the moment. Given the disastrous and lasting impacts of its participation in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union on behalf of the US, Pakistan would be far more wary of joining a war against Iran and its allies, for fear of spillover into its western border provinces’ economy, domestic security, sectarian balance, and societal harmony. Pakistani leaders would find it hard to build domestic consensus for direct attacks on the Houthis or a fight with Iran.

The likely scenario is that Pakistan would increase joint diplomatic pressure on Iran to restrain the Houthis, further augment its support for Saudi defence, and push for a multinational naval coalition to secure the Bab al-Mandeb. Adopting this restraint would still keep the essence of the Mecca Pact intact, while putting more weight behind regional de-escalation.

The new security architecture that agreements like the Mecca Pact are setting up will take years to mature. Until the mechanisms and rules of collective response develop, Pakistan’s existing bilateral defence relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Arab partners will continue to focus on defence needs.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

At a time of global upheaval, one man has redrawn Turkiye’s political map. In an exclusive interview with Al Jazeera, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reflects on more than two decades in power.

His rise began in the early 1990s, when he was elected mayor of Istanbul. He founded the Justice and Development Party, or AK Party, in 2001 and has won every election since then. After three terms as prime minister, he was elected president in 2014 and remains in office to date.

Marking the 25th anniversary of the AK Party, Erdogan talks to Al Jazeera Arabic’s Ali Al Dafiri about Turkiye’s growing role in the shifting geopolitical landscape, highlighting the recent defence deal he concluded with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. He addresses the US-Israel war on Iran, advocating for open maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz while identifying Israel as the primary driver of the regional conflict. He also affirms Turkiye’s solid support for Syria’s new administration and his unwavering solidarity with Lebanon and Gaza. On a domestic level, Erdogan reflects on Turkiye’s sweeping economic transformation and its future, stating that European Union accession is no longer a priority.

Fenerbahce president refuses Ismail Kartal’s resignation after fans threw bottles at coach in Roma Champions League tie.

Fenerbahce coach Ismail Kartal quit his role with the Turkish club after he was targeted by a bottle thrown from the crowd during hit side’s 1-1 Champions League draw with Roma on Thursday, only for his president to reject the resignation minutes later.

The 65-year-old Kartal told a press conference he was leaving “never to ⁠return”, adding that he had taken the decision “to clear the way for the club”.

Immediately after the press conference, Fenerbahce president Aziz Yildirim told reporters that Kartal “continues in his role”.

“Some fans threw ‌a bottle at the coach’s head this evening during the game. He is upset about it,” Yildirim said.

“I just spoke to Ismail Kartal. He mentioned the bottle incident and he also complained about being under pressure.”

Asked if Kartal had told him that he would stay, Yildirim ⁠said: “There’s no need for him to ⁠say (openly) that he’d continue. I am his senior, I told him to continue and that’s it. We are a family.”

Kartal, who spent a decade at ⁠Fenerbahce as a player, coached the club in 2014-15, then on an interim basis ⁠in 2021-22 before returning for a ⁠full campaign in 2023-24. He was assistant manager at Fenerbahce the last two times the club won the Super Lig and returned for a ‌fourth managerial spell in June.

Fenerbahce have finished second in the Turkish top flight in the last five seasons and reached ‌the ‌league phase of the Champions League this season for the first time in 18 years.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek this week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian received precisely the kind of political support he had hoped for. The SCO condemned the military attacks against Iran, described them as violations of international law and the UN Charter, reaffirmed Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

But the organisation did not offer to defend Iran. That distinction between political solidarity and collective defence is important. It tells us something not only about the Iranian experience with the SCO, but about the international order that is emerging around it.

For years, discussions about multipolarity have often suggested that the US-led international system would gradually be challenged by an alternative bloc centred around China, Russia and organisations such as BRICS and the SCO. From the perspective of middle powers, joining both institutions seemed to fit neatly into this transformation. Integration into non-Western organisations was supposed to make them less vulnerable to Western isolation and pressure.

The US-Israeli war on Iran has made clear that none of these alternative relationships can produce a security guarantee comparable to those provided by formal military alliances. The lesson is not that multipolarity has failed middle powers. It is that the emerging multipolar order may work differently from what many expected.

