Today

Deadly protests followed the 92-year-old president’s re-election, which opponents have called ‘fraudulent’.

Cameroon’s longtime leader, Paul Biya, has been sworn in for a new seven-year term following his victory in last month’s presidential election, which his opposition rival has described as “a constitutional coup”.

Addressing Parliament on Thursday, the world’s oldest president promised to stay faithful to the confidence of the Cameroonian people and pledged to work for a “united, stable and prosperous” country.

There were deadly protests in several parts of Cameroon days after the October 19 vote, followed by a three-day lockdown this week after former minister and key contender Issa Tchiroma claimed victory and alleged vote tampering.

The government has confirmed that at least five people were killed during the protests, although the opposition and civil society groups claim the figures are much higher.

The incumbent, Africa’s second-longest serving leader, took the oath of office during a session of Parliament in what residents describe as the heavily militarised and partially deserted capital, Yaounde.

Priscilla Ayimboh, a 40-year-old seamstress in Yaounde, does not see a new term for Biya as likely to change anything.

“I’m tired of Biya’s rule and I no longer care whatever he does. It’s a pity. I wonder what will become of Cameroon in the next seven years: there are no roads, water, and jobs,” she said.

Munjah Vitalis Fagha, a senior politics lecturer at Cameroon’s University of Buea, told The Associated Press news agency that Biya’s inauguration was “taking place in a tense yet controlled political atmosphere, marked by deep divisions between the ruling elite and a growingly disillusioned populace”.

Fagha added: “The ceremony occurs amid calls for political renewal, ongoing security challenges in the Anglophone regions, and widespread concerns over governance and succession.”

Cameroon’s top court on October 27 declared Biya the winner of the election, with 53.66 percent of the vote, ahead of his ally-turned-challenger, Tchiroma, who secured 35.19 percent.

Tchiroma insists Biya was awarded a “fraudulent” victory in the election.

“The will of the Cameroonian people was trampled that day, our sovereignty stolen in broad daylight,” Tchiroma wrote on Wednesday night. “This is not democracy, it is electoral theft, a constitutional coup as blatant as it is shameful.”

Biya came to power in 1982 following the resignation of Cameroon’s first president and has ruled since, following a 2008 constitutional amendment that abolished term limits. His health has been a topic of speculation as he spends most of his time in Europe, leaving governance to key party officials and family members.

He has led Cameroon longer than most of its citizens have been alive – more than 70 percent of the country’s almost 30 million population is below the age of 35. If he serves his entire term, Biya will leave office nearly 100 years old.

The results of his nearly half-century in power have been mixed; armed rebellions in the north and the west of the country, along with a stagnant economy, have left many young people disillusioned with the leader.

After months of blockade and starvation in Gaza, Israel allowed a new United States venture – the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) – to distribute food. Branded as a lifeline, its sites quickly became known by Palestinians and dozens of human rights groups as “death traps”.

Fault Lines investigates how civilians seeking aid were funnelled through militarised zones, where thousands were killed or injured under fire.

Through the testimonies of grieving families, a former contractor, and human rights experts, the film exposes how GHF’s operations replaced UNRWA’s proven aid system with a scheme critics say was designed for displacement, not relief. At the heart of this investigation is a haunting question: was GHF delivering humanitarian aid – or helping turn breadlines into killing fields?

England squad: AJ Brimson, Joe Burgess, Daryl Clark, Herbie Farnworth, Tom Johnstone, Mikey Lewis, Harry Newman, Mikolaj Oledzi, George Williams (capt), Harry Smith, Mike McMeeken, Jez Litten, Matty Lees, Kai Pearce-Paul, Kallum Watkins, Morgan Knowles, Owen Trout, Alex Walmsley, Morgan Smithies.

Australia XIII: Reece Walsh, Mark Nawaqanitawase, Kotoni Staggs, Gehamat Shibasaki, Josh Addo-Carr, Cameron Munster, Nathan Cleary, Patrick Carrigan, Harry Grant, Tino Fa’asuamaleaui, Angus Crichton, Hudson Young, Isaah Yeo (captain).

Interchanges: Tom Dearden, Lindsay Collins, Reuben Cotter, Keaon Koloamatangi.

Reserves: Bradman Best, Lindsay Smith, Mitchell Moses.

Obidah Habila Albert, an alumnus of the third cohort of HumAngle’s Accountability Fellowship, is among the 15 Nigerian journalists selected for the Digital Public Infrastructure Journalism (DPIJ) Fellowship, which will run from October 2025 to April 2026. 

After receiving over 200 applications, 45 candidates were shortlisted, and 15 finalists emerged from 14 media organisations, including The Guardian Newspaper, Premium Times, Foundation for Investigative Journalism, and TheCable.

