Taiwan

Amid heightened Japan-China tensions, US President Donald Trump spoke by telephone with Chinese President Xi Jinping. While Trump termed it a positive development, stating he would visit China in April 2026, China claimed that it categorically made it clear that “Taiwan’s return to China was an ‘integral part of the postwar international order.” While it has been reported that Trump requested a phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, the details of the conversation between the two haven’t been made public yet.

Trump’s claim of “extremely strong” US-China relations has once again seized global attention. Earlier, last month, just ahead of his highly anticipated meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, Trump boldly announced on Truth Social, “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!”

Unsurprisingly, the statement sparked widespread discussion, directly invoking China and seemingly reviving the long-dormant G2 concept, an idea previously floated by former President Barack Obama.

This apparent attempt to resurrect the “G2” notion, which envisions shared global leadership between the US and China, marks a notable rhetorical shift and is surprising given that Trump has been hawkish on China even during his first term as the president. By invoking it, Washington has brought back a concept dismissed as a faulty trade-off, given the persistent and often adversarial nature of US-China relations. Media analyses suggest that this move reflects a growing recognition within the US of China’s rising power and an uneasy acknowledgement of its near-equal status on the world stage. The renewed attention signals an implicit acceptance within American policy circles of China’s expanding international influence and the shifting balance of global power.

For China, however, the idea holds little appeal. First, China continues to present itself as a developing country, aspiring to lead the Global South and, eventually, to achieve broader global influence. Unlike the West, China sees strategic value in retaining the support of developing nations to bolster its legitimacy. While it aims to surpass the US militarily, economically, and technologically, it is unlikely to embrace a bilateral framework implying formalized co-governance of the world. Second, the ideological, strategic, and global ambitions gap between China and the US remains vast, limiting the feasibility of any institutionalized G2 arrangement. Third, if such a framework were ever to exist, it would likely involve broader coalitions of nations with differing ideologies, capacities, and priorities, rather than a US-China duopoly. In this light, the G2 concept appears even less plausible for China in 2025 than it did in the 2000s.

While much commentary has focused on how this discourse may be interpreted in China, the implications extend far beyond the bilateral relationship. Washington’s allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific are closely observing these developments. For many in the region, stability in US-China relations is desirable, as it would help mitigate the risks of confrontation, economic disruption, regional instability, and global upheavals. Yet Trump’s rhetoric has also generated unease among America’s regional partners regarding Washington’s long-term strategic intentions.

Concerns are growing that a return to the G2 framework could signal a weakening of US commitment to the Indo-Pacific, particularly in terms of security and regional order. While sustained engagement with China is widely accepted as necessary, framing the relationship as one of shared global governance may alarm America’s allies and partners, especially the Quad countries, the Philippines, and Taiwan. For these countries, any suggestion of a US-China condominium raises doubts about the credibility of the US’s status as a security guarantor and its assurances of collective defense and regional stability.

From the US perspective, reviving the G2 discourse may appear advantageous to smooth the way for a rare earth materials deal with China or to ease bilateral tensions. But fundamental differences and rivalry cannot be erased: China’s ultimate goal is to overtake the US. In all likelihood, China will view G2 rhetoric skeptically, interpreting it as a sign of US weakness and declining influence in the Indo-Pacific.

The Xi-Trump phone call and China’s reiteration of the Taiwan claim put pressure on Trump’s G2 plan. How Trump would manage ties with Japan and Taiwan while building relations with China is an issue worthy of international attention.

Trump’s episodic and erratic approach to China and the region risks eroding the trust the US has painstakingly built with its partners. There is little chance that countries such as India, Japan, or the Philippines would accept a bipolar world dominated solely by the US and China. Rather than serving as a stabilizer, the G2 concept is more likely to be seen as an attempt to divide the world into two poles once again, or worse, as a signal that the US is content with a bipolar world rather than a genuinely multipolar order.

Even if the G2 never materializes, the rhetoric has already strengthened China’s position while placing the US in a strategic bind. In effect, it is a win-win for China but a lose-lose for America. There are limitations to America First not only for the region but also for America itself and its foreign policy. The Trump administration’s path would do well to seriously consider the perspectives of its allies and partners, rather than advancing a strategy that ultimately benefits China.

One of the most acclaimed indie films of the year from the winner of last year’s Best Picture Oscar will be streaming on Netflix from Friday

Netflix is adding one of the best films of 2025 that you may not have heard of but is definitely worth your attention this week.

From director Shih-Ching Tsou and co-written by her long-time collaborator Sean Baker, Left-Handed Girl is a brilliantly understated family drama that will leave you breathless.

Baker is the most recent recipient of the Best Picture trophy at the Academy Awards for his masterful modern epic Anora, starring Mikey Madison, while Tsou has worked with him on his other films such as Tangerine and The Florida Project.

Tsou has now made her solo directorial debut with Left-Handed Girl, a heartfelt portrait of single mother Shu-Fen (played by Janel Tsai) who moves back to Taipei with her two daughters.

When her five-year-old I-Jing (Nina Ye) develops a dominant left hand, the family struggles to come to terms with her newfound quirk when her superstitious grandpa calls it her “devil hand” and forbids I-Jing from using it.

Set to stream on Netflix from Friday, 28th November, the film has already received critical acclaim and will be Taiwan’s submission for best international film at next year’s Oscars.

The Guardian has awarded it five-stars, writing this “striking Taiwanese family drama is a real marvel”.

They went on: “Tsou and Baker’s script sharply examines what it really means to lose face: which shames are noble, which are indulgent and what should be passed from one generation to the next?”

“Above all else, this film features what may be one of the best child performances that I’ve seen in recent memory,” one Letterboxd reviewer claimed after seeing Left-Handed Girl at the Toronto International Film Festival.

“Where this movie goes from one innocent little assumption passed by family escalates into something unexpected. It’s enough to prove Shih-Ching Tsou is on her way to becoming a great filmmaker in her own right too.”

Someone else shared: “Genuinely a very strong contender for the best film of the year. So glad I took the time to see this.

“It was so nice to hear the incredibly positive reactions from the other folks around me in the theatre when the credits rolled. It’s been a minute since I’ve been in a theatre where the audience clapped at the end. So lovely!”

A third wrote: “It does not surprise me that Sean Baker is one of the screenwriters on this film. It is a beautifully nuanced depiction of family dynamics, and family secrets.

“The wonderful performances, sometimes very raw, also felt very flawed and real. This film and also their other collaborations all worth revisiting!”

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And a final fan said: “What a remarkable film. One of the most charming kid performances I’ve seen.

“The stories/struggles of each character in this family are so well balanced. Every heartwarming and heartbreaking moment just lands perfectly.”

Will you be checking out this lesser-known gem from Taiwan now it’s becoming available to stream at home?

Left-Handed Girl is streaming from Friday, 28th November on Netflix.

Takaichi’s suggestion earlier this month that Tokyo could intervene militarily if Taiwan is attacked has enraged Beijing.

Japan has denied a report that said United States President Donald Trump had advised Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi not to provoke China over Taiwan’s sovereignty.

In a news briefing on Thursday, Japan’s top government spokesperson Minoru Kihara said “there is no such fact” about an article published in The Wall Street Journal claiming that Trump had made such a remark to the Japanese leader.

He declined to comment further on the details of the “diplomatic exchange”.

The row between Asia’s two biggest economies began after Takaichi had suggested earlier this month that Tokyo could intervene militarily in any attack on self-ruled Taiwan, which China claims as part of its territory.

Takaichi’s remark ignited anger in Beijing.

