Today

Welcome to Bunker Talk. This is a weekend open discussion post for the best commenting crew on the net, in which we can chat about all the stuff that went on this week that we didn’t cover. We can also talk about the stuff we did or whatever else grabs your interest. In other words, it’s an off-topic thread.

The caption to this week’s top shot reads:

377th Test and Evaluation Group missile operators conduct mission operations at Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., Feb. 18, 2025. The 377 TEG, the nation’s only dedicated intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test organization, oversaw an operational test launch of an Air Force Global Strike Command unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile. Fired at 1 a.m. Pacific Time on Feb. 19, 2025, the missile traveled approximately 4,200 miles at speeds up to 15,000 miles per hour before impacting in the Pacific Ocean.

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The Bunker is open!

Pakistan’s diplomatic playbook for 2025 is shifting noticeably toward trade, sustainability, and the projection of soft power. Gone are the days when foreign policy revolved solely around security concerns or aid dependency. The country’s recent economic and diplomatic maneuvers suggest a clear intent to rebrand itself as a credible, reform-driven partner focused on growth, responsibility, and engagement. From seafood export approvals by the US to partnerships with France and major development financing commitments, Pakistan’s narrative is evolving, and for once, it’s a story of initiative rather than reaction.

The US government’s decision to extend Pakistan’s seafood export approval until 2029 is a quiet but significant achievement. The deal, worth roughly $600 million annually, underscores two critical things: the growing confidence in Pakistan’s sustainability standards and the country’s ability to meet global compliance norms. For years, Pakistani exporters have faced barriers due to outdated infrastructure and quality control issues. Now, improved regulations and environmental monitoring seem to be paying off. This approval not only secures a steady stream of revenue but also signals that Pakistani industries are capable of aligning with Western ecological and safety benchmarks, something that can serve as a model for other export sectors.

In a similar spirit, the Punjab government’s recent memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with France mark another leap toward deepening provincial and international trade ties. France’s interest in Pakistan’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) reveals confidence in the country’s industrial potential. For Punjab, the partnership could attract sustainable technologies, investment in renewable energy, and expertise in urban development. It also decentralizes diplomacy, shifting some of the engagement from federal corridors to proactive provincial actors, an approach that could make economic cooperation nimbler and more region-specific.

At the macro level, multilateral institutions are showing renewed faith in Pakistan’s economic reforms. The World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC) have jointly pledged a staggering $40 billion for development and private sector growth. This isn’t charity; it’s a bet on Pakistan’s capacity to absorb and utilize global capital effectively. The World Bank’s concessional loans, particularly targeting education and climate resilience, fit neatly into Pakistan’s national development goals. Meanwhile, the IFC’s $20 billion allocation to the private sector and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) speaks to an evolving understanding that long-term economic health depends on entrepreneurial vitality rather than government-led expansion alone.

Domestically, the banking sector is mirroring this new wave of confidence. The Bank of Punjab, for instance, has reported record profits, reflecting a resilient financial system despite broader global headwinds. A profitable and stable banking environment is a prerequisite for sustained trade diplomacy; it assures foreign investors that local institutions are capable of managing large inflows and transactions transparently. When financial institutions thrive alongside industrial and export sectors, it sends a reassuring message to international partners that Pakistan’s growth is not a temporary surge but a maturing cycle.

But economic diplomacy alone doesn’t build soft power. What sets Pakistan’s recent approach apart is the coupling of trade initiatives with cultural and environmental diplomacy. The government’s efforts to promote interfaith harmony, expand cultural exchanges, and invest in green infrastructure reflect a broader understanding of influence in the modern era. Soft power, after all, isn’t about dominance; it’s about attraction. Pakistan’s reforestation programs, ecotourism initiatives, and partnerships in climate resilience not only improve its environmental record but also enhance its moral credibility on the global stage. These projects project a vision of Pakistan as a responsible global citizen, one that contributes to shared planetary goals rather than merely negotiating for its own interests.

Tourism, too, plays a key role in this narrative. The revival of heritage sites, promotion of religious tourism for Sikh and Buddhist pilgrims, and international film collaborations are creating a gentler, more relatable image of Pakistan abroad. These cultural bridges complement trade diplomacy by humanizing the country in the eyes of investors and tourists alike. They help replace outdated stereotypes with more nuanced perceptions of a nation that’s young, creative, and striving for balance between tradition and modernity.

This pivot toward soft power and trade diplomacy is not accidental; it’s strategic. Pakistan seems to recognize that credibility in global markets depends not just on economic incentives but on the consistency of reform and image. The focus on sustainability and governance reforms aims to reduce dependency on loans and shift toward mutually beneficial trade partnerships. In doing so, Pakistan positions itself not as a passive recipient of aid but as a contributor to global growth.