Organised by the Ghana-based Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) in partnership with Co-Develop, the fellowship is a flagship initiative that aims to strengthen public awareness and participation through journalism, promoting the adoption of Digital Public Infrastructures (DPIs) and Digital Public Goods and Services (DPGS).

Obidah, who is excited about his selection, said he applied for the opportunity because it aligns with his curiosity about technology’s impact on everyday life and how their stories could be more effectively documented.

“By the end of the programme, I want to understand DPI and DPGs better and tell stories about them. I hope my stories will drive conversations and help more people and policymakers in Nigeria and beyond to pay attention and take action,” he said. 

During his fellowship with HumAngle, Obidah reported extensively on conflict and peacebuilding efforts in Nigeria’s North East, as well as the rising cost-of-living crisis affecting vulnerable communities. His experience, he said, deepened his commitment to reporting stories that highlight the human dimensions of development and policy issues.

According to Sulemana Braimah, Executive Director of MFWA, the DPIJ Fellowship is a strategic investment in shaping informed media narratives around inclusive design, implementation, and the uptake of DPI development in areas such as policy, governance, and utility. 

The selected fellows and their newsrooms will receive grants to support reporting projects, as well as editorial mentorship, training, and access to resources on DPIs and DPGS. Each fellow is expected to produce at least six original stories before the end of the fellowship on issues relating to inclusive digital identification, digital payments, data exchange, and other digital safety issues. Fellows will also join a growing network of alumni across West Africa.

Last year, HumAngle’s Investigations Editor, Ibrahim Adeyemi, was selected for the West Africa cohort of the same fellowship, where he produced several stories exploring the intersection of DPIs and national security.

We appear to have gotten our first look at a curious Chinese ship, which some have dubbed a ‘drone carrier,’ actually in use, supporting at-sea testing of the AR-500CJ uncrewed helicopter. The vessel is one of a number of unusual designs with open flight decks that have emerged in China in recent years as China’s drone ambitions have increasingly extended into the naval domain.

China’s state-run television station CCTV-7, which focuses on news related to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), broadcast clips of the AR-500CJ being tested at sea back on October 30. The AR-500CJ, a version of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China’s (AVIC) larger AR-500 family optimized for shipboard operations, first flew in 2022.

The CCTV-7 segment does not appear to name the ship the AR-500CJ is seen operating from, nor does it offer a full view of the vessel. However, the size and configuration of the flight deck, especially a trapezoidal section on the starboard side toward the stern, as well as its markings, match up directly with the design of a ship that was launched at the Jiangsu Dayang Marine shipyard back in 2022. Naval News was first to report in detail on that vessel, which is approximately 328 feet (100 meters) long and some 82 feet (25 meters) across, and has a small island on the starboard side toward the bow, last year.

It had been suggested that the ship seen in the CCTV-7 footage might be a mysterious Chinese vessel with a large open flight deck and three superstructures that TWZ was first to report on last year. That ship bears the logo of the state-run China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) and may be named the Zhong Chuan Zi Hao, and could also be a first-of-its-kind ostensibly civilian research ship, as you can read more about here. However, the CSSC ‘carrier’ has a much larger and differently shaped flight deck that also has very distinct markings on it.

As mentioned, a number of unusual open-decked vessels have emerged in China in recent years. Jiangsu Dayang Marine, also known as the New Dayang shipyard, has become particularly notable in this regard. The yard has also produced at least two catamaran drone ‘motherships,’ which TWZ was also first to report on in detail, as well as various specialized barges. These all largely appear to be intended for use in training and/or testing, and to be particularly focused on replicating drone and/or electronic warfare threats. The first known imagery of one of the catamaran motherships in use also notably came from a CCTV-7 segment in 2022.

As TWZ has noted in the past, the maritime platforms that Jiangsu Dayang Marine has produced could potentially have roles in an actual operational context, including when paired with larger crewed warships. At the same time, the relatively small size and general configuration of the ‘mini drone carrier’ would limit its suitability for any kind of sustained employment in support of real-world operations.

An image from the ground of the reported Chinese experimental drone platform. If accurate, it illustrates the relatively modest proportions of the design. Via “斯文的土匪—”/Wb (H/t Temstar/SDF). pic.twitter.com/LAFHRqaGfK

— Alex Luck (@AlexLuck9) May 18, 2024

Even without a secondary operational role, dedicated naval drone test and training platforms still offer value to the PLA, which has been steadily working to expand the scale and scope of its shipboard uncrewed aviation capabilities. AR-500CJ, which AVIC has said could be used as a surveillance asset or an aerial signal relay node, among other roles, is part of this evolving ecosystem. Another drone helicopter intended for shipboard operations, based on the larger AR-2000 design from China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC), was among a host of new uncrewed aircraft designs showcased at a huge military parade in Beijing in September.