After the incident, Beijing’s Foreign Ministry said that Chinese leader Xi Jinping pressed the issue in a phone call with Trump on Monday, saying Taiwan’s return was an “integral part of the post-war international order”.

The WSJ reported on Thursday that, shortly after that phone call between the US and Chinese leaders, “Trump set up a call with Takaichi and advised her not to provoke Beijing on the question of the island’s sovereignty”. The report quoted unidentified Japanese officials and an American briefed on the call.

Takaichi said in her reporting of the call with Trump that they discussed the US president’s conversation with Xi, as well as bilateral relations.

“President Trump said we are very close friends, and he offered that I should feel free to call him anytime,” she said.

Beijing, which has threatened to use force to take control of the self-ruled island, also took other punitive steps to register its anger over Takaichi’s initial remarks in parliament on November 7.

It summoned Tokyo’s ambassador and advised Chinese citizens against travelling to Japan.

As the diplomatic row escalated, the Chinese embassy in Tokyo issued a new warning to its citizens on Wednesday, saying there had been a surge in crime in Japan, and that Chinese citizens had reported “being insulted, beaten and injured for no reason”.

Japan’s Foreign Ministry denied any increase in crime, citing figures from the National Police Agency in response that showed the number of murders from January to October had halved compared with the same period in 2024.

Last week, Japanese media reported that China will again ban all imports of Japanese seafood as the diplomatic dispute between the two countries escalated.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun reiterated on Thursday a call for Japan to officially retract Takaichi’s comments.

“The Japanese side’s attempt to downplay, dodge, and cover up Prime Minister Takaichi’s seriously erroneous remarks by not raising them again is self-deception,” Guo told a regular news briefing.

“China will never accept this.”

Meanwhile, Trump’s public silence on Japan’s escalating dispute with China has further frayed nerves in Tokyo.

Some officials worry that Trump may be prepared to soften support for Taiwan in pursuit of a trade accord with China, a move they fear will embolden Beijing and cause conflict in an increasingly militarised East Asia.

“For Trump, what matters most is US-China relations,” said Kazuhiro Maejima, a professor of US politics at Sophia University.

“Japan has always been treated as a tool or a card to manage that relationship,” Maejima told Reuters news agency.

Washington’s envoy to Tokyo has said the US supports Japan in the face of China’s “coercion”, but two senior ruling party lawmakers said they had hoped for more full-throated support from their top security ally in Washington, DC.

Taiwan has unveiled a T$1.25 trillion (US$39.9 billion) supplementary defence budget, marking one of its most significant military spending increases in recent years. The announcement comes after a sustained period of Chinese military pressure, including near-daily incursions into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone and expanding naval activities. Beijing continues to assert that Taiwan is its territory, while Taipei rejects these claims and argues that China’s actions threaten regional stability. President Lai Ching-te, who has previously signaled a desire to strengthen Taiwan’s defences, aims to increase military expenditure to 5% of GDP by 2030 a major shift for an island long reliant on the United States for support. The new spending plan reflects Taipei’s conclusion that the security environment has deteriorated to a point requiring a rapid buildup of deterrence capabilities.

WHY IT MATTERS

This defence package is significant because it signals that Taiwan is preparing for a prolonged period of heightened tension with China. By raising spending above 3% of GDP for the first time since 2009, Taiwan is accelerating efforts to modernize its armed forces and expand asymmetric capabilities a key strategy for countering a much larger Chinese military. The move also has implications for broader Indo-Pacific security, as Taiwan sits at the center of major global supply chains, especially semiconductors. Any conflict involving the island would have worldwide economic repercussions. Additionally, the announcement tests the United States’ commitment under its legal obligation to help Taiwan defend itself, particularly as the Trump administration has so far approved only a limited number of arms sales this year. The overall decision underscores the growing sense in Taipei that deterrence, rather than diplomacy alone, is essential for survival.

A range of actors will be directly affected by Taiwan’s expanded defence spending. For Taiwan itself, the budget reflects both political determination and public concern, as leaders balance the urgency of national security with domestic expectations about economic priorities. China stands on the opposite end of the debate, condemning the move as wasteful, provocative, and orchestrated by foreign powers, and warning that it will only destabilize cross-strait relations. The United States remains a pivotal player, as Taiwan’s primary security partner and arms supplier, and its actions in the coming months will shape Beijing’s and Taipei’s strategy alike. Regional governments such as Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations are also stakeholders, because escalation in the Taiwan Strait would directly affect their own security and trade routes. Beyond governments, the global technology sector especially companies dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductor production is intricately tied to the island’s stability and therefore to its defence posture.

WHAT’S NEXT

The supplementary defence budget will now move to Taiwan’s legislature, where it is expected to pass given the governing party’s support for military strengthening. Once approved, the government is likely to detail specific procurement plans, which may include new air-defence systems, long-range missiles, drone platforms, and naval upgrades aimed at deterring a potential blockade or invasion. Attention will also focus on Washington, where upcoming decisions on arms transfers will indicate the level of U.S. engagement in Taiwan’s defence strategy. China is expected to respond with a combination of military signaling such as increased air and naval patrols and sharper rhetoric accusing Taiwan of escalating tensions. Regionally, allies and partners may adjust military planning and enhance coordination as they assess the implications of Taiwan’s defence buildup for broader Indo-Pacific stability. Over the next several months, the situation is likely to remain fluid as each stakeholder reacts to the shifting balance of power across the Taiwan Strait.

With information from Reuters.

For the second time in a week, Japanese fighters scrambled to intercept a suspected Chinese drone flying near the island of Yonaguni. The events come amid growing tensions between the Asian neighbors and highlight the increasing strategic importance of Japan’s southernmost island, which has seen an expanded presence of Japanese and U.S. forces.

Located just 70 miles east of Taiwan, Yonaguni is an increasingly important part of the allied effort to defend the so-called first island chain from Chinese aggression. It is roughly seven miles long and three miles across at its widest point, it has two small ports and an airfield. It’s where Japan wants to set up an air defense system. It’s also where the U.S. Marine Corps recently set up a forward arming and refueling point (FARP), its first that close to the breakaway Chinese nation.

Amid all this tumult, U.S. President Donald Trump spoke with leaders of both nations today and Monday to discuss the future of Taiwan, among other issues. We’ll address that more later in this story.

“On November 24…we confirmed that an estimated Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle had passed between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and in response,” the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on X. “We scrambled fighter jets from the Air Self-Defense Force’s Southwest Air Defense Force to intercept it.”

Once detected, the suspected drone flew south for about 250 miles, then cut east for about another 100 miles before returning along the same route, according to a map published by the Japanese MoD, which provided no additional details about the incident.

Meanwhile, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense reported a Chinese drone and a helicopter traveled along a similar route on Monday, but it is unclear if the two incidents are related.

Monday’s interception by Japan followed a similar incident a week earlier.

Chinese drone flights are fairly routine along this path around Taiwan and during major drills, the skies see a heavier presence of Chinese military aviation assets. However, tensions have increased between the two nations with a long history of sometimes violent enmity. In particular, Beijing is enraged by Tokyo’s announcement that it will place surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) on Yonaguni and Japan considers any attack on Taiwan an existential threat. China has made no secret about wanting to subsume Taiwan, by force if necessary, a concern we have frequently addressed.

Speaking to reporters during a visit to Yonaguni on Sunday, Japan’s defense minister said his country is moving forward with plans to deploy an unspecified number of air defense systems on the island.

“The deployment can help lower the chance of an armed attack on our country,” Shinjiro Koizumi explained. “The view that it will heighten regional tensions is not accurate.” 