Rather than replacing one alliance system with another, it is producing an increasingly dense network of overlapping partnerships in which states gain diplomatic and economic options without necessarily acquiring new security guarantees.

For middle powers, this may be one of the defining characteristics of the emerging order: more room for manoeuvre, but less certainty about who will stand beside them when their security is threatened.

Turkiye provides a particularly revealing example. It has been a member of NATO for more than seven decades and remains embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet Ankara has increasingly demonstrated that alliance membership does not require automatic political alignment with Washington. Turkiye has maintained relations with Russia despite the war in Ukraine, expanded its engagement with China and participated in the SCO as a dialogue partner. At the same time, its differences with the US and Israel over the future regional order in the Middle East have become increasingly visible.

This does not mean Turkiye is abandoning NATO or moving into a Chinese- or Russian-led bloc. Quite the opposite. Ankara’s strategy depends precisely on avoiding such a binary choice. Its NATO membership provides security benefits that the SCO could not replicate. Its relationships with Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf states and other regional actors, meanwhile, expand its diplomatic and economic options.

Brazil represents another good example. Unlike Turkiye, Brazil is not bound to the US through a formal military alliance. But it has traditionally operated within a US-dominated hemisphere where Washington has expected considerable political alignment from regional governments.

Brazil’s refusal to join the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), together with its positions on the Iran war and other recent international crises, reflects its reluctance to accept that regional proximity should translate into automatic strategic alignment.

Yet Brazil is not simply switching sides. Its participation in BRICS, its extensive economic relationship with China and its calls for reform of the international system coexist with important political and economic relations with the US and Europe. Brasília’s objective is not to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing, but to preserve the ability to cooperate with both, and disagree with either.

This may be one of the most consequential opportunities that multipolarity offers middle powers. The rise of alternative centres of economic and political influence reduces the cost of saying no. For decades, weaker states often confronted a difficult choice when facing pressure from a dominant power: comply, resist and risk isolation, or seek protection from a rival bloc.

The proliferation of partners and institutions complicates that calculation. A government that disagrees with Washington may deepen relations with Beijing without becoming a Chinese ally. A state dependent on China economically may strengthen security ties with the US without fully aligning with Washington. Membership in BRICS does not prevent cooperation with Western institutions, just as membership in a US-led security framework does not necessarily preclude engagement with China or Russia.

India has made this logic almost an organising principle of its foreign policy. New Delhi participates in the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia while simultaneously belonging to both BRICS and the SCO. At Bishkek, India supported the SCO declaration defending Iranian sovereignty while Prime Minister Narendra Modi also stressed to Pezeshkian the importance of preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Gulf Cooperation Council member states are pursuing their own version of this diversification. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, for example, continue to depend heavily on their relationships with the US for security, while simultaneously expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, India and other Asian powers and participating in new regional and international arrangements.

None appears eager to replace Washington with Beijing. They want relationships with both. This suggests that the most significant consequence of multipolarity for middle and smaller powers may not be the emergence of a new bloc to which they can attach themselves. It may be the declining necessity of attaching themselves exclusively to any bloc at all.

But greater autonomy comes with a cost. The same flexible arrangements that allow states to avoid choosing sides also provide fewer guarantees when crises become existential. BRICS does not have an Article 5. Neither does the SCO, which explicitly defines itself as a non-military organisation.

Strategic partnerships can provide weapons, investment, diplomatic backing and political support without obligating partners to go to war for one another.

The emerging international system is therefore unlikely to resemble a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, or even a confrontation between two clearly defined blocs. The older alliance system is not disappearing.

NATO remains central to European and Turkish security, while US security relationships remain indispensable across much of Asia and the Gulf. What is emerging alongside it is another layer, a more fluid landscape of overlapping institutions, selective partnerships and transactional relationships.

Multipolarity, in other words, may not require states to choose a new camp. That gives middle and smaller powers greater agency. But it also places greater responsibility for their own security upon them. The world they are entering may offer more partners, more bargaining power and more freedom to say no. What it may offer less frequently is certainty about who will say yes when they ask for protection.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Fights between players and coaching staff broke out after the Turkish side won the Champions League playoff second leg.

