Syria

“Covert action should not be confused with missionary work,” former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared after the sudden abandonment of Iraqi Kurds to their fate against the Iraqi government in 1975.

Half a century later, this doctrine of geopolitical expediency echoes across the Middle East. As the US and Israel encourage Kurdish militias to serve as a ground force against Iran’s central government, knowing their aspiration for “regime change” needs a ground force, history offers a severe warning.

From the mountains of Iraq in 1991 to the plains of Syria just weeks ago, Washington’s track record of using Kurdish fighters as disposable proxies suggests the current push for an Iranian Kurdish rebellion is fraught with risk.

Amid a rapidly escalating military confrontation that has seen US-Israeli air strikes assassinate top Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Washington is seeking to open a new front.

Some US media reports claimed that thousands of Iranian Kurds have crossed from Iraq to launch a ground operation in northwestern Iran. That has not been verified. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has reportedly supplied these forces with light weapons as part of a covert programme to destabilise the country.

To facilitate this, US President Donald Trump reportedly held calls with Iraqi Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani as well as Iranian Kurdish leader Mustafa Hijri. While the White House and Kurdish officials in Erbil denied these reports, regional analysts remained wary.

The government of northern Iraq’s semiautonomous Kurdish region on Thursday denied involvement in any plans to arm Kurdish groups and send them into Iran.

Its president, Nechirvan Barzani, said it “must not become part of any conflict or military escalation that harms the lives and security of our fellow citizens”.

“Protecting the territorial integrity of the Kurdistan Region and our constitutional achievements can only be achieved through the unity, cohesion and shared national responsibility of all political forces and components in Kurdistan,” he added.

Mahmoud Allouch, a regional affairs expert, told Al Jazeera that the current strategy is aimed not simply at an immediate government overthrow but at “dismantling Iran” by inciting separatist movements as a prelude to its collapse. “The US and Israel want to produce a separatist armed Kurdish case in Iran similar to the Kurdish case that America imposed in Syria,” Allouch warned.

Added to this volatile mix is Turkiye and how it would react to any Kurdish uprising in the region. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) began steps towards disarmament last summer, closing a chapter on a four-decade armed campaign against the Turkish state in a conflict that has killed more than 40,000 people. Any armed advances by Iranian Kurds could rankle Ankara.

A legacy of betrayal and unintended gains

For the Kurds, acting as the tip of the American spear has historically ended in disaster. In the 1970s, the US and Iran heavily armed Iraqi Kurdish rebels to bleed the government in Baghdad. Yet, once the shah of Iran secured a territorial concession from Iraq in 1975, he cut off the Kurds overnight with Washington’s approval. He himself was deposed in a revolution four years later.

This scenario repeated itself with devastating consequences in 1991. After then-US President George HW Bush encouraged Iraqis – both the Kurdish and Shia communities persecuted under Saddam Hussein – to rise up, the US military stood by as loyalist forces regrouped and used helicopter gunships to indiscriminately slaughter tens of thousands of civilians and rebels.

However, David Romano, a Middle East politics expert at Missouri State University, countered in a statement on his Facebook page that the aftermath of the 1991 catastrophe eventually forced the US to launch Operation Provide Comfort and a no-fly zone, which laid the groundwork for the semiautonomous Kurdish region in Iraq. “At important junctures, the Kurds have done exceedingly well as a result of cooperation with the US,” Romano wrote although he noted the opposite was true in 1975.

The Syrian quagmire

The dark irony of Washington asking Iranian Kurds to take up arms today is compounded by the recent collapse of Kurdish autonomy in neighbouring Syria. For years, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) served as the primary US proxy against ISIL (ISIS) and led the way to vanquishing the armed group in 2019 after years of fighting and suffering.

Yet in January, a little more than a year after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, the Trump administration backed Syria’s new central government in Damascus, essentially ending support for the SDF and Kurdish autonomy.

The US envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack, declared that the original purpose of the SDF had largely expired. Within weeks, the SDF lost 80 percent of the territory it had bled for. For the Kurds across the region watching these events unfold, the implications were profound: The US is no longer perceived as a reliable partner or supporter of minorities.

Allouch highlighted this as a primary reason for Kurdish hesitation concerning Iran today, noting that Kurdish leaders are “bleeding from yesterday’s stab” in Syria.

Calculated rejections and the Iranian gamble

The US and Israel are seeking “boots on the ground” to avoid deploying their own forces. But in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, the leadership understands the severe blowback. Barzani recently emphasised to the Iranian foreign minister that the region “will not be a party to the conflicts”.