In January, former Defense Minister Gen Nakatani said Tokyo wanted to base Type 03 Chu-SAM missiles on Yonaguni, Bloomberg News noted. 

The medium-range Chu-SAM was first introduced in 2003, according to the U.S. Army, and its missiles can hit aerial targets up to roughly 30 miles away.

“The SAM’s vehicle chassis is based on the Kato Works Ltd/Mitsubishi Heavy Industries NK series heavy crane truck,” the Army explained. “It uses a state-of-the-art active electronically scanned array radar.”

The Chu-SAM system includes a command center, radar unit, launcher, and transloader, with each unit equipped with six missiles that travel at Mach 2.5, the Army noted, adding that it “can track up to 100 targets simultaneously and target 12 at the same time, engaging fighter jets, helicopters, and cruise missiles.”

Given its stated range, the Chu-SAM system can engage aerial targets roughly halfway between Yonaguni and Taiwan’s east coast (likely even farther in reality), an area Chinese aviation assets are likely to fly should it plan to invade the island nation.

Once again, this could be just one system, Japan also has the U.S. Patriot system, as well.

Koizumi’s comments about the Chu-SAM raised hackles in Beijing.

“Japan’s deployment of offensive weapons in the southwest Islands close to China’s Taiwan region is a deliberate move that breeds regional tensions and stokes military confrontation,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told reporters on Monday. “Given Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s erroneous remarks on Taiwan, this move is extremely dangerous and should put Japan’s neighboring countries and the international community on high alert.”

Mao was referencing another Chinese point of contention.

The newly elected Japanese Prime Minister recently stated that a Chinese military blockade of Taiwan would constitute a “survival-threatening” situation, thereby enabling “collective defense” alongside U.S. military forces, Newsweek reported.

“It was the first time such an explicit remark had been made by a sitting prime minister of Japan, which like the United States has long been deliberately vague as to whether it would intervene militarily in the event of an attack on Taiwan,” NBC News posited.

As this turmoil unfolded, a Chinese company released a video simulating an attack on Japanese ships and other targets using its newly introduced YKJ-1000 hypersonic missile. Although it isn’t clear if the timing is related, it is another indicator of the increasingly bellicose messaging between the two neighbors.

Trump has taken a mixed approach toward Taiwan.

The American president has at times expressed a degree of thinly veiled skepticism about Taiwan’s value to the U.S., The Diplomat noted. He has also implied the U.S. is committed to Taiwan’s freedom. In his latest administration, Trump has signed off on a $700 million deal to sell Taipei National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) medium-range air defense systems, a plan first put forward under the Biden administration. In addition, Trump authorized a $330 million deal to sell Taiwan aircraft parts.

Meanwhile, as we mentioned earlier in this story, the Trump administration has also authorized the temporary deployment of Marines to Yonaguni to set up a FARP to extend the range of helicopter patrols from the island.

“No U.S. Marine CH-53E has ever before landed that far southwest in Japan, nor has a FARP ever been established there,” Maj. Patrick X. Kelly, executive officer of Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 462, said in a statement. “This evolution not only validated that MAG’s [Marine Aircraft Group 36] organic heavy-lift assault support helicopters, in support of its adjacent units and our JGSDF [Japan Ground Self-Defense Force] partners, can generate tempo anywhere the commander should choose, but also served as a huge leap forward in our relations between the U.S. Marines and the JGSDF.”

“FARPs significantly extend MAG-36’s operational reach,” said Col. Lee W. Hemming, commanding officer of MAG-36. “Our ability to rapidly establish and disassemble these sites in austere environments enhances our capacity to respond to, and support, disaster relief and other critical operations throughout the region – particularly in conjunction with our Japanese Self-Defense Forces partners. This collaborative FARP capability underscores our commitment to regional security and humanitarian assistance.”

Given its proximity to Taiwan, Yonaguni also makes sense as a forward staging area for standoff weapons to strike Chinese targets, including ships, and advanced radars to track their movement, if Japan decides to go that route. Marine Corps doctrine calls for troops to be staged in China’s weapons engagement zone ahead of any conflict, and more islands in the region will likely become increasingly armed, but none are as close to Taiwan as this one.

The U.S. Army’s Typhon ground-based missile system, which can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6 multi-purpose missiles, was recently deployed to Japan, but some 1,200 miles to the northeast on Honshu Island. Last year, we wrote about reported plans for the U.S. Marine Corps units and their High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) to be rushed to the southwestern Japanese islands near Taiwan in case of a Chinese invasion. The anonymously sourced Kyodo News report about that move didn’t specifically mention Yonaguni, but it makes sense that it could be a destination for such future efforts.

Another Marine weapons system that might even make more sense for Yonaguni is Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) armed with Naval Strike Missiles (NSMs). In previous reporting, we noted that these highly mobile missile systems have been deployed to Luzon in the Philippines. The NSM is well suited for fighting in the littorals. With the baseline NSM’s range of around 110 nautical miles, placing these systems on Yonaguni would hold Chinese vessels operating near the northern part and the backside of Taiwan at risk. They can also strike fixed targets on land. NMESIS is highly mobile on land, making its launchers very hard to target at distance by adversary forces.

While weapons like NMESIS on Yonaguni could pose a real threat to Chinese forces trying to take the island, getting them there in the case of a Chinese move on Taiwan will likely be a great challenge. The idea would be to have them there permanently or rush them there at the start of a crisis, before the shooting begins. This would work as a deterrent to keep the fighting from starting, as well as tactical capability once the fighting begins.

Still, Beijing has a very large arsenal of missiles, aircraft and ships on hand and in development that could rain fire on Yonaguni. Any U.S. logistic missions having to push materiel forward in a time of crisis to the island would be traveling deep within China’s anti-access bubble, as well, which may be entirely unsurvivable. So, once things light off, if weapons are fired from the island, or even preemptive action by China, could widen the conflict significantly, and any forces on the island could be cutoff and under fire.

As previously mentioned, amid the boiling tensions, Trump spoke with both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Takaichi on Monday.

“Taiwan’s return to China is an important component of the post-war international order,” Xi told Trump, according to an official account of the conversation by China’s state media. For his part, Trump affirmed that the U.S. “understands the importance of the Taiwan issue to China,” Chinese media said.

“Takaichi said Trump briefed her on his overnight phone call with China’s Xi and the current state of U.S.-China relations,” according to The Associated Press. “She said that she and Trump also discussed strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and ‘development and challenges that the Indo-Pacific region is faced with.’”

“We confirmed the close coordination between Japan and the United States,” the Japanese leader added, declining to give any other details of her talks with Trump, citing diplomatic protocol.

Regardless of diplomatic platitudes, when it comes to Yonaguni Island, moving surface-to-air missiles there is largely a defensive overture. It’s also the first step in providing protection for additional assets, should Japan choose to allow their deployment. But for now, it certainly has gotten Beijing’s attention.

Contact the author: [email protected]

In November 2025 a public disagreement between Beijing and Tokyo over Taiwan exposed how the island’s fate now reaches far beyond Taipei, shaping trade, military planning and regional alliances across East Asia and further beyond.

The Taiwan question has recently re-emerged as a tension point between China and Japan. This raises broader questions about East Asian security. Beijing affirms its “One China policy”, treating Taiwan as a breakaway province to be “reunified” by force if necessary and reacts sharply to any foreign involvement. Avoiding rhetoric that might provoke its eastern neighbor until now, the consensus in Tokyo is shifting as many senior Japanese officials say a Chinese assault on Taiwan that threatens Japan’s survival could justify a military response. None of this is new, but the tone is.