Critically, these moves also reflect a certain self-awareness. The emphasis on sustainability, whether in fisheries, industry, or climate policy, acknowledges that the old model of extractive growth is no longer viable. Similarly, engaging institutions like the World Bank and IFC shows that Pakistan understands the importance of credibility and transparency in attracting international capital. Trade diplomacy, when backed by responsible domestic governance and inclusive growth, becomes more than an economic tactic; it turns into a long-term strategy for stability and respect.

That said, this strategy will need to be carefully managed. The challenge isn’t just to secure deals but to ensure they deliver equitable benefits. For instance, trade approvals and foreign investments must be accompanied by support for small exporters, labor reforms, and environmental safeguards. Otherwise, the benefits will stay concentrated among elites, undermining the very soft power Pakistan seeks to build. Likewise, diplomatic capital must not be squandered on short-term optics or domestic political point-scoring. Consistency, patience, and institutional continuity will determine whether this new vision can endure.

In many ways, Pakistan’s 2025 diplomacy embodies a pragmatic realism. It doesn’t reject global partnerships or rely excessively on one bloc. Instead, it seeks balance between East and West, between economic pragmatism and moral purpose. By intertwining trade with culture, sustainability, and finance, the country is sketching the contours of a diplomacy that’s as much about persuasion as negotiation. And in a fragmented world increasingly defined by narratives rather than alliances, that’s a powerful pivot.

Recommendations

·       Establish specialized trade diplomacy desks in embassies to promote sectoral exports, green investment, and SME partnerships.

·       Strengthen provincial economic offices abroad to attract investors in key sectors like textiles, agri-tech, and renewable energy.

·       Implement domestic policies for export diversification and improve digital trade facilitation to empower smaller producers.

·       Expand cultural diplomacy programs, including art, film, sports, and education exchanges, to enhance people-to-people connections and global goodwill.

·       Ensure policy consistency and transparency across all levels of government to solidify Pakistan’s reputation as a credible, reform-driven partner in global trade and diplomacy.

South Africa, Nigeria, Mozambique, Burkina Faso removed from Financial Action Task Force’s financial crimes list.

A global money-laundering watchdog has taken South Africa, Nigeria, Mozambique and Burkina Faso off its “grey list” of countries subjected to increased monitoring.

The Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF), a financial crimes watchdog based in France, on Friday said it was removing the four countries after “successful on-site visits” that showed “positive progress” in addressing shortcomings within agreed timeframes.

The FATF maintains “grey” and “black” lists for countries it has identified as not meeting its standards. It considers grey list countries to be those with “strategic deficiencies” in their anti-money laundering regimes, but which are nonetheless working with the organisation to address them.

FATF President Elisa de Anda Madrazo called the removal of the four “a positive story for the continent of Africa”.

South Africa revamped its tools to detect money laundering and terrorist financing, she said, while Nigeria created better coordination between agencies, Mozambique increased its financial intelligence sharing, and Burkina Faso improved its oversight of financial institutions.

Nigeria and South Africa were added to the list in 2023, preceded by Mozambique in 2022 and Burkina Faso in 2021.

Officials from the four countries – which will no longer be subject to increased monitoring by the organisation – welcomed the decision.

Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu said the delisting marked a “major milestone in Nigeria’s journey towards economic reform, institutional integrity and global credibility”, while the country’s Financial Intelligence Unit separately said it had “worked resolutely through a 19-point action plan” to demonstrate its commitment to improvements.

Edward Kieswetter, commissioner of the South African Revenue Service, also cheered the update but said, “Removing the designation of grey listing is not a finish line but a milestone on a long-term journey toward building a robust and resilient financial ecosystem.”

Leaders in Mozambique and Burkina Faso did not immediately comment, though Mozambican officials had signalled for several months that they were optimistic about being removed.

In July, Finance Minister Carla Louveira said Mozambique was “not simply working to get off the grey list, but working so that in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, when the FATF makes its assessment in 2030, it will find a completely different situation from the one detected in 2021,” MZ News reported at the time.

More than 200 countries around the world have pledged to follow the standards of the FATF, which reviews their efforts to combat money laundering, as well as terrorist and weapons financing.

The FATF’s black or “high-risk” list consists of Iran, Myanmar and North Korea.

Study finds that rates soar to 90 percent in some regions as humanitarian crises compound childhood exploitation.

Nearly two-thirds of South Sudanese children are engaged in the worst forms of child labour, with rates reaching as high as 90 percent in the hardest-hit regions, according to a government study released with the charity Save the Children.

The National Child Labour Study, published on Friday, surveyed more than 418 households across seven states and found that 64 percent of children aged between five and 17 are trapped in forced labour, sexual exploitation, theft and conflict.

The findings reveal a crisis far more complex than poverty alone, intensified by relentless flooding, the spread of disease, and conflict that have uprooted families and left millions on the brink of hunger.

In Kapoeta South, near the border with Uganda, nine out of 10 children work in gold mining, pastoralism and farming instead of attending school, the report said.

Yambio region, the country’s southwest, recorded similarly dire rates, with local conflict and child marriage driving children into labour.