Fenerbahce duo Mason Greenwood and Matteo Guendouzi have been suspended and fined for their part in the chaotic scenes after their club’s Champions League playoff second leg against Lyon.

Last month’s 2-1 victory for Fenerbahce in France meant the Turkish side progressed 3-2 on aggregate, and, after the final whistle, Greenwood and Guendouzi, who both previously played for Lyon’s bitter rivals Marseille, were involved in a brawl with players and coaching staff from both sides.

Former Arsenal midfielder Guendouzi has been suspended “for a total of four UEFA club competition matches for which he would otherwise be eligible, for insulting others present at the match, provoking spectators and for violating the basic rules of decent conduct”, UEFA announced in a decision made public on Friday evening.

Two of the matches are subject to a “one-year probationary period”, European football’s governing body added in the statement.

Guendouzi, who was also fined 50,000 euros ($58,000), was found guilty, among other things, of giving the middle finger to Lyon supporters and of provocations that led to a scuffle after the match.

His English teammate Mason Greenwood, formerly of Manchester United, received a one-match suspended ban and was fined 30,000 euros ($35,000) for “violating the basic rules of decent conduct”.

US sanctions Turkish bank over alleged IRGC ties, accusing it of facilitating millions in transactions for Iran.

The United States Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on a Turkish bank and its subsidiaries over alleged ties to Iran, as Washington seeks to economically isolate Tehran.

The Treasury Department accused Golden Global Yatirim Bankasi Anonim Sirketi (Golden Global Bank) on Friday of facilitating “tens of millions of dollars’ worth of transactions for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force” and providing the Iranian government with banking access to move its funds internationally.

Washington alleged the bank “was established for the purpose of enabling Iran’s rahbar network [shadow banking system] to transfer oil revenues from China to Turkey” using gold and cash.

Golden Global Bank responded on Friday, saying it fulfilled all local and international banking compliance rules and would take legal action against the US-imposed sanctions.

There are no transactions conducted by Golden Global Bank that could substantiate the claims made by the US, the bank said in a news release.

“We will exercise all our rights of objection and legal recourse in the most effective manner and will take the necessary actions at the earliest against these allegations and the decision,” the Turkish bank added.

“Financial institutions continue to find out the hard way that we are serious about Operation Economic Outcast,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in a statement published by the department on Friday.

The sanctions place the bank and its two subsidiaries on the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)’s Specially Designated Nationals list, cutting off access to the US financial system.

The bank said individuals and entities named in the OFAC decision “have never been and are not currently customers” of Golden Global.

US Ambassador to Turkiye Tom Barrack said on Saturday that it would be a mistake for Turkish officials “to read [the US’s] narrow measure as a judgement upon Turkiye”.

“The health of the Turkish financial system is not in question; the conduct of one institution was,” Barrack said on X.

Last week, the US took steps towards severing the UAE operations of Egypt’s second-largest bank from financial access after accusing it of processing transactions for companies linked to Iran’s shadow-banking system.

Bessent said on Tuesday on the sidelines of a G20 summit that Washington would likely announce a bank sanction this week and another next week, as it ramps up its economic campaign against Tehran.

Search and rescue operations under way as authorities lose contact with 10 crew members after a vessel collision near Istanbul.

Turkiye’s coastguard has launched a search and rescue operation after two Turkish-flagged commercial vessels collided off Istanbul and contact was lost with one vessel and its crew of 10.

The collision took place at 3am (00:00 GMT) in the Marmara Sea a little more than 20 miles (32 kilometres) south of Silivri, a suburb of Turkey’s largest city, the Istanbul governor’s office said in a statement on Wednesday.

Contact was lost with the crew of the Tugberk Imamoglu, flagged to Turkey, after the collision with the Turkish-flagged Alsu, which appeared undamaged, the governor’s office said.

“Numerous naval units from the coast guard’s Marmara and Bosphorus Command and a coast guard helicopter were dispatched to the scene,” the office said.

Foreign, defence ministers and military chiefs from three countries to meet for first time since signing Mecca pact.

Top officials from Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan will gather in Istanbul on Monday for their first meeting since signing the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement earlier this month.

Turkish officials said on Sunday that the meeting will be attended by foreign ministers, defence ministers, and chiefs of staff from the three nations.