China’s Firm Position on Taipei

Beijing’s stance remains absolute: it is Chinese territory, and any formal push or support from foreign actors for its independence is intolerable. Officials frame reunification as inevitable and non-negotiable, part of what state discourse calls the “national rejuvenation” of China. In recent months this posture has been accompanied by more visible coercion: maritime patrols in the South China Sea, large-scale exercises around the island and targeted economic measures against partners perceived to have crossed this line.

Any country that appears to undercut China’s claim through military cooperation with Taipei, public statements of support, or strengthened security ties risks a Chinese response. From Beijing’s point of view, fully controlling the region would extend China’s reach beyond its coast by securing sea lanes and projection space for the People’s Liberation Army. Politically, it would close a chapter Beijing sees as a Cold War remnant after a century of perceived humiliation.

Japan’s Stakes in Taiwan

Tokyo’s formal policy remains rooted in the One China framework as it does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state and officially supports a peaceful cross-Strait resolution. Security considerations and proximity to Taiwan have forced Japanese leaders into increasing their attention to the island in recent years. Hard-line conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s public remarks this month, that a Chinese assault on Taiwan which threatens Japanese survival could trigger a full military response, marked a break with decades of deliberate ambiguity.

It is likely that pending targets have been moved forward and planning for collective self-defence has become more explicit, while defence cooperation with partners particularly the United States under U.S. President Donald Trump has grown more visible. Taipei sits near Japan’s western islands; Yonaguni, the closest island of the Okinawa prefecture is roughly 100 km from Taiwan’s eastern coast and the sea lanes that run here carry a large share of Japan’s energy imports. The presence of substantial U.S. forces in Japan ties Tokyo’s security to Washington’s responses, making it politically and militarily difficult for Tokyo to ignore developments in the Strait.

Reactions, Responses and Confrontation

Responding with strong diplomatic protests and a suite of retaliatory measures to Prime Minister Takaichi’s parliamentary remarks on November 7, Chinese commerce authorities re-imposed bans on Japanese seafood and warned consumers against Japanese products urging its citizens to avoid travel to Japan. Diplomatically, China demanded a retraction and summoned Japan’s ambassador in Beijing to issue a formal protest. This was widely seen as an unusually public move given the recent history of cautious diplomacy in the area.

Japan has issued strong protests over the consul’s remarks and dispatched a senior envoy to Beijing to calm the situation but the talks produced little immediate de-escalation. Japanese fighters were set on high alert after a surveillance drone was detected between Taiwan and Yonaguni, underlining how geographically close this theatre is to Japanese territory. Such moves are not isolated acts but are part of a larger pattern meant to act as a “show of strength” while stopping short of starting a full-scale war.

Why This Small Island is Significant to Both Countries

For Beijing, the island is a core territorial claim bolstered by narratives about sovereignty and historical rectification. Losing the island, or allowing it to consolidate international backing as a separate political entity, would be depicted by Chinese leaders as an unacceptable erosion of national integrity. Its location is also a matter of strategy: full control over the island would make it harder for outside powers to operate in China’s seas.

For Tokyo, the calculus is concrete and immediate. Taiwan’s proximity means that military operations in the straits could quickly affect Japanese airspace and waters. Japanese industry is also deeply integrated with Taiwanese firms notably in fields such as semiconductors and electronics, so instability would hit the stock markets and raise costs for manufacturers.

Possible Future Scenarios and Regional Impact

The stand-off could begin a prolonged period of low-level confrontation. Both Beijing and Tokyo could double down: China sustaining pressure through patrols and economic sanctions, Japan strengthening its military capabilities and aligning more tightly with the United States and other western partners.

This doesn’t mean that there is no time for pragmatic de-escalation from both sides.  Recognising the mutual costs of prolonged hostility, Tokyo could clarify that its statements were contextual and not a call to aggressive action, while Beijing could temper sanctions once its political point has been made. Diplomacy behind closed doors might restore exchanges and trade, though the underlying policy differences between the two countries would remain unresolved. Therefore, such an outcome would buy more time but not resolve the underlying causes of these issues.

A third way would be one where a deeper realignment could take place. Japan might accelerate defence modernisation and legal reforms to make collective defence more actionable. On its part, China could respond by heavily investing and intensifying military presence in its south or seeking closer security ties with partners that counterbalance U.S. influence.

In the worst case, simple miscalculations could lead to direct clashes for example between Chinese forces operating near Taiwan and Japanese ships or aircraft which could rapidly draw in the United States given treaty commitments and strategic interests.

While full-scale war remains unlikely for now, we can never be 100% sure as the simple probability increases more and more with these incidents that have developed recently.

Implications for the Rest of The World

No matter if the situation escalates further or not, the United States will undoubtebly remain a central factor to any such issue. Washington’s alliance with Tokyo and its historically ambiguous but substantial support for Taipei mean that any serious incident will have trans-Pacific repercussions.

Neighbouring states like South Korea, ASEAN members, Australia, India, etc. would be forced into a difficult diplomatic calculation, by balancing economic ties with Beijing against security concerns and relations with Washington and Tokyo. Economically, prolonged instability would disrupt semiconductor production, shipping routes and regional investment, with global consequences.

Most analysts agree that this issue has shifted from a regional diplomatic concern to a great security risk for the larger world. In the near term, careful diplomacy from both sides may limit the damage, but the issues at hand suggest this will most likely be a long term gap in East Asian security. How both sides manage politics and deterrence will determine whether the next phase is a steady containment or a dangerous step toward direct military confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

Because of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statements in the Diet regarding the Taiwan issue, the already fragile China–Japan relationship has deteriorated rapidly. China has issued travel and study-abroad warnings for Japan, effectively halted imports of Japanese seafood, sent coast guard vessels into the “territorial waters” of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and had three warships transit the Osumi Strait in southern Japan.

At the same time, Beijing took the unusual step of announcing in advance that Premier Li Qiang would not meet the Japanese prime minister at the G20 summit. In just ten days, China launched a strong, multi-domain counterattack—political, diplomatic, economic, and military—with no signs of de-escalation.

If Prime Minister Takaichi does not retract her remarks, Beijing is likely to escalate even further and drag the United States into the dispute.

What actually happened? Is China overreacting? How far will Beijing take this confrontation?

Let us revisit the origin of the incident. In response to questioning in the Diet, Prime Minister Takaichi stated, “If China blockades Taiwan using warships and employing force, then no matter how you look at it, this could become a survival-threatening crisis for Japan.”

Pressed by the opposition, she added, “If China imposes a maritime blockade on Taiwan and U.S. forces intervening in that blockade come under armed attack, a crisis could arise.”

International media paid no attention to Takaichi’s clarification and focused only on the headline question: Will Japan send troops if military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait? Accordingly, France’s Le Monde, Britain’s The Guardian, and the Associated Press all ran titles implying that Japan would dispatch forces if Taiwan were subjected to military action.

Japanese scholars have since written articles in U.S. media explaining that “Japanese military intervention in a Taiwan contingency” presupposes that U.S. forces have already intervened, and only then could Japan exercise the right of collective self-defense. Yet the Japanese government has not actively clarified this prerequisite on the international stage, drawing sharp criticism from well-known Japanese commentator Hiroyuki Nishimura for dereliction of duty.

Nishimura’s criticism exposes a widespread misunderstanding: even if the United States militarily intervenes in the Taiwan Strait, as long as Japanese territory is not under armed threat, Tokyo is legally barred from exercising collective self-defense. In other words, under the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, the United States is obligated to defend Japan, but Japan has no treaty obligation to send troops to support U.S. forces in a war that does not concern Japan.