Children typically start with simple jobs before being drawn into increasingly dangerous and exploitative work, the report found. About 10 percent of those surveyed reported involvement with armed groups, particularly in Akobo, Bentiu and Kapoeta South counties.

The types of exploitation children face differ by gender. Boys are more likely to work in dangerous industries or join armed groups, while girls disproportionately face forced marriage, household servitude and sexual abuse.

‘A crisis that goes beyond poverty’

Knowing the law does not stop child exploitation, researchers found.

The surveys showed that 70 percent of children stuck in dangerous or illegal work lives came from homes with adults who were familiar with legal protections. Two-thirds of children were unaware that help existed.

“When nearly two-thirds of a country’s children are working – and in some areas, almost every child – it signals a crisis that goes beyond poverty,” said Chris Nyamandi, Save the Children’s South Sudan country director.

South Sudan’s child labour prevalence vastly exceeds regional patterns. While East Africa has the continent’s worst record at 30 percent, according to ILO-UNICEF data, South Sudan’s 64 percent is more than double that figure.

“Education remains the strongest protective factor,” Nyamandi said, noting that children who attend school are far less likely to be exploited.

The government acknowledged the crisis at the report’s launch in Juba. Deng Tong, undersecretary at the Ministry of Labour, said officials would use the evidence as a “critical foundation for action”.

The report comes as nearly one million people have been impacted by severe flooding across South Sudan, with 335,000 displaced and more than 140 health facilities damaged or submerged.

The country faces a related malaria outbreak with more than 104,000 cases reported in the past week, while 7.7 million people confront acute hunger, the United Nations said.

South Sudan has also been gripped by fears of renewed civil war. A fragile 2018 peace deal between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar appears increasingly strained, with armed clashes now occurring on a scale not seen since 2017, according to UN investigators.

Machar was arrested in March and charged in September with treason, murder and crimes against humanity. He has rejected all charges.

About 300,000 people have fled the country this year as violence has escalated.

Move to close Vilnius, Kaunas airports and border comes after helium balloons drifted into the country’s territory.

NATO member Lithuania has closed its two biggest airports and shut crossings on its border with Belarus after helium weather balloons drifted into its territory, the third such incident in the Baltic nation this month.

European aviation has repeatedly been thrown into chaos in recent weeks by drone sightings and other air incursions, including at airports in Copenhagen, Munich and the Baltic region.

The Vilnius and Kaunas airports were closed on Friday for safety reasons until 2am (23:00 GMT), while the Belarus border crossings will remain shut until midday on Sunday, authorities said.

Lithuania has said balloons are sent by smugglers transporting contraband cigarettes, but it also blames Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, for not stopping the practice.

“The National Security Commission will meet next week to assess … what can be done short-term that would be painful to the smugglers and to Lukashenko’s regime, which allows them to thrive,” Lithuania’s Prime Minister Inga Ruginiene said in a statement.

Lithuania’s National Crisis Management Centre said “tens of balloons” had been detected by radar on Friday.

Vilnius airport also closed on Tuesday of this week and on October 5, when smuggler balloons entered the capital city’s airspace, authorities said.

The incident comes after two Russian military aircraft briefly entered Lithuania’s airspace in what appeared to be a new provocation from Moscow.

Lithuania’s armed forces said in a statement that the two aircraft may have been conducting refuelling exercises in the neighbouring Russian exclave of Kaliningrad when they flew 700 metres (0.43 miles) into the country at 6pm local time (15:00 GMT) on Thursday.

“This is a blatant breach of international law and territorial integrity of Lithuania,” Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda said on X in response to that incursion, adding that his country would summon Russian embassy representatives to protest against reckless and dangerous behaviour.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence, however, denied the incursion had taken place.

It said the flights were conducted “in strict compliance” with rules and “did not deviate from their route and did not violate the borders of other states”.

Russian aircraft and drones have reportedly also violated airspace in Estonia and Poland in recent weeks.

The events have heightened anxiety that Russia’s Putin might be testing NATO’s defensive reflexes.

The U.S. Navy’s supercarrier USS Gerald R. Ford and at least a portion of the rest of its strike group have been ordered to Latin American waters. This represents a new and especially significant deployment of U.S. forces into the Western Hemisphere amid a steady escalation in the scale and scope of ostensible counter-narcotics operations. Strikes on alleged drug-smuggling boats have now become routine, and the possibility that the campaign could extend to targets on land, particularly in Venezuela, continues to grow.

Sean Parnell, the Pentagon’s top spokesperson, made the unexpected announcement about Ford, which is currently on a scheduled deployment in the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea on a scheduled deployment.

