sustain

Back in Healey’s time under Gordon Brown, there was no OBR. Back then it was not unknown for late budget maths problems to be settled with an optimistic tweak of a forecast, a date change to the economic cycle, or choosing a stronger rate of long term growth.

The OBR’s verdict is crucial now – to what extent it agrees with projected welfare savings or even the importance it places on stronger GDP figures matters now.

The bigger point here is that the chancellor must be shocked by the contrast between the sheer power of the Brown Treasury to do what it wanted, and the reality of what he currently faces: the constraints of the OBR, manifesto red lines, bond markets, significant debts and an energy shock.

There are reasons to postpone some of the toughest decisions beyond this Budget, such as how to fund desired increases in spending on defence and social care. The economic outlook could improve were the Iran war to settle at some point in the next few months, and after revised statistics the OBR may also have cause to rethink last year’s downgrade to long term economic growth.

There is an imaginable pathway to a forecast next year with higher growth, lower inflation and lower debt interest costs, plausibly improving the public finance projections by tens of billions.

This would be a much more agreeable basis upon which to decide the pace of those big ticket spending rises. It also may be a tempting option for anyone thinking about an election. Former Treasury officials lament: “There is always a reason for procrastination.”

Expect the Chancellor to laud the resilience and strength of the UK economy and seek to sustain it, and spread growth geographically. His key judgement, however, will be a balance between extra financial and economic support and the peril of still elevated borrowing costs.

He will try to offer breathing space. It may be needed not just for households and families, but for the Exchequer itself.

Top image credit: Reuters/Getty Images

London, United Kingdom – There was a moment towards the end of Andy Burnham’s conference speech in Liverpool that, through silence, spoke volumes.

The new prime minister and Labour leader fell quiet.

For 20 seconds he stood, saying nothing. He hadn’t forgotten his words. He was gathering his emotions for a passage of the speech he hadn’t been able to make it through in rehearsals without crying.

Burnham’s father had died just a couple of weeks before, and this was the section where he’d talk about it.

As the audience realised what was coming they stood, applauding, and urging him on with shouts of “Come on, lad!’ and “Come on, Andy!”

Thanking them, he composed himself and continued.

Conference speeches are theatre, and contemporary British political standards require that a leader be relatable. But there’s little doubt that Andy Burnham handled this moment with an emotional register that struck many as genuine.

His predecessor Keir Starmer sometimes came across as wooden, almost robotic and uncomfortable in front of cameras. Burnham, the seventh prime minister in 10 years, is more emotional.

He talks big ideas and grand solutions and relishes the opportunity to communicate.

In the vibes-denominated currency of modern political discourse, this matters.

The polls speak for themselves. Politico’s Poll of Polls had the Labour Party retake top spot shortly after Burnham became PM – a position it has not relinquished since. At the end of September, Ipsos found Andy Burnham to be the only politician with a positive net favourability rating.

YouGov’s polling also judges him the most popular politician in the UK at the moment.

But to keep up, Burnham must deliver tangible change before the next general election. Unless he calls one early, that will be 2029.

According to political analyst Sam Freedman, “So many in Westminster keep coming back to an early election, despite Burnham ruling it out … No one can quite figure out how Burnham keeps the hope vibe going for three more years with relatively little visible progress.”

‘Going back to what Labour was in the 50s’

In the Welsh town of Port Talbot, terraces of workers’ cottages cluster beside the UK’s largest steelworks.

Like much of Wales, Port Talbot did vote Labour for a century – until elections for the Senedd Cymru or Welsh Parliament in May.

Labour was beaten to an unprecedented third place behind Plaid Cymru’s nationalists, and the anti-immigration Reform UK.

But that was before Burnham took over.

Myles Lewis, who organises social walks for the town’s elderly, told Al Jazeera that Labour had not convinced people on immigration, and Starmer’s communication wasn’t good enough.

“[But now], it’s kind of going back to what Labour was in the 50s and 60s, where they actually looked after the working-class people. I do believe Andy Burnham can get there because I think he has the interests of the working-class people.”

In his first weeks in power, Burnham delivered a quick flurry of eye-catching, domestic, cost-of-living-focused policies.

He capped bus fares, cut the value-added tax (VAT) on electricity bills, and cut business rates for pubs.

He said that he would end street homelessness, reindustrialise the country, take services back into public control, and start the biggest build-out of social housing since World War II.

The mayor of Greater Manchester for nine years, Burnham supports the devolution of powers from Westminster to the UK’s nations and regions.

In July, he announced mayors could keep a share of business rates from April 2027 and of income tax from 2028.