Therefore, the mitigating explanations offered by Japanese scholars on Takaichi’s behalf do not hold water. The Japanese government’s failure to clarify the issue in international media is naturally out of fear of offending Washington. It remains unclear whether President Trump fully understands the “asymmetric” nature of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, and Tokyo has no desire to remind this shrewd deal-making president that when American soldiers are dying on the battlefield, Japan actually has no treaty obligation to send troops.

Unless, of course, the reason for U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait is explicitly “to protect Japan.” Political rhetoric is one thing; the law is another. The fact remains that neither the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty nor Japan’s domestic legislation imposes any legal obligation on Japan to exercise collective self-defense when its ally, the United States, comes under attack.

Another fact: the Philippines is in exactly the same position as Japan. Unless U.S. forces become involved in order to protect the Philippines or Philippine territory is affected by the war, Manila has no obligation to send combat troops to assist the U.S.—it can only provide logistical and base support.

Of course, if the United States does intervene militarily in the Taiwan Strait, it will inevitably claim it is to protect Japan (and the Philippines). But the authority to make that determination lies with Tokyo and Manila, both of which retain a certain right to stay out of the fight. This is precisely why U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby earlier this year demanded that Japan and Australia state clearly what actions they would take to support the United States in the event of a Taiwan contingency. That demand makes it crystal clear that America’s mutual defense treaties do not obligate allies to unconditionally fight alongside U.S. forces.

In short: when their own security is at stake, allies will send troops; otherwise, they will at most offer logistics and bases—no allied soldiers will go to the front lines.

This explains Beijing’s fierce reaction. Even if Takaichi did not mean Japan would intervene unilaterally in the Taiwan Strait, her remarks effectively expanded the “applicability scenarios” of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. If such moves are not checked, they will only encourage the Philippines, Australia, and other anti-China neighbors to follow suit—using the same logic to blackmail or bleed China.

This is not an overreaction, nor is it making a mountain out of a molehill. Beyond realpolitik necessity, the Chinese people have not forgotten Japan’s history of invading China—especially in this 80th anniversary year of the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. If Beijing were to let the matter slide, it would face intense domestic backlash.

Therefore, unless Takaichi retracts her remarks, China–Japan relations will continue to worsen, eventually leading to a situation where “Taiwan is fine, but Japan is in crisis.”

Takaichi may well have intentionally provoked Beijing in order to shore up LDP support, rally Japanese nationalism, loosen the “three non-nuclear principles,” and expand conventional military capabilities. But the backlash has likely been far greater than she anticipated. The key still lies in America’s attitude.

Although the U.S. ambassador to Japan publicly expressed support for Tokyo and criticized Beijing, Washington’s overall response has been relatively muted—Trump has zero interest in letting Japan torpedo his scheduled China trip next April.

On the other hand, Beijing may well conclude that Washington is deliberately allowing Japan to interfere in China’s internal affairs in order to gain negotiating leverage. That would only reduce China’s inhibitions about sanctioning Japan and could lead it to directly challenge the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, pushing the situation to the brink of losing control and forcing the U.S. to rein in Japan.

China has many tools to test the treaty—economic and trade measures, cultural exchanges, diplomacy, and even military options are all on the table. The disputed uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Ryukyu Islands, whose sovereignty remains unresolved, are both historical issues left over from World War II. Although both fall within the scope of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, Washington has never recognized Japanese sovereignty over them.

Regarding the Ryukyus, Beijing can wage a protracted legal battle, continually emphasizing that the Potsdam Declaration never returned the islands to Japan. Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu, Beijing could move directly to military control—land on the islands, demolish Japanese facilities, raise the Chinese flag, and expel foreign vessels—forcing the United States to get involved.

If Beijing is pushed to the point of letting the situation spiral, its price to Washington will be high: it may include, but is not limited to, demanding that the U.S. block Japan from abandoning the three non-nuclear principles, block Japan’s “normalization” (turning the Self-Defense Forces into a full-fledged military), force Japan to pay tangible and intangible reparations for its invasion of China, or even force Takaichi to step down.

Would Trump risk a second Chinese rare-earth embargo over an uninhabited island whose sovereignty does not belong to Japan? The answer is obvious.

Beijing’s current Taiwan strategy has shifted from “opposing independence” to “advancing unification.” Part of that strategy is to make neighboring countries acknowledge—through actual state behavior, not just words—that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair. Japan is the poster child for neighboring hypocrisy—talking peace while acting otherwise. It will be shown no mercy for breaking the promises of diplomatic normalization; Beijing is determined to make a chicken of Japan to scare the monkey.

From this perspective, Prime Minister Takaichi may have thought she could achieve a classic boomerang effect (using the Taiwan issue for domestic political gain by first exporting strong rhetoric abroad). Instead, Beijing has been handed a rare opportunity to use Japan as a target and demonstrate to the world how it will reduce obstacles to unification.

The United States wants to avoid direct confrontation with China and prefers to let proxies stand on the front line so it can reap the benefits while remaining in the rear. On the surface this creates trouble for Beijing, but in reality it also creates endless headaches for Washington—because China will not limit itself to dealing with the proxies; it will drag the United States into the fight.

This is the new tactical phase in U.S.–China competition following the Busan meeting, testing the one-year truce both sides agreed to. Whether proxies are an advantage or a liability for Washington depends entirely on how Beijing chooses to handle the dispute—and Tokyo makes the ideal canary in the coal mine.

China on Friday took its feud with Tokyo over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Taikachi’s recent comments on Taiwan to the United Nations, as tensions between the East Asian neighbours deepened and ties plunged to their lowest since 2023.

“If Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression,” China’s permanent representative to the UN, Fu Cong, wrote in a letter on Friday to the global body’s Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, referring to the strait that separates mainland China from self-governing Taiwan, which Beijing insists belongs to China. Beijing has not ruled out the possibility of forcibly taking Taiwan.

The diplomatic spat began earlier in November when Taikachi, who took office only in October, made remarks about how Japan would respond to a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan. Those remarks angered Beijing, which has demanded retractions, although the Japanese PM has not made one.

However, the spat has now rapidly escalated into a trade war involving businesses on both sides, and has deepened security tensions over a contested territory that has long been a flashpoint for the two countries.

Here’s what we know about the dispute:

What did Japan’s PM say about Taiwan?

While speaking to parliament on November 7, Taikachi, a longtime Taiwan supporter, said a Chinese naval blockade or other action against Taiwan could prompt a Japanese military response. The response was not typical, and Taikachi appeared to go several steps further than her predecessors, who had only in the past expressed concern about the Chinese threat to Taiwan, but had never mentioned a response.

“If it involves the use of warships and military actions, it could by all means become a survival-threatening situation,” Taikachi told parliament, responding to an opposition politician’s queries in her first parliamentary grilling.

That statement immediately raised protests from China’s foreign and defence ministries, which demanded retractions. China’s consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, a day after, criticised the comments and appeared to make threats in a now deleted post on X, saying: “We have no choice but to cut off that dirty neck that has been lunged at us without hesitation. Are you ready?”

That post by Xue also raised anger in Japan, and some officials began calling for the diplomat’s expulsion. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara protested to Beijing over Xue’s X message, saying it was “extremely inappropriate,” while urging China to explain. Japan’s Foreign Ministry also demanded the post be deleted. Chinese officials, meanwhile, defended the comments as coming from a personal standpoint.

On November 14, China’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Japanese ambassador and warned of a “crushing defeat” if Japan interfered with Taiwan. The following day, Japan’s Foreign Ministry also summoned the Chinese ambassador to complain about the consul’s post.