Chinese naval drone developments extend well beyond vertical takeoff and landing capable designs. Work on a navalized version of the stealthy flying-wing GJ-11 Sharp Sword uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV) has become a particular centerpiece of these efforts. Imagery just recently emerged that offered the first clear look at one of those drones with its arrestor hook deployed. The naval GJ-11, also sometimes referred to as the GJ-21, is expected to fly from at least some of China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers and big-deck amphibious assault ships.

As it seems, for the first time clear images of a GJ-21 in flight are posted and this one – based on the still installed pitots – has its tail hook down. pic.twitter.com/5h1nVZHzIe

— @Rupprecht_A (@RupprechtDeino) November 1, 2025

On a broader level, China continues to reinforce its position as a global leader in uncrewed aviation developments in the military and commercial domains, and there is often considerable overlap between the two. Just this year, TWZ was the first to report on the emergence of several previously unseen advanced drone designs, a number of which are also notably large. As we have reported in the past, flying-wing uncrewed aircraft designs also continue to be a particular area of focus for the Chinese aviation industry.

With all this in mind, China’s use of bespoke ships with open flight decks to support drone testing and training, as well as other purposes, only looks likely to grow.

Contact the author: [email protected]

The U.S. Supreme Court’s skeptical questioning of former President Donald Trump’s global tariffs has fueled speculation that his trade measures may be struck down, potentially upending the already fragile trade landscape.

The case centers on Trump’s use of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose sweeping tariffs on imports. The law grants presidents broad authority to regulate trade during national emergencies but makes no mention of tariffs, raising constitutional questions about the limits of executive power.

During oral arguments on Wednesday, justices across the ideological spectrum except Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas appeared doubtful that Trump had legal authority to levy such blanket global tariffs.

Trade experts now warn that if the court invalidates Trump’s tariff policy, it could trigger a new wave of economic uncertainty, as the administration is expected to pivot quickly to other trade laws to reimpose duties.

Why It Matters

The outcome of this case could reshape U.S. trade policy for years. Businesses have paid over $100 billion in IEEPA-related tariffs since 2025, and a ruling against Trump could open a complex refund battle or force the White House to seek alternative legal pathways for its protectionist agenda.

Corporate leaders, already weary of erratic trade shifts, say a ruling either way offers little stability. “Even if it goes against IEEPA, the uncertainty still continues,” said David Young of the Conference Board, who briefed dozens of CEOs after the hearing.

Trump Administration: Faces potential legal defeat but can pivot to Section 232 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962) or Section 122 (Trade Act of 1974), both of which allow temporary or national security-based tariffs.

U.S. Supreme Court: Balancing presidential powers with statutory limits on trade actions.

Businesses & Importers: Risk being caught in regulatory limbo over refunds and future duties.

Federal Reserve: Monitoring potential economic fallout from prolonged trade instability.

Refunds Could Get “Messy”

Justice Amy Coney Barrett raised concerns about how refund claims would be handled if the tariffs are ruled illegal, calling it “a mess” for courts to manage.
Lawyer Neal Katyal, representing five small businesses challenging the tariffs, said only those firms would automatically receive refunds, while others must file administrative protests a process that could take up to a year.

Customs lawyer Joseph Spraragen added that if the court orders refunds, the Customs and Border Protection’s automated system could process them, but he warned, “The administration is not going to be eager to just roll over and give refunds.”

Economic and Policy Repercussions

Analysts expect the administration to rely on alternative statutes if IEEPA tariffs are overturned. However, implementing new duties under those laws could be slow and bureaucratic, potentially delaying trade certainty until 2026.

Natixis economist Christopher Hodge said such a ruling would be only a “temporary setback” for Trump’s trade agenda, predicting renewed tariff rounds or trade negotiations in the coming year.

Meanwhile, Federal Reserve Governor Stephen Miran warned the uncertainty could act as a drag on economic growth, though it might also prompt looser monetary policy if trade instability dampens business confidence.

What’s Next

A Supreme Court ruling is expected in early 2026, leaving companies in limbo over the future of U.S. tariff policy.
If Trump’s powers under IEEPA are curtailed, analysts expect a new wave of trade maneuvers potentially invoking national security provisions to maintain his “America First” economic approach, prolonging the climate of global trade unpredictability.

With information from Reuters.

A months-long siege on the Malian capital, Bamako, by the armed al-Qaeda affiliate group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has brought the city to breaking point, causing desperation among residents and, according to analysts, placing increasing pressure on the military government to negotiate with the group – something it has refused to do before now.

JNIM’s members have created an effective economic and fuel blockade by sealing off major highways used by tankers to transport fuel from neighbouring Senegal and the Ivory Coast to the landlocked Sahel country since September.

While JNIM has long laid siege to towns in other parts of the country, this is the first time it has used the tactic on the capital city.