According to AFP, the Istanbul meeting will formally establish a “political and defence strategic committee” comprised of such national representatives.

Turkish Foreign Ministry sources, quoted by Reuters news agency, said the agenda will cover international security issues, as well as discussions on improving military cooperation and capabilities.

The Mecca agreement forms a collective security pact similar to NATO, under which an attack on one member could be considered an attack on all. The alliance was established following the United States-Israel war on Iran.

Turkiye possesses the second-largest military in NATO, Pakistan is the only nuclear-armed Muslim country, and Saudi Arabia is the world’s leading oil exporter.

In an August interview with Al Jazeera, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Egypt could potentially join the pact.

Bangladesh has also stated it is actively considering joining the agreement. The potential expansion is being closely monitored by India, whose Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal, told reporters that New Delhi would take all necessary steps to safeguard its national security.

Somali authorities say 14 pirates were killed in the 10-day operation to free a Cameroon-flagged cargo vessel.

Turkish and Somali forces have freed a cargo ship held captive by pirates off the coast of Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland state, according to authorities.

In a statement on X on Saturday, the Somali Ministry of Defence said that “14 pirates” died in the operation to free the Cameroon-flagged MV Latuf.

Four of their boats were also destroyed, it said.

The Defence Ministry said that “sustained pressure from the forces ultimately compelled the remaining pirates to abandon the vessel”, allowing the forces to take control of the ship.

The rescue operation was conducted under a defence cooperation agreement between Somalia and Turkiye, aimed at strengthening maritime security, protecting Somalia’s coastline and combating piracy, it said.

The Somali Defence Ministry did not provide details about any casualties or the wellbeing of the ship’s crew.

A local elder, Abdullahi Warsame, from the Jiifle community in the Godob Jiraan district of Puntland’s Nugal region, told The Associated Press news agency that the vessel and its crew had been freed.

The MV Latuf left the Turkish Port of Tekirdag in late July. It was hijacked on August 17 in waters off the coast of the Nugal region of Puntland, a semi-autonomous federal state in northeastern Somalia.

According to the Marine Traffic website, the cargo ship has continued its voyage to its reported destination in Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania.

Piracy was rampant off the coast of Somalia in the 2000s, peaking in 2011, before being curbed by international naval deployments and new protection measures for commercial shipping.

But attacks have surged since April, with at least 15 attacks off the coast of Somalia this year, the highest since 2013, according to figures from the International Maritime Organization. At least five cargo ships have been held hostage, the last of which was seized on August 20 off the coast of Yemen.

BEIRUT — Iran’s economy, already strained by high inflation, years of Western sanctions and a war that has sharply reduced oil revenue, is poised for more instability as the Trump administration tries to coerce other countries into ending all financial dealings with the Islamic Republic.

A decision by the United Arab Emirates to suspend trade relations with Iran last week kick-started the White House’s latest attempt to isolate Tehran into submission. Iran entered the war with its foreign commerce concentrated among a relatively small group of countries, leaving it with fewer places to turn now.

The success of the U.S. strategy largely will hinge on China, the main buyer of Iranian oil and its top trading partner. Russia, a fellow target of sweeping U.S.-led sanctions, has a military conflict and economic crisis of its own and probably can’t offer longtime ally Iran much hard financial support.

Regional partners like Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq maintain important relationships with both Iran and the U.S., giving them reason to avoid exposure to the secondary sanctions that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said awaited nations that did not cut economic ties with Iran.

“Those who stand with the United States will reap the rewards of our partnership,” Bessent said Monday while outlining the plan he called “Operation Economic Outcast.” “Those who tether themselves to the Iranian regime should expect to share in the isolation.”

The Emirates will be hard for Iran to replace as a conduit for foreign goods and payments

Despite Western sanctions, Iran in 2024 exchanged $125 billion worth of goods globally, according to Trade Data Monitor, a private firm. Iran is not a member of the World Trade Organization.

The bulk of its declared international trade, though, was with a handful of partners. The UAE, China and Turkey supplied nearly three-quarters of Iran’s merchandise imports. Four countries — China, Iraq, the UAE and Turkey — accounted for more than two-thirds of its non-oil exports.

