trade policy

Accession talks accelerate in Brussels as Ukraine, Moldova, Albania, and Montenegro push for faster integration into the EU.

This article appears in the September 2026 issue of Global Finance Magazine.

On July 14, the European Union took its most consequential step toward enlargement in two decades by holding four separate accession conferences in a single day and advancing membership talks with Ukraine, Moldova, Albania, and Montenegro. 

European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos (pictured) called it “Super Tuesday.” The EU’s last great expansion, when 10 mostly Central European states joined in 2004, redrew the continent. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, and Croatia in 2013. After that, the bloc shrank when the U.K. left the EU.

A New Geopolitical Calculus

Traditionally, the EU treated enlargement as a distant reward for would-be members rather than as an active geopolitical strategy. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s expanding influence, and uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to Europe and NATO have shifted Brussels’ calculus. Rather than an economic transaction in which new participants open their markets in exchange for development funds, membership is now framed as a mutually beneficial bargain over border defense, energy security, and global leverage.

Still, candidates must meet strict reform benchmarks, and none of the new crop are likely to join before 2028. Negotiations cover 35 policy areas, or chapters, grouped into six clusters ranging from fundamentals and rule of law to the green agenda, and all 27 existing members must approve the opening and closing of each chapter: a veto power that has long paralyzed the process.

European Council President António Costa has urged lifting unanimity requirements for early accession stages, but this would require unanimous agreement, the very hurdle it is meant to remove. A proposal floated by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz would partially sidestep this barrier by giving candidates gradual, milestone-based access to the EU single market — covering goods, services, energy and regulatory standards — years before full membership.

Convergence Before Integration

Regardless, economic convergence is already outpacing political integration. Over the past two decades, the Central and Eastern European economies have grown at more than twice the rate of the EU-15, the wealthier Western and Northern European nations that were members before the big Eastern enlargement in 2004. 

Some of those newcomers, according to Eurostat data, have since become the bloc’s growth engine. In 2025, the Czech Republic expanded by 2.6%, Latvia by 2.1%, and Lithuania by 2.9%. Poland, the frontrunner, grew by 3.6% and now ranks sixth in the EU by nominal gross domestic product, accounting for 4.9% of its total output, ahead of countries like Sweden, Ireland, and Austria. 

It is not just EU officials betting that a second eastward enlargement will strengthen the bloc. Investors have taken notice, too. According to a report by accounting firm Forvis Mazars, mergers and acquisitions in the region hit a record €42.5 billion in 2025, up 36% year-on-year. 

Risks loom, however. 

Demographic decline, labor shortages, and exposure to geopolitical shocks could undercut the push toward enlargement. Enlargement also carries political costs, including further impeding an already sluggish decision-making process and straining a common budget under pressure from rising defense spending. Ultimately, expansion has come to seem a matter not of if but when. The eastern frontier region is no longer just the EU’s lower-cost manufacturing base, but where the bloc’s defense, industrial policy, and future growth will be decided.

Luca Ventura is a contributing writer based in Italy.

Responding to Trump’s tariff barrage, Canada pivots from continental nostalgia to global dealmaking.

This article appears in the September 2026 issue of Global Finance Magazine.

Following President Donald Trump’s reelection in 2024, something extraordinary occurred, not seen since the War of 1812. The president not only took aim at Canada as a potential annexation target, but also breached his own USMCA trade deal by imposing punitive tariffs on the country to the north (among many others). 

This prompted Canadians to turn away from their traditional focus on continental trade and pursue deals with other, friendlier markets (and, in protest, take liquor from the U.S. off their shelves). 

The Liberal Party’s electoral victory soon after, and Mark Carney’s ascension as prime minister, expedited the process. Responding to the newly hostile environment, the new PM pledged to double Canada’s exports by 2035, diversify foreign trade, and reduce reliance on what was, and still is, Canada’s largest trading partner. 

“The old relationship we had with the United States, based on deepening integration of our economies and tight security and military cooperation is over,” he said. On another occasion, he was even more pointed: “Our relationship with the United States will never be the same as it was, even though, in the new protectionist world, we have the best trade deal of any country.”

That was then. Of course, now a war of words has become a full-blown trade war. With Canada backing away from what it considered a bad deal, the U.S. added tariffs to autos, auto parts, and aluminum, beginning January 2027, as a punishment for breaking off recent talks. Canada retaliated with tariffs of its own ranging from 15% to up to 50% on many American goods. As Carney stated at a news conference, “You’re at war when you are attacked. And we were attacked.”

A Strategic Reorientation

But a trade reorientation for Canada made sense on its own, some experts say. About four-fifths of the world’s economic activity occurs outside the U.S., much of it in Asia, according to the Fraser Institute, a nonpartisan Canadian think tank. “These facts suggest Canadian policymakers are right to emphasize the importance of expanding trade with non-U.S. markets,” it concluded.

Carney, accordingly, has been crisscrossing the globe, cutting deals with countries including India, China — where it reduced tariffs on electric vehicles, against U.S. wishes — and the United Arab Emirates, and has engaged with ASEAN members on a possible free trade agreement. All this is occurring, incidentally, as he continues to pursue tariff reduction with the U.S. and salvage as much of the free trade Canada has enjoyed with its neighbor to the south as possible.

This past summer, Maninder Sidhu, Minister of International Trade of Canada, established a new Strategic Exports Office and a Strategic Exports Advisory Council. The aim is to bring together diplomatic, commercial, and financial experts to help break down global trade barriers and open doors for Canadian businesses. 

The new bodies “mark a decisive step toward doubling our exports to non-U.S. markets,” he said, “and they give Canadian businesses the whole-of-government support they need to compete and win around the world.” Goods exports to non-U.S. markets are up about 17% from 2024 to 2025, an increase of C$33 billion (US$24 billion), Sidhu’s office said. To some observers, the pivot is not only something to navigate but also an opportunity for the world’s 11th-largest economy, according to the International Monetary Fund.

In the long term, Canada’s economy could expand its manufacturing base and raise its standard of living.

Joel Kranc is a contributing writer based in Canada.