Analysts suggested that Barzani remains angered by the US dismissal of a 2017 independence referendum for the region. Romano noted that because Baghdad vociferously rejected attacking Iran, Erbil has a perfect justification to decline Washington’s requests after decades of being told by the US to remain integrated within Iraq.

The calculus is different for Iranian Kurds, known as Rojhelati. Betrayed by the Soviet Union in 1946, they have acutely suffered under successive Iranian governments and may view this as their “first and only opportunity” to change their status.

However, Allouch warned that without a solid US military commitment, which Trump has shown no desire to provide, this move could be “suicidal” against a fierce Iranian military response.

The regional veto

Pushing Iranian Kurds into an open conflict remains a highly volatile endeavour that has triggered an immediate reaction from Turkiye. Allouch told Al Jazeera that Ankara will coordinate with the Iranian government to crush any uprising.

“The US and the international powers realise that they cannot, in the end, impose a reality that contradicts the interests of the ‘Regional Quartet’ – Turkiye, Syria, Iran and Iraq,” Allouch said. He argued that this regional bloc applies far more pressure regarding the Kurdish issue than shifts in international policies.

Ultimately, the Kurds have consistently paid the price of changing geopolitics. As Washington seeks a cost-free rebellion with no ground deployment or losses of its own soldiers in Iran, the Kurds will weigh seductive American promises against the blood-soaked lessons of 1975, 1991 and 2026.

The killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a United States-Israeli air campaign has sent shockwaves through the Middle East, decapitating the leadership of the “axis of resistance” at its most critical moment.

For decades, this network of groups allied with Iran was Tehran’s forward line of defence. But today, with its commander-in-chief dead and its logistical arteries cut, the alliance looks less like a unified war machine and more like a series of isolated islands.

Hassan Ahmadian, a professor at the University of Tehran, warned that the era of strategic patience is over and the Iranian government is now prepared to “burn everything” in response to the attacks.

While Tehran promised to retaliate against the US and Israel “with a force they have never experienced before”, the reaction from its key proxies in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq revealed a deep hesitation driven by local existential threats that may outweigh their ideological loyalty to a fallen leader.

Hezbollah: Walking between raindrops

In Beirut, the response from Hezbollah, long considered the crown jewel among Iran’s regional allies, has been cautiously calibrated.

After Sunday’s announcement of Khamenei’s death, the group issued a statement condemning the attack as the “height of criminality”. However, Al Jazeera correspondent in Beirut Mazen Ibrahim noted that the language used was defensive, not offensive.

“If one dismantles the linguistic structure of the statement, the complexity of Hezbollah’s position becomes clear,” Ibrahim said. “The secretary-general spoke of ‘confronting aggression’, which refers to a defensive posture. … He did not explicitly threaten to attack Israel or launch revenge operations.”

This caution is rooted in a new strategic reality. Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria in late 2024, the “land bridge” that supplied Hezbollah has been severed. Ali Akbar Dareini, a Tehran-based researcher, noted that this loss “cut the ground link with Lebanon”, leaving the group physically isolated.

Now with top leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) killed alongside Khamenei, Hezbollah appears paralysed – caught between a battered domestic front in Lebanon and a vacuum of orders from Tehran.

The Houthis: Solidarity meets survival

In Yemen, the Houthis face an even more volatile calculus.

In his first televised address after the strikes on Iran began on Saturday, the group’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, declared his forces “fully prepared for any developments”. Yet his rhetoric notably emphasised that “Iran is strong” and “its response will be decisive,” a phrasing that analysts interpreted as an attempt to deflect the immediate burden of war away from the Houthis.

The Houthis are under immense pressure. While they have successfully disrupted Red Sea shipping and fired missiles at Tel Aviv, they now face a renewed threat at home.

The internationally recognised Yemeni government, having won a power struggle against southern separatists, has sensed a shift in momentum. Defence Minister Taher al-Aqili recently declared: “The index of operations is heading towards the capital, Sanaa,” which the Houthis control. The statement signalled a potential ground offensive to retake Houthi territory.

This places the Houthis in a bind. While Houthi negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam recently met with Iranian official Ali Larijani in Muscat, Oman, to discuss “unity of the arenas”, the reality on the ground is different. Engaging in a war for Iran could leave the Houthis’ home front exposed to government forces backed by regional rivals.

“Expanding the circle of targeting will only result in expanding the circle of confrontation,” the Houthi-affiliated Supreme Political Council warned in a statement that threatened escalation but also implicitly acknowledged the high cost of a wider war.