On the supply side, the UAE held outsized importance. It was Iran’s biggest source of imported items and a gateway to financial channels that helped Iranian businesses make and receive international payments. Both roles kept Iran connected to the global economy.

As a reexport hub, the UAE processed shipments from foreign suppliers reluctant to deal directly with Iranian customers.

“From Iran’s perspective, the UAE can be replaced, but the Iranians are openly saying it’s not going to happen overnight,” said Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington.

China has deep economic ties to Iran but depends less on the relationship

Beijing has economic interests in the Persian Gulf beyond Iran, and so far has avoided getting drawn into the conflict the U.S. and Israel initiated. China buys the overwhelming majority of Iran’s crude through opaque trading networks that bypass sanctions.

Its manufacturing clout and stranglehold on critical mineral supplies nonetheless give Beijing more room than Iran’s other partners to resist U.S. pressure, said David Lubin, a senior research fellow at Chatham House. Aggressive action against major Chinese banks and businesses could revive trade tensions as Chinese leader Xi Jinping prepares to meet with President Trump in Washington next month.

“I don’t see China playing ball by any means,” Lubin said.

China is both Iran’s largest reported export market and a supplier of essential parts and products, according to WTO and United Nations data.

During the Obama administration, Beijing did agree to reduce energy imports from Iran, said Atlantic Council fellow Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland.

“We will want the Chinese to go a lot farther than they have gone in the past,” Fried said. “But it’s a lot harder now.”

China has experience helping an ally survive sanctions: It has long been North Korea’s economic lifeline and main diplomatic backer. Experts say China has avoided fully enforcing U.N. sanctions on North Korea and sent clandestine aid to help its impoverished neighbor stay afloat.

Expanding bilateral trade would create problems for Iran’s neighbors

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, who has been his country’s lead negotiator over the last six months, was in Iraq the day of the UAE’s trade suspension. A purpose of his visit, he said, was “speeding up efforts to expand joint cooperation among all countries in the region, without foreign interference.”

The U.S. dollar’s preeminence in international trade and finance, however, means none of Iran’s trading partners would antagonize Washington lightly, Vatanka said. “We’re still at a point where if the U.S. wants to hurt you, it will matter,” he said.

Underscoring potential consequences, Turkey settled a years-long U.S. dispute in July over the role of a state-owned bank in helping Iran evade sanctions through an oil-for-gold scheme. Trump also moved to lift sanctions on its fellow NATO member stemming from Turkey’s purchase of a sophisticated Russian missile system.

“I really don’t think Turkey would like to become the next country helping Iran to evade sanctions right now,” said Riccardo Gasco, an analyst at the IstanPol think tank in Istanbul.

Iran is a vital import source for Iraq and retains influence there through allied political factions and armed groups. Baghdad has sought closer economic and security ties with Washington. Since it invaded Iraq in 2003, the U.S. has significant control over the nation’s foreign currency reserves because they are housed in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York.

Oman, a frequent intermediary between Washington and Tehran, has found its balancing act suddenly precarious. Trump threatened Oman last week over its ongoing negotiations with Iran on the future management of the Strait of Hormuz.

One easy route for goods slipping past sanctions on Iran would be ports like Gwadar near the Persian Gulf in Pakistan, said Peter Harrell, a visiting scholar at Georgetown University.

“Ship an intermodal container of drone parts to one of the ports in western Pakistan and unload it onto a truck and have it driven across the border into Iran,” he said.

While Pakistan, a key ally and economic partner of China in the region, wants to increase trade with Iran, it faces competing pressures. It is serving as a key mediator between Tehran and Washington and has deep security ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s longtime regional rival.

Caspian Sea trade route alternatives unlikely to grow quickly

With the Strait of Hormuz mostly blocked and Russia’s war with Ukraine endangering ships on the Black Sea, Iran has sought to develop a “road of life” on the Caspian Sea, said Nikita Smagin, an independent analyst and a former Russian state news agency correspondent in Tehran.

Russia reportedly sent drones to Iran this year, repaying Tehran’s favor after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It also rerouted exports to Iran via Caspian Sea ports like Astrakhan. Agricultural products make up 80% of Russia and Iran’s reported trade.

“Both economies are exporting natural resources and have little to offer each other,” Smagin said.