And his conference speech in September set out the contours of some big political battles to come, including a national social care service, free at the point of use, paid for by changing the UK pensions’ triple lock from 2030. It would arrive next parliament. Burnham also pitched a national commission on electoral reform, with a manifesto commitment to overhaul the voting system. And he delivered a blunt verdict on Brexit: that it “has done more harm than good”. He wouldn’t rule out an in-out referendum, or a pledge for the UK to rejoin the European Union, in Labour’s next manifesto, he said.

On foreign affairs, there is less blue water between Burnham and his predecessors.

When he travelled to Ukraine in August, the UK’s new prime minister came with a headline-grabbing gift – British know-how to build the long-range SCALP missile. He was the fourth British prime minister to visit Kyiv since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and pledge steadfast support.

On Gaza, he has said the Labour government “didn’t get it right” and should have called for a ceasefire earlier. And in September, the Burnham government announced a sanctions package against illegal West Bank settlements.

But there has been no genocide declaration, and no full arms embargo against Israel. And Burnham hasn’t overturned the Starmer government’s proscription of the Palestine Action protest group as a “terrorist” organisation.

Defence spending is also a looming problem.

The government’s formal defence pledge is 3.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2035, and Burnham has declined to say whether he’d pay for it with tax rises or welfare cuts.

John Healey, who resigned as the UK’s defence secretary in June over underfunding, is now chancellor of the exchequer, and will not commit to the 3-percent-by-2030 target he set himself.

Burnham’s first budget comes at the end of this month. A full spending review follows next year. Much will be clearer after these.

His biggest pledges – reindustrialisation, control of public services, a new social care system – are expensive.

Burnham certainly has the vibes. The public likes them, for now. The budget will show whether he can afford them.

Sanaa, Yemen – A missile fired by Yemen’s Houthi group, also known as Ansar Allah, streaks across the sky over Sanaa at midday, leaving a trail of smoke behind it.

Its intended target is unclear. It could have been a site in Saudi Arabia or territory to the south and east held by Yemen’s internationally recognised government. For people in northern Yemen, missile launches have become a familiar sight.

On Thursday, at least five people were killed near the al-Maashiq presidential palace in Aden after Houthi missile strikes. Yemeni Prime Minister Shaya al-Zindani was present at the palace at the time of the attack, but was unharmed.

Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said the attack targeted an operational headquarters, part of its campaign against Saudi-backed fighters and equipment supporting the internationally recognised government in Aden.

Frequent Houthi missile attacks – combined with the Iranian-backed group’s territorial gains around the city of Taiz in southwestern Yemen – have severed key supply routes and threatened other roads, ports, and airports that government forces rely on for supplies.

The disruptions could undermine the government’s Dawn of Yemen operation, which aims to recapture territory held by the Houthi group. This includes the capital, Sanaa, which the Houthis seized at the start of the war in 2014.

Government officials, however, say supply issues will not halt the offensive, emphasising that their forces can overcome logistical challenges.

“The Houthi group consistently attempts to sever supply lines to government forces, but they have been unable to halt these supplies. So, military operations against the Houthis will continue,” Colonel Wadah al-Dubaish, spokesperson for the government-aligned Joint Forces on Yemen’s West Coast, told Al Jazeera.

But losses to the Houthis over the past few months have been damaging to the government.

A rapid Houthi advance south along the Red Sea coast in early September captured Mocha, a port on the Red Sea coast and a key supply hub for pro-government forces in western Taiz governorate.

A government counter-offensive reclaimed some of the territory lost in the southern Red Sea coast region, but not Mocha itself, which continues to be in Houthi hands.

Houthi attacks and ground advances, al-Dubaish said, may delay the delivery of supplies to government military forces or increase the cost of delivering supplies to certain fronts.

“However, they cannot stop the flow of supplies because the air, land and sea routes are still available, allowing supplies to continue reaching the front lines,” he said.

But the situation in the city of Taiz illustrates the limits of that logistical flexibility. Houthi forces have cut the main road connecting the city to Aden, the seat of the internationally recognised government. Alternative routes through the surrounding mountains have also been disrupted, leaving Taiz effectively besieged.

The consequences are already being felt. Fuel shortages and soaring prices have affected Taiz since the latest Houthi advances, with the cost of petrol tripling last week.

The loss of vital supply routes also threatens the government’s ability to deliver ammunition, reinforcements and other essential supplies to its troops, even as they face heavy and sustained Houthi attacks.

Al-Dubaish argued, however, that there are always advances and retreats in war, and that losing one battle does not mean losing the conflict as a whole.