Iraq: The internal time bomb

Perhaps nowhere is the dilemma more acute than in Iraq, where the lines between the state and the “resistance” are dangerously blurred.

Iran-aligned militias, many of which operate under the state-sanctioned Popular Mobilisation Forces, are now caught in a direct standoff with the US. Tensions have simmered since late 2024 when Ibrahim Al-Sumaidaie, an adviser to Iraq’s prime minister, revealed that Washington had threatened to dismantle these groups by force, a warning that led to his resignation under pressure from militia leaders.

Today, that threat looms larger than ever. Unlike Hezbollah or the Houthis, these groups are technically part of the Iraqi security apparatus. A retaliation from Iraqi soil would not just risk a militia war but also a direct conflict between the US and the Iraqi state.

With the IRGC commanders who once mediated these tensions now dead, the “restraining hand” is gone. Isolated militia leaders may now decide to strike US bases of their own accord, dragging Baghdad into a war the government has desperately tried to avoid.

Resistance without a head

Khamenei’s assassination has essentially shattered the command-and-control structure of the “axis of resistance”.

The network was built on three pillars: the ideological authority of the supreme leader, the logistical coordination of the IRGC and the geographic connection through Syria. Today, all three are broken.

“The most important damage to Iran’s security interests is the severing of the ground link,” Dareini said. With Khamenei gone, the “spiritual link” is also severed.

What remains is a fragmented landscape. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is too exhausted to open a northern front. In Yemen, the Houthis face a potential domestic offensive. In Iraq, militias risk collapsing the state they live in.

When the dust settles in Tehran, the region will face a dangerous unpredictability. The “axis of resistance” is no longer a coordinated army. It is a collection of angry, heavily armed militias, each calculating its own survival in a world where the orders from Tehran have suddenly stopped coming.

Recent comments by United States and Israeli officials supporting the concept of a “Greater Israel” have raised alarm bells across the region and shed light on a vision once only rarely publicly spoken about.

An interview aired last week by the American right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson with US ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee started the current furore. Carlson, an influential figure who has been vocally critical of Israel over the past year, repeatedly asked Huckabee whether he supported Israel controlling all the land between the Nile River in Egypt and the Euphrates River in Iraq.

Huckabee, a Christian Zionist, would not disavow the belief that the Bible promised that land to Israel – even though it now encompasses all or part of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

“It would be fine if they took it all,” Huckabee said, leading to anger from those countries and others in the region, many of which are close US allies.

Then, speaking on Monday, Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid said that he would support “anything that will allow the Jews a large, broad, strong land and a safe haven for us”.

“Zionism is based on the Bible. Our mandate over the land of Israel is biblical, [and] the biblical borders of the land of Israel are clear … Therefore, the borders are the borders of the Bible,” the apparently secular Israeli politician said.

So what is Greater Israel exactly? And is it really an ultimate goal for some Israeli politicians?

Defining Greater Israel

The most expansionist claim for a Greater Israel is based on a biblical verse (Genesis 15:18-21), which narrates God making a covenant with Abraham that promises his descendants the land between the Nile and the Euphrates.

That would include the Jewish people, with the tribes of Israel believed to be descended through Abraham’s son, Isaac. But it would also include the children of another of Abraham’s sons, Ishmael (Ismail), regarded as the forefather of the Arabs.

Other definitions based on different biblical verses are narrower in their territorial scope and specify that the land of Israel would be promised to the tribes of Israel descended from Isaac.

How has Israel worked to achieve expansion?

The current state of Israel emerged from the British Mandate for Palestine in 1948. The mandate, created by the League of Nations in the wake of World War I and the occupation of Palestine by the British, geographically limited Israel upon its creation.

The 1948 war that followed the end of the mandate led to Israel taking control of all of Mandatory Palestine, with the exception of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

But Israel soon expanded by force – in 1967 it defeated Arab forces and took control of the West Bank and Gaza, as well as Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, and Syria’s occupied Golan Heights. Israel continues to occupy all of those regions, with the exception of the Sinai, which it returned to Egypt in 1982.

Since then, Israel has ignored international law and continued occupying Palestinian and Syrian land, and has shown little respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty, occupying more land in Syria, as well as in Lebanon.

How popular is the idea of Greater Israel?

This needs to be broken down into two separate concepts – the expansion of Israel into the territory that immediately borders it, and the most extreme definition of Greater Israel: between the Nile and the Euphrates.

In terms of expansion into its immediate surroundings, Israeli Jews by and large support the annexation of East Jerusalem, which is occupied Palestinian territory, and the Golan Heights.