The other countries that border the Caspian — Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan — probably won’t rush to join in, said Umud Shokri, a fellow at George Mason University.

Yet Russia and Iran are already in an “axis of the sanctioned,” said Mark Galeotti, executive director of the Mayak Intelligence firm. For decades the pair have collaborated to thwart trade restrictions, and increasing bilateral trade in both “strategic goods” and contraband like military technology, microchips and Gucci handbags could be a next step.

“Pomegranates and tomatoes only go so far,” he said.

Chehayeb and McNeil write for the Associated Press. McNeil reported from Brussels. AP writers Amir Vahdat in Tehran and Dasha Litvinova in Tallinn, Estonia, contributed to this report.

On Tuesday, Israeli fighter jets attacked Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria, drawing condemnations from the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, as well as regional countries. The Israeli government claimed that it had intelligence of Turkish military movement to the site.

In a subsequent interview, US Ambassador to Turkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack said the US had received this intelligence from the Israelis six days before the attack. However, US intelligence conducted its own due diligence and found no basis for the claim.

The incident not only reflects a shift in the dynamics between Turkiye and Israel, but also signals a regional reordering that the latter is no longer at the centre of.

The Turkish response

Seeing the Israeli attack on the Syrian base as a provocation, Ankara refrained from escalating and instead provided an off-ramp out of the crisis. It framed the issue not in bilateral terms but as one between Israel and the US, and between Israel and the regional and international consensus.

Normally, there is a deconfliction mechanism between Turkiye and Israel. However, as Barrack indicated in the interview, Israel did not warn Turkiye about the attack, which could have triggered a military response.

The US envoy called for a deconfliction mechanism, but such an initiative can be effective only if the sides involved want it to be. In this case, there is no evidence that Israel sought de-escalation. In fact, it appears escalation was the intended outcome, as Israel notified neither Turkiye nor the US about the attack and acted on a pretext that the US intelligence found no basis for – a ploy to boost Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s electoral campaign.

After the US-imposed lull on the Iran front, Netanyahu is likely seeking escalation on other fronts, be it Syria, Lebanon or Gaza, in the run-up to the Israeli election. The challenge for Turkiye would be to avoid taking Netanyahu’s bait while also preventing the normalisation of such aggression.

That would require direct intervention by US President Donald Trump to rein in Netanyahu. Indeed, a trilateral deconfliction mechanism can work and be credible only if the US throws real weight behind it.

But even if a mechanism is in place, it would not change the fact that Syria has altered the lens through which Turkiye and Israel view each other. For a long time, the core of Turkiye’s discontent with Israel was the Palestinian issue. Hence, it was more humanitarian-, identity- and solidarity-based in nature.

Today, Ankara views Israeli attempts to undermine the Syrian transition as having direct repercussions for its national security. Therefore, Turkiye is no longer seeing Israel solely through the prism of the Palestinian question. Rather, it increasingly sees it as a national security challenge, with Israeli regional revisionism threatening its interests.

The international consensus on Syria

From the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa and the wider Middle East, Turkiye and Israel have conflicting policies, priorities and threat perceptions. Despite this, Syria serves as a microcosm of Turkiye and Israel’s visions of the regional order.

Ankara wants its southern neighbour to be centralised, stable and capable militarily. In contrast, Israel wants a Syria that is weak, fragmented and bereft of serious military might.

Yet this is not merely a conflict between Turkish and Israeli visions. Israel is at odds with the regional and international consensus on Syria. The US, the UK, Europe and regional states have all supported a centralised and stable government in Damascus. In an ironic way, the only other regional state that probably wants a weak or failed Syria is Iran.

Like any other sovereign state, Syria will have an army. If Israel believes that the only way to ensure its own security is by keeping its neighbouring or regional states weak, fragmented and bereft of military capability, this is a recipe for perpetual wars and for regional and international isolation.

The undermining of the Syrian state and the failure of its transition would pave the way for non-state actors and radicalism, which would bode ill for the entire region, including Israel. Indeed, neighbouring Lebanon should serve as a cautionary tale. The Israeli occupation and the weakness of the Lebanese state gave birth to and empowered Hezbollah.