“In support of the President’s [Donald Trump] directive to dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and counter narco-terrorism in defense of the Homeland, the Secretary of War [Pete Hegseth] has directed the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group and embarked carrier air wing to the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR),” Parnell said in a statement. “The enhanced U.S. force presence in the USSOUTHCOM AOR will bolster U.S. capacity to detect, monitor, and disrupt illicit actors and activities that compromise the safety and prosperity of the United States homeland and our security in the Western Hemisphere. These forces will enhance and augment existing capabilities to disrupt narcotics trafficking and degrade and dismantle TCOs.”

Ford, the Navy’s newest carrier, currently has a full air wing embarked, which includes F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters, EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets, E-2D Hawkeye airborne early warning and control planes, C-2A Greyhound Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) aircraft, and MH-60R/S Seahawk helicopters. The rest of its strike group includes four Arleigh Burke class destroyers – USS Winston S. Churchill, USS Bainbridge, USS Mahan, and USS Forrest Sherman – and likely at least one attack submarine.

USNI News has reported that it is currently unclear which of Ford’s escorts may accompany it to the SOUTHCOM AOR, citing an unnamed source. The outlet noted that, at least as of Monday, the USS Forrest Sherman and USS Mitscher were operating independently in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, respectively

It is likely to take Ford at least a week to get back across the Mediterranean and then the Atlantic Ocean. Where exactly within the SOUTHCOM AOR the carrier and elements of its strike group might take up station remains to be seen.

Regardless, just pulling Ford from a scheduled deployment is a major development and follows an already substantial build-up of U.S. naval, air, and other assets in and around the Caribbean. As of last week, approximately 10,000 U.S. personnel, in total, were forward deployed in the region. Fox News has reported that the Navy is now set to see roughly 14 percent of its combat fleets operating within SOUTHCOM’s AOR.

🚨 Today, the U.S. announced its 7th strike in SOUTHCOM, destroying a boat affiliated with a Colombian cartel. The U.S. has massed 10,000+ troops in the region, with most in Puerto Rico and on 12 U.S. Navy ships. Also:

– USAF B-52H bombers + USMC F-35B fighters conducted a… pic.twitter.com/PyYyZlWSxC

— Ian Ellis (@ianellisjones) October 19, 2025

The Navy’s aircraft carrier strike groups, in general, are at the very top of the U.S. military’s power-projection assets, offering immense capability to exercise control over surrounding sea and airspace, as well as to launch strikes on targets on the water and ashore hundreds of miles away in any direction. They also provide huge floating bases that can be utilized in other ways, including as launch points for major special operations forces missions.

Even if only a portion of the Ford Carrier Strike Group ultimately deploys to the SOUTHCOM AOR, it would still represent a major boost in capabilities and operational capacity in the theater. There are already multiple Arleigh Burke class destroyers, as well as a Ticonderoga class cruiser, in the region that could also join with Ford and its escorts, including to help provide protection for the carrier. The overall threat picture is not high, though one still does exist. It is worth noting that carrier strike groups also train heavily before deployments to be a deeply integrated, singular fighting force, something that would not exist with warships already in the Caribbean. Still, this combination of naval forces would likely be more than enough to suffice in this scenario.

Altogether, Ford‘s impending arrival can only signal a new and substantial escalation in U.S. operations in the region. As noted, American forces are now regularly striking small boats alleged to be involved in drug smuggling. Just earlier today, Secretary of War Hegseth announced the ninth such strike known to have occured since the start of September. To date, seven of the strikes have targeted boats in the Caribbean, while two more have occured in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.

Overnight, at the direction of President Trump, the Department of War carried out a lethal kinetic strike on a vessel operated by Tren de Aragua (TdA), a Designated Terrorist Organization (DTO), trafficking narcotics in the Caribbean Sea.

The vessel was known by our… pic.twitter.com/lVlw0FLBv4

— Secretary of War Pete Hegseth (@SecWar) October 24, 2025

All of this also comes amid U.S. government efforts to put particular pressure on Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro. Just yesterday, Air Force B-1 bombers conducted a show of force close to Venezuela’s coast. Last week, Air Force B-52 bombers, accompanied by U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Joint Strike Fighters, conducted a similar mission that officials later described as a “bomber attack demonstration.”

There has been a steady drumbeat of reports in recent weeks pointing to the growing possibility of direct action of some kind against Maduro’s regime. President Trump said on Wednesday that his administration was moving to target drug cartels on land, though he did not elaborate on what that might entail or where such operations might occur. He also confirmed last week that he had authorized the CIA to engage in covert operations against the Venezuelan government. Maduro has been under indictment in the United States since 2020 for drug trafficking and other charges, and American authorities currently have a $50 million bounty out for his capture.

While it will take some time for the elements of the Ford Carrier Strike Group to arrive in Latin American waters, that they are on their way already signals U.S. operations in the region are entering a new phase.

Contact the author: [email protected]

Last year, Reliance Industries Ltd signed a deal with Russian major Rosneft to import nearly 500,000 barrels per day.

India’s top importer of Russian oil, the conglomerate Reliance Industries Ltd, says it will abide by Western sanctions, ending several days of speculation about how the company will manage new measures targeting Russia’s two largest oil companies.