Although Taikachi told parliament three days after her controversial statement that she would avoid talking about specific scenarios going forward, she has refused to retract her comments.

How have tensions increased since?

The matter has deteriorated into a trade war of sorts. On November 14, China issued a no-travel advisory for Japan, an apparent attempt to target the country’s tourism sector, which welcomed some 7.5 million Chinese tourists between January and September this year. On November 15, three Chinese airlines offered refunds or free changes for flights planned on Japan-bound routes.

The Chinese Education Ministry also took aim at Japan’s education sector, warning Chinese students there or those planning to study in Japan about recent crimes against Chinese. Both China and Japan have recorded attacks against each other’s nationals in recent months that have prompted fears of xenophobia, but it is unclear if the attacks are linked.

Tensions are also rising around territorial disputes. Last Sunday, the Chinese coastguard announced it was patrolling areas in the East China Sea, in the waters around a group of uninhabited islands that both countries claim. Japan calls the islands the Senkaku Islands, while Beijing calls them the Diaoyu Islands. Japan, in response, condemned the brief “violation” of Japanese territorial waters by a fleet of four Chinese coastguard ships.

Over the last week, Chinese authorities have suspended the screening of at least two Japanese films and banned Japanese seafood.

Then, on Thursday, China postponed a three-way meeting with culture ministers from Japan and South Korea that was scheduled to be held in late November.

‘Symbol of defiance’

On November 18, diplomats from both sides met in Beijing for talks where the grievances were aired.

Senior Chinese official Liu Jinsong chose to wear a five-buttoned collarless suit associated with the rebellion of Chinese students against Japanese imperialism in 1919.

Japanese media have called the choice of the suit a “symbol of defiance.” They also point to videos and images from the meeting showing Liu with his hands in his pockets after the talks, saying the gesture is typically viewed as disrespectful in formal settings.

The Beijing meeting did not appear to ease the tensions, and there seems to be no sign of the impasse breaking: Chinese representatives asked for a retraction, but Japanese diplomats said Taikachi’s remarks were in line with Japan’s stance.

What is the history of Sino-Japanese tensions?

It’s a long and – especially for China – painful story. Imperial Japan occupied significant portions of China after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), when it gained control of Taiwan and forcefully annexed Korea. In 1937, Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Amid strong Chinese resistance, Japan occupied parts of eastern and southern China, where it created and controlled puppet governments. The Japanese Empire’s defeat in World War II in 1945 ended its expansion bid.

The Chinese Communist Party emerged victorious in 1949 in the civil war that followed with the Kuomintang, which, along with the leader Chiang Kai-shek, fled to Taiwan to set up a parallel government. But until 1972, Japan formally recognised Taiwan as “China”.

In 1972, it finally recognised the People’s Republic of China and agreed to the “one China principle”, in effect severing formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. However, Japan has maintained firm unofficial ties with Taiwan, including through trade.

Japan has also maintained a policy of so-called “strategic ambiguity” over how Tokyo would respond if China were to attack Taiwan — a policy of deliberate ambivalence, aimed at leaving Beijing and the rest of the world guessing over whether it would intervene militarily. The stance is similar to that of the United States, Taiwan’s most powerful ally.

How important is trade between China and Japan?

He Yongqian, a spokesperson for China’s commerce ministry, said at a regular news conference this week that trade relations between the two countries had been “severely damaged” by PM Takaichi’s comments.

China is Japan’s second-largest export market after the US, with Tokyo selling mainly industrial equipment, semiconductors and automobiles to Beijing. In 2024, China bought about $125bn worth of Japanese goods, according to the United Nations’ Comtrade database. South Korea, Japan’s third-largest export market, bought goods worth $46bn in 2024.

China is also a major buyer of Japan’s sea cucumbers and its top scallop buyer. Japanese firms, particularly seafood exporters, are worried about the effects of the spat on their businesses, according to reporting by Reuters.

Beijing is not as reliant on Japan’s economy, but Tokyo is China’s third-largest trading partner. China mainly exports electrical equipment, machinery, apparel and vehicles to Japan. Tokyo bought $152bn worth of goods from China in 2024, according to financial data website Trading Economics.

It’s not the first time Beijing has retaliated with trade. In 2023, China imposed a ban on all Japanese food imports after Tokyo released radioactive water from the Fukushima nuclear plant into the Pacific. Beijing was against the move, although the UN atomic energy agency had deemed the discharge safe. That ban was lifted just on November 7, the same day Taikachi made the controversial comments.

In 2010, China also halted the exports of rare earth minerals to Japan for seven weeks after a Chinese fishing captain was detained near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Chinese state media says distributors made ‘prudent’ decision to postpone releases due to audience sentiment.

Chinese film distributors have suspended the release of two Japanese anime films amid an escalating diplomatic row over Taiwan.

Crayon Shin-chan the Movie: Super Hot! The Spicy Kasukabe Dancers and Cells at Work! will not be screened in mainland China as originally scheduled, Chinese state-run broadcaster CCTV said on Tuesday.

The move comes as relations between Tokyo and Beijing are at their lowest ebb in years following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s suggestion that Tokyo could intervene militarily if China attempted to take control of Taiwan.

CCTV said distributors made the “prudent” decision to postpone the releases in view of the overall market performance of Japanese films and “Chinese audience sentiment”.

Film distributors reported that Takaichi’s “provocative remarks” would inevitably affect Chinese audience perceptions of Japanese cinema, CCTV said, adding that the companies would follow “market principles and respect audience preferences” by delaying the releases.

Naoise McDonagh, an expert in economic coercion at Edith Cowan University in Western Australia, said the postponements followed a well-worn playbook in Chinese statecraft.

“China is usually careful to target trade that is non-essential for China, but which will impact Japanese firms, creating both financial costs and symbolic pressure,” McDonagh told Al Jazeera.

Such incidents allow Beijing to signal that parties who act against its interests will face costs, “providing China some degree of influence on other governmental decision-making processes that impact China’s red line,” McDonagh said.

The delayed film releases follow a series of retaliatory moves by Beijing in response to Takaichi’s comments, including an advisory warning its citizens against travel to Japan and the deployment of warships to waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands.

Japan on Monday issued its own travel advisory for China, warning its citizens to respect local customs, avoid crowded places and exercise caution in their interactions with Chinese people.

Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara on Tuesday told a regular media briefing that its advisories were based on “the social situations” of various countries and its latest statement reflected recent reports on the Tokyo-Beijing tensions.

Kihara also said that Tokyo had an “open stance” on dialogue with China after Beijing said that Chinese Premier Li Qiang had no plans to meet Takaichi on the sidelines of this weekend’s G20 summit in South Africa.

Kihara made the comments as Japan’s top official for Asia Pacific affairs, Masaaki Kanai, met his Chinese counterpart, Liu Jinsong, in Beijing on Tuesday in a bid to calm tensions between the sides.

China considers self-ruled Taiwan part of its territory and has pledged to “reunify” the island with the Chinese mainland, by force if necessary.

Japan views China’s stance on Taiwan with concern due to the island’s close proximity to Japanese territory and its location in waters that carry large volumes of trade.

China insists that countries, in order to have diplomatic ties with Beijing, must not officially recognise Taiwan. Most countries follow China’s demand, but many maintain economic and semiofficial diplomatic ties with Taipei.

As the world moves into the final weeks of 2025, the global landscape looks markedly different from that of 2024. Over the past year, the world has witnessed a greater number of conflicts than at any time since the turbulence in the Middle East in the early 2000s. The Israel–Iran confrontation, the Thailand–Cambodia clashes, and most recently the U.S.–Venezuela conflict—together with earlier crises such as the Russia–Ukraine war that began in 2022 and Myanmar’s protracted internal turmoil—illustrate how sharply the global strategic chessboard is being reshaped.