Post-Abrahamic Middle East

Israel and Turkiye’s ideas of regional order are also at odds. The recent Mecca Pact, which brought together Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, is not inherently anti-Israel. However, it represents a regional shift that signals the failure of the order envisioned by the Abraham Accords, or similar initiatives such as India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) or the strategic partnership between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the US known as I2U2.

The Abrahamic vision of the regional order was premised on Arab-Israeli normalisation and cooperation under the US security umbrella. Hard containment of Iran, soft containment of Turkiye, and de-emphasising the Palestinian issue were also part of the same vision.

Inherently, this Abrahamic vision had more to do with Israel and its regional normalisation than the Arab states and their needs and priorities.

However, with its aggressive and revisionist policies, Israel has deepened the prospect of its regional isolation, increased the cost of any normalisation, and doomed this Abrahamic – or Israeli-centric – vision of regional order.

Israeli revisionism is not only driving a wedge between Israel and other major regional states, but it is also revealing the gap between Israel and the US on the question of regional reordering.

While Israel opposes the Mecca Pact, Trump has hailed it, likely seeing it as aligned with his strategy of burden-sharing and burden-shifting with regional allies, and as enjoying more regional legitimacy and acceptance. The US position might also reflect a recalibration of Washington’s regional vision.

Over the last decade, the US invested heavily in creating a regional order premised on Israel and the Arab-Gulf states. But this was essentially an Israeli-centric project for the regional order.

This vision is no longer tenable, and no one is more responsible for its demise than Israel itself.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Fifteen years since the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya began, and with civil strife leading to the downfall of what was once one of Africa’s wealthiest countries, several actors are seeking to end the civil war and reunite the country.

Among them are the US, which has commercial interests in Libya’s oil fields. Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye are also pushing for a return to “One Libya”, after more than a decade of fighting between two rival authorities for control of the country.

Here’s what we know:

What happened 15 years ago?

The Libyan uprising erupted during the Arab Spring, when thousands of people in the port city of Benghazi took to the streets to protest against Gaddafi’s more than four decades of absolute power.

Violence against the demonstrations pushed the protesters into an armed rebellion against Gaddafi’s rule, with a civil war starting between the two sides.

A United Nations Security Council resolution authorised an international military intervention force – led by NATO members, the United States, United Kingdom and France – to enforce a no-fly zone and ensure the protection of civilians in Libya. This bombing campaign pushed back Gaddafi’s forces from Benghazi and aided the rebels in seizing territory.

Gaddafi was eventually captured and killed in October 2011, 42 years after he first seized power in a military coup that overthrew King Idris.

How is Libya divided?

Following Gaddafi’s death, a power vacuum emerged, with multiple groups – and their allied militias – competing for power.

Control of the country is now split between two rival administrations: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dheibah, and the eastern, Tobruk-based administration backed by Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA).

The GNU is recognised by the UN and other countries, and officially has authority in the capital and western Libya.

Under Gaddafi, Haftar was exiled in the US for two decades where he holds citizenship.

His forces control vast resource-rich lands in the east, including the strategic port city of Benghazi, reportedly with the backing of Russia.

The UN began formal mediation efforts in 2020 under the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This roadmap advocates for a three-track strategy that includes unifying the two rival administrations, presidential and parliamentary elections, and hosting national dialogue meetings.

The US was a key mediator behind the scenes, and in May 2021, appointed Ambassador Richard Norlan as Special Envoy to Libya, to lead high-level talks between the two sides.

What is the US’s new plan?

Under Massad Boulous, US President Donald Trump’s African and Middle Eastern affairs adviser, and father-in-law to Tiffany Trump, Washington is intensifying efforts to reunite the country. But this can only be achieved if both sides agree to form a single government.

According to leaked details, Trump’s initiative centres on the promise that if the rival governments cooperate, the US would encourage American investment in Libya’s sizable oil fields. This comes as the Libyan Central Bank, which is attempting to finance both authorities, sounds the alarm over the dire economic situation.

While Tripoli has international legitimacy, Haftar’s forces control the oilfields and terminals.

The US is also proposing a power-sharing deal that would see Dheibah continue to lead the government while Haftar’s son and LNA army chief, 35-year-old Saddam Haftar, serves as president.