The scale of the blockade, and the immense effect it has had on the city, is a sign of JNIM’s growing hold over Mali and a step towards the group’s stated aim of government change in Mali, Beverly Ochieng, Sahel analyst with intelligence firm Control Risks, told Al Jazeera.

For weeks, most of Bamako’s residents have been unable to buy any fuel for cars or motorcycles as supplies have dried up, bringing the normally bustling capital to a standstill. Many have had to wait in long fuel queues. Last week, the United States and the United Kingdom both advised their citizens to leave Mali and evacuated non-essential diplomatic staff.

Other Western nations have also advised their citizens to leave the country. Schools across Mali have closed and will remain shut until November 9 as staff struggle to commute. Power cuts have intensified.

Here’s what we know about the armed group responsible and why it appears to have Mali in a chokehold:

What is JNIM?

JNIM is the Sahel affiliate of al-Qaeda and the most active armed group in the region, according to conflict monitor ACLED. The group was formed in 2017 as a merger between groups that were formerly active against French and Malian forces that were first deployed during an armed rebellion in northern Mali in 2012. They include Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and three Malian armed groups – Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitun and Katiba Macina.

JNIM’s main aim is to capture and control territory and to expel Western influences in its region of control. Some analysts suggest that JNIM may be seeking to control major capitals and, ultimately, to govern the country as a whole.

It is unclear how many fighters the group has. The Washington Post has reported estimates of about 6,000, citing regional and western officials.

However, Ulf Laessing, Sahel analyst at the German think tank, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), said JNIM most likely does not yet have the military capacity to capture large, urban territories that are well protected by soldiers. He also said the group would struggle to appeal to urban populations who may not hold the same grievances against the government as some rural communities.

While JNIM’s primary base is Mali, KAS revealed in a report that the group has Algerian roots via its members of the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM).

The group is led by Iyad Ag-Ghali, a Malian and ethnic Tuareg from Mali’s northern Kidal region who founded Ansar Dine in 2012. That group’s stated aim was to impose its interpretation of Islamic law across Mali.

Ghali had previously led Tuareg uprisings against the Malian government, which is traditionally dominated by the majority Bambara ethnic group, in the early 1990s, demanding the creation of a sovereign country called Azawad.

However, he reformed his image by acting as a negotiator between the government and the rebels. In 2008, he was posted as a Malian diplomat to Saudi Arabia under the government of Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure. When another rebellion began in 2012, however, Ghali sought a leadership role with the rebels but was rebuffed, leading him to create Ansar Dine.

According to the US Department of National Intelligence (DNI), Ghali has stated that JNIM’s strategy is to expand its presence across West Africa and to put down government forces and rival armed groups, such as the Mali-based Islamic State Sahel, through guerrilla-style attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Simultaneously, it attempts to engage with local communities by providing them with material resources. Strict dress codes and bans on music are common in JNIM-controlled areas.

JNIM also destroys infrastructure, such as schools, communication towers and bridges, to weaken the government off the battlefield.

An overall death toll is unclear, but the group has killed thousands of people since 2017. Human rights groups accuse it of attacking civilians, especially people perceived to be assisting government forces. JNIM activity in Mali caused 207 deaths between January and April this year, according to ACLED data.

How has JNIM laid siege to Bamako?

JNIM began blocking oil tankers carrying fuel to Bamako in September.

That came after the military government in Bamako banned small-scale fuel sales in all rural areas – except at official service stations – from July 1. Usually, in these areas, traders can buy fuel in jerry cans, which they often resell later.

The move to ban this was aimed at crippling JNIM’s operations in its areas of control by limiting its supply lines and, thus, its ability to move around.

At the few places where fuel is still available in Bamako, prices soared last week by more than 400 percent, from $25 to $130 per litre ($6.25-$32.50 per gallon). Prices of transportation, food and other commodities have risen due to the crisis, and power cuts have been frequent.

Some car owners have simply abandoned their vehicles in front of petrol stations, with the military government threatening on Wednesday to impound them to ease traffic and reduce security risks.

A convoy of 300 fuel tankers reached Bamako on October 7, and another one with “dozens” of vehicles arrived on October 30, according to a government statement. Other attempts to truck in more fuel have met obstacles, however, as JNIM members ambush military-escorted convoys on highways and shoot at or kidnap soldiers and civilians.

Even as supplies in Bamako dry up, there are reports of JNIM setting fire to about 200 fuel tankers in southern and western Mali. Videos circulating on Malian social media channels show rows of oil tankers burning on a highway.

What is JNIM trying to achieve with this blockade?

Laessing of KAS said the group is probably hoping to leverage discontent with the government in the already troubled West African nation to put pressure on the military government to negotiate a power-sharing deal of sorts.