These conflicts form a chain of consecutive flashpoints, each diverting global attention away from Taiwan—a uniquely sensitive entity for China.

China’s Moves Behind the Scenes

Following Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed on December 31, 2024, “No one can halt China’s drive to reunify with Taiwan.” Far from being a one-off remark, this declaration reflects a long-standing stance repeatedly voiced by Xi. He had frequently told President Joe Biden that Taiwan remains a “loaded gun” positioned by the United States at China’s doorstep—mirroring the Cold War dynamic when the Soviet Union stationed missiles in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs crisis. For Beijing, the absorption of Taiwan is therefore seen as indispensable to securing China’s national defense interests.

Across global media, China has been detected amassing large quantities of weaponry and military personnel in Fujian Province, only about 130 kilometers from Taiwan at its nearest point. Well before the Russia–Ukraine war broke out in 2022, Beijing had already been discreetly improving infrastructure in Fujian and stockpiling cutting-edge weapons in preparation for future contingencies.

Any state planning a major military operation must invest years into upgrading logistics networks, fortifications, and weapons production. Since 2022—while the world has been preoccupied with overlapping conflicts—China has had ample time to build the capacity needed for a move on Taiwan.

With multiple crises flaring at once, the United States cannot realistically stretch its resources to fully assist all allies. This dynamic underscores the possibility that the succession of global conflicts since 2022 has ultimately helped divert attention and dilute Western, especially American, bandwidth—conveniently easing China’s path toward its long-standing objective regarding Taiwan.

What has the US done?

Despite a clear weakening since the beginning of the 21st century, the United States still holds a ‘relatively’ firm position in leading the world order. Many US officials across two presidential administrations have shared the view regarding the possibility of China annexing Taiwan by force in 2027. President Joe Biden, a member of the Democratic Party who was initially an advocate for minimizing disagreements with China, has also exerted maximum pressure on Beijing throughout his term, surprising and confusing many experts.

In 2024, the establishment of the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral link signals the utmost concern from policymakers regarding China’s activities. Strategically, US partners and allies will therefore form a continuous arc-shaped formation to deter China’s negative activities. This support will generate significant regional influence and form the US ecosystem in the Indo-Pacific. In the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, US partners and allies will assist Washington in pressuring Beijing, forcing the country to reconsider the possibility of escalating the conflict with Taiwan.

After Trump’s election, he strengthened cooperation with Taiwan. When he imposed tariffs on Taiwan, along with other countries, it was not merely a simple economic move but also demonstrated his desire for the world’s attention on this entity. Notably, the increase in TSMC’s investment in the US to $165 billion in March 2025, compared to $65 billion, suggests the Trump administration’s subtle backing of Taiwan. When a crucial company from an investing nation is attacked, resources and investment activities will be delayed, leading to economic damage, in this case, to the US. Although the role of Taiwan was not directly integrated, the Trump administration made a very sharp move.

Furthermore, the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities in Israel’s Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 serves as a signal to China regarding the possibility of military conflict escalation with US presence should Beijing use force against Taipei. The renaming of the department back to the ‘Department of War’ further reinforces the possibility that the US could proactively attack any nation that confronts Washington’s interests.

Will a conflict in the Taiwan Strait occur?

Many experts and scholars have discussed whether China will invade Taiwan, as asserted by the country’s leaders. When a conflict occurs in a region/area, the global order will easily witness numerous impacts.

For China, in the event that Beijing captures the island, the country will incur sanctions from the US and its allies and partners. Furthermore, the possibility of intervention from countries within the US’s ‘hub-and-spoke’ model in the Taiwan situation is entirely feasible.

Japan is the country that made the strongest declaration when the new Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, stated in a National Assembly meeting that if Taiwan is attacked, Japan will be directly affected and it concerns Tokyo’s ‘survival.’ Japan has also progressively amended and interpreted its constitution to legitimize the action of deploying troops overseas to assist its partners. The fact that an individual who has just taken office as Prime Minister of Japan has made such tough statements regarding Taiwan indicates that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait is entirely possible, lending more credence to the 2027 forecast.

According to a RAND report, the countries that could potentially join the group defending Taiwan alongside the US include the UK, Australia, and Japan within the next ‘3–6 months,’ corresponding to Q1 and Q2 of 2026. This further reinforces the possibility of a conflict occurring in the Taiwan Strait, aligning with the statements made by US defense officials (and later the Department of War), as well as President Xi Jinping’s long-standing declarations regarding the possibility of annexing Taiwan by 2027.

It is clear that Taiwan, despite being an island, has a significant impact on the US-China competition. In the context of ongoing global conflicts, Taiwan is viewed as the final destination for conflicts in recent years. The US and its partners and allies may increase their presence on this island in various forms to ensure its ‘safety.’ 

US President Donald Trump has appeared on the CBS News programme 60 Minutes just months after he won a $16m settlement from the broadcaster for alleged “deceptive editing”.

In the interview with CBS host Norah O’Donnell, which was filmed last Friday at his Mar-a-Lago residence and aired on Sunday, Trump touched on several topics, including the ongoing government shutdown, his administration’s unprecedented crackdowns on undocumented migrants, the US’s decision to restart nuclear testing, and the trade war with China.

Trump, who regularly appears on Fox News, a right-wing media outlet, has an uneasy relationship with CBS, which is considered centrist.

In October 2020, the president walked out of a 60 Minutes interview in the lead-up to the 2020 election he lost, claiming that the host, Lesley Stahl, was “biased”.

Here are some key takeaways from the interview:

The interview took place one year to the day after Trump sued CBS

The president’s lawyers sued CBS owner Paramount in October 2024 for “mental anguish” over a pre-election interview with rival candidate Kamala Harris that Trump claimed had been deceptively edited to favour Democrats and thus affected his campaign.

CBS had aired two different versions of an answer Harris gave to a question on Israel’s war on Gaza, posed by host Bill Whitaker. One version aired on 60 Minutes while the other appeared on the programme Face the Nation.

Asked whether Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, listened to US advice, Harris answered: “We are not going to stop pursuing what is necessary for the United States – to be clear about where we stand on the need for this war to end.”

In an alternative edit, featured in earlier pre-broadcast promotions, Harris had given a longer, more rambling response that did not sound as concise.

The network argued the answer was edited differently for the two shows due to time restrictions, but Trump’s team claimed CBS “distorted” its broadcasts and “helped” Harris, thereby affecting his campaign. Trump asked for an initial $10bn in damages before upping it to $20bn in February 2025.

Paramount, in July 2025, chose to settle with Trump’s team to the tune of $16m in the form of a donation to a planned Trump presidential library. That move angered journalist unions and rights groups, which argued it set a bad precedent for press freedom.

Paramount executives said the company would not apologise for the editing of its programmes, but had decided to settle to put the matter to rest.

The company was at the time trying to secure federal approval from Trump’s government for a proposed merger with Skydance, owned by Trump ally Larry Ellison. The Federal Communications Commission has since approved the merger that gives Ellison’s Skydance controlling rights.

On October 19, Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and Steve Witkoff, US special envoy to the Middle East, were interviewed on 60 Minutes regarding the Israel-Gaza war.

He solved rare-earth metals issue with China

After meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea last Thursday, Trump praised his counterpart as a “strong man, a very powerful leader” and said their relationship was on an even keel despite the trade war. However, he blamed China for “ripping off” the US through its dominance of crucial rare earth materials.