There are obvious opportunities for US energy companies and economic and political incentives for European countries in a unified and stable Libya.

They include stopping irregular migration from Libya and other North African countries to the EU.

Some criticise the US-led plan as lacking input from the Libyan people. The deal, some say, could entrench the power of political dynasties, which might be best for long-term stability in Libya.

What have the results been?

There are signs that Haftar’s camp, at least, is on board with the US plan. Saddam Haftar, whose father, Khalifa, was based in Virginia until 2011, reportedly met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in DC in July.

Experts attribute the ongoing mediation efforts to the unified national budget of 2026, signed in April – the first in more than a decade.

However, there are still no talks or signs of a unified government forming.

What is Turkiye’s role?

Turkiye, which earlier deployed troops to support the GNU, has also made efforts to mediate between the two sides and is pushing a ‘One Libya’ policy.

Last month, Foreign Affairs Minister, Hakan Fidan, met with Saddam Haftar in Ankara. Earlier this month, Fidan travelled to both Tripoli and Benghazi for high-level talks with Dheibah and Khalifa Haftar.

What has Egypt done?

The Egyptian government has traditionally cooperated with Haftar’s Tobruk government, which is just across the border.

On Wednesday, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with Khalifa Haftar in Cairo and discussed unification talks.

Earlier this month, Dheibah visited Cairo, while Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad travelled to Tripoli.

What is Qatar’s stance?

Qatar has largely backed the UN mediation channels in Libya: the UNSMIL and the UN roadmap for peace.

While it has good relations with the GNU, Qatar seeks stabilisation efforts led by Libyan parties and elections.

In April, Qatar and other states welcomed the unified budget for 2026. A statement issued by Qatar, Egypt, France, Germany and several others called for all parties in Libya to follow the UN roadmap to “advance a Libyan-led political process leading to unified governance and national elections.”

The foreign minister says in an interview that Turkish military officials had visited the airbase as part of training.

Syria has no plans to establish a Turkish military presence at the Abu al-Duhur airbase attacked by Israel earlier this week, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani has said.

Al-Shaibani said in an interview with the US news outlet Axios on Wednesday that while Turkish military officials had visited the site as part of training and broader military cooperation, he denied any Turkish military build-up, explaining that the facility was largely empty.

“There was no intention to establish a Turkish base there, nor to establish a permanent Turkish military presence or deploy Turkish forces at the site,” al-Shaibani said, adding that he had made this clear to Israel.

On Tuesday, Israel carried out eight air strikes on the runway and storage facilities at the Abu al-Duhur base near Aleppo, state media reported, in what appeared to be Israel’s first attack on Syrian government assets since March.

No casualties were reported from the attack, which drew international condemnation.

Al-Shaibani said Israel had no legitimate justification for attacking the facility.

He said that while Syria remained open to negotiations with Israel on de-escalation, any future deal must address the security concerns of both countries, reiterating that Israeli military operations would increase regional instability.

The strikes came amid worsening security tensions between Israel and Turkiye over Syria, where both countries’ militaries are active.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel warned Syria ahead of the strike not to allow a Turkish presence at the base.

“Our message was very clear. Don’t. I guess they didn’t quite understand the message,” Netanyahu said on Wednesday.

On Thursday morning, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz claimed that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was “dragging Turkiye into dangerous adventures in Syria”.

“Israel will not allow any entity to threaten its security,” he said.

“It is preferable for Erdogan to continue delivering empty, delusional speeches against Israel in the Turkish parliament rather than testing Israel’s resolve to defend itself,” Katz added.

Turkiye has rejected what it called “untenable allegations” by Israel over its military position in Syria.

The Turkish defence ministry said on Thursday that Ankara would continue supporting Syria’s efforts to develop its own military capacity and infrastructure.

It said there was no military delegation at the air base hit by Israel before or during the attacks, calling for the international community to take more concrete and effective measures against Israel’s actions, which it said threatened regional peace and stability.

Turkiye, a NATO member, has emerged as one of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s main allies and has accused Israel of trying to destabilise Syria and undermine its new administration.

It has also repeatedly called for international pressure and measures on Israel to respect Syria’s territorial integrity.

Last year, Turkiye and Israel established a line of communication to avoid any incidents in Syria.