“They want to basically make people as angry as possible,” he said. “They could [be trying] to provoke protests which could bring down the current government and bring in a new one that’s more favourable towards them.”

Ochieng of Control Risks noted that, in its recent statements, JNIM has explicitly called for government change. While the previous civilian government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (2013-2020) had negotiated with JNIM, the present government of Colonel Assimi Goita will likely keep up its military response, Ochieng said.

Frustration at the situation is growing in Bamako, with residents calling for the government to act.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, driver Omar Sidibe said the military leaders ought to find out the reasons for the shortage and act on them. “It’s up to the government to play a full role and take action [and] uncover the real reason for this shortage.”

Which parts of Mali is the JNIM active in?

In Mali, the group operates in rural areas of northern, central and western Mali, where there is a reduced government presence and high discontent with the authorities among local communities.

In the areas it controls, JNIM presents itself as an alternative to the government, which it calls “puppets of the West”, in order to recruit fighters from several ethnic minorities which have long held grievances over their perceived marginalisation by the government, including the Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, and Songhai groups. Researchers note the group also has some members from the majority Bambara group.

In central Mali, the group seized Lere town last November and captured the town of Farabougou in August this year. Both are small towns, but Farabougou is close to Wagadou Forest, a known hiding place of JNIM.

JNIM’s hold on major towns is weaker because of the stronger government presence in larger areas. It therefore more commonly blockades major towns or cities by destroying roads and bridges leading to them. Currently, the western cities of Nioro and gold-rich Kayes are cut off. The group is also besieging the major cities of Timbuktu and Gao, as well as Menaka and Boni towns, located in the north and northeast.

How is JNIM funded?

For revenue, the group oversees artisanal gold mines, forcefully taxes community members, smuggles weapons and kidnaps foreigners for ransom, according to the US DNI. Kayes region, whose capital, Kayes, is under siege, is a major gold hub, accounting for 80 percent of Mali’s gold production, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats.

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (Gi-Toc) also reports cattle rustling schemes, estimating that JNIM made 91,400 euros ($104,000) in livestock sales of cattle between 2017 and 2019. Cattle looted in Mali are sold cheaply in communities on the border with Ghana and the Ivory Coast, through a complex chain of intermediaries.

In which other countries is JNIM active?

JNIM expanded into Burkina Faso in 2017 by linking up with Burkina-Faso-based armed group Ansarul-Islam, which pledged allegiance to the Malian group. Ansarul-Islam was formed in 2016 by Ibrahim Dicko, who had close ties with Amadou Koufa, JNIM’s deputy head since 2017.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM uses similar tactics of recruiting from marginalised ethnic groups. The country has rapidly become a JNIM hotspot, with the group operating – or holding territory – in 11 of 13 Burkina Faso regions outside of capital Ouagadougou. There were 512 reported casualties as a result of JNIM violence in the country between January and April this year. It is not known how many have died as a result of violence by the armed group in total.

Since 2022, JNIM has laid siege to the major northern Burkinabe city of Djibo, with authorities forced to airlift in supplies. In a notable attack in May 2025, JNIM fighters overran a military base in the town, killing approximately 200 soldiers. It killed a further 60 in Solle, about 48km (30 miles) west of Djibo.

In October 2025, the group temporarily took control of Sabce town, also located in the north of Burkina Faso, killing 11 police officers in the process, according to the International Crisis Group.

In a September report, Human Rights Watch said JNIM and a second armed group – Islamic State Sahel, which is linked to ISIL (ISIS) – massacred civilians in Burkina Faso between May and September, including a civilian convoy trying to transport humanitarian aid into the besieged northern town of Gorom Gorom.

Meanwhile, JNIM is also moving southwards, towards other West African nations with access to the sea. It launched an offensive on Kafolo town, in northern Ivory Coast, in 2020.

JNIM members embedded in national parks on the border regions with Burkina Faso have been launching sporadic attacks in northern Togo and the Benin Republic since 2022.

In October this year, it recorded its first attack on the Benin-Nigeria border, where one Nigerian policeman was killed. The area is not well-policed because the two countries have no established military cooperation, analyst Ochieng said.

“This area is also quite a commercially viable region; there are mining and other developments taking place there … it is likely to be one that [JNIM] will try to establish a foothold,” she added.

Why are countries struggling to fend off JNIM?

When Mali leader General Assimi Goita led soldiers to seize power in a 2020 coup, military leaders promised to defeat the armed group, as well as a host of others that had been on the rise in the country. Military leaders subsequently seizing power from civilian governments in Burkina Faso (2022) and in Niger (2023) have made the same promises.

However, Mali and its neighbours have struggled to hold JNIM at bay, with ACLED data noting the number of JNIM attacks increasing notably since 2020.