The Israeli government continues to move towards the de facto annexation of the occupied West Bank. Israeli politicians vary in how open they are in their support for the formal annexation of the West Bank, but most mainstream Israeli politicians are supportive of the illegal Israeli settlements in the territory.

An expansion of Israeli settlements into Gaza is not as popular, but is supported by far-right Israeli parties.

A Greater Israel, including parts of Jordan, or the most irredentist definition between the Euphrates and the Nile, is more controversial. Pre-1948, many Zionists sought not just Palestine but also Jordan for their future state – one of the most important Zionist armed groups at the time, the Irgun, even included the map of both Palestine and Jordan in its emblem.

But after the foundation of Israel this took a back seat, and open calls for a vastly expanded Israel were largely restricted to the fringes. But those fringes – far-right figures like Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir – are now in government, reflecting a wider radicalisation within Israeli society itself.

That means the Israeli ‘mainstream’, politicians such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and centrists like Lapid, are either more open in their support for some form of Greater Israel beyond the West Bank, or less willing to publicly oppose it.

How threatened do regional countries feel?

Regional states have said that the annexation of the West Bank would be a red line, but have been unable to reverse Israel’s occupation.

Hints at a wider expansion have led to an angry reaction from Arab countries. This goes further back than Huckabee’s recent comments. For example, Jordan condemned Smotrich – Israel’s finance minister – when he gave a speech in 2023 at a podium that displayed a map that showed Jordan as part of Israel.

And Huckabee’s support for Greater Israel was roundly condemned by more than a dozen states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkiye.

For Arab and Muslim states, the anger at the comments partially emanates from the sense of a lack of respect towards the sovereignty of regional states by a US official. But it also highlights fears that the balance of power in the region is weighted towards an Israel that is increasingly willing to attack across the Middle East, and has little interest in peace.

Even if the takeover of the land between the Nile and the Euphrates is not feasible, a region where Israel is the primary hegemon will likely lead to more attacks, more wars, and, if Israel determines it necessary, more occupation of land.

Official Fadi al-Qassem says all residents have left al-Hol camp, which long housed relatives of alleged ISIL (ISIS) members.

Syrian authorities say they have fully evacuated and shut down a remote camp that once kept thousands of relatives of alleged members of the armed group ISIL (ISIS).

The last residents were sent out in a convoy Sunday morning, according to Fadi al-Qassem, the Syrian government official overseeing the camp.

“All Syrian and non-Syrian families were relocated,” al-Qassem told Agence France-Presse.

Al-Hol, located in a desert region of the northeastern Hasakah province, had long kept huge numbers of relatives of suspected ISIL fighters.

At its peak in 2019, the camp held some 73,000 people. Last month, there were about 24,000 residents, mostly Syrians but also Iraqis and more than 6,000 other foreigners of around 40 nationalities.

While the camp’s residents were not technically prisoners and most have not been accused of crimes, they had been held in de facto detention at the heavily guarded facility for years.

Last month, Syria’s government took control of the camp from Kurdish authorities, as Damascus extended its reach across northeastern Syria.

Since then, thousands of its detainees, including family members of suspected ISIL members, have left for unknown destinations. Hundreds have been sent to the Akhtarin camp in Aleppo province, while others have been repatriated to Iraq.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a war monitor based in the United Kingdom, reported an unspecified number of residents “left the camp individually, without waiting for the organised convoys”. Sources on the ground told Al Jazeera many Syrian nationals left al-Hol for their hometowns, while many of the foreigners travelled west to government strongholds of Idlib or Aleppo governorates.

Al-Qassem said residents who have been relocated are children and women who will “need support for their reintegration”.

The future of the smaller Roj camp in northeastern Syria, which also houses relatives of alleged ISIL members but remains under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), remains to be seen.

Most of its inhabitants are foreigners whose home countries have largely refused to receive them.

Syrian authorities turned back buses carrying 34 Australian women and children on February 16 after they left the Roj camp, headed toward Damascus with plans to travel on to Australia. Australian authorities later said they would not repatriate the families.

“We have no sympathy, frankly, for people who travelled overseas in order to participate in what was an attempt to establish a caliphate to undermine and destroy our way of life,” said Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, explaining his country’s stance.

While it is “unfortunate” that children have been affected, Australia is “not providing any support”, Albanese added.

Syria’s government has been relocating families after announcing the closure of the notorious al-Hol camp for people with suspected links to ISIL fighters. Al Jazeera’s Heidi Pett has been seeing families arrive at a new camp, where the government says conditions will be better.