Reliance “will be adapting the refinery operations to meet the compliance requirements”, a company spokesperson said in a statement on Friday, while maintaining its relationships with suppliers.

“Whenever there is any guidance from the Indian Government in this respect, as always, we will be complying fully,” the statement added.

On Wednesday, the United States Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Russian majors Rosneft and Lukoil for the first time as President Donald Trump becomes increasingly frustrated with Russia’s unremitting war on Ukraine.

US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent said the move was the result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “refusal to end this senseless war” and encouraged allies to adhere to the new sanctions.

The following day, the European Union adopted its 19th package of measures against Russia, which includes a full transaction ban on Rosneft. The EU has previously said that, starting January 21, it will not receive fuel imports from refineries that received or processed Russian oil 60 days prior to shipping.

Reliance, chaired by billionaire businessman Mukesh Ambani, operates the world’s biggest refining complex in western Gujarat. The company has purchased roughly half of the 1.7-1.8 million barrels per day (bpd) of discounted Russian crude shipped to India, the news agency Press Trust of India reported this week.

In 2024, Reliance signed a 10-year deal with Rosneft to buy nearly 500,000 bpd, Reuters reported at the time. It also buys Russian oil from intermediaries.

Reliance did not offer details on how, exactly, it planned to navigate the sanctions – nor the fate of the 2024 Rosneft agreement – but emphasised it would comply with European import requirements.

“Reliance is confident its time-tested, diversified crude sourcing strategy will continue to ensure stability and reliability in its refinery operations for meeting the domestic and export requirements, including to Europe,” the company spokesperson said.

The sanctions also arrive as India navigates the fallout from Trump’s tariffs on Indian exports, which rose to 50 percent starting in August as a penalty for importing Russian oil. China and India are the world’s largest importers of Russian crude.

Trump has claimed multiple times over the past month that India has agreed to stop buying Russian oil as part of a broader trade deal, an assertion the Indian government has not confirmed.

Neither India’s Ministry of External Affairs nor oil ministries have responded since the sanctions were announced on Wednesday.

Canadian PM Mark Carney says Ottawa “can’t control” US trade policy but will “stand ready” to resume talks “when the Americans are ready.” His remarks came after President Donald Trump halted negotiations and accused Canada of “cheating” over ads opposing US tariffs.

Footage shows Israeli protesters blocking aid trucks at the Kerem Shalom crossing. They say Hamas broke ceasefire terms. WHO warns deliveries remain only a “fraction of what’s needed” and estimates $7 billion to rebuild Gaza’s shattered health system.

A drug dealer who organised a Russian-ordered arson attack on a warehouse providing aid to Ukraine has been sentenced to 17 years in prison.

Dylan Earl, 21, admitted a National Security Act offence over the attack on industrial units in Leyton, east London, on 20 March 2024.

He was jailed alongside five other men for their part in the plot.

An investigation by the Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Command found Earl, from Leicestershire, was working under the instruction of Russian mercenary Wagner Group, who are proscribed by the UK government as a terrorist organisation. The case is the first to be brought under the National Security Act 2023.

When conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Force (RSF) had reached its peak in early 2024, Saleh Iliyas and Abdurrahim, his friend-turned-family member, were doing the math: staying could mean dying at home, and leaving could mean dying on the road. But what becomes of a man whose world is torn in halves?  

The conflict in Sudan had caught Saleh unprepared. He was just a tailor with steady hands when the violence came without warning. He could remember when he heard the first gunshot in April 2023. It sounded like a joke, “but Khartoum breathed its last quiet breath before the storm then.”

Saleh never thought the recent tensions between the RSF and local communities in Khartoum would escalate into a full-blown war. Here he was now, not only consumed by the violence but also considering moving out. 

Deciding where to go was easy since he had lived part of his childhood in Nigeria. The difficult question was how to move out with a sick and ageing father, a young wife, and two children, including a newborn. 

Then a turning point came.

As he sat in front of his house for Iftar, the evening meal during Ramadan, one day, a rocket passed over his head and landed a few meters away. The result was a huge blast, fire, collapsed buildings, and many dead bodies.

“It was as if Khartoum stood still for a second, and then the screams from the women, children, and men who were either terrified or affected, followed,” he told HumAngle. 

Saleh had to leave. He spoke to his father and his friend, Abdurrahim. A driver who knew his way to safety said he needed three days to arrange it. 

Within the three days of waiting, violence intensified in Khartoum. Power lines were severed, the internet was disrupted, and rumours replaced news. The RSF and SAF engaged each other, and the war was everywhere.

Saleh’s house, where his wife, father, two children, and Abdurrahim had found safety, became both a refuge and a prison. Food dwindled. The markets were looted, and many high-rise buildings were targeted or destroyed.

“Do you think this will end soon?” his wife asked one night, her voice trembling over the silence.