In 2022, Mali’s military government ended cooperation with 4,000-strong French forces deployed in 2013 to battle armed groups which had emerged at the time, as well as separatist Tuaregs in the north. The last group of French forces exited the country in August 2022.

Mali also terminated contracts with a 10,000-man UN peacekeeping force stationed in the country in 2023.

Bamako is now working with Russian fighters – initially 1,500 from the Wagner Mercenary Group, but since June, from the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps – estimated to be about 1,000 in number.

Russian officials are, to a lesser extent, also present in Burkina Faso and Niger, which have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali.

Results in Mali have been mixed. Wagner supported the Malian military in seizing swaths of land in the northern Kidal region from Tuareg rebels.

But the Russians also suffered ambushes. In July 2024, a contingent of Wagner and Malian troops was ambushed by rebels in Tinzaouaten, close to the Algerian border. Between 20 and 80 Russians and 25 to 40 Malians were killed, according to varying reports. Researchers noted it was Wagner’s worst defeat since it had deployed to West Africa.

In all, Wagner did not record much success in targeting armed groups like JNIM, analyst Laessing told Al Jazeera.

Alongside Malian forces, the Russians have also been accused by rights groups of committing gross human rights violations against rural communities in northern Mali perceived to be supportive of armed groups.

Could the Russian Africa Corps fighters end the siege on Bamako?

Laessing said the fuel crisis is pressuring Mali to divert military resources and personnel to protect fuel tankers, keeping them from consolidating territory won back from armed groups and further endangering the country.

He added that the crisis will be a test for Russian Africa Corp fighters, who have not proven as ready as Wagner fighters to take battle risks. A video circulating on Russian social media purports to show Africa Corps members providing air support to fuel tanker convoys. It has not been verified by Al Jazeera.

“If they can come in and allow the fuel to flow into Bamako, then the Russians will be seen as heroes,” Laessing said – at least by locals.

Laessing added that the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, in the medium to long term, might eventually have to negotiate with JNIM to find a way to end the crisis.

While Goita’s government has not attempted to hold talks with the group in the past, in early October, it greenlit talks led by local leaders, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats – although it is unclear exactly how the government gave its approval.

Agreements between the group and local leaders have reportedly already been signed in several towns across Segou, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, in which the group agrees to end its siege in return for the communities agreeing to JNIM rules, taxes, and noncooperation with the military.

US Treasury accuses Pyongyang of stealing $3bn in digital assets to finance its nuclear weapons programme over three years.

North Korea has denounced the latest United States sanctions targeting cybercrimes that the US says help finance its nuclear weapons programme, accusing Washington of harbouring “wicked” hostility towards Pyongyang and promising unspecified countermeasures.

The statement on Thursday by a North Korean vice foreign minister came two days after the US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on eight people and two firms, including North Korean bankers, for allegedly laundering money from cybercrime schemes.

The US Treasury accused North Korea of operating state-sponsored hacking schemes that have stolen more than $3bn in mostly digital assets over the past three years, an amount unmatched by any other foreign actor. The Treasury Department said the illicit funds helped finance the country’s nuclear weapons programme.

The department said North Korea relies on a network of banking representatives, financial institutions and shell companies in North Korea, China, Russia and elsewhere to launder funds obtained through IT worker fraud, cryptocurrency heists and sanctions evasion.

The sanctions were rolled out even as US President Donald Trump continues to express interest in reviving talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Their nuclear discussions during Trump’s first term collapsed in 2019 amid disagreements over trading relief from US-led sanctions on North Korea for steps to dismantle its nuclear programme.

“Now that the present US administration has clarified its stand to be hostile towards the DPRK to the last, we will also take proper measures to counter it with patience for any length of time,” the North Korean vice minister, Kim Un Chol, said in a statement.

He said US sanctions and pressure tactics will never change the “present strategic situation” between the countries or alter North Korea’s “thinking and viewpoint”.

Kim Jong Un has shunned any form of talks with Washington and Seoul since his fallout with Trump in 2019. He has since made Russia the focus of his foreign policy, sending thousands of soldiers, many of whom have died on the battlefield, and large amounts of military equipment for President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine while pursuing an increasingly assertive strategy aimed at securing a larger role for North Korea in a united front against the US-led West.

In a recent speech, Kim Jong Un urged Washington to drop its demand for the North to surrender its nuclear weapons as a condition for resuming diplomacy. He ignored Trump’s proposal to meet while the US president was in South Korea last week for meetings with world leaders attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

Aerial footage from the Philippines shows the destruction wrought on homes and streets by Typhoon Kalmaegi.

It was one of the strongest typhoons in the Philippines this year.

At least 85 people have died in the flooding and another 75 are missing. The floodwaters swept shipping containers through the streets and cars have been left in piles.

