Today

The U.S. Air Force has confirmed it is buying two Boeing 747-8 airliners from German flag carrier Lufthansa. The jets will be used for training and as sources of spare parts as part of a larger effort to try to accelerate the entry into service of two new VC-25B Air Force One aircraft. This follows the service’s recent announcement that it now hopes to have the first VC-25B in hand by mid-2028, a slight improvement in the still much-delayed delivery timeline for the aircraft.

“As part of the presidential airlift acceleration efforts, the Air Force is procuring two aircraft to support training and spares for the 747-8 fleet,” Ann Stefanek, an Air Force spokesperson, told TWZ in a statement. “Given [that] the 747-8i is no longer in active production, and is a very different aircraft than the 747-200, it is important for the Air Force to establish an overall training and sustainment strategy for the future Air Force 747-8i fleet.”

The Air Force’s two existing VC-25A Air Force One jets are based on the 747-200, a type that has become increasingly difficult to operate and maintain in recent years. The last 200-series model rolled off Boeing’s production line in 1991. This version is also the basis for the service’s four E-4B Nightwatch ‘doomsday plane’ flying command posts, which are in the process of being separately replaced with E-4C Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC) jets converted from newer 747-8s.

Furthermore, Boeing shuttered the 747 line entirely in 2022. Lufthansa, Korean Air, and Air China are the only airlines that still use 747s of any kind for scheduled passenger flights. A number of other commercial operators continue to fly freighter versions, and a number of specially configured 747s also remain in VIP fleets globally.

“The Air Force is procuring the two aircraft for a total of $400M. We expect the first aircraft to arrive early next year. The second is expected to be delivered before the end of the year,” Stefanek, the Air Force spokesperson, added, though the reasons for the reverse order in delivery of the jets are not clear. She further clarified that one of the aircraft will fly and be used for training purposes, at least initially. The other aircraft will be utilized as a source of spare parts from the start. Air Force One pilot and flight engineer training has previously been contracted out.

Unconfirmed reports that Lufthansa was selling two 747-8s to the Air Force first emerged last week. The aircraft in question reportedly have the registrations D-ABYD and D-ABYG, which have been flying for the German airline since August 2021 and March 2013, respectively. There had been no prior indications that Lufthansa was looking to divest any part of its 747 fleet, and it is unclear how long this deal has been in the works.

“To be clear,  Boeing continues to modify two 747-8i aircraft for the VC-25B program, the first of which is expected to deliver in mid-2028,” Stefanek stressed. “The two aircraft mentioned above are additional aircraft to be used for training and spares.”

As mentioned, the VC-25B program has repeatedly faced delays due to technical and other issues. Earlier this year, the White House confirmed the first of these aircraft was not expected to arrive until sometime in 2029 at the earliest, representing a new schedule slip. The Air Force had originally hoped to take delivery of the first jet in December 2024.

Pushing the timeline to the left to 2028 would notably give President Donald Trump a better chance of flying in one of the VC-25Bs before the end of his second term. Trump has been particularly outspoken and active in regards to the program since before his first term. In December 2016, as president-elect, he had publicly called for the purchase of the two new Air Force One jets to be cancelled. Trump subsequently became a supporter of the program after claiming to have single-handedly been responsible for slashing the cost of the aircraft, though this remains debatable.

He has, however, continued to be critical of the progress, or lack thereof, on the new VC-25Bs. This is said to have contributed to the acquisition of a highly-modified ex-Qatari VVIP 747-8i aircraft earlier this year, ostensibly as a gift from that country to the United States. The process of converting that jet into an ‘interim’ Air Force One, reportedly helmed by L3Harris, began in September. The Air Force has said previously that it expects the conversion to cost less than $400 million. TWZ has previously questioned the feasibility of this plan in detail, given the strenuous operational and other requirements the jet will have to meet to truly serve in the Air Force One role.

With the ex-Qatari jet and the two 747s from Lufthansa, the plans around the future VC-25B fleet have ballooned from two aircraft to five, four of which will be flyable. This also reflects a broader trend under the Trump administration to expand U.S. government executive aircraft operations.

Separate from the VC-25B program, the Air Force’s acquisition of the two 747-8s from Lufthansa highlights broader potential challenges for operating any aircraft based on this design, also including the E-4Cs, as time goes on. It is worth noting here that with no new 747s in production, at least the initial tranche of E-4Cs are being converted from ex-Korean Air jets. Many more 747-200-series jets were made than -8 versions, as well.

Ensuring there is a sufficient logistical base to support the VC-25B and E-4C fleets will be critical going forward, and the secondary market looks set to continue playing an important role.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

As Afghanistan reevaluates its economic geography in light of the deteriorating relations with Pakistan, India has become a major option for Kabul in its quest for diverse trade routes. The recent top-level meetings between the Taliban and the Indian government indicate a desire on the part of the former to diminish their reliance on the Pakistani transit corridors and to gain more strategic independence. However, India’s role is more a matter of political calculation than of geographical convenience. Afghanistan has no direct land route to India, and therefore its trade with India is expensive routes via Iran with limited air corridors, making it very difficult for a sanctions-hit and cash-strapped economy to scale up. Although the engagement with New Delhi gives the Afghan government the chance to send diplomatic signals and obtain very limited economic relief, it also poses the question of whether India is going to be a long-term trading partner or merely a geopolitical counterweight in Kabul’s broader regional strategy.