He didn’t answer. He was thinking of the absurdity of the war — blood brothers from SAF and the RSF fighting each other with pride. He thought of how men killed for mere symbols and a warlord who didn’t care.

They did not sleep peacefully in the three nights before the driver decided they had to leave. “We’ll go west,” he said, “through Omdurman. Maybe reach some safe villages, then south. There are routes people are taking.” 

That night, Saleh stepped outside to see Khartoum one last time. The mornings that began with laughter and the Nile’s breeze were all gone. He remembered the faith that tomorrow would always come. Now, tomorrow was a ghost. 

And so began their exodus, not as wanderers seeking land, but as souls, as resilient individuals who believed that there was a life to continue elsewhere.

On the torturer’s fork 

To understand Saleh’s ruin, one must first understand the men who lit the match.

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudan Armed Forces, was a career soldier moulded by the doctrines of control and hierarchy. He rose through the ranks during Omar al-Bashir’s three-decade rule, loyal to the idea that the army was the soul of Sudan.

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, was his ally. He is a former camel trader from Darfur who built his power on the backs of Janjaweed militias that were once accused of all sorts of war crimes. Hemedti’s RSF, which was an offshoot of the Janjaweed, became an autonomous force, commanding men who were not new to violence.

When al-Bashir fell in 2019 after months of civilian protests, the two generals joined forces to secure the transition, but peace was only a mask. The revolution that brought them together also planted the seeds of distrust.

By early 2023, tensions over integrating the RSF into the regular army had boiled over. Hemedti refused to dissolve his forces, fearing subjugation; al-Burhan insisted it was necessary for a unified state. And so, the generals who once shared a coup became rivals in a war that would tear their country apart.

Abdulrahim and Saleh could recall that during the revolution that brought El-Bashir down, many people were supporting the army, “and then just a year into the regime, everything changed for the worse,” said Abdurrahim. “Inflation rose and prices skyrocketed five times.” 

Saleh explained that the size of bread that once cost 1 SDG (Sudanese pound) rose to 3 SDG under El-Bashir and led to protests, but it became about 15 to 20 SDG under al-Burhan. 

“So you could see why people were angry with al-Burhan, and when squabbles started between him and Hemedti, people like us were supporting the RSF because we thought he was doing a great job, not pursuing any selfish interest,” Saleh said. 

Hemedti won the hearts of the Sudanese by calling for a democratic transition. But as the tension rose, said Saleh, many RSF trucks were positioned “almost everywhere in Khartoum.” 

According to him, Khartoum residents are administrative people and are not familiar with seeing weapons and military personnel stationed on every corner. That situation led to lots of skirmishes between civilians and the RSF, which made the paramilitary lose its popularity. 

And then the war broke out. 

The first weeks were chaos. Khartoum became a battlefield, its neighbourhoods reduced to rubble of what once were. Jets roared over the city as SAF bombarded RSF positions, while paramilitary men seized streets, looted markets, and turned homes into barracks. 

Hospitals were shelled, schools attacked, buildings destroyed, and corpses lay unburied in the heat. Humanitarian corridors were promises that dissolved under fire.

“Every high-rise building, every mall, bank, or any empty building became a hideout for snipers or a target of bombs,” said Abdurrahim. “Lots of people were killed while attempting to run away.”

Despite that danger, more than 10 million Sudanese fled their homes, spilling into Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, and beyond. Refugee camps rose overnight. The United Nations called it “the world’s largest displacement crisis.” Families were separated, and in the chaos of the roads, mothers buried children without names. 

Saleh knew the stories before becoming one. He heard of those who died on the road to Port Sudan, those who drowned in the Nile trying to escape, and those who vanished into the desert.

And then foreign actors got involved. 

Egypt, with its close ties to the army, threw its weight behind al-Burhan’s forces, seeking a stable ally along the Nile. UN investigators accused the United Arab Emirates of backing the RSF, funnelling weapons through Chad and the Central African Republic, an allegation it has denied. 

Russia’s Wagner Group, long embedded in Sudan’s gold trade, was reported to have supported Dagalo’s men in securing mining sites. Countries condemned both sides, but diplomacy also took a bullet in the crossfire.

Long road to Nigeria 

One night in early 2025, Saleh, his father, his friend Abdurrahim, his wife, and their two children joined a small group of neighbours, eighteen in all, mostly women and children, to begin their escape.

They had been warned about the dangers. Snipers perched on rooftops, looters prowled the streets, and militias set up unpredictable checkpoints. 

“We had to move as one,” Saleh recalled. “If we walked separately or rode in a car, we might never make it out.”

They moved silently through the alleys of Khartoum. Behind them, the echoes of shelling rolled like distant thunder. Ahead lay uncertainty, hundreds of kilometres of dust, hunger, and fear. “But anything was better than staying,” said Saleh.

Abdurrahim, his childhood friend, walked beside him. “You know where you are going,” he said, “but you don’t know the road to follow. You just keep moving along the direction and stepping carefully to avoid danger.”