General Atomics’ Gambit family of drones, with its common modular core ‘chassis’ concept, now has a sixth member optimized for air-to-surface missions, such as attacking hostile air defenses or enemy ships. The company is already eyeing international sales of the new Gambit 6, particularly in Europe, but it could also be of interest to branches of the U.S. military. The latest Gambit configuration underscores the growing pursuit of loyal wingman-type drones, also now often referred to as Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), by armed forces globally.

Gambit 6 made its official debut yesterday at the annual International Fighter Conference in Rome, Italy. General Atomics’ Aeronautical Systems, Inc. division (GA-ASI) first unveiled the Gambit family back in 2022, at which time it included four designs. They were joined last year by Gambit 5, which is intended for carrier-based operations.

“The Gambit Series is a modular family of unmanned aircraft designed to meet diverse mission requirements, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; multi-domain combat; advanced training; and stealth reconnaissance,” according to a press release from GA-ASI. “It’s built around a common core platform that accounts for a significant proportion of the aircraft’s hardware, including the landing gear, baseline avionics, and chassis. This shared foundation reduces costs, increases interoperability, and accelerates the development of mission-specific variants like Gambit 6.”

“The multi-role [Gambit 6] platform is optimized for roles such as electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and deep precision strike, making it a versatile option for evolving defense needs,” the release adds.

An accompanying rendering, seen in part at the top of this story and below, shows a trio of Gambit 6s. Each one is depicted releasing several GBU-53/B StormBreaker precision-guided bombs, also known as Small Diameter Bomb IIs (SDB II).

The Gambit 6 design looks similar, at least externally, to General Atomics’ YFQ-42A. The YFQ-42A is one of two uncrewed aircraft currently under development as part of the first phase, or Increment 1, of the U.S. Air Force’s CCA program. The other is Anduril’s YFQ-44A, also known as Fury. General Atomics has previously confirmed that the YFQ-42A leverages prior work on an experimental drone called the XQ-67A Off-Board Sensing Station, which flew for the first time last year, and the Gambit family. The YFQ-42A made its maiden flight earlier this year, and a second example is now in flight testing.

General Atomics is also now among the companies under contract to develop conceptual CCA designs for the U.S. Navy.

“It’s best to think of Gambit 1 as optimized for advanced sensing, and represented by our XQ-67A OBSS [Off-Board Sensing Station] flying today,” C. Mark Brinkley, a spokesperson for General Atomics, told TWZ. “Gambit 2 is optimized for air-to-air combat and represented by our YFQ-42A, which has multiple airframes currently flying. Loaded with the proper weapons, a Gambit 2 could conduct a ground or surface strike as a multirole aircraft, but it is not optimized for that ground mission.”

“The Gambit series, including YFQ-42A, can be equipped with EW [electronic warfare] suites or EW-capable launched effects [uncrewed aerial systems],” Brinkely added.

The Gambit 3 design is primarily intended to act as a ‘red air’ adversary during training. The flying wing Gambit 4, so far the most visually distinctive member of the family, is focused on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. As noted, Gambit 5 is designed for carrier-based combat operations.

“Gambit 6 will be truly optimized for air-to-ground/surface operations. It might visually look like a Gambit 2, and perhaps the differences would be imperceptible to the casual viewer, as both would utilize RF [radiofrequency] and optical sensing,” Brinkley added. “But the mission systems inside Gambit 6 are fine-tuned specifically for ground/surface operations, missions in which General Atomics has developed deep experience over decades of ground/surface sensing and strikes. Gambit 6 could also be outfitted for an electronic warfare mission, for instance, or even naval strikes.”

Overall, “the idea is that Gambit 6 will be primarily looking down.”

Just like an air-to-air combat optimized CCA-type drone, an air-to-surface focused design would help friendly forces expand their coverage and capacity to perform relevant missions over one or more areas of the battlespace, while also reducing the risk to crewed platforms. As described, Gambit 6s seems geared to be particularly well-suited to the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses mission sets, or SEAD/DEAD, to aid in clearing the way for follow-on operations.

The idea of CCA-type drones taking on these ‘downward-focused’ missions is not new. Though the U.S. Air Force’s CCA program is currently focused on air-to-air missions, the service has expressed interest in future air-to-surface strike and electronic warfare capabilities. Previous U.S. Marine Corps testing of Kratos’ XQ-58 Valkyrie has put particular emphasis on the ability to launch electronic warfare attacks as part of SEAD/DEAD missions conducted together with F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Earlier this year, the Marines confirmed that experimental work with the XQ-58 was transitioning into a full program of record with a clear eye toward a real operational capability. Air-to-surface missions are also a component of other CCA-type programs globally.

“Air forces throughout the world are looking to air-to-ground-capable CCAs to enhance operational capabilities and address emerging threats in a denied environment,” the General Atomics press release says. “Airframes will be available for international procurement starting in 2027, with European missionized versions deliverable in 2029. GA-ASI is building industry partnerships throughout Europe with the aim of providing sovereign capabilities for all its platforms.”