Trump told 60 Minutes he had cut a favourable trade agreement with China and that “we got – no rare-earth threat. That’s gone, completely gone”, referring to Chinese export restrictions on critical rare-earth metals needed to manufacture a wide range of items including defence equipment, smartphones and electric vehicles.

However, Beijing actually only said it would delay introducing export controls for five rare-earth metals it announced in October, and did not mention restrictions on a further seven it announced in April this year. Those restrictions remain in place.

Xi ‘knows what will happen’ if China attacks Taiwan

Trump said President Xi did not say anything about whether Beijing planned to attack autonomous Taiwan.

However, he referred to past assurances from Xi, saying: “He [Xi] has openly said, and his people have openly said at meetings, ‘We would never do anything while President Trump is president’, because they know the consequences.”

Asked whether he would order US forces to action if China moved militarily on Taiwan, Trump demurred, saying: “You’ll find out if it happens, and he understands the answer to that … I can’t give away my secrets. The other side knows.”

There are mounting fears in the US that China could attack Taiwan. Washington’s stance of “strategic ambiguity” has always kept observers speculating about whether the US would defend Taiwan against Beijing. Ahead of the last elections, Trump said Taiwan should “pay” for protection.

He doesn’t know who the crypto boss he pardoned is

When asked why he pardoned cryptocurrency multibillionaire and Binance founder Changpeng Zhao last month, Trump said: “I don’t know who he is.”

The president said he had never met Zhao, but had been told he was the victim of a “witch hunt” by the administration of former US President Joe Biden.

Zhao pleaded guilty to enabling money laundering in connection with child sex abuse and “terrorism” on his crypto platform in 2023. He served four months in prison until September 2024, and stepped down as chief executive of Binance.

Binance has been linked to the Trump family’s cryptocurrency company World Liberty Financial, and many have questioned if the case is a conflict of interest.

In March 2025, World Liberty Financial launched its own dollar-pegged cryptocoin, USD1, on Binance’s blockchain and the company promoted it to its 275 million users. The coin was also supported by an investment fund in the United Arab Emirates, MGX Fund Management Limited, which used $2bn worth of the World Liberty stablecoin to buy a stake in Binance.

This part of the interview appeared in a full transcript of the 90-minute interview, but does not appear in either the 28-minute televised version or the 73-minute extended online video version. CBS said in a note on the YouTube version that it was “condensed for clarity”.

Other countries ‘are testing nuclear weapons’

Trump justified last week’s decision by his government to resume nuclear testing for the first time in 33 years, saying that other countries – besides North Korea – are already doing it.

“Russia’s testing, and China’s testing, but they don’t talk about it,” Trump said, also mentioning Pakistan. “You know, we’re an open society. We’re different. We talk about it. We have to talk about it, because otherwise you people are gonna report – they don’t have reporters that gonna be writing about it. We do.”

Russia, China, and Pakistan have not openly conducted tests in recent years. Analyst Georgia Cole of UK think tank Chatham House told Al Jazeera that “there is no indication” the three countries have resumed testing.

He’s not worried about Hamas disarming

The president claimed the US-negotiated ceasefire and peace plan between Israel and Hamas was “very solid” despite Israeli strikes killing 236 Gazans since the ceasefire went into effect. It is also unclear whether or when the Palestinian armed group, Hamas, has agreed it will disarm.

However, Trump said he was not worried about Hamas disarming as the US would force the armed group to do so. “Hamas could be taken out immediately if they don’t behave,” he said.

Venezuela’s Maduro’s ‘days are numbered’

Trump denied the US was going to war with Venezuela despite a US military build-up off the country’s coast and deadly air strikes targeting alleged drug-trafficking ships in the country’s waters. The United Nations has said the strikes are a violation of international law.

Responding to a question about whether the strikes were really about unseating Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro, Trump said they weren’t. However, when asked if Maduro’s days in office were numbered, the president answered: “I would say, yeah.”

US government shutdown is all the Democrats’ fault

Trump, a member of the Republican Party, blamed Democrats for what is now close to the longest government shutdown in US history, which has been ongoing since October 1.

Senators from the Democratic Party have refused to approve a new budget unless it extends expiring tax credits that make health insurance cheaper for millions of Americans and unless Trump reverses healthcare cuts made in his tax-and-spending bill, passed earlier this year.

The US president made it clear that he would not negotiate with Democrats, and did not give clear plans for ending the shutdown affecting 1.4 million governent employees.

US will become ‘third-world nation’ if tariffs disallowed

Referring to a US Supreme Court hearing brought by businesses arguing that the Trump government’s tariff war on other countries is illegal and has caused domestic inflation, Trump said the US “would go to hell” and be a “third world nation” if the court ordered tariffs to be removed.

He said the tariffs are necessary for “national security” and that they have increased respect from other countries for the US.

ICE raids ‘don’t go far enough’

Trump defended his government’s unprecedented Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids and surveillance on people perceived to be undocumented migrants.

When asked if the raids had gone too far, he responded: “No. I think they haven’t gone far enough because we’ve been held back by the judges, by the liberal judges that were put in by [former US Presidents Joe] Biden and [Barack] Obama.”

Zohran Mamdani is a ‘communist’

Regarding the New York City mayoral race scheduled for November 4, Trump said he would not back democratic socialist Zohran Mamdani, and called him a “communist”. He said if Mamdani wins, it will be hard for him to “give a lot of money to New York”.

US president claims Chinese leader ‘openly said’ Beijing would not act on Taiwan while Trump is in the White House ‘because they know the consequences’.

United States President Donald Trump has said that his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping has assured him that Beijing will not attempt to unify Taiwan with mainland China while the Republican leader is in office.

Trump said on Sunday that the long-contentious issue of Taiwan “never even came up as a subject” when he met with Xi in South Korea on Thursday for their first face-to-face meeting in six years. The meeting largely focused on US-China trade tensions.

“He has openly said, and his people have openly said at meetings, ‘We would never do anything while President Trump is president’, because they know the consequences,” Trump said in an interview with the CBS 60 Minutes programme that aired on Sunday.

Asked in the interview whether he would order US forces into action if China moved militarily on Taiwan, Trump demurred.

The US, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan – trying not to tip its hand on whether the US would come to the island’s aid in such a scenario.

“You’ll find out if it happens, and he understands the answer to that,” said Trump, referring to Xi.

But Trump declined to spell out what he meant in the interview conducted on Friday at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, adding: “I can’t give away my secrets. The other side knows.”

US officials have long been concerned about the possibility of China using military force against Taiwan, the self-governed island democracy Beijing claims as part of its territory.

The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which has governed US relations with the island, does not require the US to step in militarily if China invades but makes it US policy to ensure Taiwan has the resources to defend itself and prevent any unilateral change of status by Beijing.

Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, DC, did not respond directly to a query from The Associated Press news agency about whether Trump has received any assurances from Xi or Chinese officials about Taiwan. He insisted in a statement that China “will never allow any person or force to separate Taiwan from China in any way”.

“The Taiwan question is China’s internal affair, and it is the core of China’s core interests. How to resolve the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people ourselves, and only the Chinese people can decide it,” the statement added.

The White House also did not provide further details about when Xi or Chinese officials conveyed to Trump that military action on Taiwan was off the table for the duration of the Republican’s presidency.

The 60 Minutes interview was Trump’s first appearance on the show since he settled a lawsuit this summer with CBS News over its interview with then-Vice-President Kamala Harris. Trump alleged that the interview had been deceptively edited to benefit the Democratic Party before the 2024 presidential election. Trump initially sought $10bn in damages, later raising the claim to $20bn.