They reached the outskirts of the city by dawn, where they met the driver, a middle-aged man who had turned his pickup into a vessel of salvation amidst a war. He took what little they carried: documents, a few clothes, and “some stuff my father said was important,” recalled Saleh.

The drive southward revealed the full reality of the war. Buildings Saleh once admired — the glass towers, the university Abdulrahim attended, the small tea shops that once lined the streets — lay in ruins. Skeletons of burned cars littered the roads. 

They zigzagged across Sudan, avoiding the territories of warring factions, surviving on bread, water, and anything their small money could buy. The journey that should have taken days stretched into weeks. 

“We knew it wouldn’t be easy,” Saleh said, “but we didn’t imagine it would be this hard.”

When they finally reached the border with South Sudan, they rested for a day. They had thought they wouldn’t be welcomed, especially due to the recent history of conflict between North and South Sudan, “but were really supported there.”

“My son was even given water by one of their soldiers,” Saleh said. 

From South Sudan, they moved again, passing through the Central African Republic into Chad. They met others moving in the same direction on foot. One group of about ten told Saleh they had started the journey as more than thirty. “They looked haunted,” he said. “Their faces told stories the mouth could not.”

It rained the day they arrived in Chad. They were temporarily registered as refugees, yet Saleh felt restless after a few weeks. “You cannot live waiting for mercy every day,” he said softly. “You begin to forget who you are.”

Nigeria, where his late grandfather hailed from, seemed the next logical destination. Though Saleh himself was born in Saudi Arabia, he spent some of his childhood years in Nigeria.  

“I thought we could come here and start afresh before the war ended,” he said.

Now in Nigeria, the dust of the journey still clings to his eyes, the eyes of a man who has seen too much of the evil humans can do to one another.

Safety and its aftermath 

From the Chadian border, through Maiduguri, in Nigeria’s North East, they finally arrived in Kano, in the country’s North West. Saleh and Abdurrahim found a city that looked energetic, but beneath it ran a quiet struggle. They rented a small shop in Rimin Auzinawa and waited for customers who rarely came.

“The economy is choking everyone,” Saleh said. “People rarely bring new clothes, and when they do, the amount they pay is too small.”

They had imagined Nigeria as a place of opportunity, where hard work would bring dignity. But the naira’s fall made everything expensive. “You open the shop from morning to night,” Abdurrahim said, “and at the end, you barely earn enough for bread.”

Saleh and Abdurrahim told HumAngle that the money they had come with was about to finish, and they were not earning enough to sustain life. Now, as evening fell over Kano, Saleh and Abdurrahim sat outside their shop, their machines silent, their thoughts elsewhere.

“We will leave the families here,” Saleh said, his voice low. “Let them have stability, even if we don’t. Algeria is not home, but maybe there, a man can at least feed those he loves.”

And so, once again, the journey calls — not for safety this time, but for survival.

South Korea has launched its biggest and most ambitious submarine yet, the Jang Yeong-sil, as the first of the second batch of its locally designed and built KSS-III program. The boat, first of three in this sub-class, is notable for its expanded vertical launch cell arrangement, but also boasts a host of other advanced features.

In a ceremony yesterday, the Republic of Korea Navy and South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) held a launching ceremony for the ROKS Jang Yeong-sil at Hanwha Ocean’s Geoje shipyard, in the southern part of the country.

A construction contract for the submarine was signed in 2019, followed by the steel-cutting ceremony in 2021, while the keel-laying ceremony took place in 2023.

The Jang Yeong-sil, as the first of the Batch II submarines, follows on from KSS-III Batch I, also known as the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class.

There are some significant differences between the two sub-classes.

The Batch II boats have a surfaced displacement of around 3,500 tons, compared to 3,300 tons for the Batch I submarines. The Batch II is also longer, at 293 feet, compared to just under 274 feet for the Batch I.

More importantly, Batch II brings new capabilities, which the Republic of Korea Navy and DAPA summarize as “enhanced detection, strike capability, stealth, and survivability.”

In terms of detection, Batch II incorporates an updated combat system and sonar system, which are said to offer enhanced information processing and target detection capabilities.

The expanded strike potential of the new submarine is centered around its land-attack capability.

In its Batch I form, the KSS-III already had provisions for six vertical launch system (VLS) cells that are able to accommodate cruise missiles or even submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Batch II, meanwhile, increases the capacity to 10 VLS cells.

The KSS-III submarines put South Korea in a select group of countries that operate submarines with an SLBM capability. Unusually for a weapon of this type, the South Korean weapon has a conventional warhead.

Successful underwater ejection tests of an SLBM from the first of these submarines were reportedly first conducted around September last year.

Few details are known about the SLBM itself, which is variously named Hyunmoo-IV-4 or K-SLBM. Early reports suggested the missile has a range of 311 miles and that it could be a naval variant of the Hyunmoo 2B ballistic missile. More recently, it has been attributed to a range of 497 miles.