Taliban officials have begun signalling a recalibration of economic policy. Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar publicly urged Afghan traders to explore alternative transit corridors, accusing Pakistan of using border closures as a tool of political pressure. Shortly thereafter, Nooruddin Azizi, Minister of Industry and Commerce of Afghanistan, had an official visit to New Delhi on 19 November 2025 for official discussions aimed at increasing bilateral trade, enhancing the mechanisms for import and export and finding out different ways for Afghan businesses to trade. This visit comes after the Afghanistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Amir Khan Muttaqi’s trip to India in October that lasted for eight days, which was his first trip to India, for which he was granted a temporary UN sanctions exemption, even though India has not yet recognized the Taliban government.

Over the past two decades, the Taliban’s propaganda has been persistently depicting India as a Hindu “kafir” state that is supporting the “anti-Islam” forces in Kabul, making Indian diplomats look like enemies and Indian consulates like secret intelligence stations working against Afghanistan and Pakistan. The destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas was declared as a holy war against the “un-Islamic idols” and the whole Buddhist-Hindu civilization, which was a clear indication of the Emirate’s hardline ideological approach. However, this narrative has changed for political and economic reasons.

Moreover, the Taliban, having once described the Indian state as their ideological enemy, are now actively courting India, even sending their foreign minister and commerce minister to New Delhi to get access to trade routes and investment in infrastructure. However, the newly established open channels of communication between the two parties are indicative of a major pragmatism shift, wherein the former rhetoric of enmity and ideological purity has been replaced by the language of using one another in business transactions, thus, signaling the willingness of Afghanistan to retrieve economic lifelines and gain a strategic position in a region.

Historically, Taliban’s official communications are filled with references to Islamic unity, historical connections, and the values of Muslim brotherhood in its relationship with Pakistan. However, when relations with Islamabad were strained over the Tehrik-i-Taliban support, as well as border management and refugees; the Emirate quickly turned to engagement with other regional states instead of reconciliation with its closest Muslim neighbor. This selective realism reveals a definite order of priorities; Afghanistan is ignoring Pakistan’s main security issues but is ready to do anything for a state that is Hindu-majority and can offer trade routes, investment, and international legitimacy.

This transactional approach is not only limited to regional politics but also encompasses the global economic system. The Taliban constantly criticized “Western economic slavery“, interest-based financial systems and considering themselves as an ideological alternative to the West. Nowadays, the Taliban are lobbying India who is heavily involved in the Western capital markets and global financial networks positively to get banking access, reconstruction projects, and investments. The ideological rigidity at home is sharply contrasted with the foreign policy flexibility; those states which were once labelled as anti-Islamic are now being courted for material and political gains.

The Taliban’s selective pragmatism is also evident in the territorial and security sensitive issues. On one hand, they keep on challenging the issue of the Durand Line with Pakistan, an internationally recognized border between both states, while on the other hand, they are quite liberal with India. Likewise, in the past, Taliban-associated clerics and militants celebrated jihad in Kashmir, denounced Indian government actions toward Muslims there and such discourse got muted during visits to Delhi. It is very clear that economic and diplomatic goals are prioritized over ideological or sectarian consistency.

Afghanistan’s trade pivot underscores the delicate balance between ambition and structural reality. While the Taliban’s efforts to diversify transit routes reflect a desire for economic autonomy and greater regional leverage, geographic constraints, limited infrastructure, and entrenched economic patterns impose severe limitations. Engagement with India offers symbolic and partial relief, yet Pakistan remains the linchpin of Afghan commerce, providing the fastest and most cost-effective access to global markets. The Emirate’s strategy is as much a political signal-demonstrating flexibility, pragmatism, and a quest for de facto recognition as it is an economic maneuver. Ultimately, Afghanistan’s “strategic heart of Asia” narrative will be tested not by intent but by its capacity to reconcile aspiration with the unyielding realities of terrain, logistics, and regional interdependence.

Protesters called on President Pellegrini, usually an ally of Prime Minister Fico, to veto the changes.

Thousands of people have rallied across Slovakia to protest against changes to the judicial system that opposition politicians and critics say are destroying the rule of law, Slovak media reported.

Protesters filled much of a central square in the capital of Bratislava, and there were protests in eight other cities on Tuesday.

The biggest opposition party, Progressive Slovakia, called the protest after Prime Minister Robert Fico‘s leftist-nationalist government pushed legislative changes through parliament last week that dismantle the whistleblower protection agency and change the way the state deals with crown witnesses.

“They took a chainsaw to the rule of law,” Michal Simecka, the leader of Progressive Slovakia, told the crowd in Bratislava, according to a live video that streamed online.

“Slovakia is the only country where the government approves laws to make life easier for criminals and mafia,” he also said.

People carried Slovak and European Union flags as well as placards with slogans, such as “Fico’s government is helping Mafia”, and chanted “Enough of Fico” and “Shame!”

Fico’s critics claim that, under his government, Slovakia is following Hungary’s lead under Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

Fico’s administration argues that the old whistleblower agency was politically abused. The administration has also weakened criminal codes for financial crimes, revamped the public broadcaster and pushed constitutional changes asserting national sovereignty over some EU laws, which has raised European Commission scrutiny.

Fico’s government has faced several large protests since coming to power in 2023. Tuesday’s rally was one of the biggest since last February, when tens of thousands demonstrated against what critics say is an increasingly pro-Russian foreign policy.