It has been pointed out that the schedule stated aligns particularly well with a German requirement for a CCA-type drone capable of air-to-surface missions. Last year, Airbus also unveiled a loyal wingman drone with a clear eye toward meeting German Air Force needs. Airbus and Kratos also announced a partnership earlier this year to supply a version of the XQ-58 to the Germans.

General Atomics has made clear that it is looking at multiple potential foreign sales opportunities with Gambit 6.

“Many international allies and partners have expressed interest in a CCA optimized for ground or surface strike. Gambit 6 was announced here in Rome on the first day of the International Fighter Conference, and the resulting interest and inquiry from attending military representatives has been great,” Brinkley, the General Atomics spokesperson, also told TWZ. “We look forward to continuing those discussions here this week. We absolutely intend to submit Gambit 6 for various emerging international opportunities.”

“Nothing would prevent the United States from procuring a Gambit 6 variant, fine tuned to American specifications,” he added.

“I don’t have any additional details to offer on Gambit 5 or the US Navy opportunity. We’ve been talking about the Gambit 5 concept for about 16 months at this point, since Farnborough 2024,” Brinkley also said when asked for a general update on the work the company is doing in relation to the Navy’s CCA effort. “There is no specific relationship between Gambit 5 & Gambit 6 at this time. The point of the Gambit Series is to quickly deliver affordable mass at scale, and to adjust to customer demands rapidly, and each of these aircraft does that, while also leveraging years of hard work and demonstrated success. “

As has been made clear in this story already, the market space for CCA-type drones has been steadily growing in recent years, and extends well beyond General Atomics. Just since September, Lockheed Martin’s Vectis and Shield AI’s X-BAT have joined the growing field of relevant designs. The jet-powered X-BAT is a particularly novel design, intended to take off and land vertically, as you can learn more about in great detail in this recent TWZ feature. In addition to the Gambit family, Vectis, X-BAT, and Anduril’s Fury, among other drone designs, are also being showcased at the International Fighter Conference this week. Also on the market now is Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat, originally developed for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Aviation Week just recently disclosed the existence of a new drone design from Northrop Grumman subsidiary Scaled Composites, referred to now simply as Project Lotus, which could be in the broad CCA category, as well.

Authors: Christopher Jackson and Aaron Spitler*

Digital technologies, particularly AI, are accelerating democratic backsliding and revitalizing authoritarian governments. AI-focused companies have been forming close partnerships with government actors, often in ways that undermine democratic norms. Around the world, private firms are supplying or co-designing technologies that enhance mass surveillance, predictive policing, propaganda campaigns, and online censorship. In places like China, Russia, and Egypt, a blurring of boundaries between the state and the technology industry has led to serious consequences. This collusion has undercut privacy rights, stifled civil society, and diminished public accountability.

This dynamic is now playing out in the United States. Companies like Palantir and Paragon Solutions are providing government entities with powerful AI tools and analytics platforms, often under opaque contracts. In September, U.S. President Donald Trump approved the sale of TikTok to U.S. private entities friendly with the administration. Unchecked public-private integration within the technology industry poses serious risks for democratic societies, namely that it offers increased power to unaccountable actors. The focus of this article is to examine case studies on how these emerging alliances are enabling authoritarian practices, as well as what they might mean for the future of democratic societies.

Russia: Manipulating Digital Tools

In Russia, democratic norms under Vladimir Putin have eroded while Russian tech companies continue to work hand in glove with state authorities. Sberbank, the country’s largest financial institution, and their development of Kandinsky 2.1, an AI-powered, text-to-image tool owned by the firm, illustrate this long-running trend.

Despite the quality of its outputs compared to rivals like DALL-E, the solution came under fire in 2023 from veteran lawmaker Sergey Mironov, who argued that it generated images that tarnished Russia’s image. He would go on to charge that Kandinsky 2.1 was designed by “unfriendly states waging an informational and mental war” against the country.

Not long after, some in the tech space noticed that Kandinsky 2.1’s outputs changed. For instance, while the tool previously churned out images of zombies when prompted with “Z Patriot,” users noted that it now repeatedly produced pictures of hyper-masculine figures. Critics claim that this alteration not only represented an overt manipulation of the technology itself but also an attempt to curry favor with those in the government.

This episode shows how AI-powered tools are being specifically tailored to serve the needs of authorities. The modifications made to the model transformed it into an invaluable resource the government could use to amplify its messaging. As a result, users are no longer likely to see Kandinsky 2.1 as a tool for creativity, particularly if its outputs remain blatantly skewed. Developers in countries like Russia may look to this case for inspiration on how to succeed in restrictive political contexts.