A land-based launch of a Republic of Korea Army Hyunmoo 2B ballistic missile:

Beyond SLBMs, the VLS cells could be used to eventually accommodate hypersonic cruise missiles, a type of weapon that Seoul is currently exploring via the Hycore demonstrator program. A submarine-launched hypersonic cruise missile would give South Korea considerable advantages when it comes to conducting short-notice standoff strikes, especially against highly defended and time-sensitive targets.

Other armament on the Batch II comprises six 533mm torpedo tubes that can be loaded with Tiger Shark torpedoes or C-Star-III anti-ship cruise missiles, or alternatively, Submarine Launched Mobile Mines (SLMM).

Stealth and mission endurance are enhanced by the Batch II’s advanced new lithium-ion battery-based submerged propulsion system. This enables it to “operate underwater for longer durations and sustain high-speed maneuvers, thereby reducing the risk of exposure during operations.” While it is still a diesel-electric submarine at its core, with diesel generators and batteries that charge from those generators, the advanced battery tech can take the place of air-independent propulsion (AIP) technology while offering similar, and in some cases superior, capabilities. Even more interesting, is this new boat also has a fuel-cell-based ‘auxiliary’ AIP capability, so it can presumably charge its batteries or even provide propulsion aside from them, while submerged.

Back in early 2017, The War Zone’s Tyler Rogoway looked at the benefits of lithium-ion batteries, which not only offer advantages over traditional lead-acid cells but could challenge AIP technology for use in new-build submarines overall. This prediction now seems to be playing out.

Other stealth features introduced on the Batch II include various noise and vibration reduction technologies, among them a rubber acoustic coating, which combines to ensure the boats produce less underwater radiated noise.

No less importantly, as a domestically designed and produced submarine, the KSS-III Batch II incorporates a greater proportion of locally developed and manufactured components. This reduces South Korea’s reliance on foreign manufacturers and, very importantly, makes it easier to export the design. The KSS-III is already in the running for Canada’s new submarine requirement, with up to 12 boats planned, and there are growing opportunities for selling advanced diesel-electric subs in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.

The ROKS Jang Yeong-sil will soon embark on a series of sea trials and evaluations, and it’s scheduled to be delivered to the Republic of Korea Navy at the end of 2027. Another two Batch II boats, so far unnamed, are now under construction.

The importance of Seoul’s submarine program has increased in recent years, including the decision to abandon plans to build its first aircraft carrier and instead focus on its underwater fleet, which has received more funding.

In particular, the KSS-III program has emerged as a cornerstone of the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation program, or KMPR, also known as Overwhelming Response, an effort to develop ways to retaliate against North Korea, using conventional weapons, should Pyongyang launch a first strike. In particular, submarines are valuable here for bringing the survivable conventional strike capability that the KMPR plan calls for.

The combination of the KSS-III and SLBMs is part of Seoul’s broader focus on missile programs that are being developed and fielded in response to North Korea’s expanding missile capabilities. These also include more powerful land-based weapons, but the SLBM is a much more survivable option, which is of particular importance, bearing in mind the threat of a preemptive strike from the North.

Should the North launch a nuclear attack, the survivability of the submarines should allow a conventional response, even if land-based missiles may have been taken out already. In this way, the SLBMs could be fired against regime targets and command and control facilities, hitting them with much less notice and more kinetic power than a cruise missile barrage. The fact that this quasi-second-strike capability exists should also help dissuade North Korean aggression in the first place.

These submarines and their SLBMs also carry a political dimension, reducing South Korea’s dependence on the United States when it comes to deterrence.

At the same time, the submarines can also take on many other roles in a potential conflict with North Korea, including surgical strikes using cruise missiles, minelaying, insertion of special forces, and, not least, hunting down North Korea’s submarines and new heavily-armed (but questionable) surface combatants.

Potentially, South Korea’s experience with the KSS-III program could lead to even bigger and more ambitious submarines.

In the past, there has been discussion of a potential follow-on nuclear-powered submarine design. With previous missile restrictions on South Korea having been removed, these submarines could potentially be armed with new and bigger SLBMs offering much greater range.

Until the Biden administration scrapped missile restrictions that had been in place since 1979, South Korea was limited to developing missiles with a maximum range of 500 miles. This change could open the door to South Korea developing SLBMs with a range greater than 500 miles, in excess of the Hyunmoo-IV-4.

As it now stands, the KMPR initiative is based around conventional weapons only, but there has been growing speculation that Seoul might eventually commit to developing nuclear warheads, too. SLBMs would be the obvious candidate to deliver these and having this option already integrated into existing submarines would allow for Seoul to move rapidly to fielding a second-strike strategic deterrent if the choice was ever made to do so, which still seems very unlikely at this time.

For now, the Republic of Korea Navy can look forward to starting operations with its most capable submarine so far, providing a powerful and versatile bulwark to fast-paced missile and nuclear developments in North Korea.

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