“The war is still ongoing and will not cease until the Houthis are defeated,” he said.

‘Logistical flexibility’

Yemeni government forces are currently fighting the Houthis on several fronts in Yemen, including the southern Red Sea coast, around Taiz city, and in Marib and al-Jawf east of Sanaa.

Faisal al-Majidi, Yemen’s deputy minister of justice, told Al Jazeera that government forces rely on “logistical flexibility and decentralisation” to secure supply lines across the country.

“This approach involves dividing supply routes into semi-autonomous sectors, supported by nearby access points and key supply hubs – such as Shabwa, Marib, Houthi-free areas in Taiz, the Red Sea coast, and the southern governorates,” al-Majidi said.

Such an approach, he noted, mitigates the difficulties of moving between widely separated front lines.

“Furthermore, government forces have been fighting for the control of high points overlooking major roads to help protect vital supply arteries from bombardment,” al-Majidi added.

Among the areas pro-government forces have focused on is the strategic mountainous district of al-Waziiya in Taiz governorate, which overlooks the Red Sea coast and could also be a launching pad to relieve the siege on Taiz city from its western approaches. Fighting with the Houthis in al-Waziiya continues.

The Saudi role

Saudi Arabia has stepped up its support for the Yemeni government and allied forces since the launch of Dawn of Yemen, acknowledging airstrikes against Houthi forces in the country for the first time since a 2022 truce. Riyadh first intervened in the conflict in Yemen in 2015 in an effort to restore the Yemeni government to Sanaa.

Al-Dubaish said the Saudi military role is a pivotal and indispensable source of support for Yemeni government forces.

“Saudi support is a decisive factor in the conflict. Without Saudi Arabia, it would be a huge challenge for the Yemeni government to confront the Houthis, who possess advanced military capabilities – such as ballistic and cruise missiles supplied by Iran – along with a large pool of fighters,” said al-Dubaish.

The Saudi-led coalition has said airstrikes have destroyed hundreds of high-value targets since early October.

Al-Majidi described the Saudi air support as a “strategic balancer” and a vital pillar of the Dawn of Yemen operation.

“The Saudi role centres on providing direct cover for ground forces and, more importantly, neutralising the reinforcements of the [Houthis], as well as targeting missile and drone launch platforms – thereby mitigating their destructive impact,” he said.

The Saudi-led coalition has previously airdropped weapons and ammunition to pro-government fighters in Taiz when it was besieged in the early years of the war, but there have been no reports of similar operations since the latest siege began this month.

Coordination: The litmus test

Saudi Arabia is also vital for what may be an even more important task: uniting an anti-Houthi side that remains divided with disjointed command structures.

Al-Dubaish said that poor coordination among military units remains a significant challenge.

“The coordination problem stems from the presence of multiple military units operating under different command structures,” he added. “This fragmentation is not in the best interest of the forces fighting the Houthis.”

The government’s loss of the Red Sea coast in September was partly the result of faulty coordination among anti-Houthi forces, who appeared unable to respond quickly to the Houthi advance.

That was despite messaging from the Yemeni government since the start of the year that anti-Houthi forces were operating under a unified command structure, after the defeat of separatist Southern Transitional Council forces – who had been backed by the United Arab Emirates – at the start of the year.

“The coordination among various field forces … remains the true litmus test for the success of the Dawn of Yemen operation,” said al-Majidi.

Adnan al-Jabarni, a Yemeni researcher specialising in military affairs, told Al Jazeera that the level of coordination among government forces is improving.

“These forces are currently testing their coordination, given that they only began to operate under a unified structure – following the withdrawal of the UAE from Yemen and the formation of the Supreme Military Committee (SMC), which incorporated all the various branches and units,” al-Jabarni said.

In January, the Presidential Leadership Council, Yemen’s United Nations-recognised authority led by President Rashad al-Alimi, established the SMC, with the goal of overseeing all anti-Houthi military units and integrating them into the official Yemeni military under one command.

However, establishing the committee has not eliminated longstanding divisions between the different forces. Their command structures and sources of funding have historically differed, and the losses on the Red Sea coast have highlighted the continuing difficulties of coordinating their battlefield operations.

That coordination is vital for Taiz, where holding off the Houthis will depend on recapturing roads for use as supply routes.

Al-Jabarni argued that friction among pro-government forces is diminishing and the supply lines for government forces remain intact despite the Houthi attacks.

“The Houthis are attempting to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government by targeting civilian facilities and supply lines – specifically focusing on vital infrastructure – but I believe this is likely to intensify the pace of anti-Houthi operations rather than slowing them down,” al-Jabarni said.